GENETIC WILL: A PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATION ON DETERMINISM

By

VICTOR FUNK

Integrated Studies Project

submitted to Dr. Gloria Filax

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts – Integrated Studies

Athabasca, Alberta

May 20, 2006

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Genetic Will: A Philosophical Meditation on Determinism

MAIS 701 Integrated Project Athabasca University Victor Funk 2213536 Professor -- Dr. Gloria Filax March 30, 2006

Abstract

As humans in the twenty-first century begin a global capitalist project in earnest the ability of the planet to maintain a sustainable balance is severely compromised. Although the best attempts of philosophers and a wide array of sociological perspectives have been presented to explicate the enduring diabolical side of human nature, none explains the short-term thinking, significance of capitalism, and recurring self-interest successfully. As a response this MAIS 701 Integrated Project attempts to capture the significant influence of genes in this human behavior. Genetic determinism is a highly contentious subject, particularly with philosophers, sociologists, and feminists, but it may help explain the persistent irrational and immoral behavior of humans that befuddles all conventional logic. The premises presented here includes the drive or force behind this wanton consumption and self-aggrandizement as the primal need to survive and to reproduce one’s own genetic material, and secondly, that our large brain has not evolved to create codes of ethics but rather simply to promote the advantage of one’s own genetic material. My term for this force is genetic will.

Key Words: genetic determinism, determinism, evolutionary theory, anthropocentricism, genetic will.

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Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………….…….…..2 Contents……………………………………………………………………….………..3 Introduction…………………………………………………………………....….…….4 Darwinism and Evolutionary Theory…………………………………….…...…….…..8 Neurological Analysis…………………………………………………………………15 Philosophical Meditation………………………………………………………………22 Sociobiology………………………………………………………………..……….....34 The Genetic Penchant for Capitalism………………………………………….....……37 Genes and Literature…………………………………………………………..……….40 Consequences of Human Nature……………………………………………..……...…43 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………….46 References………………………………………………………………………...…....51 Appendices…………………………………………………………………………..…55 Appendix A: The radical implications of natural selection—Gould……………..…….55 Appendix B: Wilson interview on sociobiology and absolute moral precepts..…...…..56 Appendix C: Biology and human nature—Gould………………………………..…....57 Appendix D: Postmodernism and garish Western culture—Jameson…………….…...64 Appendix E: Analogies of determinism lost in metaphor—Jameson…………...….….65 Appendix F: Adaptation by evolution—Gould…………………………………..….....67 Appendix G: Darwin and Adam Smith—Gould……………………………………….68 Appendix H: Sigmoidal population graph—Gould……………………………….....…69 Appendix I: The morality of the gene—Wilson…………………………..…...……….70 Appendix J: Competition—Wilson………………………………………..…………...71 Appendix K: Central dilemmas behind ignoring the influences of biology—Wilson…72 Appendix L: Sociobiology—Wilson………………………...………………………....77 Appendix M: Evolution: an uphill struggle—Rihani……………………………….….79 Appendix N: Elites and hierarchies—Rihani………………………………………...... 81 Appendix O: Gathering clouds of food scarcity—Rihani…………………...……...….83 Appendix P: The Story of Man, The Economist………………………………………..84 Appendix Q: Will and Causality—Ingvar………………………………………...... ….86 Appendix R: Neurological connections—Spence…………………………………..….87

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“A rampant species, Homo sapiens may be nearing full occupancy of arable lands. Too many people along with disproportionate consumption by developed nations pose the dilemma of the next century.” Ehrlich—National Geographic

Introduction

To begin I will use the words of Michael Foucault:

What I would like to tell you in [this paper] are some things that may be inexact, untrue, or erroneous, which I will present as working hypotheses, with a view to a future work. I beg your indulgence, and more than that, your malice. Indeed, I would be very pleased if at the end of [this paper] you would voice some criticisms and objections so that, insofar as possible and assuming my mind is not yet too rigid, I might gradually adapt to your questions and thus at the end of this [paper] we might have done some work together or possibly made some progress. (2000, p. 1)

Written in frustration at the persistent behavior that predominates the human social condition, this essay will examine humanity as a singular species with a problem: it is systematically destroying the biosphere that supports it in spite of being, by its own admission, the most intelligent life-form on earth. Conclusions here do not offer a definitive solution as there are probably many and none at the same time. Instead, it offers reasons why the current reality tenaciously exists and why Hobbes description of life as “nasty, brutish, and short” stubbornly continues to fit the human dilemma.

Tom Bonnicksen, for example, shares the frustration:

Even though our intervention [in nature] is obvious, we prefer to maintain an illusion that nature—or God—is in charge, and we don’t like to be reminded otherwise because that might get in the way of our feelings and our role in it.1 (in Alexander Wilson, 1992)

The global destruction resulting from human intervention takes the form of loss of habitat, resource depletion, and pollution of water and air—this is despite humanity’s current wealth of knowledge. At the writing of this paper the world of multinationals and subsequent consumerism is expanding at exponential speed with China and India, not to

1 Please see page 35 for a description of cognitive dissonance. V. Funk 5 mention a myriad of smaller countries, frantically joining the Western world in the glut of production. The uniquely Western brand of capitalism is “catching-on” the world over creating a consumer frenzy that will increase the stress on the living biosphere. This trend is accelerating – not diminishing – and points to a calamity of colossal dimensions driven by open-ended growth in a closed system. All living things are subject to the indifference of nature and therefore are compelled to endure its effects—except man— who is temporarily able to dominate nature in a way that allows this disregard of balance.

But there are costs, and humans in a grand and fatal gesture are attempting to step outside of the animals that they are.

In an effort to explain human arrogance this paper will examine the concept of genetic will as an overarching life force with a universal agenda: to survive and reproduce. It will examine this concept from a deterministic stance, but it will do this warily, and with the understanding, as Stephen Gould contends, “that biological determinism has always been used to defend existing social arrangements as biologically inevitable” (1975, p.

258). The problem, it would seem, is that humans cannot help themselves and the destructive actions are not intentional and not preventable.2 Human behavior, and human nature at the macroscopic level, is diabolically predictable. Humanity stubbornly continues with exploitation, arrogance, and contempt in its treatment of the planet—but why? What is the source of this anthropocentricism? 3 The repetition of destruction is not reflected in the current sociological and philosophical rationalizations, which

2 A grounded overview of the historical data exposes correlations between habitat destruction and human activity. 3 Blackburn (1996, p.19) defines anthropocentric as “[a]ny view magnifying the importance of human beings in the cosmos, e.g. by seeing it as created for our benefit. An account of a property such as that of a colour is anthropocentric if it incorporates an element relation possession of the property to the state of some observer in some conditions. V. Funk 6 although well intentioned and eloquent, ignore the underlying purpose of humanity: like all other life forms humanity exists to reproduce and foster more humans that carry precious genetic material. This paper will investigate through published science and literature the etiology of this human behavior and look within the concept of genetic will for sources of power4, competition, and secondary or projected behavior.

Stephen Jay Gould writes, “the evolutionary unity of humans with all other organisms is the cardinal message of Darwin’s revolution of nature’s most arrogant species” (1981, p.324).5 And it is precisely this message that allows a consensus confirming animal behavior as deterministic, but Homo sapiens stubbornly resist acceptance of the deterministic nature of humans. Although humans may possess some capacity for logic and freewill, the outcome of human effort at the macroscopic level is eerily similar to animals left to their own devices; and the gross consequence is the same: overpopulation and over-use of the habitat. 6 Macroscopic biological determinism7 in and of itself should not be mysterious but there is a generalized attitude afoot that resists the notion that in Homo sapiens a connection to animals survives. Fredric Jameson maintains, “the fundamental problem with articulating biological determinism in humans is charging that Homo sapiens are like other life forms; the proof is lost in metaphor and

4 Power is used simplistically as violent domination as opposed to the Foucaultian post-structuralist view. 5 Please see Appendix C for Gould’s expanded argument on biological determinism countering sociobiologists. 6 The fact that life forms over-populate is an a priori truism. Examples besides the obvious human problem might be rabbits in Australia or virus in a pandemic. Until something stops the growth of the organism the organism is programmed to multiply, as are humans. 7 Determinism is defined as “[t]he doctrine that every event has a cause. The usual explanation of this is that for every event, there is some antecedent state, related in such a way that it would break a law of nature for this antecedent state to exist yet the event not to happen. This is purely a metaphysical claim, and carries no implications for whether we can in principle predict the event. The main interest in determinism has been in assessing its implications for free will” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 102). V. Funk 7 analogy” (1991, p.242).8 The fact that we resort to metaphor at all proves the inability for humans to accept innate animal traits. Humanity obfuscates the macroscopic behaviour by concentrating on the difficulty in relating individual behaviors with specific genes and this in turn obscures the important agenda of genes. Gould contends “the classical arguments of biological determinism fail because the features they invoke to make distinctions among groups are usually the products of cultural evolution” (1981, p.

325). “There is no direct evidence for genetic control of specific social behavior” (pp.

252-254). In this Gould may be correct. But above culture, above technology, and above altruism there is a common thread of behavior that is expressed as power, as capitalism, and is persistently animalistic. But Gould resists:

Most biologists would follow my argument in denying a genetic basis for most behavioral differences between groups and for change in the complexity of human societies through the recent history of our species. But what about the supposed constancies of personality and behavior, the traits of mind that humans share in all cultures? What, in short, about a general “human nature”? Some biologists would grant Darwinian processes a substantial role not only in establishing long ago, but also in actively maintaining now, a set of specific adaptive behaviors forming a biologically conditioned “human nature.” I believe that this old tradition of argument—which has found its most recent expression as “human sociobiology”—is invalid not because biology is irrelevant and human behavior only reflects a disembodied culture, but because human biology suggests a different and less constraining role for genetics in the analysis of human nature. (p.326)

It is hard to deny that behavioral differences linked to genes are difficult to prove, although there is a flurry of new research that attempts to do just that (Libet et al.1999,

Wegner, 2002), however, this discounted view of Gould’s does not explain behavior based on the need to reproduce, or the quest for power9 and or that these behaviors might be projected or manifested in other secondary behaviors. Microscopic behavioral differences or even cultural differences, regardless of whether they are deterministic, do

8 Please see Appendix E for Jameson’s explanation of the metaphorical problem. 9 Power is the violent dominance over competitors for the opportunity to reproduce and survive. V. Funk 8 not explain the predictable destiny of humans and all species to metamorphize into their own worst enemy when they enjoy full reproductive freedom and lack competitors.

Further to the point, humans are quintessential opportunists, including those humans involved in research. “Scholars,” Gould asserts, “learned lessons, withheld publications, responded to the pressures.” He calls it “socially driven science.” “Why is thought,” he reflects, “being a secretion of brain, more wonderful than gravity a property of matter? It is our arrogance, our admiration of ourselves” (1975, p.25-26). Stebbins concurs,

“…scientific exploration, in its quest for generalizations, overlooks the unique features of its objects to study to provide only a cross-sectional view” (2001, p. 11-12). By focusing too closely on the flaws in micro deterministic theory the overview of macroscopic behavior is missed. Of course this paper will fall far short of a conclusive answer or a definitive solution, but it may in some small way open a window to another idea that could help us out of the current apocalyptic endgame.

Darwinism and Evolutionary Theory

Evolution is a consistently misunderstood concept. Stephen Gould in Ever Since

Darwin: Reflections in Natural History (1975) attempts to clarify this variance:

Mere change within a basic type of living thing is not to be regarded as evolution. This fallacious equation of organic evolution with progress continues to have unfortunate consequences. …organic change led only to increasing adaptation between organisms and their own environment and not to an abstract ideal of progress defined by structural complexity or increasing heterogeneity. (p. 37)

Gould explains that anthropocentricism leads to a twisted view of evolution allotting values to higher orders of animals and particularly humans, but he cautions that there is no quality to the success of an organism, it is either successful or it isn’t, and that those V. Funk 9 organisms that are able to pass on genes are successful period. 10 Quoting Gould, “… who can say that one or the other is ‘better’ or any surer of evolutionary persistence?”11

And there are other equally interesting aspects of Darwin and his theory.12

One of the goals of this paper is to relate at some primal level the concept of capitalism and its survivalist competition with Darwinism and gene carrying progeny. It seems that the relationship is no accident because “[t]he theory of natural selection,” according to

Gould (1975, Appendix A), “established in perhaps unconscious analogy to the individualistic, laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith (whom Darwin had been studying intensely just before he formulated his theory), speaks only of individuals struggling for personal success.” But most importantly Gould asserts, “In modern terms, natural selection concerns the unconscious struggle of individuals to leave more of their genes in surviving offspring. Any benefits to species, any harmony in ecosystems, arise merely as a by-product of this struggle among individuals or, in the case of ecosystems, as a natural balance among competitors” (pp. 4-6). Gould asserts, “Darwin’s central postulate [was that] [n]ature provides no independent criterion of fitness; thus, natural selection is tautological” (p. 41). For an understanding of genetic determinism, this concept is paramount. Genes have no ideal, no intelligence, and no conscience; their sole purpose is to survive and reproduce via the format of the life form in which they exist.13 Edward

Wilson writes, “…how fully aware Darwin was that success in leaving progeny is a more

10 Also see Appendix P for an article taken from The Economist explaining the source of the misconception “survival of the fittest.” 11 Please refer to Appendix A for an explanation of the “radical implications of natural selection.” 12 Please see Appendix F for Gould’s explanation of “adaptation by evolution. “Science is not ‘organized common sense;’ at its most exciting, it reformulates our view of the anthropocentric prejudices that we call intuition.” 13 Wilson (1978) writes: “The reflective person knows that his life is in some incomprehensible manner guided through a biological ontogeny, a more or less fixed order of life stages. He senses that with all the drive, wit, love, pride, anger, hope, and anxiety that characterize the species he will in the end be sure only of helping to perpetuate the same cycle. Poets have defined this truth as tragedy. V. Funk 10 important component of natural selection than is mere survival.” (1983, p. 55). Genetic will is the will of genes to compete14 and to survive through progeny and precludes any long-term thinking of the human biological brain.15

For many in North America, enlightened as we immodestly contend to be, the concept of evolution is not accepted easily making any kind of counter anthropocentric argument a hard sell. David Quamman in a 2004 National Geographic article entitled “Was

Darwin Wrong” asserts that people, and more specifically creationists, “…agreed that

‘God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last

10,000 years or so,” and that “only 12 percent, believed that humans evolved from other life-forms without any involvement of a god” (p.6). Included in this same survey: 45% believed God created humans in their present form, 37% could allow both God and

Darwin. These figures evidence the room in American society for anthropocentric error and religious license while the timing of the article seems poetically sweet given the election of 2004 and the rebounding Christian fundamentalism.

Quamman argues the validity of evolution under four main headings. Biogeography is the “pattern among… ‘closely allied’ species—that is, similar creatures sharing roughly the same body plan.” Examples are several species of zebras in Africa. “Paleontology,”

Quamman contends, “reveals a similar clustering pattern in the dimension of time,” in other words, the geological record of fossils. Thirdly, embryology or the study of embryos speaks of evolution. Of interest here, for example, is the mammalian embryo as

14 Competition is only necessary when there are competitors for food and territory in an essentially closed system. Humans in opposition to nature successfully eliminate competitors allowing over-use of resources. 15 Samir Rihani (2002) presents a convincing argument of knowledge passed through the generations of genes. Unfortunately for humans and the planet the postmodern model of progress is unfolding so quickly and so destructively there will be precious little knowledge gained before the biosphere collapses. Please see Appendix M. Also, Appendix C contains Gould’s counter argument defending culture as the medium of knowledge over any deterministic defence.

V. Funk 11 it passes through its stages resembles reptilian embryos. And finally there is morphology, or the “sorting into a hierarchy of categories” such as different categories of cats, of primates, or of birds (pp. 9-13). Using these four categories of evidence and elements of adaptation in life forms, Darwin, and the generations of scientists who have followed him, has been able to piece together the sequential puzzle that got us here.

The puzzle of the evolution of the large brain as explained by Thomas Homer-Dixon in The Ingenuity Gap, involves the pressures of adaptation:

Something happened during the last two million years—a period that encompasses what experts call the Pleistocene epoch from 1,8 million to 10,000 years ago—to drive the growth of the hominid brain. Some powerful evolutionary pressure selected for the ferocious intellectual powers that modern humans deploy. The orthodox explanation, first proposed by Charles Darwin and named the savanna hypothesis, focuses on the shrinking of the forests in Africa caused by the climate’s cooling and drying around the beginning of the Pleistocene. As vast tracts of savanna opened up, early hominids were forced to descend from the trees and survive on the plains. Eventually they evolved to walk on two feet, eat meat, use language, and make tools and weapons to feed and defend themselves. Brain expansion accompanied the evolution of this tightly integrated set of characteristics common to modern human beings. (2000, p. 196-97)

Intuitively, it would seem that Homo sapiens’ very large brain would be used not only to promote the welfare of humanity but also to protect its vital habitat; unfortunately, this is not the case. The brain then, must be seen as an adaptation, however complex, specifically designed to promote genetic survival through progeny, period, while altruism if present may be confused for cooperation. There is no higher purpose; humans are not exempt from the indifference of nature.16 Central to the argument that genetic will is the driving force behind human nature is the correlate of short-term thinking. It is the clue to this puzzle. Truly, if the human brain had a real penchant for long-term thinking then most of the current problems, all driven by human

16 Philosophy under this tenet becomes an idle pastime; there is no purpose to thinking other than the production of progeny, and for now, entertainment. The existential realities of nature preclude ideologies and their paradigms. There is only one purpose under heaven. Please see Appendix B. V. Funk 12 society, would evaporate.17 In these terms then, the long-term success of genes is achieved through the short-term pursuance of sex.

David Barash, with his daughter Nanelle, has written an excellent account of Darwin in literature (2005). Through literature they humorously examine the underlying agenda of human nature. “Men,” they assert, “need not have reproduction in mind; it is in their genes. Sex is the route, reproduction the destination” (pp. 78-79). Again, it is the misleading human intuition that confuses a clear understanding of the primal needs of genes; instead that understanding is replaced with an ideology or a perceived higher purpose. Barash and Barash write, “[b]ehind the superficial façade of satisfying one’s needs or responding to one’s fears lies the deeper purpose of satisfying the ever-present, bottom-line requirement of evolutionary success” (p. 132).18 Barash and Barash go on to give examples of the similarities in behavior of humans and other animals: “…resource- rich males of nearly every species become remarkably attractive at a level that often goes beyond (or beneath) conscious awareness” (p. 43). They outline the predictability of partner preferences in literature: for men there is a preference for youth and physical attractiveness in women, while women look for wealth and reliability in men, and in both kindness is interpreted as good behavior and intelligence as good genes (p. 54-55). 19

Barash and Barash posit:

17 It is important to remember the fundamental truth that the current big problems facing humanity are the direct result of human intervention in nature that is followed awkwardly by short-term high tech solutions. In our quest for the domination of nature that domination has precipitated its collapse. * This is remembering that nature of itself doesn’t have problems; nature simply adjusts, as do the survivors, to a new set of rules. 18 They simplify life as the three F’s—“feeding, fighting, and fornication,” and as an example with reference to Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, they contend that the book is “about as biological as anything gets” (p.87). 19 Maclean’s April 17, 2006, p.8 A snippet entitled “Trophy hunting” reads: Over the years, countless studies have shown that, as a rule, women week out men with cash, and men seek out women with looks. But according to a new British study, being rich is no longer enough to guarantee a man his pick of the V. Funk 13

The point is that human beings, like other creatures, have been endowed with an inclination to have sex with partners who are especially attractive. Delving into that inclination, we see that it is an evolutionary bequeathal from a precontraceptive world when such choices were more directly connected to reproductive consequences. Although the technology has changed, our genes have hardly noticed. This is not to say that Darwinian urges are necessarily unconscious. Anna and Vronsky know perfectly well they want to have sex. But it’s the evolutionary logic behind it—the reproductive payoff and ultimate motivating force—that operates not only below the belt but also below the level of conscious awareness. (p. 100).

[And] [t]he point is not that because something is true of ants (or bees, or zebras, or prairie dogs) it is also true of people. Rather, it is that evolutionary genetics has revealed a powerful general rule, something to which a remarkably wide range of living things adhere. It takes extraordinary hubris—not to mention willful denial of the basic facts of life—to claim that we are qualitatively different from the rest of the living world. To be sure, human beings are many things to themselves and others. But, no less than our fellow creatures, people are also the way their genes act out their goals. (p. 131).

