CDA L'Institut Institute de la CAD
~ 1987 ~
THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW FOR A NEW MANDATE
ALSO IN THIS EDITION...
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE TRUMPIAN ERA
RADICAL ISLAM: UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST NARRATIVE AND MINDSET
TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF DEFENCE
...AND MUCH MORE
SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 22, NUMBER 1 PRINTEMPS 2017 | VOLUME 22 NUMÉRO 1 VOLUME 22 NUMBER 1: SPRING 2017
CHAIR OF THE BOARD / PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL Major-General Daniel Gosselin, CMM, CD (Ret’d)
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER / PRÉSIDENT DIRECTEUR-GÉNÉRAL Tony Battista
EDITOR / RÉDACTEUR Dr. Craig Mantle
CDA Institute / L’Institut de la CAD 151 Slater Street, Suite 412A 151, rue Slater, Suite 412A Ottawa ON K1P 5H3
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ON TRACK is published by the CDA Institute.
CDA Institute Mission Statement: To promote informed public debate on security and defence issues and the vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces in society. It is intended that ON TRACK facilitate this educational mandate by featuring articles that explore security, defence, and strategic issues that may have an impact on Canadian interests and on the safety of its citizens. The views expressed in ON TRACK are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CDA Institute.
ON TRACK est publié par l’Institut de la CAD.
Énoncé de mission de l’Institut de la CAD: encourager un débat public éclairé à propos des problématiques concernant la sécurité et de défense canadienne, et promouvoir le rôle vital joué par les Forces armées canadiennes dans la société. Nous souhaitons que « ON TRACK » facilite ce mandat éducatif en mettant en vedette une gamme d'articles qui explorent la sécurité, la défense et le domaine stratégique pouvant avoir un impact sur les intérêts du Canada et sur la sécurité de ses citoyens. Les points de vues exprimés dans « ON TRACK » reflètent les vues des auteurs et pas nécessairement ceux de l’Institut de la CAD.
COVER PHOTO: Canadian Army soldiers disembark a CH-147F Chinook helicopter during Exercise Common Ground II 2016 at 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, New Brunswick, 25 November 2016.
PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Soldats de l’armée canadienne débarquent un hélicoptère Chinook CH-147F au cours de l’exercice Common Ground II 2016 au 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, au Nouveau- Brunswick, 25 novembre 2016.
Permission is granted to reproduce, in whole or in part, articles from ON TRACK. A credit line is required. For inquiries contact the CDA Institute Research Manager, Matthew Overton at: [email protected]
Permission est accordée de reproduire en tout ou en partie des articles de « ON TRACK ». Nous souhaitons que la source soit mentionnée. Pour demander des renseignements, contactez le Directeur de la recherch: [email protected]
Copyright © 2017. CONTENTS
FROM THE RESEARCH MANAGER 17 Brigadier-General Matthew Overton (Retired) 2
FROM THE EDITOR Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle 3 12 CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW FOR A NEW MANDATE Francis Furtado 4 29
TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF DEFENCE Grant J. McDonald 8
NATO: THERE'S MORE TO BURDEN SHARING THAN 2 PERCENT Dr. Chris Kilford 10 43 2017 CDA AND CDA INSTITUTE OTTAWA CONFERENCE SUMMARIES Christopher Cowan 12
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE TRUMPIAN ERA: MANAGING OR EXPLOITING POWER TRANSITION ANXIETIES Adam P. MacDonald 17
RADICAL ISLAMISM: CDA INSTITUTE BOARD OF UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST NARRATIVE AND MINDSET DIRECTORS / Adnan Qaiser 24 LE CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION DE L’INSTITUT DE LA CAD Tony Battista (ex officio) | Jamie Carroll L’INDÉPENDANCE DE L’ÉCOSSE, UNE MENACE POUR JAMES BOND ET | David Collins | David Fraser | Michel LE SOFT POWER DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ? Gauthier | Daniel Gosselin | Paul Hindo | Ferry de Kerckhove | Louise Mercier | Dr. Michael Eric Lambert 29 Chiko Nanji | George Petrolekas | David Pratt | Drew Robertson | Denis Rouleau LA VICTOIRE COMME OBJECTIF STRATÉGIQUE : (ex officio) UN CONCEPT AMBIGU ET CONTRE-PRODUCTIF POUR LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT Le brigadier-général Jennie Carignan 31
CURRIE’S GAMBLE: THE BATTLE OF HILL 70, AUGUST 1917 Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle 39
REMEMBERING VIMY AND THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE GREAT WAR Brigadier-General Matthew Overton (Retired) 43
Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné
FROM THE RESEARCH MANAGER It is my pleasure to provide part of the introduction to the first of two and possibly three CDA Institute ON TRACK publications for 2017. As many of you who regularly visit the CDA Institute website will have seen, change has been constant over these past months. In addition to saying farewell to several staff members as they moved on to other challenges, the CDA Institute is also moving more surely into the electronic and social media domains. The 2017 Strategic Outlook, like ON TRACK itself, is now uniquely a digital product and we continue to update our website to ensure it has both a look and content that will encourage users to read and then comment upon our articles.
Tout ce changement a pour objectif un engagement fort et croissant avec vous, nos lecteurs. Nous avons, parmi nos auteurs expérimentés et en développement, une perspective large et éclairée sur la sécurité et la défense du Canada, tel qu’illustré par cette édition de ON TRACK. Je vous invite de participer aussi – l’engagement n’est pas unidirectionnelle et nous profitons tous d’un discours actif de votre part. Engagez-vous – notre résultat total sera encore mieux pour l’effort !
Finally, I would like to note particularly one of the most recent additions to the CDA Institute team, that of Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle as the ON TRACK editor. He has some interesting ideas that are sure to attract attention and engagement from you, our readers, in the issues to come. Craig – welcome to the team!
Matthew Overton, Research Manager pro tem.
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FROM THE EDITOR Welcome to the Spring 2017 edition of ON TRACK! This issue offers much to contemplate as Canada begins to navigate the Trump presidency, is on the cusp of a (landmark?) defence review and continues to struggle with regional instability in various guises.
As readers are undoubtedly aware, the government will release the much-anticipated Defence Policy Review in the very near future, a document that will surely encapsulate its thinking on the state of the global security environment and, importantly, the role that it wishes the nation’s military forces to play within it. Either way, whether it is completely revolutionary or simply maintains the status quo, the DPR will nevertheless provide the Canadian Armed Forces with guidance and direction for the next decade. It is fitting, therefore, that our first article, a posthumous publication by the late Francis Furtado, muses about the possible content of the DPR while concurrently offering sage insights into some of the considerations that the government probably wrestled with in formulating its outlook on defence. Keeping with the DPR, Grant McDonald of KPMG next offers a brief synopsis of his company’s submission during the public consultation phase of the Review, essentially contending that the Department of National Defence must adopt a stronger business culture if it is to realize operational savings across the board and maximize its performance. Chris Kilford’s insightful discussion of defence spending within NATO suggests that, despite falling short of the targeted 2% of GDP, Canada nevertheless makes a significant contribution to the alliance; how the DPR will affect this historic relationship, now in its 68th year, remains to be seen.
In what has become a landmark event each calendar year, the CDA and CDA Institute once again held the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence in February, bringing together military professionals and civilian experts to discuss a sweeping range of defence issues bearing upon Canada. Provided by Chris Cowan, synopses of the keynote presentations and panel discussions are offered next for the benefit of those unable to attend. Be sure to watch each presentation on the CDA Institute’s revamped website, www. cdainstitute.ca!
Shifting focus to the international scene, a series of three articles address global issues that in one way or another impact Canada. Adam MacDonald begins by analyzing how President Donald Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy may influence U.S. relations with China in particular and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The discussion continues with a thought-provoking piece by Adnan Qaiser on the roots of radical Islam. In it, he provides an interesting introduction to the thought of radical scholars, their publications and the overarching narrative that drives terrorism. And finally, Michael Lambert highlights, somewhat tongue- in-cheek, the complexity that will exist for both states and citizens in deconstructing Europe as it currently exists, with the United Kingdom moving through BREXIT and Scotland considering independence (again).
Reprinted here with the kind permission of the Canadian Military Journal, le Brigadier-général Jennie Carignan discusses in her article the concept of “victory” in war … how military theorists have defined it over the last two millennia, how it can impact the moral conduct of soldiers either for the better or for the worse, and how politicians and commanders must adequately define what they mean by it before sending military forces into harm’s way. Her cogent article provides much to think about as it becomes increasingly difficult in today’s conflicts to determine, in her words, the “victor” and the “vanquished”.
While looking predominately to the future, this issue also gazes back to the past. Amongst other significant milestones, 2017 marks the 100th anniversary of many important First World War battles like Vimy Ridge, Hill 70 and Passchendaele. It is fitting in this year of anniversaries, therefore, that something should be said within these pages about our predecessors and their accomplishments for our history very much informs our present. My comments to a fundraising event in support of the Hill 70 Memorial Project, an initiative to erect and maintain a permanent monument to this battle in France, touch upon some of the reasons for the overwhelming success of the Canadian Corps in August 1917 and are reproduced here (a coincidence, I assure you dear reader, which was wholly unintended). In a similar vein, Matthew Overton offers his thoughts on Vimy and its legacy, having been fortunate enough to attend the 100th anniversary ceremony in France. If Canada is currently deciding where it should go in the future, with the DPR as its guide, it is important for the country to remember where it has already been and the attendant cost of the journey from “then” to “now”.
With its varied fare, touching on the domestic and international, the contemporary and historical, I trust that this edition of ON TRACK will offer a little something for everyone. As always, comments and submissions are most welcome from all.
Until next time, and with warmest regards,
Craig Leslie Mantle, PhD
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 3 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW FOR A NEW MANDATE
by Francis Furtado
Editor's note: The following piece, one of the last by Francis Furtado (1966-2017), is published posthumously. It was with a very heavy heart that ON TRACK learned of his sudden and premature passing earlier this year, although we are thankful to have been offered the opportunity to publish his insightful and timely article on the forthcoming Defence Policy Review. As a public servant, Mr. Furtado’s career spanned 22 years and took him to the Department of National Defence (Policy Group), the Privy Council Office (Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat), the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. An accomplished scholar as well, his most recent project was a co-editorship with James Fergusson of Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017). The CDA and CDA Institute wish to again extend their sincere condolences to Francis’ family, friends and colleagues … bon courage à tous.
he results of the Government’s implications for a military that can and development assistance) is always defence review are due to deliver its domestic and foreign policy going to be an expensive, discretionary be released early this year. objectives? item. It poses a key question for TOriginally prompted by the debate on both Ottawa and the Canadian voter: the F-35, the circumscribed approach THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT Whatever you tell yourself about Canada’s that the Government has taken to For the Government, the question is role in the world, how much foreign and public and parliamentary consultations two-fold. First, what would it identify as defence policy do you want? suggests no great interest in changing the salient characteristics of the security the fundamentals of Canadian defence environment? (Cold War III? Genocide? Similarly, the review will need to address policy. Similarly, the cursory response Terrorism? Proliferation? Refugees? the same issue that has bedevilled of the broader Canadian foreign and The environment? The Arctic? All Western governments since the end of defence policy community suggests that the above?) Second, what is the the Cold War: Once we are secure, to it is not interested in this either. Government’s approach to responding to what extent do we care about anybody any of this? (Are these problems threats else that we are willing to expend blood That said, the review will ineluctably to Canadian security, values, interests, or and treasure on faraway problems? This deliver its results. Even if post-Cold all three? In any case, how willing is it is not to belittle the good-hearted nature War reviews of Canadian defence to spill blood and treasure to act on these of Canadians, but, over the past thirty policy have tended to return policies problems as they come up?) years, set against the backdrop of fiscal that differ only in language, tone, and austerity, this question has been a riddle specific program details, understanding On the one hand, the Government would for Canadian governments more than the new Government’s approach to be wise to avoid designating any one of most. defence remains important. What these problems as the principal threat to is its understanding of the security Canada. On the other, it should probably The disappearance of a familiar environment? How does it see the also avoid the temptation to use phrases international framework has had other role of the Canadian military at home? like “human security” to encapsulate effects as well. No longer threatened by the What perspective does it bring to the them all, if only because such terms are threat of imminent nuclear attack, talking Canada-U.S. defence relationship? so elastic as to offer little in the way of about the “defence of Canada” might What role does it wish the Canadian specific guidance for foreign or defence seem a bit abstruse. The implications military to play in a complicated, often policy planning. of what we do in North America might violent, world overseas? To what extent be easier to understand when set in the does it understand the long-term fiscal Defence (and, for that matter, diplomacy context of Canada’s relationship with the
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United States, but still might come off as a bit exotic. Beyond this, sustaining a capable Canadian military might be more compelling because the media brings images of international conflict and humanitarian tragedies into our living rooms, but it also quietly underlines how much Canadian foreign and defence policy has truly become an expensive, discretionary matter: an area in which we can choose to do as much or as little as we want.
From the point of view of predictability, the international environment offers little relief for Canadian defence planners. By the first part of this year, after a fractious election campaign, the new Administration and Congress will have set up shop in Washington. Further Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan (Source: Canadian Armed Forces) afield – from BREXIT, Russia, refugees, North Korea, proliferation to regional At day’s end, the decisions that the up greater capabilities at a moment’s conflicts – interpreting the broader Government makes on defence spending notice. international environment, and sorting now – and this includes delays – will out its implications for Canada, will not have knock-on effects for the long-term What has steadily come to infuse have grown any easier. future of the CAF, specifically how well- this discussion is the notion of prepared it is when the critical moments “transformation”: the tantalizing THE BUDGETARY CONTEXT come. Once again, the defence review prospect of a high-technology revolution Defence policy is inseparable from holds up a mirror and asks: How much for U.S. and allied militaries. Twenty the Government’s broader budgetary defence policy are you willing to pay for? years on, some aspects of this process are circumstances. The decision to freeze either complete or well underway, while the defence budget until 2018 was a A GUIDING CONCEPT FOR THE others continue to find their footing, but, broken election promise. Moreover, even CANADIAN MILITARY as the new face of interoperability, none restoring these previously agreed-upon The Government needs to settle on a of these developments can be ignored by spending levels will turn on the validity of fundamental concept of the purpose of allied governments, including Canada’s. the Government’s economic projections the CAF. Is it for the broadest range of and political decisions on the federal missions – from observers to combat These considerations are fundamental to budget as the next election approaches. – or for more specific missions like the broader future of the CAF. What then None of this is all that encouraging. peacekeeping or ill-defined concepts like confronts the Government is how this Defence (like its diplomacy and human security? baseline capability will be used. development twins) is always going to be an expensive, high-profile, discretionary This is a tedious, unproductive debate. A THE DEFENCE OF CANADA item. That said, defence is different from Canadian military equipped for combat Absent the Cold War threat of nuclear any other government portfolio, if only can easily adapt itself for lesser, but still war (which, obviously, no one ever because planning for the future of the valuable missions. One can expect to wanted), terrorism (which, as a matter Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is not encounter a wide range of threats to of jurisdiction, is more of an intelligence based on a three- to five-year cycle, but peace and security abroad, and that and law enforcement problem), or a twenty-year “cradle-to-grave” plan for Ottawa will be asked to respond. In widespread domestic conflict (which, the major capital programs that form the these circumstances, current and future thankfully, is unlikely), talking about spine of the Canadian military. governments will want a force capable “the defence of Canada” might seem a bit of carrying out the widest range of roles. abstruse. Instead, it bears noting that the Playing in the premiere league of That is the concept. One can readily CAF plays an important, if unadvertised, international security has never been tailor a broadly-capable force for less role in many aspects of Canadian life cheap and requires constant investment. demanding missions; one cannot build – from search and rescue and disaster
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relief to supporting fisheries patrols and continuously explore opportunities to in 1956, and Iraq in 1990. Otherwise, the environmental surveillance. Canadian cooperate on defence and security issues record has been uneven. This is not the governments and the public rely on the as they arise. But one can also expect fault of the institution per se – the UN is capabilities of the CAF if only because that they will zealously guard their own only as effective as its member states want they are the only institution prepared national prerogatives to ensure whether it to be. At the end of the day, Canada to operate in this vast and demanding bilateral cooperation is the best way to should not bank on the UN being the first environment at a moment’s notice. solve the “next, new problem.” On the and only instrument for its responses to one hand, when these issues emerge in international security problems, but The arrangements that govern the use of Canada, they will trigger a perennial neither should it rule it out. the Canadian military at home are the debate on whether a new initiative result of extensive practical experience. either threatens Canadian sovereignty The North Atlantic Treaty Organization As domestic contingencies come up, there or is a pragmatic exercise of Canadian (NATO): In the twenty-five years has been a natural temptation to reach for sovereignty. On the other, the United since the fall of the Berlin Wall, initial the CAF because it is the only instrument States, particularly in Congress, will predictions of NATO’s imminent at hand. In the aftermath of each event, start to wonder if its fundamental demise have shown themselves to a more refined sense emerges of the responsibility to protect Americans be premature. As a reflection of its most appropriate ways to deal with these is being put at undue risk. Beyond promise of collective defence, Western issues over the long-term: other federal, this, bilateral defence cooperation has integration and democracy, the Alliance provincial, and local organizations, and implications for how the two countries has become something that countries law enforcement. This approach, one that engage with the world. almost compete to join. The result has is informed by steady, careful learning been an organization whose membership does not need to be changed. One place where one can see these has gone from sixteen to twenty-eight considerations in play is continental nations, alongside a range of less formal Indeed, one could do worse than extend missile defence. It puts into sharp arrangements with other states. Perhaps this approach to the current fascination focus how Ottawa sees the relationship more importantly, NATO’s accumulated with a role for the CAF in the Arctic. The between proliferation, the defence of experience with multinational operations Canadian military does have a role in North America, and the management has made it a useful reservoir of military Canada’s north and the annual exercises of Canada-U.S. defence relations. For capability that can be used outside of the are valuable from an operational and Canada, the requirement is to keep pace Treaty area. symbolic perspective. But Canada’s with developments, and determine if, claims to the Arctic should be less when, and how we can make a useful It has not all been plain sailing, though. reliant on a periodic appearance of the contribution that serves both countries’ For Canada, NATO’s measures of a Canadian military than the presence of interests. For the United States, the country’s contributions to allied and our indigenous peoples, permanently questions that it asks of Canada will global security have not kept pace – most stationed military personnel, Canadian turn on the broader approach of the new notably in the use of “defence budget as research scientists, and the enforcement Administration and Congress. a percentage of Gross Domestic Product of Canadian laws and regulations. (GDP).” By this measure, at just over one CONTRIBUTING percent of GDP, Canada’s commitment to THE DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Alliance security should rate as close to This discussion should be re-cast as Generically speaking, the value of the dead last. Strangely, however, this same “Canada-U.S. defence cooperation.” Canadian military as an instrument of defence budget has consistently been Clearly, Canada and the United Canadian foreign policy will depend on between the sixth- and seventh-largest States will want to ensure that the air, what capabilities the CAF has on offer: in the Alliance. More importantly, as sea, and land approaches to North the broader, the better. That said, what a practical matter, it is a budget used America do not become avenues for other considerations are in play? to help defend the largest country in an attack on either country, but the NATO, provide for the security of the benefits of the relationship – in terms The United Nations (UN): The UN North Atlantic sea lanes, maintain the of interoperability, integrated command has turned out to be a little bit like possibility of expeditionary deployments structures, intelligence-sharing, and what George Bernard Shaw said about to defend NATO-Europe, and address defence industrial cooperation – extend Christianity – a nice idea if it was ever broader security problems that can affect far beyond the continent. tried. That said, the UN stands to be Alliance countries. Canada’s initial, preferred institution of Obviously, both countries will choice – as it was in Korea in 1950, Suez Coalitions of the Willing: Arguing that
6 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné the use of informal coalitions represents over time, but they do send an important a tragic abandonment of international signal about how a government intends institutions misses the point. It is more to manage defence. a consequence of the inability of UN member states, or those of regional Ironically, to an extent, operations tend organizations, to respond to even the to be the most predictable of these costs. most egregious violations of the rights New missions will come and go, but the of states and peoples. Coalitions do pose Department is for the most part acutely problems of their own: the lack of an aware of its current capabilities and the institutional structure and agreed-upon incremental costs of new undertakings. procedures carry with them the risk that Moreover, when the Department is asked critical decisions will be swayed by senior to respond to the unforeseen, it tends to coalition members and leave junior get a good part of its money back. partners exposed. Nevertheless, given the choice between working with imperfect Capital, maintenance, and personnel are arrangements and doing nothing at all, more complicated items. All three are how to put about in coalitions stands to essential to the current and future of the become an essential job skill for smaller CAF. The importance of each budget powers. is obvious: capital (modern equipment and the infrastructure to support The Participation of the Canadian it), maintenance (ensuring that this Armed Forces in International Security equipment is ready to go), and personnel Operations: Over the past thirty years, (investing in well-trained people to decisions to commit the CAF abroad operate and support all this). What a have moved steadily away from rigid defence policy statement provides is a “criteria” in favour of more flexible snapshot of the Department’s situation “considerations.” The reasons are and aspirations at the time of publication. obvious. A fast-moving world in which Striking the right balance amongst these the use of the Canadian military could elements is a constant effort that will range from promoting democratic civil- occupy the Department in the ensuing military relations, helping implement years. There is no dishonesty here: it is an agreed-upon ceasefire, carrying out more a reflection of how defence policy more unpredictable peace enforcement aspirations run up against governmental missions to engaging in combat annual fiscal priorities, service politics, operations will put a premium on individual program decisions, and the flexibility and imagination. In the final simple cost of doing business. analysis, what we are able to accomplish is more important than a pre-determined CONCLUSION model that we should follow, or under How the Government chooses to discuss which arrangements we choose to make these issues suggests how it plans to our contributions. treat the defence portfolio. The policy and planning horizons of defence may THE DEFENCE PROGRAM well outlast a government’s lifetime, Inevitably, a defence policy statement but the willingness of a government contains some indication about the to communicate its plans signals future of the defence program. One how seriously it takes the everyday can expect a rough estimate of how the management of defence and its vision Government and the Department of for an important national institution National Defence plan to apportion the that it will leave to future governments, defence budget between operations, Canadians, and the people who serve. capital, maintenance, and personnel. This is complicated, difficult work. These projections may not necessarily bear out
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 7 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF DEFENCE
by Grant J. McDonald (Originally published on LinkedIn.com on January 30, 2017)
fforts are underway to review through which KPMG was proud to lend need to explore new strategies, re-fresh Canada’s defence policy, inviting its voice. old strategies, and re-examine the role of all Canadians to provide input on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Ethe way that our country uses its military This year’s review not only marks the first resources both at home and beyond re-examination of defence policy since $1.2 BILLION IN OPERATRIONAL its borders. Launched by the Liberal the Canada First Defence Strategy was SAVINGS government in spring 2016, the Defence published in 2008, it arrives at a critical At the same time, the Department of Policy Review included consultations time in Canada’s history. In light of global National Defence (DND) and the CAF with civilians, industry experts, and threats, economic challenges, and digital are three years into a renewal program organizations across Canada – a process transformations, it addresses an urgent launched in 2013 to uncover upwards
(Source: Canadian Armed Forces)
8 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné of $1.2 billion in “operational savings” to use that technology and data both improvements like these through and and put those dollars to better use. efficiently and effectively. take full advantage of the Defence Policy The renewal program is focused on Review’s public consultations. Royal transforming the business of defence, ENTERPRISE RESOURCE Canadian Navy Vice-Admiral Mark which so often takes a back seat to the PLANNING Norman has also expressed his desire for defence business. Defence organizations are highly transformation, telling The Globe and dependent upon enterprise resource Mail, “I intend to root out unnecessary Surely, defence is a business – and a planning (ERP)1 systems for the back and non-value added bureaucracy and complex and expensive one at that. office and, increasingly, the battlefield. process inside our own lines here at Canada’s military is a system of systems With billions of dollars invested in ERP, National Defence.”2 stretched over 20 divisions and one that these systems have become a central marches to the beat of numerous leaders, part of the modern defence landscape, The Defence Policy Review holds plenty decision levers, accountabilities, and speeding up transactions and informing of promise, and it is this potential that objectives. Understanding this, KPMG quick, decisive action. ERPs are not a KPMG hopes to help realize by drawing put forward a submission to the Defence complete solution. In most cases, they on our global collective experience in Policy Review in July 2016, outlining its are part of a suite of complementary the defence space to contribute to its recommendations across four key pillars: technologies that combine to give defence findings. We’re confident that DND/CAF organizations the data they need, and is listening, and through consultations • Fostering greater performance when they need it, via a common, shared with Canadians like us, it will reach its management data platform. ambitious targets.
