<<

Appendix A – Breakdown of Interviews

The interviews were drawn from four ESRC projects:

• The Changing Role of Central Government Departments in Britain ESRC Award No.L124251023 [Research conducted 1995–1998] • Labour and the Reform of : Inheritance, Transition and Accommo dation ESRC Award No.R000222657 [Research conducted 1998–2000] • Public Service Delivery Programme: Analysing Delivery Chains in the . ESRC Award. No.RES.153-25-0037. [Research conducted 2005–7] • Building Bridges between Political Biography and Political Science – A Methodo- logically Innovative Study of the Core Executive Under New Labour ESRC Award No. RES-000-22-2040. [Research conducted 2006–7]

Interviews Numbers Senior civil servants 149 Other civil servants 48 Labour ministers 15 Conservative ministers 21 Special advisers 6 NGO representatives 63

204 Appendix B – Permanent Secretaries and Their Relevant Departments 1996–2004

1. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) 1996 Permanent R J Packer Secretary 1997 (before the Permanent R J Packer general election) Secretary 1997 (after the Permanent R J Packer general election) Secretary 1998 Permanent R J Packer Secretary 1999 Permanent R J Packer Secretary 2000 Permanent Brian Secretary Bender

In 2001, combined with the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) to form the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).

2. 1996 Secretary of the Cabinet and Robin Butler Head of the Home (Office of R Mountfield Public Service)

1997 (before the Secretary of the Cabinet and Robin Butler general election) Head of the Home Civil Service Permanent Secretary (Office of R Mountfield Public Service)

1997 (after the Secretary of the Cabinet and Robin Butler general election) Head of the Home Civil Service Permanent Secretary (Office of R Mountfield Public Service)

1998 Secretary of the Cabinet and Richard Wilson Head of the Home Civil Service Permanent Secretary (Office of R Mountfield Public Service)

Continued

205 206 Appendix B

Continued

1999 Secretary of the Cabinet and Richard Wilson Head of the Home Civil Service Permanent Secretary (Office of Brian Bender Public Service)

2000 Secretary of the Cabinet and Richard Wilson Head of the Home Civil Service Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Mavis Office McDonald

2001 Secretary of the Cabinet and Richard Wilson Head of the Home Civil Service Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Mavis Office McDonald

2002 Secretary of the Cabinet and Andrew Head of the Home Civil Service Turnbull Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office

2003 Secretary of the Cabinet and Andrew Head of the Home Civil Service Turnbull Permanent Secretary, Cabinet David Omand Office

2004 Secretary of the Cabinet and Andrew Head of the Home Civil Service Turnbull Permanent Secretary, Cabinet David Omand Office Permanent Secretary, Howell James Government Communications

3. Central Statistical Office 1996 Director and Head of the Tim Holt Government Statistical Service

In April 1996, merged with the Office of the Population Census and Surveys (OPCS) to form the Office for National Statistics (ONS)

1997 (before the Director, Registrar General and Tim Holt general election) Head of the Government Statistical Service 1997 (after the Director, Registrar General and Tim Holt general election) Head of the Government Statistical Service Continued Appendix B 207

Continued

1998 Director, Registrar General and Tim Holt Head of the Government Statistical Service 1999 Chief Executive, Registrar Tim Holt General and Head of the Government Statistical Service 2000 Chief Executive, Registrar Len General and Head of the Cook Government Statistical Service 2001 Chief Executive, Registrar Len General and Head of the Cook Government Statistical Service 2002 Chief Executive, Registrar Len General and Head of the Cook Government Statistical Service 2003 Chief Executive, Registrar Len General and Head of the Cook Government Statistical Service 2004 Chief Executive, Registrar Len General and Head of the Cook Government Statistical Service

4. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 1996 Director of Public Prosecutions Barbara Mills 1997 (before the Director of Public Prosecutions Barbara Mills general election) 1997 (after the Director of Public Prosecutions Barbara Mills general election) 1998 Director of Public Prosecutions Barbara Mills 1999 Director of Public Prosecutions David Calvert- Smith 2000 Director of Public Prosecutions David Calvert- Smith 2001 Director of Public Prosecutions David Calvert- Smith 2002 Director of Public Prosecutions David Calvert- Smith 2003 Director of Public Prosecutions David Calvert- Smith 2004 Director of Public Prosecutions Ken Macdonald 208 Appendix B

5. Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 1998, newly created department with a permanent secretary