Barash and Barash continue:

To an extent only rarely appreciated by social scientists, and essentially not at all by self- proclaimed experts in literature—including classicists, whose contact with the raw ferocity of the blood-soaked Homeric epics should have taught them better—the human and animal estate are now, and have ever been, fundamentally identical. (p. 32)

This point is crucial to the flagrant maligned concept of anthropocentricism. With signs of our animal past so evident in literature and in life—art following life or life following art—it would seem, or should seem more obvious. There is so much evidence, for example, David Quamman cites Nature (February 15, 2001) that “[t]he mouse genome effort, according to Nature’s editors, had revealed ‘about 30,000 genes, with 99% having direct counterparts in humans’” (2004, p. 20). In literature there are a multitude of books, for example, The Lord of the Flies, that display this correlation. In relationships there is the reality of polygamy; in sports there is the violence of football or hockey—modern gladiators all. But this denial of any primal connection to the planet and other life forms allows humans to rationalize the atrocities currently and historically at play as ideological and cultural realities.

ladies. Researchers at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland interviewed close to 2000 heterosexual women and found that the more financially secure a woman is, the more likely she is to prioritize physical attractiveness over wealth. Donald Trump would likely beg to differ. Julia Roberts’ husband would not. V. Funk 14

J. William Worden, gives further evidence of a primal connection in his book Grief

Counselling and Grief Therapy (2001), as he describes attachment theory and parallel behaviors in monkeys. Although more complex forms of reasoning comparable to those of humans may be impossible for monkeys and other primates, emotional responses similar to those in humans are consistently demonstrated. Similar emotional manifestations in terms of attachment loss and grief are also evident in other mammals, some birds, and so on. Mourning responses in animals, according to Worden, show the primitive biological processes are at work in humans. Jeffery Masson (2003) in The Pig

Who Sang to the Moon concurs: “[t]rue, humans have the capacity for metaphysical reasoning, but it is not at all clear to some people that this is such a great advantage that it should single us out from all other animals” (2003, pp. 210-11). Masson goes on to discuss the behaviorist perspective and radical behaviorism in particular. This perspective denies the “existence of subjective entities” and “questions about what an animal might be thinking and feeling become the very type of question that was not permitted to be asked” (p. 212). Donald Hebb (in Wegner, 2002, p. 24) writes:

A thoroughgoing attempt to avoid anthropocentric description in the study of temperament was made over a two-year period at the Yerkes laboratories… All that resulted was an almost endless series of specific acts in which no order or meaning could be found. On the other hand, by the use of frankly anthropomorphic concepts of emotion and attitude one could quickly and easily describe the peculiarities of individual animals, and with this information a newcomer to the staff could handle the animals as he could not safely otherwise. Whatever the anthropomorphic terminology may seem to imply about conscious states in the chimpanzee, it provides an intelligible and practical guide to behavior. (p. 24)

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Masson supports the seemingly radical concept that animals (some more than others) are capable of possessing a consciousness and have emotional depth, but there is resistance from anthropocentric traditions.20 Masson writes:

Jaak Panksepp, one of America’s leading neuroscientists, strongly believes in the existence of emotions in animals. He begins his landmark book Affective Neuroscience: The Foundation of Human and Animal Emotions, by observing that there is no doubt that both animal and human brains are wired for dreaming, anticipation, the pleasures of eating, anger, fear, love and lust, maternal acceptance, grief, play and joy, and “even those that represent ‘the self’ as a coherent entity within the brain.” 21 (in Masson, p. 209)

Although humans exhibit more complex thought patterns, conveniently available to us through language, the brain seldom overrides and often facilitates similar behavior of animals—residuum from our evolutionary past. Humans anthropocentrically accuse animals of acting instinctively while at the same time lacking consciousness. Perhaps the ultimate irony will be the “discovery” that animals really do possess a consciousness and humans really do act instinctively.

Neurological Analysis

When man studies himself with honest impartiality, he observes that he is not the conscious and voluntary artisan either of his feelings or of his thoughts, and that his feelings and his thoughts are only phenomena which happen to him.22 Hubert Benoit

A controversy is raging today about the power of our minds. Intuitively we know that our conscious thoughts can guide our actions. Yet the chief philosophies of our time proclaim, in the name of science, that we are mechanical systems governed, fundamentally, entirely by impersonal laws that operate at the level of our microscopic constituents.23 Henry P. Stapp

20 Please see Appendix E where Frederic Jameson outlines how anthropocentric constructs use language as a proof or counterproof to separate humans from any primal reality. 21 Jaak Panksepp (1998). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press. 22 Hubert Benoit (1990, p. 29) in (Libet et al. 1999, p. 79.) 23 Stapp, Henry P. 1999. “Attention, Intention, and Will in Quantum Physics.” Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland Eds. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Thorverton, U.K.: Imprint Academic. p. 142. V. Funk 16

David Hume (1711-76) “was the first modern empiricist to refuse any aid either from a priori principles of reasoning, or from any other ideology that ensures a harmony between our perceptions and the world” (Blackburn, 1996, p.180). The temptation to pseudoscience of any form opens the door to a myriad of self-legitimizing theories that use spurious logic and only confuse. Hume’s point that most ideologies “ensure harmony between our perceptions and the world” is an important one. We build anthropocentric ideologies to answer questions our biological brain was not designed to ask, hence religion, philosophy, and even capitalist driven science—science with an agenda—are created to quell our discontent.24 This insight, however, is not new.

Way back in 1874 T.H. Huxley already had problems with the overtly obvious idea of volition: “The feeling we call volition is not the cause of the voluntary act, but simply the symbol in consciousness of that stage of the brain which is the immediate cause of the act” (in Wegner, 2005, p. 29). And Wegner cautions, “[w] don’t see our own gears turning because we’re busy reading our minds” (p. 26). “[C]ausation can’t be a property of a person’s conscious intention,” he continues, “[y]ou can’t see your conscious intention causing an action but can only infer this from the constant relation between intention and action” (p. 13). 25 Reality for humans is largely a belief—ask voters at

24 The problem comes in knowing which unanswerable questions to ask. (Pilbeam 1980: 268; quoted in Fedigan 1986: 58) (in Haraway). 25 Wegner (2002) writes: “The property of goal seeking is not something we attribute just to living things; we may appreciate this feature in computers or robots or even thermostats. But the important characteristic of such goal-seeking entities is that we understand them in terms of where we think they are headed rather than in terms of where we think they have been. Unlike a mere object, which moves or ‘acts’ only when it has been caused to do so by some prior event, a causal agent moves or acts apparently on its own, in the pursuit of some future state—the achievement of a goal. Fritz Heider (1958) observed that people perceive persons as causal agents—origins of events—and that this is the primary way in which persons are understood in a manner that physical objects and events are not” (p. 16). The concept that people (men) are causal agents and animals, objects, or even women are not leads to the obviously flawed anthropocentric- androcentric view. V. Funk 17 election time. The imagination creates a reality that we act upon, but the reality is a belief that has many influences, one of which is the effect of genetic will.

In the anthology entitled The Volitional Brain (Libet et al, 1999), Jonathan Bricklin discusses the illusive nature of will and the difficulty in trying to capture its essence.26

“What we believe to be acts of free will,” Bricklin continues, “are automatic reactions to stimuli of unascertainable origin” (p. 97). In other words there is no surety to the source of will and though signals a priori may originate in the brain we do not know if these signals are unique to the human brain or if they exist in many animals. It is likely that humans are too willing to give themselves ample undue credit for being willful when that may not be the case, while depreciating animals for what we interpret as a lack of intelligent characteristics that can lead to conscious will. “The will in this traditional way of thinking,” confides Wegner (2005), “is an explanatory entity of the first order. It explains lots of things but nothing explains it” (p. 12).

Daniel Wegner (2002) outlines a theory of “apparent mental causation” as: People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action (p. 64). “Will,” he continues, “is experienced as the result of self-perceived apparent mental causation” (pp. 65-66). On the “idealization of agency he writes;

We perceive minds by using the idea of an agent to guide our perception. In the case of human agency, we typically do this by assuming that there is an agent that pursues goals and that the agent is conscious of the goals and will find it useful to achieve them. All this is a fabrication, of course, a way of making sense of behavior. It works much better, at least as a shorthand, than does perceiving only mechanistic causation. As in the case of any constructed entity (such as the idea of justice or the idea of the perfect fudge), the ideal can serve as a guide to the perception of the real that allows us to fill in parts of the real that we can’t see. We come to expect that human agents will have goals and that they know consciously what the goals are before they pursue them. This idealization of agency serves as the basis for going back and filling in such goal and intention knowledge even when it doesn’t exist. Eventually, however, this strategy leads us to the odd pass of assuming that we must have been consciously aware of what we wanted to do

26 Entitled “ A Variety of Religious Experience: William James and the Non-Reality of Free Will”. V. Funk 18

in performing actions we don’t understand or perhaps even remember—just to keep up the appearance that we ourselves are agents with conscious will. (pp. 146-47)

Without true knowledge of causation and the imaginative fabrication of motive, the true biological source of causation is naturally obscured.27

Lauren Slater concurs and in her article entitled “This Thing Called Love” (National

Geographic, February 2006), posits that “we are so hardwired and yet unconscious of the wiring” (p. 39).28 She continues:

Evolutionary psychology has said good riddance to Freud and the Oedipal complex and all that other transcendent stuff and hello to simple survival skills. It hypothesizes that we tend to see as attractive, and thereby choose as mates, people who look healthy. And health, say these evolutionary psychologists, is manifested in a woman with a 70 percent waist-to-hip ratio and men with rugged features that suggest a strong supply of testosterone in their blood. Waist-to-hip ratio is important for the successful birth of a baby, and studies have shown this precise ratio signifies higher fertility. As for the rugged look, well, a man with a good dose of testosterone probably also has a strong immune system and so is more likely to give his partner healthy children. (p. 39)

“Scientists now believe,” Slater writes, “that romance is panhuman, embedded in our brains since Pleistocene times,” and to anthropologist Helen Fisher, “pair-bonding is ultimately driven by the mating instinct, wired into the most primitive part of our brains”

(in Slater, 2006, p. 43-44). Barash and Barash write:

Any woman prospecting for a reproductive partner can therefore be forgiven—nay, expected—to evaluate whether he seems suitable in this regard (“a man’s inclination and ability to take care of kids”). Speaking biologically, it is a matter of predicting a partner’s likely level of parental investment—which requires not only that a presumed investor has the wherewithal to invest, but also the inclination to do so. (Note, by the way, that such assessments are likely to be hardwired into the human psyche, not at all attenuated by a possible commitment to intentional childlessness.) (2005, p. 52)

Of course this line of argument plays directly into the age-old “nature versus nurture” or biological determinism debate, which is accused, not unjustly, of having an agenda:

27 Please see Appendices Q and R, which expand on the indeterminate nature of finding definitive will or cause. 28 Daniiel Wegner (2002) highlights an important premise to this unconscious source of will which, “rel[ies] on the assumption that conscious will is an experience, not a cause. This means that the thoughts we attach to our actions are not necessarily the true causes of the actions, and their causal connection is something we ascribe to them” (P. 95). V. Funk 19

The biological determinist argument is fundamental to the functionalist perspective and to most conservative arguments against changes aimed at greater gender equality. It can serve as the basis for discrimination and the reproduction of structured inequality and can inhibit social changes, as can the “nature” (as opposed to nurture) position in general. (Teevan, 1995, p. 97)

The goal (intention29) of this paper is to go beyond social convention and look at the overarching genetic will that seems to make capitalism such a “good fit” with the human animal, or why over-population and over-consumption threaten our very existence.

Again, the intention here is not to try to dispel what James Teevan calls myths of

“natural” gender differences (pp. 98- 100), but rather, the goal is to investigate similarities to animals that have not been abandoned along the evolutionary trail and haunt us from deep inside our genetic information—similarities that may sabotage the length of our stay on this planet.

The answers are not clear because there is a biological/quantum physics component to irrationality of human action.30 Certainly the effect of culture on individual thought is enormous, but as Barash and Barash contend, “[i]t may be startling to some—especially those who have not kept up with recent advances in biological science—but the evidence is now undeniable that much of human life is not socially constructed” (2005, p. 2) 31, and

29 By some rules in the game of pool, you have to call your shots. You have to say where the ball is going to go, and sometimes even how it will get there (“Thirteen in the corner pocket off the nine”). This prevents you from claiming you meant to do that when half a dozen balls drop into pockets on a lucky shot. Life, however, is not always played by this rule. For some amount of what we do every day, our conscious intentions are vague, inchoate, unstudied, or just plain absent. We just don’t think consciously in advance about everything we do, although we try to maintain appearances that this is the case. The murkiness of our intentions doesn’t seem to bother us much, though, as we typically go right along doing things and learning only at the time or later what it is we are doing. And, quite remarkable, we may then feel a sense of conscious will for actions we did not truly anticipate and even go on to insist that we had intended them all along… Even when we didn’t know what we were doing in advance, we may trust our theory that we consciously will our actions and so find ourselves forced to imagine or confabulate memories of ‘prior’ consistent thoughts” (Wegner, 2002, pp.145-46). 30 And as a friend of mine, Dr. Brian Rudrick, a pathologist with a psychiatric specialty, so eloquently put it: “The brain is a biological machine. Why should it be subject to different laws of physics?” 31 It is the contention here that some aspects of human life are socially constructed and some are not. It is the contention of this paper that the macroscopic overview of human activity would imply that humans exhibit the same behavior as other life forms whether the comparators have socially constructed lives or V. Funk 20

Claxton (1999, p.107) concurs, “all that really is at stake here is the fact that consciousness is not privy to most of the workings of this model.32 The argument is that there is an underlying genetic will which is not necessarily part of consciousness and has its own pervasive agenda.

Another area of great contention is that of aggression. Humans seem perpetually perplexed by their own inhumanity and they persistently try to intellectualize, or mysticize, what is likely a biological problem. Edward O. Wilson, in his landmark work

Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) attempted to tie sociological relationships and biological realities into a new theory of evolutionary reality. Although some of the work is disputatious and now aging in the face of new genetic research, the book is still valued, as evidenced by the worn condition of the copy I consulted. On aggression Wilson writes:

Is aggression in man adaptive? From the biologist’s point of view it certainly seems to be. It is hard to believe that any characteristic so widespread and easily invoked in a species as aggressive behavior is in man could be neutral or negative in its effects on individual survival and reproduction. To be sure, overt aggressiveness is not a trait in all or even a majority of human cultures. But in order to be adaptive it is enough that aggressive patterns be evoked only under certain conditions of stress such as those that might arise during food shortages and periodic high population densities. (pp. 254-55)

Conditions such as those highlighted by Wilson of food shortages or high population densities induce similar behavior in animals; these behaviors are outside of consciousness; aggression arises when there is a threat to survival or competition for mates; it is a hardwired reaction on behalf of genetic progeny. Claxton asserts:

not. The evidence against the social constructivist argument is long: depleted oceans, climate change, loss of arable land, expansion of capitalism leading to over-use and pollution of biosphere etc. If human influence was only socially constructed then the argument would have to be supported by evidence and it is not. 32 In the strongest version of the ‘unconscious HQ’ model, conscious experiences, even those that seem to show the mind at its most rational, articulate or deliberate, are represented as corollaries of embodied activation states that are themselves neither conscious nor open to direct introspection—ever. [Could this be instinct in sheep’s clothing?] V. Funk 21

The way people think about their ‘will’—the folk model of the relationship between what we think or intend and what we actually do—is perhaps the area of human psychology where all the considerations illustrated in this preamble loom the largest and weigh most heavily. A fortiori, we have to approach the phenomena of ‘free will’ distrustful of observations that seem immediate and unequivocal, and construals that appear self- evident. It certainly seems as if each of us is a center of volition, and that conscious deliberation plays a causal role in determining our plans and actions—albeit an intermittent one. And sophisticated theoretical superstructures can be built which seem to buttress, but which actual presuppose, this ‘common sense’ (e.g. Baars, 1997; Sperry, 1985). Even—perhaps especially—when in academic mode, we have to try to see where unexamined belief or self-interest might lead to a preference for one view over another, and how this might in turn result in an unconscious epistemological squint or a tendency to load the observation dice. (1999, p. 101).

Libet concurs:

First, it may be pointed out that free choices or acts are not predictable, even if they should be completely determined. The ‘uncertainty principle’ of Heisenberg precludes our having a complete knowledge of the underlying molecular activities. Quantum mechanics forces us to deal with probabilities rather than with certainties of events. And, in chaos theory, a random event may shift the behavior of a whole system, in a way that was not predictable. However, even if events are not predictable in practice, they might nevertheless be in accord with natural laws and therefore determined. (p. 55)

Of course, as Libet articulates, believing that there is no free will sets up a dangerous problem and “we must recognize that the almost universal experience that we can act with a free, independent choice provides a kind of prima facie evidence that conscious mental processes can causatively control some brain processes” (1994). But the issue here is at a deeper level; it is at the level of animal emotion, survival, and reproduction.

Claxton adds:

Self-as-instigator is really a simple subroutine, added to the biocomputer, which does not affect the latter’s modus operandi at all, but which simply takes the glimmerings of a naturally-arising prediction, and instantly generates a ‘command’ to bring about what was probably going to happen anyway. “Faced with our inability to “see”, by “introspection”, where the center or source of our free actions is, and loath to abandon our conviction that we really do things (for which we are responsible), we exploit the cognitive vacuum, the gaps in our self-knowledge, by filling it with a rather magical and mysterious entity, the 33 unmoved mover, the active self,’ summarizes Dennett. (p. 111).

Some of the concepts discussed here, and many more that have not add to the new technology in computerization. Homer-Dixon (2000) writes:

33 This looks suspiciously like cognitive dissonance. For an explanation see page 35. V. Funk 22

In software, computer scientists are now experimenting with a technique—called “genetic programming”—in which computer programs essentially design themselves. Inside a computer the scientists create a Darwinian environment where individual computer programs compete with others to solve a problem of interest. Through a process akin to natural selection, those programs that do well are allowed to reproduce and swap computer code with other successful programs; those that don’t are eliminated from the population. The best programs that emerge, after many iterations of selection and reproduction, can be completely opaque to an outside expert, containing hundreds of inscrutable expressions in computer code. But they can also work better than expert- designed programs. (pp. 268-69)

But like these new computers the design of genes is to avoid short-term elimination.

Wilson (1978) concludes:

Because the guides of human nature must be examined with a complicated arrangement of mirrors, they are a deceptive subject, always the philosopher’s deadfall. The only way forward is to study human nature as part of the natural sciences in an attempt to integrate the natural science with the social sciences and humanities. I can conceive of no ideological or formalistic shortcut. Neurobiology cannot be learned at the feet of a guru. The consequences of genetic history cannot be chosen by legislators. Above all, for our own physical well-being if nothing else, ethical philosophy must not be left in the hands of the merely wise. Although human progress can be achieved by intuition and force of will, only hard-won empirical knowledge of our biological nature will allow us to make optimum choices among the competing criteria of progress. (Appendix K)

Philosophical Meditation

Historically, philosophy has been

optimis[tic] about the possibility of a pure or ‘first’ philosophy, taking an a priori standpoint from which other intellectual practices can be impartially assessed and subjected to logical evaluation and correction. The late 20th-century spirit of the subject is hostile to any such possibility, and prefers to see philosophical reflection as continuous with the best practice of any field of intellectual enquiry. (Blackburn, 1996, p. 286)34

Consistent with that definition this paper will question the validity of verstehen, particularly with respect to the a priori notion of anthropocentricism heretofore supported by most philosophies and religions. Instead, the search will be for the verisimilitude of

34 In addition there is the philosophy of biology, “[a]s a special science biology prompts the general philosophical problem of how its explanations relate to those of underlying chemistry, or even fundamental physics. Biology also raises acute questions of its own. One is whether the theoretical taxonomies or principles of classification of living things into species and families reflect real differences, or are reflections of conventions” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 44). V. Funk 23 theories; the goal will be to reach beyond the simulacrum35 of left-brain constructs for a truth that reduces the hubris. The logic of anthropocentricism is disrespectful and a fortiori sets a precedent for large-scale destruction.

For Camus the truth is vacuous as he describes the human condition: “Far from lacking all sensibility, humankind is driven by a tenacious and therefore profound passion, the passion for an absolute and for truth. This truth is as yet a negative one, a truth born of living and feeling, but without which no triumph over the self or over the world will ever be possible” (2000, p. 119). Sartre is on a parallel search and finds nothing but self-made meaning:

What do we mean by saying existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him as not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing—as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. (Kaufmann, 1989, p. 349)

In an existential and indifferent universe “we are thrown back upon our own freedom” – and this freedom allows Homo sapiens to invent imaginative entertainments that still only amount to atavistic behaviors of old (Blackburn, 1996, p.130).

Within these disparate etiolgical searches and within the boundaries of philosophy there is a need for ethics, for morality, and for reason. If ethics was the reduced truth then perhaps humans could be finally controlled and they could be manipulated into a freewill of morality, but philosophy has failed to do this. Philosophy is merely a culmination of meaningless a priori musings, because the truth in philosophy—the mead

35 Baudrillard’s seminal work addresses the attraction to “the more real than real” of postmodern marketing and communication and speaks of the unreal lives and concepts lived out inside the human mind. Jean Baudrillard, (1988). The Ecstasy of Communication. Trans. Bernard Schutze and Caroline Schutze. New York: Columbia University. V. Funk 24 of wisdom—is entertaining conjecture that smacks of naïve realism or naïve subjectivism.36 The logos, or divine natural order, become a psuedo-rationality similar to theodicy in Christianity and a rationalization of anthropocentricism that evolves into reification of practice or cultural materialism. The difficulty, of course, is that ethics and morality do not bear any meaning as to why we are here—truth has left the building.

