Walter C. Williams Interviewer: Addison M

Walter C. Williams Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 3/25/1964 Administrative Information

Creator: Walter C. Williams Interviewer: Addison M. Rothrock, Jay Holmes, and Eugene M. Emme Date of Interview: March 25, 1964 Place of Interview: Washington, D.C. Length: 25 pp.

Biographical Note Williams, Walter C.; Associate Director, Manned Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Williams discusses John F. Kennedy’s [JFK] interest and support for the space program, his visits with JFK regarding space missions, and the Mercury Program and Redstone missions, among other issues.

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Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation Walter C. Williams, recorded interview by Addison M. Rothrock, Jay Holmes, and Eugene M. Emme, March 25, 1964, (page number), John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.

AGREEMENT ON USE OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

I, ~alter c. Williams, of the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration, Washington, D.C., assign to cile United

States of America for administration by the John F. Kennedy

Library, Inc. , all my rights, title and interest in the tape recording and transcript of cile interview conducted with me at Washington, D. C., by Mr. Addison M. Rothrock, Mr. Jay

Holmes and Dr. Eugene M. Emme on behalf of the John F.

Kennedy Library, on March 25, 1964.

Subject to any conditions specified by me limiting access to those materials and set forth in writing on the transcript prior to its being forwarded for the Library, such transcript and recording may be made available for research, dissemination, reproduction, publication and other appropriate use, in whole or in part, as determined by the Director of the Library.

(signed)

(date)

Accepted:

(signed}

(date} Walter C. Williams Table of Contents

Page Topic 1 Williams’ interactions and visits with John F. Kennedy [JFK] 1, 7, 12, 14, 22 Alan Shepard space flight, May 1961 2, 24 JFK’s personality 3, 6, 9, 14, 17, 22 JFK’s support and interest for the space program 5 Medals and awards 8, 16, 20 Williams and the Mercury Program 9, 19 Space flight risks to astronauts 10, 12, 15 Redstone missions 16, 20 The press and the space program 23 Dyna-Soar program Addendum I Williams’ biography Addendum II National Aeronautics and Space Administration news release, October 23, 1963 ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams

Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Operations National Aeronautics and Space Administration Recorded on March 25, 1964, at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Interviewee: ~ f!a./li aa;;tt/(r,P Walter C. Williams

Interviewers: ~ _c-/ h__p-1~ '/ ),/))- ;;J- ,1[//))v dJ?:_ Addison M. Rothrock, NASA Consultant Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams

Dr. Emme: This tape record ing is an oral history interview with Dr. Walter Williams, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Operations in NASA Headquarters, made expressly for the purpose of documenting for the record things which are not available in the documents, memories of other things associated with the Kennedy Administration, more particularly the program of the Space Agency with which Dr. Williams was very familiar as director of operations for Project Mercury. It was made on March 25 , 1964 , at NASA Headquarters. Dr . williams is being interviewed b y Mr. Addison Rothrock, Mr. Jay Holmes, and Dr. Eugene M. Emme .

The Kennedy Library, of course, is most i nterested in the personal contacts that NASA top officials had with the late President. These are the memories that are most apt to slip and will help future historians, helping them document more fully the history of the past few years . Also, there are some very important features of the NASA space program on which Dr. Williams is really the only one who can shed any light upon various moments of decisi on which may not have involved personal cont.act with the Presi d ent, but certainly invo l ved recorrunendations and NASA positions whi ch got to the vn~ite House.

Now we can classify this tape as you may see fit, or other­ wise restrict it •.. otherwise, I'd suggest we j ust wor k down the questions.

Dr. Ernme: Could you describe your general recollections concerni ng the occasi ons you met and talked with Presi dent Kenn e dy?

Dr. Williams: I met President Kennedy a number of times-­ usually following one of our manned space flights.

The f i rst occasion was t he Alan Shepard flight in May of 1961, where Al and t he other six astronauts plus Bob Gilruth and I , and Dr. Douglas a nd Shorty Powers flew d i rectly from Grand Bahama Island to t he White House, first to Andrews Air Force Base, then in turn flew by helicopter and landed on the lawn. Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 2

On that occasion we met both the President and Mrs. Kennedy. Our contact with the President was quite brief; there was a presentation ceremony, but then he took off with Al Shepard to another meeting, a luncheon, elsewhere in Washington, and we remained with Mrs. Kennedy and others of the official fami ly until it was time to go to the Capitol.

On this particular occasion, Mrs. Kennedy di d take us on a tour upstairs i n the White House, which was very interesting, and I guess I was impressed mostly by the warm friendliness of both the people, both the President and Mrs. Kennedy. They were very warm.

The next occasion, of course, was the President's visit to the Cape after the Glenn flight [February 23, 1962] where he presented Glenn with the lNASA] Distinguished Service Medal and took a very quick tour of the Cape, including the Mercury Control Center. We did show him around the Control Center on that occasion. There was very little opportunity to talk because the crowds were extremely large; "a very hectic affair" would be t he best way to describe i t.

Again, you were impressed by the man 's warm, friendly attitude and h is extreme interest in the program. He was q uite interested going through the Control Center, asking: "What happens here?" "What happens there?" "How does this thing come about?"

Then, the next occasion was the visit with my family, the Carpenter family, and Astronaut Scott Carpenter after Scott ' s flight, which was in June of 1962.

On this occasion, it was probably the first time that we had a real opportunity t o talk to the President, because it was an informal gat hering in his office with just the two families and, I believe, Pierre Salinger and one or two of our [NASA] public affairs people.

We discussed the [space] program in generalities and how it was going. I don't recall anything too specific, b ut we d id discuss the oncoming programs like Gemini and Apollo as the followers to Mercury. Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 3

This was followed by a very short press conference. I might say that the significant discussion from this visit occurred as we were leaving. The President walked up to the auto­ mobiles with us behind his office, and, after the families had gotten into the cars, Scott and I stood there and talked with him for, I would guess, perhaps ten minutes. And the significant statement I remember the President making was essentially this:

He realized this [space] program was terribly expensive, but he also wanted us to realize it was terribly important. He felt that we had three ways to battle the Soviets, or to compete with the Soviets--one bei ng nuclear war , which no one wanted unless in retaliation; the second being economic, which we were doing but which took time and would be a long haul; and the third, in this battle for - I wouldn't say the "favor" of the world, but for men's minds in competition with the Soviets - was the space program. The technology, the superiority, here was a place where the competition was quite clear and could be readily evaluated by anyone. And he thought these were the three areas where we could do battle or compete with them.

