Jain Epistemology Over centuries, Jainism developed a complex theory CE), Vidyānanda (Digambara; c. 900–950 CE), of knowledge, and some of its elements, primarily the Māṇikyanandin (Digambara; c. 900–950 CE), Abhaya­ theory of the multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda), deva (Śvetāmbara; c. 900–950 CE), Prabhācandra can be reckoned as one of the most significant con­ (Digambara; c. 1050–1100), Anantavīrya II (Dig­ tributions of Indian philosophy in general that can ambara; second half of the 11th cent. or turn of the be found intellectually inspiring also for a modern 11th–12th cents.), Vādidevasūri/Devasūri Vādin philosopher. (Śvetāmbara; turn of the 11th–12th cents.), Hema­ candra (Śvetāmbara; 1088/1089–1172), and Malliṣeṇa (Śvetāmbara; c. 1200–1250); Periodization and Main Thinkers (3) epigonic period (from the 13th cent. until now); it consists of two phases: (a) medieval phase The main periods in the development of Jain episte­ (13th–19th cents.), with main philosopher Yaśovijaya mology coincide with those of Jain philosophy and (Śvetāmbara; 1638–1688); (b) modern phase (from Jain literature and can be distinguished as follows: the 19th cent. until now). (1) canonical period (c. 400 BCE–400/450 CE) Jainism shares the beginnings of its epistemol­ with relevant works being the noncanonical Skt. ogy with Ājīvikism, to which it is historically closely Ṛṣibhāṣitāni (Pkt. Isibhāsiyāiṃ; Sayings of the Seers) linked. The present article focuses on Jain episte­ and some portions of Jain canon; it consists of mology of the classical period. two phases: (a) precanonical, formative phase (400– 200 BCE), with hardly any textual evidence; certain philosophical ideas were in nascent form; (b) main Background phase (200 BCE–475 CE), during which the pres­ ently available canon and doctrine were formed; Over centuries, Jain epistemology developed against philosophical ideas were present, but marginal, with a backdrop of realist ontology of the world external hardly any noncanonical literature extant; to consciousness and populated by real, macro­ (2) classical period (350/400 –12th/13th cent. CE); scopic objects, independent of consciousness and it consists of two phases: (a) postcanonical phase capable of being accurately reflected in the mind. (4th–7th cents. CE); the first philosophical works It therefore levels criticism at all kinds of epistemo­ were composed, with a strong epistemological com­ logical idealism, including Buddhist traditions, such ponent; main philosophers include Umāsvāmin as Yogācāra, or Vedānta traditions, especially the (Digambara or Śvetāmbara?; c. 350 CE), Umāsvāti monistic Advaita Vedānta, all of which recognize (Śvetāmbara; c. 400 CE; Umāsvāmin and Umāsvāti that entities exist to the extent that they are pres­ are understood as two different authors, albeit ent in consciousness, on which they are dependent often viewed as one individual), Kundakunda in their existence. The metaphysical realism of Jain­ (Digambara; a range of authors flourished under ism impacts its epistemological realism, according this name between the 3rd and the 7th/8th cents.), to which one has immediate access to reality, which Siddhasena Divākara (Śvetāmbara; 450–500 CE), one directly cognizes the way it is. It rejects the claim, Mallavādin (Śvetāmbara; c. 550 CE), Samantabhadra for instance, that one can only know the reflections (Digambara; 530–590 CE), and Pūjyapāda Devana­ of real things or phenomena. At the same time, ndin (Digambara; 540–600 CE); (b) golden ages of Jain epistemological realism cannot be reduced Jain philosophy and epistemology (7th–12th/13th to its naive version, namely that objects are repro­ cents.); main philosophers include Pātrasvāmin duced in cognition in a completely unprocessed (Digambara or Śvetāmbara?; 660–720 CE), Sid­ manner. dhasena Mahāmati (Digambara or Śvetāmbara?; Nothing is found in the mind that has not first 710/720–770/780 CE), Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (Digambara; been present in the real world outside of it. Even 720–780 CE), Haribhadra (Śvetāmbara; 740–800 fictitious images and hallucinations have their © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 BEJ Also available online – www.brill 838 Jain Epistemology realist foundation: they are produced by artificial Propositions (utterances, statements, beliefs, and and unreal synthesis of true, real elements deriving concepts) are true if they correspond to reality, from the world. Jains, however, cannot be classified which is the ultimate point of reference. Accord­ as empiricists: perceptions primarily understood as ingly, propositions are true not simply because they forms of experience are not merely sensory. As sub­ are consistent with other accepted beliefs (coher­ stantialists, Jain thinkers accepted that real things ence theory of truth), or are practically useful