This dilemma reveals the surreptitious egoistic short-term thinking characteristic of genetic influence.37 The brain is designed to capitalize on biological advantage, which often manifests itself in other projected behavior, so cultural indoctrinations of ethical training are only partially successful and last only until primal urges take over.38 Post- structuralism is antithetical to the behaviorist perspective; while determinism and behaviorism39 look coldly at the overview of human or animal activity post-structuralists

36 Naïve Realism: The view that in sense-experience we directly perceive the objects of the external world is direct realism. The view is the natural view of people everywhere, and of philosophers when they are off-duty, but it remains naïve until it is buttressed by explanations of how experience may change while things do not, how illusion is possible, how colours and sounds can be regarded as properties of things independent of us, and so forth. Naïve Subjectivism: The view in the theory of ethics that when a person makes a moral judgment about some topic, they are strictly and literally describing their own feelings about the topic. The view has the disadvantage that if the speaker is sincere, then what is said will be true. That is, if when I say that liberalism is good I merely describe my feelings about liberalism, then, so long as I feel that it is good, what I say will be true. The conflation of sincerity and truth is avoided by more subtle approaches to moral discourse. (Blackburn, 1996, p.254) 37 For an enhanced discussion of ethics and the evolution of the human brain please see Appendix B, and see Wilson’s discussion of ethics in Appendix K. 38 It follows that this deterministic argument opposes the post-structuralist view: Post-structuralism (in Blackburn, 1994, p.295) “echoes Nietzsche’s hostility to the reduction of human phenomena to lawlike generalizations associating such views with the philosophical underpinnings of determinist systems such as Marxism and instead celebrating the formless, or the subjective and spontaneous. Leaning heavily on the psychoanalytic dissolution of the self, it provides one manifestation of the skeptical stance of postmodernism, in particular by refusing any concepts of objectivity, reality, and truth.” 39 Tenets of behaviorism include: a) The proper subject of study in psychology is not the mind but behavior, defined as the observable actions of people and other animals. a) The appropriate goal of psychology is to identify the environmental conditions that cause individuals to behave in particular ways. a) The achievement of this goal does not require reference to the mind or to any unobservable events occurring within the individual. In fact, such reference should be avoided. It is enough simply to describe the lawful environment-behavior relationships. V. Funk 25 tend to be more humanistic and consequently optimistic about human nature.

Unfortunately, there is no end in sight to the damage resulting from the festering human activity on the planet.

To accuse genes of derailing moral40 behavior is a deterministic stand that evokes plenty of opposition. Determinism, or the doctrine that every event in this case has a biological cause, has implications for freewill and quantum physics.41 To repeat, Fredric

Jameson (1991) contends the fundamental problem with articulating biological determinism is charging that Homo sapiens are like other life forms; the proof is lost in metaphor and analogy. He is correct—absolutely. How can anthropocentric humans possibly accept premises that compare them to animals?42 To be sure, there are valid arguments against deterministic stands. The problem is that determinism can be used to justify a corrupt status quo, Bookchin’s main argument, with the result that any validity of deterministic arguments is contaminated. Stephen Gould expands:

The protracted and intense debate surrounding biological determinism has arisen as a function of its social and political message. …[B]iological determinism has always been used to defend existing social arrangements as biologically inevitable—from “for ye have the poor always with you” to nineteenth-century imperialism to modern sexism. Why else would a set of ideas so devoid of factual support gain such a consistently good press from established media throughout the centuries? This usage is quite out of control of individual scientists who propose deterministic theories for a host of reasons, often benevolent. I make no attribution of motive in Wilson’s or anyone else’s case. Neither do I reject determinism because I dislike its political usage. Scientific truth, as we understand it, must be our primary criterion. We live with several unpleasant biological truths, death being the most undeniable and ineluctable. If genetic determinism is true, we will learn to live with it as well. But I reiterate my statement that no evidence exists to support it, that the crude versions of past centuries have been conclusively disproved, and that its

a) No fundamental difference exists between human behavior and that of other animals or between the methods that should be used to study humans and other animals. (Grey, 1999, p.14) 40 Deontological ethics is defined as “[e]thics based on the notion of a duty, or what is right, or rights, as opposed to ethical systems based on the idea of achieving some good state of affairs or the qualities of character necessary to live well” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 100). 41 Some of these concepts were briefly discussed in the section “Neurological Analysis” and in Appendices N and R. 42 See Appendix E. V. Funk 26

continued popularity is a function of social prejudice among those who benefit most from the status quo. (1975, p.258)

A problem with determinism is that it is not intuitively felt and culture elicits many second level causes of freewill.43 This set of causes may consist of cultural ideologies, cultural norms, and so on. Foucault, for example, argues that both education and socialization via disciplinary power produce ideologies (2000, p. 131).44

Knowledge—a surface effect, something prefigured in human nature—plays its game in the presence of the instincts, above them, among them; it curbs them, it expresses a certain state of tension or appeasement between the instincts. But knowledge cannot be deduced analytically, according to a kind of natural derivation. It cannot be deduced in a necessary way from the instincts themselves. Knowledge doesn’t really form part of human nature. Conflict, combat, the outcome of the combat, and, consequently, risk and chance are what gives rise to knowledge. Knowledge is not instinctive, it is counterinstinctive; just as it is not natural, but counternatural. (p.8)

Power then, is political and ideological and can be viewed in the Foucaultian post- structural unified sense. For the purposes of this paper power is a manifestation of genetic will—and so is knowledge.45* Evolutionary power, in opposition to the post-

43 Gould also highlights “A contemporary note: Lombroso’s brand of criminal anthropology is dead, but his basic postulate lives on in popular notions of criminal genes or chromosomes. These modern incarnations are worth about as much as Lombroso’s original version. Their hold on our attention only illustrates the unfortunate appeal of biological determinism in our continuing attempt to exonerate a society in which so many of us flourish by blaming the victim” (1975, p. 224). 44 “Foucault uses the idea of power/knowledge as actions that produce effects. Power/knowledge is enacted through discursive regimes that are unified ways of thinking about things, people, events. These unified ways of thinking place constraints on what can and cannot be thought” (Filax, 2006, Athabasca University). . 45 Although Foucault discusses Kant’s positive slant on the French Revolution, for example, as a “sign of progress” and “free use of reason,” he does not share “Kant’s confidence that humans will in fact ever attain rational maturity in the Kantian sense” (2000. p. xxxv). * “Knowledge must struggle against a world without order, without connectedness, without form, without beauty, without wisdom, without harmony, and without law. That is the world that knowledge deals with. There is nothing in knowledge that enables it, by any right whatever, to know this world. It is not natural for nature to be known. Thus, between the instincts and knowledge, one finds not a continuity but, rather, a relation of struggle, domination, servitude, settlement. In the same way, there can be no relation of natural continuity between knowledge and the things that knowledge must know. There can only be a relation of violence, domination, power, and force, a relation of violation. Knowledge can only be a violation of the things to be known, and not a perception, a recognition, an identification of or with those things” (p. 9). * “If there is no relation between knowledge and things to be known, if the relation between knowledge and known things is arbitrary, if it is a relation of power and violence, the existence of God at the center of the system of knowledge is no longer indispensable. As a matter of fact, in the same passage from the Gay Science where he speaks of the absence of order, connectedness, form and beauty in the world, Nietzsche asks, “When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de- deification of nature?” (p.10). Continued on following page. V. Funk 27 structuralist perspective, is violent, predatory, and competitive. For Agamben “…power no longer has today any form of legitimization other than emergency, and because power everywhere and continuously refers and appeals to emergency as well as laboring secretly to produce it” (2000, p. 6). Some forms are conscious and many are so ingrained they become unconscious. Any cause that might be genetic in nature, however, may be considered a first level cause and is not part of the consciousness other than the obvious—either hungry or horny.

Included in this set is the egoistic desire to promote one’s own genetic material which can be done so well through our many cultural institutions and the paradigm of capitalism including a regression “steadily toward self-indulgence” (Wilson, 1978). Edward

Wilson writes:

I believe that the human mind is constructed in a way that locks it inside this fundamental constraint (…no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history) and forces it to make choices with a purely biological instrument.

The essence of the argument, then is that the brain exists because it promotes the survival and multiplication of the genes that direct its assembly. The human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques. (Please see Appendix K for Wilson’s expansive argument.)

Forces and reason, then, that use the biological deterministic argument to rationalize patriarchy for example, are doing what they do best; it is genetic will that uses the brain, its own adaptive invention, to better the situation of the biological machine that will carry them (the genes) egoistically into the future. Patriarchy promotes the situation of men,

* “So one can see why Nietzsche declares that it is the philosopher who is the most likely to be wrong about the nature of knowledge, since he always thinks of it in the form of congruence, love, unity, and pacification. Thus, if we seek to ascertain what knowledge is, we must not look to the form of life, of existence, of asceticism that characterize the philosopher. If we truly wish to know knowledge, to know what it is, to apprehend it at its root, in its manufacture, we must look not to philosophers but to politicians—we need to understand what the relations of struggle and power are. One can understand what knowledge consists of only by examining these relations of struggle and power, the manner in which things and men hate one another, fight one another, and try to dominate one another, to exercise power relations over one another” (p. 12). V. Funk 28 and more specifically some men, while subordinating women. This has made it acceptable for stronger more powerful men to pass on genetic material and this drama has set the stage for capitalism. The status quo, including patriarchy, is so stubbornly corrupt because of the tenacious nature of these egoistic forces; otherwise, morality and equality would have been achieved eons ago. Equality is not the name of the genetic game.46

Male power in any form, however, does not overshadow the similar needs of females to survive and reproduce and it is here that the tenets of patriarchy, or matriarchy, get murky, as the relationship between the sexes is a heavily socialized area of power.

Genetic survival and reproduction is a singular self-interested effort and any altruistic or ethical group behavior has been deemed at some point in history as a benefit to the individual.

Samir Rihani (2002) concurs,” The driving force in natural selection is not the good of the species, or group, but the good, meaning survival, of the individual gene. The most significant action in natural evolution takes place, therefore, at the level of the basic unit, the selfish gene” (Dawkins, 1989, p. 19).47

Gould (1975) writes:

Sigmund Freud examined the agonizing dilemma of human social life. We are by nature selfish and aggressive, yet any successful civilization demands that we suppress our biological inclinations and act altruistically for common good and harmony. Freud argued further that as civilizations become increasingly complex and “modern,” we must renounce more and more of our innate selves. This we do imperfectly, with guilt, pain, and hardship; the price of civilization is individual suffering. (p.260)

The nature of postmodern capitalism would seem to support Freud’s assertion but for deeper reasons than some superficial psychological conflict. Since genes seek self- serving ends through the biological machines they inhabit they must act altruistically

46 Please see Appendix N for Rihani’s explanation of the “fundamental unit.” 47 Refer to Appendix N. V. Funk 29 through the group for survival, at least in most cases.48 The nature of genetic dominance, however, still drives the individuals toward self-serving “victories” within the confines of the group. In other words, strong, or smart, or crafty individuals (remember all’s fair in love and genetic warfare), win the best reproduction opportunities, or reasonable facsimiles. Within the group then, comes the discussion of power and the place it holds in genetic force.

Arguments about power become disheveled because philosophy, wisdom, and reality do not always conform to easy empirical assessment. Power, in contrast to the more sophisticated Foucaultian production of action and ideology, is guttural and primal; at the genetic level power is competitive in the struggle to reproduce and survive. If we can accept from the time of the French Revolution that the principle of sociology rose from the dictatorial and dogmatic conflicts of classical cultures and has helped shape the much tamer and comfortable society of today then clearly it is easy to argue that people can change, that environment is a huge factor in human conduct, and that primal animal behavior is not, or at least does not appear to be innate. The problem, however, is that the macroscopic misbehavior of the human animal with reference to the destruction of habitat does not reflect the logic of post-structuralism favorably. “Durkheim argued, individuals may lose their distinct character and will and become part of something larger than themselves: the group” (Teevan, 1995, p. 307). Durkheim contends, “social conditions affect human behavior,” but where is the sanity of the group (p. 4)? Re-quoting Wilson,

“[t]he human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques” (1978, Appendix K). Again, the altruistic nature of groups, and

48 However, because the genetic interests of individuals are not identical (unless they are clones), conflicts of interest perpetually endanger the survival of cooperative relationships. (Smuts, Cheney, Seyfarth, Wrangham, and Struhsaker 1987: 297) (In Haraway). V. Funk 30 newly learned “cultural kindness” is of total benefit to the individual—this in contrast to the society of Hobbes where the success of progeny was decidedly compromised. So power in this seemingly kinder society takes other forms because the individual still has an agenda; embedded within the tenets of cooperation are the concerns of the individual and competition. Today, in the current postmodern society the human biological brain gets very creative and projects that agenda in other behaviors. For example, Giorgio

Agamben contends:

…human beings—as beings of power who can do or not do, succeed or fail, lose themselves or find themselves—are the only beings for whom happiness is always at stake in their living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness. (2000, p. 4)49

The nature of the courtship dance gets very obscure embedded in the self-absorbed capitalist culture but it is alive and well and a quickly growing percentage of consumers of the 6.5 billion people now living on the planet attest to this success.

Bookchin admits, “[p]erhaps the most obvious of our systematic problems is uncontrollable growth” and “[o]ne’s personality, love life, income, or body of beliefs, no less than an enterprise, must grow or die” (August 1989, p. 4). Expansionary capitalism is entrenching the problem as it is tapping into global populations as consumers and jobs put a positive spin on population growth.50 Agamben adds:

49 Steve Maich in Maclean’s writes, “[t]he most happy and satisfied places on earth are the ones that are the most dynamic, individualist and wealthy: North America, Northern Europe and Australia”(Feb 13, 2006, pp. 26-29). Maich continues: “So if society is getting richer on the whole, and if the rich are happier than the poor, why is it that the total number of people who feel “very happy” never seems to rise? According to Firebaugh, it’s because human beings evaluate their wealth and well-being by comparing themselves with neighbors, colleagues, and peers. That results in what he calls a “hedonic treadmill” – in order to remain happy people need to raise their income faster than those around them, and since everybody’s income tends to rise gradually over time, this creates the need to constantly strive for more. (p. 29) 50 Murray Bookchin (July 1988), for example, is typical of this “neo-Malthusian” approach to quantitative population evaluation viewing the problem as a factor of progress and expansion. He criticizes the system of capitalism as the culprit that is ruining the earth and not the numbers of people. In opposition, the premise of this paper is that the system is the people and the macroscopic competitive spirit of genes legitimizes capitalism and makes it the perfect storm. Bookchin’s argument is incomplete because numbers V. Funk 31

The becoming image of capital is nothing more than the commodity’s last metamorphosis in which exchange value has completely eclipsed use value and can now achieve the status of absolute and irresponsible sovereignty over life in its entirety, after having falsified the entire social production. (2000, p. 77)

But Agamben’s “phantasmagoria” or Baudrillard’s “simulacrum” does not explain why the competitive nature of capitalism fits the human dilemma so well. The human brain takes imagination in many oblique and distracting directions but the underlying competition to survive and reproduce remains paramount and capitalism expresses that competitive spirit.

It is also possible to view the current self-indulgence and obesity problem from a genetic perspective. Given the correct combination of factors, namely insecurity, supply, and absence of limits the stage is set allowing the individual biological genetic transporter to “bulk-up” for future assurance of existence. Unfortunately, as with many of our new social ills, the genes are being duped by entrepreneurs who themselves are trying to get rich as a way of guaranteeing more success in their own progeny. Power51, then, is part of this abstruse structure, is buried in competition, and is a hard-wired characteristic, because power is an expression of genetic will.

Through Hunt and Wickham (1998), Foucault has much to say. Firstly, he delineates the “direct linkage” between power and knowledge (p. 12). The best-used biological

do matter as the depleted cod stocks off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland will attest to. How many people on this planet are enough people? What is the saturation point? Have we already surpassed it as global quality of life and consumerism rises? 51 Philosophy does not properly explain power and its relationship to the human elite because the ethics of its misuse is a contradiction. Although the elite are in the position to reduce suffering and over-population time is spent instead in bettering their own lot. It not only increases the gap between the rich and poor, but history has shown that this can ironically lead to revolution and ultimately weaken the position of the elite. Probably, a comparable situation in capitalism is the tendency of the formation of monopolies. As well, hardly a day goes by that another CEO of some large corporation is not charged with embezzling money from shareholders. These people are already rich, but the drive for power simply, implicitly, increases subconsciously the success to pass on more genetic material. There are no bounds to this behavior. It is simply not a matter of need and genes know no morals. Please see Appendix I. V. Funk 32 computer has the most options in progeny reproduction—implicitly or explicitly.

Secondly:

We should view power as present in all forms of social relations, as something that is ‘at work’ in every situation; for Foucault power is everywhere. …Quite simply, there can never be a power vacuum or a no-power situation or relationship. (p.15)

Thirdly, representative governments are not governed by the people. Fourthly,

“[g]overnment is not opposed to freedom, just as freedom has never been the mere absence of government” (p.71). And finally, there has been over the centuries a transference of power and knowledge from religion to the state (p. 76)

So, power is mundanely ‘productive’ (to use Foucault’s term; he sometimes also calls it ‘positive’ power), it is the technical process whereby all aspects of social life are produced, the process of governance. ‘Power’ is a summary term for the vast array of governing techniques which come together in various combinations as governance. To be completely clear, in portraying power as the process of governance, we are also portraying it as the techniques which make up this process. (p. 81)

Power then, is embedded, is important for the group, but is in constant flux because as opportunists humans seek genetic advantage.52

Elspeth Probyn examines some of these concepts through colonialism and literature.

In Carnal Appetites Probyn (2000), examines Western dysfunctions surrounding food, cannibalism, and colonialism. She works her arguments through Conrad’s Heart of

Darkness and Kurtz’ use of power. Overall, Kurtz, according to Probyn’s analysis, is more primal than the cannibals, mocking Western imperialist “pretensions of morality”

(p.81). In terms of power this would illustrate that the so-called advanced society of the

West is guilty of the abuse of power, as a post-structuralist action, and lack of restraint by individuals, with the cannibals much more gene smart. “She (the cannibal) is an

52 An example of power for the sake of power might be the political struggles within a volunteer group where status is the only reward of power since there is no other form of compensation. V. Funk 33 omnivore with a sense of occasion,” Probyn dignifies. She examines this power through

“well trodden themes in Western philosophy,” citing:

Following Nietzsche, Foucault argues that ‘modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question’ (cited in Agamben, 1998, p. 3). The question that interests me here is how collectively we imagine or figure that moment when man becomes inhuman. [inanimal](p, 86)

There is a point at which in modernity, according to Agamben (in Probyn), that humans are reduced to the biological,53 and “that our bodies are already caught in a deployment of power.” The accusation that Agamben makes that there is “a simultaneous exclusion and capturing of bare life [that] is ‘the hidden foundation’ of our political system;” it is this exclusion of bare life that denies power the truth of its real source (p. 87).54

Western philosophy has problems. Instead of finding truth it obfuscates the relations of humans and their evolutionary past; it is largely spurious and ethically distracting.

Similarly for religion, anthropocentric views fog the real source of power and obscure the biological background and purpose of the brain. As Wilson (1978) states, “no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history.”

The brain is “a biological instrument” and “was not constructed to understand atoms or even understand itself but to promote the survival of human genes. Wilson writes:

Reduction is the traditional instrument of scientific analysis, but it is feared and resented. If human behavior can be reduced and determined to any considerable degree by the laws of biology, then mankind might appear to be less than unique and to that extent dehumanized. Few social scientists and scholars in the humanities are prepared to enter such a conspiracy, let alone surrender any of their territory. But this perception, which equates the method of reduction with the philosophy of diminution, is entirely in error. The laws of a subject are necessary to the discipline above it, they challenge and force a mentally more efficient restructuring, but they are not sufficient for the purposes

53 Of course, this is the whole point. Particularly in Western culture, our guilty habit of denouncing that humans are any part of the biological world or any part of the animal kingdom sets the stage for abuse. Homo sapiens is stuck on the “human” in the definition of the species, which separates humans and nature. It is the great denial. 54 Agamben writes, “…state power, is not founded—in the last instance—on a political will but rather on naked life, which is kept safe and protected only to the degree to which it submits itself to the sovereign’s (or the law’s) right of life and death. (This is precisely the ordinary meaning of the adjective sacer [sacred] when used to refer to human life) (p. 5). V. Funk 34

of the discipline. Biology is the key to human nature, and social scientists cannot afford to ignore its rapidly tightening principles.55

A.H. Maslow concurs: “[s]ooner or later, we shall have to redefine both religion and science” (1970, p. 13).