And, of course, it was always very encouraging to us to know that the President d i d support us .

The next occasion was the visit of the President, Vice President, and, I believe, primarily Congressional leaders, to Houston in September of 1962, when he came in one evening and left the next afternoon, maJ.dng a speech at Rice Stadium as well as a visit to the Manned Spacecraft Center .

Dr. Emme: Did our people help on that speech?

Dr. Williams: I wouldn't know this, Gene. If there was help, it was here at the Headquarters level. There's no question that it was an outstanding speech in regard to the space prograi.-n.

It was a terribly hot day in Houston. He made the comment there about heat of reentry--he said it would be almost as hot as it is here in Rice Stadium today! Interview wi th Dr. Walter C. Williams 4

We went to one of our buildings with the Presi dential party where we had about an hour of briefing of the President and his party on primarily Gemini and Apollo programs.

It's very har d to recall any specifi c questions but there ' s no doubt that he was extremely interested.

Dr. Emme: How about the mission mode? Did he discuss that?

Dr. Williams: Well, you know, this had been thoroughly discussed the day before at Huntsville .. • in fact, I guess there was a littl e bit of a battle with Jerry Wiesner. And it's a little hard for me to remember whether it came up very strongly, .but we did discuss lunar or bital rendezvous, I k:now, at the time. And I guess he di d ask some questions. And it's hard for me to remember now unless I check the records whether we had just made the decisi on or were just getting around to making the decision.

Mr . Holmes: We made the basic decisi on i n July and then we had these follow-on studies completed i n November •. .

Dr. Williams: Yes , and we did put forth our position ... I remember now . . . of why we thought lunar orbital rendezvous was the proper mode. We thought that gave us the possibility of success.

Dr. Emme: Well, the pictures show that he made his few remarks there with the model right in his hand.

Dr. Williams: Oh, yes. Well now that was after the briefing . .. then we took a tour through the buildi ng where we had mocl(- ups of the Apollo spacecraft. In fact, if I recall, Al Shepard took him into the Apollo mock-up, and, of course, there was a mock- up of the LEM; in fact, it was in front of the LEM mock-up that he was presented with this model of the Apollo spacecraft. Again, he was highly interested.

A little interesting side light involved the terrible heat that day. After we walked into the building, he immediately tool( his coat off, opened his tie, rolled up his sleeves, and sat back and relaxed f or the briefing. Well, of course, this relaxed all of us. Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 5

Dr. Williams: I guess the next occasion of a visit to the White House was when Bob Gilruth was presented with the Civil Service Award--you know, they nominated five people -

Question: Presidential Award -

Dr. Williams: Presidential Award to Civilian Employees, I guess , and, of course, I was there along with I believe all the Mercury astronauts, and it was one of the occasions when after the ceremony the President asked Glenn and Shepard and others and myself in the audience to step up there ... he greeted us and s o forth.

Dr. Emme: He asked for you b y name?

Dr. Williams: I don't recall that he did on that particular occasion, except he did look directly at me, and gave me the high sign to come up.

I think at the time of the Cooper flight, where we had a rather large group there which was sort of a Mercury wrap-up •. .

Mr. Holmes: Was there anything after Schirra?

Dr. Williams: Well, yes. Wally went to the White House but it was a visit--just Wally and Jo and their children- - very little ceremony; in fact, he was at the White House the same day he went over to the Navy Department and received his astronaut wings. In fact, it was quite a rush day, the day we were there with the Carpenters, because we left the White House and went to New York for a luncheon.

And, of course, in the case of Carpenter and in my case, the medal presentation had been at the Cape by ~Ir. Webb rather than at the White House by the President.

The Cooper flight, of course, was a large group, because not only did Cooper receive the [NASA] Distinguished Service Medal but others of the Mercury team were honored that hadn't been in the past, including unit citations, if you Interview with Dr. Walter c . Williams 6

will, or group achievement awards to the Navy recovery forces and Air Force Space Systems Division. And General Davis, DOD representative, for Mercury support, Chris Kraft, Kenny Klei nknecht, Merritt Preston ... they were all there with their families and Bob Gilruth and I were there with our families. And, of course, there were others. But these were the Mercury people who were there on that occasion.

And this was another time where the President tried to gather everyone together--well, what you might call "the Mercury family"--and then after the ceremony, in the Rose Garden, suggested we step into his office and Mrs. Kennedy was there as well . Again this was one of those very con­ fused occasions •.• by the time we got into the office it was terribly crowded and there wasn•t too much of an opportunity to talk.

Dr. Errune: was this before the .ff.lA-10 emerged as an item for decision?

Dr. Williams: Well, yes. This was at the time--right after MA- 9. And I remember Mrs. Kennedy asking the girls (by this I mean the astronaut wives) if they wouldn 1 t come by that evening for drinks, which ended up in a cocktail party that everyone heard about with the seven astronauts and their wives. It was not a cocktail party, really, just stopping by for a few drinks.

Then the last occasion I had to meet the President, rather than just seeing him, was when the Collier Trophy was presented to the Mercury Astronauts representing the program. I ](now specifically on this occasion he wanted the rest of the Mercury team and I saw him turn to Mr. webb and say, "Where is Walt Williams?" And he asked that I come forward.

I think the reason he asked was the fact that he followed our flights very closely and what we were doing, and as a result of course knew me by name and who I was .

The real specific story that goes with this was during the Cooper fli ght. You know, we always had a hot line between the Control Center ... outside the Operations Room, but from Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 7 the Viewing- Room to t he ,Vhite House. There was usually Bill Lloyd at one end and Pierre Salinger and some of t h e staff at the other end. I know on occasion the President would get on the line and ask specific questions. He was following the flights that closely.

Well, we d id have some problems near the end of the Cooper flight. Not too long before retrofire, Shorty Powers, who always sat on my left and reported the flights and was in contact with the Public Affairs people in t he outer room, turned to me and said, "How do you feel?" Well, this was an unusual q uestion to be coming from Shorty, so I said, "Well, what do you mean, how do I feel?" And he said, "What's your confidence?" Well, this was even more unusual to me for him to ask this. He di dn't usually ask questions liJ.>:e this •.. and I said, "Who the devil wants to know?" He said, "The President. " (Everybody laughs.)

Of course, we were quite anxious. Fortunately, however , this conversation took just long enough that by t he time I gave an answer the retrorockets had just been fired . .. so I was able to say, "Well, we just had a very successful retro­ fire maneuver and I'm very confident that we ' ll have a satisfactory completion of the flight and a safe recovery."