1998 Permanent Secretary Vacant 1999 Permanent Secretary Robin Young 2000 Permanent Secretary Robin Young 2001 Acting Permanent Secretary Nicholas Kroll 2002 Permanent Secretary Sue Street 2003 Permanent Secretary Sue Street 2004 Permanent Secretary Sue Street

6. HM Customs and Excise (C&E) 1996 Chairman Valerie Strachan 1997 (before the Chairman Valerie general election) Strachan 1997 (after the Chairman Valerie general election) Strachan 1998 Chairman Valerie Strachan 1999 Chairman Valerie Strachan 2000 Chairman Richard Broadbent 2001 Chairman Richard Broadbent 2002 Chairman Richard Broadbent 2003 Acting Chairman Mike Elland 2004 Acting Chairman Mike Elland

7. Ministry of Defence (MOD) 1996 Permanent Under-Secretary Richard of State Mottram Second Permanent Secretary J M Stewart of State Chief Scientific Adviser David Davies Chief of Defence M K McIntosh Procurement Continued Appendix B 209

Continued

1997 (before the Permanent Under-Secretary Richard general election) of State Mottram Second Permanent Secretary R T Jackling of State Chief Scientific Adviser David Davies Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

1997 (after the Permanent Under-Secretary Richard general election) of State Mottram Second Permanent Secretary R T Jackling of State Chief Scientific Adviser David Davies Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

1998 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary R T Jackling of State Chief Scientific Adviser David Davies Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

1999 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary R T Jackling of State Chief Scientific Adviser Keith O’Nions Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

2000 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary R T Jackling of State Chief Scientific Adviser Keith O’Nions Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

2001 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary R T Jackling of State

Continued 210 Appendix B

Continued

Chief Scientific Adviser Keith O’Nions Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

2002 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary Ian Andrews of State Chief Scientific Adviser Keith O’Nions Chief of Defence Robert Procurement Walmsley

2003 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary Ian Andrews of State Chief Scientific Adviser Keith O’Nions Chief of Defence Peter Spencer Procurement

2004 Permanent Under-Secretary Kevin Tebbit of State Second Permanent Secretary Ian Andrews of State Chief Scientific Adviser Keith O’Nions Chief of Defence Peter Spencer Procurement

8. Office of the Deputy Prime (ODPM) In 2002, newly created department that separated from the Cabinet Office and took over the local government and neighbourhood issues from the DTLR.

2002 Permanent Secretary Mavis McDonald 2003 Permanent Secretary Mavis McDonald 2004 Permanent Secretary Mavis McDonald Appendix B 211

9. and Employment (DFEE)

1996 Joint Permanent Secretary Tim Lankester Joint Permanent Secretary Michael Bichard

1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Michael general election) Bichard

1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Michael general election) Bichard

1998 Permanent Secretary Michael Bichard

1999 Permanent Secretary Michael Bichard

2000 Permanent Secretary Michael Bichard

In 2001 department restructured to become the Department for Education and Skills (DFES).

2001 Permanent Secretary David Normington 2002 Permanent Secretary Claudette Sutton 2003 Permanent Secretary David Normington 2004 Permanent Secretary David Normington

10. Department of the Environment (DOE) 1996 Permanent Secretary Andrew Turnbull

1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Andrew general election) Turnbull

1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Andrew general election) Turnbull 212 Appendix B

In 1998, merged with the Department of Transport to form the new Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)

1998 Permanent Secretary Andrew Turnbull 1999 Permanent Secretary 2000 Permanent Secretary Richard Mottram

In 2001, combined with the MAFF to form the new Department for Environ- ment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), with the policy responsibility for trans- and regional development being transferred to another department.

2001 Permanent Secretary Brian Bender 2002 Permanent Secretary Brian Bender 2003 Permanent Secretary Brian Bender 2004 Permanent Secretary Brian Bender

11. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

1996 Permanent Under-Secretary of John Coles State and Head of the Diplomatic Service 1997 (before the Permanent Under-Secretary of John Coles general election) State and Head of the Diplomatic Service 1997 (after the Permanent Under-Secretary of John Coles general election) State and Head of the Diplomatic Service 1998 Permanent Under-Secretary of John Kerr State and Head of the Diplomatic Service 1999 Permanent Under-Secretary of John Kerr State and Head of the Diplomatic Service 2000 Permanent Under-Secretary of John Kerr State and Head of the Diplomatic Service 2001 Permanent Under-Secretary of John Kerr State and Head of the Diplomatic Service