• Enabling decision rights and The demand for coordinated and reliable Grant J. McDonald is the KPMG management levers for functional information needs to be solved from Regional Managing Partner, Regions East authorities an enterprise perspective. That said, & Office Managing Partner, Ottawa and most deployed defence ERP systems Partner, Tax Services & Aerospace and • Establishing single points of are unable to support the unique Defence Industry. Holding a B.Comm. accountability for core elements of the challenges of a mobile battlefield, where (Hons), Queen's University, Mr McDonald business of defence latency is high, bandwidth is low, and received his CA designation in 1984. tactical communications networks • Taking an enterprise approach to are often disrupted. They rarely have NOTES information management and business fully integrated demand / deployment intelligence planning capabilities and often require 1. Enterprise resource planning manual intervention. Consequently, (ERP) is a process by which orga- It is important to emphasize that Canada many combat ERP systems must be nizations manage and integrate has much to be proud of when it comes augmented or replaced by bespoke the important parts of their busi- to the handling of its military – and versions, which leads to data and system ness. An ERP management infor- certainly, the global reputation of its duplication. It is not efficient (or cost- mation system integrates and au- forces. However, just as the Defence Policy conscious) to approach data management tomates areas such as planning, Review is intent on identifying the roles 20 different times for each division. The engineering and maintenance, and tasks that Canada’s military should DND/ CAF needs more robust data supply chain, finance and human play, it is equally focused on ensuring management capabilities that drive resources the right investment is made to shore up towards a single source of truth which, its operations and identify operational in turn, will enable an enterprise view of 2. Lee Berthiaume, "Senior military savings. To support both needs, adopting what’s really going on. officer blasts onerous oversight, a stronger business culture founded on urges political direction," The performance management needs to be at ROOTING OUT BUREAUCRACY Globe and Mail, 5 August 2016, the top of its agenda. We realize that none of KPMG’s http://www.theglobeandmail. recommendations can occur overnight, com/news/national/senior-mili- Like many government organizations, but nonetheless we are confident these tary-officer-blasts-onerous-over- significant investments have been suggestions can join other public and sight-urges-more-political-di- made in enabling technologies. Yet, all private insights in improving the business rection/article31297067. too often, the value of those enabling of defence. Already, our discussions with technologies is not fully realized because senior leaders have revealed a genuine there is a lack of an enterprise capability willingness at the highest levels to see
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 9 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné NATO: THERE'S MORE TO BURDEN SHARING THAN 2 PERCENT
by Dr. Chris Kilford
ith the release of the NATO Secretary General’s 2016 Annual Report it’s clear to Wsee why the United States is generally fed-up with most of its NATO allies who it accuses of spending far too little on defence. But the scolding never seems to have much of an impact. Indeed, Washington’s allies re-pledged to reach a 2 percent of GDP defence spending target by 2024 at the 2014 NATOSummit in Wales, but then did exactly the opposite. Apart from the US only Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia upped their defence spending but not by much. No wonder that some of the bigger NATO countries like Canada needed to (Source: Canadian Armed Forces) seek cover when US Defense Secretary James Mattis spoke at a gathering of equipment, 5 percent for infrastructure fielded an impressive 380,000 regular and alliance defence ministers in Brussels upkeep and the rest on such items as conscript troops, but a good deal of that last month and waved a Marine trained operations and maintenance. Overall, it’s combat power was simply not available finger at them. not a bad record although our defence for NATO’s use because much of the spending has remained fixed at around army and air force remained focused on However, as Craig Stone recently noted 1 percent of GDP for several years given combatting the Kurdish PKK in Turkey’s in a Canadian Global Affairs Institute that important defence acquisitions were south-east. In addition, approximately report “how much a nation spends on postponed. 30,000 Turkish troops are permanently its armed forces as a percentage of GDP stationed in Cyprus. And let’s not forget is not a good measure for determining But look at Belgium. NATO figures show Turkey’s failed coup last year and its actual military capability.” Some NATO that 77 percent of its defence budget recent military foray into Syria. countries, for example, spend huge went to personnel costs in 2016 and amounts on salaries and pensions with only 4.6 percent for equipment. Portugal The US should also be reminded that the little left over for arms and ammunition. spent 78 percent of its defence budget NATO alliance is not the one-way street it That’s one reason why NATO members on personnel costs, Slovenia 76 percent, routinely makes it out to be. For example, also pledged in 2014 to spend a minimum Greece 70 percent and Italy 69 percent. in return for Washington’s defensive of 20 percent of their defence budgets The result is people in uniform but often umbrella many NATO allies have acquiring major new equipment. with aging equipment, no money for provided troops, often half-heartedly, in training and the potential for a leaky roof support of American-led post-Cold War According to NATO, Canada spent overhead. adventures in such places as Afghanistan, about $20.6 billion on defence in 2016 Iraq and Libya. As a consequence of with approximately 46percent going Turkey might have spent 1.69 percent these interventions, countries such as towards personnel costs, 18 percent for of its GDP on defence in 2016 and Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey,
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among many others, are now responsible for millions of refugees. Yet soon after assuming office, President Trump was quick to slash the number of refugees the US will take in this year from a planned 110,000 to just 50,000.
The point is that burden sharing and overall military effectiveness in the alliance is more than just spending 2 percent of GDP on defence. Besides, as Stone importantly notes, “Canada’s military is far more capable than those of other nations that spend much more on defence as a percentage of GDP.” Not that Canada should ever rest on its laurels, of course.
Chris Kilford is a Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario and a regular contributor to the CDA Institute blog (The Forum).
(Source: Canadian Armed Forces)
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 11 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné 2017 CDA AND CDA INSTITUTE OTTAWA CONFERENCE SUMMARIES
by Christopher Cowan
The Annual CDA and CDA Institute Conference on Security and Defence, held 16-17 February at the Shaw Conference Centre, attracted a wide range of participants and panelists. While disappointed in their expectation of having a Defence Policy Review to examine and discuss, attendees were nonetheless actively engaged by and on issues from Great Power relationships, the balance of Canadian defence activities, the system of defence procurement, the Asia-Pacific region and without great surprise, the impact of the recent U.S. election.
Readers will find below a short synopsis of the keynote presentations and panel discussions, all of which may be found in their entirety on the CDA Institute's newly-revised website at http://cdainstitute.ca/ottawa-conference-2017.
Presentation: Dr. Kim Nossal, Strategic Outlook 2017 r. Kim Nossal kicked off the 2017 Ottawa Conference with a presentation on the 2017 DStrategic Outlook document published by the CDA Institute. In his introduction, Dr. Nossal briefly outlined each of the chapters and their contributors, concluding that a key strength of the document is that it highlights the tough choices and issues that will have to be addressed in the upcoming Defence Policy Review (DPR). Dr. Nossal then noted how the general views of Canadians expressed in the public consultation documents for the DPR reflected many of the myths surrounding Canada’s military history and defence policy. He wondered how the DPR would (Source: Richard Lawrence Photography) be able to reconcile the myths surrounding difficult as many make it seem. He argued Canadian defence policy and the realities Panel 1: Reviewing Canadian Defence that many of Canada’s grand strategic of the country’s contemporary security Policy questions—the variables and worries that environment, especially in the age of Moderator: Dr. Elinor Sloan keep other countries up at night—are Donald Trump. He concluded his remarks Panelists: General (Ret’d) Tom Lawson, Dr. already answered and unlikely to change by discussing the implications of Trump’s Srdjan Vucetic, Dr. Christian Leuprecht much in the future. This is in part due to election for Canada, Canada-U.S. relations, Canada’s geography that makes it easy to and the global order. The first panel of the conference focused identify direct, existential threats and has on the Canadian government’s upcoming allowed it to take a “defence discount”. But, DPR. General (Ret’d) Tom Lawson’s he argued, Canadians’ desire to actively remarks centred on his contention that contribute to global peace and security reviewing Canada’s defence policy is not as means that a homeland-focused Canadian
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Armed Forces (CAF) is not feasible. Canada environment, offering windows of global security environment means that it will always be engaged in multilateral opportunity for Canada to reflect on its is time for NORAD to be modernized. She institutions and alliances with the goal of defence policy. He then wondered whether then highlighted the numerous avenues making the world a safer and more secure we will see any genuine policy shifts from for NORAD’s modernization, including place, and it needs a CAF with the ability the DPR or if we will see the return of inter- new equipment, strategies, and operational to do so. General Lawson concluded his departmental competition marked by the concepts. General Robinson concluded remarks by stating that the most important results of previous reviews. He finished off her address by stressing the importance of thing that could come out of the DPR is a his remarks by stressing the need for the Canada’s contribution to NORAD and its stable resource line for the CAF. Canadian government to be proactive in upcoming modernization process. pursuing its defence policy goals in a time Dr. Srdjan Vucetic examined the findings of great uncertainty. Panel 2: Canada-U.S. Relations in the of the DPR’s expert consultations in his Trump Era remarks. He illuminated the openness Questions for this panel centred on Moderator: Dr. Stefanie von Hlatky of this iteration of the DPR, highlighting what type of threats Canada faces in the Panelists: Dr. Joseph Jockel, Dr. Andrea how the government consulted with four contemporary security environment and Charron, Dr. Christopher Sands key stakeholders: the Canadian public, how Canada can manage them. Dr. Vucetic parliamentarians, allies and foreign and General Lawson highlighted the The second panel of the conference centred partners, and experts within the defence challenges Canada faces in conceptualizing on the future of Canada-U.S. relations in the community. A noteworthy part of his and dealing with a broad range of threats. era of President Donald Trump. Dr. Joseph remarks was his finding that Canadian Dr. Leuprecht ended the session by noting Jockel began his remarks by noting that it is defence experts tended to view Canadian that Canadian unity and stability are key difficult to predict the future of Canada-U.S. defence policy and its place in the relations after the most contentious U.S. world not through the lens of national presidential election in recent history. Dr. interests, but through the framework of Jockel highlighted the fact that the U.S. has Canada’s relationships with other states been unhappy with the levels of Canadian and multilateral institutions (such as the defence spending since the days of Pierre United Nations and NATO). The expert Trudeau. But, Dr. Jockel argued, the U.S. community also tended to categorize has no leverage over Canada because “threats” using the terms “challenges” and defence spending is not linked with other “risks”. After highlighting other noticeable issues, and the U.S. cannot afford to walk trends from the expert consultations, away from North American defence. Dr. (Source: Richard Lawrence Photography) Dr. Vucetic concluded his remarks by Jockel concluded his remarks by stressing discussing what was not mentioned in the that the issue is that the forms of bilateral document, notably, Trump! and that there are forces out there in the defence cooperation may change under world that seek to undermine Canada’s the Trump administration should they be Dr. Christian Leuprecht rounded out the democracy. dissatisfied with Canada’s contribution, panel with his reflections on the DPR. with “huge” implications. He highlighted the challenges brought Speaker: General Lori Robinson on by the contemporary global security The CDA and CDA Institute were thrilled to Dr. Andrea Charron was the second environment. Globalization has created a have General Lori Robinson, commander of speaker of this panel. Dr. Charron began world where events abroad can profoundly U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) her remarks by stressing that it is Canada’s affect Canada and Canada’s security, and NORAD, give the first keynote address decisions about NORAD and NORAD’s which complicates defence policymaking. of the conference. General Robinson began future that are the stumbling blocks in He noted that while procurement issues by highlighting the bi-national nature of NORAD’s modernization process. She capture much of the public’s attention, NORAD. She then discussed the close argued that Canada needs to focus more it is the personnel of the CAF that is key. working relationship between the United on continental defence, emphasizing a Canada is diversifying twice as quickly as States and Canada that began in 1940 return to Canada’s core national interests. the CAF is, and it is critical that the CAF with the Ogdensburg Agreement—over a Dr. Charron then identified the evolving adapt to this new recruiting environment decade before NORAD was created. While threats to the North American continent, and be truly representative of Canadian NORAD has served both Canada and the emphasizing the cruise missile threat. society. Dr. Leuprecht also argued that U.S. well over the past 59 years, General These threats require NORAD to have previous defence reviews have all come Robinson stated, the evolving better command-and-control capabilities, at times of change in the global threat institutional linkages, and the ability to
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focus on the “archers” rather than the “arrows”. Dr. Charron then worried that Canada will only focus on modernization and not the transformation NORAD needs to remain relevant. She concluded her remarks by stating that Canada needs to start caring about NORAD on days other than Christmas Eve when it monitors the southward flight of Santa Claus.