Sociobiology

Briefly, sociobiology56 incorporates the study of patterns of behavior, relationships of organisms to their environments and genetics in relation to the “biological properties of entire societies.” It compares social species and through this lens examines human beings. “The question is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent. The accumulated evidence for a large hereditary component is more detailed and compelling than most persons, including even geneticists realize. I will go further: it already is decisive.” Determinism, according to Wilson

(1978), “[is] loosely employed to designate any form of constraint on the development of an anatomical organ, physiological process, or behavior. Genetic determinism means some degree of constraint that is based on the possession of a particular set of genes.”57

Although Gould admits that there are many behaviors that cannot be blamed on genes, there are consistent behaviors that run in all cultures that must be genetic in origin. The excerpt from Gould’s (1981) The Mismeasure of Man, attempts to separate the logical relationships behind some universal behaviors and other culturally unique fringe

55 Please see Appendix K 56 “The academic discipline best known through the work of Edward O. Wilson…The approach to human behavior is based on the premise that all social behavior has a biological basis, and seeks to understand that basis in terms of genetic encoding for features that are then selected for through evolutionary history. The philosophical problem is essentially one of methodology: of finding criteria for identifying features that can usefully be explained in this way, and for finding criteria for assessing various genetic stories that might provide useful explanations” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 355). 57 In Appendix L Wilson explains the nature of sociobiology. V. Funk 35 behaviors that are contested as environmentally motivated.58 Here Gould argues well the perilous tendency of sociobiologists to blame all behavior on genes; this too is the disagreement held by sociologists and psychologists contending that there are many behaviors that are learned. Regardless of the influence that genes may or may not have with some isolated behaviors, the fundamental argument here is that humans are not above the influence of their genes, that the genes are the drivers while the brain facilitates survival and the opportunity to reproduce on their behalf.

Bauman (1999), posits, “[b]oth the nation and family are collective solutions to the torments of individual mortality. They both spell a similar message: my life, however short, was not in vain nor devoid of meaning…(p. 38). Bauman refers to the fear of death that underpins national identity and family as well as the fundamental need to reproduce.

Humans enter murky water, however, when in an attempt to invalidate the genetic argument any comparison to animal behavior is trivialized.59

There is evidence everywhere of parallel behavior and an example might be that of step parenting. Barash and Barash (2005) present the case of the langur monkeys:

In the extreme case, step parenting among animals leads to outright murder. The paradigmatic example was first reported by anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, who studied langur monkeys in India. In this harem-forming species, one male monopolizes a number of adult females and breeds with them, while a corresponding bunch of langur bachelors languish resentfully in the background. Every now and then, a revolution takes place in langurland, whereupon the dominant male is ousted and one of the bachelors takes over the troop of females. In such cases, the newly ascendant male is likely to methodically pursue and kill the nursing infants, who are offspring of the previous male. Without suckling infants, the newly bereaved mothers stop lactating, their ovaries begin cycling once again, and they mate with their offspring’s murderer. So, because nursing females are less likely to ovulate, by killing their infants a male not only eliminates the offspring of his predecessor but also improves his own reproductive prospects. (p. 162)

Although the extreme behavior of stepchild, and child, murder is probably rare in human society, stepchildren are often mistreated and abused; sexual assault is also very common

58 See Appendix C. 59 See Appendix C. V. Funk 36 between stepfathers and stepdaughters telling of the genetic disconnection between the two. The actions of the stepparents exemplify superficial altruistic behavior.60

Persistent short-term thinking in individuals, business, and in government is another example of genetic behavior. Remembering that the genetic behavior is not at the conscious level and short-term thinking favors opportunism, so in turn, individuals who get rich quickly may hurt other people or the planet but being rich has great advantage to survival and genetic legacy. Getting rich is a projected genetic victory. Business and governments are also guilty of short-term thinking because they are run by individuals who have a short-term tenure, or who can act with power in control of a group.61 Either way the outcome is the same. Quick advantage is still advantage and the brain is hardwired to win. At the gene level, ‘short term’ means success while ‘long-term’ has no salience.

A portion of the rationalization that lends itself to the denial of these activities is called cognitive dissonance. Wegner (2002) describes this theory:

60 The stepfather, for example, is benevolent to the stepchild because this altruistic behavior gets him closer to the mother but this feigned behavior is exposed when, with the passing of time, he lacks genetic ownership of the progeny and mistreatment or neglect surfaces. 61 Ian Hacking writes: What are the relationships between power and knowledge? There are two bad short answers: (1) knowledge provides and instrument that those in power can wield for their own ends; (2) a new body of knowledge brings into being a new class of people or institutions that can exercise a new kind of power. These two assertions parallel two opposed these about ideology: (1) a ruling class generates an ideology that suits its own interests; and (2) a new ideology, with new values, creates a niche for a new ruling class. Virtually nobody likes either side of these simple dichotomies. Foucault is one of many who want a new conception of how power and knowledge interact. But he is not looking for a relation between two givens, ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’. As always he is trying to rethink the entire subject matter, and his ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ are to be something else. Nobody knows this knowledge; no one wields this power. Yes, there are people who know this and that. Yes, there are individuals and organizations that rule other people. Yes, there are suppressions and repressions that come from authority. Yes, the forms of knowledge and of power since the nineteenth century have served the bourgeoisie above all other, and now also serve a comparable class in Eastern Europe. But those ruling classes don’t know how they do it, nor could they do it without the other terms in the power relation—the functionaries, the governed, the repressed, the exiled—each willingly or unwillingly doing their bit. One ought to begin an analysis of power from the ground up, at the level of tiny local events where battles are unwittingly enacted by players who don’t know what they are doing. Ian Hacking (1981). “The Archaeology of Foucault” David Couzens Hoy ed. Foucault: A Critical Reader. Cambridge, USA: Blackwell. Pp. 27-28. V. Funk 37

With the theory of cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger (1957) proposed that people will revise their attitudes to justify their action. In a nutshell, the theory says this happens because people are motivated to avoid having their thoughts in a dissonant relationship, and they feel uncomfortable when dissonance occurs. The strongest dissonance arises when a person does something that is inconsistent with a preexisting attitude or desire. (p. 172)

An example of this might be when short-term behavior that is clearly harmful is chosen over more sensible and considerate behavior and is rationalized because “that is what anyone else would do.” Rationalization of self-indulgence can be quite imaginative, of genetic origin, and quite harmful.

The Genetic Penchant for Capitalism

As maleficent as the current global spread of multinational companies carrying the consumerist message to all corners of the planet might be capitalism as an operating system seems to positively fit the human animal. Darwin recognized that immediately.

“Individuals struggle to increase the representation of their genes in future generations, and that is all. If the world displays any harmony and order, it arises only as an incidental result of individuals seeking their own advantage—the economy of Adam Smith transferred to nature” (Gould 1975, p.12). Darwin spliced Adam Smith’s theory, which predated his own, to establish his concept of natural selection.62 The theories of evolution, natural selection, and individual advantage fit the ideology of capitalism so well that “the end of history” has been declared (Fukuyama, 1992). 63 Relating to the end of the cold war when the Soviet Union collapsed and the conversion to capitalism began, it seemed that there would be no future evolution of the capitalist paradigm; all countries, more or less, would now adopt it. But what started with so much promise of equality and

62 See Appendix G. 63 Francis Fukuyama, (1992). The End of History: and the Last Man. Penguin. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/fukuyama.htm V. Funk 38 opportunity for all has turned into gross disparities between nations while commodity fetishism proliferates on an unprecedented scale.

What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. (Jameson, 1991. Please see Appendix D).

Elspeth Probyn (2000) asserts:

It may also be the case that the food frenzy taking place in metropolitan centers such as London, Sydney and New York represents the complete colonization of bare life: the canary squawking prior to a truly cataclysmic economic and social crisis. It’s tempting, although facile, to see the current foodism as analogous to Marie Antoinette’s infamous slogan tossed to starving French peasants. Nonetheless, the present alimentary and economic conjuncture is bewildering. Food is now simultaneously a deeply fetishised commodity—the last difference—and, as I have argued, the only thing that is held to be really real. (p. 88)

Jameson (1991) points to the American and military domination as the dark side of global capitalism, “the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror” (p. 5).

With this incredible expansion comes gross destruction of traditional cultures; there is loss of land and infrastructure due to deals made with government officials; there is pollution on a scale never before seen; and there is irrevocable harm to the environment as masses of people join the Western consumer ideal.

Capitalism is so naturally Darwinistic it fits surreptitiously with genetic will.

Embedded in the tenets of its ideology there is competition allowing some to win and some to lose. 64 There are hierarchies and elites, and there are the poor and the workers.

Capitalism legitimates Hobbes’ world and allows individual genetic transporters a perceived opportunity to gain some kind of an advantage for the genes they carry. 65 It is difficult not to relate the natural forces of genes to capitalism and once again, the short-

64 Please see Appendix J for Wilson’s comments on competition. 65 Hobbes, in a cruel Machiavellian tone, contends that “might is right,” it is a “war of every man against every man,” and he had a “sage mistrust of the rhetorical power of words” (Blackburn, p. 176). V. Funk 39 term thinking involved in most capitalistic ventures, that is representative of genetic will, is destructive to the habitat that supports the species. Capitalism institutionalizes, sanctifies, consecrates, legitimates, and rationalizes genetic will and ironically the success and health of capitalism only improves with growth. As capitalism overtakes all other forms of interaction on the planet the overall standard of living, at least in the short term, rises until the supporting biosphere collapses. Bookchin comments on “[t]his arithmetic mentality which disregards the social context of demographics [as being] incredibly short-sighted” (July, 1988, p. 4).66 But Bookchin’s solution of “a radical restructuring of society as a whole” is naïve.67 Capitalism is the new mantra of third world countries and the competitive spirit of the human soul; there is no way to turn the arithmetic around in time; 6.5 billion people all wanting the higher standard of living that capitalism has promised to supply will see this project through to the eventual exhaustion of the planet.68

Humans are doing exactly and exhibiting precisely the behavior that the biological brain

66 For Bookchin the problem is over-consumption and not over-population but it is really a chicken and egg problem. 67 Bookchin raises issues with his own solution: growth cannot be arrested with the market intact and there are other social tenets that are threatened with a shrinking economy. He alerts us to the fact that, “[a]side from the costs involved most people quite rightly do not want to “live simply.” They do not want to diminish their freedom…(August 1989, p.7). 68 Jonathan Gatehouse writes “[b]y 2010, predicts Leggett (Oxford-trained geologist and professor at the Royal School of Mines), democracy will be on the run. As with the Great Depression economic hardship will bring out the worst in people. Fascists will rise, feeding on the anger of the newly poor and whipping up support. Those new rulers will find the tools of repression—emergency laws, prison camps, a relaxed attitude toward torture—already in place, courtesy of the war on terror” (p. 23). Gatehouse continues, “I take it as a given that we have already overshot earth’s long-term carrying capacity for humans—to such an extent that some sort of societal collapse is now inevitable” (Heinburg quoted from “Powerdown”)(p. 25). “Ninety per cent of the organic chemicals humans use for agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and plastics, for example, are derived from petroleum. The challenge [in order to avoid a crisis] is enormous and the possible fixes fraught with their own difficulties. ‘One way to accomplish that would be to return to life as it was lived in the 18th century,’ Goodstein writes (professor of physics and vice-provost at the California Institute of Technology). ‘That would require, among many other things, eliminating roughly 95% of the world’s population’” (p. 23). * For an instruction paper on returning to a simple lifestyle please see Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt- Thomsen, (1999). The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Globalized Economy. Trans. Patrick Camiller, Maria Mies and Gerd Weih. New York: Zed Books. V. Funk 40 is designed to do—they are competing albeit through capitalism for genetic survival and supremacy. There may be no solution to this reality because how can you solve success?

Genes and Literature

Literature imitates life. Elspeth Probyn discusses Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as “a critical vision of social relations that goes beyond a general condemnation of consumer appetite,” and she asserts that, “ he gives us a way of thinking about restraint in the midst of excess” (2000, p. 83). Unfortunately, restraint is antithetical to genetic will and not part of the biological vocabulary, either for humans or any other life form. Gross corruption among modern-day CEOs speaks of that lack of restraint. Genetic advantage, in the names of dominance, power, and furtive politics are open and obvious examples of the innate opportunism that is part of every living creature and is only limited by ability.

Homo sapiens, regrettably, although claiming to be a learning being capable of grand ethical conduct, use this magnificent biological brain for the accumulation and expression of power as a display of genetic supremacy.

Probyn remarks on the quote, “‘Kurtz is an illuminated man,’ which we can take to mean that Kurtz refracts images of ourselves, shedding light on our collective behaviour”

(p. 84). The collective human behavior is, even to this day, an embarrassment. Besides the overt corruption among today’s leaders—the pillars of our society—the overall lack of restraint in Western civilization alludes to the self-interest of the individual gene machine. Humans are depleting the planet’s ability to recover and we are powerless to stop it because “it would hurt the economy.” But it is extremely ironic that the perpetrator of all this harm, the force of genetic will, is a biological entity and is destroying its own biological support system. The argument Probyn is making is not V. Funk 41 about gender issues or the ethic of determinism; it is about the macroscopic overview of expansive human activity. Barash and Barash write:

Memorable literature owes its greatness to many things, including the artistry and imagination with which characters and situations are portrayed, not to mention the richness of the language employed, all made possible by the genius of the author. But if human nature isn’t somehow in or behind the picture, then literature will have less staying power. For this reason alone, it seems certain that despite all the hand-wringing, the Western canon is solid; its grounding in the biology of human nature is what keeps it from becoming a loose cannon. …Shakespeare didn’t invent the human, evolution did. (2005, p. 12)

Literature reflects humanity. Barash and Barash continue:

In Madam Bovary’s Ovaries, we merge two worlds, literature and science, showing how fiction can be illuminated by the single most important idea in biology (evolution) newly applied to human behavior. We hope that our dissection of Madame Bovary’s ovaries, Othello’s jealousy, Holden Caulfield’s alienation, and the like will reveal a novel way to read and understand. Not the only way, mind you—our intent is not to sweep away any current literary theories in favor of science—but a new one, a useful tool to add to each reader’s kit. Our basic premise is simple enough, although oddly revolutionary at the same time: that people are biological creatures and that as such they share a universal, evolved human nature. Add to this our second basic principle: that evolutionary psychology, a decidedly nonfiction science, has been discovering why human beings behave as they do… (p. 9)

Probyn (2000) attempts to connect this behavior in the case of enraged European colonizers to a disturbed “European psyche.” How does this connect to human nature? It is possible to see associations between the Eurocentric/anthropocentric behavior of

European colonizers. Kurtz’ rage, analogous to imperialism, is necessary to justify the domination and annihilation of both animal species and stable native cultures. The genetic will of expanding European cultures consumes all before it.69

Conrad’s tale of colonial violence and the “obscenity of capitalist anthropophagy” (men and women devoured as expendable commodities) (Probyn, p.95), speak of the modern biological brain transferring or projecting genetic will upon exterior objects; the expression of power and domination perverted. Stable, and outwardly peaceful, cultures

69 Skeptics reading this might ask: if in situ there existed stable cultures before European imperialism? Where in that milieu is the genetic will of expansion? V. Funk 42 express genetic will perhaps in more traditionally biological ways when higher infant mortality, shorter life span, structured expression of genetic legacy, and more clandestine limiting structures stabilize population growth until eventually there is some or other invasion by a competing culture. The European model of expansion, on the other hand, simply exhibits the greed of a brain that has expanded in knowledge to be able to apply truly imaginative twists to genetic will. Again, to quote Wilson (1978), “[t]he human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques.”70 The European brain has developed reason beyond reason to the point that survival is now problematic.

For sociologists these concepts might overlap into cultural materialism or the de- emphasis of “ideas and ideology as determinants of cultures, and instead see cultures as adaptations to the needs forced upon social groups by the specific physical environments in which they live” (Teevan, 1995, 45). The particular expression of genetic will is related to physical environment. Power and opportunism71 are employed by individuals within the confines of groups as they entertain themselves with the literature that delves into the mysteries of human nature.72

70 See Appendix K. 71 Zygmunt Bauman (1999) discusses two distinct uses of knowledge that Pierre Bourdieu coined “cynical and clinical: the world being what it is, let me think of a strategy which will allow me to exploit its rules to my best advantage; whether the world is fair or unjust, likeable or not, is neither here nor there. When it is used ‘clinically’, the same knowledge of how society works may help you and me to fight more effectively what we see as improper, harmful or offending our moral sense. By itself, knowledge does not determine which of the two uses we resort to” (p.2). 72 See Maclean’s August 15th, 2005 p. 50-51. The article called “The Pleasure Principle” is about Edward Shorter’s book, Written in the Flesh: A History of Desire. University of Toronto Press. The book traces the development of sexual practices and the complexity of the libido. Although humans have been imaginative in most area of life and sex is not exempt, sex is still the reproductive territory of the gene. V. Funk 43

Consequences of Human Nature

As a broad generalization it could be said that any species with no restraints on progeny production and no natural enemies metamorphoses into its own enemy. The world’s problems that humans are so busy trying to solve are self-initiated and the actors are egoists working against the wisdom of sociology in search of personal advantage.

The far-reaching benefits afforded by sociological research are ignored and minimalized by elites seeking personal advantage.73 Irving Stone (1983) contends that our apparatus of logical thought has not controlled greed:

One of our greatest accomplishments has been in the extended understanding of man through the social sciences. We know to an infinitely greater degree what motivates man’s thinking, feeling, and action. These disciplines have afforded us partial control over human conduct, as well as a medical approach to irrational or destructive behavior. But these valuable tools have not enabled us to eliminate dictatorships, genocide, or the all-consuming belief in military action and the horrifying tragedies it causes. Nor has our knowledge enabled us to prevent internecine wars of religious, political, or ideological origin. (p. 22)

He also contends that creationists are “working to abolish Darwin’s theories on evolution and natural selection” and that “hard-core, right-wing extremists in both politics and religion are doing their best to slam that door shut” (p. 23). What, then, in light of

Stone’s warnings, is the source of the force that drives this individualism? Why do humans ignore the sociology? It is the covert but natural scheme to gain genetic advantage. There is plenty of rhetoric. Gould (1975) for example accuses white

Europeans of colonial arrogance and “our belief in dominion over, rather than fellowship with, more than a million other species that inhabit our planet” (p. 38). But this arrogance is logical when it is accepted that the biological brain and body are designed to

73 But power, interestingly, works both ways and is frustrated in the games of unions and management, for example, where the balance of power cycles to and fro often rife with corrupt behaviors on both sides. Also, see footnote 47. V. Funk 44 carry the genetic material into the future; action is applied to this one particular purpose and all rhetoric is just politics to that end.

Historically humans have a terrible track record at maintaining sustainable populations, with Easter Island and the desert of the Sudan as good examples of defoliation and resource depletion.74 Despite this abuse human populations have grown with successful adaptation from hunter-gatherers, to farmers, to post-modern industrialists and mass consumers. Dysfunctional parents are cultivating a culture of over-achievement as their children become what Betsy Hart calls “surrogates for parents’ competitive impulses.”75 The post-modern Western culture is taking a dangerous path of over-use and poorly thought-out ideology and Samir Rihani (2002) concurs: “ [e]xperts, especially those dealing with complex issues from afar, can, and often do, get things seriously wrong.” They “misdiagnose problems” and “implant wrong solutions,” according to Rihani, “while overlook[ing] the need for local forces to be free to interact”

(p. 233). And the stakes are high; disaster is lurking on many fronts.

Rihani highlights some dangers in the area of food scarcity in the face of declining resource banks and population increases,76while Gould (1975) outlines “the laws of sigmoidal growth” and biological population in graph form (in Appendix H).77 The culmination of these problems intensifies as the human population reaches its maximum limit and takes with it many other species that are unable to compete.78 Humans

74 See Ronald Wright (2004), A Short History of Progress. 75 “Betsy Hart Talks to Linda Frum” in Maclean’s. Nov. 2005. pp. 12-13. Hart is the author of, It Takes a Parent: How the Culture of Pushover Parenting is Hurting Our Kids. 76 See Appendix 0. 77 The topic of population as presented by Malthus apparently affected Darwin and “catalyzed his thoughts” on struggle and crowding. (Gould, 1975, p. 22). 78 Wilson. Edward. O. and W. H. Bossert (1971). A Primer of Population Biology. Stamford, Connecticut: Sinauer Associates, Inc. (p. 158) Competitive exclusion occurs if one species produces enough individuals to prevent the population of the other from rising. V. Funk 45 transform the earth into commodities and in turn decimate the biological habitat. Homer-

Dixon (2000) writes:

Taking into account the concurrent fourfold growth in the world’s population, the total annual human impact on the planet’s environment at the end of the twentieth century was therefore nearly sixteen times that of 1900: the population was four times as large and each person consumed each year, on average, more than four times the natural resources and released more than four times the waste. 79 (p. 53)

Humans then, compete directly with nature in an effort to pass on genetic material forgetting that they are stepping outside the continuum of ecology (Salleh, 1997, pp. 70-

71). Self-interest is everywhere. Rihani (2002) points to the “…five permanent members of the UN Security council, with supposedly a keen interest in peacekeeping, are also the main suppliers of arms, accounting for more than 4/5’s of the weapons sold” (p. 14).