But, to me, this is indicative of how close the man foll owed what we were doing and I would think really would be the answer to the question of why he asked for me by name perhaps at some of these ceremonies--that h e was that close to the program and what was going on.

Dr. Emme: Did you have closed-circui t TV in the imite House?

Dr . Williams: No, no .•. this was just a phone line. Of course, we know he watched the commercial TV and we 've seen pictures-­ the picture I remember specifically was he and Mrs . Kennedy and others watching the Alan Shepard flight (MR-3). So we know that he d i d follow things very closely. Interview with Dr. i1Jalter C. Williams 8

The last time I saw him--just to nod--was in Houston when he spoke at the Albert Thomas dinner on November 21st, but I had no opportunity to talk to him.

Mr. Holmes: You weren't at the Cape at the brie£ing the previous weekend?

Dr. Williams: No, I wasn't. I d idn't go down--something which I've regretted .

Question: The Wiesner Report submitted to President [-Elect] Kennedy on January 12, 1961, said that the Atlas booster was marginal for Mercury, that the t wo-stage Titan should be considered. Also the inference that Mercury should be scrapped . 'What role did you play in continuance of the Mercury program? Wh at was your position with regard to Atlas versus Titan?

Dr. Williams: ~v· e11 , I remember the Wiesner Report, which said the Atlas booster was marginal for Mercury and the two-stage Titan should be considered. And there were inferences about Mercury.

Well, our position on the Titan was that it had further to go at that point in time than Atlas, although Atlas had had some problems, and these were primarily in the reliability area. Then, of course, we had some concern about performance, too. But i t would have been lik e starting over again because of the systems integration problems between the spacecraft and the booster, so we gave no serious consideration to changing over to a Titan booster.

Now the inference that Mercury should be scrapped•.. ! don't recall that particularly, but you know ..• and there may be a question further down in here • .. we, of course, had a number of discussions (a lot more than discussions) . It must have been in March and April of 1961 prior to the Alan Shepard flight, MR- 3 , our first manned space flight, that we had a series of brie£ings, discussions, meetings, with a sub- panel of the Presidential Scientific Advisory Conunittee. Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 9

Mr. Rot hrock: Who was chairman of that?

Dr. Williams: Dr. Hornig of Princeton was Chairman. Some of the people on it were Pat Hyman, Ed Heineman, Harrison Storms. This was the engineering side of it. I'm trying to think of the radiologist from the University of California ... and there were three medics. I remember par­ ticularly Dr. Beeson of Yale, Dr. Livi ngston of the National Institutes of Health, and I ' m just hard put to recall the third man.

But, of course, the President had asked them to look at Mercury. We had this flight coming up, he was new in office, he didn ' t know the agency, he didn't k now the people. But he did see, I think, in a way, that it was a satisfying thing. He did see the importance of the flight •.. from a national standpoint.

Question: This was prior to the Gagarin flight?

Dr. Vlilliams: Yes, and during. This got to be quite a session with these people and a couple of times we thought all was lost.

Question: This was the X-15 blood pressure problem?

Dr. Williams: Well, that was one of the things we did. Mechanically, systems-wise, I think we didn't have to go very far with people like Storms and Heineman to where they were convinced we knew what we were doing. They saw the same elements of risk that we did, which are the things you accept in a program such as this. But we had a particularly diffic ult time with the medical group, and there were times when we had a very pessimistic outlook.

Dr. Emme: vvhat was Dr. Hornig 1 s position as Chairman?

Dr. VVilliams: Hornig was pretty neutral and followed the lead of the rest of his people. The particular concern, of course, was the physiological reactions and we intro­ duced X-15 data which we had then, which showed the pulse rates. The medical concern was the fact that at that time Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 10

we were not measuring b lood pressure. The question was: With these high pulse rates and not knowing the blood pressure, would we know whether or not the man was near cardiac collapse. And they at various times made recom­ mendations for many, many more centrifuge runs involving men and animals, many, many more flights involving animals. Several things we did do. We did run some centrifuge programs where we measured blood pressure and we agreed that on the orbital missions, when possible, we would try to measure blood pressure. And, well, we were very busy with these people trying to defend our position to where we could make this flight. And, of course, somewhere in that period the Gagarin flight came along, April 12, and you see at that time we were scheduled probably about April 20th or April 25th--sometime in that period--for the Shepard flight, so we were getting pretty close to flight time. And then everything seemed to die down after that.

Dr. Errnne: You had problems with the Redstone booster?

Dr. Will iams: Oh, yes. But it was a tough battle with those PSAC people.

Mr . Rothrock: What was your general impression--that they were not adequately informed?

Dr. Williams: No, my impression was that as medical people they weren't used to making these types of decisions.

Of course, they would probably disagree with me and say they make life-and-death decisions every day, but, of course, they probably always make them in the conservative direction.

I think one of the problems, too, at that time (and it•s improving now) was that they were not used to looking at healthy people or healthy hearts under stressful conditions. Normally if the guy is healthy, such measurements have not been made. Since then data of this sort has been introduced in other programs. Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 11

We were terribly •.. well, the word isn•t "dedicated" ..• we were motivated •.. to move ahead ... and it was a very dis­ couraging type of experience. Not that we shouldn 1 t be called on to defend our programs--I feel we should always stand ready to do that.

Dr. Emme: Who would have made the decision in this case- ­ the President?

Dr. Williams: I imagine it would have gone to the President. Although, finally, the committee, I believe, after conversation between M.r. Webb and Jerry Wiesner, finally came out with the fact that we ran these centrifuge prog-rams where we measured blood pressure. Don Flickinger got into this and had a discussion with one of the doctors and Joe Walker [X-15 pilot]. And this doctor asked Walker whether he had fainted or not during the X-15 flight. And Walk er said, "My God, no!" "Well, how do you know you didn 1 t? 11 He said, 11 Because everything I did one second depended on what I did the last second and I'm sitting here talking to you." (Everybody laughs.) So that sort of settled that one.

Dr. Emme: This did get to the President for final decision?

Dr. Williams: Oh, yes.

Dr. Emme: Senator Kerr told the press about it after the Shepard flight. The President had decided with NASA.

Dr. Williams: Yes, that•s correct.

Mr. Rothrock: Not that he overruled anybody?

Dr. Williams: No ... it [PSAC] was an advisory committee, of course.