Continued Appendix B 213

Continued

2002 Permanent Under-Secretary of Michael State and Head of the Diplomatic Jay Service 2003 Permanent Under-Secretary of Michael State and Head of the Diplomatic Jay Service 2004 Permanent Under-Secretary of Michael State and Head of the Diplomatic Jay Service

12. Department of Health (DH)

1996 Permanent Secretary Graham Hart Chief Medical Officer Kenneth C Calman Chief Executive of NHS Alan Langlands Executive

1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Graham Hart general election) Chief Medical Officer Kenneth C Calman Chief Executive of NHS Alan Langlands Executive

1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Graham Hart general election) Chief Medical Officer Kenneth C Calman Chief Executive of NHS Alan Langlands Executive

1998 Permanent Secretary Chris Kelly Chief Medical Officer Kenneth C Calman Chief Executive of NHS Alan Langlands Executive

1999 Permanent Secretary Chris Kelly Chief Medical Officer Liam Donaldson Chief Executive of NHS Alan Langlands Executive 2000 Permanent Secretary Chris Kelly Continued 214 Appendix B

Continued

Chief Medical Officer Kenneth C Calman Acting Chief Executive Neil McKay of NHS Executive

2001 Permanent Secretary Nigel Crisp Chief Medical Officer Liam Donaldson Permanent Secretary of Neil McKay NHS Executive

2002 Permanent Secretary/ Nigel Crisp NHS Executive Chief Medical Officer Liam Donaldson Director of Human Andrew Foster Resources (NHS)

2003 Permanent Secretary/ Nigel Crisp NHS Executive Chief Medical Officer Liam Donaldson Director (Workforce) Andrew Foster

2004 Permanent Secretary/ Nigel Crisp NHS Executive Group Director, Liam Standards and Quality Donaldson and Chief Medical Officer Director (Workforce) Andrew Foster

13. Health and Safety Commission (HSC) 1996 Director-General (Second J H Bacon Permanent Secretary) 1997 (before the Director-General (Second J H Bacon general election) Permanent Secretary) 1997 (after the Director-General (Second J H Bacon general election) Permanent Secretary) 1998 Director-General (Second J H Bacon Permanent Secretary) 1999 Director-General (Second J H Bacon Permanent Secretary)

Continued Appendix B 215

Continued

2000 Director-General (Second Timothy Permanent Secretary) Walker 2001 Director-General (Second Timothy Permanent Secretary) Walker 2002 Director-General (Second Timothy Permanent Secretary) Walker 2003 Director-General (Second Timothy Permanent Secretary) Walker 2004 Director-General (Second Timothy Permanent Secretary) Walker

14. Home Office

1996 Permanent Under-Secretary R T J Wilson of State 1997 (before the Permanent Under-Secretary R T J Wilson general election) of State 1997 (after the Permanent Under-Secretary R T J Wilson general election) of State 1998 Permanent Under-Secretary David Omand of State 1999 Permanent Under-Secretary David Omand of State 2000 Permanent Under-Secretary David Omand of State 2001 Permanent Under-Secretary John Gieve of State 2002 Permanent Under-Secretary John Gieve of State 2003 Permanent Under-Secretary John Gieve of State Permanent Secretary: Crime, Leigh Lewis Policing, Counter Terrorism and Delivery 2004 Permanent Under-Secretary John Gieve of State Permanent Secretary: Crime, Leigh Lewis Policing, Counter Terrorism and Delivery Permanent Secretary: Chief Martin Narey Executive of the National Offenders Management System 216 Appendix B

15. Board of Inland Revenue (IR)

1996 Chairman Anthony Battishill 1997 (before the Chairman Anthony general election) Battishill 1997 (after the Chairman Anthony general election) Battishill 1998 Chairman N L J Montagu 1999 Chairman N L J Montagu 2000 Chairman N L J Montagu 2001 Chairman N L J Montagu 2002 Chairman N L J Montagu 2003 Chairman N L J Montagu 2004 Acting Chairman Ann Chant

16. ’s Department (LCD)