Gould tries to inject a little sanity into an otherwise frightful situation, “Our biological nature does not stand in the way of social reform” (1975, p. 259), but this statement is an oxymoron. Our biological nature does, in fact, stand directly in the way of social reform and that is clearly why social reform has not thus far worked and why the situation on the planet is worsening daily. The drive for genetic advantage—the persistence of genetic will—precludes social reform. Wilson (1978) concludes:

The first dilemma, in a word, is that we have no particular place to go. The species lacks any goal external to its own biological nature. It could be that in the next hundred years human kind will thread the needles of technology and politics, solve the energy and

79 This estimate is based on the assumption that growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is roughly correlated with growth in per capita material consumption and waste production. Some might question this assumption, because in technologically more advanced economies in which information and services have become very important, economic growth shows evidence of decoupling from resource consumption. From the early 1970s to the mid 1980s, the material intensity of economic production (i.e., the quantity of materials or natural resources used to produce a dollar of GDP) in these economies declined quite rapidly. Since then, however, energy intensity, a major component of material intensity, has not declined as quickly, so there is reason to doubt that the decoupling will continue indefinitely. Moreover, the assumption of a close relationship between economic growth and material consumption is entirely reasonable for economies in the resource-intensive and “dirty” early and middle stages of industrialization. The majority of the world’s economic growth in the twentieth century was of this kind, as will be a large fraction of the growth in developing countries in the first half of the twenty-first century. (Homer-Dixon, 2000, p. 409) V. Funk 46

materials crises, avert nuclear war, and control reproduction. The world can at least hope for a stable ecosystem and a well-nourished population, but what then?

Biology is the key to human nature, and social scientists cannot afford to ignore its rapidly tightening principles. But the social sciences are potentially far richer in content. Eventually they will absorb the relevant ideas of biology and go on to beggar them. The proper study of man is, for reasons that now transcend anthropocentricism, man.80

There must be a fast reversal of development away from the self-aggrandizement of the individual or humanity will be lost.

Conclusion

Initially, the paper began with an introduction and definition of the original term genetic will. It explained the relationship between the drive for survival and reproduction of genetic material and the relationship of this force to tempestuous human nature. As a background, the nature of evolutionary theory was explained in the context of genetic determinism in an attempt to show the tenacious will of the genes that manifests as opportunistic attempts to gain genetic advantage. The section on philosophical meditations (or machinations if you prefer), relates the contradictions of heretofore- sociological research and the actual behavior of humans.81 As behavior empirically worsens, as humans demand more from the planet as their consumerist demands know no bounds, sociology is consistently frustrated by the stubborn lack of ethical comportment.

Within capitalism, the quintessential system for genetic achievers and “wanna-bees,” the competing actors play a game of genetic superiority. Although more complex, the embarrassingly primitive concept of patriarchy persists in debasing male/female relations

80 See Appendix K. 81 Gould explains that, “Deterministic arguments divide neatly into two groups—those based on the supposed nature of our species in general and those that invoke presumed differences among ‘racial groups’ of Homo sapiens” (p. 239). V. Funk 47 in humans but has traceable ties to power in genetic will.82 Relief for women comes in the form of education and the power that comes with it. Finally, the dire consequences of the self-indulgent-self-absorbed post-modern culture are reflected in the sad over-use of the planet and the loss of habitat of other species and humans. Bookchin, in agreement with Wright asserts that “the planet is in evolutionary reverse and is being reduced by human over-use into moonscapes” (August, 1989, p. 4). Sadly, the conclusion of this meditation is that human behavior, or human nature, or genetic will will not change—it is biological; it is an evolutionary reality; and it is hardwired in all of us.

Fixing social problems requires first level solutions—first level being the source of will and the motive for power.83 This first level exists in biology and is problematic because of its furtive nature. There is no a priori logic to genetic will. Over-population, over-indulgence, and competitiveness derive their power at the level of the gene. As

William James is quoted in Libet et al. (1999), “these thoughts are experienced more as happening to us than as being made by us” (p. 79). We are often helpless to over-come the power of them and because of that our actions appear to be the result of short-term thinking. Barash and Barash (2005) concur: “[e]volution rewards immediate success

(including but not limited to wealth and social prestige) with reproductive success…” (p.

42). Genetic decisions, far below the level of consciousness, require immediacy. Of course, many sociologists and philosophers might argue that lack of authority is the explanation behind short-term thinking, and this view may have merit but only on the

82 Success in genetic legacy is not historically tied to either ethical conduct or the relative ‘happiness’ of the actors—only successful sex and survival. Simply put—whatever works. 83 Bookchin (summer 1987) differentiates “first nature” as the primeval nonhuman nature from “second nature” that consists of a thinking brain with a “rich conceptual manner and [that] produce[s] a highly symbolic form of communication” (p. 8). Although Bookchin’s analysis is clear what is not so well discussed is the relationship of the second nature to the first or in other words how the second nature is used by the first nature to promote an agenda; his anthropocentric “second nature” denies the natural and biological balance of humans in the order of life. V. Funk 48 second level of awareness. Authority may superficially change some deportment but the surge for genetic advantage will remain and project as other behavior. Our biological brain thinking on behalf of our genes causes the short-term thinking that causes long-term problems; the genes, not the brains are in charge here. Humans, despite their arrogance and assurances otherwise, are at the mercy of their biological mandate—reproduction of genetic material in the short term, so although genetic determinism may not entirely explain the behavior of humans it may help to explain the misbehavior of humans.84 So what’s at stake?

“Extinction is the fate of most species,” Gould (1975) concludes, “usually because they fail to adapt rapidly enough to changing conditions of climate or competition.

Darwinian evolution decrees that no animal shall actively develop a harmful structure, but it offers no guarantee that useful structures will continue to be adaptive in changed circumstances” (p. 90). Given our present dilemma in light of Gould’s insight the question arises: Is the human brain a harmful structure for which we will suffer extinction, or is it a useful structure for which there is no guarantee? Will humans, like the Irish Elk that Gould uses as an example, be victims of their own grand success. It could be the rise of a new slogan shadowing Herbert Spenser’s if the ineptness of our

84 Gould (1975) contends that, “[a] belief in the innate nature of human violence does not brand anyone a racist. Yet all these claims have a common underpinning in postulating a direct genetic basis for our most fundamental traits. If we are programmed to be what we are, then these traits are ineluctable. We may, at best, channel them, but we cannot change them, either by will, education, or culture” (p. 238). He goes on to say, “[s]imilar arguments, carrying the apparent sanction of science, have been continually invoked in attempts to equate egalitarianism with sentimental hope and emotional blindness. People who are unaware of this historical pattern tend to accept each recurrence at face value: that is, they assume that each statement arises from the ‘data’ actually presented, rather than from the social conditions that truly inspire it” (p. 243). Of course this conflicts with Samir Rihani’s (2002) assertion that there can be an accumulation of knowledge that can be passed on through the genes. (Please see Appendix M) The problem might be that human kind’s sigmoidal population curve (Appendix H) might mature so quickly that humans will not be able to evolve; the brain as a biological entity will not react quickly, in opposition to genetic will, to reverse environmental damage. V. Funk 49 philosophy plays out as extinction of the fittest.85 It certainly qualifies as the greatest biological experiment in the history of the earth.

Gould sees some reason to be hopeful:

Although I worry long and hard about the deterministic uses of kin selection, I applaud the insight it offers for my favored theme of biological potentiality. For it extends the realm of genetic potential even further by including the capacity for kindness, once viewed as intrinsically unique to human culture. Sigmund Freud argued that the history of our greatest scientific insights has reflected, ironically, a continuous retreat of our species from center stage in the cosmos. Before Copernicus and Newton, we thought we lived at the hub of the universe. Before Darwin, we thought that a benevolent God had created us. Before Freud, we imagined ourselves as rational creatures (surely on of the least modes statements in intellectual history). If kin selection marks another stage in this retreat, it will serve us well by nudging our thinking away from domination and toward a perception of respect and unity with other animals. (p.267)

Of course, unity with other animals may be much easier in years to come as there will only be a few left to contend with. Wright (2005) remains pessimistic:

The case for reform that I have tried to make is not based on altruism, nor on saving nature for its own sake. I happen to believe that these are moral imperatives, but such arguments cut against the grain of human desire. [What is the source of this “human desire?”] The most compelling reason for reforming our system is that the system is in no one’s interest. It is a suicide machine. All of us have some dinosaur inertia within us, but I honestly don’t know what the activist “dinosaurs”—the hard men and women of Big Oil and the far right—think they are doing. They have children and grandchildren who will need safe food and clean air and water, and who may wish to see living oceans and forests. Wealth can buy no refuge from pollution; pesticides sprayed in China condense in Antarctic glaciers and Rocky Mountain tarns. And wealth is no shield from chaos, as the surprise on each haughty face that rolled from the guillotine made clear. (p. 131)

And this is the thesis. Although a future calamity is probably a reality, we are helpless but to watch it unfold as there are no systems compatible with human nature and the planet, that can replace current ideologies. And even if there were planet-friendly systems available to replace the culture of expansion, vis-à-vis the present growth, they could not reverse in time the real and present danger. But it is not the system at fault as

85 See Appendix P. V. Funk 50

Adam Smith did not have this debacle in mind when he thought of his laissez faire; it is the opportunistic nature of the actors using cynical or clinical knowledge.86

We are now at the stage when the Easter Islanders could still have halted the senseless cutting and carving, could have gathered the last trees’ seeds to plant out of reach of the rats. We have the tools and the means to share resources, clean up pollution, dispense basic health care and birth control, set economic limits in line with natural ones. If we don’t do these things now, while we prosper, we will never be able to do them when times get hard. Our fate will twist out of our hands. And this new century will not grow very old before we enter an age of chaos and collapse that will dwarf all the dark ages in our past. Now is our last chance to get the future right. (Ronald Wright, 2005, p. 132)

In order to change the direction of this current disastrous course it will be necessary to drastically lower population and consumption and this must be done quickly. Time is running out. The required diminishment of the impact of humans on the planet is overshadowed by the current reality of expansion. The human brain must break out of its short-term traditions and think into the future if it wants to reproduce those precious genes.

86 See footnote 74 (page 48). V. Funk 51

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V. Funk 55

Appendix A

Gould, Stephen Jay, (1983). “In Praise of Charles Darwin.” Darwin’s Legacy: Nobel Conference XVIII. Ed. Charles L. Hamrum. New York: Harper & Row. pp. 4-6.

The radical implications of natural selection. The common denominator of the evolutionary theories proposed by Darwin’s rivals lies in their congeniality with many traditional biases of Western thought that Darwin was trying to challenge or strip away. They view evolution as a foreordained process ruled by principles of inherent progress. [Gould elaborates further on this “debunking” approach to evolutionary and deterministic theory in The Mismeasure of Man, 1981.] Natural selection, however, is a theory of local adaptation only. Changes that, in our anthropocentric way, we choose to call progressive represent only one pathway of adaptation to changing local environments. Every large-brained mammal harbors species of parasites so morphologically “degenerate” that they are little more than bags of reproductive tissue. Yet who can say that one or the other is “better” or any surer of evolutionary persistence? If a denial of inherent progress were not radical enough, Darwin also introduced the specter of randomness into evolutionary theory. To be sure, randomness only provides a source of variation in Darwin’s theory. Natural selection (a deterministic process) then scrutinizes the spectrum of random variants and preserves those individuals best adapted to changing local environments. Still, chance in any form was anathema to many nineteenth-century thinkers, both then and now. Darwin’s theory also challenged the comforting assumption that evolution must be purposive, working toward the good of species or ecosystems. The theory of natural selection, established in perhaps unconscious analogy to the individualistic, laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith (whom Darwin had been studying intensely just before he formulated his theory), speaks only of individuals struggling for personal success. In modern terms, natural selection concerns the unconscious struggle of individuals to leave more of their genes in surviving offspring. Any benefits to species, any harmony in ecosystems, arise merely as a by-product of this struggle among individuals or, in the case of ecosystems, as a natural balance among competitors. What then of spirit, of vital forces, of God himself? No intervening spirit watches lovingly over the affairs of nature (though Newton’s clock-winding god might have set up the machinery at the beginning of time and then let it run). No vital forces propel evolutionary change. And whatever we may think of God, his existence is not manifest in the products of nature. Darwin was not an atheist. He probably retained a belief in some kind of personal god—but he did not grant his deity a directly and continuously intervening role in the evolutionary process. Many have viewed this message as pessimistic, or even nihilistic. I have always understood it (as I believe Darwin intended) as positive and exhilarating. It teaches us that the meaning of our lives cannot be read passively from the works of nature, but that we must struggle, think, and construct that meaning for ourselves. Moreover, Darwin maintained deep humility before the difficulty of such a task. He understood the limits of science.

V. Funk 56

Appendix B

“Appendix B: Conversations at Nobel XVIII, ‘Darwin’s Legacy’”(1983). Darwin’s Legacy: Nobel Conference XVIII. Ed. Charles L. Hamrum. New York: Harper & Row. pp.118-19.

Audience: Mr. Wilson, what does evolutionary theory tell us about the foundation of ethics and morality? Wilson: The central question of ethical philosophy, I am convinced, and I believe that it should be of primary concern to theology as well, is whether or not ethical precepts originated entirely within the evolution of the human mind. Because if they did, it makes all the difference in the world. One could easily imagine wholly different ethical systems evolving in other species. In fact, it’s difficult in thought experiments not to imagine it happening that way. For example, if termites had somehow managed to ascend 100 million years ago to the pinnacle that human beings now occupy, if they came to weigh ten kilograms, with a growing neocortex and a rational apparatus developing on top of all the termite passions and mode of life, we would find them rationally explaining an ethical system with myths, legends, cultural heroes, sacred literature, and a termite God profoundly different from our own. Their theologians would advance, as absolute moral guidelines, a sacred caste system, cannibalism glorified, personal reproduction a sin in the worker castes, territorial war proper, darkness preferred to light, pheromonal song, and so on. The termite God would be terrifying to the human mind, but extremely congenial to the termite mind. Only a few ethical philosophers have come to grips with this severest and most troubling of Darwin’s legacies. We have to ask again whether or not morality might indeed be ultimately relativistic—or if there is something more. Recently, Robert Nozick, in his book Philosophical Explanations, conceded that the evolutionary analysis from sociobiology might be correct. But if it is correct, he said, it does not disprove the existence outside the human mind of a set of absolute ethical precepts which the human species might be tracking by genetic and cultural means. And the analogy he used, which seemed to me very weak, was that there exist certain laws of numerosity employed by human beings that appear to exist outside human evolution and which we put adventitiously to use in mathematical theorems and a good deal of physical science. Is it not possible, he asked that there also exist fundamental ethical precepts which we are tracking? If that much is true, we have a basis for extrabiological origins of moral reasoning. But I am not sure the termites would agree. A similar approach has recently been taken by Peter Singer in his book, The Expanding Circle, in which he says that, yes, maybe the evolutionary explanation is correct. But there is something else beyond which justifies a steadily enlarging concern for the whole human species and even other species. A nice thought. Well I raise this question as the one I regard as absolutely fundamental; there is none more important. I think it should be the point of departure of a colloguy between philosophers, theologians, and scientists, because up until now the philosophers and theologians have not demonstrated the way to identify the extrahuman, absolute moral precepts that our species might be tracking in the course of its evolution, and about which we desperately need to have more information.

V. Funk 57

Appendix C

Gould, Stephen Jay, (1981). The Mismeasure of Man. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp.324-33.

Biology and human nature

(p.324)

If people are so similar genetically, and if previous claims for a direct biological mapping of human affairs have recorded cultural prejudice and not nature, then does biology come up empty as a guide in our search to know ourselves? Are we after all, at birth, the tabula rasa, or blank slate, imagined by some eighteenth-century empiricist philosophers? As an evolutionary biologist, I cannot adopt such a nihilistic position without denying the fundamental insight of my profession. The evolutionary unity of humans with all other organisms is the cardinal message of Darwin’s revolution of nature’s most arrogant species. We are inextricably part of nature, but human uniqueness is not negated thereby. “Nothing but” an animal is as fallacious a statement as “created in God’s own image.” It is not mere hubris to argue that Homo sapiens is special in some sense—for each species is unique in its own way; shall we judge among the dance of the bees, the song of the humpback whale, and human intelligence? The impact of human uniqueness upon the world has been enormous because it has established a new kind of evolution to support the transmission across generations of learned knowledge and behavior. Human uniqueness resides primarily in our brains. It is expressed in the culture built upon our intelligence and the power it gives us to manipulate the world. Human societies change by cultural evolution, not as a result of biological alteration. We have no evidence for biological change in brain size or structure since Home sapiens appeared in the fossil record some fifty thousand years ago. (Broca was right in stating that the cranial capacity of Cro Magnon skulls was equal if not superior to ours.) All that we have done since then—the greatest transformation in the shortest time that our planet has experienced since its crust solidified nearly four billion years ago—is the product of cultural evolution. Biological (Darwinism) evolution continues in our species, but its rate, compared with cultural evolution, is so incomparably slow that its impact upon the history of Homo sapiens has been small. While the gene for sickle-cell anemia declines in frequency among black Americans, we have invented the railroad, the automobile, radio and television, the atom bomb, the computer, the airplane and spaceship.

(p.325)

Cultural evolution can proceed so quickly because it operates, as biological evolution does not, in the “Lamarckian” mode—by the inheritance of acquired characters. Whatever one generation learns, it can pass to the next by writing, instruction, inculcation, ritual, tradition, and a host of methods that humans have developed to assure continuity in culture. Darwinian evolution, on the other hand, is an indirect process: V. Funk 58 genetic variation must first be available to construct an advantageous feature, and natural selection must then preserve it. Since genetic variation arises at random, not preferentially directed toward advantageous feature, the Darwinian process works slowly. Cultural evolution is not only rapid; it is also readily reversible because its products are not coded in our genes. The classical arguments of biological determinism fail because the features they invoke to make distinctions among groups are usually the products of cultural evolution. Determinists did seek evidence in anatomical traits built by biological, not cultural, evolution. But, in so doing, they tried to use anatomy for making inferences about capacities and behaviors that they linked to anatomy and we regard as engendered by culture. Cranial capacity per se held as little interest for Morton and Broca as variation in third toes length; they cared only about the mental characteristics supposedly associated with differences in average brain size among groups. We now believe that different attitudes and styles of thought among human groups are usually the nongenetic products of cultural evolution. In short, the biological basis of human uniqueness leads us to reject biological determinism. Our large brain is the biological foundation of intelligence; intelligence is the ground of culture; and cultural transmission builds a new mode of evolution more effective than Darwinian processes in its limited realm—the “inheritance” and modification of learned behavior. As philosopher Stephen Toulmin stated (1977, p.4): “Culture has the power to impose itself on nature from within.” Yet, if human biology engenders culture, it is also true that culture, once developed, evolved with little or no reference to genetic variation among human groups. Does biology, then, play no other valid role in the analysis of human behavior? Is it only a foundation without any insight to offer beyond the unenlightening recognition that complex culture requires a certain level of intelligence?

