DOCSLIB.ORG

PF Topic Analysis March 2016

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PF Topic Analysis March 2016 PF Topic Analysis March 2016 Public Forum debaters will be discussing “Resolved: The United States should withdraw its military presence from Okinawa.” We’ll begin by taking a closer look at the meaning of the key phrases in the resolution. Resolutional Analysis The United States is the actor for this resolution. Hopefully, you know what the United States is! This part seems pretty self-explanatory, so we’ll move on. Should is a word that is typically understood to demand a particular policy action—in this case, withdrawal from Okinawa. Although I do not anticipate many debates on this particular resolution will hinge on arguments about the word “should,” you may nevertheless wish to review our more thorough discussion of its nuances from last month’s topic analysis. 1 Withdraw is defined by Merriam-Webster as “to take back or away” or “to remove from use or cultivation.” In other words, “to withdraw” can be thought of as basically meaning “to exit” or “to pull back from.” However, this topic takes place in a military context, so we’ll want to also check the military definition of the term. According to Rick Baillergeon (retired U.S. Army Infantry Officer Associate Professor of Tactics at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) and John Sutherland (retired U.S. Army Infantry Officer, former Professor of Tactics at the U.S. Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning and at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, current employee at the Joint Center for Operational Analysis) “withdrawal” is defined thusly in military parlance: Is a form of retrograde in which a unit is in contact, but not necessarily under pressure. In this operation, the unit disengages from the enemy and moves to an assembly area or a new defensive position. A unit may conduct a withdrawal unassisted or with assistance from other friendly forces. Within the withdrawal, there are two basic types – under enemy pressure and not under enemy pressure. We will discuss each in detail momentarily. First, we will highlight some basic principles that are critical to achieving success in either type. That seems to largely fit with the civilian understanding of the word. There is significant discussion within military literature of various types of withdrawal during the course of combat, but we need not become concerned with those here. A withdrawal from Okinawa would involve the termination of an occupation, not a tactical maneuver during an active battle with an enemy. Therefore, the various sub-varieties of military withdrawal tactics aren’t relevant to debates on this topic. 2 Here is the important thing about “withdraw”—it is absolute. In other words, “withdraw” is not synonymous with terms like “reduce,” “decrease,” “curtail,” etc. Pro teams on this topic cannot meet their burden by arguing that the U.S. should close one (or several) bases. They will need to defend total removal of America’s military forces from the island. However, it would be legitimate for pros to advocate that bases be moved from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland, or elsewhere in the region (more on that later). As long as all U.S. forces leave Okinawa, it’s fair game. Nevertheless, I have a feeling that plenty of pros on this topic will try to get away with strategies endorsing less- than-full removal of U.S. forces. To check back against those tactics, we’ll also be releasing a supplemental topicality file covering the “withdraw” debate at-length. It will be published within a day or two or this guide, so don’t forget to check back. For now, though, let’s keep going. Its is possessive. Since we know the U.S. is the actor, “its” means America needs to remove troops and other military operatives that belong to the United States. The definition of military presence might seem intuitively obvious to you, but there is actually some nuance involved. Obviously, soldiers are included, but what about infrastructure, vehicles, weapons and gear, support staff, intelligence capabilities, non-combat peacekeepers, unmanned drone operations, etc. etc. etc.? 3 Like “withdraw,” the phrase “military presence” must be defined contextually, within the discipline of national security. However, experts don’t necessarily speak with a unified voice when it comes to whether these borderline considerations should technically be considered “presence.” For that reason, you’ll want to make sure you have an interp to support your pro case, and potentially a few additional interps to check back against opponents’ pro cases you might consider unfair. Most generally, “military presence” can be understood to mean everything the U.S. military owns that is stationed abroad. However, most definitions suggest that “presence” is specific to people/things stationed as a part of planned, routine, non-combat functions, like deterring potential adversaries. It does not typically include people/things deployed as a part of an active combat response to an unplanned crisis. Here is evidence: (James Thomason, Project Leader, Institute for Defense Analysis, “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.122.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf, July 2002) US overseas military presence consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine non-combat activities or functions. Collectively, these assets constitute one of a set of very important military instruments of national power and influence. It is regularly asserted within the Department of Defense that these overseas military presence activities promote key security objectives, such as deterrence, assurance of friends and allies, the provision of timely crisis response capabilities, regional stability and, generally, security conditions that in turn promote freedom and prosperity. In other words, according to the definition above, a military ship that patrols a particular region for the purposes of monitoring things and/or “flexing” to discourage aggressive actions from foreign nations would be considered a component of “presence.” A military ship deployed to attack an enemy vessel in response to an act of war would not be “presence.” 