The final speaker of this panel was Dr. Christopher Sands whose remarks focused on President Trump and the revolt against the Washington establishment. Dr. Sands began by noting that Donald Trump is a discontinuity in American politics – he is an “abnormal” president. Dr. Sands argued that the establishment is what became “abnormal”; it could not see what the average American was going through (Source: Richard Lawrence Photography) because of its economic policies. He noted capabilities could be the way forward for Speaker: General Jonathan Vance that Donald Trump’s election promises Canada. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General were not new … George W. Bush and Jonathan Vance, kicked off day two of the Barack Obama all made similar promises Facilitated Discussion with Rona conference with his keynote address. He of change in their campaigns. Shifting to Ambrose began his remarks by noting that the past Canada-U.S. relations, Dr. Sands stated that The final keynote speaker of day one of year has been both intense and productive we will likely see a revival of the notion of the conference was the Honourable Rona for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), “exemptionalism”; Canada is likely not on Ambrose. Ms. Ambrose spoke about her with deployments in Iraq and Ukraine, as Trump’s radar so Canada may be “exempt” experiences in government, especially in well as many domestic operations. Moving from certain U.S. policies. He then the realm of defence procurement. She on to procurement, General Vance echoed concluded by worrying that issue linkage highlighted the fact that ninety percent of the comments of the Honourable Rona may make a comeback and that Canada defence procurement is both on-time and Ambrose from yesterday, stating that most should be wary. on-budget, but the other ten percent is procurement decisions do go smoothly. His what makes the news. That ten percent also focus this past year, General Vance stated, Questions for this panel centred on the tends to be the larger projects. She stated was on personnel. He noted the steps taken notion of issue linkage brought up by Dr. that she personally believes that Canadian by the CAF to improve mental health care Jockel and Dr. Sands and how Canada procurement decisions need to be and assistance programs. He then discussed could better contribute to continental centralized in the form of an independent the importance of Operation Honour and defence. Dr. Jockel stated that if issue secretariat. She argued that this secretariat the CAF’s ongoing commitment to combat linkage becomes a Trump strategy, Canada would need expertise in managing large harmful sexual behaviour in the military. could be placed in a tough situation and projects in the defence sphere, or else we He also identified the evolving challenges of that the way to proceed is to distract Trump would see the continuation of the current recruiting in a diversifying Canada, stating by highlighting Canada’s contributions. trend of delays and further expense. Ms. that the CAF needs to evolve to attract the In response to a question about Canada’s Ambrose then highlighted the importance necessary talent to be an effective combat continental defence contributions and of domestic industry in defence force. Moving on to operations, General potentially joining American ballistic procurement, noting that Canadian jobs Vance stated that no decision had yet missile defence (BMD), Dr. Jockel noted are a key part of procurement decisions. been made with regards to future peace that the pressure to do so would come She then concluded her remarks by support operations. He then stated that the from within Canada, as the U.S. does not stressing the importance of forging links CAF will be increasing its presence in the need Canada to conduct BMD operations. with members of parliament to get the Asia-Pacific region by deploying a naval Dr. Charron highlighted the need for message across that Canadians care about task group there in 2017. General Vance better maritime domain awareness, while defence policy. concluded his speech by thanking the Dr. Sands noted that improving its cyber members of the CAF in the audience for
14 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné their service. policy decisions. While discussing the Force. Brigadier General Montocchio 2016 coup attempt, he noted that Turkey’s began his remarks by stating that the Questions for General Vance centred on membership in NATO has been marked by current global security environment has future operations and women in the CAF. coups, coup attempts and military purges; deteriorated and shaken the foundation In response to a question about the CAF he says that NATO has always seen Turkey of France’s security relationship. He deployment to Latvia, General Vance stated as a “very distracted ally”. According to Dr. identified global Islamic terrorism and that the CAF deployment was on track. In Kilford, Turkey has always had to balance the return of superpower competition as response to a question about diversity in its interests with regards to its engagement key drivers of this deterioration. Brigadier the CAF, General Vance noted that changes with both Russia and Europe. In a time General Montocchio then highlighted the in conflict require new skill sets that can when Turkey seems to be moving away difficulties facing international institutions only be obtained through diversity, calling from Europe, concluded Dr. Kilford, it is in dealing with these problems. He it a matter of “institutional survival”. In unlikely that it will abandon its links with emphasized the continued importance of response to a question about how to make the West given the value it holds with the NATO but stressed the need for NATO to CAF kit more accessible to women, General Turkish people. self-reflect and show where it can best add Vance stated, “you’re right, we have to do value. To meet the challenges of the new better”. The final speaker of the panel was Dr. Samir security environment, France requires a Battiss who spoke about NATO’s southern full spectrum of capabilities, including a Panel 3: NATO’s Pivot Countries and flank. Dr. Battiss began by noting that the nuclear deterrent and a professional army. Their Threats collapse of the Soviet Union took away Moving on to France’s global commitments, Moderator: Richard Cohen NATO’s raison d’etre and the alliance has Panelists: Dr. Alexandra Gheciu, Dr. not been able to find a new one since. He Christopher Kilford, Dr. Samir Battiss argued that European states have become addicted to U.S. military support, saying The third panel of the conference focused that they need to learn to live without it on the threats facing NATO member states. for NATO to continue to exist. Moving Dr. Alexandra Gheciu kicked off the panel on to NATO’s southern flank, Dr. Battiss by highlighting the fact that NATO worried identified the key NATO partners in the not only about the Soviet Union, as internal Mediterranean, as well as the challenges discord and fissures were real concerns as that they face. He also highlighted the well. These internal fissures have returned, role of Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt in Dr. Gheciu argued, noting the rise of cooperating with NATO to combat violent illiberalism among member states. She extremism. Dr. Battiss then concluded his stated that NATO works by consensus and remarks by arguing that NATO needs to the invocation of Article V requires member become more decentralized to survive. states agreeing on the interpretation of events and attribution. Dr. Gheciu stated The question and answer session for this that she is worried disagreements in other panel focused on how NATO can identify realms (such as Brexit) could spill over and respond to internal challenges. Dr. (Source: Richard Lawrence Photography) into NATO and hurt solidarity. She then Gheciu stated that there are debates within argued that other potential complicating NATO about what the institution should he stated that France has taken a leadership factors for NATO solidarity include the focus on and how. In response to a question role in combatting terrorism in the Sahara rise of far-right politicians and potential about the Turkish military’s ability to and the Sahel region, as well as in Iraq and bilateral defence deals between members. recover from the purges, Dr. Kilford stated Syria. Closer to home, Montocchio then Dr. Gheciu then concluded her remarks that this has happened many times before described France’s contributions to NATO’s by stating she is not predicting NATO’s and that the Turkish military would likely deterrence mission in Eastern Europe. collapse, but she is worried about NATO step in to “protect” the country if it saw an He concluded his address by highlighting solidarity in the future. opportunity. the close relationship that exists between France and Canada. The second speaker of this panel was Dr. Speaker: Le général de division aérienne Christopher Kilford who discussed Turkey’s Philippe Montocchio role within NATO. Dr. Kilford began by The final keynote address of the conference saying that 2016 was a bad year for Turkey was given by général de division aérienne due to several bad foreign and domestic Philippe Montocchio of the French Air
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Panel 4: Great Powers and Interventionism Moderator: Dr. Jim Boutilier Panelists: Dr. Kenneth Christie, Dr. Kerry Lynn Nankivell, Dr. Roland Paris
The final panel of the conference focused on the role of great powers in interventions. Dr. Kenneth Christie began by highlighting Canada’s role in creating the “responsibility to protect” doctrine and the issues associated with it. But, Dr. Christie argued, there has been an ideological shift—from liberal internationalism to moral imperialism— with respect to how intervention is viewed. He cited the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which has been called “imperialism-lite”, as an example of the pitfalls of intervention. (Source: Richard Lawrence Photography) He then concluded his remarks by stating that the battle for Afghanistan’s “hearts and into the heart of Western democracies, minds” has been lost, for little gain. with attempts to sway their opinions and undermine their institutions. Dr. Paris The second speaker of the panel was Dr. concluded his remarks by highlighting Kerry Lynn Nankivell who spoke about the importance of these institutions and the South China Sea dispute. She began by stressing the need to defend them. stating that the South China Sea dispute is not between the U.S. and China, but The questions for this panel centred on the between China and its neighbours. She Asia-Pacific region, as well as the conflict argued that China and the U.S. both use in Syria. In response to a question about the notion of interventionism to justify Canada’s role in the Asia-Pacific region, Dr. their positions on the dispute. She then Paris stated that there is a regional disparity highlighted the growing professionalism in interest in the region within Canada. Dr. and capability of China’s navy and maritime Nankivell, in response to a question about militia, both of which have been used to ASEAN, identified the internal fissures back China’s maritime claims. According within the organization that hinder its to Dr. Nankivell, the artificial islands in ability to achieve consensus. And lastly, in the South China Sea are more than just response to a question regarding a potential symbols as the bases on them allow China intervention in Syria, Dr. Christie noted the to extend its maritime reach. She then intractability of the conflict, warning that concluded her remarks by discussing the an intervention would achieve little without importance of the principle of freedom of having a clear end game and strategy. navigation to the U.S. Christopher Cowan is a Research The final speaker of the panel was Dr. Roland Analyst and Editor with the CDA institute. Paris whose remarks focused on Russia. He has a Master’s Degree in Strategic Dr. Paris began by stating that Russia is Studies (Advanced) from the Australian not a great power by GDP or demographic National University, as well as a Bachelor standards, but that its power stems from of Arts (Honours) in Political Studies its military and influence abroad. He from Queen’s University. He specializes then argued that the lines surrounding in Canadian defence and security issues, intervention have blurred, stating that nuclear strategy, and Asia-Pacific security. intervention is not just about military force anymore. Intervention has extended
16 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE TRUMPIAN ERA: MANAGING OR EXPLOITING POWER TRANSITION ANXIETIES?
by Adam P. MacDonald
resident Donald Trump’s fixation on remaking the United States’ global engagements to serve P“America First” has designated China a primary target. Talking tough on China – particularly with respect to trade – has been a constant in American presidential campaigns and administrations over the past three decades. What is new, though, with President Trump’s corrective policies of rebalancing the budget sheet and restoring manufacturing jobs (which begun to walk back on some of the more attacking China, which plays well to his are questionable in achieving these vitriolic and inflammatory commentary domestic base but has caused confusion objectives) is the apparent conditionality and propositions with respect to China and serious tensions with Beijing. and subservience of all other facets of espoused earlier on. President Trump, Ensuring the relationship remains on Sino-American relations to favouring furthermore, following his first face- stable strategic ground will require the trade concessions from Beijing. Such to-face meeting with his Chinese Trump Administration to become more an approach suggests the absence of counterpart, President Xi Jinping, in clear and predictable with respect to its foresight into the strategic ramifications April, has taken a pragmatic turn in his views of and interactions with Beijing, of positioning their interactions within dealings with Beijing, working together especially towards a plethora of divisive a confrontational and zero-sum terrain, to address common interests including issues that if improperly managed could compromising the stability of their ever- deterring further provocative actions and result in both viewing the other as their evolving and complicated great power language by North Korea with respect to greatest and immediate adversary. relationship and its resultant impact on an its growing nuclear weapons capability. international order undergoing profound Their relationship, though, remains SHAPING THE RULES OF GLOBAL change. A Trump Administration, vulnerable to theories of power transition TRADE as well, exceptionally focused on and policy prescriptions stemming from President Trump recently formally renegotiating trade and redistributing the portrayal of the situation as hostile withdrew the United States from the or simply offloading burdens associated and dangerous, where the established Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), with international commitments may power in the United States must blunt asserting that the 12-nation free-trade cede, without even knowing it, strategic the emergence of a rising challenger deal would be disastrous for American advantages to China in terms of global in China determined to remove them workers; a popular decision as the leadership that Washington may come from their position of dominance. So American populace was not properly to resent after the fact, provoking further far President Trump has by and large educated on the nature and purpose of hostility and enmity. avoided comment on strategic concerns the TPP. It was not simply an economic associated with an ever-capable and pact to produce immediate benefits, but To its credit, the Trump Administration, powerful China, but it is unclear if and to rather a strategic initiative by the United specifically the President himself, has what degree he will refrain from publicly States – and the centrepiece of the Obama
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Administration’s “Rebalance” strategy1 – including financial, environmental, ambiguity, however, towards sustained, – to develop a governance structure labour and intellectual property rights multilateral engagement in East Asia constructing the rules and norms regulations – may not only have a is generating unease amongst allies of trade in the Asia-Pacific without detrimental impact on American and partners that their relationship Chinese (or Indian) input. The merits of companies, but might well alter the with Washington is not based on denying China entry into such forums is strategic landscape of East Asia towards shared interests and values, but simply debatable, but by pulling out, President China’s favour. Beijing’s “assertive” transactional arrangements whose Trump has conferred de facto leadership behaviour in the region over the past existence solely depends on cost-sharing on Beijing in a region of the world that decade has strengthened military analyses. The Trump Administration, remains largely supportive of global ties between Washington and Asian however, has toned down such talk trade. Beijing is increasingly focused on allies such as Japan and Australia, as with Secretary of Defense James “Jim” and determined to create institutional well as with new partners including Mattis reassuring regional allies during conditions and influences to build an Vietnam. There is no direct correlation, his first trip abroad that the United integrated and networked continent, furthermore, between a country’s trading States remains a committed and trusted with itself in a central position, through patterns and its strategic alignment ally and the President giving personal such avenues as the One Belt, One Road behaviour, evidenced by the fact that assurances to Japan’s Prime Minister that Project and the Asian Infrastructure China is the number one trading partner Washington will continue to uphold its Investment Bank; it may also revise the of almost every East Asian state but defence treaty obligations with respect Regional Comprehensive Economic has no strategic/military allies, with to Tokyo’s security. A number of high- Partnership as an alternative to the now- the partial exception of North Korea profile diplomatic visits, including one deceased TPP.2 (relations between the two have become by the vice-president to South Korea estranged since Kim Jong-Un took over that re-affirmed Washington’s defence These regional undertakings are part of in 2011). The questioning, however, commitments amidst growing tensions and complemented by Chinese activism by President Trump of the economic with an ever-proactive North Korea, internationally. Beijing is becoming burdens of alliance commitments may have also signalled a continuation of one of the most vocal and forceful provoke some states to move towards a traditional American engagement in the defenders of trade and globalization, hedging position of strategic ambiguity region. Though these gestures allay Asian highlighted by Xi Jinping’s speech at between Beijing and Washington. Issues states’ concerns of retrenchment on the the recent World Economic Forum, of unbalanced alliance costs have a part of Washington emboldening a rising which was a first for a Chinese president. degree of legitimacy, motivating calls China, they are also adverse to an overly A litany of current practices, both by some for the United States to adopt aggressive American approach towards domestic and international,3 though, an offshore balancing strategy, placing Beijing transforming the region into a questions the willingness and sincerity greater security responsibilities onto bipolar geopolitical landscape. of Beijing towards assuming global regional states and only intervening in leadership duties and responsibilities. a significant way to combat revisionist THE SOUTH CHINA SEA - A Nevertheless, Chinese leaders are challengers.4 Along with the difficulties GEOSTRATEGIC FLASHPOINT? sensing an opportunity to exploit the of explaining and operationalizing China’s expansive claims to the entirety current American Administration’s offshore balancing and how this would of the South China Sea (SCS) and the misgivings about global order (and impact current military and political topographical features within it have others’ apprehensions as a result) to commitments, allies and partners may be been vocally attacked and rebuked by their advantage, along with a strong concerned that it would not be out of the various Trump Administration officials, motivation to maintain and support the realm of possibility for President Trump continuing in line with the previous global processes that have enabled their to make a grand bargain with China over Obama Administration’s opposition rise. These endeavours speak to a more regional security in exchange for trade towards Beijing’s extensive land concerted Chinese effort to shape the deals given his “America First” approach reclamation projects; the building and rules and norms of trade and economic to foreign policy. deployment of military infrastructure engagements, specifically in Asia, with and weaponry on disputed islets and the United States possibly looking from Growing Chinese power and regional islands; and any attempts to claim the the outside in on future attempts to gain leadership is not translating into entire body of water as Chinse internal further entry into the world’s fastest neighbouring states jumping onto waters, a territorial sea or an Exclusive growing economic market. Beijing’s bandwagon, largely due to Economic Zone (EEZ) according to fears of what an unchecked Chinese the United Nations Convention of the Shaping the rules and structure of trade regional primacy would entail. American Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Comments
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rationales of these claims and the degrees of sovereignty that stem as a result are not in accordance with UNCLOS. China, however, as the world’s largest trading and shipping country, is broadly supportive of the international maritime legal regime, but in its near abroad adopts a strong position favouring exaggerated rights and powers as a coastal state. Attempts to challenge and call out this dichotomy in Chinese diplomacy adds further justification for the United States to ratify UNCLOS and accept the implications of the regime towards its interests and (Source: Reuters) freedom of action, including restricting much of the “scientific” work it conducts made, however, by Secretary of State Rex Militarily, establishing a blockade would in other countries’ EEZs. A strengthened Tillerson during his Senate Confirmation significantly raise tensions and may force American commitment and adherence Hearing (and repeated by President Beijing into a confrontation, not because to UNCLOS would add further leverage Trump’s press secretary) that the military of any particular islet/islands’ geographic and pressure on Beijing to temper its buildup by China on disputed islands or military importance, but rather to save countervailing views and claims, which is unacceptable and proposing a naval face and defend one of its “core national China is influenced by as evidenced in blockade to deny Beijing access to them interests”. its subtle but noticeable clarification would be a major policy shift both in about the nature of its maritime claims terms of American formal position on The rationales underpinning, and power following the 2016 Permanent Court of these disputes and the employment of resources employed to achieve, any sort Arbitration Ruling.6 and willingness to use military power. of blockade are at present vague, causing confusion in Beijing and other regional China, however, is reluctant to The United States does not recognize capitals towards American interests and meaningfully engage the region towards any claimants’ assertions to parts or activities in the SCS. Producing and a diplomatic resolution of these disputes, all of the islet/islands groups residing publicizing a clear and straightforward favouring bilateral vice multilateral in and waters compromising the SCS. position on the SCS disputes, detailing negotiations given its asymmetrical power Avoiding comment on the legitimacy of the new Administration’s legal views, relationship with the other claimants. specific island claims, Washington has strategic interests, and actions to Beijing, furthermore, maintains strategic remained focused on ensuring Freedom defend these, is needed to produce and legal ambiguity towards the purpose of Navigation (FON) via naval FON predictability in Washington’s actions and basis of its claims in the SCS while patrols that challenge excessive maritime and its expectations towards Beijing changing the facts on the ground, claims by states, such as restricting access and other claimants. Greater American including both military deployment of of foreign military vessels and aircraft involvement in the SCS, though, requires assets, as well as the “civilianization” of operating in their Exclusive Economic Washington to elucidate its position these islands, entrenching its effective Zone (EEZ) or exercising Innocent on a number of aspects pertaining to occupation of these disputed features Passage through their territorial waters. UNCLOS (which it has not ratified but regardless of their legal status.7 Such Blocking China’s access to islets/islands accepts as customary international law) endeavours do not point to a reckless under its effective control, therefore, in order to form any sort of consistent strategy of a completely risk-accepting would be tantamount to adopting a legal basis for objecting to the illegalities Beijing, but one determined to formal position on the legitimacy of of Chinese claims and actions. It is far incorporate these islands – with the legal, these territorial claims, shifting the from certain at this point that Beijing economic and military advantages that emphasis on maintaining FON towards seeks to limit, let alone control, access they offer – into the Chinese state despite a surgical focus on the illegitimacy of and movement to and within the SCS for the tensions generated with regional Chinese claims vice those of the other commercial traffic. Instead, its current powers and the United States. In response claimants. If the opposition is towards actions point more towards a desire to to these realities, the United States must reclamation work, the United States secure marine resource rights and limit determine what behaviours and actions would have to oppose similar work foreign military operations in its claimed are deemed unacceptable and the degree being done by other claimants as well. Extended EEZs5. The nature and
