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RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT – Sinjar Town NRC IRAQ MULTI SECTOR RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SINJAR TOWN Overview details Date(s) of field assessment 15/05/18, 28/05/2018, 04/07/18 Governorate Ninewa District Sinjar Location type (town, camp, etc) Town Location name Sinjar Town Map of assessment region: REACH, July 17 – NRC does not endorse any boundaries shown on map Page 1 of 8 RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT – Sinjar Town NRC IRAQ Desk review Sinjar town (also referred to as Shingal in Kurdish) had an estimated population of 88,023 in 20131 with the Sinjar district being home to 237,073 individuals2 (primarily Yazidi but with substantial minorities of Kurdish, Arab, and Christians). The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) governed Sinjar following the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with both KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) forces initially establishing control of the district and KDP party personnel implanted into local administration positions, further disenfranchising both Yazidis and other ethnic groups in Sinjar district.3 In August 2014, Sinjar was captured by the Islamic State group (IS), causing massive displacement and destruction. An estimated 30,0004 people from Sinjar district immediately fled into the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and up to 100,000 sought refuge in the Sinjar Mountain ridge, where thousands of civilians remained for over a year attempting to avoid IS.5 The battle to retake Sinjar was prioritised by all sides due to its location on the main supply routes from Raqqa in Syria to Mosul and within the disputed territories between KRI and the Iraqi central government. The town was retaken by Peshmerga, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Units (YPG) in November 2015, and then by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in October 2017 following the KRI referendum6 and the subsequent shift in control of disputed territories. Around 49,212 individuals7 returned to Sinjar district by 31st May 2018, with 6,000 returning to Sinjar Town8 according to REACH (NRC estimates that 20-25,000 people have returned). More are now expected to return due to anticipated closure of schools in camps for IDPs in the KRI, where the majority of Sinjar IDPs are living. Despite these returns, Sinjar town has been accessed far less by humanitarian actors, whose aid efforts have largely focused around Sinuni town and surrounding rural villages which experienced earlier waves of return. Returns to Sinjar town began in June 2017 under authorisation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) but have remained slow; the primary reason cited by many of those who have not returned is lack of livelihoods and services. Muslim IDPs have cited safety issues connected with social tensions and potential reprisal attacks.9 In March 2017, a comprehensive survey by IOM showed that only 65% of displaced persons from Sinjar District planned to return at some point. This figure is now estimated to be higher,10 though social cohesion issues will remain a significant challenge for the foreseeable future. The pre-existing tensions are compounded by the atrocities committed in Sinjar under IS group rule, which the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have described as “genocide as well as multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Yazidis.”11 Methodology note Mixed methodology assessments for NRC’s first two scoping missions included: community entry with local authorities; Key Informant Interviews (KII) with religious leaders, local authorities, mukhtars, local business owners, female and male school leadership, female and male shoppers in the market, and market vendors; transect walk and drive; desk reviews; and coordination with humanitarian partners in Sinuni, Tel Afar and Mosul. Information was captured using NRC’s scoping mission tool, a multi-sectoral quantitative and qualitative questionnaire. The geographic scope was confined to the urban population center and its immediate surroundings, but questions were designed to gather secondary data across the whole district. Assessment teams were comprised of persons identifying as Yazidi, Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, Kurdish, and internationals with expertise in Urban Displacement and Out of Camps (UDOC), Informational Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA), youth, logistics, security, protection, and education. The initial assessments included only one female Iraqi participant, however female staff were hired and based in Sinjar prior to the follow up assessment missions which expanded the teams’ access to female populations. These scoping missions form the foundation for comprehensive community based assessments to be conducted in the near future. 