U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement

A POWERFUL VOICE FOR LIFESAVING ACTION

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

LESSONS

FROM THE

OPERATIONAL

LEVEL IN

AFRICA

July 2008 Mark Malan Acknowledgements The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the many people interviewed in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo during Refugees International’s visits to both countries. Staff members of the United Nations and many local and international non-governmental organizations were particularly helpful, and their willingness to share information and insights is sincerely appreciated. Superintendent Dag Roger Dahlen of the Norwegian Police and Lieutenant Colonel William M. Wyatt of the U.S. Army deserve a special thank you for their time, interest, and candid exchange of information on police and military reform in Liberia. The author would also like to thank Refugees International colleagues Megan Fowler and Kimberly Compton, whose input and help with the preparation of this report were invaluable. And finally, the author thanks the Connect U.S. Fund for their generous financial support that made this report possible.

New recruits for the Armed About Refugees International Forced of Liberia undergo Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people training exercises in Monrovia as part of and promotes solutions to displacement crises. Based on our on-the-ground knowledge of key a U.S.-funded security humanitarian emergencies, Refugees International successfully pressures governments, interna- sector reform plan. The tional agencies and nongovernmental organizations to improve conditions for displaced people. U.S. is only helping four African countries Refugees International is an independent, non-profit humanitarian advocacy organization transform their armies based in Washington, DC. We do not accept government or United Nations funding, relying and security agencies. instead on contributions from individuals, foundations and corporations. Learn more at ©Refugees International www.refugeesinternational.org.

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA Table of Contents

Executive Summary...... i Introduction...... 1 The Nature of the Imbalance ...... 3 The Cold War Peace Dividend: Forever Lost To GWOT?...... 3 The Perversion of Aid...... 4 Militarization and “Securitization” of U.S. Foreign Assistance...... 7 Overhauling Foreign Assistance...... 10 The Marginalization of Africa in U.S. Foreign Policy...... 12 U.S. Security Sector Reform Efforts In Liberia...... 16 Background...... 16 The Legal Framework...... 17 The Conceptual Framework...... 18 Role of the New AFL and the Security Sector Reform Program...... 19 Recruitment and Training...... 21 The New AFL...... 22 Funding and Resources ...... 23 Transparency and Accountability...... 24 Contractors Are Not the Answer...... 24 Security Sector Reform Efforts in the DR Congo ...... 26 Background...... 26 Military “Integration” in the DRC...... 26 The European Contribution...... 28 Real Commitment Needed...... 29 The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) ...... 31 Background...... 31 Posture and Promises...... 32 Extant U.S. Security Programs in Africa...... 33 Resource Issues...... 36 Potential for a Cohesive Approach to Africa...... 37 Conclusion...... 39 Recommendations...... 40 List of Acronyms...... 42 Endnotes ...... 44

www.refugeesinternational.org executive summary

In his introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush said: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” Failing states with weak state institutions struggle to deliver services to their population or to control corruption and are at risk of ongoing conflict. When these countries descend into civil war, massive flows of refugees and large-scale human displacement lead to further regional and global instability. Nowhere is this more of a challenge than in Africa.

There is broad agreement that combating today’s global threats requires a balanced, integrated approach with coordinated defense, diplomacy and development efforts. In practice, the Pentagon is largely dictating America’s approach to foreign policy. The nation’s foreign aid budget is too low; its civilian capacity to construct and carry out effective, long-term policies to rebuild states is too weak; interventions abroad are often unilateral when multilateral solutions could be more effective; and the military, which is well trained to invade countries, not to build them up, is playing an increasingly active and well-funded role in promoting development and democracy. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that U.S. soldiers conducting development and assistance activities in countries where they frequently don’t speak the language is “no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise.”

The rising military role in shaping U.S. global engagement is a challenge to the next president. Foreign assistance represents less than one percent of the federal budget, while defense spending is 20%. The U.S. military has over 1.5 million uniformed active duty employees and over 10,100 civilian employees, while the Department of State has some 6,500 permanent employees. Although several high-level task forces and commissions have emphasized the urgent need to modernize our aid infrastructure and increase sustainable development activities, such assistance is increasingly being overseen by military institutions whose policies are driven by the Global War on Terror, not by the war against poverty. Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance the Pentagon controlled exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shrunk from 65% to 40%.

This civil-military imbalance has particular ramifications for Africa, where Global War on Ter- ror imperatives do not address the continent’s biggest needs for security assistance. The U.S. is only helping four African countries transform their armies and security agencies into professional organizations that protect citizens rather than abuse them. Resources are allocated in a manner that does not reflect the continent’s most pressing priorities. For example, the U.S. has allocated $49.65 million for reforming a 2,000-strong Liberian army to defend the four million people of that country. In contrast, it only plans to spend $5.5 million in 2009 to help reform a 164,000-strong army in the DR Congo, a country with 65 million people where Africa’s “first world war” claimed the lives of over five million people.

Two case studies emphasize the problems inherent in the U.S. approach. Military dominance over reform programs in Liberia has resulted in a policy focused solely on restructuring Li- beria’s army by expensive private contractors, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers. Meanwhile, intelligence, judiciary, and prison agencies are sadly neglected. In the DR Congo, the State Department has played a very active role in facilitating dialogue among belligerents and is concerned about the humanitarian situation in the east, but the Defense Department is virtually ignoring the nation’s desperate need of military reform. As a result, an inadequately resourced security sector reform program has contributed to the Congolese army becoming a major source of insecurity for civilian communities.

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA The U.S. military’s new Africa Command (AFRICOM) is poised to become the dominant influence over U.S. policy on the continent. Originally, AFRICOM was promoted as integrating military and civilian agencies for “humanitarian assistance, civic action… and response to natural disasters.” After much criticism from African nations and the international humanitarian community, the new AFRICOM Commander is now emphasizing the value the Command can add to the many U.S. military programs already operating in Africa.

AFRICOM should focus on two unashamedly military/political roles that will strengthen peace and security in Africa: a) assisting African countries with defense sector reform; and b) supporting Africa’s regional organizations in building conflict management and standby force capacity. The Command’s legitimacy will ultimately be determined by its ability to work with the African Union and UN operations to address Africa’s principal security challenge – mobi- lizing sufficient resources to provide a secure, stable and well-governed environment in which human rights are protected and promoted and where business can thrive. Assisting with the coordination of security sector and peacekeeping assistance should be strongly emphasized in its mandate to help national governments absorb the plethora of uncoordinated initiatives from various coalitions of donor countries.

Another priority for AFRICOM should be to enhance peacekeeping capacity-building programs. As a matter of urgency, AFRICOM should establish a core of civil-military expertise specifically related to UN peace operations in Africa. With the demand for African peacekeepers far out- stripping the supply of adequately trained and equipped forces, AFRICOM has the potential to increase the number of trained soldiers for UN or AU peace operations.

AFRICOM could also enhance international cooperation for delivering more sustainable support to African efforts to establish peace and security. Instead of having three commanders that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, an informed, consistent and coherent engagement with Africa could be established. However, AFRICOM’s current meager budget for bilateral security cooperation falls far short of what is needed to have true credibility and impact. Currently, no funds are allocated for security sector and governance capacity-building for African nations. Instead, funding is being requested for Global War on Terror priorities.

While AFRICOM can improve engagement with African nations, more effective non-military support is needed to provide the basic foundations of stability that would encourage refugees to return home and would meet Africa’s enormous development challenges. Although the current administration is promoting a range of initiatives to redress the imbalance in U.S. instruments for global engagement, these are aimed at a “quick fix” for long-broken machinery.

The next president must strengthen civilian professional capacity to carry out diplomatic and development operations. More funding is needed to address the current 17 to 1 spending imbalance in staffing and resources between defense and diplomatic/development operations, and to reduce the use of contractors in foreign assistance programs. A thorough assessment of both civilian and military capacities to achieve developmental goals must also be conducted.

Doing a few things well in Africa, and doing the right thing in Africa, can have a positive impact on 53 UN member states, help uplift 80% of the world’s poorest people, and win friends and influence in the most under-governed continent in the world. If the establishment of AFRICOM, the strengthening of the State Department’s Africa Bureau and USAID programs in Africa can be seen to produce positive results, the effort could serve as a model for U.S. global engagement.

www.refugeesinternational.org ii U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: lessons from the operational level in africa Introduction instruments spanning traditionally independent spheres of diplomacy, development, and The impetus for recent efforts by the U.S. defense (the 3Ds) – as well as trade, finance, and other donor governments to integrate intelligence, and others. Moreover, these ele- their defense, diplomatic, development, and ments of engagement should be consciously other policies in engaging weak, failing, and aligned so as to be mutually reinforcing.2 war-torn countries in the developing world is clear: fragile states are not only a major In the U.S., the quest for policy coherence is development challenge; they are also seen much more difficult than in countries such as as a leading source of transnational threats 1 Canada, the UK and Sweden because in these to global security. From a humanitarian and other donor countries, the amount of perspective, one of the major concerns about government resources allocated for develop- fragile states is the massive flows of refugees ment and diplomacy is fairly well balanced and the large-scale human displacement that with money for defense. In the U.S., however, results when these countries descend into defense spending dwarfs that of the civilian civil war. agencies for global engagement by a factor of approximately seventeen to one. Foreign Policy makers have come to recognize that assistance represents less than one percent the security, governance, and development of the federal budget, while defense spend- challenges of fragile and failing states are ing is 20%.3 The U.S. military (including the interconnected. Experience suggests that ef- Coast Guard) has over 1.5 million uniformed forts to bolster, reform, or reconstruct weak active duty employees, nearly a million more or failed states must simultaneously address in the reserve forces, and over 10,100 civilian security and stability, good governance, and employees.4 By contrast, the Department of development needs. To do so effectively State has some 6,500 permanent employees requires a wide range of capabilities and

Nearly one million people are displaced inside Somalia, including 250,000 in this camp. Fragile states like Somalia are not only a major development challenge; they are a major threat to regional and global stability.

©Refugees International

1 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA – about the same as the number of personnel Although there is broad rhetorical agreement serving in one U.S. carrier battle group, and that the problems of poor governance, instabil- less than the number employed in military ity, and war-torn states require integrated, bands. The U.S. Agency for International “3D” approaches (through merging or at least Development (USAID) has only 2,021 per- better coordinating defense, diplomacy, and manent employees – a number said to be less development efforts), the Pentagon is largely than the number of lawyers working in DOD dictating the doctrinal debate on how to headquarters at the Pentagon. stabilize and reconstruct failed states. There is not yet a strong political or interagency con- Giant arms manufacturers such as Lockheed sensus on the rationale for U.S. engagement; Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman the criteria that should guide U.S. involve- have been the main beneficiaries of the Pen- ment; the scale of U.S. aspirations; the end While Africa has 5 tagon’s rising expenditures. The Pentagon’s state toward which prevention, stabilization historically been of fast-growing service contractors have equally and reconstruction efforts should be directed; been making fortunes. Contracted services 8 and the means required to achieve success. marginal strategic extend from basic food and sanitation provi- Achieving consensus will require strong sion to highly sophisticated services, such as leadership from the relevant civilian agencies interest to America, the provision of security to U.S. personnel of government, as well as strong guidance and the majority of the serving abroad. By the end of 2006, there support from the presidency and the legislature. were about 100,000 government contractors world’s most fragile operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors While Africa has historically been of marginal – a total that was fast approaching the size of strategic interest to America, the majority states are on that the U.S. military force there.6 of the world’s most fragile states are on that continent. However, the new U.S. concern continent. The inflated defense budget deprives civilian for failed states is shaped by recent experi- agencies of the resources they need to build up ence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and resources their own technical expertise and response ca- allocated accordingly. Even where the State pabilities, respond to unforeseen contingencies Department has a clear mandate and budget and provide foreign aid to fragile and post-con- to engage in stabilization and reconstruc- flict states. While exaggerating the position of tion tasks in Africa (such as security sector the Pentagon in the nation’s national security reform in Liberia, and support to the African structure, the greatly skewed resource alloca- Union and the AU Mission in Sudan), core tions have led to an over-reliance on soldiers tasks are contracted out to private U.S. to conduct post-conflict activities – such as companies. The issues of State Department policing, governance reform and infrastructure weakness and of military dominance of U.S. development – that should logically be done by Africa policy come to the fore in the debate 7 civilian agencies and actors. on the establishment of AFRICOM.

civilian vs. military personnel Department Number of Personnel US Military Active Duty Employees 1,500,000 US Military Reserve Forces 1,000,000 US Military Civilian Employees 10,100 US Dept of State Permanent Employees 6,500 USAID Permanent Employees 2,021

www.refugeesinternational.org On March 13, 2008 General ‘Kip’ Ward, their strategic interests. The end of the Cold Commander of AFRICOM, presented before War did not, however, see reduced military the House and Senate Armed Services budgets resulting in some resources being Committees the first free-standing posture put towards increased aid, as hoped. statement on the U.S. security strategy for Africa. According to Ward: While there was a peace dividend in the U.S., it was erased after September 11, 2001. “AFRICOM is pioneering a new way for a U.S. military spending returned to Cold Unified Command to fulfill its role in sup- War levels by 2004 and in 2006, spend- porting the security interests of our nation. ing was 9 per cent higher in real terms From inception, AFRICOM was intended than in 1988.11 Between 2001 and 2007, The FY 2008 to be a different kind of command designed U.S. military expenditure increased by to address the changing security challenges 53% in real terms. Since 2001, Congress military budget confronting the U.S. in the 21st century. has provided the Department of Defense We are integrating interagency person- (DOD) with hundreds of billions of dollars is more than 30 nel into our structure to improve both the in supplemental and annual appropriations times higher than planning and execution of our duties. By for military operations in support of the incorporating interagency representatives war on terrorism. DOD’s reported annual all spending on into our structure, we will provide better obligations for GWOT have shown a steady informed and more effective support to increase from about $0.2 billion in fiscal State Department initiatives led by civilian Departments and year 2001 to about $139.8 billion in fiscal operations and non- Agencies, such as the Department of State year 2007. To continue GWOT operations, (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for Internation- the President requested $189.3 billion in military foreign aid al Development (USAID).” 9 appropriations for DOD in fiscal year 2008. The United States’ commitments to GWOT combined. Many humanitarian NGOs are highly critical will likely involve the continued investment of the new Command and are deeply con- of significant resources, requiring decision cerned by the role of AFRICOM in harness- makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the ing – or hijacking – relief and development nation faces an increasing long-range fiscal assistance to combat terrorism. This role is challenge. described by Robert Kaplan as one in which: The supplemental appropriation to pay for “…through a combination of small-scale the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would military strikes that do not generate bad bring proposed military spending for FY publicity and constant involvement on the 2008 to $647.2 billion, the highest level of soft, humanitarian side of military opera- military spending since the end of World tions, AFRICOM could rebuild the post-Iraq War II.12 Using official budget figures, image of the American soldier in the global William D. Hartung, provides the following commons… AFRICOM will be about pick- useful comparisons: ing low-hanging terrorist fruit. The so-called long war – and particularly the work of AF- • Proposed U.S. military spending for FY RICOM – will be relentless and low-key.”10 2008 is larger than military spending by all of the other nations in the world combined. THE NATURE OF THE IMBALANCE The Cold War Peace Dividend: • The FY 2008 military budget is more Forever Lost to GWOT? than 30 times higher than all spending on State Department operations and The Cold War years saw high spending on non-military foreign aid combined. aid as well as defense, as each super power and their allies aided regimes friendly to

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA • The FY 2008 military spending The Perversion of Aid represents 58 cents out of every dollar A smart security strategy must be compre- spent by the U.S. government on dis- hensive and long-term to combat today’s cretionary programs: education, health, global threats. However, despite its housing assistance, international affairs, extraordinary and historically unprecedented natural resources and environment, justice, military preeminence, the United States has veterans' benefits, science and space, failed to reduce, to any significant degree, transportation, training/employment and the endemic insecurity that prevails among social services, economic development, the people of the world’s poorest nations and several more items. 13 – including those living in the kind of ‘failing states’ that are seen as likely ‘breeding By any conceivable measure, the United The United States States is currently the most powerful country grounds’ for terrorists. Approximately two- in the history of the world. Potential chal- fifths of the world population live in ‘high- has failed to reduce… lengers cannot even begin to rival its military mortality developing countries’ – mainly the endemic power. The United States outspends China located in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia. In these countries, one-third of prema- by about seven to one. China spends 3.9 per- insecurity that cent of its GDP on defense; it would have to ture death and disability results from four spend about 25 percent of GDP on defense if risk factors: being underweight; unsafe sex; prevails among the it were to begin to rival the United States. unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene; and indoor smoke from fossil fuel. people of the world’s poorest nations.

