Jain Epistemology

Over centuries, Jainism developed a complex theory CE), Vidyānanda (Digambara; c. 900–950 CE), of knowledge, and some of its elements, primarily the Māṇikyanandin (Digambara; c. 900–950 CE), Abhaya­ theory of the multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda), deva (Śvetāmbara; c. 900–950 CE), Prabhācandra can be reckoned as one of the most significant con­ (Digambara; c. 1050–1100), Anantavīrya II (Dig­ tributions of Indian philosophy in general that can ambara; second half of the 11th cent. or turn of the be found intellectually inspiring also for a modern 11th–12th cents.), Vādidevasūri/Devasūri Vādin philosopher. (Śvetāmbara; turn of the 11th–12th cents.), Hema­ candra (Śvetāmbara; 1088/1089–1172), and Malliṣeṇa (Śvetāmbara; c. 1200–1250); Periodization and Main Thinkers (3) epigonic period (from the 13th cent. until now); it consists of two phases: (a) medieval phase The main periods in the development of Jain episte­ (13th–19th cents.), with main philosopher Yaśovijaya mology coincide with those of Jain philosophy and (Śvetāmbara; 1638–1688); (b) modern phase (from Jain literature and can be distinguished as follows: the 19th cent. until now). (1) canonical period (c. 400 BCE–400/450 CE) Jainism shares the beginnings of its epistemol­ with relevant works being the noncanonical Skt. ogy with Ājīvikism, to which it is historically closely Ṛṣibhāṣitāni (Pkt. Isibhāsiyāiṃ; Sayings of the Seers) linked. The present article focuses on Jain episte­ and some portions of Jain canon; it consists of mology of the classical period. two phases: (a) precanonical, formative phase (400– 200 BCE), with hardly any textual evidence; certain philosophical ideas were in nascent form; (b) main Background phase (200 BCE–475 CE), during which the pres­ ently available canon and doctrine were formed; Over centuries, Jain epistemology developed against philosophical ideas were present, but marginal, with a backdrop of realist ontology of the world external hardly any noncanonical literature extant; to consciousness and populated by real, macro­ (2) classical period (350/400 –12th/13th cent. CE); scopic objects, independent of consciousness and it consists of two phases: (a) postcanonical phase capable of being accurately reflected in the mind. (4th–7th cents. CE); the first philosophical works It therefore levels criticism at all kinds of epistemo­ were composed, with a strong epistemological com­ logical idealism, including Buddhist traditions, such ponent; main philosophers include Umāsvāmin as Yogācāra, or Vedānta traditions, especially the (Digambara or Śvetāmbara?; c. 350 CE), Umāsvāti monistic Advaita Vedānta, all of which recognize (Śvetāmbara; c. 400 CE; Umāsvāmin and Umāsvāti that entities exist to the extent that they are pres­ are understood as two different authors, albeit ent in consciousness, on which they are dependent often viewed as one individual), Kundakunda in their existence. The metaphysical realism of Jain­ (Digambara; a range of authors flourished under ism impacts its epistemological realism, according this name between the 3rd and the 7th/8th cents.), to which one has immediate access to reality, which Siddhasena Divākara (Śvetāmbara; 450–500 CE), one directly cognizes the way it is. It rejects the claim, Mallavādin (Śvetāmbara; c. 550 CE), Samantabhadra for instance, that one can only know the reflections (Digambara; 530–590 CE), and Pūjyapāda Devana­ of real things or phenomena. At the same time, ndin (Digambara; 540–600 CE); (b) golden ages of Jain epistemological realism cannot be reduced Jain philosophy and epistemology (7th–12th/13th to its naive version, namely that objects are repro­ cents.); main philosophers include Pātrasvāmin duced in cognition in a completely unprocessed (Digambara or Śvetāmbara?; 660–720 CE), Sid­ manner. dhasena Mahāmati (Digambara or Śvetāmbara?; Nothing is found in the mind that has not first 710/720–770/780 CE), Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (Digambara; been present in the real world outside of it. Even 720–780 CE), Haribhadra (Śvetāmbara; 740–800 fictitious images and hallucinations have their

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 BEJ Also available online – www.brill 838 Jain Epistemology realist foundation: they are produced by artificial Propositions (utterances, statements, beliefs, and and unreal synthesis of true, real elements deriving concepts) are true if they correspond to reality, from the world. Jains, however, cannot be classified which is the ultimate point of reference. Accord­ as empiricists: perceptions primarily understood as ingly, propositions are true not simply because they forms of experience are not merely sensory. As sub­ are consistent with other accepted beliefs (coher­ stantialists, Jain thinkers accepted that real things ence theory of truth), or are practically useful and are reflected in one’s knowledge as units consisting effective (pragmatic theory of truth), but only of three interdependent layers: substance (dravya) because they conform to the actual state of affairs alongside its qualities (guṇa) and modes (paryāya), and to the way that things are there. This realist none of which can exist independently. Further­ foundation was laid well after the 2nd century CE, more, there is even a fourth layer of directly expe­ when Jain thinkers were confronted with the tradi­ rienced but inexpressible transient occurrences tion of analysis and methodical inquiry, ānvīkṣikī, (vivarta, vartanā), which can be neither verbalized with the Brahmanical philosophical schools of nor conceptualized. Substance as a property bearer Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and with Buddhism, and were accounts for the permanence of a thing, for the forced to rationally justify their religious beliefs. thing’s extension in time and ­self-identity, whereas Prior to that, the prime criterion of truth had been qualities make it perceptible to the senses. Both sub­ moral relevance and rectitude. Also later ethical stances and their qualities not only endure in time and epistemological questions often overlapped, as but also incessantly undergo changes through their did Jain ethics and ontology, which can be seen for modes. This explains an apparent paradox of how instance in the case of the seven soteriological cat­ a real thing can be both permanent, which entails egories (tattva): its immutability, and impermanent, that is changing 1. living beings (jīva); and mutable. Everything that exists is characterized 2. lifeless elements (ajīva); by origination (utpāda), continued existence (sthiti), 3. influx of karmic matter (āsrava); and annihilation (bhaṅga) in every moment of its 4. karmic bondage (bandha); existence, an idea developed under an influence of 5. control or stoppage of karmic matter the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda and Abhidharma notions (saṃvara); of the four conditioned factors, known as contingent 6. eradication of karmic matter (nirjarā); and markers (saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa), which characterize all 7. liberation (mokṣa); momentarily existent things. Such an understand­ with optionally also merit (puṇya) and demerit ing of reality and the reals as complex, multifaceted (pāpa) as two kinds of karman. The first two cate­ entities is an ontological extension of the Jain theory gories, being both of moral and ontological nature, of the multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda), which formed also the skeleton for the metaphysical model takes every individual thing as a part interconnected of the five extensive entities (astikāya) as well as for with other entities through infinite relations and as the model of the five (or six) substances (dravya). having a complex nature. The epistemic­ -semantic Accordingly, for the first few centuries of the exis­ aspect of the theory of the multiplexity of reality tence of Jainism, cognition (jñāna) was considered deals with the question of how one can effectively primarily a means of knowing moral truths and sote­ know and verbally express such a multifaceted riological goals; it was of little epistemological impor­ world of complexities. Indeed, no phenomenon can tance. Much of this early moral leaning remained be comprehended and analyzed without its individ­ also in the classical period. Cognition in the form ual ontological context, with its particular complex of (morally) right cognition (samyagjñāna), along­ temporal, spatial, causal, and other relations being side right belief (samyagdarśana) and right con­ ignored. A vast range of properties can be predicated duct (samyakcāritra), forms the path to liberation on a given entity with equal right, and each of such (mokṣamārga). Rightness (rather than mere cor­ perspectives seems equally justified due to the infi­ rectness) of cognition in this case does certainly not nite manifoldness of interdependencies.1 mean a faithful reproduction of the state of affairs A corollary of Jain metaphysical realism is the but first and foremost its correspondence to moral correspondence theory of truth and objectivity. principles and its usefulness in religious practice.