1 Regularly cited by federal, KRI and Yazidi writers but true source unknown 6 Winning the post-ISIS Battle for Iraq in Sinjar, ICG, 20 February 2018 2 IAU and OCHA, “Ninewa Governorate Profile”, March 2009 7 DTM Round 96, IOM, May 2018 3 Winning the Post-ISIS Battle for Iraq in Sinjar, ICG, 20 February 2018 8 ROAR Sinjar and surrounding areas, REACH, May 2108 4 Sinjar Mountains IDP Red Flag Report, REACH, 5 August 2014 9 ROAR Sinjar and surrounding areas, REACH, May 2108 5 MSRNA among Conflict-affected Populations on Sinjar Mountain, MedAir, 5-7 10 Obstacles to return in retaken areas of Iraq, IOM, March 2017 November 2015 11 “They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes against the Yazidis, OHCHR, 15 June 2016 Page 2 of 8 RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT – Sinjar Town NRC IRAQ Context, general security situation, population movements and trends Villages to the south of Sinjar are widely reported to be contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), and the comprehensiveness of the decontamination efforts in Sinjar town, especially the Old City, appear to be a concern for residents. However, from discussions within the town, the impact of this on returns appears to be limited. The current return movements to Sinjar town does not appear to have the patterns of coercion (camp closures) or restrictions (security clearance requirement) as in other areas of western Ninewa. This is partially due to the returning population being less likely to be suspected of IS affiliation, and the uncertainty around the potential IDP camp school closures in Dohuk. However, the impact of the school closure factor will increase ahead of the start of next year, and may become a major push factor to return. The contamination in rural villages will have contributed to the lack of returns, alongside the primary concern of limited livelihood opportunities. There is also some evidence of intentionally blocked returns to create a buffer region between the predominantly Yazidi populations of Sinjar and the predominantly Sunni Arab populations of Ba’aj. Sinjar town appears to actively block (through real or perceived measures) movements of Sunni Arabs from Mosul to Ba’aj and its surroundings, including of an Iraqi parliament member who reported being denied access through Sinjar. However, NRC received confirmation that Sunni Arab NGO staff would not face difficulties working in Sinjar. Local governance in the area has been in flux and has not been representative for decades (see desk review). Current control by ISF and the Shia PMF (outside of Sinjar town) have started to introduce structures but this has also displaced many of the local authorities that were more aligned with the KDP back into camps in the KRI. This is not to say that the preference among the population is a return to Kurdish rule; respondents stated that trust of Kurdish forces and rule was definitely diminished by their retreat in the face of the IS group advance. However, no concerns were raised about having Kurdish NGO staff working in the town. In terms of current local governance, there are about 20 mukhtars in Sinjar Town who have been selected by the mayor. The number of mukhtars per neighborhood varies from one to three, and NRC was able to interview multiple mukhtars to inform the report. Current line ministries are lacking in all sectors in Sinjar with little oversight or support from Mosul government bodies or ministries. The ‘current’ mayors of both Sinjar and Sinuni town have been appointed since the shifting of territorial boundaries between the KRI and federal Iraq, and are apparently not recognized by all community members or authority structures. The ‘former’ mayors are now residing in the Dohuk governorate and claim to be the figures through whom access should be coordinated. Estimated population and affected population data for the area Most current residents returned to Sinjar in either June or September of 2017, appearing to align with the dates of permission to return under KDP rule. NRC encountered estimates ranging from 2,000 – 4,000 households currently living in Sinjar town; these figures are significantly higher than the estimated 6,000 individuals stated in the rapid overview of areas of return (ROAR). Displacement locations included Dohuk and Zakho camps, Syria and Mount Sinjar. Respondents stated that lack of livelihoods opportunities was the key factor limiting return, rather than security concerns. Some respondents reported that people simply do not have the money to leave the camps and return to Sinjar. The (current) mayor said that many people will return after their children have completed their exams in schools in KRI. 100% of the population in Sinjar are returnees and rates of return are expected to increase over the next three months. Around a quarter of the total urban population have returned so far, and the remainder indicate that they would like to but are waiting for livelihoods and services to become available, according to residents NRC spoke to in Sinjar. However, these intentions and estimations probably do not capture secondary displacement probabilities, such as the rural populations moving from the camps to Sinjar town, but not to their homes in surrounding areas. Gender disaggregated estimations of populations were not available and this will have to be examined in follow up community assessments, including the gendered realities of current returnees and the gendered dimensions of future returns, including specific risks.
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