Dr. Emme: But didn't he have the same sort of a problem with the MA-6 flight--the so-called "Beeson Report"? It wouldn 1 t be the same problem in kind - Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 12

Dr. Williams: Not really. There was never any question about making MA-6 and we did not measure b l ood pressure on that particular flight as I recall. But by then, you know, there had been t wo Russian flights, both Gagarin and Titov, and ... oh, the skirmishes continued to a degree but we were busy.

Mr. Holmes: One point maybe that didn't involve the ~Vhite House at all is when you were talk ing about the preparation of the Shepard flight ... what was the situation with regard to this scheduling of an extra Redstone?

Dr. Williams: Well, we had had two Redstone flights , ~lR-1 and 2 • . . "2" being the one with the animal ... neither of which had been completely clean as £ar as the Redstone was concerned. We got an overspeed on MR-2, the flight with Ham , and also some structural vibration, structural coupling, I guess it was. The Marshall Space Flight Center [von Braun] people felt very strongly that just analysis and a "fix" was not enough. Although we felt (at least this was my position and Bob's {Gilruth] position and I guess generally the Space Task Group position) ... that we knew enough about the booster that the problems that were involved could be handled without additional flight testing. But the Marshall people felt very strongly that they wanted a clean flight with no problems prior to the manned flight, so they made the changes and we made this flight. We put a dummy spacecraft on it because we felt we needed no additional spacecraft testing and didn't want to waste a flight spacecraft. The flight was absolutely clean. Then, so far as they were concerned, they also felt they were ready for manned flight.

Dr. Emme : There was no thought of assuming the risks and doing a manned flight as soon as possible, say, to beat the Russians to manned flight?

Dr. Williams: Well, I wouldn't put it that way. In any program where you're motivated, you want to do it as soon as possible. Of course, we would have liked to beat the Russians. This couldn't be an overriding consideration. We did want to do it as expeditiously as possible. I think Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 13 we felt perfectly safe in going ahead without the booster development flight because it was more like the thing I was used to in airplane testing where if you had a problem you f ixed it and then flew it. But, of course, the man was always involved.

Mr. Holmes: If they had adopted yours and Gilruth's recom­ mendations, you would have beat the Russians.

Dr. Williams: Our ballistic flight might have beat the orbital f light of Gagarin, y es. It was just right in that time period. But the £light would have come up at about the time we were still arguing with PSAC lPresident's Science Advisory Committee], so I don't k now, it's real hard to say.

Mr. Rothrock: was this the last outside group you had on d ecisions in the program?

Dr. Williams: Yes. In fact, the whole progrmn to me was remarkably free from outside influence.

Mr. Rothrock: ~mo was responsible for that .•. that outside groups were not allowed to .•.

Dr. williams: I think you have to give a lot of credit to both of the Administrators, Glennan and Webb, because Mr. Webb held firmly that the agency was making the decisions. In fact, he was the Administrator making the decisions based on what his people told him.

I will say he had this position and this was good, but I think also the President--although it would be quite a temptation I would think--never, to my knowledge, even attempted to influence the program.

Question: At one time it was believed (1960-61) that the services, particularly the U.S. Air Force, were to gain a larger role in manned space flight. Did you have any part in persuading the President that such exploration should r~nain with a civilian agency? Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 14

Dr. Williams: Well, that's true, and I don't know whether we did any selling or not. I didn't do any specifically. I think the program in a sense sold itself. Part of this, I believe, was an argument on the part of the services that they were better fit to manage, but I think as the Mercury program got moving this settled that issue q uite well.

Question: What was· your role in educating both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations relative to a manned exploration program? How would you contrast them?

Dr. Williams: I thinJc the one thing in that time period - early in the Kennedy Administration - in contrasting the two administrations - was t h e fact that during the Eisenhower Administration •.. you had the feeling that perhaps the President and the official circles didn't necessarily consider space flight, particularly manned flight , very important .•. that it was a one-time stunt, or something of this order. Whereas, President Kennedy went on record very strongly that manned space flight was extremely important and that there would be follow-on programs. This, of course, occurred after the Shepard flight. He made his May 25th speech where he set the goal of going to the moon.

Political critics of the program have tied it to things like the Bay of Pigs invasion and a nuraber of bad things that had happened and gave these as the reason for President Kennedy pushing the program - to take the light off these other things. But every one of them has failed to state that he did this after the Shepard flight. I know that t h is was when our program became strongly oriented to the lunar landing rather than the circumlunar mission. And I feel the strongest influence on the decision to go with manned flight and then to lunar mission was not these other things but the fact that the Shepard mission had been successful and we had demonstrated that we had a capability to do this sort of thing. This has been overlooked.

Dr . Emme: He was mindful of t h e world-wide impact of the Shepard flight? Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 15

Dr. Williams: Oh, yes. Absolutely. Oh, yes, there was no question about that. He saw clearly the impact •.. I thinJc he also saw that we did have this capability. Then he came to be very aware of the manned space program. A number of people were reshaping this progr~n to the lunar-landing program and presented it to him.

Dr. Enune: For the NASA historical record, did Dr. Glennan in any way crimp the actual planning for the lunar program?

Dr. Williams: Not the planning, but he d i dn 't want to do any more than make· studies.

Mr . Rothrock: There were not many Mercury flights in fact scheduled?

Dr. Williams: Well, the number of flights planned was the same in both cases. The amount of hardware changed. That was established while Glennan was still Administrator. But I thi~ he pictured, too, a lot of losses along the way. That was the reason he went along with a l ot of hardware. We had more unmanned flights scheduled initially than we finally made, and more manned flights scheduled than we finally made, particularly Redstones.

Mr. Holmes: Six Redstones?

Dr . Williams: At that point in time it was the best he could do •.• assume you have to make these Redstones as a preamble to part of the training for an orbital Atlas flight.

Dr. Enune: On the 111.IA- 6 flight, do you remember, we were trying to do it if at all possible in '61 and it was scrubbed about December 6?

Dr. Williams: I thinJc I made the decision on the 10th or 11th. What was happening there •.. this was a self-generated drive, I thinJc, for those of us in the program, that we would have liked to complete an orbital flight in '61, maybe so we could have said we made orbital flights in the same year as the Russians, many things like this. Again, there were never any outside pressures. Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 16

We had the .M.A- 5 flight involving the ape, or the chi mp , "Enos, " about November 30th, as I recall, and we were pushing hard to get MA- 6 in '61 •.. I set a date, I think, of about December 10th, we would review where we stood, and when I did it worked out that the fli ght date was either the 28th or the 29th of December.

