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FAUSTIAN BARGAINS: RISK AND TIME IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Seth H. Robinson, M.A. Washington, DC March 20, 2012 Copyright 2012 by Seth H. Robinson All Rights Reserved ii FAUSTIAN BARGAINS: RISK AND TIME IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Seth H. Robinson, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Leaders at times select policies that pose significant long-term strategic risks. In order to explain why decisionmakers knowingly pursue policies that pose a security risk over time, this dissertation uses process tracing to examine instances in which leaders chose to discount the future strategic risks associated with nuclear assistance, state-sponsored terrorism, and arms transfers to recognized adversaries. In pursuing these policies, decisionmakers risked that the client would: 1) use received weapons, training, or technology against its former patron (“boomerang”); 2) change its future policies and align with a patron’s enemies (“betrayal”); or 3) no longer be susceptible to pressure from its former patron (“emancipation”). Risks could also stem from a third party that sought to stop the flow of assistance to an enemy (“revenge”). To explain these behaviors, this dissertation develops a theory of risk in international politics that links threat perception to risk tolerance: drawing on the concepts of heuristics and intertemporal choice, it argues that when a decisionmaker believes that threats are acute and immediate, his time horizon contracts and he becomes more willing to pursue policies that pose long-term strategic risks. The principal finding of this study is that adverse shifts in the balance of threat lead a decisionmaker to discount future strategic risks: when his state faces an immediate and acute threat, a leader becomes more willing to run long-term risks. A secondary insight centers on the idea that a decisionmaker becomes more willing to pursue policies that iii pose strategic risks over time when he believes his state can manage the risks associated with such policies. This dissertation examines six case studies, which vary in geographic location, regime type, time period, and type of long-term risk. A process-oriented schema supplements this strategy and demonstrates that temporal considerations and shifting time horizons best explain why policymakers discount long-term strategic risks. By moving beyond traditional approaches to risk in international politics, this study provides scholars and policymakers with a better understanding of risk perception and time horizons in international relations. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First thanks go to my dissertation committee members, whose thoughtful advice and general patience made this work possible. Dan Byman, my advisor, provided me with insightful and timely comments, and has been a consistent source of support in both my academic and professional endeavors. Not only did Dan Nexon push me to think more deeply and critically about my theories, but his counsel and support throughout my time at Georgetown were more valuable and appreciated than he knows. Matt Kroenig helped me sharpen my ideas and nurtured my interest in all things nuclear, working with me on an independent study and introducing me to the PPNT program. I remain indebted to each of these truly talented scholars. At Harvard, I was lucky to learn from a number of gifted historians. Kenneth Weisbrode inspired me to “tell it like it really was.” Eric Paras, another tutor and mentor of mine, indulged my interest in Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and taught me the value of following my academic passions. I learned more about writing from Dan Wewers, my undergraduate thesis advisor, than anyone else in my years of schooling. Ann Blair, my department advisor, and Dan Sargent, my house advisor, helped me remember to stand for my ideas. I am grateful for the opportunities I have been afforded by other academic institutions. At Columbia, I owe thanks to Robert Jervis and Ingrid Gerstmann, who welcomed me into the Saltzman Institute family and allowed me to use Columbia’s remarkable resources. I was also lucky enough to participate in UC San Diego’s Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Training Program, where, in addition to receiving a first-rate education on nuclear energy, weapons, and strategy, I was able to bounce my ideas off some of the country’s leading atomic thinkers. v A number people in Washington, DC are owed immense gratitude. My roommates of 2022 N — Kiran Bhatraju (who also proofread a chapter for me), Dan Milich, and Chad Maisel — were incredibly tolerant of my studying and proved wonderful friends to hang out with around the house. I couldn’t have passed comps without my inimitable study group members, Anna Lee and Tom Nagle, who continue to be my go-to people for my IR ideas and confusion. Michael and Sally Oren have given comfort and guidance to me since I was a senior in college. Finally, I am deeply grateful to the current and former government officials who let me interview them for this work; I appreciate their confidence and trust. I could not ask for more extraordinary or truer friends. My blockmates — Aaron Alexander-Bloch, Kyle Berkman, Teddy Bressman, Chris Schonberger, and Trevor Walsh — are simply the best and most jokes people I know. Katherine Thompson, my friend from Let’s Go and a star of Columbia’s psych department, graciously answered all of my questions about cognitive psychology. Adrienne Gerken took time out of her medical studies to translate sources for me. Anjali Dayal generously read my introduction and theory chapter, and helped me prepare for my defense. Sophie Brickman, Rachel Nolan, and Jacob Savage lent their considerable talents to proofreading chapters; I am grateful for their edits, but more so for their friendship. Emily Moffet, David Kaden, Stephen Fee, Sandra Di Capua, Dave Eisenberg, and Laura Graber have all also been unending sources of encouragement and kindness over these past years. I am tremendously lucky to have such a wonderful family. In Brooklyn, Adam, Joanne, Ethan, and Will have made my New York life all the more enjoyable with Tuesday night dinners and time spent at basketball and baseball games. Through countless meals, coffee breaks, and walks around Washington and New York, my sister Kimberly and sister-in-law Kim have vi expressed their faith in me and my ability to complete this work; their words have always been much appreciated. Stuart, my brother, proofread four chapters of this dissertation and has always been the first person I turn to with questions and concerns, whether they pertain to syntax or life. Final and greatest thanks go to my parents, Owen and Linda, whose unwavering support and encouragement have made everything possible. Not a day goes by that I don’t count myself lucky to be their son. This work is, of course, for them. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One: Faustian Bargains .................................................................................... 13 Chapter Two: U.S. Nuclear Assistance to the United Arab Emirates .......................... 87 Chapter Three: Soviet Nuclear Assistance to China .................................................... 131 Chapter Four: Jordanian Sponsorship of the Palestinian Fedayeen ............................ 170 Chapter Five: Iranian Sponsorship of Hezbollah ......................................................... 211 Chapter Six: Arms for Adversaries .............................................................................. 255 Chapter Seven: A Process-Oriented Schema of Risk and Time .................................. 324 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 347 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 355 viii INTRODUCTION In August of 2010, reports emerged that U.S. and Vietnamese officials were meeting to discuss the development of nuclear energy in Vietnam. Though the terms of the dialogue remained undisclosed, the negotiations sparked controversy and outcry from a number of international observers. A principal point of contention rested on the idea that such a deal would stand in stark contrast to U.S. policy on the Iranian nuclear development program, which Washington has struggled with increasing urgency to curtail.1 What is perhaps most striking about current U.S. policy toward Iranian and Vietnamese nuclear development is the history of bilateral relations between the United States and these countries. The U.S. lost more than 58,000 soldiers during the Vietnam War, most of them during the 1960s. That same decade, the United States expended a great deal of monetary and political capital to cement its alliance with Iran; it supplied Tehran with enriched uranium, allowed Iranian nuclear physicists to train at American universities, and even helped Iran build a research reactor. The dramatic shifts in U.S. policy over a relatively short timeline highlight the problems of decisionmaking over time in international politics. The Iranian nuclear program represents one of the foremost threats to U.S. security and interests today, and the idea of providing nuclear