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Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership

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Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership FEBRUARY 2019 ISSUE NO. 280 Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership DHANANJAY SAHAI ABSTRACT This brief analyses the politico-economic relations between Russia and China and the recent changes in their power equation owing to Russia’s fall in economic and demographic strength and, for its part, China's economic and military growth. Russia’s unfavourable position has been identified as a possible reason for the rise in Chinese influence in Central Asia and the Russian Far East (RFE), in areas of military power and trade. The brief analyses the possible methods of coercion Beijing might employ in both these regions. It suggests ways for Russia to address the same, to secure its ‘near-abroad’ and RFE interests. The brief closes with recommendations for India to position itself as a strategic partner for Russia while subverting Chinese influence. (This brief is part of ORF’s series, ‘Eye on China’. Find other research in the series here: https://www.orfonline.org/series/eye-on-china/) Attribution: Dhananjay Sahai, “Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership”, ORF Issue Brief No. 280, February 2019, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-93-88262-89-7 © 2019 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership INTRODUCTION POTENTIAL ARENAS OF CONFLICT When the newly appointed Chinese Defence Central Asia Minister Wei Feng attended the seventh Moscow International Security Conference, he The region between the Caspian Sea and the declared to his Russian counterpart, “We have Xinjiang province has the potential to create come to support you.”1 The bonhomie between tensions between Russia and China. As China and Russia is considered amongst the Moscow tries to retain predominance over this biggest challenges to US supremacy. However, region—earlier a part of the USSR—it is while the two countries have often pooled bound to clash with Beijing and its economic efforts to resist American influence, penetration. Both China’s One Belt One Road competing interests and subtle rivalry in (OBOR) initiative2 and the Russia-dominated various areas mar their relationship. Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) seek to establish influence in Central Asia. While the For one, Russia and China compete in leaders of both countries have asserted that Central Asia. While China is trying to establish the two projects can co-exist,3 the much larger its dominance in this resource-rich region, OBOR is likely to eclipse the EEU, orienting Russia is struggling to maintain its own clout the Central Asian economies towards China.4 in what it considers its “near abroad.” Illegal This would be in direct contradiction to immigration and conflicting territorial claims Moscow’s interest, which considers this region could also lead to a clash between Russia and a part of its “near abroad”, where it has been China in the Russian Far East (RFE). struggling to maintain influence. The EEU has Despite their potential in getting embroiled been seen as Russia’s attempt to bring itself in a massive geopolitical confrontation, the closer to the Central Asian economies and relationship between China and Russia has counteract the influence of outsiders. As the seen an upward trend. The West’s sanctions World Bank noted, “[It] creates an opportunity against the Russian Federation have pushed it for Russia to expand its exports and its to foster closer ties with the People’s Republic presence in Central Asia at the expense of of China. Conventional narratives postulate exports from other countries, such as the that the relationship between Moscow and European Union and China.”5 Beijing is likely to strengthen in the current international strategic environment. However, This hydrocarbon-rich region can serve as given the increasing disparity between the two an alternative source of energy imports, 6 countries, this relationship forms an reducing China’s dependence on Moscow. asymmetrical interdependence. As the power China is the largest global importer of natural disparity between Russia and China increases, gas and crude oil,7 and it relies heavily on Russia it will dramatically alter the balance of power for their supply. As of 2016, China imported 14 between the two countries in the long run, percent of its crude oil from Russia and is also a increasing Beijing’s coercive strength over large market for Russian gas exports. Energy- Moscow. This could create a rift between the related products form around 58 percent of two. Russian exports to China.8 While China has run 2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 280 l FEBRUARY 2019 Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership Map 1: China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor Source: OBOReurope. into friction with the Central Asian countries9 has expressed interest in building another over the supply of LNG,10 it still remains corridor connecting its city of Khorgos to committed to strengthening trade and Greece’s Piraeus port, passing “through only investment, particularly in the energy sector. three intermediate countries: Georgia, This includes the China–Central Asia–West Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.”12 Both these Asia Corridor, a subset of the OBOR. It “mainly projects bypass Russian territory to connect covers five countries in Central Asia China with the European Union (EU) and will (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, have severe implications on the geopolitics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) as well as Iran the region, cementing China’s influence to the and Turkey in West Asia.”11 Additionally, China exclusion of Moscow. Figure 1: Total Trade with Central Asia (in US$ thousands) 60000000 50000000 40000000 30000000 China Russia 20000000 10000000 0 2 5 6 8 9 1 2 4 5 1 3 4 7 0 3 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Source: International Trade Centre (2018) ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 280 l FEBRUARY 2019 3 Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership Many analysts have suggested that the two The Russian Far East countries can still cooperate in this region, with China establishing economic dominance Throughout history, the border between and Russia entrenching itself as the region’s Russia and China has been a source of tension security provider.13 Moscow has a large between the two countries. Large parts of the security presence in Central Asia: it has troop RFE came under the control of the Tsarist deployments and bases in most countries and Empire after the signing of a number of is a major arms exporter to the region. A part “unequal treaties”17 with the Qing dynasty. In of this presence has been formalised into the the 20th century, the Far East witnessed two Collective Security Treaty Organisation.14 violent border conflicts, the last one between However, Russia’s increasing economic the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of distress limits its ability to spend on military China in 1969.18 However, over the years, the power. China, on the other hand, has shown two countries have made efforts to settle their an increased military interest in the region as issues on the border, and the transfer of well as willingness to use its military overseas, territories in 2008 officially marked the end 15 in a major departure from previous policy. of any land disputes between them.19 The question to be asked is how long this “division of labour” between Russia and However, the region remains vulnerable to China16 can survive in the face of growing another border dispute. The resource-rich disparities. Russian territory is sparsely populated, with Map 2: Historical Map Showing the Change in the Border between Russia and China Source: US Library of Congress. 4 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 280 l FEBRUARY 2019 Russian Far East and Central Asia: Impediments to Sino-Russian Partnership 23.9 million Russians living in the border WHAT LIES AHEAD areas of Siberia and the Far East.20 Meanwhile, the Chinese provinces bordering Russia have a The current confrontation between Russia and combined population of 111 million.21 While the West was triggered by reports of American Russia is keen on developing the region, it is involvement in the Euromaidan protests of 28 hobbled by a lack of infrastructure and labour 2014 and the violent overthrow of the elected resources. With economic slowdown Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. hampering its aspirations, Russia has been in Yanukovych had resisted the integration of search of partners.22 While China has shown Ukraine with the EU and had forged closer ties 29 interest in investing in the region,23 Russia is with Russia. Moscow viewed his removal as wary of its intentions. Economic incentives an instance of the West’s attempts to establish availed by Chinese investors have stirred local hegemony and isolate Russia in its near resistance.24 In 2015, the leasing of 1,000 sq. abroad, fearing that the end goal was to km of land in Siberia to a Chinese company instigate a regime change in Russia. was heavily criticised by Russian media and This fear is backed by history.
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