4 Expanding on that interpretation a bit, here is further evidence clarifying that “presence” does include units engaged in training foreign militaries, gathering intelligence, and/or conducting peacekeeping: (James Thomason, Project Leader, Institute for Defense Analysis, “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.122.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf, July 2002) Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities or functions. By this definition, forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are engaging in combat (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be “engaged in presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.” We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they are not. In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing? Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella” concept of military presence. These include but are not limited to US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries; to improve inter- operability of US and friendly forces; to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency should call for them. However, per this evidence, “presence” excludes diplomatic efforts, economic negotiations, etc.: (Charles Greer, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, “The Future of Forward Presence,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA234227&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, 1991) To establish a conceptual framework for this paper, I developed the following definition of forward presence within the context of national defense: the visible employment of US military personnel and/or military material as a deterrent outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) at any point along the operational continuum short of involving major US conventional forces in combat. 5 My simplistic definition could be subject to endless scholarly debate. It includes small unit combat operations of limited scope and duration and peacetime contingency operations such as Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia, but it excludes the subsequent combat operation designated Desert Storm. It includes our military activities in Alaska and Hawaii. It excludes any diplomatic, economic, social or psychological activities that do not have
Load more

Recommended publications
  • China's Relations with US Allies and Partners in Europe and the Asia
    1112 16th Street NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036 P: 202-546-3300 • F: 202-675-1010 fas.org • [email protected] Prepared statement by Ankit Panda Adjunct Senior Fellow, Defense Posture Project Federation of American Scientists Before U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission April 5, 2018 Hearing on “China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners in Europe and the Asia Pacific” Chairman Cleveland, Vice Chairman Bartholomew, and Honorable Commissioners, thank you for the invitation to participate in this hearing and to testify today on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC, or China) relations with and pursuit of influence in two important United States allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). This is a timely topic as we witness the crystallization of an ambitious Chinese regional policy in East Asia—one which has cast aside past reticence about seeking regional hegemony and influence. We should take Chinese President Xi Jinping’s word when, at his presentation of his Political Report at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, he underlined a plan to achieve China’s “great rejuvenation” across three phases—by 2020, by 2035, resulting in the emergence of China as the unquestioned regional hegemon in East Asia by 2050.1 Today, the United States and the PRC are well into a period of protracted geostrategic competition in East Asia—a dynamic that this administration has acknowledged in its December 2017 National Security Strategy. We are witnessing this competition play out in the realm of institutional influence, the military balance of power, and certainly in terms of how Asia’s regional security architecture might adapt to China’s undeniably large regional presence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Independence Movement on Okinawa, Japan. a Study on the Impact of US Military Presence
    STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies The independence movement on Okinawa, Japan. A study on the impact of US military presence. Bachelor Thesis in Japanese studies Spring 2017 Anton Lövgren Supervisor: Ingemar Ottosson Abstract Ryūkyū independence movement has ever since WWII been an actor working towards independence for the Ryūkyū islands. Since the Okinawa Reversion Agreement 1971 the military bases has been a topic for debate. In this research the influence of the American military bases and its personnel's behavior have on the independence movement is examined using a qualitative analysis method. Further, this research argues that the military bases have influenced independence movement to gain more momentum for autonomy on Okinawa between 2004-2017. Keywords Ryūkyū, Identity, Ryūkyū independence movement, American military bases, Collective identity. Acknowledgement I am so glad for all the encouragement and assistance I’ve been given by the department of Asian, Middle eastern and Turkish studies. Especially by my supervisor Ingemar Ottosson and course coordinator Christina Nygren. Romanisation of Japanese words and names Japanese words and names will be written with the Hepburn romanization system. Long vowels such as a e i o u will be written with a macron (ā ē ī ō ū). For example Ryūkyū (琉球) would otherwise be written ​ with long vowels as ryuukyuu. Japanese names are traditionally written with family name and given name ​ subsequently. This thesis will use the western standard i.e. given name first and family name second. For example Takeshi Onaga the governor of Okinawa Prefecture in Japan (In tradtional Japanese standard 翁 長 雄志 Onaga Takeshi).