Quality-adjusted aid and charitable giving/GDP (%) Country Quality-adjusted aid as percent of GDP Sweden 0.5 Denmark 0.48 Netherlands 0.45 Norway 0.4 France 0.23 Belgium 0.21 Switzerland 0.21 Finland 0.19 United Kingdom 0.19 Austria 0.15 Germany 0.15 Canada 0.14 Ireland 0.12 Australia 0.11 Italy 0.11 Portugal 0.1 Japan 0.09 Greece 0.07 Spain 0.07 United States 0.07

www.refugeesinternational.org Thus, interventions to reduce hunger, improve • Grants to NGOs and to domestic agencies the physical environment and reduce poverty to support emergency relief operations; and are important means of improving the security of human lives. Furthermore, in comparisons • Technical co-operation grants which pay with military expenditure, the prevention for the services of nationals of the donor strategies developed for the World Health countries. Organization (WHO) and the United Nations In short, many forms of aid are not directed to achieve this appear highly cost-effective. For towards poverty alleviation. For example, in example, it has been estimated that 8 million 2006 Action Aid estimated “… that $37 bil- lives could be saved annually for an investment lion – roughly half of global aid – is ‘phan- of $57 billion in basic health interventions in tom aid,’ that is, it is not genuinely available Many forms of poor countries. to poor countries to fight poverty.” 15 Techni- aid are not U.S. aid, in terms of percentage of GDP, cal assistance was singled out as a particular has almost always been lower than any other problem, with at least one quarter of donor directed towards industrialized nation in the world, though budgets being spent on consultants, research poverty alleviation. since 2000, its dollar amount has been the and training: highest. Moreover, if aid numbers are ad- “This is despite a growing body of evi- justed to include qualitative indicators of the dence… that technical assistance is often efficacy of aid, as David Roodman has done, overpriced and ineffective, and in the then the U.S. ranks no higher than Greece worst cases destroys rather than builds the and Spain.14 capacity of the poorest countries…Donor In 1970, official development assistance was funded advisers have even been brought understood as bilateral grants and loans on in to draft supposedly ‘country owned’ 16 concessional terms, and official contributions poverty reduction strategies.” to multilateral agencies. However, a number The U.S. spends more on international of factors have led to a large decline in aid technical assistance than any other donor that meets such criteria – including tighter – almost half its official development assis- budgetary constraints in richer countries dur- tance. The bulk of that funding goes to U.S. ing the 1980s; neo-liberalism and structural consultants whose real expertise is often adjustment programs; and donors putting a knowing how to adhere to complex U.S. broader interpretation on what constitutes procurement and administrative procedures development assistance. Regarding the latter, rather than having knowledge of context, expanded categories for official development experience in the field, language skills, or a assistance include, for example: long-term poverty reduction orientation.17 • Debt relief; Between 1998 and 2006, reductions in USAID direct-hire staff were accompanied • Subsidies on exports to developing countries; by a sharp increase in foreign assistance spending, with the result that aid disburse- • Food aid which disposes of agricultural ment per staff member grew by 46 percent surpluses resulting from government to $2 million. USAID has consequently had subsidies; to reduce development expertise in favor of general management skills. • Provision of surplus commodities of little economic value; In fact, the U.S. has no coherent long-term foreign assistance strategy. As stated by the • Administrative costs; Secretary of Defense, • Payments for care and education of refugees in donor countries;

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA “The U.S. government has tried to meet pursued a distinctively unilateral posture in post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st the pursuit of national security and foreign century objectives with processes and orga- and development policy. American policy nizations designed in the wake of the Sec- places little emphasis on the need to har- ond World War.… The last major legislation monize U.S. approaches with those of other structuring how America dispenses foreign donors, or indeed to align these policies assistance was signed by President Kennedy. with the priorities of aid recipients. Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, the U.S. government has The principle of local ownership is under- sought to improve interagency planning and mined by the U.S. appropriations process, cooperation through a variety of means: new which rewards agencies for delivering nar- legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, rowly defined outcomes on a year-to-year “The U.S. government ‘tsars’, authorities, and initiatives with vary- basis and provides little space for hand- has tried to meet ing degrees of success.”18 ing over controls to foreign states or their citizens. With the notable exception of the post-Cold War Instead of modernizing the Cold War era aid Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S. infrastructure, the U.S. administration has development agencies are prohibited from challenges and responded to each new global challenge by committing funding over the long term, creating new ad hoc institutional arrange- making it difficult for operational agen- pursue 21st century ments alongside the old ones – like the cies and recipient governments to plan.20 objectives with pro- President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Similarly, no major donor country makes (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative less use than the U.S. does of recipient gov- cesses and organiza- (PMI), the Millennium Challenge Corpora- ernments’ procurement or public finance tion (MCC), and the State/F Bureau.19 Amer- management systems for its funding.21 And tions designed in the ica’s foreign aid is now (mis)managed by an the U.S. ties more aid than any other donor. wake of the Second alphabet soup of no less than fifty separate units within the executive branch, pursuing Several high level task forces and commissions World War…” fifty disparate and sometimes overlapping have reported on different aspects of U.S. aid 22 objectives ranging from narcotics eradica- effectiveness in recent years. All emphasized – Secretary of tion to biodiversity preservation. Poor coor- the urgent need to modernize an aid infra- Defense Robert Gates dination and lack of integration means that structure and for greater U.S. engagement on U.S. agencies often work at cross purposes development. All called for elevating develop- – something which is not lost on recipient ment on a par with diplomacy and defense – countries that are already wary of the fact and not for subordinating it to either. The that the U.S. ties more aid to the purchase United Kingdom provides an example of how of American goods and services than any this can be done. Besides being a full cabinet other donor. Of the more than $2.6 billion department, the UK Department for Interna- in aid that the U.S. reported to the OECD tional Development (DFID) is governed by Development Assistance Committee for the International Development Act, which 2005, less than $200 million was untied mandates that its funds be spent “to support aid. If development aid is an important ele- sustainable development.” This gives the ment of the U.S. national security strategy, Secretary of State for development near total including “winning hearts and minds,” then discretion over the use of those funds. DFID’s this sends precisely the wrong message. Public Service Agreement with the Treasury provides an additional constraint on the Effective aid requires the promotion of own- diversion of DFID resources, by mandating ership by recipient governments, alignment that 90 percent of the department’s budget be of aid under national plans, harmonization spent on low-income countries – effectively with other donors, and empowerment of the restricting the lion’s share of DFID’s aid to the citizenry. Since 2001, the United States has poorest regions of Africa and Asia. 23

www.refugeesinternational.org Militarization and “Securitization” PENTAGON CONTROL OF of U.S. Foreign Assistance OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE The Pentagon has greatly increased and ex- 25% panded its involvement into the realm of aid 25% activities that have traditionally been imple- 20%20% mented by civilian agencies and overseen by 15% the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 15% The numbers speak for themselves: the 10%10% percentage of the Official Development As- 5% sistance the Pentagon controls has exploded 5% from 1998 to 2005, growing from 3.5% to 0% There is thus a clear 0% nearly 22%, while USAID’s percentage of 19981998 2005 danger that the ODA shrunk from 65% to 40%. “The Department of Defense has taken U.S. Department In 2005, President Bush established a new on many of (the) burdens that might have National Security Presidential Directive been assumed by civilian agencies in the 24 of Defense will (NSPD-44) and assigned to the Secretary of past.… [F]orced by circumstances, our effectively bypass State responsibility to prepare for, plan, brave men and women in uniform have coordinate, and implement reconstruction stepped up to the task, with field artillery- the United Nations and stabilization operations in a wide range men and tankers building schools and of contingencies, ranging from complex mentoring city councils – usually in a and other multilat- emergencies to failing and failed states, and language they don’t speak. … But it is no eral institutions at a war-torn societies. The office is, theoretically, replacement for the real thing – civilian supposed to serve as the focal point for involvement and expertise.” time when global creating, managing, and deploying standing civilian response capabilities for a range of Secretary Gates lamented the gutting of “key partnerships are purposes, including to advance “internal instruments of America’s national power” and the withering of America’s ability to most needed. security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and engage, assist, and communicate with other reconciliation.”25 Where the U.S. military parts of the world which had been so impor- may be involved, the office is to coordinate tant throughout the Cold War.26 Budgetary with the Department of Defense to harmo- allocations are important, but money alone nize military and civilian involvement. will not fix the problem without a substantive overhaul of strategy and policy – while The directive seems logical enough in con- funding can be relatively quickly allocated, it cept, but application has proved extremely will take years to address the civilian deficit problematic – mainly because the civilian in human resources. capacity of the Federal government to implement international policies and programs has The U.S. response to these problems for the eroded over the past twenty-five years. The foreseeable future, it seems, is to formalize Department of State is unable to provide even the U.S. military’s present and future roles advisory support to essential governmental in post-conflict reconstruction and state- functions in post-conflict states, while USAID building processes abroad. DOD Directive relies largely upon contractors to promote its 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, various development objectives. Innate civil- Security, Transition, and Reconstruction ian agency capacity, there and elsewhere, to (SSTR) Operations, dated November 28, operate overseas is very, very thin. 2005, recognizes that civilian Federal agencies lack capability to operate in high-risk In a November 26, 2007 speech, Secretary environments, and establishes the policy that Gates explained that DOD has, by force of DOD shall give stability operations “prior- circumstance, stepped into the breach: ity comparable to combat operations,” and

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA U.S. soldiers carry school equipment in eastern Mali in November 2006. Skewed resource allocations have led to an over-reliance on soldiers to conduct post-conflict activities – such as policing, governance reform and development assistance – that should logically be done by civilian agencies..

©REUTERS/Luc Gnago that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to There is thus a clear danger that the DOD establish or maintain order when civilians will effectively bypass the United Nations cannot do so. The major mission elements and other multilateral institutions at a time comprising SSTR are to: when global partnerships are most needed. The desire of the Department of Defense for a “Establish and maintain a safe, secure “unity of purpose” that uses all U.S. govern- environment; deliver humanitarian ment agencies as “force multipliers” in the assistance; reconstruct critical infrastructure war on terror is further changing how civilian and restore essential services; support eco- agencies operate. This trend is seen in the nomic development; establish representa- current USAID strategic plan, which focuses tive, effective governance and the rule of law; on “counterterrorism; weapons of mass 27 and conduct strategic communications.” destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons; security cooperation and security According to the Secretary of Defense: sector reform; conflict prevention, mitigation, “The objective is to synchronize DOD and response; and transnational crime.” activities with those of other U.S. Govern- The results of this strategy have been ment agencies and international partners dubious. For example, the ‘development’ in coherent campaigns that improve civil programs funded under the rubric of the security, promote effective governance, Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership and foster economic stability. To achieve (TSCTP) have thus far been little more than our national objectives, stability operations a collection of initiatives cobbled together require unity of purpose and synchro- from various accounts, with little consider- nized, timely efforts in all diplomatic, ation of their strategic integration, sustain- defense, and development activities to ability, and long-term developmental im- build partner capacity and address the pacts.29 There are also increasing concerns causes of conflict.”28 that USAID intends to seek DOD funding

www.refugeesinternational.org for USAID development activities – and this Gates lent credence to fears of increased may indeed already have occurred.30 militarization of U.S. foreign assistance. While he emphasized that there has been ex- Further, the Pentagon is seeking yet more cellent cooperation between DOD and DOS discretionary money for military assistance. on Section 1206 issues, and that all projects Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides funding are decided jointly, Gates also stated that: for DOD to fight and win America’s wars, and cannot be used to provide equipment, “In my view, building partner capacity supplies, and/or training to build the capacity is a vital and enduring military require- of foreign national military forces. However, ment – irrespective of the capacity of other Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense departments – and its authorities and The U.S. now Authorization Act (NDAA) created a unique funding mechanisms should reflect that three-year authority permitting DOD and reality. The Department of Defense would provides over half State jointly to plan, execute, and oversee no more outsource this substantial and up to $300 million annually in bilateral and costly security requirement to a civilian of its global aid to regional military-to-military programs agency than it would any other key mili- 34 10 countries alone, to develop foreign military forces’ capacity tary mission.” to conduct counterterrorism operations or in contrast to the to support stability operations. Embassy coun- Moreover, the DOD appears to think that try teams and regional combatant commands countering terrorism (or criminal acts of ter- 5 percent it jointly formulate projects. As a ‘dual-key’ ror) is the exclusive preserve of the military, allocates among program, the Secretaries of State and Defense but it is happy for the Department of State to must both approve the proposed projects.31 retain responsibility for training and equip- the 10 poorest ping thousands of military peacekeepers The DOD (with strong support from the under the Global Peace Operations Initia- countries. Secretary of State) is now requesting Congress tive – with most of these activities actually to authorize the “Building Global Partner- conducted by private contractors. ships Act of 2007,” which would make permanent in Title 10 the three-year pilot Extant U.S. aid – whether delivered by DOD program established under Section 1206 or DOS/USAID – is not geared towards – and would allow the DOD to spend up to poverty reduction. The U.S. does not allocate $750 million a year on training and weapons its development aid on the basis of neutrality; for militaries of its choosing. The proposed it is concentrated around countries that are legislation would allow the Defense Depart- political allies in the “war on terror.” ment to bypass historic provisions within According to the 2006 National Strategy the Foreign Assistance Act32 that prevent as- for Countering Terrorism: sistance from going to countries that commit “We will continue to prevent terrorists gross human rights violations, experience a from exploiting ungoverned or under-gov- military coup, engage in nuclear prolifera- erned areas as safe havens – secure spaces tion, or condone human trafficking, child that allow our enemies to plan, organize, soldiers, or religious intolerance. Secretary train, and prepare for operations. … To Gates also wants to use Section 1206 money further counter terrorist exploitation of un- to support non-military forces, such as con- der-governed lands, we will promote effec- stabulary, coast guard, border guards, and tive economic development to help ensure similar units. 33 long-term stability and prosperity.”35 In advocating for authority and money for The U.S. now provides over half of its the DOD to support non-military security global aid to 10 countries alone, in con- agencies, while also arguing against the trast to the 5 percent it allocates among the funding and execution of Section 1206 world’s 10 poorest countries. The current activities by the State Department, Secretary

U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA A rusty sign marks the headquarters for Liberia’s disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) program, which helps former soldiers establish new lives in their communities. The U.S. Department of State has minimal funding or civilian capacity to support programs like this that are essential to rebuilding war-torn societies.