(p.326)

Most biologists would follow my argument in denying a genetic basis for most behavioral differences between groups and for change in the complexity of human societies through the recent history of our species. But what about the supposed constancies of personality and behavior, the traits of mind that humans share in all cultures? What, in short, about a general “human nature”? Some biologists would grant Darwinian processes a substantial role not only in establishing long ago, but also in actively maintaining now, a set of specific adaptive behaviors forming a biologically conditioned “human nature.” I believe that this old tradition of argument—which has found its most recent expression as “human sociobiology”—is invalid not because biology is irrelevant and human behavior only reflects a disembodied culture, but because human biology suggests a different and less constraining role for genetics in the analysis of human nature. Sociobiology begins with a modern reading of what natural selection is all about— differential reproductive success of individuals. According to the Darwinian imperative, individuals are selected to maximize the contribution of their own genes to future generations, and that is all. (Darwinism is not a theory of progress, or ecosystems.) Paradoxically (as it may seem to many), altruism as we as selfishness can be selected under this criterion—acts of kindness may benefit individuals either because they V. Funk 59 establish bonds of reciprocal obligation, or because they aid kin who carry copies of the altruist’s genes. Human sociobiologists then survey our behaviors with this criterion in mind. When they identify a behavior that seems to be adaptive in helping an individual’s genes along. They develop a story for its origin by natural selection operating upon genetic variation influencing the specific act itself. (These stories are rarely backed by any evidence beyond the inference of adaptation.) Human sociobiology is a theory for the origin and maintenance of specific, adaptive behaviors by natural selection;87 these behaviors must

(p.327) therefore have a genetic basis, since natural selection cannot operate in the absence of genetic variation. Sociobiologists have tried, for example, to identify an adaptive and genetic foundation for aggression, spite, xenophobia, conformity, homosexuality,88 and perhaps upward mobility as well (Wilson, 1975). I believe that modern biology provides a model standing between the despairing claim that biology has nothing to teach us about human behavior and the deterministic theory that specific items of behavior are genetically programmed by the action of natural selection. I see two major areas of biological insight: 1. Fruitful analogies. Much of human behavior is surely adaptive; if it weren’t, we wouldn’t be around anymore. But adaptation, in humans, is neither an adequate, nor even a good argument for genetic influence. For in humans, as I argued above (p.324), adaptation may arise by the alternate route of nongenetic, cultural evolution. Since cultural evolution is so much more rapid than Darwinian evolution, its influence should prevail in the behavioral diversity displayed by human groups. But even when an adaptive behavior is nongenetic, biological analogy may be useful in interpreting its meaning. Adaptive constraints are often strong, and some functions may have to proceed in a certain way whether their underlying impetus be learning or genetic programming. For example, ecologists have developed a powerful quantitative

87 The brouhaha over sociobiology during the past few years was engendered by this hard version of the argument—genetic proposals (based on an inference of adaptation) for specific human behaviors. Other evolutionists call themselves “sociobiologists,” but reject this style of guesswork about specifics. If a sociobiologist is anyone who believes that biological evolution is not irrelevant to human behavior, then I suppose that everybody (creationists excluded) is a sociobiologist. At this point, however, the term loses it meaning and might as well be dropped. Human sociobiology entered the literature (professional and popular) as a definite theory about the adaptive and genetic basis of specific traits of human behavior. If it has failed in the goal—as I believe it has—then the study of valid relationships between biology and human behavior should receive another name. In a world awash in jargon, I don’t see why “behavioral biology” can’t extend its umbrella sufficiently to encompass this legitimate material. 88 Lest homosexuality seem an unlikely candidate for adaptation since exclusive homosexuals have no children, I report the following story, advocated by E.O. Wilson (1975, 1978). Ancestral human society was organized as a large number of competing family units. Some units were exclusively heterosexual; the gene pool of other units included factors for homosexuality. Homosexuals functioned as helpers to raise the offspring of their heterosexual kin. This behavior aided their genes since the large number of kin they helped to raise held more copies of their genes than their own offspring (had they been heterosexual) might have carried. Groups with homosexual helpers raised more offspring, since they could more than balance, by their extra care and higher rates of survival, the potential loss by nonfecundity of their homosexual members. Thus, groups with homosexual members ultimately prevailed over exclusively heterosexual groups, and genes for homosexuality have survived. V. Funk 60

(p.328) theory, called optimal foraging strategy, for studying patterns of exploitation in nature (herbivores by carnivores, plants by herbivores). Cornell University anthropologist Bruce Winterhalder has shown that a community of Cree-speaking peoples in northern Ontario follow some predictions of the theory in their hunting and trapping behavior. Although Winterhalder used a biological theory to understand some aspects of human hunting, he does not believe that the people he studied were genetically selected to hunt as ecological theory predicts they should. He writes (personal communication, July 1978):

It should go without saying…that the causes of human variability of hunting and gathering behavior lie in the socio-cultural realm. For that reason, the models that I used were adapted, not adopted, and then applied to a very circumscribed realm of analysis… For instance, the models assist in analyzing what species a hunter will seek from those available once a decision has been made to go hunting [his italics]. They are, however, useless for analyzing why the Cree still hunt (they don’t need to), how they decide on a particular day whether to hunt or join a construction crew, the meaning of hunting to a Cree, or any of a plethora of important questions.

In this area, sociobiologists have often fallen into one of the most common errors of reasoning: discovering an analogy and inferring a genetic similarity (literally, in this case!). Analogies are useful but limited; they may reflect common constraints, but not common causes. 2. Biological potentiality vs. biological determinism. Humans are animals and everything we do is constrained, in some sense, by our biology. Some constraints are so integral to our being that we rarely even recognize them, for we never imagine that life might proceed in another way. Consider our narrow range of average adult size and the consequences of living in the gravitational world of large organisms, not the world or surface forces inhabited by insects (Went 1968; Gould, 1977). Or the fact that we are born helpless (many animals are not), that we mature slowly, that we must sleep for a large part of the day, that we do not photosynthesize, that we can digest both meat and plants, that we age and die. These are all results of our genetic construction, and all are important influences upon human nature and society. These biological boundaries are so evident that they have never

(p.329) engendered controversy. The contentious subjects are specific behaviors that distress us and that we struggle with difficulty to change (or enjoy and fear to abandon): aggression, xenophobia, male dominance, for example. Sociobiologists are not genetic determinists in the old eugenical sense of postulating single genes for such complex behaviors. All biologists know that there is no gene “for” aggression, any more than for your lower-left wisdom tooth. We all recognize that genetic influence can be spread diffusely among many genes and that genes set limits to ranges; they do not provide blueprints for exact replicas. In one sense, the debate between sociobiologist and their critics is an argument about the breadth of ranges. For sociobiologists, ranges are narrow enough to program a V. Funk 61 specific behavior as the predictable result of possessing certain genes. Critics argue that the ranges permitted by these genetic factors are wide enough to include all behaviors that sociobiologist atomize into distinct traits coded by separate genes. But in another sense, my dispute with human sociobiology is not just a quantitative debate about the extent of ranges. It will not be settled amicable at some golden midpoint, with critics admitting more constraint, sociobiologists more slop. Advocates of narrow and broad ranges do not simply occupy different positions on a smooth continuum; they hold two qualitatively different theories about the biological nature of human behavior. If ranges are narrow, then genes do code for specific traits and natural selection can create and maintain individual items of behavior separately. If ranges are characteristically broad, then selection may set some deeply recessed generating rules; but specific behaviors are epiphenomena of the rules, not objects of Darwinian attention in their own right. I believe that human sociobiologists have made a fundamental mistake in categories. They are seeking the genetic basis of human behavior at the wrong level. They are searching among the specific products of generating rules—Joe’s homosexuality, Martha’s fear of strangers—while the rules themselves are the genetic deep structures of human behavior. For example, E.O. Wilson (1978, p.99) writes: “Are human beings innately aggressive? This is a favorite question of college seminars and cocktail party conversations, and one that raises emotion in political ideologues of all stripes. The

(p.330) answer to it is yes. As evidence, Wilson cites the prevalence of warfare in history and then discounts any current disinclination to fight: “The most peaceable tribes of today were often the ravagers of yesteryear and will probably again produce soldiers and murderers in the future.” But if some peoples are peaceable now, then aggression itself cannot be coded in our genes, only the potential aggression itself cannot be coded in our genes, only the potential for it. If innate only means possible, or even likely in certain environments, then everything we do is innate and the word has no meaning. Aggression is one expression of a generating rule that anticipates peacefulness in other common environments. The range of specific behaviors engendered by the rule is impressive and a fine testimony to flexibility as the hallmark of human behavior. This flexibility should not be obscured by the linguistic error of branding some common expressions of the rule as “innate” because we can predict their occurrence in certain environments. Pursuing the Galilean analogy, if cannonballs act by cannonballness, feathers by featherness, then we can do little beyond concocting a story for the adaptive significance of each. We would never think of doing the great historical experiment—equalizing the effective environment by placing both in a vacuum and observing an identical behavior in descent. This hypothetical example illustrates the social role of biological determinism. It is fundamentally

(p.331) a theory about limits. It takes current ranges in modern environments as an expression of direct genetic programming, rather than a limited display of much broader potential. If a V. Funk 62 feather acts by featherness, we cannot change its behavior while it remains a feather. If its behavior is and expression of broad rules tied to specific circumstances, we anticipate a wide range of behaviors in different environments. Why should human behaviorial ranges be so broad, when anatomical ranges are generally narrower? Is this claim for behavioral flexibility merely a social hope, or is it good biology as well? Two different arguments lead me to conclude the wide behavioral ranges should arise as consequences of the evolution and structural organization of our brain. Consider, first of all, the probable adaptive reasons for evolving such a large brain. Human uniqueness lies in the flexibility of what our brain can do. What is intelligence, if not the ability to face problems in an unprogramed (or, as we often say, creative) manner? If intelligence sets us apart among organisms, then I think it probable that natural selection acted to maximize the flexibility of our behavior. What would be more adaptive for a learning and thinking animal: genes selected for aggression, spite, and xenophobia; or selection for learning rules that can generate aggression in appropriate circumstances and peacefulness in others? Secondly, we must be wary of granting too much power to natural selection by viewing all basic capacities of our brain as direct adaptations. I do not doubt that natural selection acted in building our oversized brains—and I am equally confident that our brains became large as an adaptation for definite roles (probably a complex set of interacting functions). But these assumptions do not lead to the notion, often uncritically embraced by strict Darwinians, that all major capacities of the brain must arise as direct products of natural selection. Our brains are enormously complex computers. If I install a much simpler computer to keep accounts in a factory, it can also perform many other, more complex tasks unrelated to its appointed role. These additional capacities are ineluctable consequences of structural design, not direct adaptations. Our vastly more complex organic computers were also built for reasons, but possess an almost terrifying array of additional capacities—including, I suspect, most of what makes us human. Our ancestors

(p.333) did not read, write, or wonder why most stars do not change their relative positions while five wandering points of light and two larger disks move through a path now called the zodiac. We need not view Bach as a happy spinoff from the value of music in cementing tribal cohesion, or Shakespeare as a fortunate consequence of the role of myth and epic narrative in maintaining hunting bands. Most of the behavioral “traits” that sociobiologists try to explain may never have been subject to direct natural selection at all—and may therefore exhibit a flexibility that features crucial to curvival can never display. Should these complex consequences of structural design even be call “traits”? Is this tendency to atomize a behavioral repertory into a set of “things” not another example of the same fallacy of reification that has plagued studies of intelligence throughout our history? Flexibility is the hallmark of human evolution. If humans evolved, as I believe, by neoteny (see chapter 4 and Gould, 1977, pp. 352-404), then we are, in a more than metaphorical sense, permanent children. (In neoteny, rates of development slow down and juvenile stages of ancestors become the adult features of descendants.) Many central V. Funk 63 features of our anatomy link us with fetal and juvenile stages of primates: small face, vaulted cranium and large brain in relation to body size, unrotated big toe, foramen magnum under the skull for correct orientation of the head in upright posture, primary distribution of hair on head, armpits, and pubic areas. …In other mammals, exploration, play, and flexibility of behavior are qualities of juveniles, only rarely of adults. We retain not only the anatomical stamp of childhood, but its mental flexibility as well. The idea that natural selection should have worked for flexibility in human evolution is not an ad hoc notion born in hope, but an implication of neoteny as a fundamental process in our evolution. Humans are learning animals.

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Appendix D

Jameson, Fredric, (1991). Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press. Pp. 4-5. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~DRBR/JAMESON/jameson.html

Consider, for example, the powerful alternative position that postmodernism is itself little more than one more stage of modernism proper (if not, indeed, of the even older romanticism); it may indeed be conceded that all the features of postmodernism I am about to enumerate can be detected, full-blown, in this or that preceding modernism (including such astonishing genealogical precursors as Gertrude Stein, Raymond Roussel, or Marcel Duchamp, who may be considered outright postmodernists, avant la lettre). What has not been taken into account by this view, however, is the social position of the older modernism, or better still, its passionate repudiation by an older Victorian and post-Victorian bourgeoisie for whom its forms and ethos are received as being variously ugly, dissonant, obscure, scandalous, immoral, subversive, and generally “antisocial.” It will be argued here, however, that a mutation in the sphere of culture has rendered such attitudes archaic. Not only are Picasso and Joyce no longer ugly; they now strike us, on the whole, as rather “realistic,” and this is the result of a canonization and academic institutionalization of the modern movement generally that can be traced to the late 1950’s. This is surely on of the most plausible explanations for the emergence of postmodernism itself, since the younger generation of the 1960’s will now confront the formerly oppositional modern movement as a set of dead classics, which “weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living,” as Marx once said in a different context. As for the postmodern revolt against all that, however, it must equally be stressed that its own offensive features—from obscurity and sexually explicit material to psychological squalor and overt expressions of social and political defiance, which transcend anything that might have been imagined at the most extreme moments of high modernism—no longer scandalize anyone and are not only received with the greatest complacency but have themselves become institutionalized and are at one with the official or public culture of Western society. What has happened is that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally: the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel- seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. Such economic necessities then find recognition in the varied kinds of institutional support available for the new art, from foundations and grants to museums and other forms of patronage. Of all the arts, architecture is the closest constitutively to the economic, with which, in the form of commissions and land values, it has a virtually unmediated relationship. It will therefore not be surprising to find the extraordinary flowering of the new postmodern architecture grounded in the patronage of multinational business, whose expansion and development is strictly contemporaneous with it. Later I will suggest that these two new phenomena have an even deeper dialectical interrelationship than the simple one-to-one financing of this or that individual project. Yet this is the point at which I must remind the reader of the obvious; namely, that this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror.

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Appendix E

Jameson, Fredric, (1991). Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press. Pp.242-44. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~DRBR/JAMESON/jameson.html

[The fundamental problem with articulating biological determinism in humans is charging that Homo sapiens are like other life forms; the proof is lost in metaphor and analogy.]

If such a “theory” exists (if it is not, in other words, simply a question of a useful and portable opposition), then it consists in positing two distinct moments of the deconstructive narrative, the second succeeding the first and incorporating it at some higher dialectical level of complexity. First, the initial metaphor is undone—undermined as soon as it has been posited by some deep suspicion of this particular linguistic act. Yet in a second moment, that very suspicion washes back over the first and becomes generalized: what was at first only an acute doubt as to the viability of this particular resemblance and this particular concept—a doubt about speaking and thinking—now becomes a deeper skepticism about language in general, about the linguistic process, or about what DeMan calls reading, a term which usefully excludes general ideas about Language itself:

The paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of figures) and its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be closed off by a final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural superposition which narrates the unreadability of the prior narration. As distinguished from primary deconstructive narratives centered on figures and ultimately always on metaphor, we can call such narratives to the second (or the third) degree allegories. Allegorical narratives tell the story of the failure to read whereas tropological narratives, such as the Second Discourse. Tell the story of the failure to denominate. The difference is only a difference of degree and the allegory does not erase the figure. Allegories are always allegories of metaphor and, as such. They are always allegories of the impossibility of reading—as sentence in which the genitive “of” has itself to be “read” as a metaphor. (AR 205)

The terminology is sometimes uncertain: are the allegories referred to here the same as what later on, in connection with the Confessions, “can be called an allegory of figure” (AR 300)? What happens when the allegorical process is contained or repressed ? Such questions have the merit of forcing us to the obvious conclusion that since the initial problem cannot be solved (there is no “solution” to the metaphorical dilemma), it admits of no single outcome either, but yields a variety of attempted solutions whose mode of failure, although logical after the fact, cannot be predicted or theorized in advance. Here again the theory of allegory, since it cannot be completed, sends us back to the individual texts themselves, whose in-terminable “reading” merely reconfirms the initial description while focusing attention on the unique structural failure of each specific text. Whence the productive confusion, for example, about the nature of the Social Contract:

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Is Rousseau himself the “lawgiver” of the Social Contract and his treatise the Deuteronomy of the modern State? If this were the case, then The Social Contract would become a monological referential statement. It could not be called an allegory…instead, by praising the suspicion that the Sermon on the Mount may be the Machiavellian invention of a master politician, [Rousseau} clearly undermines the authority of his own legislative discourse. Would we then have to conclude that the Social Contract is a deconstructive narrative like the Second Discourse? But this is not the case either, because the Social Contract is clearly productive and generative as well as deconstructive in a manner that the Second Discourse is not. To the extent that it never ceases to advocate the necessity for political legislation and to elaborate the principles on which such a legislation could be based, it resorts to the principles of authority that it undermines. We know this structure to be characteristic of what we have called allegories of unreadability. Such an allegory is metafigural: it is an allegory of a figure (for example, metaphor) which relapses into the figure it deconstructs. The Social Contract falls under this heading to the extent that it is indeed structured like an aporia: it persists in performing what it has shown to be impossible to do. As such we can call it an allegory. But is it the allegory of a figure? The question can be answered by asking what it is the Social Contract performs, what it keeps doing despite the fact that it has established that it could not be done. (AR 275)

[In the case of biological determinism the comparison to other life forms is at the mercy of metaphor and does not construct a proof.]

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Appendix F

Gould, Stephen Jay, (1975). Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. p.91.

Since man created God in his own image, the doctrine of special creation has never failed to explain those adaptations that we understand intuitively. How can we doubt that animals are exquisitely designed for their appointed roles when we watch a lioness hunt, a horse run, or a hippo wallow? The theory of natural selection would never have replaced the doctrine of divine creation if evident, admirable design pervaded all organisms. Charles Darwin understood this, and he focused on features that would be out of place in a world constructed by perfect wisdom. Why, for example, should a sensible designer create only on Australia a suite of marsupials to fill the same roles that placental mammals occupy on all other continents? Darwin even wrote an entire book on orchids to argue that the structures evolved to insure fertilization by insects are jerry-built of available parts used by ancestors for other purposes. Orchids are Rube Goldberg machines; a perfect engineer would certainly have come up with something better. This principle remains true today. The best illustrations of adaptation by evolution are the ones that strike our intuition as peculiar or bizarre. Science is not “organized common sense”; at its most exciting, it reformulates our view of the anthropocentric prejudices that we call intuition.

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Appendix G

Gould, Stephen Jay, (1975). Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 99-100.

…Darwin[‘s] theory advocates no higher principle beyond individuals pursuing their own self-interest—i.e. the representation of their own genes in future generations. The problem [Gould was writing about the synchroneity or sex in the cicada and bamboo species] is similar to that faced by Adam Smith when he advocated an unbridled policy of laissez faire as the surest path to a harmonious economy. The ideal economy, Smith argued, might appear orderly and well balanced, but it would emerge “naturally” from the interplay of individuals who follow no path beyond the pursuit of their own best interests. Smith argues in his famous metaphor, only reflects the operation of an “invisible hand.”

As every individual…by directing (his) industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value, intends only his own gain, he is in this as in may other cases led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention…But pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it.

Since Darwin grafted Adam Smith upon nature to establish his theory of natural selection, we must seek an explanation for apparent harmony in the advantage that it confers upon individuals.

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Appendix H

Gould, Stephen Jay, (1975). Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp.128-30.

J.J. Sepkoski, a paleontologist at the University of Rochester, has recently found that a plot of increasing organic diversity versus time from the late Precambrian to the end of the “explosion” conforms to our most general model of growth—the so-called sigmoidal (S-shaped) curve. Consider the growth of a typical bacterial colony on a previously uninhabited medium: each cell divides every twenty minutes to form two daughters. Increase in population size is slow at first (Rates of cell division are as fast as they will ever be, but founding cells are few in number and the population builds slowly toward its explosive period.) This “lag” phase forms the initial, slowly rising segment of the sigmoidal curve. The explosive, or “log” phase follows as each cell of a substantial population produces two fecund daughters every twenty minutes. Clearly this process cannot continue indefinitely: a not-too-distant extrapolation would fill the entire universe with bacteria. Eventually, the colony guarantees its own stability (or demise) by filling its space, exhausting its nutrients, fouling its nest with waste products, and so on. This leveling puts a ceiling on the log phase and completes the S of the sigmoidal distribution. It is a long step from bacteria to the evolution of life, but sigmoidal growth is a general property of certain systems, and the analogy seems to hold in this case. For cell division, read speciation; for the agar substrate of a laboratory dish, read the oceans. The lag phase of life is the slow, initial rise of the latest Precambrian times. (We now have a modest fauna of the latest Precambrian age—mainly coelenterates [soft corals and jellyfish] and worms.) The famous Cambrian explosion is nothing more than the log phase of this continuous process, while post-Cambrian leveling represents the initial filling of ecological roles in the world’s oceans (terrestrial life evolved later). If the laws of sigmoidal growth regulated the early diversification of life, then there is nothing special about the Cambrian explosion. It is merely the log phase of a process determined by two factors: (1) the event that initiated the lag phase well within Precambrian times and (2) the properties of an environment that permitted sigmoidal growth.