1 Padmarajiah, 1963, 121–181; Balcerowicz, 2001, 379–380. Jain Epistemology 839 Its opposite, false cognition (mithyājñāna, ajñāna), (māna), deceit (māyā), and desire (lobha), and characterizes a person classified as wrong believer while in the cycle of rebirth (saṃsāra), it endures (mithyādṛṣṭi), who acts out of moral ignorance and in five different karmic states (bhāva): karman’s false belief (mithyādarśana), or simply falsehood subsidence (aupaśamikabhāva), destruction (mithyātva), that is the wrong understanding of reli­ (kṣāyikabhāva), partial subsidence mixed with par­ gious principles; it is not merely an inaccurate rep­ tial destruction (kṣāyopaśāmikabhāva), manifesta­ resentation of facts. tion (audayikabhāva), and natural transformation It is therefore not a deception, cognitive error, (pāriṇāmikabhāva). impaired sense organs, logical incoherence, and so Due to karman’s complex influence on one’s forth that would render a cognition false, but the epistemic faculties, karmic subtle material parti­ cognizer’s moral corruption, and this was believed cles are classified as threefold: the veil of cognition to be due to the negative influence of one’s own ( jñānāvaraṇakarman), the veil of perceptual expe­ past deeds, or karman. As Umāsvāti explains in rience (darśanāvaraṇakarman), and the karman his Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya (Commentary causing confusion (mohanīyakarman). on the Comprehension of Reality), an exposi­ Fortunately, the impact of karman and the tion of Umāsvāmin’s Tattvārthasūtra (Treatise on karmic veils can be terminated by means of ­Reality),2 what turns basic cognitive faculties of a right belief (samyagdarśana) and right conduct wrong believer – such as sensuous (matijñāna), (samyakcāritra), that is through rectitude (samyak­ testimonial (śrutajñāna), and clairvoyant cognition tva), which translates into moral control limiting (avadhijñāna) – into erroneous cognition (ajñāna) and ultimately preventing further influx of karmic is false belief.3 This falsehood makes one’s cognition, matter, and into the eradication of karmic matter. according to Umāsvāmin, “like in the case of a mad­ A complete destruction of karman and a release man, because one cannot distinguish between the from its veiling influence is a condition known as real (sat) and the unreal (asat), inasmuch as one’s liberation (mokṣa), in which the soul realizes all its comprehension is fortuitous,” hence incoherent. cognitive potential and becomes perfect (siddha). This inborn and beginningless falsehood sets a cog­ Such perfection is considered the ultimate goal of nitive veil on one’s faculties, which is also of mate­ Jainism. In this way, Jain epistemology is strongly rial nature: it consists of subtle karmic matter, which soteriologically oriented. results from one’s former deeds. Jain epistemological tradition pursued two closely The actual agent as well as the cognitive and interrelated routes: that of an inquiry into the nature moral subject is the soul (ātman), or the living being of cognitive faculties, typology of cognitive criteria, (jīva), which is by nature pure. One undertakes analysis of knowledge, its nature and sources, on threefold activity, with mind, speech, and body, and the one hand, and, on the other, the theory of the the activity is called yoga, or “connection,” because multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda), the connect­ through one’s threefold actions, subtle material par­ ing link between the two being the idea of cognitive ticles (karman) are assimilated by, or connected to, criteria (pramāṇa). and obfuscate the soul and its innately perfect cog­ nitive faculties. Of note is that karman carries a two­ fold meaning in Jainism: (1) one’s ethically bound Senses (Indriya) and Sense Organs actions, and every action has an ethical dimension, as well as (2) subtle matter, which attaches to the As all classical philosophers in India, Jains also dis­ soul and envelops it, which in turn determines the tinguish five senses (indriya): touch (sparśana), taste soul’s future fate. (rasana), smell (ghrāṇa), sight (cakṣus), and hear­ The process in which the soul acts and thereby ing (śrotra), which grasp their respective domains assimilates the subtle karmic matter is known (viṣaya), namely tactile (sparśa), gustatory (rasa), as the influx of karmic matter (āsrava), and its olfactory (gandha), visual (varṇa), and auditory result is karmic bondage (bandha), mentioned (śabda) sensations. However, they also distinguish as soteriological categories. Therefore, the soul a sixth, quasi­ -sense organ (Pkt. noindriya; Skt. anin­ acts under the influence of four karman-triggered driya), the mind, which grasps all that is of verbal passions (kaṣāya), namely anger (krodha), arrogance nature (śruta), namely concepts and thoughts, as

2 see Balcerowicz, 2017a, 191. 3 TBh. 1.30; pp. 30–31. 840 Jain Epistemology well as mental processes (manovṛtti) and the flow 5. omniscience (kevala), which is a perfect and of consciousness (oghajñāna). This implies that all absolute form of cognition. thought and all contents of consciousness are ver­ This classification was present already at a relatively bal. Sense organs are a distinguishing mark of an early canonical stage, perhaps around the 1st cen­ incarnated soul (jīva) inhabiting a material body, tury BCE, and was preserved throughout Jain history. which necessarily inhibits its inborn extrasensory The first variety of cognition in this model is cognitive faculties. That is why the soul is depen­ sensuous cognition (abhinibodha), also known as dent on senses in order to cognize. Each of the five “apprehension” or “mental process” (mati), which senses is twofold: the material sense organ (dravy­ was understood as a most basic kind of cognition endriya) and the factual inner sense (bhāvendriya). common to all living beings. Initially, it comprised An uninhibited joint work of both is required for any any sense­ -based cognition that could not be classi­ perception to occur. A physical damage of the mate­ fied under the remaining four kinds and referred to rial sense organ does not destroy the sense capacity any cognition based on direct experience. Gradu­ within. An unimpaired material sense organ does not ally, and probably under the influence of Nyāya, produce perception when the inner sense is dam­ its understanding was refined to broadly refer to a aged or disconnected, for instance due to inatten­ cognition derived from sense organs and the mind, tion. The former, made of various types of ordinary, or a quasi­ -sense organ, and their contact with an coarse matter, consists of two elements. The first is external object. sensory receptors (nirvṛtti), for example the cornea Probably around the 3rd/4th century CE, it and pupil, the process of the production of which approximated an idea of sensory perception broadly is impacted by two subvarieties of karmic matter, understood, but never limited or reduced to pure namely ­organ-forming karman (aṅgakarman) and sensation: it also comprised mental insight, that is lesser ­organ-forming karman (upāṅgakarman), and inner apprehension of mental images, memories, of the ­body-forming karman (śarīranāmakarman). and so on as well as processes of simple reasoning, The second is accessories (upakaraṇa), which sup­ sensation of doubt, acts of deliberation and cogita­ port the receptors (e.g. eyelids and eyelashes). tion, recognition, and so forth. In the 4th century CE, Similarly, the inner sense has two elements: the pre­ it came to comprise four consecutive stages, all tak­ disposition (labdhi), or the potential to grasp, and ing place almost within a short moment. (1) Sensa­ the cognitive faculty (upayoga), that is the actual tion (avagraha), or the first contact of a sense organ utilization of the predisposition. Predisposition is a and the object, is defined as unclear, unspecified condicio sine qua non for all the three other compo­ reception of a sensory data through one particular nents of a sense organ to materialize and function. sense organ, which is merely stimulated or “woken up,” activated by the data. In the phase of (non­ conceptual) sensation of momentary manifesta­ Cognitive Faculties (Upayoga) and tion (vyañjanāvagraha), the cognizer may not even Valid Cognition (Pramā) be aware which particular sense organ has been activated, as in the case of a person who has been Jain epistemology can be described through some asleep and suddenly awoken by a sensory stimulus. basic models of cognitions and cognitive faculties, This nonconceptual phase is found in four senses: which developed over a period of a few centuries. tactile, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory. The visual The historically earliest part of Jain epistemology is sense and the mental organ (the mind, a quasi­ -sense the classification of cognition (jñāna) into a range that grasps concepts) can proceed only at the con­ of varieties in a hierarchical sequence that culmi­ ceptual stage known as the sensation of the object nates in perfect cognition, or omniscience. At least (arthāvagraha) as do all the remaining senses as 14 various models can be distinguished,4 the earliest well. This conceptual phase leads to the next stage of of which is the one classifying all cognitions into five (2) cogitation (īhā), which is speculation with regard types: to the character of the sensory data that enters the 1. sensuous cognition (abhinibodha,mati); sensory apparatus and an internal process of its 2. testimonial cognition (śruta); analysis. At this stage, the process of the actual clas­ 3. clairvoyance (avadhi); sification and determination of a particular sense 4. telepathy (manaḥparyāya); and data begins. A set of particular features recognized