©Refugees International administration’s engagement with weak and networks can traffic in drugs and people and failing states is motivated almost entirely by weapons of mass destruction…” The Bush traditional national security concerns, ignor- administration’s response to this challenge is ing the fact that a comprehensive strategy for ‘transformational diplomacy’ – a civilian-led, security and stability also requires address- whole-of-government effort to “build and ing good governance and development. sustain a world of democratic, well-governed Development is severely compromised when states that respond to the needs of their short-term security objectives are prioritized people, that reduce widespread poverty, and over longer-term poverty reduction goals. It that conduct themselves responsibly in the becomes very difficult to hold U.S. aid agen- international system.”36 cies accountable for poverty reduction results -- and recipients of U.S. development fund- To address these challenges, the State ing know that they can rely on a continuing Department’s FY 2009 budget request seeks flow of assistance regardless of development to increase the size of the diplomatic corps outcomes -- as long as they remain solely with 1,100 new positions for the Department aligned with U.S. military objectives. of State and 300 new positions for the U.S. Agency for International Development.37 Overhauling Foreign Assistance The Department of State has also launched a Civilian Stabilization Initiative with the aim In her testimony before the House Armed of creating a rapid civilian response capabil- Services Committee on 15 April 2008, Sec- ity for use in stabilization and reconstruction retary of State Condoleezza Rice highlighted environments. The idea is that elements the dangers of weak and failing states. She of this new team could be deployed along- reminded the Committee that President side of the U.S. military, with international Bush has designated the State Department partners, or on their own. This is a good as a national security agency, and that failed first step towards increasing civilian capac- states “create holes in the fabric of the in- ity, but such an initiative is still ad hoc and ternational system where terrorists can arm not a comprehensive response to structural and train to kill the innocent, where criminal deficiencies in the U.S. government.

www.refugeesinternational.org 10 The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is based teragency “partnership” is far from equitable, on the establishment of three tiers of civilian with permanent DOD employees outnum- response capabilities: an Active Response bering those of AID by a ratio of 750:1. Corps of selected and specially trained diplomats and interagency federal employ- A recent RAND Corporation study confirms ees; a Standby Response Corps of federal that despite the common notion that civil employees; and a Civilian Reserve Corps capabilities and military power are equally that will be comprised of private sector, local important to counterinsurgency operations, government and civil society personnel with the meager and infrequent bump-ups in relevant specialized skill sets. Following a the State Department’s budget have been decision to take action, the objective is to be dwarfed by massive increases in Penta- The current able to deploy trained and equipped Ac- gon spending. The report notes that, “… if tive Response Corps members to a conflict countering [Islamic] insurgency requires a U.S. interagency zone within 48-72 hours of notification. The broad and balanced array of capabilities, the grim implication is that the United States “partnership” is far larger force of Standby and Civilian Reserve Corps members could then be mobilized is ill equipped to counter the gravest threat 39 from equitable, with within two months. The President’s FY09 it faces.” The authors estimate that the budget includes $248.6 million to launch United States would need to add thousands permanent DOD this capability. of deployable civilian professionals and billions more in targeted foreign aid to meet employees outnum- Secretary Rice has been an unashamed counterinsurgency needs. bering those of AID champion of the Building Global Partner- ships Act and the extension and expansion However, generating and sustaining popular by a ratio of 750:1. of the Section 1206 authority. She is also and legislative support for such substantial pushing hard for an extension and expan- increases in resources devoted to develop- sion of Section 1207 authority, which would ment activities will require a broad consen- give the State Department money to deploy sus among the American people regarding diplomats in support of U.S. military forces. the importance of international development Whereas 1206 is a DOD-State Department to America’s interests as well as its values. program with DOD lead, Section 1207 is a Establishing a dedicated cabinet-level depart- State Department-DOD program with a DOS ment for foreign assistance and development lead. Congress authorized both programs efforts -- a debate re-emerging within policy through the Defense Department because circles in Washington -- will not change the they meet important military requirements. trend towards harnessing aid in pursuit of a Section 1207 allows DOD to transfer up to militarized national security in the absence $100 million to the Department of State to of consensus on a global development policy. bring civilian expertise to bear alongside Structure should follow strategy, as form fol- the military. DOD and State are now jointly lows function. The debate over a cabinet lev- pushing Congress for a five-year extension of el department for international development Section 1207 and an increase in the authority should continue, but it must be informed by to $200 million. robust discussions on a concrete and enduring strategy for sustained and meaningful Still, the Section 1206 and 1207 authorities foreign assistance. are ad hoc responses that will not provide a coherent structure to meeting the world’s The next U.S. administration will certainly development challenges. While Gates calls have to deal with urgent issues of strategy, the programs “terrific interagency partner- including the need to re-craft the National ships,”38 the notion of partnership, implies Security Act of 1947 for the 21st century and an equitable relationship based on a balance perhaps, in tandem, to initiate an overhaul of 40 of power and interests. The current U.S. in- the Foreign Assistance Act.

11 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA THE MARGINALIZATION OF AFRICA Foreign Military Financing (FMF) furthers IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY U.S. interests around the world by ensuring that coalition partners and friendly foreign While U.S. aid to Africa has doubled since governments are equipped and trained to President Bush entered the White House in work toward common security goals and 2001, and is set to double again by 2010, it share burdens in joint missions. FMF pro- is still relatively insignificant. For example, motes U.S. national security by contributing U.S. aid to sub-Saharan Africa in the 45 years to regional and global stability, strengthening from 1961 to 2005 was about half of what military support for democratically-elected the U.S. government spent in Iraq and 41 governments, and containing transnational Afghanistan in 2007 alone. Moreover, since threats including terrorism and trafficking the end of the Cold War era proxy wars in in narcotics, weapons, and persons. FMF is Africa and the U.S. military debacle in allocated strategically within regions with Somalia, the U.S. has failed to make any the vast majority of funds directed to our significant investment in the enhancement sustaining partners and a significant propor- of African security – beyond its support for tion to developing countries to support their UN peace operations on the continent. advancement to transforming status. 42 The marginalization of Africa – especially The total FY09 request for Africa is for sub-Saharan Africa – is reflected in the $12.55 million – 0.26% of the total FMF Foreign Military Financing budget request amount of $4.812 billion – with more for Fiscal Year 2009. According to the than half of that going to GWOT partners government blurb: Djibouti and Ethiopia. For the Near East, the

UN peacekeepers patrol in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. While the U.S. continues to rely on UN peacekeepers to maintain peace and security in Africa, Congress frequently falls behind on its share of funding for UN peacekeeping.

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www.refugeesinternational.org 12 figure is nearly $4.2 billion, with Israel and However, the U.S., as a permanent and influ- Egypt by far the primary beneficiaries ($2.55 ential member of the Security Council, con- billion and $1.3 billion respectively). Despite tinues to approve mission after mission in the rhetoric, it is clear that the countries of Africa while falling behind on its payments. sub-Saharan Africa – with a combined total Two weeks prior to his African visit, on 4 of $3.5 million, or 0.08% of the FMF budget February 2008, President Bush imperiled a – count for virtually nothing. number of African countries emerging from war to peace by releasing a FY 09 budget Africa’s proportional share of funded mili- request that significantly shortchanged UN tary training opportunities in the USA is peacekeeping – asking for an amount that much larger. According to the U.S. govern- was some $610m short of what it will owe In its desire to find ment, the International Military Education to peacekeeping for FY 09, and that would and Training (IMET) program is a key com- bring America’s total arrears to the UN to and combat ponent of U.S. security assistance, promot- nearly $2bn. ing regional stability and defense capabili- terrorism in ties through professional military training In its desire to find and combat terrorism Africa, the DOD has and education to students from “allied and in Africa, the DOD has oriented its major friendly nations.” The global sum allocated regional initiatives in North and East Africa oriented its major to IMET in the FY09 budget is $90,500,000 along counterterrorism lines, despite the – with 15% of this designated for 45 African fact that the GWOT simply does not rank regional initiatives countries. However, there is no way to assess high on the list of African security priori- in North and East the positive effects of IMET on African peace ties. Although these programs have involved and security (or for that matter, in combat- efforts to improve governance and security Africa along coun- ing terrorism), and the program has been sector capacity, their potential benefits have criticized in the past for training officers who been overshadowed by short-term, kinetic terterrorism lines. have served despots like Mobutu Sese Seko operations conducted by U.S. military forces of Zaire. against suspected terrorists.

The most – and most meaningful – financial On January 7, 2008, for example, two U.S. support to African peace and security cur- AC-130 gunships45 attacked a convoy of rently provided by the U.S. is undoubtedly trucks moving through the Somali fishing the money it contributes to UN peacekeep- village of Ras Kamboni, near the Kenyan ing. UN peacekeeping in Africa is at a his- border. The targets were Abu Taha al-Sudani, toric high today, accounting for 70 percent al-Qaeda’s leader in East Africa, and Saleh or more of the over 120,000 blue helmets Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of two suspected authorized by the UN Security Council operatives involved in the 1998 bombings of worldwide. The UN has increasingly proved the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. willing to intervene to help terminate civil According to local Somalis, and confirmed wars and establish rule of law in Africa and by western diplomats and aid officials in other places where the U.S. cannot or does Nairobi, a group of pastoralists were killed not want to go. 43 To enable it to do so, the in the U.S. attack, and none of the dead was UN depends heavily on the U.S. picking up connected to al-Qaeda or the Islamic Courts. a little over a quarter of the cost of each mission. This turnaround in UN engagement in The hunt for Nabhan and other suspects Africa remains absolutely critical to restoring continued and, on March 3, 2008, a U.S. security on the continent. Whatever their submarine launched two Tomahawk cruise operational shortcomings, the UN and its missiles that struck near Dhoobley, a remote specialized agencies command respect and Somali town some 140 miles from the 46 support from almost every African govern- Kenyan border. The strike was aimed at a ment and from all levels of African society. 44 “facility where there were known terrorists”

13 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA affiliated with East African al-Qaeda operations. sional armed force capable of maintaining According to the local district commissioner, national peace and security as part of a the missiles hit two houses, killing three wom- multi-sectoral approach to post-conflict en and three children and wounding another security sector reform.”47 20 people. The Pentagon has not said whether it believes Nabhan or any other terrorist sus- Somalia is not the only country being pects were killed or wounded in the attack. neglected; the U.S. is in fact doing remark- ably little to help transform African armies Using cruise missiles to target individual and security agencies into professional suspects at great risk of collateral damage organizations dedicated to protecting the citi- raises a host of moral, ethical and legal zenry rather than abusing them. Civilian and issues that are worthy of lengthy debate. democratic control over security structures Beyond such issues, however, the concrete – including armed forces, police, security numbers in the President’s FY 09 budget management and oversight bodies, and justice point to a total lack of concern for security in and law enforcement institutions – may not Somalia – where the world’s worst humani- guarantee economic development, but they tarian crisis continues to fester, eclipsing are certainly a necessary precondition. even the scale of human suffering in the Darfur region of the Sudan. In this hunting In an ideal world, security sector reform ground for the U.S. military and its Ethio- (SSR) is an essential part of a comprehensive pian allies in pursuit of Islamic jihadis, a post conflict peace-building process, where meager $11.6 million is allocated to “trans- the reform program derives from a compre- forming the Somali military into a profes- hensive national defense and security review. It involves, at its core, the transformation of

The Temple of Justice in Liberia is home to Liberia’s court system. Liberia’s judiciary and public defenders receive some training and supervision from a U.S.-funded project run by a private contractor, PAE, but many parts of the justice system still suffer from a chronic lack of qualified human resources and funding.

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www.refugeesinternational.org 14 a country’s military and police forces, but it For example, $49.65 million is allocated to also involves a comprehensive review and “[complete] efforts to transform the Liberian restructuring of intelligence services, the military into a professional two thousand penitentiary, the judiciary, and other agen- member strong armed force that respects cies charged in some way with preserving the rule of law and has the capacity to protect and promoting the safety and security of the Liberia’s borders and maintain adequate state and its citizenry. security in the country.”49 While this support is much needed and in the interests of stabil- However, in real-life war to peace transi- ity in the West African region, Liberia has a tions in Africa, the process of security sector total population of only three million people. reform – as supported by the international Its significance in terms of continental peace Security sector community and bilateral donors – is often and security pales in comparison to that of far more rudimentary. It often is aimed sim- the DR Congo – a country the size of West- reform often is ply at the training and equipping of armed ern Europe with 65 million people in over forces and police agencies, with little atten- aimed simply at the 200 ethnic groups – where Africa’s “first tion or resources being devoted to the other world war” has claimed the lives of over five training and equip- components of the security system. million people and where over a million people have been displaced over the past year ping of armed forces The U.S. contribution to SSR in Africa is alone as a result of continued violence in the funded through the Peacekeeping Opera- east. The DRC has a dysfunctional and mal- and police agencies, tions (PKO) account. As stated in the admin- integrated army of 164,000 – 82 times the istration’s budget request: “PKO funding with little attention size of that of Liberia. Yet the FY 09 request provides security assistance to help diminish is for a paltry $5.5 million, to “continue ef- or resources being and resolve conflict, … address counter-ter- forts to reform the military in the DR Congo rorism threats, and, in the aftermath of con- into a force capable of maintaining peace devoted to the other flict, reforms military establishments into and security.” 50 components of the professional military forces with respect for the rule of law.…” The FY 09 request is for security system. a modest $247 million (down from a FY08 estimate of $261 million).48 Of this amount, $96.75 million is dedicated to SSR activities in only four countries in Africa, in a manner that does not reflect at all the most pressing reform priorities on the continent.

15 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA U.S. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Agreement (CPA), the population and EFFORTS IN LIBERIA the transitional government were deeply mistrustful of law enforcement and military Background officials. Police and military officers were not Fourteen years of civil war displaced nearly regarded as a source of protection, but rather one-third of Liberia’s population and took as entities to be feared. the lives of approximately 250,000 people. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1989, Libe- The international community is now ria’s rulers had developed systems of parallel supporting a multidimensional transition and informal governance that sidelined and from war to peace; from militant misrule hollowed-out state institutions. They virtually to rule of law. This support has coalesced subcontracted the management of state secu- around the United Nations Mission in rity and revenue resources to an informal Liberia (UNMIL). Established in September group of presidential associates – which led 2003, UNMIL has helped to restore relative inevitably to the collapse of the state bureau- calm to the country by supporting and over- cracy and security services. seeing the disarmament of over 100,000 combatants; the disbandment of former A key feature of security institutions in armed factions; the partial restoration of Liberia was the gross abuse of human rights State authority in the counties; and the (often with impunity) by security person- launching of a security sector reform pro- nel through torture, arbitrary arrests and gram. The Liberian government’s Interim killings, and the use of official powers for Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) priori- private gains. Not surprisingly, by the time tized key development issues and challenges of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace into four pillars, namely:

On August 21, 2007, Libe- ria’s Ministry of Defense announced a recruitment drive for the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). However, weak and erratic funding from the U.S. has led to delays in AFL development.

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www.refugeesinternational.org 16 1. Enhancing national security; of security functions, some discrete and some overlapping. Overarching responsibil- 2. Revitalizing economic growth; ity for developing national security strategy and polices is supposed to be vested in the 3. Strengthening governance and the rule of National Security Council (NSC), created on law; and March 12, 1999 by an Act of Legislature.52 4. Rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering However, the Liberian government has not basic services. yet produced this long-awaited National Security Strategy and supplementary legisla- Significantly, national security is the first tion and policy documents. pillar. Responsibility (including financial The UN has not support) for the reconstitution of Liberia’s In the absence thereof, SSR has been hastily security sector is shared between the U.S. implemented within the convoluted legal been effective in the government, which is leading the reform framework provided by the 1986 Constitu- tion of Liberia, the Comprehensive Peace broad realm of of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the Liberian government (Ministry of Defense Agreement (CPA) of 2003, and United security sector and Ministry of Justice); and UNMIL, which Nations Security Council Resolution 1509 is implementing police reform. However, (2003). The CPA provides specific criteria reform, and has not the UN has not been effective in the broad for the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); in particular specifying that had the conceptual realm of security sector reform, and has not had the conceptual framework or the means recruits would be screened with respect to framework or the to engage meaningfully in military transfor- educational, professional, medical and fit- mation processes. As explained in the UN’s ness qualifications and prior history of means to engage Capstone Doctrine for peace operations: human rights abuses. Further, it stressed that the restructured army should reflect meaningfully “Given their relatively short lifespan and regional balance within the country and that in military limited access to program funds and spe- the AFL’s mission shall be to defend Liberian cialist expertise, UN peacekeeping opera- “national sovereignty and in extremis, re- transformation tions are neither mandated nor resourced spond to natural disasters.” It also identifies to engage in the long-term peace-building the UN, AU and other organizations for the processes. activities required to achieve the objectives provision of staff, equipment and logistics, identified above. Other actors, both within and the U.S. as playing “a lead role” in orga- and outside the UN system, normally nizing the restructuring program.53 undertake the bulk of this work.”51 UN Security Council Resolution 1509 SSR continues to slip into a systemic funding specifically stipulates that UNMIL shall vacuum, while the Security Council contin- work with Liberia’s government to develop ues to mandate missions to do SSR work a civilian police training program and – hoping that a “lead nation” will step up restructure the Liberian military.54 Although to the plate and provide both the leadership the CPA is specific about the role of the U.S. and resources to reform the security sector in the restructuring of the army, Resolution in host nations. For Liberia, the lead nation 1509 refers simply to “Interested States.” has been the U.S. From August 2003 to January 2006, the The Legal Framework CPA was the major source of legal authority for SSR in Liberia, and even suspended parts Liberia’s post-war security architecture is of the Liberian Constitution. However, the characterized by redundancy, inadequate inauguration of Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf control, and incoherence. The present gov- in January 2006 has again made the Consti- ernment inherited no fewer than 15 separate tution of Liberia relevant to the process.55 As agencies and structures tasked with a variety

17 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of While the GRC is supposed to lead the devel- Liberia, the President “appoints members of opment of a national security strategy, it has the military from the rank of lieutenant or its not succeeded in moving the process forward equivalence and above; and field marshals, at a satisfactory pace. The GRC has deep deputy field marshals and sheriffs.”56 concerns about the legal framework for SSR and the roles of the various actors involved, There is obviously potential for debate and and how this is being interpreted and applied. argument as to which of these three docu- For example, while the CPA provided for the ments is legally supreme, but there is broad U.S. to play a lead role in defense transforma- agreement that the security sector should tion, the GRC contends that the U.S. SSR 57 be reformed and transformed. However, Team is “muscling out everybody else” in the there are strong differences of opinion within area of defense sector transformation and The success and Liberian civil society, and some of the security that the U.S.-driven process does not suffi- sustainability of agencies themselves, as to the nature and ciently take into account the regional realities scope of reform – and the rationale behind it. and security situation. In particular, defense rebuilding Liberia (re)structuring is proceeding in isolation from The Conceptual Framework the ECOWAS security architecture, and does depends on a security In view of the role played by ill-governed and not seem to be based on a thorough analysis sector that can predatory security institutions in the Liberian of the security dynamics of the Mano River civil wars, the success and sustainability of Basin. The Chairman of the GRC, Dr. Amos operate effectively, rebuilding Liberia depends on a security Sawyer59 contends that the AFL is being sector that can operate effectively, and within organized according to an apparently threat- and within a frame- a framework of effective democratic control. independent approach to defense planning work of effective Thus, the challenge before the national, and structuring.60 regional, and international communities lay democratic control. not just in rebuilding the Liberian military The Defense Act of 1956, which framed and police force – but also in defining their Liberia’s defense policy, was extremely con- new roles in the post-conflict society and en- troversial and has been withdrawn by Presi- suring effective oversight and management. dent Johnson-Sirleaf. SSR Program staff from the U.S. subsequently assisted MoD According to the IPRS, the government’s staff with the drafting of a new Liberian medium-term approach is to “… develop National Defense Act, in coordination with a national security strategy to guide secu- and incorporating guidance from Minister rity sector reform, extend national security of National Defense Brownie Samukai and actions to ensure national safety, security Minister of Justice Counselor Frances John- and peace as well as build national secu- son-Morris. The draft Act, which is similar to rity capabilities.” The Governance Reform the U.S. Title X, was completed by December Commission (GRC), the Ministry of Defense 2006, but it is still being debated and vetted (MoD) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are by the Liberian legislature. According to Tom supposed to lead this process. The IPRS also Dempsey, who was on the faculty of the SSR commits the government to developing a: Program at the time, the draft Act “…delin- eated the responsibilities and missions of “comprehensive longer-term operational the Liberian Defense sector and established and institutional security reform agenda… a solid foundation for civilian control and in order to rationalize various security oversight of the Armed Forces of Liberia.”61 forces, facilitate a change in culture of the However, the GRC contends that the new security forces, define clear missions and draft does not differ significantly from the tasks and ensure there are no duplications, old Defense Act, and that there is a clear overlap or conflicts of interest between need to first develop a comprehensive secu- security agencies.”58

www.refugeesinternational.org 18 rity sector policy as well as an authoritative police service and armed forces, the RAND defense policy which can then be enacted in Corporation’s analysis of possible operational specific legislation. 62 contingencies also suggested a need for an additional capability that would complete The GRC attributes delays in the formulation and tie together currently planned capabili- and promulgation of a national security ties: a mobile unit of the LNP that can per- strategy and policy to a turf struggle between form either in a law-enforcement mode or the “security community,” UNMIL, and the in combat. RAND therefore recommended GRC. Amos Sawyer explains this as follows: the establishment of a police quick-response unit (QRU) that would complement the “The security community – including the regular police. Unlike the police support Ministry of Defense, the IGP, the SSR The new Liberian unit, which is meant to deal with civil unrest Team and the National Security Advisor (e.g. riot control), the QRU would be capable government – favors secrecy and ‘opaqueness.’ UNMIL of defeating organized armed threats, (which takes the lead on police reform) specifically where countering the formation determined that the feels that the UN Security Council is the of armed opposition forces would extend legitimate authority to provide direction to country needed a beyond the capabilities of regular police, yet the SSR process and that UNMIL should not warrant the domestic use of the army.65 force with the therefore be the lead agency. The GRC sees security sector reform as part and ability to patrol Role of the new AFL and the parcel of human security policy and of the Security Sector Reform Program borders, control overall governance reform agenda which it leads.” 63 In the absence of a valid National Defense immigration, and Act, the RAND Report again provides the In the absence of an authoritative and most credible direction for the establishment manage criminality. comprehensive National Security Strategy, of a new army, beginning with a definition of and attendant legislation and policies, the the role and functions, as well as the pos- only clear guidance for pursuing SSR in ture of the AFL. In particular, it notes that, Liberia remains the RAND Report, which “At present, non-state external and internal is based on international “best practices” threats are more likely than threats from and clear, logical analysis rather than an in- neighboring states. The size of the AFL is less depth understanding of Liberia and the West important than that it be superior in quality African region. The RAND Report’s general and capability to foreseeable threats.”66 recommendation is that Liberia’s capabilities architecture should respond to a security Underpinning this RAND assessment is the concept whereby (a) public safety and law logic that the size, structure, and function of enforcement are immediate concerns, (b) the new AFL should be framed by financial, the appearance of organized armed internal regional, and historical concerns. According opposition can be anticipated and prevented, to a former member of the SSR Program and (c) future external threats that may arise staff, the government of Liberia therefore without long warning can be countered. envisioned an infantry force that was able to move quickly while at the same time pos- The RAND Report rightly states that, even ing no threats to its neighboring countries. with foreign assistance, Liberia’s economy Rather than building a force with the capac- does not permit large forces,64 and that the ity to fight external threats, the new Liberian key to cost-effectiveness for Liberia’s security government determined that the country forces is to have complementary capabilities needed a force with the ability to patrol that cover the forces’ core security functions, borders, control immigration, and manage possess the right qualities, and can be criminality. Sean McFate elaborates: used flexibly. In addition to a reconstituted

19 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) is one of two companies contracted by the U.S. State Depart- ment to support security sector reform programs in Liberia. The increasing reliance on military contractors reflects the lack of civilian capacity to oversee and implement such overseas development programs.

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“The force must be postured so that it is The most controversial facet of the SSR strong enough to defend the integrity of Program is the framing of the national the nation’s borders but not so strong that security architecture by the RAND Corpora- it threatens neighbors with its force-pro- tion and the use by the U.S. Department of jection capability. Its structure, equipment, State of two private contractors to build it. and training must be appropriate to the DynCorp International has been contracted force’s mission (for example, Liberia does to provide basic facilities and basic training not require F-16 fighter jets). Perhaps for the AFL, and Pacific Architects and En- most critically, the new security force must gineers (PAE) won the contract for building not be so large that the government can- some of the bases, for forming and struc- not pay its salaries. Such a condition is a turing the AFL and its component units, precipitant to civil war.” 67 and for providing specialized and advanced training, including mentoring of the AFL’s The United States pledged $210 million and fledgling officer and non-commissioned signed a Memorandum of Understanding officer corps. DynCorp’s job is essentially to with the Interim Transitional Government “recruit and make soldiers,” while PAE is of Liberia, formalizing the U.S. role and employed to “mentor and develop” them into commitment, through the Security Sector a fully operational force. In addition to the Reform Program, to assist in demobilizing contracted trainers, the U.S. European Com- the existing Liberian military, recruiting and mand (EUCOM) is seconding eight active vetting recruits for an entirely new force, and duty officers and non-commissioned officers then training, equipping and sustaining that to work alongside PAE in mentoring the force until it was operational. AFL commanders. While EUCOM will pay

www.refugeesinternational.org 20 for these officers’ general service benefits, candidate’s physical fitness, literacy level, PAE will provide them with accommodation health, and human rights record. This body, and vehicles. the Joint Personnel Board (JPB), is the final arbiter of who gets accepted and who gets The SSR Program has provided for the rejected for training and service in the AFL. demobilization of 13,770 soldiers who served in the old AFL, allocating one-time payments The Government of Liberia decided that the of between US$285 and $4,300, depending new AFL will be trained according to U.S. on the seniority and length of service of de- Army doctrine, because this had been the mobilized personnel. The SSR Program also basis of the training of the old AFL. Every supported the demobilization of the Ministry soldier, irrespective of final mustering, is The GovernmentOperating ofin of National Defense, which had 400-450 first trained as an infantry rifleman during a personnel in its books, and the retraining of basic training – Initial Entry Training (IET) extremelyLiberia decided dangerous that select candidates. On March 20, 2007, 119 course – which was 11 weeks long for the ini- civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense tial intake. The period has subsequently been the newenvironments, AFL will be graduated after completing 17 weeks of train- reduced to 8 weeks by cutting three weeks trainedunder-funded according and to ing offered by the U.S. Defense Department. of training time initially devoted to human rights training and education in civics and Uoften.S. Army isolated, doctrine. Iraqi Recruitment and Training civil-military relations in a democracy. The SSR program subsequently supported organizations are These subjects have been dropped from the the MoD with the recruiting and vetting of curriculum because of the high cost of basic providing life-saving an initial 12,100 applicants for service in the training. DynCorp instructors are all former new AFL. DynCorp designed, and continues assistance in many drill instructors from the U.S. Army or the to manage, the ongoing recruiting and vet- U.S. Marine Corps, or who have served in ting program. Given the long civil war, acute parts of the country. their respective Corps Instruction Schools. suffering of civilians, and the widespread Their average age is 39 years; they are the atrocities committed by all of the armed type of people who can command an excel- groups, the government of Liberia and the lent rate of remuneration in the private SSR Program established a number of stages security industry in places such as Iraq and by which to screen recruits for the new Libe- Afghanistan. This drives up the DynCorp rian army. As explained by McFate: salary bill. Training in civic consciousness, “The goal of the recruiting, vetting, and human rights, and International Humanitar- training components of security sector ian Law is therefore planned for a later stage reform is to achieve a force that maintains of training, after soldiers are assigned to a professional ethos, respects the rule of permanent units. law, cultivates public service leadership, is The training program is much like the apolitical, and accepts civilian control with basic training presented in most armies; it transparent oversight mechanisms.”68 includes subjects such as personal hygiene, The vetting process has proved thorough. drill, weapons instruction, field craft, and There is concern for ensuring that the new land navigation. The facilities are designed AFL reflects a healthy regional and ethnic to accommodate a maximum of 550 recruits balance,69 and there has been a very strong and are functional, but by no means luxuri- emphasis on ensuring that those with a his- ous or extravagant. The basic weaponry pro- tory of committing human rights abuses are vided to the AFL is compatible with that of not admitted to the AFL. A vetting council, other countries in the region – AK-47 assault comprised of a representative of the Min- rifles and RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade 70 istry of Defense, Liberian civil society, and launchers. the United States Embassy, assesses each

21 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA More than two years after the launch of a UN-led police training program in Liberia, students were still accommodated in these rudimentary refugee camp style tents.

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The New AFL support company. The rifle companies will each comprise a company headquarters The end state for the AFL is a professional and three rifle platoons. army “… modeled on U.S. Army doctrine, that will support the national objectives of 71 • An engineering company with a strength the Government of Liberia.” The SSR Pro- of 220. gram plans to deliver, by September 2010, an AFL that will essentially be comprised of • A military police company with a strength the 23rd Infantry Brigade. The total planned of 105. strength of this brigade is 2,000 men and women –146 officers and 1,854 enlisted • A Brigade Training Unit (BTU) with a ranks. The 23rd Infantry Brigade will be strength of 162. commanded by a colonel, and have a higher • The band platoon with 40 members. headquarter element staffed by a total of 113 personnel. While the basic and specialized training of enlisted ranks and junior officers is well The constituent units, sub units, and sub- underway, there is clearly a gap when it sub units of the brigade are planned as comes to senior command positions in the follows: AFL. Ideally, the appointment of the brigade • 1st and 2nd Battalions — light infantry bat- commander, battalion commander and talions each comprised of 680 soldiers, senior staff officers should have preceded and organized into a battalion headquar- the formation, activation, and operation- rd ters, three rifle companies and a combat alization of the 23 Brigade. The Brigade

www.refugeesinternational.org 22 certainly cannot be declared operational until million in the July 2007 supplemental was such posts are filled by competent officers. not enough to see the SSR Program through However, it generally takes 20-30 years of to conclusion, but it came just in time to military training and experience to create a prevent the collapse of the recruitment and good brigade commander, and the AFL is basic training program. The Department of being created from scratch. State would not allow the commencement of training for a further intake until the money Funding and Resources to pay them was secured.74 According to a The SSR Program is funding every aspect of former senior DynCorp employee in Liberia, the AFL (from bases and base maintenance the U.S. Department of State has been lax to uniforms and food during the initial train- in overseeing the process and promoting It generally takes ing phase), except salaries.72 However, ac- an effective and sustained SSR program in cording to the ODC, the SSR Program is not Liberia; in particular, it has been unwilling to 20-30 years of 75 entirely a U.S. “closed shop,” as suggested press Congress for increased funding. military training by the GRC and some civil society interlocu- Weak and erratic funding is thus said to tors. There is a Defense Support Group for be the main cause of the slow pace of AFL and experience to Liberia, comprised of representatives of all development, with the timelines specified interested donor governments, which meets create a good in original contracts and agreed to with the quarterly in Monrovia. Assistance to the AFL Liberian MoD slipping badly.76 Only 5% of brigade commander, is being provided by other partners, some- the force had completed the basic IET course times making up for shortfalls in essential by August 2007.77 With the graduation of the and the AFL is areas where needs cannot be met by the U.S. second intake on September 7, 2007, this team due to funding limitations.73 being created figure increased to 32% (604 plus 40 band members). By the first week of February from scratch. The funding for the SSR Program, including the DynCorp and PAE contracts, is provided 2008, 57% of the force had completed basic through the PKO budget, as well as through training; and by the first week of May 2008, IMET (eight of the nine AFL officers who the figure was up to around 80% of the graduated in May 2007, and two AFL non- 2,000 troops. commissioned officers are currently on Past delays in funding have significantly courses in the USA, at Fort Bragg and Fort increased the cost of basic training for re- Benning). Much has been said of the high cruits. As previously mentioned, DynCorp’s costs involved in standing up the AFL, with services are particularly expensive. In 2007, the figure of $210 million having been the company employed 82 international staff contested by many as extremely high. The in Liberia, as well as 239 Liberian staff. The truth is that the SSR Program was never thorough recruiting and vetting process, fully funded. Funding to date has fallen far including the services of expert investigators, short of this figure, and money has been was both time consuming and very expen- disbursed in dribs and drabs. sive. Like other State Department contracts, In the FY 07/08 budget, for example, only the DynCorp contract has been signed on $13 million was appropriated. This was a “cost plus [overhead]” basis. Cost escala- followed by a further $11 million transfer tion for goods and services, including idle from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) in personnel time due to late disbursement of June 2007 and by $45 million in the July funding, is therefore passed on directly to 2007 supplemental budget voted for Liberia, the U.S. Government, and DynCorp has a although $5 million of this was allocated for fixed “burn rate” for every month that it is the establishment of a Police Quick Reaction retained in Liberia. (The combined expenses Unit and $5 million for support to the LNP of DynCorp and PAE totaled $18 million in 78 and Corrections Service. The remaining $35 the first six months of 2007.)