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to which it will defend against them. This may include any attempts to reclaim other disputed islands – either those occupied or not by another claimant – which may actually be the rationale behind the Trump Administration’s speculative blockade. The legalities and strategic purposes, however, of such a move remain unanswered. Beijing is certainly not assisting in arresting provocative developments or advocating regional management of these disputed waters, but Washington should be careful not to inflate or respond to Chinese actions in SCS at this juncture as if they are an existential threat to PLA Navy guided-missile frigate Yancheng (Source: Getty Images) American interests and regional stability. avoided comment on strategic concerns Rise/Development” is an enduring grand Beijing is determined to alter the status and challenges regarding China, but if strategy or simply a transitional one, but quo in these long-standing disputes, but the hostility and visceral tone evident China has not pursued a warlike rise confrontational actions by the United in the early days of his Administration that is exceptional in the history of rising States, specifically in contradiction to stems into all areas of their relationship, powers. Despite closing the gap, also, or in the absence of a clearly articulated there is the possibility that Washington Beijing will not be overtaking the United strategy, threaten to propel and inflate may eventually view Beijing not simply as States in terms of power and influence in this issue of controlling a number of small an exploiter of global trade and violator the near to medium future as Washington islets to one conditioning the stability of of international law in the South China retains significant advantages in both hard the entire great power relationship. Sea, but as an unacceptable great power and soft power.9 American unipolarity, competitor. however, is fading as China (and others) Over the past two decades, China has become indispensable powers necessary embarked on a military modernization POWER TRANSITION TENSIONS to the successful managing of a number strategy designed to erode American China is increasingly becoming active of global challenges, including economic primacy, producing a new military reality in creating new and influencing existing and financial stability; combating climate in East Asia where Washington remains institutional structures to increase change; protection of the commons; non- a formidable and leading military power its leverage and say in these bodies, proliferation and new emergent domains with strong bilateral alliances and forward demonstrating a level of dissatisfaction such as cyber and space. deployed forces, but with a reduced with the current international order in ability to move and act unhindered or terms of norms, roles and responsibilities. Over the last decade, Washington has threatened by ever-improving Chinese In the most basic sense, therefore, China is moved its strategic position on China sea-denial capabilities.8 The military a revisionist state, but it is not advocating from debating membership in the buildup by China on reclaimed islets and the emergence of an entirely different international order towards encouraging islands in the SCS is not fundamentally geopolitical alternative as it is focused Beijing to become a “responsible power” altering the regional balance of power, on changes, some of them significant, in sharing the duties and burdens of but is entrenching its occupation of these within the system rather than overturning maintaining the global political and features, as well as enabling the expanding it. China’s emergence, furthermore, is economic architecture and processes that range and operations of the Chinese taking place in an international order facilitated and continues to support its navy that is slowly becoming more active far different than others that confronted rise.10 As a result, the United States has globally. Growing Chinese military previous aspirants to great power status not opposed China’s rise in any concerted power, furthermore, seems to be the – highly networked and integrated; and systemic way, despite the advocacy primary rationale for President Trump’s populated by many other established and by those promoting the “China Threat” in 350-ship navy concept. The SCS dispute emerging powers; and becoming more the early 1990s.11 Various American and may, therefore, be seen as a litmus test of diffuse in terms of power, inhibiting the Chinese administrations, furthermore, American resolve to stunt China’s growing ability of a small group of actors from have played down the possibility of the military reach and ability to impose its will completely controlling it. Uncertainty “Thucydides Trap” – of power transition on others. President Trump has largely surrounds whether Beijing’s “Peaceful anxieties between rising and established
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states leading to war and conflict – produce a landscape where the Trump quo where the United States will still be hijacking their relationship, transforming Administration forces states to choose the most influential state, but existing it into a great power struggle where both between the two in a binary system of great in a far more complicated and complex view the other as an unacceptable peer power competition. In particular, China’s world where others, particularly China, competitor.12 international initiatives may increasingly are indispensable in its functioning. be seen as a threat to the United States. American determinations of Chinese Tensions in Sino-American relations were A premonition of such a condition in support or opposition to the international on the rise before Trump’s ascension to the part already exists with the Obama order should not be arbitrarily linked with presidency, but the possibility of abdicating Administration’s attempt to convince, Western foreign policy preferences on global responsibilities while at the same unsuccessfully, allies and partners not to a case-by-case basis. The United States, time developing an overtly hostile position join the China-led Asian Infrastructure furthermore, will have to reinvigorate its towards Beijing threatens to undermine Investment Bank, despite the need for such commitment to the international order by global stability. Publicly musing about an institution for regional development acknowledging the need for institutional withdrawing support of the One-China and against which the West presented no and relational reconfigurations amongst Policy, the political foundation of their alternative. If such a mindset becomes established and emerging powers, while diplomatic relationship, demonstrates the entrenched, the development of parallel tempering and challenging narratives zero-sum nature President Trump appears orders or spheres of influence, based on of exceptionalism that justify the to be assuming in all of his international mutually exclusive institutions and pacts circumscribing of global rules and dealings.13 It would be unwise for anchored by Beijing and Washington, is a mechanisms either by themselves as well Washington to demand everything be real possibility. This development would as others. on the table in negotiations as there are obstruct the clear need to change existing, a number of areas in their relationship inclusive institutional arrangements to MANAGING ANXIETIES – such as the One-China Policy and the accommodate emerging states in the The possibility exists that the global nuclear force balance between the two international architecture. Doing so will position of the United States and the – that have remained isolated from and shape these states’ global engagements, benefits accrued will socialize and not conditioned upon the more divisive and while still acting out of self-interest, soften President Trump towards system aspects of their engagements. President will socialize them towards the realization supporting and maintaining a careful Trump’s reaffirmation, however, of the of the necessity for widespread and deep balance of working with China to One-China Policy was an important move cooperation and compromise towards the promote its emergence as a “responsible to get the relationship back on track. management of the collective challenges power” while deterring any predilections What remains unanswered, though, are associated with globalization. towards compromising, undermining or the rationales driving his questioning of holistically challenging the international this long-standing policy in the first place One should not be naïve in supposing order. After a rocky start, it appears that the (especially as it appears that he received the authoritarian regime in China is fully Trump Administration is moving towards nothing in return from Beijing for his supportive of the liberal international such an approach by easing off the hostile pledge) and whether other important order, especially considering some rhetoric and affirming key principles and aspects of their relationship will be aspects of globalization (like freedom of facets of its relationship with Beijing and vulnerable to similar public attacks in the information flows) are seen as a national its alliance commitments. A more active future. security threat. A dissatisfied China, China internationally, also, may actually however, should not be exaggerated either, assist in President Trump’s determination As Joseph Nye has aptly warned, especially portrayals of its intentions as to spread the burdens of global leadership globalization should not be seen as fixed and hostile, its aims as revisionist to other partners. This would require, simply the sum of international trade and unmovable, and its development though, a deep appreciation that deals, but the forces that are producing an of a growing proclivity for risk-taking institutional arrangements, and decision- interdependent international environment behaviour. Standing up to China is not a making powers, must be reconfigured to in which global leadership, specifically reckless approach, but the motivation for better include and represent rising powers from the world’s established and rising doing so should not be a hopeless attempt that will diminish American influence to a powers, is critical in addressing system- to re-assert unquestioned American certain extent. wide challenges.14 Deferral of such unipolarity in a world defined by power leadership by the United States, combined transition and diffusion; rather, it should The world is changing. The United States with an increasingly hostile and zero- focus on how to manage change in a stable is not an invulnerable superpower, sum-based relationship with China, may manner towards a new geopolitical status but unquestionably remains the most
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important and powerful actor globally. well, a member of the Nova Scotia Health sustainable development projects, In the broadest sense of the term, power Research Ethics Board. specifically in Asia. Despite being transition is occurring with China, by portrayed as a rival to the World almost every metric, the second-most Bank by Japan and Washing- powerful state, but the gulf between ton, the AIIB enjoys diverse and the two remains large. This is not to NOTES growing membership including downplay the impressive rise of China a number of Western states such over the past four decades, but American 1. The 2012-announced Pivot (lat- as Canada. The Regional Com- weaknesses should not be exaggerated er renamed Rebalance) Strategy prehensive Economic Partnership nor that of the international order by the Obama Administration (RCEP) is a proposed free-trade Washington has built and supported for signalled an American refocus agreement between the member over half a century. Managing, therefore, towards the region across dip- states of ASEAN (Association of power transition anxieties – due to the lomatic, military and economic Southeast Asian Nations) and the narrowing power resource differential as fronts following more than a de- six states that have existing free- well as the differences in regimes, cultures cade of interest in other regions, trade deals with ASEAN: Austra- and histories defining the two – will specifically the Middle East. The lia, China, India, Japan, South Ko- increasingly become important as Beijing rationale is to ensure the stability rea and New Zealand. The RCEP and Washington continue to calibrate of East Asia amidst altering pow- is seen as an alternative to the and reconfigure their relationship within er dynamics, specifically the rise Trans-Pacific Partnership and fa- an altering international environment of China and resultant concerns voured by Beijing as it is excluded where globalization is a reality, not a by neighbours of Beijing’s inten- (along with India) from the latter policy position. Given the structural tions and behaviours as its power process. tensions defining their relationship, and influence grows. Washington furthermore, both sides must continue perceives itself as a strategic coun- 3. Elizabeth Economy, “Beijing is to be conscious of maintaining stability, terweight whose regional leader- No Champion of Globalization”, avoiding outbursts and preventing the ship, military presence and bilat- Foreign Affairs, 22 January 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ influx of unpredictability into their eral alliances help counteract any articles/china/2017-01-22/bei- interactions. The main challenge for revisionist predilections on the jing-no-champion-globalization. the Trump Administration (and one its part of China or any other state counterpart in Beijing confronts as well) from challenging the status quo. 4. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen is of exploiting these anxieties in the name Despite Washington’s objections Walt, “The Case for Offshore of populist fervor amongst domestic to the assertion, many in China Balancing”, Foreign Affairs, constituents by constructing simple believe the strategy is aimed at July/August 2016, https://www. narratives of the other as the reason for containing China and stunting its foreignaffairs.com/articles/unit- their decline in power, status and wealth rise as a great power. ed-states/2016-06-13/case-off- internationally and ultimately questioning shore-balancing. their legitimacy as a great power. Such 2. The One Belt, One Road Project rhetoric, regardless of the underlying is a comprehensive development 5. Same Bateman, “South China rationales, endangers an already complex strategy proposed by Chinese Sea Dramas Distract From Big- and complicated relationship between the President Xi Jinping in 2013 to ger Problems Between America world’s two most important states in an build a diverse network of trans- and China”, National Interest, age of uncertainty and pessimism. portation infrastructure to bet- 30 December 2016, http://na- ter connect China with the rest tionalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ south-china-sea-dramas-distract- Adam P. MacDonald is an independent of Asia, consisting of two ma- bigger-problems-between-18906. academic based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, jor components: The Silk Road Economic Belt (land-based) and Canada. Receiving his Masters in Political 6. The 2016 Permanent Court of Ar- the Maritime Silk Road (mari- Science from the University of Victoria bitration Ruling on the South Chi- in 2010, Adam specializes in geopolitical time-based). The Asian Infra- na Sea concerned a case brought developments in the Arctic and East structure Investment Bank (AIIB) forward by the Philippines to Asia. He has been published in various is another initiative launched by seek clarification on the legalities Canadian and international journals and President Xi Jinping to establish a of specific Chinese actions (such is a regular contributor to the East Asia multinational development bank as land reclamation work) in dis- Forum and Frontline Defence. He is, as focused on providing funding for puted waters, as well as the le-
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gitimacy of China’s “Nine-Dash thammer, “Why We Must Con- Line” claims based on “historic tain China”, Time Magazine, rights”. Though the Court by 31 July 1995, http://content. and large ruled in favour of Ma- time.com/time/magazine/arti- nila’s positons (Beijing did not cle/0,9171,983245,00.html. participate in the proceedings), it clearly stated it was not ruling, 12. Graham Allison, “The Thucy- nor had it been asked to rule, on dides Trap: Are the US and China the sovereignty of the disputed Headed for War?”, The Atlantic, topographical features in the SCS 24 September 2015, https://www. or delineate any maritime bound- theatlantic.com/international/ar- aries. See Andrew Chubb, “Did chive/2015/09/united-states-chi- China Just Clarify the Nine Dash na-war-thucydides-trap/406756/. Line?”, East Asia Forum, 14 July 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum. 13. The One-China Policy is a joint- org/2016/07/14/did-china-just- ly-held positon between the Peo- clarify-the-nine-dash-line/. ple’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) that 7. Zhibo Qiu, “The ‘Civilization’ of there is one China, though each China’s Military Presence in the claims to be the legitimate gov- South China Sea”, The Diplomat, ernment of the state. In 1972, the 21 January 2017, http://thedip- United States formally accepted lomat.com/2017/01/the-civiliza- the One-China Policy and that tion-of-chinas-military-presence- Beijing was the legitimate gov- in-the-south-china-sea/. ernment, which paved the wave for the establishment of diplo- 8. Adam P. MacDonald, “The New matic relations between the two Military Reality in East Asia”, alongside the maintenance of un- Frontline Defence, 2014, http:// official ties with Taiwan. Though defence.frontline.online/arti- Washington has never formally cle/2014/5/140-The-New-Mili- commented on the sovereignty tary-Reality-in-East-Asia. of Taiwan, any decision to retract support for the One-China Policy 9. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. would in effect recognize Taiwan Wohlforth, “The Once and Future as an independent state and al- Superpower: Why China Won’t most certainly destroy diplomatic Overtake the United States”, relations with Beijing. Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 14. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Will the Lib- articles/united-states/2016-04-13/ eral Order Survive?”, Foreign once-and-future-superpower. Affairs, January/February 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 10. The term and characteristics of articles/2016-12-12/will-liber- a “Responsible Stakeholder” al-order-survive. were first laid out by then Dep- uty-Secretary of State Robert Zoellick with specific reference to an emerging China. See Rob- ert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Respon- sibility?”, Remarks made to the National Committee on US-Chi- na Relations, 21 September 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/ former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm.
11. For example: Charles Krau-
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 23 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné RADICAL ISLAMISM: UNDERSTANDING EXTREMIST NARRATIVE AND MINDSET by Adnan Qaiser
s Muslims celebrated the birth anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Ahim) in December 2016, the Islamic world was rocked by a total of 107 terrorist attacks, killing 346 innocent people and leaving 370 injured. It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the West, only, is targeted by Islamic terrorism; the Muslim world remains its victim too. In order to fight extremism, it is imperative to first understand the drivers and dynamics of radical militancy. Historically, the roots of Muslim unrest lie in the Middle East’s oppressive monarchies and autocratic regimes, buttressed for the West’s foreign policy (Makkah Madina) objectives. While terrorism cannot be condoned, a distinction needs to be Advancing the reclusive dogmas of Ibne from the Quranic “Sword verses,” militant made between a terrorist and someone Tammiyyah and Jamal-ud-din Afghani, ideologues find the survival – and struggling for democratic rights. Islamic intellectuals propagated the expansion – of the Islamic faith lying in notion of Islamic statehood “beyond jihad3. The Muslim Brotherhood’s slogan Contemporary Islamic extremism boundaries” and brought Sharia and meaningfully endorses: “Allah is our resulted from the Sykes-Picot Agreement “political Islam” into the lives of ordinary objective; the Prophet is our leader; The (May 1916), when state boundaries were Muslims. Sayyid Qutb, who was hanged Quran is our law; jihad is our way; and arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers with in Egypt in 1966 for his rebellious ideas, dying in the way of Allah is our highest little or no regard for tribal affiliations or laid the foundation for contemporary hope.” Against the backdrop of the Soviet sectarian sensibilities. The 11th Century Islamic militancy. In his scholarship, invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989), Crusades were not as cataclysmic as the Milestones, Qutb advocated a new social Osama bin Laden’s mentor, Abdullah abolition of the six-century old Ottoman and economic / political system after Azzam, a Palestinian scholar who fought Caliphate after the First World War. annihilating tyrannical forces. Linking in the Arab-Israel War of 1967, issued a This was when a “Khilafat Movement” the Muslim (disorderly) state with the fatwa (religious edict) declaring jihad erupted in the Indian subcontinent pre-Prophet time of jahilyya (ignorance), obligatory for all believers irrespective for the restoration of the caliphate and he argued that what is necessary “is a of which part of the Islamic world had revolutionary Muslim scholars, such full revolt against human ruler-ship in been invaded. Azzam’s jihad consisted as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and all its shapes and forms, systems and of: 1) Offensive jihad, to terrorize the Abul A’la Moududi, led Muslim societies arrangements … It means destroying enemies of Allah; and 2) Defensive jihad, into obscurantism under the banners the kingdom of man to establish to be waged upon the invasion of Muslim 2 4 of Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim the kingdom of heaven on earth.” lands. Brotherhood. Drawing inspiration – and legitimacy – Islamic militancy has three protagonists:
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1) al-Qaeda; 2) Daesh/Islamic State; and never existed before 9/11. As the neo- 10 Later, Abu Musab al-Suri draftedThe 3) Sectarian bands (Jundullah, Lashkar- conservatives coined the term, it was Call for Global Islamic Jihad to terrorize e-Jhangavi al-Almi and many others). widely seen by Muslims as a pretext for the Western world, reinforcing al-Qaeda’s Despite President Barack Obama having waging war against Islam – after the end of “seven-stage terror strategy.”11 Negating proclaimed that “al-Qaeda is on the path the Cold War – and granted the extremists the Islamic injunction of jihad as a to defeat,” the terrorist organization, with a rallying cause to carry out terrorism state’s prerogative, all these publications its loose-knit groups, remains a potent around the world5. Finding a justification legitimized an individual to wage jihad threat, because unlike Daesh, it does not for al-Qaeda’s mindless terror, Osama bin in his personal capacity. Calling Muslims subscribe to holding land. al-Qaeda has Laden told an interviewer that his own around the world to arms in the holy a global presence: (i) al-Qaeda in the “life or death [did] not matter [because] war against the godless Soviet Union, Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen; the awakening [had] started.”6 Egypt’s Abdullah Azzam had already decreed: “[J] (ii) al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) notorious “Blind Sheikh,” Omer Abdel ihad will remain an individual obligation in Algeria, Mali and Mauritania; (iii) al- Rahman, also issued a fatwa from his until all the other lands that were Muslim Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) jail cell in the U.S. calling on “Muslims will be returned to us so Islam will reign in Pakistan; (iv) Jabhat-al-Nusra li Ahl-al- everywhere ... to cut-off all relations again.”12 Sham in Syria; (v) Harkatul-al-Shabaab-al- [with] the Americans, the Christians and Mujahideen in Somalia; (vi) Boko Haram Jews, tear them into pieces, destroy their The terrorists’ strategy of “morphing, in Nigeria; and (vii) at least 23 smaller economies, sink their ships, shoot-down mutating and dispersing” allows them to groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such their planes and kill them wherever you fight another day. While they need physical as Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), Jamaat-ul- may find them.”7 control of an area to motivate people Ahraar, Lashkar-e-Khorasan, as well as the toward Khilafat, these groups quickly Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and East Militant ideologues believe that past dissolve and relinquish ground under Turkestan Islamic Movement. Muslim victories were God’s favour; duress, only to pop-up at another place, whereas their later subjugation resulted sometimes with a different name or under Driven by self-legitimized dogmas, the from abandoning the divine path. The new leadership. Lacking a Clausewitzian “core” (ideologues) has always relied upon “Mecca Siege,” led by Juhayman al- “centre of gravity,” the extremists generally local criminals for its security, offering in Otaibi in November 1979, demonstrated operate without a centralized command return money, protection from the law, an undercurrent to rid the Arab world and control architecture. Not only do training and combat experience, a well- from oppressive regimes. Otaibi’s Saba they keep evolving by fragmenting into oiled transportation fleet and hi-tech Rasail (Seven Letters), published in 1978, smaller offshoots, they also thrive through communications. While Daesh is already called for inviting people to join Islam, their network of “abettors, facilitators and dying its death, Islamic extremism may organizing them, and then migrating sympathizers.” not end until the basic fundamentals of the to a secure base to launch a movement Islamic world are corrected and ordinary for Islam’s domination – similar to the Their skilful use of the internet and Muslim grievances are addressed. Prophet Muhammad’s struggle8. Success modern apps further allow them to in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet survive in the digital world undetected. Admittedly, the West’s Middle Eastern Union further cemented the idea of a Militant publications – Inspire (al-Qaeda); policies, including the unresolved “global Islam” by targeting the “near Resurgence (AQIS); Azan and Ahya- Palestinian issue and the unjustified wars enemy” (Islamic rulers) and “far enemy” e-Khilafat (TTP); Dabiq and Rumiyah in Iraq and Afghanistan, have fostered the (the West). (Daesh); and Harvest (Jabhat-al-Nusra) – notion of an assault on the Islamic faith. underpin the utility of powerful messaging The stories about rendition by the CIA; Al-Qaeda’s philosophy, Edarat-ul-Wahash through video footage and propaganda the inhumane treatment of prisoners (Management of Savagery) by Abu-Bakr tools, which help them proliferate into at Abu-Gharaib and Guantanamo Bay Naji9 – an extension of Qawaid-ul- Muslim and non-Muslim societies to prisons; the carpet bombings of villages Takfir (Rules for Expulsion from Islam/ recruit. The terrorists’ barbaric publicity and funeral and marriage congregations Apostatization) written by Abu Baseer in cyberspace is akin to German anarchist in Afghanistan; and indiscreet night al-Tartusi after the Afghan jihad in 1994 Johannes Most’s Philosophy of the Bomb raids (desecrating the sanctity of Afghan – aims at transforming Muslim societies (1880) that advocated “outrageous households) undoubtedly caused Muslim by turning Ibn-ul-Balad (sons of soil) into violence,” which he believed “will seize the abhorrence. blood brothers (devoted militants) and imagination of the public and awaken its invoking Khuruj (revolt against deviant audience to political issues.” The so-called “threat of radical Islam” Muslim rulers) and Takfir (apostatization).