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Appendix I

Wilson, Edward O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkap Press of Harvard University Press. Pp. 3-4

The Morality of the Gene

Camus said that the only serious philosophical question is suicide. That is wrong even in the strict sense intended. The biologist, who is concerned with questions of physiology and evolutionary history, realizes that self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional control centers in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain. These centers flood our consciousness with all the emotions—hate, love, guilt, fear, and others—that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and evil. What, we are then compelled to ask, make the hypothalamus and limbic system? They evolved by natural selection. That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists, at all depths. Self-existence, or the suicide that terminates it, is not the central question of philosophy. The hypothalamic-limbic complex automatically denies such logical reduction by countering it with feelings of guilt and altruism. In this one way the philosopher’s own emotional control centers are wiser than his solipsist consciousness, “knowing” that in evolutionary time the individual organism counts for almost nothing. In a Darwinist sense the organism does not live for itself. Its primary function is not even to reproduce other organisms; it reproduces genes, and it serves as their temporary carrier. Each organism generated by sexual reproduction is a unique, accidental subset of all the genes constituting the species. Natural selection is the process whereby certain genes gain representation in the following generations superior to that of other genes located at the same chromosome positions. When new sex cells are manufactured in each generation, the winning genes are pulled apart and reassembled to manufacture new organisms that, on the average, contain a higher proportion of the same genes. But the individual organism is only their vehicle, part of an elaborate device to preserve and spread them with the least possible biochemical perturbation. Samuel Butler’s famous aphorism, that the chicken is only an egg’s way of making another egg, has been modernized: the organism is only DNA’s way of making more DNA. More to the point, the hypothalamus and limbic system are engineered to perpetuate DNA.

In the process of natural selection, then, any device that can insert a higher proportion of certain genes into subsequent generations will come to characterize the species. One class of such devices promotes prolonged individual survival. Another promotes superior mating performance and care of the resulting offspring. As more complex social behavior by the organism is added to the genes’ techniques’ for replicating themselves, altruism becomes increasingly prevalent and eventually appears in exaggerated forms. This brings us to the central theoretical problem of sociobiology: how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection? The answer is kinship: if the genes causing the altruism are shared by two organisms because of common descent, and if the altruistic act by one organism increases the joint contribution of these genes to the next generation, the propensity to altruism will spread through the gene pool. This occurs even though the altruist makes less of a solitary contribution to the gene pool as the price of its altruistic act.

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Appendix J

Wilson, Edward O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkap Press of Harvard University Press. Pp. 3-4

Competition

Competition is defined by ecologists as the active demand by two or more organisms for a common resource. When the resource is not sufficient to meet the requirements of all the organisms seeking it, it becomes a limiting factor in population growth. When, in addition, the shortage of the resource limits growth with increasing severity as the organisms become more numerous, then competition is by definition one of the density- dependent factors. Competition can occur between members of the same species (intraspecific competition) or between individuals belonging to different species (interspecific competition). Either process can serve as a density-dependent control for a given species, although the more precise regulation of population size is likely to occur when the competition is primarily intraspecific. The techniques of competition are extremely diverse, and will be explored more fully in a later chapter on territory and aggression. An animal that aggressively challenges another over a piece of food is obviously competing. So is another animal that marks its territory with a scent, even when other animals avoid the territory solely because of the odor and without ever seeing the territory owner. Competition also includes the using up of resources to the detriment of other organism, whether or not any aggressive behavioral interaction also occurs. A plant, to take an extreme case, may absorb phosphates through its root system at the expense of its neighbors, or cut off its neighbors from sunlight by shading them with it leaves. For the moment, it is useful to classify competition into two broad modes, scramble and contest (Nicholson, 1954). Scramble competition is exploitative. The winner is the one who uses up the resource first, without specific behavioral responses to other competitors who may be in the same area. It is the struggle of small boys scrambling for coins tossed on the ground before them. If the boys stood up and fought, with the winner appropriating all the cons within a certain radius, the process would be contest competition. Examples of this latter, more fully animallike (sic) behavior are territoriality and dominance hierarchies. Competition theory is a relatively advance field in ecological research; important recent reviews include those by Levins (1968), Pielou (1969), May (1973), and Schoener (1973).

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Appendix K

Wilson, Edward. O. (1978). On Human Nature. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1, pp. 1-13.

Dilemma

These are the central questions that the great philosopher David Hume said are of unspeakable importance: How does the mind work, and beyond that why does it work in such a way and not another, and from these two considerations together, what is man’s ultimate nature? We keep returning to the subject with a sense of hesitancy and even dread. For if the brain is a machine of ten billion nerve cells and the mind can somehow be explained as the summed activity of a finite number of chemical and electrical reactions, boundaries limit the human prospect—we are biological and our souls cannot fly free. If humankind evolved by Darwinian natural selection, [then] genetic chance, and environmental necessity, not God, made the species. Deity can still be sought in the origin of the ultimate units of matter, in quarks and electron shells (Hand Kung was right to ask atheists why there is something instead of nothing) but not in the origin of species. However much we embellish that stark conclusion with metaphor and imagery, it remains the philosophical legacy of the last century of scientific research. No way appears around this admittedly unappealing proposition. It is the essential first hypothesis for any serious consideration of the (p.2) human condition. Without it humanities and social sciences are the limited descriptors of surface phenomena, like astronomy without physics, biology without chemistry, and mathematics without algebra. With it, human nature can be laid open as an object of fully empirical research, biology can be put to the service of liberal education, and our self-conception can be enormously and truthfully enriched. But to the extent that the new naturalism is true, its pursuit seems certain to generate two great spiritual dilemmas. The first is that no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. Species may have vast potential for material and mental progress but they lack any immanent purpose or guidance from agents beyond their immediate environment or even an evolutionary goal toward which their molecular architecture automatically steers them. I believe that the human mind is constructed in a way that locks it inside this fundamental constraint and forces it to make choices with a purely biological instrument. If the brain evolved by natural selection, even the capacities to select particular esthetic judgments and religious beliefs must have arisen by the same mechanistic process. They are either direct adaptations to past environments in which the ancestral human populations evolved or at most constructions thrown up secondarily by deeper, less visible activities that were once adaptive in the stricter, biological sense. The essence of the argument, then, is that the brain exists because it promotes the survival and multiplication of the genes that direct it s assembly. The human mind is a device for survival and reproduction, and reason is just one of its various techniques. Steven Weinburg has pointed out that physical reality remains so mysterious even to physicists because of the extreme improbability that it was constructed to be understood by the human mind. We can reverse that insight to note with still greater force that the intellect was not constructed to understand atoms or even to understand itself but to promote the (p.3) survival of human genes. The reflective person knows that his life is in some incomprehensible manner guided through a biological ontogeny, a more or less fixed order of life stages. He senses that with all the drive, wit, love, pride, anger, hope, and anxiety that characterize the species he will in the end be sure only of helping to perpetuate the same cycle. Poets have defined this truth as tragedy. Yeats called it the coming of wisdom:

Though leaves are many, the root is one; Through all the lying days of my youth I swayed my leaves and flowers in the sun; Now I may wither into the truth.

The first dilemma, in a word, is that we have no particular place to go. The species lacks any goal external to its own biological nature. It could be that in the next hundred years human kind will thread the needles of technology and politics, solve the energy and materials crises, aver nuclear war, and control reproduction. The world can at least hope for a stable ecosystem and a well-nourished population. But V. Funk 73 what then? Educated people everywhere like to believe that beyond material needs lie fulfillment, and to what ends may potential be realized? Traditional religious beliefs have been eroded, not so much humiliating disproofs of their mythologies as by the growing awareness that beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. Religions, like other human institutions, evolve so as to enhance the persistence and influence of their practitioners. Marxism and other secular religions offer little more than promises of material welfare and a legislated escape from the consequenc3es of human nature. They, too, are energized by the goal of collective self-aggrandizement. The French political observer Alain Peyrefitte once said admiringly of Mao Tse-tung that “the Chinese knew the narcissistic joy of loving themselves in him. It is only natural that he should (p.4) have loved himself through them.” Thus ideology bow to its hidden master the genes, and the highest impulses seem upon closer examination to be metamorphosed into biological activity. The more somber social interpreters of our time, such as Robert Heilbroner, Robert Nisbet, and L.S. Stavrianos, perceive Western civilization and ultimately mankind as a whole to be in immediate danger of decline. Their reasoning leads easily to a vision of post-ideological societies whose members will regress steadily toward self-indulgence. “The will to power will not have vanished entirely,” Gunther Stent writes in the Coming of the Golden Age,

but the distribution of its intensity will have been drastically altered. At one end of this distribution will be the minority of the people whose work will keep intact the technology that sustains the multitude at a high standard of living. In the middle of the distribution will be found a type, largely unemployed, for whom the distinction between the real and the illusory will still be meaningful… He will retain interest in the world and seek satisfaction from sensual pleasures. At the other end of the spectrum will be a type largely unemployable, for whom the boundary of the real and the imagined will have been largely dissolved, at least to the extent compatible with his physical survival.

Thus the danger implicit in the first dilemma is the rapid dissolution of transcendental goals toward which societies can organize their energies. Those goals, the true moral equivalents of war, have faded; they went one by one, like mirages, as we drew closer. In order to search for a new morality based upon a more truthful definition of man, it is necessary to look inward, to dissect the machinery of the mind and to retrace its evolutionary history. But that effort, I predict, will uncover the second dilemma, which is the choice that (p.5) must be made among the ethical premises inherent in man’s biological nature. At this point let me state in briefest terms the basis of the second dilemma, while I defer its supporting argument to the next chapter: innate censors and motivators exist in the brain that deeply and unconsciously affect our ethical premises; from these roots, morality evolved as an instinct. If that perception is correct, science may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and meaning of human values, from which all ethical pronouncements and much of political practice flow. Philosophers themselves, most of whom lack an evolutionary perspective, have not devoted much time to the problem. They examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. Thus John Rawls opens his influential A Theory of Justice (1971) with a proposition he regards as beyond dispute: “In a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.” Robert Nozick begins Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) with an equally firm proposition: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.” These two premises are somewhat different in content, and they lead to radically different V. Funk 74 prescriptions. Rawls would allow rigid social control to secure as close an approach as possible to the equal distribution of society’s rewards. Nozick sees the ideal society as one governed by a minimal sate, empowered only to protect its citizens from force and fraud, and with unequal distribution of rewards wholly permissible. Rawls rejects the meritocracy; Nozick accepts it as a desirable except in those cases where local communities voluntarily decide to experiment (p.6) with egalitarianism. Like everyone else, philosophers measure their personal emotional responses to various alternatives as though consulting a hidden oracle. That oracle resides in the deep emotional centers of the brain, most probably within the limbic system, a complex array of neurons and hormone-secreting cells located just beneath the “thinking” portion of the cerebral cortex. Human emotional responses and the more general ethical practices based on them have been programmed to a substantial degree by natural selection over thousands of generations. The challenge to science is to measure the tightness of the constraints caused by the programming, to find their source in the brain, and to decode their significance through the reconstruction of the evolutionary history of the mind. This enterprise will be the logical complement of the continued study of cultural evolution. Success will generate the second dilemma, which can be stated as follows: Which of the censors and motivators should be obeyed and which ones might better be curtailed or sublimated? These guides are the very core of our humanity. They and not the belief in spiritual apartness distinguish us from electronic computers. At some time in the future we will have to decide how human we wish to remain—in the ultimate, biological sense—because we must consciously choose among the alternative emotional guides we have inherited. To chart our destiny means that we must shift from automatic control based on our biological properties to precise steering based on biological knowledge. Because the guides of human nature must be examined with a complicated arrangement of mirrors, they are a deceptive subject, always the philosopher’s deadfall. The only way forward is to study human nature as part of the natural sciences in an attempt to integrate the natural science with the social sciences and humanities. I can conceive of no ideological or formalistic shortcut. Neurobiology cannot (p.7) be learned at the feet of a guru. The consequences of genetic history cannot by chosen by legislatures. Above all, for our own physical well-being if nothing else, ethical philosophy must not be left in the hands of the merely wise. Although human progress can be achieved by intuition and force of will, only hard-won empirical knowledge of our biological nature will allow us to make optimum choices among the competing criteria of progress. The important initial development in this analysis will be the conjunction of biology and the various social sciences—psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics. The two cultures have only recently come into full sight of one another. The result has been a predictable mixture of aversions, misunderstanding, over enthusiasm, local conflicts, and treaties. The situation can be summarized by saying that biology stands today as the antidiscipline of the social sciences. By the word “antidiscipline” I wish to emphasize the special adversary relation that often exist when fields of study at adjacent levels of organization first begin to interact. For chemistry there is the antidiscipline of many-body physics; for molecular biology, chemistry; for physiology, molecular biology; and so on upward through the paired levels of increasing specification and complexity. In the typical early history of a discipline, it practitioners believe in the novelty and uniqueness of their subject. They devote lifetimes to special entities and patterns and during the early period of exploration they doubt that these phenomena can be reduced to simple laws. Members of the antidiscipline have a different attitude. Having chosen as their primary subject the units of the lower level of organization, say atoms as opposed to molecules, they believe that the next discipline above can and must be reformulated by their own laws: chemistry by the laws of physics, biology by the laws of chemistry, and so on downward. Their interest is relatively narrow, abstract, and exploitative. P.A.M. Dirac, speaking of the theory of the hydrogen (p.8) atom, could say that its consequences would unfold as mere chemistry. A few biochemists are still content in the belief that life is “no more” than the actions of atoms and molecules. It is easy to see why each scientific discipline is also an antidiscipline. An adversary relationship is probable because the devotees of the two adjacent organizational levels—such as atoms versus molecules—are initially committed to their own methods and ideas when they focus on the upper level (in this case, molecules). By today’s standards a broad scientist can be defined as one who is a student of three subjects: his discipline (chemistry in the example cited), the lower antidiscipline (physics), and the subject to which his specialty stands as antidiscipline (the chemical aspects of biology). A well-rounded expert on the nervous system, to take a second, more finely graded example, is deeply versed in the structure of single nerve cells, but he also understands the chemical basis of the impulse that pass through and between V. Funk 75 these cells, and he hopes to explain how nerve cells work together to produce elementary patterns of behavior. Every successful scientist treats differently each of the three levels of phenomena surrounding his specialty. The interplay between adjacent fields is tense and creative at the beginning, but with the passage of time it becomes fully complementary. Consider the origins of molecular biology. In the late 1800s the microscopic study of cells (cytology) and the study of chemical processes within and around the cells (biochemistry) grew at an accelerating pace. Their relationship during this period was complicated, but it broadly fits the historical schema I have described. The cytologists were excited by the mounting evidence of an intricate cell architecture. They has interpreted the mysterious choreography of the chromosomes during cell division and thus set the stage for the emergence of modern genetics and experimental developmental biology. Many biochemists, on the other hand, remained skeptical of the idea that so much structure exists at the microscopic level. They (p.9) thought that the cytologists were describing artifacts created by laboratory methods of fixing and staining cells for microscopic examination. Their interest lay in the more “fundamental” issues of the chemical nature of protoplasm, especially the newly formulated theory that life is based on enzymes. The cytologist responded with scorn to any notion that the cell is a “bag of enzymes.” In general, biochemists judged the cytologist to be too ignorant of chemistry to grasp the fundamental processes, while the cytologists considered the methods of the chemists inappropriate for the idiosyncratic structures of the living cell. The revival of Mendelian genetics in 1900 and the subsequent illumination of the roles of the chromosomes and genes did little at first to force a synthesis. Biochemists, seeing no immediate way to explain classical genetics, by and large ignored it. Both sides were essentially correct. Biochemistry has now explained so much of the cellular machinery on its own terms as to justify its most extravagant early claims. But in achieving this feat, mostly since 1950, it was partially transformed into the new discipline of molecular biology, which can be defined as biochemistry that also accounts for the particular spatial arrangements of such molecules as the DNA helix and enzyme proteins. Cytology force the development of a special kind of chemistry and the use of a battery of powerful new techniques, including electrophoresis, chromatography, density-gradient centrifugation, and x-ray crystallography. At the same time cytology metamorphosed into modern cell biology. Aided by the electron microscope, which magnifies objects by hundreds of thousands of times, it has converged in perspective and language toward molecular biology. Finally, classical genetics, by switching from fruit flies and mice to bacteria and viruses, has incorporated biochemistry to become molecular genetics. Progress over a large part of biology has been fueled by competition among the various perspectives and techniques derived from (p.10) cell biology and biochemistry, the discipline and its antidiscipline. The interplay has been a triumph for scientific materialism. It has vastly enriched our understanding of the nature of life and created materials for literature more powerful than any imagery of prescientific culture. I suggest that we are about to repeat this cycle in the blending of biology and the social sciences and that as a consequence the two cultures of Western intellectual life will be joined at last. Biology has traditionally affected the social sciences only indirectly through technological manifestations, such as the benefits of medicine, the mixed blessings of gene splicing and other techniques of genetics, and the specter of population growth. Although of great practical importance, these matters are trivial with reference to the conceptual foundation of the social sciences. The conventional treatments of “social biology” and “social issues of biology” in our colleges and universities present some formidable intellectual challenges, but they are not addressed to the core of social theory. This core is the deep structure of human nature, an essentially biological phenomenon that is also the primary focus of the humanities. It is all too easy to be seduced by the opposing view: that science is competent to generate only a few classes of information, that its cold, clear Apollonian method will never be relevant to the full Dionysian life of the mind, that single-minded devotion to science is dehumanizing. Expressing the mood of the counter culture, Theodore Roszak suggested a map of the mind “as a spectrum of possibilities, all of which properly blend into one another… At one end, we have the hare, bright lights of science; here we find information. In the center we have the sensuous hues of art; here we find the aesthetic shape of the world. At the far end, we have the dark, shadowy tone of religious experience, shading off into wave lengths beyond all perception; here we find meaning.” No, here we find obscurantism! And a curious underestimate of (p.11) what the mind can accomplish. The sensuous hues and dark tones have been produced by the genetic evolution of our nervous and sensory tissues; to treat them as other than objects of biological inquiry is simply to aim too low. V. Funk 76

The heart of the scientific method is the reduction of perceived phenomena to fundamental, testable principles. The elegance, we can fairly say the beauty, of any particular scientific generalization is measured by its simplicity relative to the number of phenomena it can explain. Ernst Mach, a physicist and forerunner of the logical positivists, captured the idea with a definition: “Science may be regarded as a minimal problem consisting of the completest presentation of facts with the least possible expenditure of thought.” Although Mach’s perception has an undeniable charm, raw reduction is only half of the scientific process. The remainder consists of the reconstruction of complexity by an expanding synthesis under the control of laws newly demonstrated by analysis. This reconstitution reveals the existence of novel, emergent phenomena. When the observer shifts his attention from on level of organization to the next, as from physics to chemistry or from chemistry to biology, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. But to reconstitute the upper levels of organization requires specifying the arrangement of the lower units and this in turn generates richness and the basis of new and unexpected principles. The specification consists of particular combinations of units, as well as particular spatial arrangements and histories of the ensembles of these elements. Consider the following simple example from chemistry. The ammonia molecule consists of a negatively charged nitrogen atom bonded to a triangle of three positively charged hydrogen atoms. If the atoms were locked in one position the ammonia molecule would have an opposite charge at each end (a dipole moment) in apparent contradiction to the symmetry laws of nuclear physics. Yet the molecule manages to behave properly: it neutralizes (p.12) its dipole moment by passing the nitrogen atom back and forth though the triangle of hydrogen atoms at a frequency of thirty billion times per second. However, such symmetry is absent in the case of sugar and other large organic molecules, which are too large and complex in structure to invert themselves. They break but do not repeal the laws of physics. This specification may not be greatly interesting to nuclear physicists, but its consequences redound throughout organic chemistry and biology. Consider a second example, closer to our subject, from the evolution of social life in the insects. In the Mesozoic Era, about 150 million years ago, primitive wasps evolved the sex-determining trait of haplodiploidy, in which fertilized eggs produced females to choose the sex of their offspring according to the nature of the prey insects they were able to subdue. In particular, smaller prey might have been assigned to the male offspring, which require less protein in their development. But whatever its initial cause, haplodiploidy represented and evolutionary event that quiet accidentally predisposed these insects to develop advanced forms of social life. The reason is that haplodiplidy cause sisters to be more closely related to each other than mothers are to daughters, and so females may derive genetic profit from becomes a sterile cast specialized to the rearing of sisters. Sterile castes engaged in rearing siblings are the essential feature of social organization in the insects. Because of its link to haplodiploidy, insect social life is almost limited to the wasps and their close relatives among the bees and ants. Furthermore, most cases can be classified either as matriarchies, in which queens control colonies of daughters, or as sisterhood, in which sterile daughters control the egg-laying mothers. The societies of wasps, bees, and ants have proved so successful that they dominate and alter most of the land habitats of the Earth. In the forests of Brazil, their assembled forces constitute more (p.13) than 20 percent of the weight of all land animals, including nematode worms, toucans, and jaguars. Who could have guessed all this from a knowledge of haplodiploidy? Reduction is the traditional instrument of scientific analysis, but it is feared and resented. If human behavior can be reduc3ed and determined to any considerable degree by the laws of biology, then mankind might appear to be less than unique and to that extent dehumanized. Few social scientists and scholars in the humanities are prepared to enter such a conspiracy, let alone surrender any of their territory. But this perception, which equates the method of reduction with the philosophy of diminution, is entirely in error. The laws of a subject are necessary to the discipline above it, they challenge and force a mentally more efficient restructuring, but they are not sufficient for the purposes of the discipline. Biology is the key to human nature, and social scientists cannot afford to ignore its rapidly tightening principles. But the social sciences are potentially far richer in content. Eventually they will absorb the relevant ideas of biology and go on to beggar them. The proper study of man is, for reasons that now transcend anthropocentrism, man.