    [Show full text]
  • On the Consequences of the Okinawa Elections, US Military Presence, US-Japan Relations
    On the Consequences of the Okinawa Elections, US Military Presence, US-Japan Relations By Vladimir Terehov Region: Asia, USA Global Research, November 05, 2018 Theme: History, Militarization and WMD New Eastern Outlook 4 November 2018 In-depth Report: Militarization of Japan So, the snap governor elections of the Okinawa Prefecture that were critical for the Japanese federal government were held on September 30 this year and ended in an unpleasant surprise for it. Despite Tokyo’s anticipation (and to its sheer disappointment) the former Ginowan City Mayor Atsushi Sakima supported by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan failed at the elections. The former radio host Denny Tamaki won by receiving 56% of the vote; he considers himself a follower of the former Governor Takeshi Onaga. Takeshi Onaga who deceased in early August was a strong opponent of the US military presence on Okinawa, that is, the largest island of the Ryukyu Arc and a prefecture of the same name. 10 days prior to his death, he made a kind of political will by claiming that he was going to revoke the permission for allocating a part of the island’s coast in the low-populated settlement of Henoko for the construction of a new location for the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The aforementioned base is currently located in the very heart of Ginowan City whose population is approaching 100,000 people. On August 15 (due to the allegedly coming typhoons), all work in Henoko that had been carried out by the federal government for over a year using the state budget funds was suspended.
    [Show full text]
  • 25Th Okinawan Festival Mahalo
    www.huoa.org November/December 2007 Issue #111 Circulation 11,512 TH 25 OKINAWAN Sharing Uchinanchu FESTIVAL MAHALO Aloha By Jon Itomura, Festival Chair Grand Prize “Performance Art” was the eve of the Festival and all plans had been made, Kalakaua Avenue was filled for the International Okinawan Festival Parade. by Reid T Shimabukuro The parade participants came from the U.S., Brazil, near and far, many from Okinawa and some from nearby Waikiki bars. The parade made its way through thousands of waving bystanders, young, old “A performer from and many mainlanders. Okinawa prepares back- stage for her upcoming number.” What started as a humble idea from Roy Kaneshiro, has evolved into an annual celebration of culture and fellowship that continues to grow. But none of this can be done without the dedication of so many volunteers, the months of planning, discussion and fears. All come together on one weekend demonstrating undeniable conviction, to a culture requiring the assistance of all to accomplish Uchinanchu, Shimanchu, and Uminchu promotion, perpetuation and preservation. So Ippee Nifee Deebiru to everyone and to all please have a great year, for before we all know it, the next Okinawan festival will be here. Let us all hope and believe that together we will always strive, to view the Okinawan Festival as a symbol of Kizuna and keep the dreams of our heritage alive. But many in attendance were anxious, Kapiolani Park beckoned, they all knew that the Okinawan Festival was soon to be awakened. David Arakawa gave a great speech, Vice-Governor of Okinawa Nakazato was already impressed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Plight of the Okinawan Dugong: an Okinawan Civil Society Critique of the Government of Japan's Environmental Impact Assessment and the U.S
    The Plight of the Okinawan Dugong: An Okinawan Civil Society Critique of the Government of Japan's Environmental Impact Assessment and the U.S. Department of Defense's Response Okinawa Environmental Justice Project Hideki Yoshikawa In April 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) notified the Federal District Court of San Francisco that it had completed its “take into account” process in accordance with the 2008 court’s order under the U.S. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and released a 25-page document entitled “The U.S. Marine Corps Recommended Findings, April 2014” (hereafter: The Findings). This document summarized the Dugong case, the DoD’s “take into account” process, and conclusions emerging from the process. The DoD was ordered by the District Court to answer a loaded and unprecedented question: would the construction and operation of a U.S. military base in Henoko-Oura Bay have adverse effects on Japan’s Natural Monument, the dugong? The DoD provided its answer in simple terms. The Findings stated: The USMC [United State Marine Corps] below presents its findings in two categories: construction effect and operational effect. The overall determination of effect for the Undertaking (construction and operation of the base) is “no adverse effect” on the Okinawa dugong, because of the extremely low probability of Okinawa dugongs being in the APE [Area of Potential Effects]; or should dugongs in fact be present, the construction and operational activity is primarily of the type that would not have an adverse effect. The exception to this, as discussed in Section 3.2.4, is construction noise; however, the GoJ [Government of Japan] has committed to noise minimization and monitoring efforts that the USMC finds likely to be effective in avoiding or minimizing impacts on dugongs if they are present during construction.