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and can never be friendly to Muslims. Plotting against the Ummah, the modern world has usurped Muslim resources. External enemies comprising Hindus, Jews and Christians are the main cause of all Muslim tribulations, including Muslim backwardness, deprivation, deviation, sectarian infighting, weakness and ignorance. 9/11 was a conspiracy hatched by Jews and Christians to malign Muslims.
Such an outrageous narrative can only be countered by the Islamic provisions of Ijtehad and Ijmah (scholarly discourse and consensus) explicitly denouncing extremism and terrorism. The uninspiring “Marrakesh Declaration” (January 2016) and Jordan’s “Common Word” initiative (Makkah Madina) have proved that moderate Islam cannot be promoted through “selective” publicity Militants find no dearth of funds or determine issues of governance, lifestyle, stunts by tyrannical regimes, which are arms as well. Bypassing international citizens’ rights and freedom, women’s largely seen as ways to target political monetary checks, the supporters of the roles and the status of minorities. opposition, frighten the world and attract “Islamic cause” [sic] in oil-rich Gulf 2) Muslims are prohibited from identifying Western support. countries ensure Hawala/Hundi (cash- themselves with their hereditary lands, courier and reference) transactions. A ancestral cultures or indigenous ethno- The Islamic world remains at war European Parliament June 2013 report linguistic nationalities, except that of the with itself. The 7th century hia-S found Middle Eastern Wahhabi and sacred birthplace of Islam. Since Arabs Sunni (political) feud has, meanwhile, Salafist groups “supporting and supplying invaded territory to spread Islam, all metastasized into a Wahhabi-Sunni, as arms [to rebel groups] all over the globe.” non-Arab land constitutes Dar-ul-Harab well as a Deobandi-Brelvi (sub-sects), 13Elsewhere, militants make effective (enemy territory), requiring Muslim power struggle. Declared as rafidah use of the narcotics trade, kidnappings inhabitants to disown their lineage. (rejecters of faith), the Shias’ Takfir for ransom, human trafficking, illicit 3) While the liberal arts, women’s (apostatization/targeted killings) remains smuggling, mercenary services and empowerment, freedom of expression, sanctioned under the Radd-e-Rawafiz organized crime. human rights, international law, due (repudiation of the rejectionists) fatwas process, family planning and the market of Islamic scholar Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi Notwithstanding an odd fatwa rejecting economy are all proscribed, polygamy, (1562-1624) and by Deoband seminaries terrorism and suicide bombing14, no patriarchal dominance and intrusion into (1986).16 Vali Nasr documents in substantial rebuttal has so far challenged privacy remain permissible. Since religion The Shia Revival that despite Shias the terrorists’ (preposterous) narrative15. provides the ultimate knowledge, all accounting for “10 to 15 percent of the Briefly: man-made social and physical sciences, total” Muslim population, “in the Islamic 1) The Muslim community (Ummah) research and inventions are illegitimate. heartland, from Lebanon to Pakistan, is essentially an ideological and supra- 4) Present-day Muslim decline is owed there are roughly as many Shias as territorial fraternity whose Islamic to abandoning puritanical Islam. It is Sunnis” with some 80 percent living in identity is supreme and cannot be legitimate to carry out individual jihad the “geostrategically sensitive rim of the subordinated to the concepts of the and qital (mass killings) and to declare Persian Gulf.”17 However, a 2012 PEW modern nation-state, man-made laws, a opposing sects kafir (apostate), that is, survey of 39 Muslim countries found “at constitution or democracy. Considering liable to be killed. Equally permissible is least 40% of Sunnis do not accept Shias that the Islamic ethos is rooted in the violent vigilantism to check/prevent un- as fellow Muslims.”18 Unsurprisingly, golden era of the Prophet Muhammad Islamic practices. Morality is absolute, Pakistan – a sectarian battleground and the first four caliphs, its institutional thus unchangeable. having 148 sectarian organizations – saw functions can only be run by the most 5) All religions, except Islam, are based on heightened Shia-Sunni violence in 2013: pious or ulema (religious scholars) who falsehood; their adherents are misguided 687 killed and 1,319 injured in a total of
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220 sectarian attacks.19 proxies and non-state-actors – with Saudi education and continues with his In their quest for regional dominance and Arabia (supported by the Gulf states and professional development while working at to become paterfamilias of the religion, Turkey)2015 competing VIMY against AWARD a resurgent various senior positions in public, private both Saudi Arabia and Iran have been Iran (relying on Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and not-for-profit organizations. Speaking tarnishing the image of Islam worldwide and Shiite communities in Iraq, many of the languages and having deep by pitting innocent Muslims against Bahrain, Yemen and Azerbaijan); 3) The insight into the region he has written their fellow believers. Saudi Arabia’s unresolved Palestinian issue, aggravated and published papers on Pakistan, India, Wahhabism has not only distorted the by Israel’s obstinacy and the Trump Afghanistan, Middle East and Canada’s largely-followed Sunni rituals, through administration’s abandonment of the military engagement in Afghanistan its extreme Salafist practices, but also “two-state solution;” 4) Survival battles and has been a regular commentator at brought the (hardline) Deobandis into of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Canadian television talk-shows as well conflict against the (mystic) Barelvis, movements; 5) An exodus of Muslim as a speaker at various Canadian think resulting in frequent bombings of Sufi refugees and revenge attacks against tanks. Adnan Qaiser can be reached at: ('saints') shrines in Iraq and Pakistan, Europe under global jihad; 6) A quest [email protected]. denounced as un-Islamic. for puritanical Islam based on Sharia and establishment of a global caliphate; NOTES Blaming the West for their political and 7) Creating chaos among civilizations economic marginalization, bitterness to fulfil Prophet Muhammad’s “end 1. Meaning conservativeness or keeps brewing amongst Muslim youth. of times” prophesy about “Ghazwa-e- orthodoxy, including a nar- The Iranian Revolution of February Hind” – the last battle of Islam21; and 8) row-minded mindset or isola- 1979 demonstrated how violently a The purification of the Islamic faith by tionist approach. The approach liberal society could vent its anger when eliminating opposing sects. of the scholars mentioned provided an opportunity. By abandoning throughout is “regressive” and the Arab Spring of 2011, the international Driven by emotions, terrorism is more “reclusive.” In order to establish community did not win any friends in a mind game, uncontrollable by kinetic the primacy of Islam; regain the the Arab streets. force alone. Here, people like bin Laden glory of earlier era (of Muslim or al-Baghdadi are irrelevant; while victories); and to instill a sense In his book The New Arab Wars, Marc leaders come and go, the ideology – and of pride amongst Muslims, these Lynch notes: “Autocratic regimes, in grievances – stay. Countering the mindset intellectuals led Muslim societies their single-minded pursuit of survival, through a convincing dialogue and by into “seclusion.” are the root cause of the instability and addressing the root causes of Muslim have fueled the region’s extremism and unrest and alienation are, therefore, vital. 2. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Amer- conflicts.” In order just to stay in power, Until then, the past and present not only ican Trust Publications, 1990), p. states opened the floodgate of both remain painful, they also obstruct the 49. money and weapons to non-state actors way to constructing a new future. 3. Bill Warner, The 149 Sword in both formal organizations, as well as Verses of the Koran, Political Is- informal networks, who employed every Adnan Qaiser began his professional lam (15 March 2009). technique – even sectarian politics – to career as a commissioned officer in the impress their patrons. Lynch further Pakistan army and took early release 4. Jason Burke, The New Threat: finds modern-day “Sectarianism, [as] one as a Major. While working at various The Past, Present and Future of the most disturbing forms of regional command and staff positions, he developed of Islamic Militancy (The New identity politics ... driven more by power a thorough understanding of national Press, 2015), pp. 38-39. politics and regime survival concerns politics, civil and military leadership, than by ancient hatred.”20 intelligence establishment, regional 5. Timothy J. Lynch, Kristol Balls: geopolitical players and the security and Neoconservative Visions of Po- Islamic radicalism, thus, forms part of the policy issues that preoccupied them. litical Islam, Paper presented at larger Muslim world’s conundrum with Moving on to international diplomacy, he the European Consortium for eight overlapping conflicts: 1) A broader fostered political, economic and cultural Political Research Joint Sessions struggle between the despotic Middle relations for the next 12½ years at bilateral Granada, Spain, 14-19 April 2005. Eastern regimes (backed by Western and multilateral platforms, watching powers) on the one side and mobilized closely some of the most turbulent times 6. Burke, p. 55. Arab societies and extremist militants in the South Asian and Middle Eastern on the other; 2) Brinkmanship and a politics from a G7 perspective. Emigrating 7. Peter Bergen, The Osama bin battle for regional influence – employing to Canada in 2001 he upgraded his
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Laden I Know: An Oral History 20. Marc Lynch, The New Arab of al Qaeda’s Leader (Simon & Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in Shuster, 2006), pp. 204-5. PRIXthe Middle VIMY East (Public 2015 Affairs, 2016), pp. xiii, 27, 37. 8. Saleem Shahzad, Inside A-Qae- da and the Taliban: Beyond bin 21. Husain Haqqani, Prophecy & Laden and 9/11 (Palgrave Mac- the Jihad in the Indian Subconti- millan, 2011), p. 129. nent, Hudson Institute (27 March 2015). 9. Abu Bakr Naji, trans. William McCants, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (23 May 2006).
10. Shahzad, pp. 125, 134, 140-142.
11. Bill Roggio, The Seven Phases of The Base, FDD’s Long War Journal (15 August 2005).
12. Burke, p. 39.
13. Directorate General for External Policies, European Parliament, The Involvement of Salafism/ Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups around the World (June 2013).
14. Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings (December 2010).
15. Imtiaz Alam, What is the extrem- ist narrative?, The News Inter- national (4 February 2016); See also, Shahzad, pp. 124-149.
16. Khaled Ahmed, Sectarian War: Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia Violence and its Links to the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 3, 82-83, 88, 92, 105, 128, 136, 138.
17. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (Norton, 2007), p. 34.
18. PEW Survey, The World’s Mus- lims: Unity and Diversity (9 Au- gust 2012).
19. Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Report, Sectarian Violence (2015), p. 27.
28 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné
L’INDÉPENDANCE DE L’ÉCOSSE, UNE MENACE POUR JAMES BOND ET LE SOFT POWER DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ?
par le Dr. Michael Eric Lambert
e célèbre Agent 007, personnage inventé de toute pièce par l’auteur Ian Fleming après son expérience en Ltant qu’agent du renseignement pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, arrive en tête des figures les plus populaires au Royaume- Uni. Si l’on demande à l’Homme de la rue ce que lui évoque la “Grande Bretagne”, que cela soit en Europe, en Amérique du Nord ou sur le continent asiatique, James Bond arrive largement en tête aux cotés de la Reine, du whisky Écossais, et même devant Harry Potter.
L’agent du MI6 est tellement connu de tous que l’on oublie souvent ses origines, sans (Source: Eon Productions) même oser questionner son affiliation à la Couronne. La question semble cependant “jamais avoir aimé cet endroit”, y a passé souhaite pas rejoindre les futurs Services d’actualité avec le referendum sur son enfance. Tout dépendra naturellement Secrets écossais, ce qui n’a rien d’une l’indépendance de l’Écosse. En effet, en des conditions du futur gouvernement certitude dans la mesure où l’on ignore cas d’indépendance, celui-ci devra choisir écossais sur l’obtention de la citoyenneté, encore les avantages que ces derniers d’entrer dans les futures Services Secrets et des négociations avec ce qui restera du proposeront par rapport à ce qui restera du Écossais, ou bien de revenir dans son pays gouvernement à Londres, mais si celles- MI6. Il semble important de noter qu’à ce maternel, la Suisse. Une perte nette pour le ci déterminent l’appartenance à l’Écosse jour le MI5 et MI6 sont parmi les services soft power de ce qui resterait de la Grande avec le Droit du sang, ou le Droit de la de renseignement les moins flexibles Bretagne. terre, Bond deviendra immédiatement en termes de nationalité, et obtenir un Écossais. D’une manière assez paradoxale, travail implique souvent de renoncer à la La personne de Ian Fleming est en effet celui-ci pourrait demander la citoyenneté double citoyenneté, ce qui s’avérerait être pleine de contradiction. Le père de James britannique et refuser ou cumuler la un problème majeur pour l’ensemble des Bond remonte à 1953 où il apparaît pour citoyenneté écossaise. Malheureusement personnes qui y travaillent. À l’inverse, la première fois dans le roman “Casino pour Bond, cela dépendra de son temps l’Écosse indépendante pourra décider ou Royal”, son père “Andrew Bond” est un de résidence en Angleterre, qui est non, comme le font beaucoup d’autres pays écossais originaire de Glen Coe, lieu probablement inférieur à 6 mois par an d’Europe, d’accepter la double nationalité où - non sans une certaine ironie - 38 du fait de ses nombreux voyages, ce qui dans ses services. Les origines de Bond membres du clan MacDonald furent l’empêcherait possiblement de clamer son se retrouvent dans les premiers films, ou tués en refusant de prêter allégeance à obtention. l’Écossais Sean Connery joue le rôle du Guillaume II d’Angleterre en 1692. Le film personnage, avec un accent prononcé. Skyfall se déroule dans cette même région. Cette spéculation d’une demande de 007 Ce dernier rappelle lui-même les origines pour rester “britannique” et refuser d’être La mère de Bond est pour sa part de l’agent 007, qui même s’il affirme ne “Écossais” part du principe que celui-ci ne originaire de Suisse, Fleming s’inspirant
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de sa propre fiancée Monique Panchaud jeunes européens sur le continent. pour sa future armée, que pour ses de Bottens, probablement francophone. services de renseignement. 007 sera-t-il Cela explique les nombreuses aventures Sa relation de proximité avec l’Europe l’apanage du soft power de l’Écosse dans et séjours de 007 en Suisse, le fait qu’il ne se limite pas à ses choix dans sa vie un avenir très proche? Les Écossais en parle parfaitement français, et qu’il privé, mais également dans son travail. décideront dans les prochaines années. perde tragiquement à l’âge de 11 ans Impossible de détacher de son Aston ses deux parents dans un accident Martin anglaise, mais il lui préfère la Michael E. Lambert est doctorant en d’alpinisme à Chamonix-Mont-Blanc. marque bavaroise BMW entre 1995 Relations internationales à Sorbonne Bond a également étudié à l’Université de et 2002. Son arme, le Walter PPK est Université (France) et à l’Université Genève, probablement en français à une également le fleuron de l’industrie de Tampere (Finlande), ses recherches époque où les cours en anglais étaient militaire allemande, même si dans les pour l’IRSEM – Ministère de la Défense plutôt rares. romans de Fleming il aborde un Beretta française portent sur les stratégies de mise 6.35 mm d’origine italienne. en place du soft power et le processus 007 pourrait donc probablement réclamer de Guerre hybride dans l’espace post- la double citoyenneté Suisse et envisager Quelles seraient les conséquences soviétique. Il dirige également l’équipe de de rejoindre les Services Secrets de la d’une indépendance de l’Écosse pour recherche “Caucasus Without Borders” qui Confédération, avec un salaire bien plus James Bond ? La figure populaire analyse les problématiques géopolitiques, conséquent, d’autant plus que ce dernier devrait justifier son affiliation au MI6, juridiques et migratoires dans le Caucase parle le français, mais aussi l’allemand, ce qui s’avérerait difficile à concevoir Sud. deux des quatre langues officielles du sur un plan psychologique, celui-ci pays. n’aurait donc pas ou peu d’attachement émotionnel au pays de son père. Il serait Il reste donc difficile de dire si l’agent juridiquement contraignant pour 007 de secret le plus connu au monde pourra et devenir un citoyen britannique au regard décidera de rester dans un Royaume Uni de la loi et du manque de flexibilité du sans Écosse, le Brexit jetant également processus de recrutement du MI5 et MI6. une incertitude sur ses avoirs et sa Cependant, rester dans un MI6 post- capacité à voyager librement dans toute Brexit n’apporterait que de nombreux l’Europe, où il apprécie notamment désavantages pour l’agent, rejetant son de faire du ski. À ce propos, rappelons identité “européenne” résolument ancrée que 007 fut brièvement marié à une par Ian Fleming dans ses habitudes française d’origine Corse, qui décèdera quotidiennes. tragiquement. Il semble donc fortement apprécier ses séjours en Europe. Les La possibilité de rejoindre les Services femmes du continent ne sont pas sa Secrets d’Écosse s’avérerait loin d’être seule “préférence”, celui-ci apprécie le improbable. Premièrement car James champagne français Taittinger, le whisky Bond aurait la possibilité juridique de la Macallan, la vodka des pays Baltes, et le faire sans entraves, deuxièmement car il Bourbon. Ces cigarettes de prédilection obtiendrait probablement une promotion sont également les Morland Specials de au regard de son expérience au sein d’un Macédoine. nouveau Service, ce que ne lui propose pas l’actuel MI6. En bref, le James Bond de Ian Fleming est “international”, mais avec la construction Dans le monde réel, cela signifierait de l’Union européenne, celui-ci est une perte nette pour le soft power de ce en réalité de nos jours l’exemple type qui resterait de la Grande Bretagne, qui de l’Européen qui aurait effectué un devrait renoncer à son drapeau en même Erasmus en Suisse, aimerait certaines temps qu’à l’agent secret le plus connu au choses qu’il aurait découvertes lors de ses monde. En revanche, cela s’avérerait un voyages dans l’espace Schengen, et serait splendide coup de communication pour tombé amoureux des femmes qu’il aurait l’Écosse, qui aurait à son service une figure rencontrées lors de ses vacances, ce que populaire de renom, et pourrait l’utiliser vit actuellement toute une génération de tant dans ses campagnes de recrutement
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LA VICTOIRE COMME OBJECTIF STRATÉGIQUE : UN CONCEPT AMBIGU ET CONTRE- PRODUCTIF POUR LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT par Jennie Carignan (Article initialement publié dans la Revue militaire canadienne, vol. 17 no 2 à http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol17/no2/page5-fra.asp)
« En guerre, il n’y a pas de victoires. Il n’y a que divers niveaux de défaites. » [TCO]
INTRODUCTION1 ne conduisaient pas à la victoire? la relation entre la fin, la victoire, et les a source d’inspiration pour un Plusieurs experts militaires éminents moyens, l’usage de la force armée. Ce texte sujet de dissertation survient ont affirmé que l’objectif principal en s’intéresse aussi à ce que cette relation souvent à des moments tout à guerre est de gagner2 ou encore « implique pour la manière et l’esprit dans Lfait inattendus. L’idée de ce texte m’est [qu’] en guerre, il n’y a pas de substitut lequel sont menées les actions militaires venue à la suite d’une discussion avec à la victoire3». La notion de victoire sur le terrain. un de mes démineurs au camp Nathan tourmente l’institution militaire. En Smith à Kandahar, en 2009. Ce dernier effet, une force armée est employée en Ce travail est organisé en trois parties. me brossait le tableau de sa situation dernier recours et doit donc gagner ses Dans la première, les théoriciens et les tactique quotidienne dans le secteur de la batailles pour assurer la survie de son stratèges qui ont contribué au culte de la ville de Kandahar. Celle-ci exigeait qu’il pays. La perception de la victoire comme victoire dans la pensée militaire seront neutralise parfois jusqu’à 9 ou 10 engins une fin en soi – et synonyme de succès examinés pour comprendre ce qu’ils ont explosifs dans une seule journée, ces stratégique – est donc très présente dans laissé en héritage : nous verrons qu’il s’agit derniers se trouvant souvent aux mêmes l’esprit du haut commandement militaire. d’un ensemble d’idées plutôt ambiguës endroits qu’il avait déminés quelques Mais quelles sont les implications de la et incohérentes. Dans la deuxième jours auparavant. Pour conclure la victoire comme objectif stratégique pour partie sera examinée la prépondérance discussion, il a dit « écoutez madame, on le haut commandement et les militaires du concept de victoire dans le récit ne la gagne pas cette guerre ». Situation, déployés sur le terrain? quotidien des décideurs politiques et il faut l’admettre, plutôt alarmante et experts militaires. L’utilisation du mot décevante considérant les efforts, les Cette question à la fois fondamentale, « victoire » (ou encore « succès ») par pertes humaines et l’intention des Forces importante et d’actualité sert de toile le commandement stratégique, sans armées canadiennes de mener ce combat de fond à toute réflexion stratégique du prendre la peine de le définir clairement, vers la victoire. La question se pose donc, haut commandement qui doit décider cause de la confusion tant chez le pays qu’est-ce que la victoire au juste? Qu’est- de la façon dont les forces armées seront qui se mobilise pour la guerre qu’à celui ce que cela veut dire : gagner une guerre? employées lors d’interventions militaires. des forces militaires chargées d’exécuter Pourquoi mon démineur – malgré son Le présent essai examinera donc les les opérations. Enfin, en troisième partie, engagement total, les nombreux sacrifices opérations militaires dans le contexte des pistes de solutions seront proposées pour son pays et les risques pour sa vie – stratégique de la guerre. Par conséquent, pour se libérer de la notion de victoire et avait-il cette perception que ses actions cette étude se place du point de vue de ainsi offrir une approche peut-être mieux
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adaptée à la réalité de la guerre moderne pour laquelle il est souvent impossible de déterminer clairement qui a perdu et qui a gagné.