1996 Permanent Secretary to the Thomas Legg Lord Chancellor 1997 (before the Permanent Secretary to the Thomas Legg general election) Lord Chancellor 1997 (after the Permanent Secretary to the Thomas Legg general election) Lord Chancellor 1998 Permanent Secretary to the Hayden Phillips Lord Chancellor 1999 Permanent Secretary to the Hayden Phillips Lord Chancellor 2000 Permanent Secretary to the Hayden Phillips Lord Chancellor 2001 Permanent Secretary to the Hayden Phillips Lord Chancellor 2002 Permanent Secretary to the Hayden Phillips Lord Chancellor 2003 Permanent Secretary to the Hayden Phillips restructured to Lord Chancellor become the Department for Constitutional Affairs 2004 Chair and Permanent Secretary (Corporate Board) Chief Executive Operations Ian Magee and Second Permanent Secretary (Corporate Board) Appendix B 217

17. Department of National Heritage (DNH)

1996 Permanent Secretary Hayden Phillips 1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Hayden Phillips general election) 1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Hayden Phillips general election)

In 1998, department restructured to become the DCMS.

18. Overseas Development Administration (ODA)

1996 Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker 1997 (before the Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker general election) 1997 (after the Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker general election) Restructured to form the Department for International Development (DFID) 1998 Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker 1999 Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker 2000 Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker 2001 Permanent Secretary J M M Vereker 2002 Permanent Secretary 2003 Permanent Secretary Suma Chakrabarti 2004 Permanent Secretary Suma Chakrabarti

19. Department of Social Security (DSS)

1996 Permanent Secretary Anne Bowtell 1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Anne Bowtell general election) 1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Anne Bowtell general election) 1998 Permanent Secretary Anne Bowtell 1999 Permanent Secretary 2000 Permanent Secretary Rachel Lomax 218 Appendix B

2001, reconstructed to form the Department for Work and Pensions.

2001 Permanent Secretary Rachel Lomax 2002 Permanent Secretary Richard Mottram 2003 Permanent Secretary Richard Mottram 2004 Permanent Secretary Richard Mottram

20. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

1996 Permanent Secretary Peter Gregson Chief Scientific Adviser and Robert May Head of Office of Science and Technology

1997 (before the Permanent Secretary general election) Chief Scientific Adviser and Robert May Head of Office of Science and Technology

1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Michael Scholar general election) Chief Scientific Adviser and Robert May Head of Office of Science and Technology

1998 Permanent Secretary Michael Scholar Chief Scientific Adviser and Robert May Head of Office of Science and Technology

1999 Permanent Secretary Michael Scholar Chief Scientific Adviser and Robert May Head of Office of Science and Technology

2000 Permanent Secretary Michael Scholar Chief Scientific Adviser and David King Head of Office of Science and Technology

2001 Permanent Secretary Michael Scholar Chief Scientific Adviser and David King Head of Office of Science and Technology

Continued Appendix B 219

Continued

2002 Permanent Secretary Robin Young Chief Scientific Adviser and David King Head of Office of Science and Technology

2003 Permanent Secretary Robin Young Chief Scientific Adviser and David King Head of Office of Science and Technology

2004 Permanent Secretary Robin Young Chief Scientific Adviser and David King Head of Office of Science and Technology

21. Department of Transport (DT)

1996 Permanent Secretary Patrick Brown 1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Patrick Brown general election) 1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Patrick Brown general election)

In 1998, combined with the Department of the Environment, but recreated in 2001 to become the , Local Government and the Regions (DTLR). It took over local, parliamentary and European parliamentary elections and local legislation from the Home Office.

22. Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR)

2001 Permanent Secretary Richard Mottram 2002 Permanent Secretary Rachel Lomax reorganised again to become the Department for Transport (DFT), with policy responsibility for local government, neighbourhood and housing issues being transferred to the ODPM. Continued 220 Appendix B

Continued

2003 Permanent Secretary David Rowlands

2004 Permanent Secretary David Rowlands

23. HM’s Treasury (HMT)

1996 Permanent Secretary Terence Burns Director (Spending) R P Culpin Director (International Nigel Wicks Fianance) Director Macroeconomic Policy Alan Budd and Head of the Government Economic Service Director Financial Management, Andrew Reporting and Audit and Head Likierman of the Government Accountancy Service

1997 (before the Permanent Secretary Terence Burns general election) Director (Spending) R P Culpin Director (International Nigel Wicks Fianance) Director Macroeconomic Policy Alan Budd and Head of the Government Economic Service Director Financial Management, Andrew Reporting and Audit and Head Likierman of the Government Accountancy Service