Well, I felt two things: one, our chances of making i t were pretty marginal because it would be very easy to lose a few days and the pressures that it would have taken to try to hold those dates were such that, (again internally generat ed) would have been the pressure on the people doing the work. But I di dn't feel it was worth the risk.

Question: Bad weather season, too?

Dr. Williams: Well, the weather I Jcnew would be bad for several months. But when you work crews like that too hard, too tight against a schedule, mistakes are being made. - And I thought it too important ••. well, let's put it this way: it's more important to me that the flight is successful than it takes place in ' 61. And I thought the better way to do it was to relax a little and do it right and we actually then set the mate date, putting the spacecraft on the booster, for January 2d as I recall .

Dr. Emme: But there was no outside pressure of any kind?

Dr. Williams: Absolutely none .

Dr. Emme: The press did play it up?

Dr. Williams: Well, of course, the press played it up and at times I thought they attended some of my meeti ngs. (Ever ybody laughs . ) The pressures that were there were self-generated, the release of the ·pressure was self- generated, the decision was within the program.

Dr. Emme: What about the pressure of the press? Did this have any influence on any of the Mercury decisions? Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 17

Dr. Williams: No. It got annoying, particularly during that six- week siege when we were at the beach wi th Glenn and the press sometimes knew about our troubles before I knew about them. They were making my decisions for me, but other than that it surely d idn't affect any decisions t hat were made.

Mr. Rothrock: You had an occupational hazar d?

Dr. Williams: Oh, yes ... you learn that pretty early.

Dr. Errnne: The next question we have is MA-10 decisi on. About the MA- 10 mission, why d id Kennedy ask Glenn (at banquet) and Shepar d (at Cooper ceremony) about its feasibility and/or desirability? Why did you favor it? How did you attempt to sell it?

Dr. Williams: Well, I think Presi dent Kennedy asked Glenn and Shepard about this because, agai n, he was h i ghly interested in the program. It was a subject that was being debated daily in the newspapers , and I think it woul d be very logical for him to ask these people what they thought about it. And I saw no more to it than that.

Dr. Emme: Well, the press was saying Spacecraft Center people down at Houston were trying to intervene directly with the White House.

Dr. Williams: I would deny this, because I talked to Shepard, particularly, because he would probably have flown the mission, before they went to the Wh i te House, about what they would discuss. I had their word that they would discuss the facts of the case, answer any questions the President had, make no requests for intervention. When they reported back after the visit, they said there were specific que stions asked and that they gave specific answers . I was one of those that felt we should make the flight and we said all the things I think we could have said. The decision was made not to make it so we picked up our marbles and wrapped up Mercury and went on about our business. Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williarns 18

But I know of no case where we asked for any outside inter­ vention. I know the President was interested and I think this was an interest generated out of his interest in the program.

Mr. Holmes: There•s an interesting point that I think should be put on the record here •.. and that is there was some feeling in the press and some people t hought because Brainerd Holmes resigned at the time this decision was made there might be some connection.

Dr. Williams: No, there wasn 1 t ... because Brainerd Holmes was one of the people who had reconunended against the flight. I guess I was the h i ghest level who recommended for it. And the reasons I did are, one, it would have been a three- or four-day mission, which I felt would have moved us along ... might have eliminated such a mission in the Gemini program, and I can only say "might"--I guess the other thing is that it would keep the operating complex going, keep people sharp. The investment in people didn 1 t appear to me to be unduly large for a relatively short period of time. I guess a belief of mine is that you learn by doing . We didn 1 t make any Mercury flights that we didn 1 t learn something that we hadn't set out to learn when we did it. So I thought there was merit in that, and that was why I favored riJA-10 .

Dr. Emme: During the space dialogue which was going on in the public press during the sununer of 1963, I'm sure some people might have changed their minds about MA-10 .

Question: To what extent was it your impression that President Kennedy obtained space advice from someone other than NASA? Or, other than top NASA officials?

Dr. Williams: Yes. Well, as far as the President obtaining space advice from someone other than NASA, I have no way of knowing that. He did have his Science Advisory Committee and I'm sure he listened to the military on occasions, but I have no way .•. and, of course, Dr. We lsh, being Secretary of the Space Council at that time, r•m sure he [JFK] had counsel with him. Interview with Dr. ·waiter c. Williams 19

As far as the President and Vice President are concerned, it was difficult to see any real difference of opinion between the two. They both seei."Ued to be solid supporters of the space program, and I think nothing has happened during President Johnson's term in office to indicate that he isn't.

Question: Special question relative to your career which could help future historians: 'Why was it that great concern over the life of an astronaut was not duplicated with previous experience on airplane test pilots? Is it just a matter of publicity and the extent to which the public identifies itself with space flight operations on TV?

Dr. Williams: This next one I would like to talk about. And that's this concern ov er the life of an astronaut was not duplicated with previous experience on airplane test pilots, and I'll disa gree with just that statement. I'll grant, depending on who was doing the testing, there were a number of pilots k illed and probably some of them unnecessarily. Any programs that I've been involved in have always placed safety very high . In fact, they operated on the basis that accidents are not a necessary part of flight tests, that accidents ARE caused, that you CAN avoid them. I never bought the philosophy this is a dangerous business, that we're going to k ill people. And I always felt that by careful preparation, careful planning in carrying the flight out in a careful manner, you can do some pretty exotic things, liJ<.e orbiting a man or break ing the sound barrier, without k illing people. And I think the record in Mercury is further substantiated by the record of the Research Airplane Program - particularly that part of it handled directly by the NACA [National Advisory Conunittee for Aeronautics] and NASA. We lost one pilot at Edwards in - what was it - an 18-year history, and this was an eng ine failure on tak e-off, and this taught me, too, that I couldn't accept anything at face value. You have to look behind every piece of hardware that you work with. This was very early in our program at Edwards. But since then we've been t h rough a number of airplane-test programs, including the X-15, that have been very successfully carried out. Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 20

So I would say the concern for the astronaut was no greater than that we 've shown in our airplane programs.

Dr. Erorne: What about the relative publicity?

Dr. Williams: More publicity for Mercury perhaps, and we applied the same basic philosophy to it - of trying to know what we were doing and that there would be no surprises during the mission. We tried to think of all these things ahead of time.

Dr. Errune: I apologize for the pointed question.

Dr. Williams: No, it's all right to say it that way ... but I want to put this on the record.