Ce travail démontrera que la victoire n’est pas utile comme objectif stratégique. Nous ne remettrons donc pas en question ici l’importance de l’efficacité opérationnelle des troupes ni le succès tactique. Il serait frivole de penser que les troupes se présentent sur le champ de bataille pour perdre. Gagner oui, mais pas à tout prix et dans quelle mesure? Comme le phénomène de la guerre est quasiment incompréhensible, surtout du point de vue de la morale4, et que les guerres concrètes souffrent souvent (Le source: Bibliothèque et Archives Canada) de l’absence de directions stratégiques claires, je soumets que les décideurs tactiques jusqu’à la victoire finale. nombreux stratèges de la Renaissance, politiques et le haut commandement des Lumières et du XIXe siècle8. militaire qui commettent des forces L’éminent stratège chinois Sun Tzu qui a militaires à l’étranger doivent penser au- écrit au IIIe ou IVe siècle av. J.-C. affirme Bâtissant sur le précédent établi par la delà du concept de la victoire. que « La victoire est l’objectif principal de levée en masse pendant la Révolution la guerre6». L’essence de la victoire pour française, Napoléon Bonaparte a Sun Tzu est qu’elle devrait être acquise grandement influencé le développement L'HÉRITAGE DES THÉORICIENS : rapidement et, si possible, sans combat. et la pratique de l’idée que les États puissent L'AMBIGUÏTÉ Cependant, il nous met aussi en garde mobiliser leurs citoyens et développer de Le récit de la victoire qui s’est développé contre la poursuite aveugle de la victoire grandes armées pour mener des guerres depuis les écrits de Sun Tzu jusqu’au début en suggérant que cette dernière n’est pas totales. Napoléon croyait que le succès du XXe siècle peut être divisé en deux strictement tactique mais essentiellement sur le champ de bataille lui apporterait familles théoriques principales. Pour les reliée à la stratégie. Ce que Sun Tzu la paix et la prospérité alors que tout ce penseurs classiques et prémodernes, le but suppose ici est que la victoire est difficile que ses victoires lui ont valu, et ce n’est stratégique de la guerre est de conquérir à définir et que les événements post- pas négligeable, c’est la gloire militaire, un territoire par une série de victoires conflits sont imprévisibles et difficiles à comme ce fut le cas notamment aux tactiques. En conséquence, ils ont mis contrôler7. Dans un survol des penseurs pyramides d’Égypte et, surtout, à l’accent sur les conditions nécessaires militaires de l’Antiquité, le distingué Austerlitz et Iéna où il a remporté des pour vaincre les armées sur le champ de chercheur et professeur d’études sur la victoires totales9. Même si l’empereur bataille. Avec l’arrivée de l’ère industrielle sécurité internationale, William Martel, ne définissait pas la victoire seulement et des forces mécanisées, les penseurs souligne que Sun Tzu comprenait en termes d’interactions entre armées et militaires tels Napoléon Bonaparte, l’importance de la victoire au plan d’engagements tactiques, ses idées ont Antoine de Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz stratégique, mais sans toutefois en avoir contribué à la conception de la victoire et John Frederick Charles Fuller ont approfondi la signification plus en avant. comme résultat stratégique décisif. favorisé la guerre totale impliquant toutes Quant aux Grecs, et plus particulièrement les ressources humaines, économiques, Thucydide, il constate, toujours d’après Le stratège allemand Carl von Clausewitz technologiques et industrielles de l’État Martel, les avantages et inconvénients est sans contredit l’un des plus grands pour mener à la destruction de l’ennemi d’une victoire stratégique, mais, encore penseurs militaires de l’histoire, et ainsi remporter des « victoires notamment grâce à la publication de son 5 une fois, sans en tirer une théorie plus décisives ». Pour plusieurs stratèges, les approfondie de la guerre. Enfin, les œuvre inachevée De la guerre en 1831. « défaites allemandes pendant les Première penseurs militaires occidentaux, fascinés La guerre est une simple continuation de et Deuxième Guerres mondiales ont par la supériorité militaire romaine, se la politique par d’autres moyens10», son accrédité l’idée que l’objectif de toute sont concentrés sur la victoire tactique, célèbre axiome, illustre explicitement le guerre est l’accumulation de succès ce qui sera reflété dans les écrits de lien entre les moyens militaires et les fins
32 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné politiques d’une guerre. Sa conception destruction hérité du XIXe siècle a donc signifie tantôt un résultat tactique et de la guerre repose sur l’importance dominé le mode de pensée pendant la fondamentalement militaire, tantôt un des conséquences politiques et sociales première moitié du XXe siècle. Pendant résultat stratégique et fondamentalement qu’elle engendre. Pour comprendre les deux Grandes Guerres, les États ont politique, voire idéologique et culturel. et interpréter Clausewitz, il faut se mobilisé un niveau de ressources sans L’ambiguïté du concept de victoire pose familiariser avec les idées d’Immanuel précédent pour produire des machines donc un problème important pour le Kant11, notamment celle de « la chose en de guerre pouvant anéantir des nations haut commandement, y compris dans soi12» : « dans l’ensemble [le] caractère antagonistes17. La conception de la son usage traditionnel. distinctif [de la bataille] est que, plus que victoire retenue par cette expérience fut, tout autre engagement, elle existe par elle en conséquence, que l’objectif stratégique LE BOURBIER DE LA VICTOIRE même13». Ou encore « la destruction des (la victoire par reddition complète et Selon l’éminent psychologue Elliot forces armées de l’ennemi est le principe inconditionnelle) s’obtient en employant Aronson, « du joueur de base-ball des suprême de la guerre, et la voie principale des moyens militaires. Ainsi, selon petites ligues qui éclate en sanglots vers le but pour tout ce qui concerne le sociologue Eric Ouellet, la victoire quand son équipe perd, jusqu’à l’étudiant l’action positive14». peut être construite tant au sens légal au stade de football qui scande : "Nous (signature d’un traité de reddition) qu’au sommes les champions"; de Lyndon Malgré la théorie très nuancée et sens empirique (les objectifs stratégiques Johnson, dont le jugement était presque sophistiquée de Clausewitz sur la guerre, annoncés ont été atteints). certainement altéré par son désir tant c’est le principe de destruction qui a de fois formulé de ne pas être le premier retenu le plus l’attention. En effet, cette Chez le militaire, c’est le désir d’une président américain à perdre une guerre, dépendance au principe de destruction victoire stratégique conduisant à un traité jusqu’à l’élève du primaire qui déteste son a radicalement influencé la pensée de reddition qui prime implicitement ou camarade de classe parce qu’il a mieux militaire occidentale et aussi la façon de de façon inconsciente. L’importance de réussi son test d’arithmétique; nous faire la guerre partout dans le monde. cet objectif provient du fait qu’il peut manifestons une étonnante obsession Le stratégiste israélite Shimon Naveh être clairement défini. Mais, cette clarté culturelle pour la victoire18». affirme que la fortune de cette idée est théorique ne veut pas dire qu’elle mènera fondée sur un raisonnement assez simple infailliblement à sa réalisation pratique. Ainsi, pour la majorité des gens, et brillamment défendu. Le fait que son L’atteinte des objectifs stratégiques au l’image des Forces alliées marchant auditoire ait été dépourvu d’outils pour sens militaire et la signature d’un traité victorieusement dans les rues de Paris à la critiquer a favorisé la prédominance de reddition sont les deux facettes la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale de cette idée et, par conséquent, de cette d’une réalité difficilement réconciliable illustre bien ce que représente la victoire manière de faire la guerre basée sur la dans le contexte historique actuel, où militaire. Toutefois, la guerre, une des destruction15. la guerre n’implique pas seulement des plus vieilles activités humaines, reste armées régulières et des États, mais des encore aujourd’hui inexpliquée au niveau À travers l’œuvre de Clausewitz, nous organisations aux contours flous dont théorique quant à sa nature et à la façon assistons à la « tacticisation » de la les motivations débordent souvent dont elle devrait être conduite. Comme stratégie. « La planification stratégique la politique au sens traditionnel du nous l’avons vu en première partie, en doit sans cesse tendre aux résultats terme. C’est pourquoi les opérations dépit de la vaste littérature disponible tactiques et […] ceux-ci sont la cause dans lesquelles le Canada et ses alliés sur le sujet de la victoire, la majorité foncière de toute solution heureuse, s’engagent ne facilitent aucunement des écrits se concentrent sur les aspects que cette solution se produise d’ailleurs l’accomplissement du « désir de victoire mécaniques (le « comment ») de ce qu’un avec ou sans effusion de sang16. » Pour stratégique » tel que nous l’avons défini État doit faire pour gagner la guerre sans Clausewitz, le combat est d’abord et plus haut. vraiment décrire ce qu’on entend par « avant tout une fin en soi. Même s’il fut victoire ». le premier théoricien à explicitement La victoire au sens empirique suggère distinguer entre les moyens militaires quant à elle que les objectifs stratégiques Il n’existe donc pas de théorie, de et les fins politiques d’une guerre, il aient été clairement énoncés, puis langage approprié ou de récit qui définit n’a insisté que marginalement sur le qu’on évalue les résultats – et donc la la victoire en termes d’évaluation des concept de victoire puisqu’il croyait que victoire – selon l’atteinte de ces objectifs. résultats obtenus après une guerre ou les batailles tactiques seraient suffisantes Cependant, cette évaluation risque fort bien de ce que les décideurs politiques pour atteindre les objectifs stratégiques. de ne pas être interchangeable avec la veulent accomplir en utilisant des victoire au sens légal. Cette inadéquation moyens militaire19. Curieusement, le Le concept de guerre totale et de sème la confusion. Le concept de victoire problème de la victoire, d’une importance
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 33 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné
fondamentale pour un État, s’habille États-Unis que pour la France. pour le militaire opérant sur le terrain d’un langage incohérent, imprécis et puisqu’il risquerait de tenir pour acquis confus. Nous n’avons qu’à penser au Plusieurs experts s’entendent aujourd’hui que la fin (la victoire) justifierait l’emploi débat public au Canada sur ce que veut pour affirmer qu’il n’y a pas de relation de moyens inacceptables pour gagner. dire le « combat » pour nos troupes et causale entre les victoires tactiques et la La notion de victoire transcendant tous sur ce qui ne l’est pas, sur ce qui est une réalisation d’objectifs stratégiques sur les niveaux, de la tactique à la grande guerre et sur ce qui ne l’est pas, ce que le plan politique23. Les guerres récentes stratégie, peut changer de statut et de représente une victoire ou une défaite20. en Iraq, en Libye et en Afghanistan signification dans le temps et dans Les récents cas d’intervention canadienne représentent de bons exemples des l’espace. Dans ce contexte, elle influencera en Afghanistan et en Libye illustrent bien limites du succès tactique et de l’emploi fortement les moyens employés pour la difficulté d’arriver à un constat clair de la force. Bien que les Forces armées remporter la victoire dite « décisive ». Le entre qui a gagné et qui a perdu. Car c’est canadiennes aient « gagné » toutes leurs militaire peut perdre de vue le fait qu’une justement là le problème : si on accepte batailles tactiques en Afghanistan, il est victoire tactique n’est qu’un des moyens d’utiliser le langage de la victoire, on impossible d’arriver à la conclusion que d’atteindre l’objectif stratégique26. doit automatiquement décider qui est le nous avons gagné la guerre. De ce fait, vainqueur et qui est le vaincu. Blanken, Rothstein et Lepore illustrent La psyché du militaire est bercée par clairement, dans leur œuvre récente divers slogans qui donnent le ton à la Pour le commandement stratégique, le Assessing War, le défi de relier le succès façon dont il doit agir pour obtenir principe de base est clair et habituellement tactique sur le terrain à un éventuel cette victoire si importante. Comme on implicite. Tel que mentionné par le succès stratégique24. Au fil du temps, l’a vu plus tôt, il n’y a pas de substitut à général américain Douglas MacArthur, des circonstances et des cultures, le mot la victoire est un dicton très courant au « en guerre, il n’y a pas de substituts à victoire a revêtu différentes significations sein des forces armées. Il y a d’autres la victoire ». Ou encore par le maréchal parfois confuses et contradictoires pour exemples comme « la guerre c’est l’enfer britannique Bernard Montgomery dans les perdants comme pour les gagnants25. », « tuez ou soyez tués », « si ça bouge sa publication de 1945, High Command in Aujourd’hui, la norme est donc d’utiliser détruisez-le », « go ugly early », « shoot War, « une guerre se gagne en remportant le terme victoire librement en assumant them all and let God sort them out ». des victoires sur le terrain21». Si on que tous le comprennent, sans toutefois Donc si la destruction constitue le but des accepte cet axiome, comment explique-t- lui donner de définition précise. manœuvres de combat et que le combat on que depuis la fin de la Guerre froide, est la base de la guerre, la destruction et la les triomphes militaires n’aient pas généré Pour les militaires, la participation victoire deviennent l’objectif de la guerre. les bienfaits positifs escomptés? Un des aux combats implique un engagement Démontrer de la clémence devient une exemples les plus retentissants est celui physique et psychologique intense. faiblesse qui doit être éliminée au bénéfice du Vietnam. Les Américains ont gagné Ils endurent l’impensable durant ces de la « victoire »… La morale, c’est pour toutes les batailles tactiques mais ont missions où ils doivent côtoyer la mort les perdants. perdu la guerre. Le colonel (retraité) de et la violence au quotidien, ainsi que la l’armée américaine et stratégiste Harry perte de leurs camarades, en plus de vivre Si nous poussons encore le paradoxe, Summers a dit à son homologue de séparés de leur famille pour de longues nous constatons que même si le militaire l’armée du Vietnam du nord à Hanoi, périodes avec toutes les perturbations veut agir moralement, gagner à tout cinq jours avant la capitulation de Saigon, que cela implique. Le militaire a donc prix peut le pousser à commettre des « vous savez, vous ne nous avez jamais un grand besoin d’être convaincu qu’il atrocités au nom de la victoire ordonnée battus sur le champ de bataille » [TCO]. fait la bonne chose et que ses efforts par le haut commandement – que ce Et Vietnamien de répondre « peut-être, en valent la peine. Lorsque les termes soit explicitement ou implicitement. mais c’est sans importance22. » [TCO] Il de la victoire – le but à atteindre, la fin Pour citer Démosthène, « la difficulté en va ainsi avec le cas de la Bataille d’Alger – ne sont pas clairement définis ou, n’est pas de vous apprendre ce qui vaut en 1957 qui est aussi très instructif sur la pire, lorsque ce qu’ils observent sur le le mieux, disait-il aux Athéniens – je notion de victoire. Malgré l’utilisation terrain ne correspond pas à l’idée qu’ils crois qu’en général, vous le savez tous systématique de la torture à grande s’étaient faite d’une victoire, il s’ensuit fort bien. C’est de vous persuader de le échelle permettant de gagner la bataille une impression profonde de participer à faire27 ». Dans son article Le paradigme tactique, les Français ont perdu la guerre. quelque chose de futile. analytique du tortionnaire, le philosophe Ces victoires tactiques totales furent Marc Imbeault explique que plus la cause d’ailleurs très coûteuses stratégiquement Par conséquent, une fixation sur est juste, plus le but est noble et urgent, sur les plans humain, matériel ainsi qu’en le concept de victoire par le haut plus la fin semble justifier les moyens. crédibilité internationale, tant pour les commandement serait dommageable Ainsi, l’utilisation de la torture pendant