    [Show full text]
  • Proposals Concerning Consolidation and Reduction of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa
    Proposals concerning consolidation and reduction of U.S. military bases in Okinawa March 2020 Bankoku Shinryō Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues Table of Contents [Overview] Proposals from the " Bankoku Shinryō Council on the U.S. Military Base Issues” ・・・・i Introduction ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・1 １．Construction plan for the new base in Henoko and eliminatinG the danGers and suspendinG operations of Futenma Air Station Current state and backGround ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 2 Points of discussion ・The standpoint of Okinawa ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・3 ・The Japanese Government's standpoint ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4 ・ExamininG the main points of discussion ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 5 Proposals ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 8 2．Towards a fundamental consolidation and reduction of U.S. military bases in Okinawa Current state and backGround ・Current state of U.S. military bases in Okinawa ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9 ・BackGround reGardinG the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa ・・・・・・・・ 9 ・ChanGes in the security environment and U.S. military strateGy ・・・・・・・・・・・・ 11 Points of discussion ・ExamininG “the reduction of the base burden” in Okinawa ・・・・・・・・・・・・ 12 ・ExamininG Okinawa's GeoGraphical advantaGe ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 13 ・ExamininG the siGnificance of havinG the Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa ・・・・ 14 ・The Marine Corps' new operatinG concept EABO ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 17 Proposals ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 18 3．MakinG Okinawa a hub for the Asia-Pacific reGion Current state and backGround ・Asia from a security
    [Show full text]
  • Millennial+ Voices in Okinawa: an Inquiry Into the Attitudes of Young Okinawan Adults Toward the Presence of U.S
    Millennial+ Voices in Okinawa: An Inquiry into the Attitudes of Young Okinawan Adults toward the Presence of U.S. Bases By Charles E. Morrison and Daniel Chinen Millennial+ Voices in Okinawa: An Inquiry into the Attitudes of Young Okinawan Adults toward the Presence of U.S. Bases By Charles E. Morrison and Daniel Chinen A Report of an East-West Center Project Supported by a Grant from the U.S.-Japan Foundation The East-West Center promotes better relations and under- The United States-Japan Foundation is committed to standing among the people and nations of the United States, promoting stronger ties between Americans and Japanese by Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and supporting projects that foster mutual knowledge and dialogue. Established by the U.S. Congress in 1960, the education, deepen understanding, create effective channels Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on of communication, and address common concerns in an critical issues of common concern, bringing people together increasingly interdependent world. to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. Millennial+ Voices in Okinawa: An Inquiry into the Attitudes of Young Okinawan Adults toward the Presence of U.S. Bases By Charles E. Morrison and Daniel Chinen © 2019 East-West Center This publication may be downloaded from the East-West Center website at EastWestCenter.org/Publications. ISBN 978-0-86638-288-5 (print) and 978-0-86638-289-2 (electronic) A Report of an East-West Center Project Supported by a Grant from the U.S.-Japan Foundation East-West Center 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, HI 96848-1601 808.944.7111 EastWestCenter.org Millennial+ Voices in Okinawa: An Inquiry into the Attitudes of Young Okinawan Adults toward the Presence of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • US Military Liberty Restrictions in Okinawa—Falling on Deaf Ears?