Dr. Errune: ·well, the point is that the general public was not conscious, was not concerned with each flight of the X-15 ... they weren 't in the cockpit with Joe Walker like they're in the capsule with Al Shepard or John Glenn. Now wasn ' t it the publicity given Project Mercury that distinguished the degree of the public's consciousness concerning the fact of the hazard of a p ilot's life involved?

Dr. Williams: No, I think there is a general image that the test pilot is a daredevil and this is partly substantiated by the many movies that have been made and so on. So in the public's eye a test pilot is a guy who is going to be killed. And as I moved into that business many years ago I made up my mind it wasn't necessarily so-- that there was a way to beat it.

As far as the TV coverages of the Mercury launches, I don't feel these affected our flight operations at all, because we didn't allow it to. Although there were arguments and the like, our own public affairs people and the networks and the press were quite good about the whole thing as far as organizing it, agreeing to ground rules as to where they would be, where they would go, and so •.. it didn't affect our flights one i ota.

I had running argw.nents with them. It came up every time there was a new pool director •.. and that was having live Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 21 television from the Control Center, and I had only one answer to that one and that was "No." Because I felt this would unduly compromise the mission, our people would be self-conscious, I felt. it was the type of thing that we just couldn't afford. This, of course, is what created Shorty Powers' role in Mercury operations. This was the compromise . .. since we would not let them in, we would provide something going out. In fact , we worJ<.ed it out for the Shepar d flight right here in Washington in the bar at the Hay- Adams, Shorty Powers, Paul Haney, and Roy Neal and I.

I still feel that live television must be excluded from the Control Center during a critical mission--or from the block­ house so far as that goes.

Dr. Emme: (Interrupts) This was a Wh ite House decision, though, wasn 't it?

Dr. Williams: I don't know that it went that high up or not ... I don't know if it was White House or NASA administration.

Mr. Holmes: The jurisdiction was left up to you?

Dr. Williams : Yes, that's right. And since it was well organized, it did not hurt us, and, of course, the thing was you can't avoid it anyway, the way the Cape was laid out. Even if you didn't bring them on the Cape, they could cover from the b each and if you had a failure it would be a failure - period. If we didn't have live coverage at all, it would look just as bad three hours later as it did when it occurred.

Mr. Rothrock : I just wondered if it can be handled adequately from the standpoint of the public?

Dr. Williams: Yes, it can be managed properly.

Mr. Holmes: They [the news media] did respect your position?

Dr. Williams: Yes, other than this argument every mission of having live TV from the Control Center, we never had any problem with them. ' Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 22

Dr. Emme: Well, Shorty was a pretty good filter?

Dr. Williams: Yes, he was . I do thiruc the coverage was great. I think it undoubtedly helped the President, both the President and the Vice Presi dent, as well as the whole world. They knew better what this thing was all about. And there's no question in my mind there was a very large gain by doing it this way . •. in visits from people overseas as well as trips overseas and mail from overseas that we received and that I received personally - the fact that we did things in the open impressed the world. I had some letters from a Japanese boy who refused to believe the Russians had done anything because they wouldn't show him what they'd done the way we had.

Dr. Rmme: But we didn't have any failures either!

Dr. Williams: I don't thiru< that would have made any difference because we can't hide a failure anyway.

Mr. Holmes: You might be interested, Walt •.. a short time before the Shepard flight, a man from Tass {Soviet News Agency] was at the Press Club, and I said, "Are you going down for the Shepard flight?" And he looked at me and said, "I've got to cover it from here."

Dr. Williams: Yes, that's right, they wouldn't dare show up dovm there.

Question: Did President Kennedy's relations with the Mercury astronauts directly affect Mercury fli ght operations?

Dr. Williams: I don't thinJ< the Presi dent's relations with the astronauts affected our operations. In fact, I think if anything it had a very beneficial effect - not only for th~n but for all of us to know that he was interested and interested in them as individuals. I think the high point - probably of each of the missions - for the astronauts themselves - it became a tradition, and that was the phone call from the President after he landed. It came as a surprise to us after the Alan Shepard flight. In fact, the Interview with Dr. ~'1/al ter c. ~Vill iai'"Tls 23

Navy had to scramble real hard to get circuits hooked up so he could get to the carrier and talk to Al. After that, of course, we expected it and proper arrangements were made, but it took some scrambling in that case because no one expected that. In fact, I think really none of us at that time really intimately involved in the program had any real feel for the national and international impact or the pressure that was building up prior to t h e Shepard flight; one, we were too busy fighting to be able to make the flight, and then too busy getting ready for the flight to be too concerned about that or even have time to think about it.

And we went down range immediately after the flight to talk with Al and, of course, the next thing we knew there was a jet airplane coming down to picJ<. us up and haul us back to Washington. This came as quite a shock and surprise •.. and then we were totally unprepared for the vfuite House reception and the mobs of people on the street. For about two or three days we were out of touch being down range.

And with the build-up prior to the mission, of course, we were out of touch. we were too busy, and the Shepard flight par­ ticularly, I think, made us aware of where we stood on the national scene.

Dr. Errune: I can•t find documents to show that President Kennedy had any contact with NASA much before he became President ...

Dr. Williams: None that I know of ... no, none that I know of.

Question: What was your opinion of the deletion by the DOD of the X-20 Dyna- Soar program in 1963?

Dr. Williams: Well, of course, the Dyna- Soar was a very difficult program and at the time I felt it was a good program. In fact, I was working heavily in it. It went through so many orienting, reorienting situations and studies to make it something better and really it was some­ thing less than a weapons system. If they had started off initially as another h igh - speed or hypersonic research vehicle, they might have been able to get the thing moving. Interview with Dr. Walter C. Williams 24

But to me it was an example of a program where a lot of money was spent but not quite enough was spent to accomplish something. You know, there's a magic level there where you spend a lot of money without really doing anything.

Mr . Rothrock: There is continued indecision as to really what it LDyna-Soar] was for •. .

Dr. "Williams: Yes, and it was unfortunate ...

Quest.ion: Do you believe that the NASA-USAF cooperative program on Geuini will be a profitable venture?

Dr . Williams: I would think surely that the NASA- USAF cooperative program on Gemini would b e a profitable v enture. Oh, several years ago, when Gemini was forming, we were formulating plans and we felt this was something that would be of great interest to the Air Force.

Question: What effect did you feel that President Kennedy 's death would have on the U.S. manned space flight program?