34 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné la bataille d’Alger et dans la guerre contre la responsabilité en tant que professionnel d’objectifs limités énoncée par le général le terrorisme démontre nettement l’effet des armes de poser les bonnes questions Vance. Selon le philosophe américain pervers de la poursuite apparemment au moment propice. Cela afin d’ouvrir John Dewey (1859-1952), « ce qui noble de la victoire à tout prix28. un dialogue sur ce qu’on entend par arrive n’est jamais final, en ce sens que victoire ou succès, et ainsi encourager cela fait toujours partie d’une séquence DÉPASSER LA NOTION DE les décideurs politiques à préciser leurs d’événements en cours34 ». Dewey VICTOIRE intentions et leurs objectifs stratégiques. considère que le concept de finalité est Alors, si on ne peut se fixer comme but En d’autres mots, le haut commandement défaillant en ce sens qu’il maintient que stratégique la victoire, quelle est l’autre doit tenir compte des enjeux politiques la fin en elle-même n’a pas vraiment de possibilité? Dans la présente section, et les décideurs politiques doivent être valeur à moins de considérer les moyens quatre pistes de solution seront explorées, conscients des limites et réalités de pris pour y arriver. Par exemple, lorsqu’on soit les relations civiles militaires et le l’usage de la force et ne pas abandonner examine l’intervention canadienne en processus décisionnel, l’établissement la conduite de la guerre aux généraux Afghanistan entre 2001 et 2014, force est d’objectifs limités, le concept de viser la sans poser les questions difficiles31. Par de conclure que les opérations militaires paix et l’évaluation des moyens employés. conséquent, la conduite de la guerre est n’ont pas mené à un résultat final, que ce un acte tout autant politique que militaire. soit en termes de progrès démocratiques On trouve une partie de la réponse en ou même de stabilité et de sécurité. Le examinant les relations civiles-militaires. Considérant les cultures militaires commandement stratégique doit donc Risa Brooks, politicologue de l’Université et politiques, les relations civiles- s’équiper d’un cadre de référence où le Marquette, conteste la croyance populaire militaires représentent un défi de taille, succès tactique ne constitue pas le but voulant que les démocraties prennent de le professionnel militaire préférant poursuivi ou l’état final. Car, comme le meilleures décisions stratégiques grâce instinctivement se concentrer sur les succès ou la victoire est difficile à définir à la nature participative du système et opérations militaires et le décideur et que, de plus, une guerre peut avoir à la présence des débats publics. Selon politique sur les luttes politiques à une « valeur morale » variable au cours elle, ce sont plutôt des relations civiles- livrer avant et pendant la guerre. De du temps35, le but devrait être non pas la militaires conflictuelles jumelées à une par son expérience, sa formation et ses victoire, mais bien la paix. coordination maladroite, un manque de connaissances en matière de défense, consultations et un processus décisionnel le professionnel militaire a l’ultime En 1961, J.F.C. Fuller, dans son œuvre The ambigu qui agissent négativement sur la responsabilité d’entamer, de générer et de Conduct of War, affirme que « l’objectif qualité des décisions stratégiques rendues poursuivre un dialogue continu avec les réel de la guerre est la paix et non la par les décideurs politique29. De ce fait, décideurs politiques afin de bien exposer victoire. En conséquence, la paix devrait pour les décideurs politiques, l’utilisation ce qu’il est réellement possible de réaliser être l’idée maîtresse derrière les politiques du concept de victoire sans le définir en militairement. De plus, il doit se garder et la victoire devrait être uniquement le objectifs stratégiques peut résulter en d’être trop optimiste quant à la possibilité moyen vers cet objectif36. » [TCO] Cela paralysie décisionnelle, en perte de soutien d’atteindre des objectifs stratégiques par implique que le haut commandement populaire, en explosion de violence post- l’emploi de la force et ne pas promettre devrait se donner des objectifs limités intervention et, ultimement, en échec l’irréalisable32. Pour citer le chef d’état- lorsqu’il engage des forces militaires politique. Le discours de la victoire flatte major de la défense, le général Jonathan dans une guerre et qu’il devrait être prêt les intérêts nationaux, mais ne clarifie Vance : « Quand nous disons que nous à envisager les choses au-delà du succès pas nécessairement les intentions du allons faire quelque chose, nos politiciens militaire. De plus, plusieurs experts pouvoir30 et favorise souvent, comme écoutent et ils nous croient. Il vaut mieux aujourd’hui s’entendent pour dire qu’on nous l’avons vu plus haut, l’utilisation d’un nous assurer que nous sommes capables doit réduire le nombre de guerres se langage incohérent pour le militaire. Le de faire ce que nous avons dit, ce qui veut terminant par une victoire tactique et commandement stratégique se doit donc dire que nous devrions plutôt viser des rechercher plutôt une fin négociée37. Cet de développer des processus décisionnels objectifs limités et réalisables33» [TCO]. argument se base sur le raisonnement que efficaces et d’entretenir des relations Enfin le haut commandement se doit de les conditions qu’un conquérant impose saines avec les décideurs politiques de traduire ces objectifs stratégiques parfois au vaincu contrecarrent toute possibilité façon à assurer la qualité des stratégies flous en actions cohérentes pour les de paix durable. Une paix négociée militaires émises. troupes déployées de façon à agencer ce permet la compréhension mutuelle et qu’elles vivent en réalité sur le terrain avec le respect des parties opposées. Le haut Le haut commandement doit aussi les objectifs de la mission. commandement devrait donc réfléchir s’attendre à ne pas recevoir d’ordres clairs à la paix que l’on recherche une fois la des décideurs politiques et, ultimement, a Subséquemment, reprenons l’idée guerre terminée plutôt que la victoire
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 35 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné
totale à tout prix. Si le militaire sur le terrain recherche une paix négociée au lieu d’une victoire complète, cela aura une incidence significative sur sa façon de se battre. Agir de façon honorable pourrait devenir ainsi plus important qu’une victoire à tout prix.
Enfin, l’évaluation des moyens mis en œuvre lorsque l’intervention a lieu devient cruciale, puisque ces moyens auront des effets à long terme après l’intervention. Timothy L. Challans, du US Army Command and Staff College, propose le principe de réciprocité, c’est- à-dire que si la fin détermine les moyens, peut-être que les moyens devraient déterminer la fin. Et pour citer Dewey : « peu importe le domaine, aucune réalisation notable ne peut être citée pour (la source: Forces armées canadiennes) laquelle les personnes ayant amené la fin stratégique a la responsabilité morale de Dans cet exposé, nous avons examiné n’avaient pas donné des soins affectueux concevoir des stratégies employant des le concept de victoire pour démontrer aux instruments et aux agences qui moyens militaires justes afin de créer l’ambiguïté qui l’entoure et son insuffisance en sont responsables38» [TCO]. Les les conditions nécessaires pour que les en tant qu’objectif stratégique. En fait, moyens employés durant une guerre troupes puissent agir de façon honorable. non seulement la victoire est peu utile deviennent ainsi plus importants qu’une comme concept, mais elle est aussi victoire à tout prix. On devrait donc CONCLUSION : PENSER ET AGIR contre-productive puisqu’elle peut servir s’attendre à ce que le commandement AU-DELÀ DE LA VICTOIRE à justifier l’emploi de moyens militaires stratégique ait une connaissance pratique Peu importe le débat sur ce que signifie la inacceptables pour gagner décisivement. des conséquences de l’emploi des victoire ou sur la valeur de l’intervention À mon avis, les moyens employés pendant moyens militaires utilisés pendant une dans laquelle le Canada s’est engagé, et les hostilités sont plus importants que intervention. Cela inclut non seulement parfois même en l’absence de directives l’obtention de la victoire à tout prix. Ainsi, les actes individuels des soldats et leaders stratégiques claires, le militaire est appelé les gestes posés par les militaires sur sur le terrain, mais aussi les politiques à se déployer sur le terrain et doit agir. le champ de bataille, si cruciaux pour nationales liées à la conduite de la guerre L’idée de victoire stratégique légale et bâtir la paix à venir, le jus in bello, pour telles que le traitement des prisonniers claire entre alors en conflit avec la réalité employer la terminologie de la théorie ennemis, la qualité de l’entraînement et la quotidienne vécue par le militaire. Une de la guerre juste, dépendent du « ton » sélection du personnel39. Ces politiques réalité qui donne au soldat l’impression employé et des directives transmises par nationales, ou leur absence, influencent qu’il perd la guerre, du moins cela peut- le haut commandement militaire. De grandement les actions posées par les il être le cas dans la guerre moderne où ce fait, le commandement stratégique militaires lors des opérations. Et pour le vainqueur et le vaincu sont difficiles a donc la responsabilité morale, dans citer Sun Tzu : « Ceux qui excellent dans à distinguer. En fait, la loi – et donc la l’élaboration des stratégies militaires, l’art de la guerre cultivent d’abord leur victoire au sens légal – n’a vraiment de de s’assurer que les moyens employés propre justice et ils protègent leurs lois sens qu’au passé, qu’après les événements, soient cohérents avec la fin envisagée. et leurs institutions. De cette manière ils alors que ce dont le soldat a besoin pour En conséquence, pour dépasser la rendent leur gouvernement invincible40. affronter la complexité du champ de notion de victoire, nous proposons la » La débâcle de la mission canadienne bataille est un regard vers le futur, vers poursuite d’objectifs stratégiques limités en Somalie après la torture et le meurtre la paix. Si le militaire doit choisir, il vaut et une fin négociée, ce qui devrait créer du Somalien Shidane Arone aux mains mieux qu’il perde avec honneur. Car la les conditions nécessaires à des actions des militaires canadiens représente victoire dans le déshonneur est la pire militaires honorables sur le terrain et un exemple retentissant où le haut de toutes les défaites. « La morale va au- mener vers une paix durable. Car la seule commandement a failli à ses obligations. devant de l’action, la loi l’attend41 ». option possible pour les militaires c’est Somme toute, le commandement d’agir de façon honorable. C’est d’ailleurs
36 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné la seule chose que les militaires contrôlent bransky, « The Dawn of a New 15. Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Mil- sur le terrain : leurs moyens, leurs actions Age? Democracies and Military itary Excellence: The Evolution et leurs réactions; et le souvenir de ces Victory », dans Journal of Stra- of Operational Theory, Abington actes est tout ce qui leur reste lorsqu’ils tegic Studies, 2013, vol. 7, no 1, (R.-U.), Frank Cass Publishers, rentrent au pays. p. 1 15. 1997, p. 71.
Le brigadier-général Jennie Carignan, 3. Le général américain Douglas 16. Carl von Clausewitz, p. 435 436. OMM, MSM, CD, est sapeur de combat. MacArthur lors de son discours Diplômée du Collège militaire royal du d’adieu au Congrès, le 19 avril 17. Peter Paret (dir.), Makers of Canada, elle s’est spécialisée en génie des 1951. Modern Strategy from Machia- combustibles et du matériel. Par ailleurs, velli to the Nuclear Age, Prince- elle possède une MBA de l’Université Laval 4. Michael Walzer, Guerres justes ton (N.J.), Princeton University et une maîtrise en arts et sciences militaires et injustes, Paris, Belin, 1999, p. Press, 1986, p. 528, et William de la US Army School of Advanced 436. Martel, p. 98. Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth), 5. William Martel, Victory in War: 18. Cité par Dudley Lynch et Paul L. et elle est diplômée du Programme de Foundations of Modern Strategy, Kordis, La stratégie du dauphin : sécurité nationale (CFC Toronto). Elle Cambridge, Cambridge Univer- Les idées gagnantes du 21e siècle, cumule trois affectations opérationnelles sity Press, 2011, p. 98. Les Éditions de l’Homme, 2006, avec la FNUOD (plateau du Golan), la p. 36. SFOR (Bosnie Herzégovine) et la Force 6. Sun Tzu, L’art de la guerre, Paris, opérationnelle Kandahar (2009-2010), Flammarion, 2008, p. 132. 19. William C. Martel, p. 374. où elle agissait comme commandant du Régiment du génie. Plus récemment, elle 7. Ibid, p 106-107. 20. http://ottawacitizen.com/news/ a occupé les fonctions de chef d’état-major national/defence-watch/gen- de la 4e Division de l’Armée canadienne 8. William Martel, p. 66. jon-vance-says-hes-the-expert- et de commandant du Collège militaire on-what-is-combat-if-you-dont- Royal Saint-Jean. Le général Carignan 9. Nicholas Stuart, « Finding the agree-iraq-mission-is-non-com- est actuellement chef d’état-major des Hinge: The Western Way of War bat-then-too-bad-for-you opérations de l’Armée – Armée canadienne. and the Elusive Search for Victo- ry », dans Australian Army Jour- 21. Cité par William Martel, Victory NOTES nal, p. 223, vol. II, no 2, p. 217 in War, p. 102. 225. 22. Timothy L. Challans, Awakening 1. Je voudrais remercier les profes- 10. Carl von Clausewitz, De la seurs Marc Imbeault du Collège Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics guerre, Paris, Les Éditions de of Warfare, Albany (N.Y.), State militaire royal Saint-Jean et Eric Minuit, 1984, p. 67. Ouellet du Collège des Forces University of New York, p. 106. canadiennes, le Mgén (retraité) 11. Martin Van Creveld, The Art of 23. Bernard Fook Weng Loo, « De- Daniel Gosselin ainsi que M. War: War and Military Thought, cisive Battle, Victory and the Éric Lefrançois pour leur aide Londres, Harper Collins, 2000, p. Revolution in Military Affairs », précieuse au cours de la rédac- 109. dans Journal of Strategic Studies, tion de ce travail dont je prends p. 195, avril 2009, vol. 32, no 2, p. toutefois l’entière responsabilité. 12. Selon le professeur Marc Im- 189-211. beault, dans la philosophie de 2. Plusieurs théoriciens actuels Kant, la chose en soi est in- 24. Leo J. Blanken, Hy S. Rothstein décrivent la guerre en termes de connaissable et s’oppose au et Jason J Lepore, Assessing War: gagnant-perdant avec des recom- phénomène, ce que nous con- The Challenges of Measuring mandations sur les moyens à em- naissons. La connaissance n’est Success and Failure, Washington, ployer et les paramètres à utiliser donc pas la vérité, mais plutôt Georgetown University Press, pour gagner. Voir par exemple une construction de la réalité qui 2015, p. 9. Ryan Grauer et Michael Horow- est, en soi, inconnaissable! itz, « What Determines Military 25. Robert Mandel, The Meaning Victory? Testing the Modern 13. Carl von Clausewitz, p. 267. of Military Victory, Boulder System », dans Security Studies, (Colo.), Lynne Reinner Publish- 2012, no 2, p. 83 112; Steve Do- 14. Ibid, p 279.
ON TRACK SPRING 2017 37 Independent and Informed CDA Institute Autonomne et renseigné
ers, 2006, p. 1. 39. James M. Dubik, p 167.
26. Julian Alford et Scott Cuomo, « 40. Sun Tzu, p. 156. Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer », dans 41. Cité par Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, La JFQ, p. 94, numéro 53, 2e trime- guerre au nom de l’humanité, p. stre de 2009, p. 92-98. 496.
27. Cité par Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, La guerre au nom de l’humanité : tuer ou laisser mourir, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, p. 498.
28. Marc Imbeault, « Le paradigme analytique du tortionnaire ou La nouvelle philosophie du bour- reau » à l’adresse http://www. cmrsj-rmcsj.forces.gc.ca/cb-bk/ art-art/2014/art-art-2014-3-fra. asp
29. Risa A. Brooks, Shaping Strat- egy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment, Princ- eton (N.J.), Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 4-9 et 15-18.
30. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, p. 323.
31. Leo J. Blanken, et al., p. 21.
32. James M. Dubik, Just War Re- considered: Strategy, Ethics and Theory, Lexington (Ky), The University Press of Kentucky, 2016, p. 139.
33. Cité avec la permission du général Jonathan Vance par cour- riel daté du 22 novembre 2016, Session des officiers généraux, Ottawa, 31 août-1er septembre 2016.
34. Cité par Timothy Challans, Awakening Warrior, p. 113.
35. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, p. 486.
36. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1869-1961, Boston (Mass.), Da Capo Press, 1961, p. 76.
37. Robert Mandel, p. 177.
38. Cité par Timothy Challans, Awakening Warrior, p. 126.
38 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné CURRIE’S GAMBLE: THE BATTLE OF HILL 70, AUGUST 1917
By Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle
This after-dinner talk was originally given at the Battle of Hill 70 Gala in Peterborough, Ontario on 7 April 2017 in support of the Hill 70 Memorial Project. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of R. Kenneth Armstrong, Honorary Colonel, Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, and Captain (Ret’d) Robert Ough.
Good evening.
Your Honour, Your Worships, Veterans, Serving Military, the Regimental Family, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is my distinct pleasure to be here with you this evening in this historic armoury where, one century ago, undoubtedly to the day, men prepared for war.