    US Military Liberty Restrictions in Okinawa —Falling on Deaf Ears? Maj John C. Wright, USAF Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs requests a courtesy line. n 21 November 2017, in response to a criminal drunk driving incident Oby a US Marine that resulted in the death of an Okinawan civilian, US military leadership in Japan issued the latest in a series of disciplinary measures for US personnel, designed to show the Japanese that the United States is taking the behavior of its troops seriously. These restrictions were draconian by previous standards: US service members were strictly prohibited from traveling anywhere beyond their work locations and their residences and barred from purchasing or consuming alcohol on or off base, including their own residences. The restrictions were subsequently relaxed on 1 December, then removed on 14 December. Enacting these measures is understandable: faced with the formidable political and diplomatic obstacles challenging the US–Japan alliance, the highest US mili- tary authorities must consistently respond to a bevy of incidents, unfortunately with fewer arrows in their quiver to deal with local personnel crimes and breaches of decorum than those at their disposal for dealing with potential enemies. How- ever, even considering their severity, these disciplinary actions will never achieve their objective—preventing further deterioration of the US–Japan relationship— without the help of the Japanese central government.
    [Show full text]
  • Hawaii-Okinawa High School Student Exchange
    www.huoa.org March/April 2012 Issue #137 Circulation 9,790 Hawaii-Okinawa High School Student Exchange wenty-four high school students arrived from Okinawa anxiously looking forward Tto spending two weeks with their host stu- dents and families here in Hawaii, yet sad because they had to leave behind one student who became ill just prior to departure. Five days later, much to everyone’s delight, Yuki Uehara was escorted by his dad Hayazo Uehara to join the group. Yuki’s dad remained in Hawaii for two days and flew back to Okinawa. 2012 marks the 22nd year of this Hawaii- Okinawa Student Exchange Program and the sec- ond year that HUOA has undertaken the project completely. Students visited the Arizona Memorial and met with Pearl City High’s Japanese class to exchange ideas and discuss issues on the promo- tion of peace. They were also treated to a typical local style picnic prepared by President Cyrus Tamashiro and President-Elect George Bartels, Hawaii and Okinawa students march together in the Honolulu Festival Parade down Kalakaua Avenue in Waikiki. Jr. after their morning of Hawaiian games led by Tom Yamamoto. Polynesian Cultural Center was the highlight of the day where they were intrigued by the various Polynesian cultures. A three-day trip to the Big Island ended with an Aloha Party and an overnight stay at the Hawaii Okinawa Center. Taught by host students Cameron Brumblay and Ashley Oshiro, all of the Okinawan students danced the hula for their host families in addition to playing the sanshin and sharing some popular Okinawan songs.
    [Show full text]
  • Agenda & Speakers
    Agenda & Speakers CHANGING EAST ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND OKINAWA: Re-examining the U.S. Force Posture in Japan Agenda Tuesday, March 13, 2018 10:30 AM – 3:00 PM Program Moderator Dr. Mike Mochizuki Japan-U.S. Relations Chair, George Washington University 10:00 am Registration 10:30 am - 10:40 am Opening Remarks Morning Keynote 10:40 am - 11:10 am The Honorable Takeshi Onaga (Governor of Japan) Comments on Governor Onaga’s Speech 11:10 am - 11:50 am Dr. Andrew Yeo (Associate Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America) 11:50 am - 12:20 pm Lunch Break Midday Keynote 12:20 pm - 1:05 pm The Honorable William J. Perry (19th U.S. Secretary of Defense) 1:05 pm - 1:15 pm Break Panel Discussion Dr. Morton Halperin (Senior Advisor, Open Society Foundations) Dr. Eric Hogenbotham (Principal Research Scientist, MIT Center for 1:15 pm - 2:55 pm International Studies) Dr. Fumiaki Nozoe (Associate Professor, Okinawa International University) Moderated by Dr. Mike Mochizuki (Japan-U.S. Relations Chair, George Washington University) 2:55 pm - 3:00 pm Closing Remarks 2 CHANGING EAST ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND OKINAWA: Re-examining the U.S. Force Posture in Japan Keynote Speakers The Honorable Takeshi Onaga 7th Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Governor Onaga has dedicated his life to public service as a conservative politician in Okinawa for over 30 years. In November 2014, Governor Onaga ran for the Okinawa gubernatorial election, and his platform to find a way to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma outside of Okinawa brought together both conservatives and liberals.
    [Show full text]
  • Prime Minister Shinzo Abe: Disputes Over US Military Base in Okinawa
    International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) ISSN (Online): 2319-7064 Index Copernicus Value (2016): 79.57 | Impact Factor (2017): 7.296 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe: Disputes over US Military Base in Okinawa Ajeng Tri Hidayati1, I Ketut Surajaya2 1Graduate Student Japanese Studies Program School of Strategic and Global StudiesUniversitas Indonesia 2Professor of History Japanese Studies Program School of Strategic and Global StudiesUniversitas Indonesia Abstract: The existence of US military bases in Okinawa reaped pros and cons at the domestic and international level to relocate Marine Corps Air Station or MCAS Futenma from Ginowan city to Nago city in Henoko. The relocation of MCAS Futenma that has been agreed since 1996 by Japan and the United States was still not fully approved by Okinawa people. The Okinawa people do not want the military base to be relocated to Nago city, because they wanted the US military base to be completely removed from Okinawa. This research will analyze the policy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in addressing the issue of relocation of US military base in Okinawa (MCAS Futenma). This research used theory of decision making process proposed by William D. Coplin. The results of this study indicated that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continue efforts to relocate the US military base in Okinawa, namely MCAS Futenma to Henoko by looking at various policy determinants. The factors that boost Shinzo Abe's policy were Japanese domestic factors, economic and military capabilities,including the international context. Keywords: Relocation; Okinawa; MCAS Futenma; Shinzo Abe 1. Introduction Okinawa has a long history and set of characteristics that distinguish it from other regions in Japan.
    [Show full text]
  • Spring 2013 Full Issue
    Naval War College Review Volume 66 Number 2 Spring Article 1 2013 Spring 2013 Full Issue The U.S. Naval War College Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Naval War College, The U.S. (2013) "Spring 2013 Full Issue," Naval War College Review: Vol. 66 : No. 2 , Article 1. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss2/1 This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Naval War College: Spring 2013 Full Issue NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Spring 2013 Volume 66, Number 2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207 Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013 1 NWC_Spring2013Review_FrontMatter.indd 1 2/26/13 8:43 AM Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 2, Art. 1 N AVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS ADVISORY BOARD PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE A dam Bellow R ear Adm. John N. Christenson, USN Jeffrey Kline P ROVOST Gale A. Mattox A mb. Mary Ann Peters Robert A. Silano Marin Strmecki DEA N OF NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES Dov S. Zakheim R obert C. Rubel N AVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD Carnes Lord, Editor D onald Chisholm Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor Audrey Kurth Cronin Phyllis P.
    [Show full text]