I NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER the COLD WAR: CHANGE and CONTINUITY IN
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER THE COLD WAR: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN PUBLIC DISCOURSES by David Cram Helwich Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Science, University of Wyoming, 1997 Master of Arts, University of Wyoming, 2000 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of College of Liberal Arts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2011 i UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by David Cram Helwich It was defended on January 24, 2011 and approved by William Keller, PhD, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs John Lyne, PhD, Professor, Communication John Poulakos, PhD, Associate Professor, Comunication Dissertation Advisor: Gordon Mitchell, PhD, Associate Professor, Communication ii Copyright © by David Cram Helwich 2011 iii NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER THE COLD WAR: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN PUBLIC DISCOURSES David Cram Helwich, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2011 This dissertation assesses the rhetorical dynamics of American public argumentation about the appropriate role of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Four case studies are examined, including the controversy created by “fallen priests” like General George Lee Butler, the U.S. Senate’s deliberations on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the George W. Bush administration’s campaign to implement its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, and the public debate about the development and deployment of “mini” nuclear weapons. Collectively, the case studies reveal that a potent combination of institutional interests, restricted access to official deliberative spaces, the deployment of threat discourses, the presumption that nuclear deterrence was effective during the Cold War, and the utilization of technical discursive practices narrowed the scope of public debate about the role of nuclear weapons and allowed advocates of robust nuclear deterrence to construct rhetorical and policy bridges between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. “Security” and “risk management” frames dominated public discussions about nuclear weapons, and advocates of nuclear abolition were largely unsuccessful in their efforts to reconfigure public argumentation on nuclear weapons policy. iv A.1.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFTER THE COLD WAR ....................................... 1 1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................... 5 1.2.1 Rhetorical Criticism of U.S. Foreign Policy .................................................. 6 1.2.2 Public Sphere Theory .................................................................................... 12 1.2.3 Nuclear Rhetorical Criticism and ‘Nukespeak’ .......................................... 20 1.2.4 Other Disciplines............................................................................................ 28 1.3 RATIONALE, QUESTIONS, AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........ 34 2.0 THE FALLEN NUCLEAR PRIEST ........................................................................ 45 2.1 BUTLER’S CASE FOR ABOLITION ............................................................ 52 2.2 A FALLEN PRIEST .......................................................................................... 62 2.2.1 Butler’s Resume ............................................................................................. 62 2.2.2 Butler’s Portraiture ....................................................................................... 66 2.2.3 Butler’s Reception ......................................................................................... 81 2.3 THE GENERAL’S CRITICS RESPOND ....................................................... 85 2.3.1 The Head Priest ............................................................................................. 86 2.3.2 The Church .................................................................................................. 101 2.3.3 Continuity and Change from the Cold War ............................................. 112 v 2.3.4 Concluding Thoughts .................................................................................. 115 3.0 THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ................................................ 119 3.1 CONTROVERSY IN CONTEXT .................................................................. 123 3.1.1 Domestic Political Context .......................................................................... 123 3.1.2 Geopolitical Context .................................................................................... 130 3.2 CASES FOR AND AGAINST RATIFICATION ......................................... 141 3.2.1 Arsenal Reliability ....................................................................................... 145 3.2.1.1 Will the SSP Be Effective? ................................................................ 147 3.2.1.2 Will the SSP Be Ready in Time?...................................................... 152 3.2.1.3 Will the SSP Be Adequately Funded in the Future?...................... 155 3.2.1.4 Do “Talent” and “Data Gaps” Threaten the SSP? ........................ 156 3.2.1.5 Will Re-manufacturing Reliably Extend Arsenal Life? ................ 159 3.2.1.6 Do Safeguards Adequately Protect Against Future Threats? ...... 162 3.2.2 Modernization .............................................................................................. 167 3.2.2.1 Is the CTBT a Backdoor to Eventual Disarmament? .................... 169 3.2.2.2 Does the CTBT Preclude Responding to New Security Threats? 174 3.2.2.3 Does the CTBT Threaten Arsenal Safety? ..................................... 180 3.2.2.4 Can Confidence in the Arsenal Be Maintained without Testing? 183 3.2.3 Nonproliferation and Verification ............................................................. 193 3.2.3.1 Can “Militarily Significant” Tests Be Detected and Deterred? .... 195 3.2.3.2 Are IMS Monitoring Systems Effective? ........................................ 200 3.2.3.3 Do Definitional Problems Sabotage Treaty Effectiveness? ........... 208 3.2.3.4 Is Nuclear Testing a Prerequisite to Nuclear Proliferation? ......... 210 vi 3.2.3.5 Does the CTBT Solidify Norms Against Nuclear Proliferation? .. 213 3.2.4 Key Aspects of the Security and Risk Management Frames ................... 222 3.3 ANALYZING THE SENATE DEBATE ....................................................... 226 3.3.1 Limited Access to Deliberative Spaces ....................................................... 227 3.3.2 Truncated Deliberations ............................................................................. 232 3.3.3 Advocate Credibility Problems .................................................................. 240 3.3.4 Presumption for Deterrence ....................................................................... 247 3.3.5 Role of Secret Evidence ............................................................................... 252 3.3.6 Concluding Thoughts .................................................................................. 256 4.0 THE 2001 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW ........................................................ 260 4.1 CONTROVERSY IN CONTEXT .................................................................. 265 4.2 BREAK WITH THE COLD WAR ................................................................ 271 4.3 RECEPTION AND RESPONSE .................................................................... 290 4.3.1 Capabilities-Based Force Structure ........................................................... 292 4.3.2 Reconfiguration of Arms Control .............................................................. 299 4.3.3 Russia and the Cold War Hangover .......................................................... 303 4.3.4 The “Nuclear Hit-List” ............................................................................... 306 4.4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ........................................................................ 309 5.0 “MINI-NUKES” & “BUNKER BUSTERS” ......................................................... 323 5.1 CONTROVERSY IN CONTEXT .................................................................. 325 5.1.1 Mini-nukes as a Recurring Controversy ................................................... 326 5.1.2 Hard and Deeply Buried Targets ............................................................... 329 5.1.3 2001 Defense Authorization Bill ................................................................. 335 vii 5.1.4 Implementing the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review ...................................... 337 5.2 THE ADMINISTRATION’S CASE .............................................................. 341 5.2.1 New Threats ................................................................................................. 343 5.2.2 Arsenal Deficiencies and Self-Deterrence .................................................. 347 5.2.3 Promise of New Weapons............................................................................ 349 5.3 THE CRITICS RESPOND ............................................................................. 352 5.3.1 Deterrence Failure ....................................................................................... 353 5.3.2 Fallout and “Collateral Damage” .............................................................. 358 5.3.3 Proliferation ................................................................................................