and are reflected in one’s knowledge as units consisting effective (pragmatic theory of truth), but only of three interdependent layers: substance (dravya) because they conform to the actual state of affairs alongside its qualities (guṇa) and modes (paryāya), and to the way that things are there. This realist none of which can exist independently. Further­ foundation was laid well after the 2nd century CE, more, there is even a fourth layer of directly expe­ when Jain thinkers were confronted with the tradi­ rienced but inexpressible transient occurrences tion of analysis and methodical inquiry, ānvīkṣikī, (vivarta, vartanā), which can be neither verbalized with the Brahmanical philosophical schools of nor conceptualized. Substance as a property bearer Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and with Buddhism, and were accounts for the permanence of a thing, for the forced to rationally justify their religious beliefs. thing’s extension in time and self­identity, whereas Prior to that, the prime criterion of truth had been qualities make it perceptible to the senses. Both sub­ moral relevance and rectitude. Also later ethical stances and their qualities not only endure in time and epistemological questions often overlapped, as but also incessantly undergo changes through their did Jain ethics and ontology, which can be seen for modes. This explains an apparent paradox of how instance in the case of the seven soteriological cat­ a real thing can be both permanent, which entails egories (tattva): its immutability, and impermanent, that is changing 1. living beings (jīva); and mutable. Everything that exists is characterized 2. lifeless elements (ajīva); by origination (utpāda), continued existence (sthiti), 3. influx of karmic matter (āsrava); and annihilation (bhaṅga) in every moment of its 4. karmic bondage (bandha); existence, an idea developed under an influence of 5. control or stoppage of karmic matter the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda and Abhidharma notions (saṃvara); of the four conditioned factors, known as contingent 6. eradication of karmic matter (nirjarā); and markers (saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa), which characterize all 7. liberation (mokṣa); momentarily existent things. Such an understand­ with optionally also merit (puṇya) and demerit ing of reality and the reals as complex, multifaceted (pāpa) as two kinds of karman. The first two cate­ entities is an ontological extension of the Jain theory gories, being both of moral and ontological nature, of the multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda), which formed also the skeleton for the metaphysical model takes every individual thing as a part interconnected of the five extensive entities (astikāya) as well as for with other entities through infinite relations and as the model of the five (or six) substances (dravya). having a complex nature. The epistemic­semantic Accordingly, for the first few centuries of the exis­ aspect of the theory of the multiplexity of reality tence of Jainism, cognition (jñāna) was considered deals with the question of how one can effectively primarily a means of knowing moral truths and sote­ know and verbally express such a multifaceted riological goals; it was of little epistemological impor­ world of complexities. Indeed, no phenomenon can tance. Much of this early moral leaning remained be comprehended and analyzed without its individ­ also in the classical period. Cognition in the form ual ontological context, with its particular complex of (morally) right cognition (samyagjñāna), along­ temporal, spatial, causal, and other relations being side right belief (samyagdarśana) and right con­ ignored. A vast range of properties can be predicated duct (samyakcāritra), forms the path to liberation on a given entity with equal right, and each of such (mokṣamārga). Rightness (rather than mere cor­ perspectives seems equally justified due to the infi­ rectness) of cognition in this case does certainly not nite manifoldness of interdependencies.1 mean a faithful reproduction of the state of affairs A corollary of Jain metaphysical realism is the but first and foremost its correspondence to moral correspondence theory of truth and objectivity. principles and its usefulness in religious practice. 1 Padmarajiah, 1963, 121–181; Balcerowicz, 2001, 379–380. Jain Epistemology 839 Its opposite, false cognition (mithyājñāna, ajñāna), (māna), deceit (māyā), and desire (lobha), and characterizes a person classified as wrong believer while in the cycle of rebirth (saṃsāra), it endures (mithyādṛṣṭi), who acts out of moral ignorance and in five different karmic states (bhāva): karman’s false belief (mithyādarśana), or simply falsehood subsidence (aupaśamikabhāva), destruction (mithyātva), that is the wrong understanding of reli­ (kṣāyikabhāva), partial subsidence