V. Funk 77

Appendix L

Wilson, Edward. O. (1978). On Human Nature. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Pp. 16-21

Sociobiology, in contrast [to ethology whose emphasis remains on the individual organism and the physiology of organisms], is a more explicitly hybrid discipline that incorporates knowledge from ethology (the naturalistic study of whole patterns of behavior), ecology (the study of the relationships of organisms to their environment), and genetics in order to derived general principles concerning the biological properties of entire societies. What is truly new about sociobiology is the way it has extracted (p.17) the most important facts about social organization from their traditional matrix of ethology and psychology and reassembled them on a foundation of ecology and genetics studied at the population level in order to show how social groups adapt to the environment by evolution. Only within the past few years have ecology and genetics themselves become sophisticated and strong enough to provide such a foundation. Sociobiology is a subject based largely on comparisons of social species. Each living form can be viewed as an evolutionary experiment, a product of millions of years of interaction between genes and environment. By examining many such experiments closely, we have begun to construct and test the first general principles of genetic social evolution. It is now within our reach to apply this broad knowledge to the study of human beings. Sociobiologists consider man as though seen through the front end of a telescope, at a greater than usual distance and temporarily diminished in size, in order to view him simultaneously with an array of other social experiments. They attempt to place humankind in its proper place in a catalog of the social species on Earth. They agree with Rousseau that “One needs to look near at hand in order to study men but to study man one must look from afar.” This macroscopic view has certain advantages over the traditional anthropocentrism of the social sciences. In fact, no intellectual vice is more crippling than defiantly self- indulgent anthropocentrism.

(p.19)

The question of interest is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent. The accumulated evidence for a large hereditary component is more detailed and compelling than most persons, including even geneticist, realize. I will go further: it already is decisive.

(p.20)

The picture of genetic determinism emerges most sharply when we compare selected major categories of animals with the humans species. Certain general human traits are shared with a majority of the great apes and monkeys of Africa and Asia, which on grounds of anatomy and biochemistry are our closets living evolutionary relatives:

V. Funk 78

‰Our intimate social groupings contain on the order of ten to one hundred adults, never just two, as in most birds and marmosets, or up to thousands, as in many kinds of fishes and insects. ‰Males are larger than females. This is a characteristic of considerable significance within the Old World monkeys and apes and many other kinds of mammals. The average number of females consorting with successful males closely corresponds to the size gap between males and females when many species are considered together. The rule makes sense: the greater the competition among males for females, the greater the advantage of large size and the less influential are any disadvantages accruing to bigness. Men are not very much larger than women; we are similar to chimpanzees in this regard. When the sexual size difference in human beings is plotted on the curve based on other kinds of mammals, the predicted average number of females per successful male turns out to be greater than one but less than three. The prediction is close to reality; we know we are a mildly polygynous species. ‰The young are molded by a long period of social training, first by closest associations with the mother, then to an increasing degree with other children of the same age and sex. ‰Social play is a strongly developed activity featuring role practice, mock aggression, sex practice, and exploration.

(p.50)

I will go further and suggest that hope and pride and not despair are the ultimate legacy of genetic diversity, because we are a single species, not two or more, one great breeding system through which genes flow and mix in each generation. Because of that flux, mankind viewed over many generations shares a single human nature within which relatively minor hereditary influences recycle through ever changing patterns, between the sexes and across families and entire populations.

(p.215)

Glossary

Determinism. Loosely employed to designate any form of constraint on the development of an anatomical organ, physiological process, or behavior. Genetic determinism means some degree of constraint that is based on the possession of a particular set of genes.

V. Funk 79

Appendix M

Rihani, Samir (2002). Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-Linear Realities. New York: Zed Books. Pp.83-85

Evolution: An Uphill Struggle

Nonlinear science revealed evolution fro what it really is, an arduous task undertaken against considerable odds. A system has to be able to adapt, by having at all time some elements that are fit for the prevailing circumstances; and then it has to remain stable for long enough to adapt repeatedly. That cyclic process, survival and adaptation, entails a battle against nature. This sounds somewhat odd on first inspection. What could be more natural than evolution? Living organisms, from the humblest to the most complex, have been doing it for millennia apparently without thought or effort. That cosy picture is misleading and is the source of considerable misunderstanding when on moves (p.85) away from evolution of living entities to tackle social, political and economic systems. A glance at what is involved is sufficient to illustrate the difficulties. An evolving system, be it an animal in pursuit of life, a company struggling to grow, or a whole nation seeking development, has to traverse cycles of adaptation and survival, and time is the medium over which that precarious process unfolds. Progress is precarious because the system has to combat the destabilizing punches thrown at it all the while by thermodynamics’ second law. That law, which also requires time to achieve its devastating ends, dictates that things, when left to their own devices, must move towards disorder and decay. Put simply, but very accurately, the second law is based on an unshakable principle that chaos is more a probable state than stability. That is only natural; for example, a pile of rubble never assembles itself into a building, but the reverse, by contrast, is a self-evident occurrence. In short, continual action is required to maintain a system in a stable, less probable, state of survival and, hopefully, evolution. Stability, technically self-organized Complexity, is achieved through a system’s ability to exchange energy with the outside world through its internal dynamics. As discussed before, a system with many interacting elements has a potentially vast number of states. In chaos, a more probable condition, the system wanders through all its state space to visit an infinite number of possible states; it does not settle down to a recognizable pattern. However, in organized Complexity the system is locked in small, less probable, regions of its state space with a fewer number of states to scroll through. To keep it there is no mean task: too little effort and the second law triumphs by pushing the system into chaos; too much effort and it is ‘killed’ as unvarying order prevails everywhere; all regions ‘freeze in fixed states of activity’ (Kauffman 1993: 174). Living systems mastered the trick of remaining within the narrow layer of Complexity, between order and chaos, after millions of years of trial and error.

The Accumulation of Knowledge

A fundamental notion, that of learning, presents itself here. A living entity achieves homeostasis, a state of self-organized Complexity, and then lives long enough to pass on its past experiences through its genes. Essentially, the system records regularities and V. Funk 80 ignores random occurrences. (p.85) A dog learns through that mechanism to distinguish between food and poison and also learns to bury unused food for later without being told by other dogs or by human beings. These features are regularities. Next generations receive the message, amend it by adding other regularities, and then in turn pass it on. There is, therefore, a recurrent process that includes the accumulation of knowledge in addition to adaptation and survival. The trilogy of survival, adaptation and learning exists in all situations involving Complex Adaptive Systems, irrespective of whether on is dealing with phenomena in the natural or the social sciences. If the tools of knowledge building are impaired, the process of adaptation and survival is affected, slightly or catastrophically.

V. Funk 81

Appendix N

Rihani, Samir (2002). Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-Linear Realities. New York: Zed Books. Pp.97-99

Elites and hierarchies

Inequality, elites and hierarchies are facets of the same phenomenon. Study of social, political and economic elites that exercise disproportionate power over others is a vast subject. Remarks made here are only intended to present a few aspects of direct relevance to the present subject. As described in the next section, it is natural for egoistic individuals to compete in the search for survival and dominance. The hierarchical model is an inevitable consequence of that process, and it is now firmly fixed as a frozen accident in most instances where people are involved, including the international political economy. The rigidity and shape of the hierarchy in the context of a political economy is determined by a number of factors, including history, tradition and form of government. The hierarchy is steep under a dictator or a despotic royal family; those who monopolize political and economic interactions might amount to no more than a handful of people. In a democratic country, by contrast, the hierarchy is somewhat flatter; the elite embraces more individuals, and people are free to interact locally in many secondary hierarchies where they have ‘bosses’ above and ‘underlings’ below. The elite in this case is a flexible group with slowly changing membership. This distinction is a critical feature that will recur in later discussion. The global hierarchy, comprising leading powers, international regimes, and less developed countries, is a typical manifestation of the above feature of Complexity. Interactions, within bounds, are crucial for self-organized Complexity. They energize the system and thereby confer positive benefits. However, too many interactions could shunt the system into chaos: Complexity catastrophe is an ever-present risk. Conversely, too few interactions might push it into a deathly state of order. Ultimately, a balance has to be struck somewhere between the two polar positions.

The Fundamental Unit

The driving force in natural selection is not the good of the species, or group, but the good, meaning survival, of the individual gene. The most significant action in natural evolution takes place, therefore, at (p.98) the level of the basic unit, the selfish gene (Dawkins 1989: 19). Selfishness in this instance describes self-interest rather than ill will to others. Similar traits in the affairs of humankind could be observed in the behavior of egoistic individuals, as appreciated by Adam Smith centuries ago. Furthermore, Dawkins suggested that if there were a general principle that is true of life it would be that it ‘evolves by the differential survival of replicated entities’. Genes develop for themselves increasingly more elaborate ‘survival machines’, including of course human beings. In consequence, Dawkins pointed out that although the main aim in evolution is strictly gene survival, ‘for many purposes individual survival is a reasonable approximation’ (Cawkins 1989: 55). Humans therefore, are essentially V. Funk 82

‘selfish’: they basically want to prevail and then survive long enough to pass their genes to their offspring. In consequence, individuals focus almost exclusively on their own concerns. However, that does not mean that they could not, or would not, cooperate to achieve societal aims. Even here the welfare of the species as a whole has no real meaning in practice. At heart, decisions to compete or cooperate are meaningful in the main only at the level of the individual. The phenotypes of the conscious world—groups, committees, businesses, sectors of an economy, communities, whole nations, and ultimately the entire international political economy—are shaped substantially by the interactions pursued egoistically at the local level of conscious individuals.

Survival Machines for Individuals

To continue Dawkin’s theme, families, tribes and nations can be thought of in turn as survival machines for individuals. The terminology might be modern but the idea is ancient and does not require elaboration. Nevertheless, it is important to present that simple concept to see the picture in its true colours. Looking at events through ideological, moral, religious or nationalistic glasses obscures the most salient feature; one would be observing the vehicle rather than the purposeful driver within. Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, to name only four instances, were all triggered by a single idea that germinated in the supreme intellect of on individual. In a similar vein, if the history of the British Empire were analyzed, there would be little argument about the identities of the handful of individuals who took part in that grand design through its long history. (p.99) One fundamental fact must be kept clearly in mind though: they did not set out to creat an Empire. They simply wished to promote or safeguard their interests and to impose their opinions on others. The history of other nations shows similar traits. On needs only mention George Washington, Ataturk, de Gaulle, Gandi, Mao Tse-tung, Stalin, Hitler, Franco, Castro and Mandela, to illustrate the point.

V. Funk 83

Appendix O

Rihani, Samir (2002). Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-Linear Realities. New York: Zed Books. Pp. 187-88.

Gathering Clouds of food Scarcity

There was a time in history when humankind was able to rely on plentiful availability of food and water. Overall, land and water were plentiful, and rivers and seas were brimming with fish. Land under irrigation increased over the millennia up to the end of the nineteenth century when the area amounted to some 40 million hectares, but that increased sharply to 94 million by 1950 and to 248 million by 1993 (Brown et al. 1997: 29). Consumption increased rapidly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to faster growth in populations (p.188) and a move up the food chain driven by rising affluence, but new demands were met by more intensive fishing, by the cultivation of new lands that required special irrigation methods, and by heavy reliance on fertilizers. There are indications, however, that future expansion might not be as easy. For instance, the amount of fish caught increased from 19 million tons in 1950 to 88 million tons in 1988, but the catch seems to have hit a ceiling as it has remained roughly at that level ever since (Brown et al. 1997: 24,29). Clearly, much can be done with the help of advanced technology but cost of production—in other words, price of food—begins to be a limiting factor. Additionally, other factors have conspired to make future prospects less promising. Increasing use of chemical fertilizers has become less effective; in many instances fertilizers no make little difference to yield. Water for irrigation is another major headache these days. Levels are falling in even the great rivers of the world, such as the Yellow River in China and the Colorado in the USA. In addition, the water table is falling fast in many parts of the world that rely on underground supplies for agricultural purposes. And it seems global warming is becoming an established fact that few venture to dispute. A few areas have suffered floods, but in the main drought and desertification are on the increase. To make matters worse, demand for food is escalating due to rapidly increasing populations and growth in consumption per head. In short, the candle is burning at both ends. It is now generally accepted that there is a serious problem of food and water shortage, which is likely to grow worse in future, particularly in Africa.

V. Funk 84

Appendix P

“The Story of Man.” The Economist 24 December 2005. p. 11.

“The Story of Man: Modern Darwinism” paints a more flattering portrait of humanity than traditionalists might suppose.

In those parts of the planet that might once have been described as “Christendom”, this week marks the season of peace on Earth and goodwill towards men. A nice idea in a world more usually thought of as seasoned by the survival of the fittest. But goodwill and collaboration are as much part of the human condition as ill-will and competition. And that was a puzzle to 19th-century disciples of Charles Darwin, such as Herbert Spenser. It was Spenser, an early contributor to The Economist, who invented that poisoned phrase, “survival of the fittest”. He originally applied it to the winnowing of firms in the harsh winds of high-Victorian capitalism, but when Darwin’s masterwork, “On the Origin of Species”, was published, he quickly saw the parallel with natural selection and transferred his bon mot to the process of evolution. As a result, he became one of the band of philosophers known as social Darwinists. Capitalists all, they took what they thought were the lessons of Darwin’s book and applied them to human society.89 Their hard-hearted conclusion, of which a 17th-century religious puritan might have been proud, was that people got what they deserved—albeit that the criterion of desert was genetic, rather than moral. The fittest not only survived, but prospered. Moreover, the social Darwinists thought that measures to help the poor were wasted, since such people were obviously unfit and thus doomed to sink. Sadly, the slur stuck. For 100 years Darwinism was associated with a particularly harsh and unpleasant view of the world and, worse, one that was clearly not true—at least, not the whole truth. People certainly compete, but they collaborate, too. They also have compassion for the fallen and frequently try to help them, rather than treading on them. For this sort of behavior, “On the Origin of Species” had no explanation. As a result, Darwinism had to tiptoe round the issue of how human society and behavior evolved. Instead, the disciples of a second 19th-century creed, Marxism, dominated academic sociology departments with their cuddly collectivist ideas—even if the practical application of those ideas has been even more catastrophic than social Darwinism was.

Trust me, I’m a Darwinist

But the real world eventually penetrates even the ivory tower. The failure of Marxism has prompted an opening of minds, and Darwinism is back with a vengeance—and a twist. Exactly how humanity became human is still a matter of debate. But there are, at least, some well-formed hypotheses. What these hypotheses have in common is that they rely not on Spenser’s idea of individual competition, but on social interaction. That interaction is, indeed, sometimes confrontational and occasionally bloody. But it is

89 This was a rather circuitous route since Darwin got the idea of natural selection, at least in part, from Adam Smith. Please see Appendix A. V. Funk 85 frequently collaborative, and even when it is not, it is more often manipulative than violent. Modern Darwinism’s big breakthrough was the identification of the central role of trust in human evolution. People who are related collaborate on the basis of nepotism. It takes outrageous profit or provocation for someone to do down a relative with whom they share a lot of genes. Trust, though, allows the unrelated to collaborate, by keeping score of who does what when, and punishing cheats. Very few animals can manage this. Indeed, outside the primates, only vampire bats have been shown to trust non-relatives routinely. (Well-fed bats will give some of the blood they have swallowed to hungry neighbors, but expect the favour to be returned when they are hungry and will deny favors to those who have cheated in the past.) The human mind, however, seems to have evolved the trick of being able to identify a large number of individuals and to keep score of its relations with them, detecting the dishonest or greedy and taking vengeance, even at some cost to itself. This process may even be— as matt Ridley, who wrote for this newspaper a century and a half after Spencer, described it—the origin of virtue. The new social Darwinists (those who see society itself, rather than the savannah or the jungle, as the “natural” environment in which humanity is evolving and to which natural selection responds) have not abandoned Spencer altogether, of course. But they have put a new spin on him. The ranking by wealth of which Spencer so approved is but one example of a wider tendency for people to try to out-do each other. And that competition, whether athletic, artistic or financial, does seem to be about genetic display. Unfakeable demonstrations of a superiority that has at least some underlying genetic component are almost unfailingly attractive to the opposite sex. Thus both of the things needed to make an economy work, collaboration and competition, seem to have evolved under Charles Darwin’s penetrating gaze.

Dystopia and Utopia

This is a view full of ironies, of course. One is that its reconciliation of competition and collaboration bears a remarkable similarity to the sort of Hegelian synthesis beloved of Marxists. Perhaps a bigger one, though, is that the Earth’s most capitalist country, America, is the only place in the rich world that contains a significant group of dissenters from any sort of evolutionary explanation of human behavior at all. But it is also, in its way, a comforting view. It suggests a constant struggle, not for existence itself, but between selfishness and altruism—a struggle that neither can win. Utopia may be impossible, but Dystopia is unstable, too, as the collapse of Marxism showed. Human nature is not, to use another of Spencer’s favorite phrases (though one he borrowed from Tennyson, his poetical contemporary), red in tooth and claw, and societies built around the idea that it is are doomed to early failure. Of the three great secular faiths born in the 19th-century—Darwinism, Marxism, and Freudianism—the second died swiftly and painfully and the third is slipping peacefully away. But Darwinism goes from strength to strength. If its ideas are right, the handful of dust that evolution has shaped into humanity will rarely stray too far off course. And that is, perhaps, a hopeful thought to carry into the New Year.

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Appendix Q

Ingvar, David H. (1999) “On Volition: A Neurophysiology Oriented Essay.” Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland Eds.. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Thorverton, U.K.: Imprint Academic. P. 8.

VIII: Addendum: Will and Causality

In a recent analysis of the phenomenon of consciousness (Ingvar, 1997), concepts originally developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) were applied. These concepts pertained to what Kant called categories which we use to interpret the surrounding world. The three most important categories were space, time, and causality. The model for consciousness developed from Kant’s ideas emphasized that sensory parts of the cerebral cortex, located in the postrolandic regions, in parietal, occipital, and temporal cortex, handle the analysis of spatial characteristics of the world. Powerful and rapid phylogenetically young transcortical connections and then assumed to transmit ‘packages’ of complex supramodal sensory messages to precentral frontal and prefrontal cortex. Here the temporal organization of the sensory input—from all modalities—is identified. From this temporal analysis, causalities in the sensory input can be recognized. The postrolandic (sensory/special) and the preolandic (motor/temporal) division of the hemisphere cortex has been inspired by the work of Luria (1966) and of Fuster (1995; cf. Ingvar, 1985). Once causality has been established and evaluated emotionally, as well as reached consciousness, one may furthermore assume that the individual ‘understands’ the survival value of the causal relationships observed. Such a series of events may, as a consequence, then induce behavioral, verbal, or cognitive responses of the type we call intentional, willed acts. In this manner will is used by the organism in order to avoid, or search for, certain situations compatible with survival. It appears possible that this biological—and teleological—line of argument may contribute to the discussion of whether man has a free will or not.

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Appendix R

Spence, Sean A. and Chris D. Frith, (1999) “Towards a functional Anatomy of Volition.” Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland Eds.. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Thorverton, U.K.: Imprint Academic. P. 27.

Conclusions

Brain imaging studies show that a characteristic pattern of activity is associated with the subjective experience of deciding when to act and which action to perform. DLPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) seems to be uniquely involved in this kind of mental activity. Other regions—anterior cingulated, SMA, basal ganglia, and parietal cortex— are also necessary, but on their own when actions are carried out routinely and without thought. Thinking about what we are going to do before we do it clearly requires some form of mental representation of intended actions and indeed the pattern of brain activity associated with imagining making a movement is very similar to the pattern of activity associated with preparing to make a movement (Jeannerod, 1997). The parietal lobe probably contains representations of intended actions such as the intended position of a limb or an eye. DLPFC seems to be involved for keeping possible actions in mind before they are executed and selecting which one will be performed. Damage to different pars of this system disrupts the experience of selecting between actions. Limbs may perform actions against our will (alien hand) or we may have the experience of being passively controlled by an external agent (delusions of alien control). These experiences are both disturbing and debilitating. Rather than asking whether our experience of freedom in choosing different actions is justified, we consider that the important question to be answered is: what advantage does this experience of free choice confer upon us? The evolution of these complex brain systems must have resulted from pressure to develop such an advantage. One possibility is that the experience of choice is necessary for us to make the distinction between us, as agents, and the outside world upon which we act. A second. And related advantage concerns our ability to recognize other agents in the world and to understand something of the basis of the decisions, which seem to guide their behavior. In a complex environment our experience of choice is associated with our execution of non-routine (non-stereotypic) procedures. Our unique behaviors may characterize ‘ourselves’; they make us who we feel we are.