2017 is a year of significant anniversaries. I suppose every year is in one way or another. But this year marks the 175th of the founding of Queen’s University in Kingston (1842), the 150th of Confederation (1867), the 100th of many important First World War battles (1917), and sadly, the 50th of the last time that the Toronto Maple Leafs won the Stanley (Source: David Freeley Photos) Cup (1967)! Even Lord Stanley’s chalice, initial success, his offensive soon stalled that coveted prize won by every child in number to make any meaningful amidst heavy rain, even heavier mud, who has ever braved sub-zero weather to difference. Interestingly, 1917 was for a resolute opponent and horrendous play a game of road hockey in Canada, is Canada a banner year, at least as far as its casualties. By the time that it was all over, a very respectable 125 years old this year army was concerned. If domestic issues it had cost the British Empire an estimated (1892). Without a doubt, 2017 marks the like conscription were tearing Canada 275,000 men. Later, in 1918, all of this confluence of many important events and apart at the seams, overseas the Canadian territory gained at such a terrible cost was institutions that make up our national Corps was meeting with considerable effectively handed back to the Germans fabric. success … a well-planned victory at Vimy, a gambling victory at Hill 70 and in the face of a looming offensive. Not surprisingly, Passchendaele, along with 1917, however, was a very different a muddy victory at Passchendaele. All the Somme in 1916, ranks as one of the year. It was by any measure an annus three of these Canadian battles share most controversial and hotly-debated horribilus, a year of immense challenge more than a mere temporal connection. operations of the entire First World War. for the Allies with very few bright spots to cheer the war-weary soul … the At the end of July 1917, Field-Marshal Nevertheless, early into the campaign, French were in mutiny, the British were Sir Douglas Haig began his campaign Haig believed that an attack to the south, bogged down at Passchendaele, the in Flanders for the purpose of securing in France, would prevent the relief or Russians were in the throes of revolution the vital Channel ports and eliminating reinforcement of the tired German and the Americans were much too small the bases from which German U-boats operated. Although meeting with some divisions opposite him. A major attack
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elsewhere along the line would hopefully months before. In this battle, in a sense, divert the enemy’s attention and “fix” In proposing a different plan altogether Canada would either prove that it had or “hold” some of his forces in place. and thereby disagreeing with both Horne become a master in every sense of the A significant enough threat would and ultimately Haig, Currie demonstrated word or remain a senior apprentice for demand a serious enough response. Haig significant moral courage. What pluck it some time still. eventually ordered the First Army, under must have taken for a freshly-promoted the command of General Sir Henry militia officer from the dominions with But Currie made other gambles too. He Horne, to attack and capture Lens (ou limited, albeit exceptional, wartime took a chance that the Germans would Lens, si vous préférez) for this purpose. experience to challenge superior British counter-attack and that his preparations In turn, Horne assigned the task to the officers and push for a new plan, one that would be sufficient to stop them. The Canadian Corps and its new commander, he knew was right, and one that would first wager was a pretty safe bet. Years of the recently-promoted and -knighted not squander the fighting strength of his fighting on the Western Front had taught Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie. corps. That is leadership. Yet, we must not him that the Germans always counter- Here, Currie, much like the soldiers of his be too quick to condemn or dismiss either attacked with lightening rapidity before corps, would be put to the test. Haig or Horne, for leadership is very their enemies had time to consolidate much a two-way street. The initial idea to their gains. Hill 70 would probably be Assessing the ground over which his attack Lens may have been ill-conceived, no different. Where he took the greatest Canadians would soon attack, Currie but both officers listened to their risk, however, was in his plan to stop the quickly appreciated the ramifications of subordinate, evaluated an alternative, inevitable response with overwhelming his orders. To the north-northwest of and agreed upon a new approach to firepower. His Canadians would suffer Lens lay Hill 70, an elevated feature on the battle. That too, I would suggest, mightily if he erred. an otherwise flat battlefield that gave a is leadership. Such interplay was not commanding view of the coal-mining city necessarily a common part of the military At 4:25 on the morning of 15 August, itself, the German lines both within and culture of the time, but that is exactly the Canadians attacked Hill 70 across a around it, and the Douai Plain beyond what makes this exchange all the more frontage of 3,900 yards. Ten battalions it. Currie reasoned that capturing Lens remarkable. If Currie was persuasive and from the 1st and 2nd Divisions climbed while leaving the high ground in enemy convincing, then Haig and Horne were out of their trenches and began the hands was unwise and would invite receptive and supportive. We would do harrowing advance toward the German disaster. From the hill, so it followed, the well to remember that elevated rank does lines. The resistance, and thus the Germans would be able to observe the not automatically confer a monopoly intensity of the fighting, was uneven in Canadians in their newly-won positions on good ideas. (There’s probably a joke places, with some battalions reaching their and lob artillery shells at them with in there somewhere about colonels and objectives with “relative” ease (by First impunity. Casualties, perhaps prohibitive generals, but, I think I’ll leave it at that!) World War standards) and others finding casualties, were the predictable result. A the going quite difficult. In the span of frontal attack against a well-concealed Hill 70 was Currie’s first major battle roughly 90 minutes, the Canadians had enemy, as well as the urban fighting that as a newly-minted corps commander all but captured the hill; some positions, would occur if the Canadians reached the and in many ways it was a gamble with however, remained in enemy hands until city, spelled massacre. national stakes. If he was successful, the following day. The now-exhausted then he would add to his reputation and soldiers quickly consolidated what they Because the hill afforded significant prove that both his promotion and new had gained by bringing forward heavy advantages to whomever controlled it, command were warranted; perhaps more machine guns and reversing the German Currie reasoned that the Germans would important, he would again demonstrate trenches, making the old parados the not tolerate its loss and would quickly that the Canadians could fight just as well new parapet. Was Currie right? Would counter-attack. He further believed as (aside: if not better!) than the British. the Germans counter-attack? Could the that concentrated small-arms fire from On the other hand, if he failed, surely Canadians stop them? They would not machine guns and rifles, as well as artillery some it is reasonable to assume would have to wait for long to find out. fire from guns well back of the lines, could take it as a sign that Canadians could effectively deal with the inevitable and not yet be trusted to lead their own, that Hill 70 was in many ways a repeat of Vimy. inflict significant casualties on the enemy, whatever their individual prowess, they What had worked so successfully in April always an important consideration in this still needed the professional, experienced was again employed with great effect in grinding war of attrition. Currie thus hand of career British officers to guide August: considerable time was devoted to suggested that Hill 70, not Lens, become them, much like Lieutenant-General Sir training and rehearsal prior to the attack the Canadian objective. Julian Byng had done at Vimy only a few so that every man knew his job and the
40 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné ground; counter-battery fire neutralized now possessed the hill. Currie’s gamble heavy toll on the Germans at Hill 70: by German guns that could break up the had paid off. the cold calculus of attritional warfare Canadian advance; a creeping barrage on the Western Front, 9,000 Canadians sheltered the vulnerable infantry as they But the story has more to it than that. traded for an estimated 15,000 Germans navigated No Man’s Land; assaulting A few days later, on 21 August, Currie was a fair return on investment, a ratio of battalions were assigned limited launched a probing attack against Lens to almost two to one. objectives; and reinforcements passed test German defences and to determine gingerly through captured positions if the Canadian possession of Hill 70 Even though Currie took some calculated to continue the attack with renewed had encouraged them to pull back from risks in proposing the attack on Hill momentum and greater weight. Where the city. It had not and they did not. 70 and for dealing with the inevitable the two battles differed, however, was at After making some minor advances, German response, he was by no means the top – while Byng led the Canadians the Canadian assault was repelled with reckless or flippant. Over the course of the at Vimy, Currie led them at Hill 70. For considerable loss. Once Currie gained war, he earned a reputation for preferring all the nation-building importance that this vital information, that there indeed to waste shells rather than men’s lives: is attached to Vimy, whether rightly or was no success to be exploited, he should shells could be easily replaced, casualties wrongly, we must remember that it was a have ended the battle and been satisfied could not. His actions at Hill 70 prove no battle run by a British general; Hill 70, in with its lop-sided results. Instead, he exception to this general rule. During the contrast, was a battle run by a Canadian allowed another attack on a heavily- battle, a First Army staff officer informed general, the first time that a Canadian defended part of Lens to occur on 23 Brigadier-General Edward Morrison, commanded substantially at the corps- August, with predictable and unfortunate the General Officer Commanding Royal level. And what’s more, the soldiers results. Ten days after its start, Currie Artillery, that the army commander going into the attack at Hill 70 had the finally called off operations. Historians was quite “appalled” at the prodigious confidence and spirit that only their claim that it was his inexperience as a Canadian consumption of shells; recent success at Vimy could instill. corps commander – he had been “in Morrison dryly replied with some wit, harness” for only a month or so – that led “So are the Germans.” Even Sir Douglas True to form, and as Currie had to the unnecessary prolongation of the commented with some exasperation anticipated, the Germans quickly fighting. Undoubtedly they are right, but on the Canadian propensity to ensure counter-attacked. Although this initial perhaps his elation at such a one-sided that the corps’ guns never went hungry, assault was easily repulsed, it marked the victory only a few days before, a sense of writing as he did, “The Canadians always beginning of a prolonged attempt by the over-confidence in his own abilities, or open their mouths very wide!” Currie Germans to regain Hill 70, so vital was the desire to prove himself to everyone was not averse to committing his forces this ground. For four days, from 15 to 18 who was watching, like Haig and Horne to battle and absorbing the cost of such August, the Germans launched no fewer from above, also contributed in some a decision, yet, with only a few instances than 21 separate counter-attacks against small way to this sad denouement. notwithstanding, he tried to give them the Canadians. Advancing in waves every possible advantage that would over open ground or worming their way The two failed attacks on Lens – the first make success on the battlefield more forward from shell hole to shell hole, a few excusable, the second much less so – cost likely. Victory was the usual outcome German soldiers managed to reach the many Canadians their lives and took a when planning and preparations were Canadian positions; they were eventually little something away from the success meticulous, as at Vimy and Hill 70 proper; ejected however, but not before inflicting at Hill 70. But what a success it was. In when they were rushed, as during the casualties. But on the whole, the sheer the end, the battle achieved its strategic probing attacks into Lens, the opposite volume of fire that the Canadians poured objective by diverting German forces was generally true. onto the axis of advance stopped each away from Passchendaele. Currie had attempt in its tracks. Cold. A few statistics delivered what Haig had asked for, and So why is Hill 70 important? Why are illuminating. The 1st Motor Machine this would become a pattern in the months should you care? The fact that the battle Gun Brigade fired no less than 120,000 following. (Of note, later, in October and ultimately proved to be a way station rounds in one day; the 1st Brigade, November 1917, the Canadians helped along the path of Canada’s military Canadian Field Artillery, numbering end the fighting at Passchendaele on evolution and national development is 24 guns, fired slightly more than 11,000 orders from the field-marshal. Currie certainly one good reason. In addition, shells in a 24-hour period. That anyone and his corps were quickly earning a it was a battle planned, orchestrated and could survive such a maelstrom defies reputation as elite troops, something that fought almost entirely by Canadians. comprehension. In time, the Germans the battles of 1918 only reinforced.) In And, on a higher plane, it was one of gave up, conceding that the Canadians addition, the Canadians had exacted a those rare instances on the Western
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Front where the attackers suffered fewer the regimental colour of the “Hasty Ps” Craig Leslie Mantle received his PhD casualties than the defenders. (and pretty much every other infantry in military and strategic studies from the regiment in Canada) will also have been University of Calgary in 2013. He has But more than this, in my ever-humble explained. And surely, if this does occur, taught courses for both the Royal Military opinion, it is important that we as a it will not be because of anything that I College of Canada and the Canadian people, both individually and collectively, have said necessarily, but rather will be Forces College. After working for a decade understand the circumstances under due to the excellent work undertaken by at the Canadian Forces Leadership which some 118,000 Canadians, both the members of the Hill 70 Project. Their Institute where he had the opportunity to men and women, gave their lives in efforts to “rescue” this battle from the publish widely on a number of leadership- conflict stretching from the 19th to the historical subconscious are commendable related topics from both an historical 21st Centuries; how many more gave of and we all owe them a great debt. and contemporary perspective, he spent body or mind is less easy to determine. a further year and a half working as the By understanding the events surrounding Perhaps this push to understand is all post-1945 historian at the Canadian Hill 70, indeed by understanding all very naïve and too much to hope for – War Museum. He is affiliated with two battles in which Canadians have fought, after all, Canadians were once labelled an professional organizations: the Conference from Paardeberg in South Africa to “unmilitary people” – but it is, again in of Defence Associations Institute as a Panjwai in Afghanistan, we attach my humble opinion, a worthwhile goal. research fellow and the Laurier Centre meaning to otherwise anonymous names. If we are to enjoy the fruits of sacrifice, for Military Strategic and Disarmament Rather than making the ultimate sacrifice then it behooves us to understand the Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University as for vague and non-descript terms such as circumstances under which that sacrifice an adjunct faculty associate. His research “freedom” and “honour,” Private Bloggins was made. We owe them that much … at interests, broadly speaking, include oral died stemming the German onslaught the very least. history, leadership, material culture and the following the use of gas at Ypres; he died experience of military service from South securing a strategic piece of ground at Thank you. Africa to Afghanistan. A strong believer in Hill 70; he died, tragically, entering the community service and involvement, Dr. city of Mons on the last day of the war. Mantle is actively involved with St. John Ambulance in Kingston; he currently sits If we remember the fallen on on the board of Loyalist Branch, as well as Remembrance Day and other important on a number of separate committees. occasions throughout the year, we honour The author would like to thank Dr. Tim them by knowing a little something more Cook, Canadian War Museum, and Dr. about the circumstances of their deaths. Rob Engen, Royal Military College of In light of the astounding casualties of Canada, for their valuable and very kind the First World War, numbering into collegial support. the millions of both dead and wounded on both sides, the stories of individual Further reading: Douglas E. Delaney and soldiers are oftentimes lost, drowned out Serge Marc Durflinger, eds.,Capturing by sheer volume. Yet, if we endeavour to Hill 70 – Canada’s Forgotten Battle of know something about them – where the First World War (Vancouver: UBC they fought and why, for instance – we Press, 2016), passim; Tim Cook, Shock reclaim some of their individuality and Troops – Canadians Fighting the Great life-story, making them less anonymous War, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking, 2008), and perhaps more “real.” 255-307; G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 – Official Now that they have been set in context, History of the Canadian Army in the First the names of the twelve men from World War (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, Peterborough and the surrounding area 1962), 283-297; Matthew Walthert, who died at Hill 70, which were read “Neglected Victory: The Canadian Corps aloud earlier this evening, will possibly at Hill 70,” Canadian Military History 19, take on a greater significance to us in the no. 1 (Winter 2010): 21-36. 21st Century, some 100 years removed from the event. Maybe the history behind the Hill 70 battle honour that appears on
42 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 Independent and Informed L'Institut de la CAD Autonomne et renseigné REMEMBERING VIMY AND THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE GREAT WAR
By Brigadier-General Matthew Overton (Retired)
he Battle of Vimy Ridge, it seems, continues to evoke a wide variety of emotions and commentaries, Teven though it is now 100 years in the past. Like the Great War itself and the campaigns of 1917 – for which the seizure of the Vimy heights was a part – Canadians have no consistent, accepted and full story from the Canadian perspective to understand the horrific, self-generated catastrophe that engulfed the European nations, their empires and colonies. While Canada officially recognizes Vimy as a significant and largely positive event on the slow road to (Source: Canadian Armed Forces) true independence from Great Britain, Canadians are perhaps not so sure. argue against Vimy as the most deserving compared to Europe. Canadians, like point of remembrance for Canadians Australians, South Africans and many Even while tens of thousands of Canadians, in honouring the sacrifices of the Great others outside of Europe, collectively young and old, flocked to the site for War, they have a collective weight and struggle to recall individual details from the commemorations accompanied logic, but alternative options are not the great sweep of the conflict, except by their French counterparts, who individually any more compelling or for one or two that come to encapsulate remain steadfastly appreciative of the resistant to the same weight of criticism all the suffering, heartache and loss that Canadian sacrifice, old arguments and when applied against them in turn. their nations experienced, distant from criticisms resurfaced once again in the battle sites. Names like Gallipoli, national news media: “Vimy was not The truth of the matter is that Canada Beaumont-Hamel, Vimy and Belleau that important strategically”, “there were and Canadians have no intimate, Wood invoke memories of not just those more important battles for Canadians”, compelling and visceral memories of battles, but become the lens through “it was nothing but Canada doing what the Great War. This was unlike the which the entire war is recalled. it was told”, “it wasn’t really a Canadian European nations where intense fighting victory because there wasn’t a Canadian was daily life, or death, for not only Vimy, for many reasons well- in command”, “it more split than unified the soldiers and sailors thrown into documented by Tim Cook in his recent the country – look at the conscription battle in unheard-of numbers, but their book Vimy: The Battle and the Legend, crisis” and even “Chanak, when Canada citizens and communities as well. It is has become that lens through which said ‘no’ (sort of) to the UK, was the true our blessing as a nation that we dodged most Canadians view the Great War birth of our nation as an independent this intimate knowledge of the war – we when it is not Remembrance Day (most, entity”. Lacking a substantive, inclusive suffered other difficulties to be sure, as as Newfoundland and Labrador have and widely accepted core narrative, these well as significant casualties for our size developed a comparable relationship differing perspectives endure as isolated of population – and it changes the quality with Beaumont-Hamel). It may not have and discordant elements. Mustered to of our recollection of the events when been the most strategically important
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victory won by the Canadian Corps, but Officer, culminating in the command of it was the first. With the capstone success the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia’s provided by the Corps at Passchendaele Canadian Light Infantry, he commanded for the British/Imperial army several the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group and months later, Canada provided glimmers held a number staff appointments within of hope in a year of unmitigated suffering Military Personnel Command, including for the Anglo-French forces. It might not the post of Assistant Chief of Military have been a truly independent statement Personnel. In addition to operational by Canada in opposition to the desires of deployments, he completed defence the UK, but it set Canada upon the path diplomacy posts as the Military Advisor where such an option could be exercised at the Canadian High Commission in not so many years later. It may not have London, Defence Attaché in Kabul and provided the solid point about which all then Defence Advisor at the London High Canadians could rally during the war – Commission once again as the capstone to the political and community divisions his career. across the country were far too deep and complex to be swept away so easily – but In addition to holding a BA in Physics and it has over time provided Canadians with Oceanography from Royal Roads Military all that is required to remember with College, and an MA of War Studies from pride and humility the commitment, Royal Military College of Canada, he is a sacrifice and humanity of so many men graduate of the National Strategic Studies and women in the service of their nation Programme at the Canadian Forces – that day and for the entire conflict. College and is Certified Human Resources Leader. The iconic Vimy monument and the dozens of young women and men that each year guide visitors through the site and speak to the Canadian contribution to success, not just at Vimy but for 1918, are the envy of every other nation, Great War participant or not, something that we scarcely acknowledge. Vimy the battle is not the full story of Canada in the Great War, but Vimy the memorial can provide the point from which to tell that story – from trench to Main Street, from desperate battles and mounting military success to domestic crisis and ongoing doubts. This past 9th of April 2017, listening and watching as Canadian Armed Forces members, artists, national leaders and others played their part in focusing our remembrance on the momentous events of Vimy and the Great War as known by Canadians, it seemed that perhaps after 100 years, it was not too early to accept that full story a little more fully.
Matthew Overton served for 39 years in the Canadian Armed Forces, retiring in 2017 having attained the rank of Brigadier- General. In addition to the traditional employments expected of an Infantry
44 ON TRACK SPRING 2017 CDA L'Institut Institute de la CAD
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THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE