Political Party Identification and Support
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Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 16 Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue1 16 Political Party Identification and Support: Transitory or Turning Point? Russell Hsiao Fighting with the Army You Have: An Alternate Vision of Taiwan Defense Reform and US-Taiwan Security Cooperation (Part I) Eric Chan Japan’s Policy Shift on Taiwan Centers on Okinawa I-wei Jennifer Chang CCP Proxies Call for Mutiny, Violence, and Overthrow of the Tsai Government J. Michael Cole The Struggle Over “Comfort Women” in Taiwan: Historical Memory and Lack of Consensus Emilie Hu Political Party Identification and Support: Transitory or Turning Point? The Global Taiwan Brief is a bi-weekly publication released By: Russell Hsiao every other Wednesday and pro- Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief vides insight into the latest news on Taiwan. of the Global Taiwan Brief. Editor-in-Chief Amid the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and other simmering political issues, party identifica- Russell Hsiao tion in Taiwan appears to be undergoing a transition, potentially signaling a turning point Associate Editor in Taiwanese domestic politics. According to the latest polling data from TVBS—a major John Dotson media outlet aligned with the Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT)—the public support rate for the Staff Editor Katherine Schultz opposition KMT edged out support for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨, DPP) in the month of July. Public opinion polls conducted by other party-affiliated as well The views and opinions expressed as academic institutions released in recent months have also pointed to similar trends in in these articles are those of the party identification on the island. While the results of multiple surveys vary—with some authors and do not necessarily re- flect the official policy or position showing the DPP’s support rating higher than that of the KMT—one thread seems consis- of the Global Taiwan Institute. tent throughout: the level of support for the ruling party appears to be falling. This drop, and the corresponding modest increase in support for the KMT, may be attributed to sev- To view web sources cited in the eral factors. published papers (underlined in printed text), visit https:// This recent decline in support for the ruling party since 2020 has been especially notable, globaltaiwan.org/2021/08/vol-6- issue-16/ as it followed a period of growing popularity. Indeed, according to polling data released by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center (政治大學選舉研究中心), support Global Taiwan Institute for the DPP saw a sharp 14 percent increase from 2018-20, culminating with a high of 34 1836 Jefferson Place NW, percent in 2020. Support rates for political parties and presidents tend to ebb and flow— Washington DC 20036 [email protected] shaped by the prevailing events of the time—and this decrease since 2020 appears to cor- relate with growing public dissatisfaction with President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) decision To subscribe, visit in August of that year to lift restrictions on US pork containing the additive ractopamine, http://globaltaiwan.org/sub- as well as perceived failures in her handling of vaccine acquisitions. scribe/. Tsai announced the administrative order to lift restrictions on importing US pork in August © 2021 · Global Taiwan Institute 2020, almost immediately after she started her second term as president and while she was riding on an almost record high support rating. At the time, observers were uniform Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 16 2 in pointing out the political risks that Tsai was taking purchasing and obtaining the vaccines showed that 57 with that decision, and the change in public opinion percent of the public were not satisfied, whereas only appears to validate this concern. The opposition KMT 35 percent were satisfied. capitalized on the about-face of the DPP (when it was It is perhaps worth noting that in the TVBS poll, the in the opposition it had opposed the lifting of import difference between the two parties’ support ratings restrictions), as well as public fear about the decision, (results were collected between July 27 through Au- and has been engaged in a full-court press campaign to gust 1) was marginal at best at 1.6 percent, with the drum up popular angst against the import of pork from KMT at 23.4 percent and the DPP at 21.8 percent. Yet the United States. The opposition even mobilized an the increase in the KMT’s support rating from the same effective grassroots campaign and was successful in in- poll from May to August is remarkable at 11.2 percent cluding the pork issue in a national referendum, which (from 12.2 percent). By contrast, the DPP’s support rat- was originally scheduled for the end of August but was ing dropped by 6.9 percent (from 29.7 percent) over recently delayed to December 2021 due to the coun- the same period of time. try’s recent COVID outbreak. If the referendum passes, it would put a non-binding hold on the president’s abil- While the various survey results do not all indicate that ity to continue to import American pork that includes the KMT’s support rating has surpassed the DPP’s, one the additive. trendline appears consistent: declining support for the ruling party. For instance, the Green-leaning Taiwan- It is worth noting that, in part, President Tsai sold the ese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) polls from July decision to lift the restrictions to the public as a nec- showed that support for the DPP stood at 28.3 percent essary step for Washington to begin considering the and the KMT at 21.9 percent, with a plurality (32 per- possibility of negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) cent) expressing support for no political party. Interest- with Taiwan. The Trump Administration—which by al- ingly, however, another TPOF survey data did show a most every measure helped to upgrade US-Taiwan re- precipitous drop in party identification for the DPP, de- lations—held off on initiating trade talks with Taiwan clining from 43.1 percent in March to 28.2 percent in and did not resume Trade and Investment Framework June, whereas the KMT held steady from March (19.0 Agreement (TIFA) dialogues with Taiwan (which had percent) to June (18.9 percent). This was the sharpest not been held since 2016). The Biden Administration, three-month decrease in the TPOF’s polling since it be- to its credit, resumed the TIFA talks in June 2021 but gan polling on the issue in 2016. There was a spike in gave no public indication about whether an FTA was in party identification for the ruling DPP after the erup- the cards. In any case, the resumption of TIFA appears tion of the Hong Kong crisis in early 2019. In November to have had little effect on public opinion, which still 2018, support for the party stood at 23.5 percent and trends against the lifting of restrictions. by June 2019 it reached 45.4 percent, ultimately reach- In addition to the pork controversy, the Tsai govern- ing its peak in November 2019 at 49.6 percent. ment’s efforts to acquire COVID-19 vaccines from Consistent with the other aforementioned surveys, abroad have not been spared from domestic political the latest poll from the National Chengchi University’s wrangling. The opposition mounted a campaign that Election Study Center that was released in late July blamed the central government for failing to acquire showed a similar decrease in DPP support from 34.0 Chinese vaccines as the country was dealing with an percent in 2020 to 31.4 percent in 2021, whereas KMT outbreak of the virus, after successfully containing it support increased only slightly, from 17.0 percent to throughout 2020. KMT leaders seized on the growing 18.7 percent. public fear amidst the ongoing crisis, as Hung Shiu-chu (洪秀柱), former chairwoman of the party, even em- barked on a visit to China to receive a jab of the Chi- nese vaccine that was widely publicized by the Chinese state media. Indeed, the TVBS polling from June on public satisfaction with the government’s response to Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 16 3 Image: The most recent polling data from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), which shows a marked decline in support for the DPP. (Image source: Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.) Image: The most recent polling date from the National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, also showing a drop in support for the DPP. (Image source: National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center.) Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 16 4 So, what might these recent trends in party identifica- Kong crisis. Coming on the heels of the recent surge in tion mean? From a historical perspective, KMT popu- party identification in favor of the DPP, public opinion larity also dropped steadily from its pinnacle of 39.5 could simply be self-correcting. The question remains: percent in 2011 during the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) do these current public opinion trends indicate a turn- Administration to 20.8 percent in 2016. Similarly, the ing point, or are they transitory? It is still too early to DPP may have reached a peak at 34.0 percent in 2020 say. A more salient indicator will be the 2022 local elec- and has now begun experiencing a steady decline. To tions. Yet, if what’s past is prologue, it is likely the latter. be sure, this drop followed a surge from 2018-2020 in While public support for President Tsai party identification in favor of the DPP during a peri- The main point: and her ruling DPP has declined markedly in 2021, it is od of a relative economic underperformance, and in unclear whether this trend is here to stay.