23 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA UNMIL has also expressed concern about design of the new AFL (which it has agreed delays in establishing an operational AFL, to) and on progress made in implementing because time frames for the drawdown and agreed plans and on the quality of equip- ultimate withdrawal of UNMIL forces are ment and training provided to the AFL; and closely linked to AFL (and LNP) capacity d) The U.S. Government, in turn, accepts its to assume responsibility for the territorial responsibility to deliver promised and agreed integrity of Liberia.79 As the drawdown plans assistance though the SSR program, and to for the UNMIL force include benchmarks effectively oversee the services of the contrac- that are directly linked to AFL capacity, tors that it hires to do the job. delays in meeting SSR Program targets may well lead to additional expenses for the U.S., The U.S. view is not shared by the GRC, given the $722 million annual budget of which complains that the build-up of the There is thus a fear UNMIL, of which the U.S. is assessed to pay AFL is being done in a very insular way, one that when the U.S. nearly $190 million.80 which pays lip-service to the concept of Secu- rity Sector Reform and which is not linked to withdraws support for Transparency and Accountability a broader security sector policy. While international SSR guidelines call for a consulta- its SSR program and Liberian civil society groups and some tive process of security sector reform, there government officials have complained of is strong resistance to a public discourse on funding for the AFL, lack of transparency regarding the contract security from the Liberian authorities – the between the U.S. Department of State and Liberia will be sitting Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, the DynCorp. (Little is said of PAE, probably Presidency, and the IGP – as well as the SSR on a time bomb. because DynCorp is far more visible and Program team. Liberians in general assume, in the media limelight.) The concerns are because of the past, that security issues are mainly about several controversies involving secret in nature, and that they should not be DynCorp in other countries,81 perceived lack discussed openly. 83 of performance by DynCorp in Liberia, and lack of consultation with Liberian stakehold- According to Sawyer, “the image of DynCorp ers on the military transformation process. creating an armed elite is disconcerting to According to Pajibo and Woods, for example: many Liberians.” He recalls that in 1980, “After more than two years in Liberia… the U.S. Government spent $500 million to DynCorp has not only failed to train the train and equip the army of then president 2,000 men it was contracted to train, it has Samuel Doe, and adds that “every armed also not engaged Liberia’s legislature or its group that plundered Liberia over the past civil society in defining the nature, content, 25 years had its core in these U.S.-trained 82 or character of the new army.” AFL soldiers.” 84 There is thus a fear that when the U.S. withdraws support for its The U.S. response to such criticism, from SSR program and funding for the AFL, the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Liberia will be sitting on a time bomb – a Chief in Liberia, is broadly as follows: a) well trained and armed force of elite soldiers The details of the contracts with DynCorp who are used to good pay and conditions and PAE may not be revealed, not even to of service, which may be impossible for the the Government of Liberia, as it is against government of Liberia to sustain on its own. U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations; b) The U.S. is providing gratis assistance to Contractors Are Not the Answer Liberia for the restructuring of its armed forces through an assistance package that Outside of Europe, a multi-sectoral, whole- the Liberian government has approved and of-government approach to SSR may be con- accepted; c) The Government of Liberia is ceptually valid, but unworkable in practice. entitled to query and get information on the In Africa, donor countries have generally not had the fortitude to see comprehensive pro-

www.refugeesinternational.org 24 cesses through, and recipient countries have in the AFL the notion of duty to country not had the financial and human resource and military service ethics – including the capacity to implement or sustain ambitious, democratic principle of civil supremacy over overarching SSR programs. Nevertheless, the military. Indeed, in a country and region much more can be done to actually arrest in- where recent history has been shaped by security within a conceptually and practically warlords and mercenaries, the U.S. Depart- more modest program that focuses primarily ment of State has shown remarkable insensi- on military and criminal justice reform. It tivity by sending in contractors to shape the is clear that both the UN and the U.S. have new army. made a start with police and military reform, but they have not done nearly enough to- Assistance with military reform is clearly In a country… wards accomplishing the SSR goals laid out best provided by active duty military person- in Resolution 1509 and the CPA respectively. nel who are directly accountable to the U.S. where recent government. However, the narrow focus of Sierra Leone faced similar, if not much the Liberia SSR Program – almost exclusive- history has been larger and more urgent, SSR challenges than ly on the AFL -- is indicative of the lack of shaped by warlords Liberia. The United Kingdom supported U.S. government civilian capacity to engage the enhancement of short- and longer-term robustly and effectively in the other dimen- and mercenaries, security in Sierra Leone through a program sions of SSR. There is clearly a need for a aimed at training, equipping and advising cadre of federal government employees who the U.S. Depart- government security forces. This program can oversee police reform and help build ment of State has involved the integration of UK military local capacity in prison services, judicial advisors, serving British officers, into Sierra services, intelligence services, border control, shown remarkable Leone forces; close co-ordination with UN- and customs and immigrations – as well as AMSIL and the Sierra Leone Police; and the within the appropriate legislative and de- insensitivity by enhancement of the combat effectiveness of partmental oversight mechanisms for these sending in contrac- the forces through ongoing advice and train- elements of the security and justice sector. ing. The UK advisors made sure that the tors to shape the armed forces were operationally proficient and capable of conducting effective joint pa- new army. trols with UN forces, before UNAMSIL with- drew. The UK also seconded a senior British police officer to take charge as IGP; it set up an effective Office of National Security, and helped produce a comprehensive national security strategy and defense policy.

The UK’s efforts in Sierra Leone stand in stark contrast to the U.S.’s SSR Program, which after two years amounted to little more than processing groups of admittedly well screened recruits through boot camp. The job is being done by private contractors, by trainers who are all former U.S. soldiers, but who have opted out of their national military and chosen a “paramilitary” occupa- tion with a stronger cash-work nexus. While contractors may be good at providing basic and even advanced infantry training, they are certainly not the ideal role models to instill

25 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA SECURITY SECTOR REFORM EFFORTS insurgency campaign against recalcitrant IN THE DR CONGO armed groups operating in the east. The campaign was at best partially successful, Background but after the 2006 elections, primary respon- With a population of 65 million and over sibility for the intractable security problems, 200 ethnic groups in a country that is one incomplete disarmament, demobilization quarter the size of the United States, the and reintegration (DDR) processes, and pro- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is tection challenges in the eastern DRC was a country with a very violent history, from shifted from MONUC to the government the period of Belgian colonization to the of the DRC. President Kabila has set 2009 32 years of ruthless dictatorship of Mobutu as the target for the DRC to take over full Sese Seko. A massive inflow of refugees in responsibility for the security of the country. Given the level of 1994 from fighting in Rwanda and Burundi MONUC continues to ‘support the transi- suffering endured by caused ethnic strife and civil war, spark- tion’ and to provide training and operational ing the overthrow of the Mobutu regime in assistance to the government forces. the Congolese people May 1997 by a rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda and fronted by Laurent-Désiré Security sector reform (SSR), especially and strategic Kabila. On 10 July 1999, the Lusaka Cease- military reform, is key to meeting the importance of the fire Agreement was signed by the major remaining disarmament and civilian protection challenges in the DRC. However, parties involved in the war. DRC… the U.S. it has not been pursued with sufficient vigor A small UN observer mission was deployed to actually enhance security in the eastern administration’s to monitor the cease-fire in August 1999. Congo. Rather, an inadequately resourced This became the United Nations Mission and supported SSR program has contributed level of support is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the FARDC becoming a major source of shockingly small. (MONUC) in November 1999 – a mission insecurity for civilian communities in the that, after many mandate adjustments over east. While the U.S. Department of State is the ensuing years, eventually grew into the concerned about the humanitarian situation largest and most expensive UN peace opera- in the east, and has played a very active role tion ever deployed. Yet the Eastern part of in facilitating dialogue among belligerents, the country has remained in turmoil to date, the DRC seems to be a very low priority for a with rebel groups, financed in part by illegal Department of Defense that is preoccupied extraction of resources, continuing to oper- with GWOT priorities. ate with seeming impunity. Eight years after Lusaka and a year after democratic elections, Military “Integration” in the DRC the people of the Kivus are still at the mercy While the U.S. government may be criticized of thousands of armed belligerents fighting for what it is doing in the realm of military for and against the Congolese government, reform in Liberia, it should be criticized and often among themselves. The armed mainly for what it is not doing in support groups all have one thing in common. With- of military reform in the DRC. Given the out exception, they have preyed off the local level of suffering endured by the Congolese population and committed gross human people and strategic importance of the DRC rights abuses. – not only in terms of minerals for the West and China, but also for the future stability of By 2005 MONUC’s most important task was the Great Lakes region and sub-Saharan Af- ensuring that national elections went ahead 85 rica – the U.S. administration’s level of sup- as planned for 2006. To accomplish this task port is shockingly small. Indeed, the FY 09 MONUC supported the newly-constituted request – for $5.5 million to “continue efforts Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 86 to reform the military in the Democratic du Congo (FARDC) in prosecuting a counter-

www.refugeesinternational.org 26 An estimated 1.1 million people are displaced in North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo and forced to live with neighbors or in camps like this one outside of Goma. With minimal support going toward reform of the Congolese military, the Congolese army is better known for preying on civilian communities than protecting them.

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Republic of the Congo into a force capable plan, which was supposed to begin with all of maintaining peace and security” – smacks armed forces regrouping under the authority of tokenism. 87 of the Chief of General Staff. The creation of a number of infantry brigades was planned In the absence of a strong lead nation, to occur sequentially, beginning with a cen- MONUC was unable to rally donor support sus of all combatants eligible for integration for military reform, and it has become into the FARDC, followed by disarmament increasingly apparent that the Congolese at assembly points and transportation to government prefers bilateral agreements to orientation centers, where individuals could meaningful international coordination, so as elect for demobilization or a career in the to extract as much as possible from individu- integrated army. Those electing for military al donor countries. service were then to be organized into stan- dard brigades of 4,200 troops and training With the disarmament of all armed groups of the new brigades at six Centres de Brassage in the DRC far from complete, donor (CBRs), after which nine brigades would be governments supported the build-up of a deployed to the eastern provinces. A further new Congolese army through a process of nine brigades were also to be integrated and integration of the disparate armed forces that deployed to the rest of the country before the were signatory to the April 2003 “Global and elections in March 2006. All-inclusive Peace Agreement” for the DRC. This process, called brassage, was conceived Due to capacity constraints, centers were not as an emergency measure rather than stra- established for the identification of combat- tegically-planned process of defense sector ants for the DDR process. Consequently, reform. African mediators proposed the the FARDC, supported by various donor

27 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA countries, took responsibility for regroup- Moreover, President Kabila does not trust his ing the combatants and transporting them military staff in Kinshasa, and issues orders directly to the CBRs, resulting in combat- directly to his regional commanders and ants bypassing the orientation centre phase. brigade commanders in the field. Not one Individuals were grouped together and written operational order has been issued, groups were topped up with new arrivals and there are no written administrative and until brigade strength was reached at which logistic reports within the FARDC. Accord- time the whole group entered a 45-day basic ing to the MONUC Force Commander: training program, upon completion of which the group became a numbered “Integrated “The national authorities, FARDC and Brigade.” Substantive training was sup- PNC [Congolese National Police], remain posed to take place after the newly formed the leading perpetrators of human rights Government troops brigades were deployed from the CBRs to abuses in the country …Until such time as have been responsible the operational areas. The training of the the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is effectively implemented, the civilian population first integrated brigade with assistance from for serious human the Belgian government began in February will remain at high risk of human rights 2004 at the CBR in Kisangani.88 While the violations at the hands of rebel groups and rights violations, Belgian-run training was regarded as suc- Congolese Law Enforcement and Security 89 including sexual cessful, the living conditions at the CBRs in Agencies.” Mishaki and Luberizi were so appalling that It is difficult to see how the Congolese violence, which between March and August 2005 an esti- government and those countries that assisted mated 2,500 out of 6,000 troops assembled remains rife in with the process convinced themselves there deserted. that cohesive, operationally proficient and eastern DRC. Brassage in the DRC was at most a process combat effective brigades could be formed in of amalgamation, rather than integration such a short space of time. In most armies of or even assimilation. The result of brassage the world, the formation of an effective pla- is a national army that is out of control, at toon takes at least six months. The building least by democratic and professional military of the small, single-brigade Liberian army standards. Command and control are weak is scheduled to take at least three years and and unstructured. The army lacks cohesion the brigade will be thoroughly evaluated by and basic operational capability. FARDC the U.S.-sponsored SSR Program before it is exactions and harassment of the local operationally deployed. population continue in virtually all areas of deployment. Soldiers take their families with The European Contribution them on operations, where they often live in It is evident that real military reform in far worse conditions than the thousands of the DRC requires work on the base of the displaced civilians. Government troops have FARDC. Human resource management sys- been responsible for serious human rights tems must be developed and implemented, violations, including sexual violence, which administrative and logistic systems created, remains rife in eastern DRC. Illicit taxing by new training schools and barracks built, etc. government forces is ubiquitous. FARDC For the past few years, the European Union elements cooperate with the FDLR, the rem- (EU) has attempted to partner with the nants of the Hutu forces that committed the Congolese government in supporting such a genocide in Rwanda, who they are supposed process. Following an official request by the to disarm, sharing looted items and taxes DRC government, the EU decided to estab- and the proceeds from gold and coltan min- lish an EU advisory and assistance mission ing operations. Serious criminal acts, such – the EU Security Sector Reform Mission as murder and rape, go unpunished. (EUSEC) in the DR Congo. The mission is intended to provide advice and assistance to

www.refugeesinternational.org 28 the Congolese authorities in charge of secu- the FARDC are officers; 44% are warrant rity while ensuring the promotion of policies officers and non-commissioned officers; and that are compatible with human rights and only 30% are privates. According to EUSEC, international humanitarian law, democratic the FARDC should be reduced in number to standards, principles of good public manage- around 70,000 personnel. ment, transparency and observance of the rule of law. The mission was launched on While the Government of the DRC needs June 8, 2005, with French General Pierre considerable help with defense restructur- Joana as head. ing and the build-up of a professional army, there is a chronic lack of international fund- The first priority of EUSEC was to provide ing for such a process. The EUSEC team While the technical expertise to the GoDRC on issues consists of 49 personnel from 13 different of military command and control, budget- EU member states, but EUSEC cannot ac- Government of the ary and financial management, training, cess any money at all from the European accountancy and dealing with contracts and Commission’s development assistance DRC needs tenders. A project known as ‘EUSEC FIN’ budget. Although it is widely accepted that considerable help – aimed at setting up a chain of payment security is a prerequisite for development, no system for the FARDC – was launched on funding mechanism has yet been found to with defense December 1, 2005 to target one of the key convert this common wisdom into tangible weaknesses of the FARDC: the embezzle- funding for the establishment of capable and restructuring and ment of a considerable part of the soldiers’ sustainable defense forces. the build-up of a salaries at various points in the chain of command, and the issue of ‘ghost soldiers’ MONUC and bilateral partners have professional army, on the military payroll.90 therefore engaged in low-level capacity building rather than defense sector reform. there is a chronic The basis of the EUSEC FIN project is MONUC has merely been holding the line, lack of international to separate the payment chain from the keeping a lid on the FARDC in attempt to command chain, so that corrupt command- prevent force disintegration and the wide- funding for ers cannot help themselves at each level spread commission of human rights abuses, of command. The idea is to simplify the while using the FARDC to stabilize the such a process. payment procedure of salaries and reduce eastern DRC. the risk of embezzlement of funds. EUSEC FIN involves the deployment of a number Real Commitment Needed of international advisors in the chain of pay- The current situation of military mal-integra- ment system, down to brigade level units. tion and ongoing insecurity in the eastern EUSEC is also working on the compilation DRC stems from a transition process that of an accurate biometric personnel database, was fundamentally flawed. Elections were which is a sine qua non for improving human held with sub-national armed groups still resources management. operative, and long before the creation of a unified and integrated national military. The current estimate is that there are Although security sector reform – or more 164,000 members on the FARDC payroll pertinently defense sector transformation (30,000 of them “ghosts”), and a further – was acknowledged as the key to meeting 80-90,000 individuals awaiting registration the remaining disarmament and civilian and brassage.91 There is an urgent need to protection challenges, it was not pursued demobilize approximately 40,000 redundant with sufficient vigor to actually enhance FARDC soldiers. More than 30,000 FARDC security in the eastern Congo. Rather, an personnel are over 60 years of age, and there inadequately resourced and supported SSR is no military pension system in place. The program has resulted in the FARDC becom- resultant army is bloated, and the military ing a major part of the security problem for hierarchy is badly skewed – about 33% of civilians, rather than the solution.

29 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA Building new armed forces from the base up will require 10-15 years of sustained effort by the Government of the DRC as well as long- term and coordinated international support for the effort. The DRC does not so much need more technical military assistance, in the form of training and equipment. The real need is for assistance with military organization, professional military socialization, and the institution of effective command and control. However, there is a lack of international coordination and cooperation, Building new armed as well as a lack of coordination and coopera- forces from the tion among Congolese institutions on these issues. The heart of the matter is that there base up will require is a total lack of willingness to actually deal with SSR beyond the level of rhetoric. 10-15 years of

The Congolese government and its interna- sustained effort… tional partners – including the U.S. – need to accept and deal with the real need for assistance – for military organization, professional military education and socialization, and the institution of effective command and control. If a relapse into civil war is to be averted over the medium to long term, and the ongoing human rights abuses halted, the UN Security Council, MONUC, the “P3+2,”92 the European Union, the Contact Group, and others who are dabbling in military assistance to the DRC, must get a grip on the real challenges of defense sector transformation in the DRC and be prepared to commit resources for the long term.

www.refugeesinternational.org 30 THE UNITED STATES AFRICA can power and hegemony globally. The view COMMAND (AFRICOM) remains widespread that AFRICOM is a tool to secure better access to Africa’s natural re- Background sources, erode China’s growing influence on Unified and specified combatant commands the continent, and establish forward bases to were first described by statute in the U.S. hunt and destroy networks linked to al-Qaeda. National Security Act of 1947, and three such As one Nigerian journalist puts it: commands have been operating in Africa for decades: European Command (EUCOM), “Energy supplies are concentrated in those Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific countries where a mix of internal social Command (PACOM).93 On October 1, 2008, tensions, radical Islamism and anti-Amer- AFRICOM will assume mission responsibil- icanism has produced a fertile breeding ity as a Unified Command, and serve as the ground for militancy and terrorism. Oil Department of Defense lead for support to platforms, tankers, pipelines, expatriate U.S. Government agencies and departments workers and the whole integrated infra- responsible for implementing U.S. foreign structure of the petroleum industry are 94 policy in Africa. extremely vulnerable to attacks.”

U.S. foreign and security policies that played While the Pentagon has gone to great out in Africa during the Cold War, however, lengths to deny anything but a desire to have made African leaders suspicious of “help Africans help themselves” in its public U.S. intentions with the new combatant diplomacy efforts, it is common knowledge command. For many African leaders and an- that key members of the Bush administra- alysts, AFRICOM is, along with the interven- tion, as well as some legislators and influen- tions in Iraq and Afghanistan, another sign tial U.S. think tanks, have become more and that the U.S. is seeking to re-assert Ameri- more alarmed by the growing efforts of China to expand its access to energy supplies

An IraqiA Senegalese Shiite woman soldier takesholds care two of her U.S. sick soldiers baby insideprisoner a makeshift during a camp“Visit,,, Board,for Search displaced and people Seizure” in Baghdad.military exerciseThe Govern using- mentdummy of Iraq weapons must deviseon the andUSS implement Fort McHenry a plan toin addressDakar’s the harborhumanitarian in April needs2008. of Suchdisplaced military and trainother- ing will bevulnerable continued Iraqis. as one of the security assistance ©programsREUTERS/Ceerwan of the new Africa Aziz Command (AFRICOM).

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31 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA and other resources from Africa and to the thrust of its public diplomacy accordingly. enhance its political and economic influence Since his confirmation as AFRICOM throughout the continent. It is easy to assume, Commander last September, General Ward therefore, that AFRICOM is a response to has also done much to set the record these developments. straight, emphasizing not new and complex possibilities on the humanitarian and Posture and Promises developmental front, but rather the value his The initial reaction of the Office of the Command can add to extant U.S. security Secretary for Defense to African concerns assistance programs in Africa. about AFRICOM was to disparage them. In his April 2008 statement to Congress Senior officials such as Ryan Henry, Principal on AFRICOM’s posture, General Ward General Ward has Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, outlined the following aims and objectives denied what he described as myths, stating for the command, “in support of vital also done much to set categorically that AFRICOM is not being national interests”: established in support of the war on terror- the record straight, ism, and that it will not be concerned with • to prevent attacks emanating from Africa emphasizing… the securing U.S. oil interests and/or countering against Americans, Chinese influence in Africa. For example, value his Command in June 2007, Mr. Henry explained to the • to secure U.S. strategic access, and foreign press that: can add to extant U.S. • to preserve unhindered movement along “The missions that AFRICOM will empha- lines of communication in AFRICOM’s security assistance size are those of humanitarian assistance, Area of Responsibility. programs in Africa. civic action …and response to natural disasters.… [T]he deputy for the command… To achieve these ends, AFRICOM will will be a senior civilian from the State De- adopt a strategy of Active Security that will partment so that we can integrate with the focus on establishing and sustaining reli- diplomatic aspects.… [We] will also have a able partnerships while developing securi- large percentage of civilians from different ty partner capacity at the theater, regional, 96 parts of the U.S. government integrated and state levels. Ward defined Active Se- into the command, because our engage- curity as “a persistent and sustained level ment on the continent is one of diplomacy, of effort oriented on security assistance of development and where we can be of programs that prevent conflict and foster assistance to Africans. And having an in- continued dialogue and development.” The tegrated staff will help us to do a better job goal of Active Security is “to enable the in integrating with those other parts of the work of Africans to marginalize the ene- U.S. government’s engagement.” 95 mies of peace and prevent conflict, thereby enabling the growth of strong and just The specter of integration was as unpalatable governments and legitimate institutions to for humanitarians as it was for Africans, as support the development of civil societ- there was clear ignorance of core humanitar- ies.” General Ward added that “AFRICOM ian principles of Humanity, Impartiality, will contribute to this goal by employing a Neutrality and Independence. The observ- wide range of tools at its disposal – from ance of these principles is essential in order conducting security cooperation activi- to maintain the trust of all sides of a given ties to prosecuting combat operations.”97 conflict, and to maintain access to victims, Although it promises sustained African ca- while the DOD was co-opting the language pacity building assistance, General Ward’s and aims of humanitarianism for political concept of Active Security is thus clearly and military purposes. The DOD eventually driven by U.S. national security interests took note of such criticism, and has amended and the imperatives of GWOT.

www.refugeesinternational.org 32 Two of the U.S. military’s most significant nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and is African security cooperation programs – expected to receive approximately $100 Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara million annually from FY 2008 through and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of FY 2013. Africa – carry a mandate directly linked to the Global War on Terrorism.98 Since their • Africa Contingency Operations Training inception, these initiatives have placed U.S. and Assistance Program (ACOTA). This counterterrorism efforts within a larger program, which began operating in 2002, framework of development, long-term is now part of the Global Peace Operations counterinsurgency, and a campaign to win Initiative (GPOI). ACOTA is officially “hearts and minds.” However, U.S. opera- designed to provide training to African When the tions in North and East Africa have nonethe- military forces to improve their ability to less relied on “kinetic” military operations conduct peacekeeping operations. By FY command becomes focused on short-term objectives, such as 2007, nineteen African countries were participating in the ACOTA program. It fully operational… those in Somalia discussed above. is impossible to ascertain exact levels of it will take over Extant U.S. Security Programs funding for ACOTA, since its funding is in Africa subsumed within the budget for GPOI. responsibility for AFRICOM is not being created entirely from • International Military Education and the implementation scratch. When the command becomes fully Training Program (IMET). The IMET operational on October 1, 2008, it will take of a range of ongo- program brings African military officers over responsibility for the implementation of to military academies and other military ing military, security a range of ongoing military, security coop- educational institutions in the United eration, and security assistance programs, States for professional training. Nearly cooperation, and which are funded through either the State all African countries participate in the Department or the Defense Department. security assistance program. In FY 2006 14,731 students from The U.S. provides military training to the African continent (excluding Egypt) par- programs. African military personnel through a wide ticipated in IMET at a cost of $14.7 million. variety of training and education programs. In addition, it conducts military exercises • Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS). in Africa jointly with African and European The FMS program sells U.S. military troops to provide training to others as well equipment to African countries; such sales as to train its own forces for possible deploy- are conducted by the Defense Security ment to Africa in the future. Extant programs Cooperation Agency of the Defense Depart- in Africa include the following:99 ment. The U.S. government provides loans to finance the purchase of virtually all of • Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) this equipment through the Foreign Mili- exercises, conducted primarily by units tary Financing Program, but repayment of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the of these loans by African governments is U.S. Army Rangers, to provide training almost always waived, so that they amount experience both for American troops and to free grants. In FY 2006, sub-Saharan for the troops of African countries. JCETs African countries received a total of nearly were conducted in 2005 and 2007 as part $14 million in FMF funding, and the of Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans- Maghreb countries of Morocco and Tunisia Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership received almost another $21 million; for (TSCTP) which now links the U.S. with FY 2007, the Bush administration requested Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, nearly $15 million for sub-Saharan Africa Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The TSCTP and $21 million for Morocco and Tunisia; received some $31 million in FY 2006, and for FY 2008, the administration

33 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA requested nearly $8 million for sub- with those of countries in those regions. Saharan Africa and nearly $6 million Specifically, JTFAS was charged with con- for the Maghreb. ducting surveillance operations using the assets of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to share • African Coastal and Border Security information, along with intelligence col- Program (ACBS Program). This program lected by U.S. intelligence agencies, with provides specialized equipment (such as local military forces. patrol vessels and vehicles, communications equipment, night vision devices, • Naval Operations in the Gulf of Guinea. and electronic monitors and sensors) to Although American naval forces operat- African countries to improve their ability ing in the Gulf of Guinea and other areas to patrol and defend their own coastal wa- along Africa’s shores are formally under The Africa Partnership ters and borders from terrorist operations, the command of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and smuggling, and other illicit activities. In other U.S. Navy commands, AFRICOM Station initiative… some cases, airborne surveillance and will help coordinate naval operations along aims to work intelligence training also may be provided. the African coastline. For example, on In FY 2006, the ACBS Program received October 16, 2007 the U.S.S. Fort McHenry cooperatively with nearly $4 million in FMF funding, and the began a seven-month deployment to the Bush administration requested $4 million Gulf of Guinea. The amphibious dock U.S. and international in FMF funding for the program in FY landing ship serves as a platform for the partners in promoting 2007. No dedicated funding was requested Africa Partnership Station (APS) initiative, for FY 2008, but the program may be which aims to work cooperatively with maritime security in revived in the future. U.S. and international partners in promoting maritime security in Western Africa. Western Africa. • Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa The Fort McHenry will serve as a “floating (CJTF-HOA) In October 2002, the U.S. schoolhouse” to train local forces in port Central Command played the leading role and oil-platform security, search-and res- in the creation of this joint task force that cue missions, and medical and humanitar- was designed to conduct naval and aerial ian assistance. patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean as part of The APS initiative is the first U.S. opera- the effort to detect and counter the activi- tion in the sub-region since the launch of ties of terrorist groups in the region. Based AFRICOM in February 2007. According to at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, long the General Ward, the initiative, site of a major French military base, the CJTF- HOA is made up of approximately “provides a good example of what the new- 1,400 U.S. military personnel (sailors, ly established U.S. Africa Command is all Marines, and Special Forces troops) that about as it relates to helping our partner work with a multi-national naval force nations on the continent of Africa build composed of American naval vessels along their capacity to better govern their spaces with ships from the navies of France, Italy, (and) to have more effect in providing for 101 and Germany, and other NATO allies.100 the security of their people.”

• Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS). There can be little doubt that the extant In December 2003, the U.S. European programs, including the APS, will constitute Command created this joint task force the core of AFRICOM’s activities for the under the commander of the U.S. Sixth foreseeable future. This was indeed con- Fleet (Europe) to carry out counter-ter- firmed during a press briefing at the African rorism operations in North and West Union headquarters on November 8, 2007, Africa and to coordinate U.S. operations where General Ward concluded his statement

www.refugeesinternational.org 34 by reaffirming that “U.S. AFRICOM will and of evaluating and updating such pro- sustain the activities that the three com- grams to ensure their relevance, coherence mands and our African friends are already and effectiveness in enhancing the quality conducting together.”102 and quantity of African troops who are read- ily available for peace operations. However, a top priority for AFRICOM should be to enhance U.S. peacekeeping There are, however, a number of very real and capacity-building programs. The demand for practical challenges regarding AFRICOM’s African peacekeepers far outstrips the supply ability to deliver on the non-counter-terrorism of adequately trained and equipped forces, part of its mission, and to add the necessary capable of sustaining themselves for lengthy value to existing U.S. capacity-building pro- A top priority for periods while deployed on UN and AU grams that General Ward has been promis- operations, and AFRICOM is well-suited to ing. Capacity-building is a long-term, rela- AFRICOM should address this. According to U.S. Ambassador tionship-based activity, rather than simply a to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad: menu of trainings or skill-sets to be delivered. be to enhance Human resources development is central U.S. peacekeeping “The United States is committed to help- to any capacity building process. Expert-led ing African states increase their capacity. practices have to be replaced by local training, capacity-building Since 2005, the United States has trained education and technical transfer of know-how, over 34,000 African peacekeepers from 19 for the aim of capacity building is to nurture programs. countries and has provided $375 million local ownership and to develop local compe- to increase global capacity for peacekeep- tences in order to break out of a vicious circle ing operations in Africa and elsewhere. of dependency. In practice, however, interven- Additionally, we see an opportunity for ers inevitably attempt to transplant their own several African countries to increase their national systems, procedures and values to capacity for combined and joint operations host-nation institutions. Failure occurs when by stressing interoperability in equipment, the specificities of the recipient country are training, and communications and build- either not correctly addressed, or ignored, re- ing professional relationships among of- sulting in a bad copy of the initial model and, ficers of all African nations. Steps such as in the long run, to its abandonment because these will enhance overall AU peacekeep- of its lack of effectiveness. ing capacity and will be a focus for the new U.S.-African command (AFRICOM).”103 The problem for AFRICOM is that U.S. forces have no recent experience as UN The numbers look impressive at first blush peacekeepers. Moreover, while U.S. forces – but years of U.S. assistance to Africa have deployed to Africa and worked with through ACRI, ACOTA and GPOI have not African militaries in different contexts over produced a viable and credible indepen- the years, the U.S. military has less exposure dent African peace operations capability. to and knowledge of Africa than many other Rather, these programs bring home the fact foreign militaries. Ex-colonial powers such that real capacity building is not a simple as France and the United Kingdom have “train and equip” quick fix. Africa needs a more military experience in Africa, both demonstrable commitment by AFRICOM combat and peacetime, than does the United to provide long-term, sustainable support to States. AFRICOM therefore lacks the depth developing African peacekeeping capabilities of historical knowledge, cultural references for participating in UN peacekeeping, as well and local connections regional commands as African Union and regional operations. enjoy in other theaters of operation. AFRICOM holds the promise of joining up current U.S. military capacity-building Part of the delivery challenge will lie in programs such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET the time it takes to build AFRICOM’s staff

35 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA capacity, to build true African knowledge Section 1206 allocation would be insufficient within the Command, and to forge lasting for the Command to successfully accomplish and meaningful relationships with African its full range of missions, especially SSR and counterparts. This will take a good deal the building of real and sustainable African of time, and require sufficient dedicated peacekeeping capacity. Security-related pro- financial and human resources to prove grams in Africa currently receive only about to Africans that the U.S. is serious about $250 million a year. This level of funding AFRICOM’s capacity-building mandate. is woefully inadequate. While security is a However, it is unclear at this point where prerequisite for development, U.S. security these resources will come from. assistance to Africa remains ineffective. It is both under funded and skewed towards Resource Issues perceived partners in the war on terrorism. Funds are not While the President’s budget provided funds Africa’s principal security challenge is to currently allocated to establish AFRICOM’s interim headquar- mobilize sufficient resources to provide a ters in Stuttgart, Germany,104 funds are not to allow AFRICOM to secure, stable, and well-governed environ- currently allocated to allow AFRICOM to ment characterized by the Rule of Law, in play a more effective play a more effective role as a security sector which human rights and civil liberties are and governance capacity-building vehicle protected and promoted, and where business role as a security for African nations. General Ward has told can thrive. All African countries face a capac- the House Armed Services Committee that sector and gover- ity deficit in their institutions of state, and “…building regional stability and security the state is too often a predator rather than a nance capacity- will take many years of sustained and dedi- facilitator. Since the 1960s, African armies cated effort. There is no conspicuous finish have exhibited a tendency towards rapacious building vehicle for line. Therefore, enduring Congressional behavior, and the rebellions spawned in re- support is indispensable.”105 However, the African nations. sponse have caused unimaginable suffering focus of General Ward’s pitch, like that of for civilians. To support defense sector trans- Secretaries Gates and Rice to the same com- formation in a manner that can be sustained mittee a month later, was on entrenching over a long period, AFRICOM will need and expanding Section 1206 authority, and additional resources, as well as expertise. For was motivated with reference to the GWOT. example, only two officials in USAID have Ward asked Congress specifically to: any knowledge of SSR or Disarmament, “Provide budgetary flexibility to Combat- Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) ant Commanders and Ambassadors, programming. including making Section 1206 Global In the realm of defense sector reform, the Train and Equip authority permanent and importance of sustained external mentor- expanding it to meet the demand State ing and commitment is well recognized and and DOD have seen over the past three cannot be over-emphasized. The usefulness years ... This authority is a vital element of of a lead-nation rather than multinational the GWOT.”106 approach has been demonstrated by the General Ward made no mention of Title 22 UK in Sierra Leone, as has the allocation of the U.S. Code, which gives the Depart- of sufficient financial resources to do the ment of State authority for important tools job properly. On the other hand, there are for supporting military professionalism and many examples of perverse consequences of security sector reform – like the Interna- short-term U.S. assistance to select African tional Military Education and Training armies. AFRICOM should therefore demon- (IMET) program, Foreign Military Financing strate that it understands the role of military (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). support within the broader sphere of Secu- AFRICOM’s potential share of an expanded rity Sector Reform (which includes the police

www.refugeesinternational.org 36 and intelligence agencies as well as the cohesive approach to U.S. military engage- judicial sector), that it is willing to provide ment with the continent. Instead of having sustained support to defense transformation three commanders that deal with Africa as a in partner countries, and that it will have a third or fourth priority, there is now a single secure funding mechanism to do so. four-star general who deals with the continent as his first and only priority. The new AFRICOM’s current meager DOS budget command should therefore be welcomed by for bilateral security cooperation falls far Africans. Informed, consistent and coherent short of what is required if AFRICOM is to engagement is far better than ad hoc U.S. have true credibility and impact. Without military engagement or retrenchment in Af- sufficient authority and resources for AF- rica. However, this simple benefit has been Informed, consistent RICOM, it may well be “business as usual” overshadowed by U.S. public diplomacy that in Africa. Because of the length of budget emphasizes the “soft” side of AFRICOM’s and coherent cycles, competing priorities, emerging mandate, at the same time as the U.S. crises, and its perceived lack of importance engagement is far military continues with short-term kinetic compared to other regions, Africa usually operations, such as air strikes, in support of better than ad hoc gets short changed. Absent the creation of a the GWOT. mechanism such as the UK Africa Conflict U.S. military Prevention Pool, increases in foreign mili- Elements of the global jihadi insurgency tary financing (FMF), international military are no doubt present in several African engagement or education and training (IMET), and a sub- regions, and AFRICOM rightly considers retrenchment stantial increase in peacekeeping operations the neutralization of these elements one of (PKO) funding should be used to support its primary goals. However, this objective in Africa. AFRICOM engagement initiatives. At the would be more consonant with broader U.S. same time, the State Department’s Africa goals in Africa and the proclaimed concept Bureau will need an increase in personnel to of ‘active security’ if it were accomplished facilitate coordination with AFRICOM and through partnering with African nations in to ensure faster processing of program and areas such as intelligence sharing, law en- spending proposals. forcement, and military cooperation, as well as through longer-term civilian-led efforts to Such resource increases should help to ad- reduce poverty, promote development under dress the conspicuous imbalance that now the rule of law, and improve governance. exists between the modest amounts current- If AFRICOM continues to be justified to ly allocated to actual programmatic activities Congress primarily in terms of the GWOT, in Africa and the much larger cost projec- and if the U.S. military continues to conduct tions for the establishment and operation sporadic but dramatic military strikes on of AFRICOM. Unless substantial programs individuals suspected of terrorism – while exist to justify AFRICOM’s overhead costs, attempting to embed AFRICOM in a larger hard questions are likely to arise about the construct of humanitarianism and capacity gap between AFRICOM’s posture of “Ac- building – African and domestic humanitar- tive Security” and the actual enhancement ian opposition to the command is bound to of African security through the delivery of grow stronger. assistance programs that are appropriate, meaningful and sustainable. AFRICOM’s legitimacy on the continent will be largely determined by its ability to work Potential for a Cohesive Approach to Africa in collaboration with and close support of The establishment of AFRICOM and the the African Union, as well as with United transfer of geographical responsibility for Nations operations in Africa. Although Africa from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and African security needs are well defined and PACOM hold great promise for a more articulated in the various conflict manage-

37 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA ment protocols of the African Union and Department and USAID need the capacity the Regional Economic Communities, these and the will to engage robustly with their have hitherto not been well known by U.S. DOD counterparts in AFRICOM in the de- military staff. Indeed there has been a gen- velopment and execution of this plan. eral and serious dearth of knowledge about the African continent among DOD officers, In order to be effective in a capacity-build- and AFRICOM presents the opportunity to ing role, AFRICOM will need access to a develop a stable cadre of African area special- predictable and substantial enough source of ists, officers who know Africa and how to funding to allow for engagement in the kind interact constructively with Africans. Part of of long-term interagency programming that 108 the delivery challenge will therefore lie in the may actually deliver meaningful results. time it takes to build true African knowledge However, any increased funding that may ac- If AFRICOM is to within the Command, and to forge lasting crue to the Command through DOD should overcome the legacy and meaningful relationships with African be over-matched by the funding of State Department funding for Africa programs. As counterparts. of nearly a year of Senator Feingold warned last year, The African Union is increasingly working negative hype and in close cooperation and often in tandem “…We need to ensure that [AFRICOM] will with the UN Department of Peacekeeping contribute to, not define, the U.S. Gov- African opposition… Operations. With the United Nations present ernment’s overall strategy and objectives then much detail in virtually every corner of Africa, often in for the continent. We also need to make a peacebuilding or peacekeeping capacity, sure that the U.S. military’s activities needs to be added to AFRICOM will not be able to operate for and involvement on the continent do not long without intersecting in some way with overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our a new strategy. UN activities. To the extent that AFRICOM Government’s other key objectives.… We is perceived as supportive of UN security need to look at an equally aggressive plan and peacekeeping missions, international to strengthen our diplomatic, develop- acceptance of AFRICOM will grow. Con- ment, humanitarian, and human rights versely, few things are as likely to undermine work throughout the continent. This may AFRICOM’s effectiveness or its welcome include addressing how the Congress al- in Africa as a perception that AFRICOM is locates funds—both to this new command working at cross-purposes with the United and to the other departments and agencies Nations.107 that will make the spirit and intent of this command work.”109 If AFRICOM is to overcome the legacy of nearly a year of negative hype and African opposition, and attract U.S. budgetary support, then much detail needs to be added to a new strategy, one backed by substance rather than rhetoric. Talk of “value added” is necessary but insufficient. General Ward and his AFRICOM staff need to communicate a plan that provides evidence of a deep understanding of the African peace and security architecture and illustrates in some detail exactly how the U.S. intends to support this through a variety of capacity-building programs that are coordinated and integrated, both within the U.S. Government and among Africa’s other international partners. And the State

www.refugeesinternational.org 38 CONCLUSION its “3D” approach to bolstering weak, fragile, failing or failed states. While the gains of The erosion of civilian capacity and the targeted aid harnessed in pursuit of the fight accompanying reliance on military power against terrorism remain dubious at best, have significant consequences for the U.S. the U.S. has no coherent long-term foreign and the world. Military and other security assistance strategy in the fight against global concerns have effectively reshaped U.S. poverty. There is clearly an urgent need to international priorities such that global modernize the U.S. aid infrastructure and engagement is often determined by the for elevating development on a par with di- military’s capabilities and requirements. plomacy and defense. Beyond better targeted Issues that lack a security dimension for and delivered development assistance, the the U.S. have been relegated to a much There is clearly United States could clearly wield far greater lower priority, if they are addressed at all. influence per aid dollar spent by deploying an urgent need to Moreover, since 2001, the United States has its influence in trade, investment, debt, and pursued an increasingly unilateral posture in financial policies in a deliberate manner modernize the U.S. the pursuit of national security and foreign towards achieving coherent rather than con- and development policy. American policy aid infrastructure flicting objectives abroad. For example, in places little emphasis on the need to harmo- the realm of agriculture, U.S. development and for elevating nize U.S. approaches with those of the UN and trade policies frequently work at cross and other donors, or indeed to align these purposes. development on a policies with the priorities of local actors. The U.S. ties more aid than any other donor par with diplomacy While the current administration is pro- to the purchase of its own goods, it relies far moting a range of initiatives to redress the and defense. more heavily on contractors for delivery, and imbalance in U.S. instruments for global it spends more on international technical as- engagement, these efforts do not go far sistance than any other donor, with the bulk enough. They are aimed at a “quick fix” for of that money going to U.S. consultants. long-broken machinery, with the objective of getting the machinery running quickly and The U.S. military is moving rapidly to fill smoothly enough for all parts to engage in the vacuum created by shrinking civilian the overarching U.S. foreign policy objective capacity, in pursuit of short-term solutions – victory in the GWOT. Reform efforts point to stabilization problems that do not address in the direction of further militarization of the vexing and enduring challenges fac- foreign policy, with the DOD championing ing the world’s billion most impoverished the cause for increased funding for State and people. The desire of the Department of De- AID, and the State Department reciprocating fense for a “unity of effort” that uses all U.S. all too willingly in the name of interagency government agencies as “force multipliers” cooperation and unity of effort in pursuit of in the war on terror is changing the ethos ‘transformational diplomacy.’ and manner in which weakened civilian agencies operate. The resultant militariza- In both aid and diplomacy, a new U.S. com- tion of aid in an effort to prevail in the war mitment to multilateral global engagement against terrorism and in pursuit of national – especially through the UN and its various security objectives is unlikely to enhance departments and agencies – would lend cre- either national security or the ability of the dence to the notion that both development U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals. The and the war against terrorism are global history of counter-insurgency, as well as de- challenges, and that America can work velopment theory and practice, points rather with a variety of allies to achieve its foreign towards long-term failure. policy objectives. Where the UN intervenes in a peacekeeping role, it is time to think Despite all the talk of “Smart Power,” it is of the success or failure of such operations clear that the U.S. has not been very smart in

39 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA also as U.S. successes or failures. With the RECOMMENDATIONS U.S. playing a dominant role in the Security • The President, working with Congress, Council and paying more than a quarter of must strengthen U.S. civilian professional the peacekeeping bill, this approach would capacity to carry out diplomatic and be based as much on common sense as a development operations to improve efforts new spirit of internationalism. to build stable, prosperous democracies. The war in Iraq is hopefully the high water Benchmarks should be set for allocating mark of post 9/11 U.S. unilateralism in funding to address the current 17 to 1 issues of international peace and security. spending imbalance in staffing and As the presidential candidates campaign on resources between defense and diplomatic/development operations, and for the promise of change in Washington DC, The next president and at least two on the promise of drawing rolling back the over-reliance on contrac- down U.S. forces in Iraq, attention must tors to deliver on foreign assistance should conduct a shift to post-Iraq policy, to a post-Iraq “peace programs. thorough assessment dividend” and a commitment to use a good • The next President should conduct a portion of this to substantially increase U.S. thorough assessment of both civilian of both civilian and capacity for diplomacy and development. and military capacities to advance national The development and effective imple- military capacities goals as a step toward modernizing the mentation of a comprehensive new global National Security Act and the Foreign to achieve develop- engagement strategy will require bipartisan Assistance Act. political consensus. It will require more than mental goals. piecemeal adoption by various agencies and • The President and Congress should departments. It will ultimately depend upon mandate a thorough review of U.S. Africa strong presidential leadership, and regular, policy and then provide sufficient funding constructive consultation with Congress, in and manpower resources to the Depart- order to garner popular support and to rec- ment of State to strengthen its Africa oncile competing bureaucratic interests. bureau to engage regionally as well as bilaterally in Africa; to provide direction Building bipartisan consensus to reinvent for civilian capacity building programs in the way America engages with the rest of the governance and security sectors; and the world will not be easy. A single “suc- to support African peacekeeping opera- cess demonstrator” may well be the key to tions and regional conflict management advancing the process. Africa is a relatively mechanisms. low-cost investment for the U.S. and rein- venting Africa policy should not place undue • Beyond counter-terrorism efforts, AFRICOM demands on other budgetary priorities. should focus on two roles to strengthen Doing a few things well in Africa, and doing peace and security in Africa, namely the right thing in Africa, can have a positive a) assisting African countries with impact on 53 UN member states, help uplift defense sector reform; and b) supporting 80% of the world’s poorest people, and win Africa’s regional organizations in building friends and influence in the most under-gov- conflict management and standby force erned continent in the world. In other words, capacity. These roles will require both if the establishment of AFRICOM, the State Department and DOD involvement strengthening of the State Department’s Af- and collaboration. rica Bureau and USAID programs in Africa can be seen to produce really positive results, • Until a review of civilian and military the effort could serve as a pilot project for capacities is conducted and an overall the grander scheme of global engagement. foreign aid strategy is developed, the Congress should defer the permanent

www.refugeesinternational.org 40 authorization of and the requested peace process. Moreover, the AU and the substantial increase in funding (from sub-regional organizations in Africa lack $300 to $750 million) for the Department the capacity to analyze and absorb the of Defense Section 1206 train or equip plethora of uncoordinated assistance ini- program, to ensure full Congressional tiatives emanating from various coalitions oversight and compliance with the Foreign of donor countries. AFRICOM would be Assistance Act’s provisions on aid to uniquely poised to act as a focal point for repressive governments. liaison and coordination between African countries and organizations and their • The Department of Defense should multiple peacekeeping and security develop, in concert with State and AID, a capacity-building ‘partners’. AFRICOM should draft strategy paper that explains exactly how AFRICOM’s role in security sector • AFRICOM should create, as a matter of create… a core reform supports the U.S. development urgency, a core of civil-military expertise and good governance goals. With a clearly within the Command staff for construc- of civil-military articulated strategy, AFRICOM will be bet- tive engagement with and support to UN expertise within ter positioned to convince Congress that peace operations in Africa – particularly a consistent level of funding dedicated to in those dimensions of operations where the Command staff Africa is needed to permit the U.S. to take expertise and resources are sadly lacking a longer-term view on development needs, yet absolutely essential for stabilization for constructive holistic security sector reform, sustained and reconstruction – like DDR and Rule engagement with engagement with partner nations, and in of Law. building peace and security capacity more and support to UN effectively. • The Administration should work with Congress to create a transparent, inter- peace operations • AFRICOM’s planning should take into agency budget-building process for in Africa. account the African Union’s detailed plans AFRICOM to allocate the money to imple- for the establishment of an African Standby ment a comprehensive U.S. military and Force (ASF) by 2010. The Command’s political strategy in Africa. This process plans should incorporate some of the should involve the Department of State detail of the African Union’s ASF Policy and the Country Teams, USAID, the Framework Document and its Roadmap Commander AFRICOM, the Joint Staff, for Implementation. and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

• The President and the Congress should provide funding and support for security sector reform and AFRICOM’s mission should prioritize those processes and programs that have been clearly identified by the UN Secretary-General as an essential prerequisite for successful war to peace transitions and to permit the drawdown and ultimate withdrawal of expensive peace operations in Africa.

• Coordinating security sector and peacekeeping assistance should be a priority in AFRICOM’s mandate. A lack of coordinated international donor support for SSR in the DRC threatens that country’s

41 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACOTA Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia

AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command

APS Africa Partnership Station

ASF African Standby Force

BTU Brigade Training Unit

CBR Centres de Brassage

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DFID UK Department for International Development

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ESF ECOWAS Standby Force

EUCOM U.S. European Command

EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission

EUSEC FIN European Union Security Financial Mission

FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)

FMF Foreign Military Financing

GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative

GRC Governance Reform Commission

GWOT Global War on Terror

IET Initial Entry Training

www.refugeesinternational.org 42 IGP Inspector General of Police

IMET International Military Education and Training

IPRS Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy

JPB Joint Personnel Board

LNP Liberia National Police

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MONUC Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

ODA Official Development Assistance

ODC Office of Defense Cooperation

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PACOM U.S. Pacific Command

PAE Pacific Architects and Engineers

PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

PKO Peacekeeping Operations

PMI President’s Malaria Initiative

PNC Congolese National Police

QRU Quick Response Unit

SSR Security Sector Reform

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

TSCTP Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership

UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

WHO World Health Organization

43 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA Endnotes 16 Ibid. 1 British attention to fragile states actually 17 Ibid, p 24. antedates 9/11 and the “global war on terrorism.” It originated in experiences in Sierra 18 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House Leone and other African countries during the Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit. 1990s, which persuaded the UK Department 19 for International Development (DFID), in par- Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance ticular, that violent conflict posed a significant within the Department of State (State/F). The obstacle to development. DFID’s White Paper Director of this Office – the Director of U.S. of 2000, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Foreign Assistance (DFA) – serves concurrently Globalization Work for the Poor, made this con- as the USAID Administrator and has authority nection explicit, identifying personal security as over all USAID and Department of State foreign prerequisite for sustainable livelihoods. assistance funding and programs. 20 2 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than Paying the price: Why rich countries must invest the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Govern- now in a war on poverty, Oxfam International, ment” Approaches to Fragile States, International Oxford, 2005. Peace Academy, New York, 2007, p 1. 21 The U.S. channels about 12% of its funding 3 Source: Congressional Budget Office for through local procurement systems (against an FY2008. international average of 38 %) and 10 % of its funding through the public finance manage- 4 Source: The International Institute for Strategic ment systems, such as budget execution, Studies, The Military Balance 2007, London, financial reporting, and auditing of recipient IISS, 2007, p 28. countries, compared with 75 percent for the UK and an average across all major donors of 33%. 5 Bill Rigby, “Defense stocks may jump higher OECD 2006 donor survey overview, OECD, Paris, with big profits,”Reuters , April 12, 2006. 2007, p 82. 6 The Washington Post, 5 December 2006. 22 For example, the HELP Commission, the 2006 Task Force on Transforming Foreign Assistance 7 Patrick and Brown, op cit, p 54. for the 21st Century, the 2007 Smart Power 8 Ibid, p 35. Commission, and the 2004 Commission on Weak States. 9 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command, 23 Patrick and Brown, op cit, p. 10. before the House Armed Services Committee 24 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)- on 13 March 2008, p 3. 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning 10 Robert D. Kaplan, The Next Frontier, The Atlantic, Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 7, 1 November 2007. 2005. Archived at http://www.fas.org/irp/off- docs/nspd/nspd- 44.html. 11 SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007. 25 Ibid.