Dr. Williams: As far as the President's death, I guess I had no great concern as far as the manned flight program as such because we knew that the Vice President, President Johnson, was quite interested, and I guess the other thing is that the manned space flight prograi.u seemed like a trivial thing to worry about at a time like that.

Dr. Emme: Do you have any other comments on President Kenne dy as a man? His appreciation of people who lived with danger, war heroes, astronauts?

Dr. Williams: Yes, I think he respected men. I mean, you know, real men who had accomplished things, that were dedicated, that would take risks to accomplish their ends.

Question: How about briefings of President Kennedy--his grasp of detail? Interview with Dr. Walter c. Williams 25

Dr. Williams: His g-rasp at briefings was uncanny. As everyone knows, he was an extremely intelligent man. Particularly at those briefings in Houston, there was no doubt in your mind that you were getti ng through to him and he understood everything you were saying.

The first indication we got of this was a comment made during the PSAC business. One of the cormnittee (I don't remember who) said, "Well, we can say this--whether the President understands it or not isn't important ... ," more or less implying that this was something beyond his [ the President's] ken and so on and he wouldn't want to know about it anyway. And ~'liesner said, "Oh, you don 1 t know this man!" (Everybody laughs.)

Dr. Emme: Dr. Williams, thank you for your excellent contribution to history.

Interviewee: lal ter C. Williams

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WALTER C. W ILLIAVS October 1963 NASA M.Aj\JNED SPACECRAFT CENTER'S DEPUTY D IRECTOR FOR MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND FLIGHT OFER.PC:' IONS NASA HEP_DQUARTEL\.S DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERA ':':.'.ONS

Walter C . Willia.n-.is, Deputy Dir ector for Mission. Requi::.-2::-.c. cn'::s and Flizht O perations for the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center and Director oi i~: ig ht Operations for the NASA I-Ieadquarters Office of Manned Space Flight, has responsibility for 1 MSC s space i :. ission req uirements and complete mission a uthority dur''lg manned space fligl:.t ope1-a::ions of Projects Mercury, G err1ini and. A:;>oi.ic.

Dr·. . Willian:is: served as t he Associate Direc~or and Operations :.::J :..:r ecto r foi- the Manned Spacecraft Cente r fi~om September 1959 until assuming his p :ces.:::nt duties on January 1, 1963. As the Operations Director, he held the responsit E ity fer foe overall l aunch, t racking and recovery during manned s pace fli ghts . In h is new _,_,osition c..s Deputy Director for lviission Requirer.o.ents anci ~~ligh t Opera.tior.s , tie aintair... s full ::..- esponsibility for conduct of manned space flights . All NASA, ....Jepartment of .Cefense, and other tearn.s participating i n the operation r e port to him for direction. E a ch team has resp onsioility for a specific facet of a space flig~-:it and reports di:;.:e ctly to Dr . Wiliiams during flight operaLons , enabling him to assess the flight and to rnake :-:iecessary d ire ctions f r om the Mission Control C e nter at Cape Canaveral, Florida.

D:-. \t\Tilliams performed as Operations Director for Ame r ica' s s:x inanned space fligi-1ts - - the suborbital flights of Astronauts Alan B. Shepard, Jr., on May S , 1961, and Virgil I. Grisson> o n July 21, 1961; the t h ree- orbit flights of J ohn H . Glen n , Jr. , on February 20, 1962, and M. Scott Carpent er o n May 24, 1962; the six-orbit flig ht of Walter M . Schi rra on October 3, 1962; and L . Gordon Cooper ' s 22-oi:bit :mission -- May 15-16, 1963. He also directed the unmanned o :-bital fii ght of September 13, 1961, and the two- orbit m i ssion of the chimpanzee, Enos, on Novembe r 29, 1961.

Dr. Williams is a native of New Orleans, Louisiana. He received a BS deg:ree in ae ronautic a l e ngineering from Louisiana S tate University, Baton Rouge , Louisiana, i n 1939, and an Honorary Doctorate Degree for Engineer ing from his alma mater in June 1963.

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....-~ fter g raduation; he was employed by the Glenn L. Martin C ompany of )c..~-~1mo1· e, 1viaryla:::i. d a n d _.:. later that year - - joi ned tne science staff of the JACA Langley Memorial Ae1·onautical Laboratory (now NASA L angley Research :ente r ), where he initiaHy w ork ed in t he stability and control f iel d , p redomj.nately 7 i th \\To rJ. cl War II aircraft.

In Septemb e r 1946 Dr. Williams was assigned as the NACA Proje ct :n g ineer for the X - 1 e x perime ntal aircraft program and i n August 1947 was esign2.ted head of NACA 1 s deta chment a t Mu.roe, California (now Edwards, :alifornia).

In this assignment, he directed a great variety of flight researcn programs, :icluding the followi:ig: compreh ensive program s involving the X - 1 which w as tb.e ~ r st airpla!le to exceed the speed of sound; the D - 558 a irplanes , O:>J.e of which w as 1e first to fly twice the s peed of sound; X - 4 p r ograms emphasizing s tabiEty and o~t r ol investigations; v ai-iable swept wing X-5 progr c:.ms_: programs :;_nvolving ·!e XF- 92A, p:rototype delta- wing fighter; B-47 flight investig ations; programs sing the X - 3 on whici:1 inerba coupling was first expe r i enc ed; programs using ie X - 2 for researcf-:. on aerodynamic heating; i n vestigations using Ceniu:::-y- eries f ighte r s , F - 100, F - 102, F - 104; F - 105, and F - 107 .

!-Dr. Williams was activ ely e:.c.gci.ged in estab lishi ng the research requi:r- e - 1er n the development of the X - ~5 aircraft. In his position as Chie£ of t~1 e "AS~. _... igh- Speed Flight Station he direc ted the planni".)_g of the r esearch progr a::-n ) be c a r r ied out witn the X - J.5 .

In JanuaJy 1958 he became Chairm an of the X-15 F light Test Stee:ring ommitte e, d~ang~d i:i Janua~y 1959 to the X-15 J oirot Ope r ating Commi::tee.

In April 1959 he was appoi:ited a member of the A dvisory Group for cronautic2.l Resea::rch a nd Dev elopment for the North Atlantic T reat 1-ga-:Jiz-?.'::-::> n (NA TC) . :-:e is ::i. membe ;:- of the Mexico- U . S . Commis sion:~-:--:: pace Tracldng Obsc:--v2.~:~.o:':'.-

,..4: -~~. He is '::Ce authc:~ o:c :'.1.u::c.;.erous NASA teshnical ?apers ...... · ..,:;,··-" ~search .

