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The Tankship Tromedy the Impending Disasters in Tankers

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The Tankship Tromedy the Impending Disasters in Tankers The Tankship Tromedy The Impending Disasters in Tankers Second Edition Jack Devanney Sisyphus Beach Tavernier, Florida 2006 ii Copyright c 2006, 2007 Jack Devanney Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the Gnu Free Documentation License (GFDL), Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invarient Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the GFDL is available at www.gnu.org. Published by The CTX Press 212 Tarpon Street Tavernier, FL 33070 Publishers’s Cataloging-in-Publication Data Devanney, Jack The tankship tromedy: the impending disasters in tankers / Jack De- vanney — Tavernier, Fla : The CTX Press, 2006 p. : cm. ISBN: 0-9776479-0-0 ISBN 13: 978-0-9776479-0-3 1. Tankers – Design and Construction. 2. Tankers – Casualties. 3. Tankers – History. I. Devanney, Jack. II. Title VM455.D38 2005 387.2/45—dc22 2005938363 Printed in the United States of America 10 09 08 07 06 • 54321 Contents Preface xi Acknowledgments xv 1 Introduction 1 1.1 ABitPlayerintheTromedy . 1 1.2 Dedication............................. 4 1.3 BlametheCrew ......................... 6 1.4 TheCTXCasualtyDatabase . 8 2 A Brief History of Tanker Regulation 9 2.1 The Rise of the Classification Society . 9 2.2 Pre-WorldWarI ......................... 14 2.3 World War I thru World War II . 17 2.4 Flags of Convenience . 21 2.5 TorreyCanyonandIMO. 25 2.6 VLCC’sandInerting. 28 2.7 Boom, Bust, and the Argo Merchant . 34 2.8 The Amoco Cadiz and Marpol/78 . 36 2.9 TheExxonValdezandDoubleHull. 43 2.10 Isoism and the Rise of the Hirelings . 50 2.11 KirkitoErika........................... 54 2.12Castor............................... 67 2.13Prestige .............................. 72 2.14 RegulatorySummary. 74 3 The Nature of Tanker Spills 77 3.1 The Three Salient Features of Tanker Spills . 77 3.2 SpillCausality .......................... 82 3.3 HullStructuralFailures . 86 iii iv CONTENTS 3.4 RulesoftheRoadScrew-Ups . 94 3.5 MachineryFailures . 108 3.6 Conning/Navigation Errors . 119 3.7 Inerting/Purging/Hotwork . 127 3.8 ExternalFactors . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 132 3.9 TransferSpills. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 136 3.10 A Digression: Groundings and Double Bottoms . 145 3.11 Collisions and Double Sides . 153 3.12 SpillSummary .......................... 160 4 Category A Spills 163 4.1 Introduction............................ 163 4.2 TheGrand,ChristmasEveSpill . 165 4.3 DribsandDrabs ......................... 169 4.4 SternTubeSealLeaks . 172 4.5 Cargo Tank Bottom Pitting . 174 4.6 FatigueCracking . 178 4.7 Regulating Category A Spills . 185 5 Newbuilding Standards 189 5.1 The Direct Analysis Downratchet . 189 5.2 Unreasonable Operating Restrictions: Lolling . 195 5.3 HiddenRestrictions . 197 5.4 Unfloodable Double Bottoms . 199 5.5 Don’t Allow. Don’t Check . 201 5.6 The Misuse of Finite Element Analysis . 203 5.7 The Case of the Disappearing Swash Bulkheads . 209 5.8 Calibration Factors . 215 5.9 ForebodyandAftbody. 216 5.10Welding ..............................218 5.11 TheSternTubeBearingSaga . 221 5.12 Crankshaft Bearings and Bearing Girders . 226 5.13 The15%Rule........................... 229 6 The CTX Standard Tanker 231 6.1 The Basic Requirements of a Good Tanker . 231 6.2 EggCarton ............................235 6.3 RobustStructure . 237 6.4 Inert All Double Hull Ballast Tanks . 240 6.5 TwinScrew ............................246 CONTENTS v 7 How Should We Regulate Tankers? 259 7.1 TheImportanceofTransparency . 259 7.2 WhatWon’tWork ........................ 262 7.3 PortStateControl . 273 7.4 Regulation of Design and Construction . 279 7.5 FinalPoints............................287 Glossary.................................290 A Tank Steel Protection 297 A.1 Introduction............................ 297 A.2 Coating ..............................298 A.3 CathodicProtection . 312 A.4 Inerting ..............................316 A.5 Summary .............................319 B Implementation of Twin Screw 321 C The Physics of Tank Spillage 325 C.1 Disclaimer.............................325 C.2 HydrostaticBalance . 327 C.3 MarpolversusPre-Marpol . 334 C.4 LiveBottomSeal . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 337 C.5 Side Damage and Exchange Flow . 345 C.6 Ballasting Down: the Tamano Spill . 349 C.7 TheRightResponse . 353 C.8 Double Hull Bottom Damage . 360 C.9 TheFullVacuumTanker . 365 D The Politics of Tank Spillage 379 D.1 The Mid-Deck Tanker . 379 D.2 TheDefenseoftheDoubleSkin. 384 D.3 Obligatory Warning Label . 389 E The Joint Tanker Project 391 vi CONTENTS List of Tables 2.1 Results of Hellespont Embassy CAPS Surveys . 44 2.2 Comparison of Segregated Ballast Tank Coated Areas . 47 3.1 Typical Tanker Spill Size Density . 78 3.2 Total annual spillage versus single biggest spill . 79 3.3 Breakdown of CTX Casualties by Initial Event . 84 3.4 Segregated Ballast Tank Casualties . 90 3.5 Hull Structural Failure Spills . 92 3.6 ManeuverIncidence . .. .. .. .. .. .. 99 3.7 RulesScrew-upSpills. 106 3.8 Machinery Failure Spills . 110 3.9 V-Plus Total Loss of Power Incidents, 2002-2004 . 115 3.10 Lousy Navigation Casualties . 122 3.11 ConningErrorSpills . 126 3.12 Inerting/Purging/Hotwork Screw Ups . 130 3.13 Casulaties due to External Factors . 135 3.14 TransferSpills. 137 3.15 LighteringSpills . 144 3.16 Double Bottom Spill Summary . 148 3.17 Spills over 2000 liters in which double bottom might have helped151 3.18 Depth of Penetration in CTX Collisions . 153 3.19 Collisions and Allisions in which ship survived . 157 4.1 Cracks in Alaskan Trade Tankers . 182 5.1 IMO Effective Oil Spill Numbers . 212 5.2 Known Sterntube bearing failures on Brand-new VLCC’s . 221 5.3 Reduction in Shaft Diameter, 1975-1999 . 223 5.4 Deterioration in Main Shaft Couplings, 1975 to 2001 . 229 vii viii LIST OF TABLES 6.1 CTX Cargo Tank Sub-division Standards . 235 6.2 Frequency of Total Loss of Power . 247 6.3 TwinScrewSpillSummary . 249 6.4 Spills in which twin screw might have helped . 250 A.1 SolarReflectance . 310 E.1 Increase in steel weight (tons) due to JTP Rules . 391 List of Figures 2.1 Gl¨uckauf stranded on Fire Island . 13 2.2 Sinclair Petrolore: One of a Kind . 24 2.3 Tugs abandoning Torrey Canyon . 26 2.4 Mactra deck after tank cleaning explosion . 29 2.5 Kong Haakon deck after tank cleaning explosion . 30 2.6 Betelgeuse at Whiddy Island: the grave of 50 men . 33 2.7 AnnualSpillVolume . .. .. .. .. .. .. 37 2.8 World Horizon sans Forepeak Tank . 54 2.9 TochalsansForepeakTank . 55 2.10 KirkisansForepeakTank . 56 3.1 Annual versus Biggest Spill by Year . 81 3.2 DanceofDeath.......................... 97 3.3 Alvenus buckled after grounding. 146 3.4 Alvenus fracture extended down to waterline. 147 3.5 Helo view of double hull Baltic carrier . 155 3.6 Close up view of Baltic Carrier penetration. 155 4.1 The All-White Tanker . 171 4.2 DesignforProducability . 180 5.1 Sterntube bearing pressure and oil film thickness . 224 6.1 DoubleScrubbingSchematic . 242 6.2 TwinSkegHullForm . .. .. .. .. .. .. 253 6.3 SectionatAftEndofPumpRoom . 256 A.1 Installation of Tsevas Pitguard . 314 C.1 Neutral Level, Fully Loaded Pre-MARPOL ULCC . 328 C.2 Neutral Level for same ULCC, Tank Drawn Down 2 M . 329 ix x LIST OF FIGURES C.3 Final situation, Full load vs Tank Drawn Down 2 M . 331 C.4 Marpol vs pre-Marpol Spillage . 336 C.5 Required Live Bottom Height versus Current Speed . 338 C.6 OceanicGrandeurafterflooding . 343 C.7 Waves breaking over Nino deck . 344 C.8 Fully Loaded, Pre-MARPOL, Side damage up 4 M . 347 C.9 Full load but ballasted down 2 M . 350 C.10Damage1Pup5m. Crewdoesnothing . 358 C.11 Damage 1P up 5 m. Crew ballast 3P and Forepeak . 359 C.12Damageathoppercorner. 361 C.13 Double hull VLCC. Damage to 3P lower hopper corner. 364 C.14 Active Full Vacuum(5M) Tanker, Full Tank . 372 D.1 Mid-Deck, Damage up 3 m . 380 D.2 Coulombi Egg, Damage up 3 m . 382 Preface Tanker design, construction and operation has been controlled by an un- usual form of self-regulation called the Classification Society, combined with sporadic, emotional intervention by outsiders in the aftermath of a big oil spill. The Classification Societies — and their partners, the Flag States — compete for and are financially dependent on the entities that they are supposed to regulate: the shipyards that build the tankers and the shipown- ers that operate them. This incestuous relationship has produced a steady deterioration in tankship standards since World War II. The well-meaning but technically ignorant outside intervention has not only not been directed at the core problems facing tankers; but in several critical areas has exacer- bated those problems. The result is a mess. The tanker being built today is flimsy, highly unreliable, unmaneuver- able, and nearly impossible to maintain. And the situation is becoming progressively worse. As a result, we will have gargantuan spills in the future that need not have happened. This book outlines the sad history of tanker regulation and calls for fundamental changes in both tanker design and the regulatory system. The main body of the book assumes no prior knowledge of tankers. All the technical detail has been banished to appendices. With respect to the ship itself, I argue that we must: • Substantially upgrade our hull structural standards, and adopt a far more conservative machinery design philosophy. The ships need at least 15% more steel. Otherwise we are guaranteed massive structural failure spills. • Require much better cargo sub-division, going back to lots of smaller tanks, regularly arranged. • Put a blanket of inert gas in all double hull ballast spaces. The book documents that cargo leaking into ballast tanks is the single most important cause of both tanker spillage and tankerman deaths. The book describes how two classes of double hull tankers built in Korea in 2001-2003 had their ballast tanks successfully inerted. The book xi xii PREFACE demonstrates that ballast tank inerting is critical to tanker safety not only by preventing an explosion should a leak occur, but even more importantly by preventing the leak in the first place by drastically reducing corrosion in way of coating breakdown.
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