12 William D. Hartung, Bush Military Budget Highest 26 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture (Kansas Since WW II, Common Dreams, 10 February State University),” 26 November 2007. 2007. http://www.commondreams.org/ http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech. views07/0210-26.htm aspx?speechid=1199.

13 Ibid. 27 Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, Report to Congress on the Implementation of DOD 14 David Roodman, An Index of Donor Performance, Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Center for Global Development, April 2004. Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/ Operations, Washington DC, 1 April, 2007, p 1. _active/cdi/ Own emphasis added to tasks that are patently civilian in nature. 15 Real Aid: Making Technical Assistance Work, Action Aid, 5 July 2006, pp 5-6. 28 Ibid, p 2.

www.refugeesinternational.org 44 29 According to USAID, the characteristics that 37 This will be the first time in 12 years that USAID differentiate TSCTP activities from traditional will hire above its attrition rate. USAID had as development are targeting and timeframe. many officials deployed in Vietnam in 1969 as it Remote at-risk geographic regions and at-risk does worldwide today. populations are targeted based on vulnerability 38 to influence by extremists. This targeting can Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House come from a variety of sources. The develop- Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, ment portion of the TSCTP will be implemented op cit. in an abbreviated timeframe because the 39 War by Other Means: Building Complete and program needs to keep pace with DOD and DOS Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, interventions. USAID, Request for Task Order RAND Corporation, February 2008. Proposals (RTOP), “Peace Through Develop- ment”, 2007, p.4 40 See, for example: Jim Thomas, Sustainable Se-

30 curity: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Correspondence from James Bishop, Vice Presi- Haul, Center for New American Security, April dent, Humanitarian Policy & Practice, InterAc- 2008. http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?1924. rion, 18 April 2008. 41 Leo Hindery Jr., Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Gayle 31 Section 1206 authority initially provided funds Smith, “Appendix 11: Additional views by to the Pentagon to train and equip military and commissioners,” in Beyond Assistance: The HELP police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan without Commission report on foreign assistance reform, State Department involvement. It was later US Commission on Helping to Enhance the broadened to allow for paying the costs, with Livelihood of People Around the Globe, 2007. State Department concurrence, of training and equipping other countries, including Algeria, 42 U.S. Government, Summary and Highlights – Chad, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Lebanon, International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal, 2009 Budget Request, p 44. Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. In 43 FY2006, DOD and State jointly approved 8 A 2005 RAND Corporation study found that programs in 11 countries totaling approximately UN-led nation-building efforts are more suc- $100M. In 2007, 39 programs were approved in cessful — and cheaper — than comparative 47 countries, at a total cost of $280M. American-led efforts. Since the start of the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN 32 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) gives has quietly assumed responsibility for manag- the Department of State primacy over how and ing a growing number of conflicts, not only when to provide military assistance to foreign in Africa, but worldwide. The flare-up in Haiti governments. Over the last 46 years, Congress in 2004 and the July 2006 fighting between has added conditions to the FAA that require the Israel and Hezbollah, for example, were both State Department to consider the recipient state’s mitigated by sending UN peacekeepers, very record on human rights and democracy, before few of whom were from the United States. Of disbursing military aid. Congress deliberately the over 90,000 UN troops and police that were placed the responsibility for providing military deployed to 20 missions worldwide, only 293 assistance with the State Department in order to were American. ensure that assistance is granted in accordance 44 with long-term U.S. foreign policy goals. Mark Bellamy, Kathleen Hicks, and J. Stephen Morrison, Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case, 5 33 Robert M. Gates, Testimony before the House March 2008. http://www.csis.org/component/ Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2008, op cit. option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,1160/

34 Ibid. 45 The AC-130 is basically a Hercules C-130

35 transport plane fitted with an awesome array U.S. Government, National Strategy for Countering of armament – ranging from 20mm Vulcan Terrorism, September 2006, p 16. cannons and 40mm Bofors cannons to 105 mm 36 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Testimony howitzers and a 25 mm Gatling gun that can fire before the House Armed Services Committee 1,800 rounds per minute. The firepower of the hearing on “Building Partnership Capacity and AC-130 is devastating. the Development of the Interagency Process,” 15 April 2008.

45 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA 46 The Tomahawk is a long-range subsonic cruise 58 Liberia: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy missile for attacking land targets. It is approxi- Paper, IMF Country Report No. 07/60, February mately 20 feet long, and weighs around 3,000 2007, p 32. http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ pounds. Each Tomahawk costs around US$ scr/2007/cr0760.pdf one million, and can be fitted with a warhead 59 containing 1,000 pounds of conventional explo- Amos Sawyer was the President of the Interim sives — or a nuclear warhead equivalent to 20 Government of National Unity in Liberia from thousand tons of conventional explosives. 22 November 1990 to 2 March 1994. He left Liberia in 2001, after the militiamen of Presi- 47 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget dent Taylor attempted to murder him and his Request, op cit, p 45. colleague, Conmany Wesseh of the Center for Democratic Empowerment. 48 The FY 09 PKO request reflects ongoing funding requirements for GPOI, TSCTP, a new counter- 60 Dr. Amos Sawyer, Chairman of the Liberia Gover- terrorism program (EARSI) in East Africa, and nance Reform Commission, Monrovia, 21 August multi-lateral peacekeeping and regional stability 2007. operations, as well as security sector reform 61 programs in Somalia. Thomas A. Dempsey, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Restructuring the Ministry of National 49 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Defense, unpublished information paper, 17 Request, op cit, p 45. June 2007. Thomas Dempsey, a retired U.S. Army colonel, served on the SSR Program team 50 Ibid, p 46. as Director of Ministry of Defense Reform and 51 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Training. Principles and Guidelines. (Capstone Doctrine 62 Amos Sawyer, op cit. Draft 3), UN DPKO, 29 June 2007, par 54. 63 Ibid. 52 Government of Liberia, An Act to establish the National Security Council of the Republic of 64 The national budget for 2006 was a paltry $123 Liberia, 12 March 1999. million; for 2007 it was $199 million. Even if Liberia were to attain and sustain an economic 53 Article VII Sections 1(b), 2 (a – d) and 3 of the growth rate of 10% per annum, the baseline is CPA, 2003, pp 15-16. so low that it would take 25 years for the Libe- 54 United Nations Security Council, Resolution rian economy to return to the level it was at in 1509 (2003), S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September the 1980s. 2003, p 4. 65 RAND Report, op cit, pp 26-28. 55 Article XXXV, Section 1(e) of the CPA states that: 66 Ibid, pp 25-26. “All suspended provisions of the Constitution, Statutes and other laws of Liberia, affected as 67 Sean McFate, The Art and Aggravation of Vet- a result of this Agreement, shall be deemed to ting in Post-Conflict Environments, Military be restored with the inauguration of the elected Review, July-August 2007, p 82. Government by January 2006…” 68 Ibid, p 82. 56 Articles 51 and 54 (e) of the Constitution of the 69 Republic of Liberia, 1986. At present, no single ethnic group makes up more than 15% of the AFL. 57 However, a meaningful, long-term process of 70 security sector reform must consider the extent Sergeant Major Spike Roberts (USMC retired), to which the constitution too must be reformed. Director of Training, Camp Ware, Monrovia, 30 The issue of overlapping responsibilities of se- August 2007. curity institutions highlights the need to provide 71 Briefing by Lieutenant Colonel William Wyatt, constitutional backing and clarification for all Monrovia, 28 August 2007. statutory security institutions. Moreover, the present Constitution encourages abuse of power, especially by the President, who appoints virtually all the leaders of these security apparatus.

www.refugeesinternational.org 46 72 The Government of Liberia (Ministry of Defense) and (f) training and operationalization of the is responsible for paying the monthly salary of all first and second Armed Forces of Liberia battal- members of the AFL, according to agreed salary ions by September 2008 and September 2009, scales ranging from US$90 for a private to $170 respectively. UN Security Council, Fifteenth for a Sergeant-Major. This compares well to the progress report of the Secretary-General on the basic monthly salary for the civil servants, which United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2007/479, is $50 per month. Interestingly, all members of 8 August 2007. the Band are paid at a rate of $140 per month, 81 For example, there are controversies around regardless of rank. Recruits undergoing basic DynCorp flying missions to eradicate coca fields training receive a salary of $40, until such time as in Colombia. However, the company really they graduate as riflemen. shook the peacekeeping community in 2001, 73 For example, the UK has offered to train compa- when Kathryn Bolkovac, a UN Police Officer, ny grade officers and has seconded an advisor (a filed a lawsuit in Britain against DynCorp for lieutenant colonel) to the program. This officer firing her after she reported that DynCorp police is currently assisting the Ministry of Defense. trainers in Bosnia were paying for prostitutes William M. Wyatt, op cit. and participating in sex trafficking. Many of the DynCorp employees were forced to resign 74 Ibid. under suspicion of illegal activity. None were prosecuted, since they enjoyed immunity from 75 Telephone interview with Andy Michels, former prosecution in Bosnia. head of DynCorp’s Security Reform team in Liberia, 7 August 2007. 82 Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, AFRICOM: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa, Foreign 76 DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in Au- Policy in Focus, 26 July 2007. http://fpif.org/ gust 2005. According to DynCorp, delays in the fpiftxt/4427 start of the program were predicated by certain actions of the national government, including 83 Amos Sawyer, op cit. the slow pace of voluntary relocation of civilians living in Camp Scheifflin. 84 Ibid.

77 DynCorp took up assignment in Liberia in 85 The elections were a huge logistical accomplish- August 2005. ment. MONUC facilitated the registration of some 25 million people throughout the country, 78 William M. Wyatt, op cit. as well as the road, air and river transport of ballots. The first and second round of Presi- 79 According to Lieutenant Colonel Wyatt: “The dential elections were held on 30 July and 19 AFL is not replacing UNMIL. That is the job October 2006; National Assembly elections on of the police. The AFL can assume the UNMIL 30 July 2006; Provincial Assembly elections on border responsibilities, but that does not entail 19 October 2006; Indirect Senatorial elections 15,000 peacekeepers.” Similarly, Jacques Klein, on 19 January 2007; and Indirect Gubernatorial the former UN Secretary General’s Special elections (27 January 2007). Representative in Liberia, suggested shortly after taking up his post that Liberia should abolish 86 Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of its army altogether, and that Liberia could make Congo, the name used for the Congolese national do with a decent police force and a well-trained army since the beginning of the transition. border security force of 600 to 700 men. 87 U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget 80 According to the latest UN assessment, the pace Request, op cit, p 46. of the drawdown process should be linked to the following core benchmarks: (a) completion of 88 International training support was provided to the basic training of 3,500 personnel of the Libe- the FARDC in the CBRs as follows: Belgium rian National Police by July 2007; (b) completion – Kisangani; Angola – Kitona; Belgium and of police operating procedures by December South Africa – Kamina; Netherlands and South 2008; (c) completion of the formation of the Africa – Nyaleke; Netherlands and South Africa 500-strong Police Quick Reaction Unit by July - Mushake (Rumangabo); and the EU – Luberizi. 2009; (d) equipping of police personnel and 89 Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye, Force Commander’s their deployment to the counties, as well as Directive 01/07 on Protection of Civilians in the building of police infrastructure by December Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC OpsSp 2010; (e) finalization of the national security 01/07, 10 March 2007. strategy and architecture and their implementation throughout the country by December 2008;

47 U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY IMBALANCE FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL IN AFRICA 90 Hans Hoebke, Stephanie Carette and Koen 99 Daniel Volman, AFRICOM: The new United Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic States military command for Africa, http://www. Republic of Congo, Brussels, IRRI-KIIB, 2006. africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=16418

91 There is no system in place for validating the to- 100 The CJTF-HOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia tal number of personnel serving in the FARDC. in support of its invasion of Somalia in January 2007 and used military facilities in Djibouti, 92 France, the UK, and the USA – plus Angola and Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch its own attacks South Africa. against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in 93 U.S. security interests on the African continent the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia in have hitherto been overseen by three different January and June of 2007. combatant commanders: the commander of the 101 Donna Miles, Navy Mission to Set Tone for U.S. European Command, based in Stuttgart, Germany, Africa Command—USS Fort McHenry to work has been responsible for North Africa and with West African, European nations, American much of sub-Saharan Africa; the commander of Forces Press Service, Washington DC, 15 Octo- Central Command, located in Tampa, Florida, ber 2007. with primary responsibility for the Middle East has had oversight over the Horn of Africa; and 102 Press Conference by General William E. Ward, the commander of Pacific Command, located in African Union Building, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Honolulu, Hawaii has been responsible for the 8 November 2007. http://www.AFRICOM.mil/ islands off the west coast of Africa. getArticle.asp?art=1582

94 Nigeria; Country, Gulf of Guinea and 103 Statement by Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Permanent AFRICOM, Africa News 22 November 2007. Representative, in the Open Debate on Strength- ening the Relationship Between the UN and 95 Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Sec- Regional Organizations, in the Security Council, retary of Defense for Policy, State Depart- April 16, 2008. ment Foreign Press Center Briefing, June 22, 2007. http://www.eucom.mil/africom/tran- 104 $50 million in 2007 and nearly $57 million script221110Ljun2007.asp for 2008.

96 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, 105 Statement of General William E. Ward, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command, Commander, United States Africa Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on before the House Armed Services Committee on 13 March 2008, pp 8-9. 13 March 2008, p 18.

97 Ibid, pp.7-8. Emphasis added. 106 Ibid.

98 CENTCOM established CJTF-HOA in late 2002 107 Mark Bellamy, Kathleen Hicks, and J. Stephen to disrupt the flow of jihadis from the Middle Morrison, Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case, East to East Africa in the wake of the invasion March 05, 2008. http://www.csis.org/compo- of Afghanistan. It soon became clear, however, nent/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,1160/ that the region encompassing the African states 108 of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, The UK, for example, has joined the efforts and Sudan contained less of an al-Qaeda pres- of DFID, the FCO and the MOD though the ence than once feared. CENTCOM therefore establishment in 2001 of the Africa Conflict amended CJTF-HOA’s mandate. The Task Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP, supported Force based at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonier soon by the Treasury and coordinated at Ministerial took on an increasing number of quick impact level by the Cabinet Office, serves as a tool for projects aimed at “winning hearts and minds” joint analysis, financing and coordination in and thought to be addressing the root causes areas where collaboration between the three de- that “breed jihadis”. See Robert G. Berschinski, partments can add value to UK conflict preven- AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Ter- tion activities. Objectives and priorities are laid rorism,” “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, out in a jointly agreed UK Sub-Saharan Africa and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa, Strategy for Conflict Prevention. The ACPP SSI Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, budget for FY 2005/6 was £60m, of which November 2007. http://www.strategicstudiesin- MOD spent around £30m. stitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB827.pdf 109 Senator Russell Feingold, Creation of a U.S. Africa Command, Congressional Record, Senate, 10 January 2007, page s352.

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