Dr . Williams is a .:?dlow of the A merica n Institute o!. Aero:iautics an.:'. stronautics. He is a member of Ta'I;. Beta Pi and Om:'.cr0n Delta K;:;.ppa. ~-ie :;cc ~. vcr:i~ '::hr:: NP.SA Distinguished Service Med8.l from FASA Adminis ~;r2.tor ··:-: -::s :C: . -,;/eY.::J in May 1962. He rece:ved the D isting~:.is~.ed Serv~.ce Medal fro m tlle -.-~·:::: ~:::: z::a ',·.rar 1-V;:others in May 1962 and i\:ew Y ork Cit:y's Gold Mec~a l of Eono :c

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fr om Mayor Robert Wagner in June 1962. He received the S ylvan D S .!~-:.~:.~:..< Reed Award from the Institute of the Aeros;:-a. ce Sciences in Jam1ary :c:;..'.:,:; .

Dr. Wiiliams has been pmminent in NASA program participa tion md was :

Chairman, Flight Testing Session, IAS, 1959; Session Chairman, Con­ ference on the Progress of the X-15 Project , 1959; and C hairman, Project Mercury Session, 11:-.S National l\ifeeting on lVIanned Space Flight, St. Louis, M i ssouri, April 1962.

He also presented a :i.1urnbe r of papers incluciing the following :

11 The X -15 R esearch Airplane P r ogram, 1 1 p resented at the Americ a:i Roc:zet Society Space Exploration R egiona l Meeting i n S an Diego, Ca.liforr..ia, in 1958; 11 The Comparison ,_,:_ Flight Measur ement of High- Spec'·- Airplane Stabil ity and Control Ch aracteristics , 11 presented in Brussels, Belgium, in A ugust 1956; and "Manned Flight Systems : Past, Present, Futur0 - - Flight Mechanics Aspects'' pr_esented to AGARD Twelfth Gene ral Assembly and Tenth Anniversa::..7, July 1962, Paris, France.

Dr. W illiarns is mar:-: - ..J t o the forme r Helen Ma~".:.:: ~:::-.g of New Orleans .. The y have th::..-- ee c hildren - - C11z..:::les lvianning, born Nov-:-:.:.--:-.. -.::>e r 2 6, 19 ~2 , a busine ss major and p r e law student at the Universi ty of Hou stm:.; :-{ mvard Lee, born October 3, 1948; and Elizabeth A-:~ne, born September 12, ::.952. f·--· 1 ·~·-· ;:'"!... :··· j -- f f -, i .1. .._-~; ; L '-· ~ '-' ~-· l.. "' ·"- ... -~- ...... / '"~-···- ".,-·,, ,... ,... . ;· . c.,.., • .. - .. ...J, _ , ... ~ . .• _, - f "'- .. .,. .' '

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V!iLLI.'.\.i'llS ·I·O E3).:0 Ifi;._:;:~J.: D S:? ..l~ CE FLIGHT' 0?3RATIONS FOR NA:::.:.

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t::.1:::_::....;.ri1.s to -.::,.:;; Opera'c i oEs Dir·ector fm."' a l l M..s.:1:::.c~ Space

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~ or o~ ~a~ned Spacecraf~ Center for ~~ss ion Requir~ments

and Flisht Operations at Houston, Tex.;; will becom0 i;&~:Jt:-Cy l'.ssoc:Late Aem::.n.::..strator fo:.c· rvlann0d Spc::.ce Flight Operatio:r.s i n l~·AsA Headquarter·s, Wash::ngton,

- mo:r·e- - 2 -

Dr. Williarns will supervise operations :"or Manneci

Space Flight Missions at the M~nned Spacecraft Center,

Marshall S.:,J2.Ce Flig~1t Cent.er, e.nd Launch Operations Cen­ t e ::-. During ma::med sp&ce flight missions he will have

full authority and responsibility for cond~ct of the flights .

.. ll NASA_, :C:J:J._, and othe:t• teams participating i:-: t :· ~ opera­ tion w::.11 :eepor t to him f or- d.:. ::cec'cion .

1 Dr. Muell e r · said~ i Becaus0 of the increc..si:'.16 ·complexity

of NASA 1 s Manned Space Flight .Projects, we must have a key man t o direct the operations of the many organizations and installations locate d throughout t he U.S. and the worl d that contr ibute to the conduct Of a flight mission . We are indeed ·fortunatc to be able to rely on the uniq~e experienc e of Dr .. Williams in P :..~oject .l\'~e:r· cu1"y for t he more c haller.ging operations t ask 2head in Gemi~ i a~d Apollo.

James c. El ms, De~:mty Director for D2velof:twent a:.";d

Prograrns of MSC will assume f\.lll responsi-r...' .:'...: i ty as Deputy

Di r2...;~;or under Dr. Robert R. Gil:..."uth, Director oI th2

Center>.

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Dr·. Williams has 23 years of flight en0ineering

experience with the National A6viso::-y Com::-Jittee for

tration ..

operational phases of Cl.d.va.:'lceC: r e searc:-: type &2::."'osp 2ce

.Du::·i:."'-G this ·cime.:i 1-:e has n:ade many outstandit1g co~;. t:._-· ibutions

in the field of high -speed flight research and was awarded

the NA.S .~..: Distinguished Ser·vice Hedal for' his outstanding - . tecl:u:.ical leade:c·ship as the Dircc tor of' Cpera tions for Project Me1""cury.

.,.. I, D.l. .. Williams is a native of New ·orleans 1 La . He received a B.S. degree in Aeronautical Engin.a2rinz from Louisiana Stc:ce Universi"cy_, Baton Rouge _, La. in 1939, and an honorary doctorate in enzineering from his Alma Mater in June 19630

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lJI'. willianlS is marr:i.ed to the for.71er Helen Manning of New Orleans. They have- three children- -Charles Manning, born Nov. 2b, 1942, a b~siness ma j or a~d pre-law s~udent at the University of Houston; : '·o ward Lee, bo:2n Oct. 3,

1948; and Eli zabeth Ann, born Sept . 12, ~952.

5 .... ~2u s e Dr. Willia'!1s will co:.Jtinue to have m2.j0r duties in the Hluston area as .well as in Washi~g~on and

Cape Canaver2.l, h.e will continue to make his home in

Ho·..... s ton .

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