4 Balcerowicz, 2016a. Jain Epistemology 841 through it is being tentatively ascribed to one of pos­ the “revelation,” imparted by a religious authority sible referents and can be formulated as a question (āpta), primarily the Tīrthaṅkaras. A nonphilosoph­ of the form, “Is x A or B (or C etc.)?”, for instance “Is ical, religious background of this kind of cognition this white flickering object in the distance a crane was so deep that its two main divisions were called or a flag?” As distinguished from the preceding aṅgapraviṣṭa (included in primary canonical texts) phases, sometimes classified as not having any defi­ and aṅgabahya (included in secondary canonical nite contents (anākāra), this and subsequent stages texts). are known as having definite contents (sākāra). This The third variety of cognition is clairvoyance, stage is followed by (3) perceptual judgment (avāya, or telesthesia (avadhi), considered the lowest of apāya), that is a process that removes doubt with all the remaining suprasensory cognitions. With respect to the character of the sensory data and it, one grasps directly – that is without senses and determines the source of the sensation. The previ­ the mind – only macroscopic objects, possessed of ous hesitation with regard to the nature and char­ physical form (rūpin), which are at a distance or are acter of the sensory data is resolved: “It is a crane behind a physical barrier. Only certain living beings (it is moving).” (4) Retention (dhāraṇā) is the cul­ could have this faculty: it was innate in divine beings mination of the whole cognitive process, and it pre­ (deva) and denizens of hells (nāraka), whereas some serves the judgment, or conclusion, of the cognitive animals and ascetics could acquire it through special process, in memory, and therefore it becomes the practices. It was an expression of a widespread belief source for future memory. popular in India (and not only) that some individu­ In the process of sensuous cognition, one can als (humans, ghosts, etc.) can perceive objects that distinguish two phases, nonconceptual, an initial ordinary humans cannot. instant restricted to all senses except vision and the The fourth variety – telepathy, or mind reading mind, and conceptual, which seems to be an influ­ (manaḥparyāya, manaḥparyaya; lit. penetration ence of the distinction into pure, nonconceptual of the mind) – is still more subtle: with it one can (nirvikalpaka) and conceptual (savikalpaka), cogni­ directly grasp other persons’ thoughts or the con­ tions, introduced by the schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, tents of other minds. To be acquired, it required and Buddhism. In conceptual cognitions, the “bare moral excellence and advancement on the spiritual percepts” are associated with mental concepts and path to perfection. Again, it was an offshoot of a pop­ universal ideas (sāmānya), linked to language and ular ­pan-Indian belief that it was possible to read classified under various categories. This model other people’s minds. This belief rests on a convic­ turned out to be inconsistent when the theory of tion that thoughts and minds are not abstract, non­ cognitive criteria (pramāṇa) was adopted by the corporeal entities but are of somatic nature: they are Jains and when they began to develop the theory subtle, physical, and occupying particular space. of inference (anumāna), which was classified as The apex of the hierarchy of cognitions is its fifth a different type of cognition from sensuous cogni­ variety, omniscience (kevala) – perfect and absolute tion (from now on closely resembling perception) knowledge, which is never lost and which is acquired but with which it partially overlapped (especially only by the perfected beings (siddha) as a culmina­ the stages of cogitation, perceptual judgment, and tion of their spiritual practice. One first becomes retention seem to form a kind of inner reasoning “the omniscient being with residual activities” similar to inference). (sa­yogikevalin), with limited influence of karman, The second variety is testimonial cognition still during embodiment, a condition technically (śruta), which literally means “the heard” or “the known as the 13th “stage of virtue” (guṇasthāna). revealed,” and is a cognition of what is heard and Thereafter, one achieves the condition of “the comprehended. With its basis in language, it covers omniscient being with no residual activities” (ayogi­ all cognition that is not gained from direct experi­ kevalin), that is the final, 14th guṇasthāna, for a short ence of the cognizing subject but from verbal com­ moment at the very end of saṃsāra (Glasenapp, munication with another person. It corresponds to 1942, 90–92), whereupon one departs to the world of what is known as verbal cognition (śabda, śābda) the perfected beings (siddhaloka) as a liberated, per­ recognized by certain Brahmanical schools. Origi­ fected being (siddha) in a true sense. Omniscience nally, it was mainly understood to comprise all has no limit: the omniscient person (kevalin) simul­ cognition acquired from scriptures or orally trans­ taneously knows literally everything, distant and mitted scriptural tradition, that is teachings, or sublime, material and mental, in all aspects and in 842 Jain Epistemology all times. For the Jains, omniscience is not a poten­ not mediated by any physical organ, is called direct, tial to know everything on which one focuses his or whereas any cognition in which sense organs or the her attention (like in the case of the Buddha).5 To be mind play any role is called indirect. The criterion omniscient means to be liberated, because the cause of immediacy was the soul (jīva) itself: it was con­ for restricted cognitive faculties and for transmigra­ sidered the actual “perceiving organ” (akṣa; lit. the tion (saṃsāra) is the same: beginningless karman in eye), being the ultimate agent of all actions, whereas the form of subtle matter that literally envelops and the mind, speech, and body were merely its instru­ obfuscates an innately pure soul. To become perfect, ments. Such understanding stood in stark contrast omniscient, and liberated is one and the same thing: to all Indian philosophical traditions, which all with the removal of karmic matter, the soul regains understood the term pratyakṣa (direct cognition) as its natural condition of purity, both ethical and sensory perception. Around the 2nd century CE, this epistemic, and never returns to the mundane con­ and the previous models merged. dition. It is not a result of a true transformation of It was probably around the 2nd–3rd centuries CE consciousness or deep meditation. This condition of that another important concept was introduced, perfection has been the (theoretical) ultimate goal namely that of cognitive faculties (upayoga; lit. use), and ideal for all the Jains. considered one of the defining characteristics of The description of the earliest model of cogni­ the soul, which meant the soul’s capability to use tions already incorporates its historically later vari­ its innate potential. Two such cognitive faculties ants. The model, gradually extended over centuries, are distinguished: cognition (jñāna), defined as dis­ clearly lacks consistency. Its actual origins are to be tinct and manifest (vyakta), that is having definite sought in religious and doctrinal beliefs rather than contents (sākāra) and grasping its object along with in philosophical inquiry. The model groups all the its modes (saparyāya), and perceptual experience cognitions hierarchically, from the sensuous cogni­ (darśana), understood as indistinct or manifest tion, the lowest of all and present in any living crea­ (vyakta), not having any definite contents (anākāra), ture in some form, via a range of more elitist and through which one merely becomes aware of the sophisticated kinds, to the supreme, perfect cogni­ presence of an object along with its general exis­ tion of the Jinas and other perfect beings (siddha). tence (sāmānyarūpatā).10 However, in this aspect This idea of a “cognitive ladder” is later used by the of indeterminateness, it approximates sensation of Jains as an argument from progression to prove the momentary manifestation (vyañjanāvagraha), the existence of omniscience and omniscient beings, very nonconceptual phase of sensuous cognition and its structure closely resembles Aristotle’s two (abhinibodha, mati). The former idea in the model, arguments for god’s existence, “from the prime jñāna (cognition), is rather straightforward, whereas mover” and “from the first cause,” also known as a the latter, darśana, is philosophically problematic. cosmological argument.6 The idea of an omniscient Both terms were adopted into this epistemological being is pivotal in Jainism: it is the foundation of model from an earlier, clearly soteriological scheme the Jain moral path, Jain religiosity and religious that describes a path to liberation (mokṣamārga) practice, metaphysical claims, epistemology, and as consisting of four (later three) elements, the first philosophy in general; it is also vital for explaining two being the same as in the epistemological model, the uniquely Jain understanding of karman. It is no albeit with a certain semantic shift, (1) cognition wonder that Jain philosophers formulated around (jñāna), (2) belief (darśana), or conation, that is 20 arguments for the existence of such a person.7 religious worldview or the proper moral attitude in Another model developed slightly later by the life and moral worldview, (3) conduct (cāritra), and Jains classifies cognitions under two distinct cat­ (4) ascetic practice (tapas).11 Both cognitive facul­ egories: direct cognition (pratyakṣa) and indirect ties are originally enumerated among the soul’s four cognition (parokṣa).8 This model and terminology faculties, besides happiness (sukha) and suffering may have an early Brahmanic background,9 however (duḥkha).12 What was initially the pair of cognition the way it is construed is uniquely Jain. All cogni­ (jñāna) and belief (darśana) was also enumerated tion acquired by the soul directly, in other words alongside conduct (cāritra), ascetic practice (tapas),

5 see Jaini, 1974. 9 Balcerowicz, 2016a, 1001–1002. 6 Balcerowicz, 2016b. 10 Shastri, 1990, 423–461. 7 Balcerowicz, 2016b. 11 US. 28.2; trans. Jacobi, 1895, 152; TS. 1.1. 8 Shastri, 1990, 227–422. 12 US. 28.10; trans. Jacobi, 1895, 153. Jain Epistemology 843 innate energy (vīrya), and cognitive faculties (upay­ A conspicuous feature of this and similar models oga) as the characteristics of the soul.13 When the is that cognition (jñāna) and perceptual experience pair became the foundation of a new epistemo­ (darśana), being two distinct cognitive faculties, logical model of two distinct cognitive faculties, culminate in their perfect, absolute versions of per­ the terms came to mean cognition (jñāna) and fect cognition (kevalajñāna), or omniscience, and perceptual experience (darśana), no longer belief perfect perceptual experience (kevaladarśana), or (darśana). Besides the standard perception, either omniperception. This presented Jain thinkers with sensory or extrasensory, the Jains also recognize the a range of problems when trying to explain how existence of apperception, or inner perception of these two perfect, absolute cognitive faculties at mental states. the stage of the omniscient being (kevalin) could be Around 350–400 CE, the earlier model of five cog­ distinguished.15 nitions and the scheme of two cognitive faculties Erroneous cognition (mithyājñāna) or nescience merged into a new extended model, which became (ajñāna) is defined as the grasp of something in a the main point of reference in Jain epistemology distorted form, or apprehension of P sometimes as and remained so for centuries, despite its further non-P and sometimes as P,16 for example “of iron developments. The new model14 distinguishes five rust in place of gold, but also iron rust as iron rust.”17 varieties of correct cognition (jñāna), three kinds It is incoherence and randomness that render such of erroneous cognition (ajñāna) in the form of the cognition unreliable and false, whereas a consistent opposites of the first three correct cognitions, and and exceptionless distortion of the world could eas­ four kinds of perceptual experience (darśana), as in ily be employed as a dependable means of know­ diagram 1. ing in a valid way: an image of an object projected

cognitive faculty (upayoga)

cognition perceptual experience jñāna) (darśana)

correct cognition erroneous cognition (samyagjñāna) (viparyaya)

sensuous cognition erroneous sensuous cognition (matijñāna) (matyajñāna) scriptural cognition erroneous testimonial cognition (śrutajñāna) (śrutājñāna) clairvoyance distorted supernatural cognition (avadhijñāna) (vibhaṅgajñāna) mind reading (manaḥparyāyajñāna) ocular perceptual experience absolute knowledge (cakṣurdarśana) (kevalajñāna) non-ocular perceptual experience (acakṣurdarśana) clairvoyant perceptual experience (avadhidarśana) perfect perceptual experience (kevaladarśana)

Diagram 1

13 US. 28.11; trans. Jacobi, 1895, 153. 16 TS. Ś.1.33/D.1.32. 14 model XI in Balcerowicz, 2016a. 17 TBh. 1.33; pp. 31–32; RVār. 1.32; p. 92. 15 Tatia, 1951, 69–80. 844 Jain Epistemology through the lens on the retina is reproduced in an philosophy and epistemology, during which Jain inverted way, upside down, but such a consistent thinkers began to participate in the pan­ -Indian phil­ distortion is then reverted and corrected. Here we osophical debate. However, the early Jain model of can notice a certain pragmatic tilt in the Jain cor­ two cognitive criteria was both incoherent and con­ respondence theory of truth. A cognition is false not fusing to other Indian philosophers, for whom also simply because it reproduces P as non-P, but because sensory perception was direct (pratyakṣa), because it does so randomly, inconsistently, and unexpect­ Jains alone held the view that sensory perception edly, and therefore provides no firm basis for any was indirect. action based on such a cognitive act. Nescience18 The idea of cognitive criteria (pramāṇa), or cog­ is explained by the Jains as a result of two kinds nitively valid procedures, concerns the question of of karmic matter that distort the inner epistemic the foundations of knowledge: these are the valid capacity of the soul (jīva): ­cognition-veiling karman means of knowing, which warrant that the result of (jñānāvaraṇīyakarman) is responsible for the dis­ the process is a valid true cognition. Traditionally, torted image of an object, whereas deluding karman cognitive criterion as a process was differentiated (mohanīyakarman) superimposes a foreign element from its result, valid cognition (pramiti, pramā). onto the image and leads to an inaccurate synthe­ However, Jain philosophers, slightly similar to their sis of real elements into a fictitious aggregate. The Buddhist counterparts, often used these two ideas impact of these kinds of karman on cognitive states interchangeably and maintained that, on the one is further conditioned by the four basic passions hand, the same valid cognition (jñāna) can be con­ (kaṣāya), namely anger (krodha), arrogance (māna), sidered a result of a cognitive criterion, but, on the deceitfulness (māyā), and greed (lobha).19 Doubt is other, it is the cognitive criterion per se, because it also explained as a result of karman. is a part of a cognitive process and leads to further conclusions.20 Probably the first one who brought Jain terminol­ Cognitive Criteria (Pramāṇa) ogy of cognitive criteria in line with general Indian understanding of the concept, and who devised Parallel to the scheme of cognitive faculties of the a new, much more consistent model was Siddha­ soul, which had its soteriological background, sena Mahāmati (710/720–770/780 CE), possibly another important stream of thought came to domi­ inspired by his contemporary, Pātrasvāmin (alias nate Jain epistemology after the 5th century CE. This Pātrakesarin/Pātra­kesarisvāmin?; c. 660–720 CE). is the theory of cognitive criteria (pramāṇa), per­ Siddhasena Mahāmati was also the first Jaina phi­ haps the most central concept in all classical Indian losopher who formulated a descriptive definition of philosophy. After the 2nd/3rd century CE, Jainism cognitive criterion, which “is the cognition reveal­ adopted the idea of a “cognitive tool” or “the cause of ing itself and something else different from it (sc. valid cognition” (hetu), soon thereafter called “cog­ object), and is free from subversion,”21 that is it is not nitive criterion” (pramāṇa), or cognitively valid pro­ sublated or invalidated by a later act of cognition. He cedure (often translated as “means of knowledge”), also introduced a completely new understanding of from the traditions of ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya. Eventu­ the twofold division of cognitive criteria, albeit pre­ ally it was partially integrated with earlier models of serving their original names: perception (pratyakṣa) five cognitions. Two main cognitive criteria were dis­ and indirect cognition (parokṣa), which correspond tinguished, namely direct cognition (pratyakṣa) and to the way in which their respective objects are indirect cognition (parokṣa); the former comprised determined,22 as in diagram 2. clairvoyance (avadhi), telepathy (manaḥparyāya), This new approach was much more consistent and omniscience (kevala), whereas the latter com­ and reconciled earlier models. From then onward, prised sensuous (mati) and testimonial (śruta) cog­ it became accepted in Jainism that perception nition. To introduce the theory of cognitive criteria could be both sensory, or conventional, and supra­ into Jain philosophy was a historically vital step that sensory, or absolute, perfect omniscient perception integrated Jain thought into Indian philosophy and (kevalapratyakṣa). Indirect cognition comprises all marked the beginning of the golden ages of Jain the remaining kinds of valid cognitions and cognitive

18 Shastri, 1990, 462–482. 21 NyA.1 1; p. 333; trans. Balcerowicz, 2008, 9. 19 Tatia, 1951, 220–260. 22 model XIV in Balcerowicz, 2016a.

20 NyAṬ.1 4; p. 50=NyAṬ.2 4; p. 33. Jain Epistemology 845 cognitive criteria (pramāṇa)

perception / direct cognition (pratyakṣa) indirect cognition (parokṣa)

conventional perception verbal cognition (śābda) (sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa) inference (anumāna) absolute perception other (kevalapratyakṣa)

perception for oneself inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) (svārthapratyakṣa) inference for others (parārthānumāna) perception for others (parārthapratyakṣa) sentence for oneself (svārthavākya) sentence for others (parārthavākya)

Diagram 2 procedures: verbal cognition (śābda), based on lan­ ­epistemological-semantic aspect of the theory of guage; inference (anumāna), as the basis for Jain the multiplexity of reality is about. The theory com­ logic; and a range of other kinds of cognition, such prises three such analytical methods: the method as reasoning by analogy (upamāna), scriptures of the four standpoints (nikṣepavāda, nyāsavāda), (āgama), and presumption (arthāpatti). Siddhasena the method of viewpoints (nayavāda), or the sev­ Mahāmati’s novel idea, inspired by the Buddhist enfold method of conditionally valid predications, logician Dharmakīrti (550–610 CE), is that all valid and the method of the sevenfold modal descrip­ cognitions that ordinary humans can acquire can be tion (syādvāda, saptabhaṅgī). These are considered either “for oneself” (svārthapramāna), that is they complementary. Sometimes, all the three meth­ serve the epistemic goals of the cognitive subject ods are reckoned among the ­so-called methods of alone, or “for others” (parārthapramāna), that is analysis (anuyogadvāra), which are an even broader they are elements of communication of one’s cogni­ concept. tions to other people. The well­ -known term saptabhaṅgī (lit. seven­ - figured approach) has been treated as a synonym of syādvāda (lit. modal description) by the research­ Multiplexity of Reality (Anekānta) ers for at least the last hundred years. However, and Methods of Its Description toward the late classical period, Jain philosophers, such as Prabhācandra, Hemacandra, Māilladhavala Jain philosophers maintain that an adequate com­ (or Māilladhavaladeva; Digambara; c. 1200), and prehension of reality can be accomplished through Malliṣeṇa, spoke of two kinds of such ­seven-figured cognitive criteria (pramāṇa) and conditionally valid approach: sevenfold description through cognitive predications (naya),23 which subsequent Jain tradi­ criteria (pramāṇasaptabhaṅgī), that is syādvāda tion interprets as two kinds of philosophical inquiry (modal description) proper, and sevenfold descrip­ into the multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda). tion through viewpoints (nayasaptabhaṅgī), that is And this directly links the idea of cognitive fac­ nayavāda (the theory of viewpoints). ulties and cognitive criteria to the doctrine of The ­epistemological-semantic background for the multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) in its the theory of the multiplexity of reality is set by the ­epistemological-semantic aspect. Jain philosophers maxim that “every sentence functions with a restric­ have developed a complex methodology to describe tion,” in other words no singular term of sentence the complexity of the world, and this is what the can adequately refer to its denotatum but represents

23 TS. 1.6. 846 Jain Epistemology merely a particular cross section of it, focusing on its onto a particular existent object according to the particular feature. Accordingly, every term or propo­ intention (translated into a concept) and context. sition is necessarily ambiguous and emphasizes just The point of departure here is the term and its usage. one facet out of many, and to understand it, one Four such basic standpoints are tradition­ has to precisely know its exact context and sphere ally distinguished (but sometimes more are also of application, one of innumerable possible ones. mentioned): Similarly, no single object can be comprehensively 1. name (nāman); described in a single sentence or term. 2. material representation (sthāpanā); 3. substance (dravya); and 4. actual condition (bhāva). Multiplexity of Reality and For instance, the term “king” (rāja = rex) can func­ Standpoints (Nikṣepa, Nyāsa) tion on four basic semantic planes, and a particular thing x is “a king” in one of the four semantic dimen­ The four standpoints (nikṣepa, nyāsa) are the oldest sions: (1) in terms of its name, any thing we decide of the three methods of relating the complex real­ to call “king” is a king, for example a dog called Rex ity to our language and descriptions of it, and their is the king; (2) in terms of material representation, beginnings most probably go back to Pārśva himself; any thing that is an imitation of a king is the king, for the earliest reference is found in the Ṛṣibhāṣitāni, in example a caricature of a particular person, who is a a section attributed to him.24 They are frequently monarch, is the king; (3) in terms of substance, any used in early Jain canonical literature too.25 In con­ thing that was, is, or will substantially be a monarch tradistinction to the remaining two components of is a king, for example the ashes of a monarch are the the theory of the multiplexity of reality, which deal king; (4) in terms of actual condition, any thing that with propositions (sentences), this method is con­ is actually performing the activities ascribed to a cerned with the meanings of terms (words). monarch (such as holding the office not accessible The standpoints are rooted in a belief that the to any other, ruling, plundering, or oppressing the meaning of a term depends on the understanding subjects) is the king, but not someone who is now that it brings about in the mind and according to asleep and so on. Despite terms being thus ambigu­ which we establish a relation between the term and ous, language regularly operates on these semantic its designatum: a concept (selected out of a range planes, and speakers allocate a particular semantic of possible concepts) behind the term leads us to a layer to a particular term in a given context. Such particular thing. This approach slightly resembles an interplay of various semantic layers can today be a medieval (e.g. John Buridan’s) understanding of observed for instance in the case of René Magritte’s the notion of suppositio, going back to the Aristo­ famous painting Ceci n’est pas une pipe (“This is not telian Hermeneutics, according to which an indi­ a pipe”). vidual term (dictio), possessing two semantic layers, represents an ­object-related concept linked by an utterance within a particular sentential context, Multiplexity of Reality and as distinguished from significatio, which directly Viewpoints (Naya) relates a concept to a real thing (res) via a standard convention. In Jain theory, the meaning of a term The theory of viewpoints (nayavāda) classically con­ t is not a simple denotatum x but rather a relation sists of seven conditionally valid predications, but between t and a particular denotatum x1 selected more such predications can be conceived of, each out of a possible semantic range of concepts {x1…xn} reflecting a particular aspect of reality. The theory linked to objects that can be denoted by the term t was developed by both Jains and Ājīvikas at an early depending on a particular interpretation of it. Both historical stage.26 This method provides semantic terms (nikṣepa, nyāsa), translated here as “stand­ tools to disambiguate a particular sentence by allo­ points,” mean “casting, throw, placement, alloca­ cating it to a context in which it is true. The point tion” within a context determined by the speaker’s of departure here is the sentence (utterance), its intention. In other words, the term is “projected” actual usage and interpretation. Every sentence can

24 ṚBh. 31.(7); Jain, 1988, 58–60; Balcerowicz, 2016c, 179–182. 26 Balcerowicz, 2016c, 203–204, 220–221. 25 Alsdorf, 1973; Bhatt, 1978; Jain, 2006. Jain Epistemology 847 possibly be true in its particular context and only in The original terms are variously rendered into such a context, not outside of it. When its semantic English, either highlighting their etymology emphasis, the particular cross section of reality, is ([1] common viewpoint, [2] general viewpoint, taken as an exhaustive description of the whole real­ [3] practical viewpoint, [4] straight­ -thread view­ ity, the sentence is false.27 point, [5] verbal viewpoint, [6] subtle viewpoint, Usually, the viewpoints, or interpretative and [7] thus­ -happened viewpoint)28 or their sug­ factors, are classified into two major groups: sub­ gested meaning ([1] ­universal-particular viewpoint, stantial (dravyāstikanaya) or substance expressive [2] summarizing viewpoint, [3] viewpoint of worldly (dravyārthikanaya), and attributive (paryāyāstika­ transactions, [4] viewpoint of ultimate particulars, naya) or mode expressive (paryāyārthikanaya). The [5] viewpoint of synonymy, [6] viewpoint of seman­ former emphasizes the substantial, essential aspect tic analysis, and [7] ­such-like viewpoint).29 of a phenomenon, the self­ -identity and permanence A conspicuous feature of such a model is that of things. The latter highlights the opposite, namely each subsequent viewpoint is often represented transience and incessant transformation of things, as having a narrower, more restricted and more their impermanence and momentary character. The specific, reference, and it narrows the scope of the sentence “everything flows” is true only within the preceding one, a feature that is noticed by Jain phi­ bounds of the ­mode-expressive viewpoint, inasmuch losophers themselves (e.g. Pūjyapāda Devanandin). as nothing is changeless in all its aspects. However, A viewpoint widest in scope is the comprehensive when understood as an exhaustive description of viewpoint (naigama), which is a commonplace and all phenomena in all their aspects, it is patently unreflected everyday approach that does not dis­ false because one can arguably discern certain lay­ tinguish between the class and its members or the ers of reality that are enduring and constant, for universal, on the one hand, and particulars instanti­ nothing is either absolutely impermanent or abso­ ating it, on the other. For instance, the sentence “the lutely permanent in all its aspects. Furthermore, both mongoose digs up the forest litter” is deliberately sentences – “everything flows” and “nothing flows” – imprecise: it does not specify whether, say, the whole can be true, with all laws of classical logic preserved genus of Herpestes is meant or a particular species or intact. Each of them is a truncated, incomplete specimen. Some later interpretations (e.g. Devasūri statement, and their exact points of reference are Vādin, Malliṣeṇa) take this view to embrace all that not expressly stated. What they can mean, once exists – as the highest universal (mahāsāmānya) of completed and disambiguated, may for instance be pure existence (sattā) – in an undifferentiated man­ “everything flows with respect to modes” and “noth­ ner. The collective (saṃgraha) viewpoint denotes ing flows with respect to substance” (changeless classes ( ­jāti) and universals (sāmānya). Precisely ­self-identity). When both predications, substantial the same sentence will therefore take “the mon­ and attributive, are taken jointly, they express a goose” in the sense of a class of carnivorans of a mon­ comprehensive depiction of a particular thing with goose genus. The empirical viewpoint (vyavahāra) all its ontological layers of substance (dravya), quali­ selects a particular specimen out of the genus. We ties (guṇa), and modes (paryāya). can therefore have a pair of sentences – “the mon­ Usually, since Siddhasena Divākara, all view­ goose digs up the forest litter” and “the mongoose points are classified under these two main headings does not dig up the forest litter” – which, when not as follows: analyzed, appear to be contradictory, but when dis­ a. substance expressive (dravyārthika): (1) ambiguated via the method of viewpoints, entail no comprehensive (naigama); (2) collective contradiction at all: the former describes a general (saṃgraha); and (3) empirical (vyavahāra); behavior of the genus, whereas the latter refers to b. mode expressive (paryāyārthika): (4) direct a particular mongoose that simply happens not to (ṛjusūtra); (5) verbal (śabda); (6) etymological follow the general behavioral pattern of its fellow (samabhirūḍha); and (7) factual (evaṃbhūta, mongooses. According to the next, direct viewpoint itthaṃbhāva). (ṛjusūtra), the same sentence is true if and only if it refers to the same animal but actively involved now

27 Balcerowicz, 2001; 2003. 29 e.g. Gorisse, Clerbout & Rahman, 2010. 28 e.g. Matilal, 1981. 848 Jain Epistemology (or at some other particular point of time that one case we deal in fact with a similar sentence but not intends to highlight) in the situation or behavior that the same, and to specify under what conditions a the sentence describes: “the mongoose digsNOW up particular sentence can be true. It is often said that the forest litter.” Since neither Sanskrit nor Prakrits there is an infinite number of viewpoints, because (the languages in which the theory of viewpoints there are infinite ways of putting forth a proposition was conceptualized) know the distinction between (Siddhasena Divākara),30 that is an uninterpreted simple and continuous tenses, the statement would and originally ambiguous sentence can be infinitely be expressed in English rather as, “the mongoose is contextualized and supplied with more precise addi­ digging up the forest litter.” The subsequent three tional information, but for all practical reasons, only viewpoints introduce a completely new range of seven are usually mentioned as the most practical. semantics, based on synonymy and other linguistic In this way, an interpretation of a proposition features of an expression. The first one of these, the (utterance, sentence) is never straightforward. verbal viewpoint (śabda), treats all synonyms as fully Being ambiguous, incomplete and uninterpreted, interchangeable, for example, “the mongoose is dig­ no single utterance directly carries its truth value ging up the forest litter” and “the ichneumon is rum­ (see diagram 3). maging in the duff” – if the former is true, then the In fact, whether a proposition is true or not can be latter is necessarily true. However, the etymological decided only via a particular viewpoint – or index – viewpoint (samabhirūḍha) distinguishes between selected out of a whole spectrum of viewpoints that these two, and according to it, one of them can be corresponds to the intention of the speaker (see true, whereas the other one may not. The last one, diagram 4). The viewpoint, or index, contains the the factual viewpoint (evaṃbhūta), takes a state­ speaker’s intention as well as selected linguistic con­ ment to be true if and only if its etymology and other ventions that govern the usage of words in particular semantic features correspond to the situation that contexts. is occurring right now. For instance, “the mongoose In short, the theory of viewpoints can be formal­ digsNOW (= is digging) up the forest litter” is true only ized in symbolic logic as a model of the ­context-based when the animal is doing it silently (“mongoose,” interpretation of the utterances α, β, γ…that its etymology is derived via Marathi muṅgūsa and belong to a class of formulas (possible utterances): Portugese mangusto from *muṅga/mūká°, “mute”) = < D, I, A >. Under interpretation , D is the domain and within the bounds of a forest, not outside of it. of admissible interpretations (a class of conceivable One can observe that seemingly one and the same situations: phenomena or individuals in action, pro­ statement, for example, “the mongoose digs up the cess, condition, state, etc.) denotable by the utter­ forest litter,” may have different truth values, that is ances α, β, γ); I is a class of indices i, or viewpoints, be true or false, depending on different contexts. In which are context indicators; A comprises i-indexed fact, such a sentence is only superficially one and the classes of actual denotata. Accordingly, Ai (a referent same. Depending on the viewpoint, its meaning is or denotatum of a particular utterance disambigu­ supplied with additional semantic content, and the ated via a particular viewpoint) is a particular class sentence is no longer the same. In fact, what sounds indexed with a given index i∈I (the i-interpreted like one and the same sentence turns out to be quite class), which subsumes actual situations under a different sentence depending on the point of ref­ circumstances described by index i (a viewpoint). erence, or the viewpoint. One can easily notice how The truth value of the i-interpreted utterance α (i.e. the idea of truncated, incomplete statements is at asserted from a particular viewpoint) depends on work here. The method of viewpoints allows one to the actual context represented by the circumstances determine whether a particular sentence is true in a delimited by elements of the class I (indices, or view­ particular context and false in another one, in which points) in the interpretation . The truth value of

utterance truth value

Diagram 3

30 STP. 3.47. Jain Epistemology 849 utterance index (i)

truth value

Diagram 4 any i-interpreted utterance α depends on the actual It is not implausible that the theory of view­ context represented by an index i (viewpoint) of the points initially developed as a hermeneutic device class I in the interpretation .31 to interpret the scriptures (sūtra), considered rich The theory of viewpoints is sometimes inter­ in meaning and profound by the believers, and their preted differently, for instance as a Jain version of proper interpretation required such an interpreta­ dialogical logic, that is a theory of disputation based tive method (Siddhasena Divākara). The theory was on a theory of meaning for logical constants based refined over centuries, and we can speak of no sin­ on argumentative practices.32 gle uniform interpretation of it. Most importantly Kundakunda, as the author of the Pañcāstikāya­ for the Jains, the method determines limits within saṃgraha (Pkt. Paṃcatthiyasaṃgaha; Compen­ which a particular opinion (expressed through sen­ dium of the Five Extensive Entities), is often credited tences) is true or false. with proposing two other kinds of viewpoints: The theory frequently provides a conceptual the empirical (vyavahāranaya) and the absolute framework for views of other philosophical or (niścayanaya). The former is a mundane standpoint religious systems as well. Each viewpoint may be of actual interactions and phenomena as seen by an treated as expressing a particular angle, opinion, or uncultivated, commonsensical mind (e.g. “the living view, and this also applies to philosophical views. A being lives and dies”), whereas the latter is a descrip­ relatively early such attempt to relate a particular tion from the ultimately true perspective (e.g. “the philosophical system to a viewpoint is that found living being is eternal”). This division entails a the­ with Siddhasena Divākara, for whom the substantial ory of two truths: empirical (vyavahāra, saṃvṛti) viewpoint (dravyāstika) is represented by Sāṃkhya, and absolute, ultimate (paramārtha), and invokes the attributive viewpoint (paryāyāstikanaya) by two such levels of truth and reality known from Bud­ Buddhism, and mixed substantial and attributive dhist schools, such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, viewpoints by Vaiśeṣika. A comprehensive model, and from the idealist Advaita Vedānta tradition. and probably the most elaborate to date, to identify However, there is no indication in the (ambiguous) all philosophical beliefs within a viewpoint scheme verses ascribed to Kundakunda that viewpoints was undertaken by Mallavādin. The standard model (naya) are implied in it, and a closer analysis of the of the seven viewpoints to map particular philo­ text leads to a conclusion that it is most probably the sophical doctrines is the following one: commentator Amṛtacandrasūri (10th cent. CE) who 1. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika; introduced them, and perhaps even composed the 2. all monistic philosophies, such as Buddhist verse in question himself.33 monistic schools (śūnyavāda, i.e. Madhyamaka,

31 for more on formalization, see Balcerowicz, 2001; 2003; 33 Balcerowicz, forthcoming b. 2013; 2017b, 81–89. 32 Gorisse, Clerbout & Rahman, 2010. 850 Jain Epistemology and Yogācāra) and Advaita Vedānta, as well as Multiplexity of Reality and the Sāṃkhya; Sevenfold Modal Description 3. the materialists (Cārvāka); 4. Buddhism in general (as a doctrine of momen­ (Syādvāda) tariness, or impermanence); and 5–7. the grammarians. The third component of Jain theory of the mul­ It is assumed that a proper viewpoint, philosophi­ tiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda), the method cally productive and conducive to one’s true under­ of the sevenfold modal description (syādvāda, standing of the world, is such that is restricted to saptabhaṅgī), is the most contested and debated, its own particular sphere of reference and does and it has led to a large number of interpretations, not go beyond it: a singular perspective may never including among modern researchers. Both terms be generalized. As long as a viewpoint, or rather used for the theory are significant: syādvāda means a sentence representing a certain cognitive atti­ “the theory of the sentential functor (syāt),” or tude or intention representing a particular state of “modal description,” whereas saptabhaṅgī means affairs, is kept within its specific context, it is true. “­seven-figured approach” and is derived from sapta, Once it is universalized, once a singular perspective “seven,” and bhaṅga, that is “angle” or figure, a mode is projected on other (or on all other) contexts, it of expression, since this theory was traditionally becomes false and is called a contaminated view­ treated as an extension of the theory of cogni­ point (apariśuddhanaya), a defective viewpoint tive criteria (pramāṇa), hence properly called “the (durnaya), or a fallacy of the viewpoint (nayābhāsa). sevenfold description through cognitive criteria” Just as infinite are viewpoints in number, as infinite (pramāṇasaptabhaṅgī). are perspectives that ­non-Jain philosophers take Unlike the method of viewpoints, which for a (Siddhasena Divākara). The viewpoints can be statement allocates a context in which it is true, compared to threads (Pūjyapāda Devanandin),34 the point of departure for the sevenfold modal none of which, standing on its own, can make a description is any given object of cognition (or the fabric, but all woven together perfectly do. Simi­ whole reality) and its possibly exhaustive descrip­ larly, each and every viewpoint taken separately tion through as numerous perspectives as required is defective and therefore false, but all of them for its complete presentation. That is why it was together, conjoined, describe the reality properly: interpreted as “a complete account” (sakalādeśa) like disunited jewels do not form any whole, once of an object, in contradistinction to an “incomplete arranged together, they compose a beautiful com­ account” (vikalādeśa) provided by the theory of plete necklace (Siddhasena Divākara).35 Jainism, viewpoints (naya), each of which presents only a with its theory of viewpoints and with other com­ facet or aspect of a thing. ponents of the theory of the multiplexity of reality In this model, any analysis of an object should (anekāntavāda), presents itself as a singular true follow a pattern of seven figures (bhaṅga) of formal system capable of adequately representing the real­ language taken jointly, each expressing a partial pic­ ity as it is. In this way, it, self­ -professedly, projects ture of the object, however, with respect to the angle itself as a ­meta-philosophical system that embraces from which each statement is predicated, the state­ all other philosophical and religious beliefs, neces­ ment is true, or its truth value is | 1 |. In other words, sarily subordinate to it as merely expressing par­ all of the seven figures are simultaneously true. In its tial truths. This is how the theory of viewpoints classical version, which took centuries to develop, (nayavāda), also supported by the sevenfold modal they are formulated as follows (with Sanskrit pho­ description (syādvāda), was interpreted since the netic rules of assimilation ignored below): beginnings and in the classical period: as methods 1. “In a certain sense (syāt), x indeed (eva) is (asti) to substantiate the supremacy of Jainism as a system [P]” (syāt asti eva); and the preeminence of the Tīrthaṅkaras, who, with 2. “In a certain sense, x indeed is not (na) [Q]” their omniscience, surpass the limited knowledge of (syāt na asti eva); humans and teachers of other religious and philo­ 3. “In a certain sense, x indeed is [P] and, in a cer­ sophical systems, such as the Buddha. tain sense, indeed is not [Q]” (syāt asti eva, syāt na asti eva);

34 SAS. §249, 45; trans. Jain, 1992, 45. 35 STP. 1.21–25. Jain Epistemology 851 4. “In a certain sense, x indeed is inexpressible of its condition (C), here, its color. Accordingly, (avaktavya)” (syāt avaktavyam eva); no sentence is a simple predicative sentence of 5. “In a certain sense, x indeed is [P] and, in a cer­ the form “x is P” but rather a much more complex

tain sense, indeed is inexpressible” (syāt asti semantic structure, such as “x isS P” (with respect

eva, syāt avaktavyam eva); to substance S) or “x isO P” (with respect to occur­ 6. “In a certain sense, x indeed is not [Q] and, in a rence O). certain sense, indeed is inexpressible” (syāt na Furthermore, every sentence also contains the asti eva, syāt avaktavyam eva); verb “is” (asti; consistently the third­ -person singu­ 7. “In a certain sense, x indeed is [P], in a certain lar, present indicative of the verbal root as, “to be”) sense, indeed is not [Q] and, in a certain sense in a copulative meaning, being a connective with indeed is inexpressible” (syāt asti eva, syāt na the third element, a predicate (not expressed in the asti eva, syāt avaktavyam eva). forms). In this theory, all sentences are treated pri­ Jain philosophers emphasize that no contradiction marily as predicative, never existential: no proposi­ is involved at any stage in this model, which has tion ever carries a universal purport, and the verb “to been a standard criticism leveled against the theory be” (as) does not form a standard existential clause by other philosophical schools. For instance, in fig­ but functions merely as a copula verb. Therefore, ure 3, first, one predicate (P) is asserted of x, whereas existence is treated as a predicate (“existent”). another one (Q) is denied, and, second, the assertion A third element of every sentence is a predi­ and denial are made from two different angles. Here cate (which we can symbolize as P, Q, etc.): even and in all remaining figures, the law of (non)con­ though it is not expressly stated in the seven figures tradiction is respected, and contradiction is under­ described above, it is always implied. All sentences stood in a standard manner. have therefore a predicative structure. A predicate The most conspicuous element of the theory is or a predicate clause is asserted or denied of a par­ the term syāt, which is a sentential functor meaning ticular object x under description. “somehow,” “in a certain sense,” or “from a particu­ Accordingly, some of these statements (2, 3, 6, lar perspective or angle.” Grammatically, albeit for­ and 7) in addition contain a negative particle na mally the ­third-person optative of the verbal root as (“not”). It seems likely that predicates of the nega­ (“to be”), it is treated here as a particle understood in tive statements are never the same as those found the sense of “being expressive of the multiplexity of in assertions (1, 3, and 5). For this reason, the figures reality.” In the formal language of this theory, every do not contain any contradiction, as in figure 3, in properly structured sentence implicitly contains which a predicate P is asserted of x from a certain such a sentential function that limits its contents to angle, and a predicate Q is denied of the same x from a particular angle or perspective from which a prop­ another angle. erty is asserted or denied. Whatever we express of a Furthermore, some of the figures (4–7) con­ particular object through a particular proposition, it tain a much­ -debated predicate called “inexpress­ is necessarily done with respect to a certain param­ ible” (avaktavya), which is treated as a complex eter or from a certain angle. description (being a conjunction of predicates). The sentential functor introduces a particular What inexpressibility here means is certainly not perspective into every sentence, and traditionally an unfathomable, incomprehensible, or absolutely four such perspectives, or parameters, were distin­ unspeakable character of reality that remains guished: substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time beyond the grasp of the mind and senses as well (kāla), and condition (bhāva), and their list could as the language, as it is for instance implied in the easily be extended depending on the needs of the famous maxim (mahāvākya) of the upaniṣads that speaker. When predicating any property of an object, the underlying reality or the absolute (brahman) we naturally do it from a particular perspective is “neither this nor that” (neti neti), or it cannot be and emphasize its particular feature. A traditional reduced to anything perceivable or thinkable. On instance is a pot that “is made of clay” (figure 1) and the contrary, the inexpressibility of the sevenfold “is not made of water” (figure 2) from the perspective modal description simply means that one and the of its substance (S), “is made in village A” and “is not same predicate cannot be both asserted and denied made in village B” from the perspective of its place of the same object from the same angle. Alterna­ or occurrence (O), “is there in autumn” and “is not tively, an idea of emphasis is employed, accord­ there in summer” from the perspective of its time (T), ing to which every sentence can emphasize, in and “is black” and “is not red” from the perspective other words explicitly convey a particular idea or 852 Jain Epistemology explicitly assert/deny a particular property, while it all the perspectives together, whether expressed or may at the same time imply still another property implied. or its absence in the predicated object. Accordingly, Finally, an element historically added by two different properties (such as P and not-Q) can­ Samantabhadra is the particle “indeed” (eva), or not be emphasized – or explicitly expressed – simul­ “exclusively” – it confines the applicability of a prop­ taneously in one breath, but only consecutively in erty predicated of the real thing to a limited range two separate sentences or two combined sentences, of objects. In other words, it delimits the scope of as it happens in figures 1 and 2 (two separate sen­ the applicability of a particular predicate, either tences) or in figure 3 (two combined sentences). asserted or denied, to a particular object only, not They all express a property explicitly, in other words to any other. the property is emphasized. However, both of them An element much less conspicuous is the empha­ cannot be emphasized in one and the same simple sis, mentioned already. It always accompanies a sentence, hence one can speak of their practical property, asserted or denied, of an object: when a and logical inexpressibility in identical seman­ property is expressly stated, it is “under emphasis,” tic circumstances. Still another interpretation of when it is not, but merely implied or hinted at, it inexpressibility relates it to cases in which under is “not under emphasis.” Two properties can never present circumstances, one cannot either assert or be under emphasis in one and the same simple deny a property of an object, such as – to use the sentence, as this would lead to their practical inex­ actual historical example – determining the sex of pressibility, even though it is possible that both are a fetus now before the future birth, or (alluding to not emphasized at the same time – and such a case the famous example from the classical, Aristotelian is likewise classified as “inexpressible” (both are context of future contingents) determining the out­ merely hinted at but not expressed). come of a sea battle tomorrow, before it even begins. This formal approach of Jain philosophers to the If we compare figures 3 and 4, the former asserts and natural language can be symbolized as follows. What denies two emphasized properties of an object con­ is a simple sentence “x is P ” assumes the proper form secutively, whereas the latter either expresses the ∀x. ∃πε σ: Px , or, “For every real thing x, there is always same properties not emphasized or does so simul­ a particular perspective σ such that it can be inter­ taneously; hence nothing is expressed explicitly. If preted as parameter π with respect to which x is P and inexpressibility is understood as unassertibility, as the property P is emphasized under condition ε.”36 some researchers interpret it, it is only in the above A criticism traditionally wielded against the the­ sense, not in the sense of universal unassertibility of ory was that it leads to contradictions or absurdities. certain properties of an object. Accordingly, it was argued, one and the same per­ Accordingly, what appears to be a simple predica­ son can never become liberated, that is achieve the tive sentence is even more complex, for instance the ultimate goal of Jainism, because he or she will be sentence “this pot is made of clay,” or “x is P,” is tradi­ both liberated and not liberated at the same time, tionally said to express physical structure only from or liberated, not liberated, and inexpressible, that is the point of view of one substance S1, “x isS1 P,” but neither. Another charge was that of skepticism and simultaneously necessarily entails a range of other relativism.37 However, as we can see from the fore­ statements, such as “this pot is not made of water” going, such criticisms were misplaced and rest on

(substance S2), “x isS2 not-Q,” “this pot is in village A” inadequate reading of the theory. At the same time,

(place or occurrence O1), “x isO1 in A,” “this pot is not the theory is not entirely unproblematic and does in village B” (occurrence O2), “x isO2 not­ -B.” Depend­ lead to various ambiguities and redundancies in its ing on the needs of communication, the speaker formulations.38 may emphasize only one of such aspects. However, The theory has also inspired a range of mod­ a proper understanding of any particular object will ern logicians and philosophers, who offer various require a complete account, which has to include interpretations of it. Numerous researchers take

36 on formalization, see Balcerowicz, 2014; 2015, 195–231; 38 Balcerowicz, 2015, 221–224. 2017b, 89–97. 37 a review of criticisms is available in Padmarajiah, 1963, 363–378. Jain Epistemology 853 it to represent a case of many­ -valued logic,39 para­ approach though, but they are more faithful to the consistent logic, probabilistic or probability logic,40 original concept. modal logic,41 fuzzy logic, assertion logic,42 devi­ ant logic,43 logic of conditionals,44 ­non-bivalence logic,45 disjunctive and conjunctive dialectics,46 and A History of the Multiplexity of a question–answer semantics,47 implying that Jain Reality and Ājīvikism understanding of contradiction is nonstandard, not classical, and so forth.48 We may call this approach It seems that the theory of the multiplexity of real­ constructivist, which attempts to meaningfully ana­ ity (anekāntavāda) was jointly developed by Jains lyze the Jain theory by making use of modern tools and Ājīvikas, two closely linked religious traditions. of logic and epistemology, which were not explicitly Whereas the beginnings of the theory of the four known to ancient or medieval Indian thinkers, and standpoints (nikṣepavāda) can be traced back to explores what is currently believed to be hidden, Pārśva himself, there is no historical evidence at all, unexpressed logical structures and logical and phil­ apart from hagiographies created centuries later, osophical implications of the ancient theory, which that Vardhamāna Mahāvīra ever showed any inter­ may have indeed been formulated in a logically or est in standpoints, viewpoints, or any other aspect of semantically imprecise manner because a more pre­ epistemology and of what later came to be known as cise machinery of modern logic and semantics was multiplexity of reality. not known at that time. The serious risk is that in It is quite difficult to trace the roots of the theory of this way modern theories are read into and imposed viewpoints (nayavāda) and determine when exactly on the ancient theory, seriously distorting it. Such it emerged. Early philosophers of the 3rd–5th centu­ attempts at formalization, which should rather be ries CE subsumed under the name of Kundakunda treated as modern logical and semantic models (a name that actually covers a collective authorship inspired by the theory of the multiplexity of real­ of some works composed in the period between the ity, may be very stimulating and philosophically 3rd and the 7th/8th cents. CE) already knew the the­ valuable in themselves; however, caution should be ory in some form. It was elaborated by Umāsvāmin applied with regard to what they tell us about the and Umāsvāti, and Siddhasena Divākara applied it ancient philosophical theory per se in its actual his­ profusely; Mallavādin provided what may perhaps torical context. be its most comprehensive version. Some impulse Such constructivist interpretations may be dis­ for the theory came from philosopher­ -grammarian tinguished from the reductionist approach charac­ Bhartṛhari, the author of the work Vākyapadīya (On terizable by parsimony in applying tools of modern Sentences and Words) around 450 CE. What can logic and semantics, keeping them to the necessary be called Jain perspectivism, that is an analysis of minimum. What can be called reductionist research an object from different angles, is also traceable to restricts itself to an analysis of what the ancient Ājīvikism, which also developed its own set of stand­ or medieval authors express themselves explicitly, points (naya), and its existence perhaps in an even without postulating anything that goes beyond it more complex form than that of the Jains is attested or without devising semantical or logical models in Jain texts of 7th–8th centuries CE. Most probably that are to meet modern standards, which could the theory of viewpoints gradually emerged in some not have been met in the case of ancient theories form out of the exchange between the two rival reli­ expressed in ambiguous natural languages and in gious groups. times that knew no symbols or formal tools. The out­ The sevenfold modal description (syādvāda) come of such reductionist interpretations may not took centuries to reach a mature form in the early be as stimulating as in the case of a constructivist 7th century CE. There is also some evidence that

39 Burch, 1964; Mukerji, 1977; Bharucha & Kamat, 1984; Mati­ 44 Matilal, 1981; 1985, 301–319. lal, 1991; Ganeri, 2001; Ganeri, 2002; Priest, 2008; Schang, 45 Matilal, 1991. 2010. 46 Mukerji, 1977. 40 Mukerji, 1977. 47 Schang, 2010. 41 Barlingay, 1965; Priest, 2008. 48 for a review of such interpretations, see Balcerowicz, 2015, 42 Ganeri, 2001, 137–144; 2002. 184–191. 43 Bharucha & Kamat, 1984. 854 Jain Epistemology some elements of the sevenfold modal descrip­ object can be described in different ways, but these tion (syādvāda), especially an analysis of an object descriptions provide complementary information through the first three figures, were adapted by the on the object, and no incertitude is ever involved: Jains from the Ājīvikas. These three figures formed every object can be fully known in its completeness. the nucleus of the theory and were developed by It is also true that a sentence without any context is one of the Ājīvika leaders, Gośāla Maṅkhaliputra ambiguous simply because it is incomplete: it lacks (Pkt. Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta; Pal. Makkhali Gosāla; its actual point of reference, which is required for d. c. 409 BCE). The sentential functor syāt (“from any proposition to make sense. Once the theories of a particular perspective or angle”) was most likely conditionally valid predications and modal descrip­ introduced into Jainism in the 4th century CE. tion are employed, the sentence is complete in its One of the first Jain authors to apply it explicitly meaning and necessarily assumes a definite truth was Kundakunda around the 4th/5th century CE, value (i.e. is either true or false). Consequently, no and the earliest canonical text to use it is the relativism of our knowledge is implied in the theory. Vyākhyāprajñapti Sūtra (Pkt. Viyāhapannatti; Lec­ The scheme of ­meta-philosophy, which classifies ture of Explanations) in fragments dating back to a all other worldviews and philosophical systems as period between the first half of the 4th century CE applying to a restricted context, embedded in the and circa 450–480. theory of viewpoints (naya), has been reinterpreted The first Jain author to use the term anekānta, over the last century. Since the early 20th century, or “multiplexity of reality,” explicitly was, it seems, the Jain theory of the multiplexity of reality has been Pūjyapāda Devanandin49 in the 6th century CE. interpreted as an expression of universal tolerance There is, however, some tangible evidence50 that and intellectual openness. Violence (hiṃsā) can eas­ already a century earlier, the Ājīvikas employed the ily be related to intolerance interpreted as an intel­ same term in a similar meaning, and the expression lectual assault against other views. Since Jainism is already attested in the Niyatidvātriṃśikā (The professes nonviolence, or noninjury (ahiṃsā), the ­32-Stanza Composition on Determinism), a work ethical dimension of the system was combined with composed in the 5th century CE and erroneously its logic and semantics to the effect that a number of ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara, which provides an contemporary academic representatives of Jainism52 account of the Ājīvikas’ doctrine.51 and other ­non-Jain researchers53 have concluded that Jainism elevated the principle of nonviolence to the intellectual level and that anekānta (“multi­ Multiplexity of Reality, Relativism, plexity of reality”) is an expression of intellectual and Nonviolence (Ahiṃsā) ahiṃsā and its hallmark is tolerance. Just as the principle of noninjury embodies the respect for the Terms sometimes used to describe Jain theory of the life of other living beings, so is multiplexity of reality multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) in general, epitomized through the appreciation of other views and the method of the sevenfold modal descrip­ and worldviews, being a philosophy of synthesis and tion (syādvāda) in particular, are perspectivism and reconciliation. Every philosophy and point of view relativism. These may make sense only when no reflects some true facet of reality, albeit limited, and idea of indeterminability or uncertainty is thereby therefore has to be appreciated. Some researches54 connoted. The Jain theory does not mean that facts claim that nonviolence was at the root of the theory cannot be established, objects cannot be definitely of the multiplexity of reality. known, sentences as such are indefinite in their Such claims find no support in historical sources.55 meanings, propositions are principally indetermin­ There is no single Jain text of antiquity that would able with regard to their truth values, and actual relate the idea of nonviolence with the theory of the facts can never be ascertained. On the contrary, multiplexity of reality in any way. In addition, we Jain thinkers acknowledge that it is true that an can clearly see from historical texts that the theory

49 Soni, 2002, 34. 53 e.g. Burch, 1964, 71–72; Matilal, 1981, 4, 23, 61; 1985, 313–314; 50 Balcerowicz, 2016c, 221–223; forthcoming a. Chapple, 1993, 88. 51 Qvarnström, 2015. 54 e.g. Matilal, 1981; 1985; 1991. 52 among the first Dhruva, 1933, lxxiii–lxxiv; Kapadia, 1940– 55 Cort, 2000. 1947; Tatia, 1951, 21–22. Jain Epistemology 855 of the multiplexity of reality served Jain debaters to Balcerowicz, P., “Do Attempts to Formalise the ­Syād-vāda hierarchically rank and classify other philosophical Make Sense?” in: P. Flügel & O. Qvarnström, eds., Jaina systems and views as merely true with respect to Scriptures and Philosophy, London, 2015, 181–248. Balcerowicz, P., “Introduction: On Attempts to Formalise the their restricted particular ­cross-section of the whole ­Syād-vāda,” in: P. Balcerowicz & K. Potter, eds., Encyclope­ reality, hence ultimately only partially true, Jainism dia of Indian Philosophies, vol. XVII/3: Jaina Philosophy, being the single creed to faithfully and comprehen­ Delhi, 2014, 29–51. sively represent the whole of reality and truth, hav­ Balcerowicz, P., “Introduction: Some Remarks on the Naya ing a monopoly. Method,” in: P. Balcerowicz & K. Potter, eds., Encyclopedia With the renaissance of Jainism toward the late of Indian Philosophies, vol. XIV/2: Jaina Philosophy, Delhi, 19th century, we can observe a gradual process of 2013, 23–38. Balcerowicz, P., ed. & trans., Jaina Epistemology in Histori­ both strengthening and constructing Jain identity cal and Comparative Perspective: A Critical Edition and against Hinduism, with which Jainism had blended an Annotated Translation of Siddhasena Mahāmati’s to large extent. The process of distinct identity Nyāyâvatāra, Siddharṣigaṇin’s ­Nyāyâvatāra-vivṛti and building also involves what one could call the myth Devabhadrasūri’s ­Nyāyâvatāra-ṭippana, 2 vols., Stuttgart, of tolerance as an explanatory tool to account 2001, 22008. for the theory of the multiplexity of reality and to Balcerowicz, P., “Some Remarks on the Naya Method,” in: ground it in the pragmatically most important ethi­ P. Balcerowicz, ed., Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion, Delhi, 2003, 37–67. cal principle of Jainism, nonviolence. The conjunc­ Balcerowicz, P., “The Logical Structure of the Naya Method of tion of anekānta, ahiṃsā, and intellectual tolerance the Jainas,” JIPh 29, 2001, 379–403. are currently instrumental in the ­self-portrayal of Barlingay, S.S., A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, Delhi, modern Jain community and have become a kind of 1965. modern credo of Jainism. It is therefore no longer Bharucha, F., & R.V. 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