1997 (after the Permanent Secretary Terence Burns general election) Director (Spending) R P Culpin Director (International Nigel Wicks Fianance) Director Macroeconomic Policy Alan Budd and Head of the Government Economic Service Director Financial Management, Andrew Reporting and Audit and Head Likierman of the Government Accountancy Service Continued Appendix B 221

Continued

1998 Permanent Secretary Terence Burns Director (Spending) R P Culpin Director (International Nigel Wicks Fianance) Director Macroeconomic Policy Gus O’Donnell and Head of the Government Economic Service Director Financial Management, Andrew Reporting and Audit and Head Likierman of the Government Accountancy Service

1999 Permanent Secretary Andrew Turnbull Managing Director Gus O’Donnell Macroeconomic Policy and International Finance, and Head of the Government Economic Service Managing Director Financial Andrew Management, Reporting and Likierman Audit and Head of the Government Accountancy Service Managing Director Budget and Robert Culpin Public Finances

2000 Permanent Secretary Andrew Turnbull Managing Director Gus O’Donnell Macroeconomic Policy and International Finance, and Head of the Government Economic Service Managing Director Financial Andrew Management, Reporting and Likierman Audit and Head of the Government Accountancy Service Managing Director Budget and Robert Culpin Public Finances

2001 Permanent Secretary Andrew Turnbull

Continued 222 Appendix B

Continued

Managing Director Gus O’Donnell Macroeconomic Policy and International Finance, and Head of the Government Economic Service Managing Director Financial Andrew Management, Reporting and Likierman Audit and Head of the Government Accountancy Service Managing Director Budget and Robert Culpin Public Finances

2002 Permanent Secretary Gus O’Donnell Managing Director Jon Cunliffe Macroeconomic Policy and International Finance Managing Director Financial Andrew Management, Reporting and Likierman Audit and Head of the Government Accountancy Service Managing Director Budget and Robert Culpin Public Finances

2003 Permanent Secretary Gus O’Donnell Managing Director Jon Cunliffe Macroeconomic Policy and International Finance Managing Director Financial Andrew Management, Reporting and Likierman Audit and Head of the Government Accountancy Service Managing Director Budget and Robert Culpin Public Finances

2004 Permanent Secretary Gus O’Donnell Managing Director Jon Cunliffe Macroeconomic Policy and International Finance Managing Director Financial Andrew Management, Reporting and Likierman Audit and Head of the Government Accountancy Service Appendix B 223

24. Treasury Solicitor’s Department

1996 HM Procurator General and M L Saunders Treasury Solicitor 1997 (before the HM Procurator General and M L Saunders general election) Treasury Solicitor 1997 (after the HM Procurator General and A H Hammond general election) Treasury Solicitor 1998 HM Procurator General and A H Hammond Treasury Solicitor 1999 HM Procurator General and A H Hammond Treasury Solicitor 2000 HM Procurator General and Juliet Wheldon Treasury Solicitor 2001 HM Procurator General and Juliet Wheldon Treasury Solicitor 2002 HM Procurator General and Juliet Wheldon Treasury Solicitor 2003 HM Procurator General and Juliet Wheldon Treasury Solicitor 2004 HM Procurator General and Juliet Wheldon Treasury Solicitor

25. Office (NIO)

1996 Permanent Under-Secretary of State Second Permanent Under- David Fell (Head of Northern Ireland Civil Service)

1997 (before the Permanent Under-Secretary John Chilcot general election) of State Second Permanent Under- David Fell Secretary of State (Head of Northern Ireland Civil Service)

1997 (after the Permanent Under-Secretary John Chilcot general election) of State Second Permanent Under- David Fell Secretary of State (Head of Northern Ireland Civil Service)

Continued 224 Appendix B

Continued

1998 Permanent Under-Secretary of Joseph Pilling State Second Permanent Under- John Semple Secretary of State (Head of Northern Ireland Civil Service)

1999 Permanent Under-Secretary of Joseph Pilling State Second Permanent Under- Gerry Secretary of State (Head of Loughran Northern Ireland Civil Service)

2000 Permanent Under-Secretary of Joseph Pilling State Second Permanent Under- Gerry Secretary of State (Head of Loughran Northern Ireland Civil Service)

2001 Permanent Under-Secretary Joseph Pilling of State Second Permanent Under- Gerry Secretary of State (Head of Loughran Northern Ireland Civil Service)

2002 Permanent Under-Secretary Joseph Pilling of State Head of the Civil Service Stormont Castle

2003 Permanent Under-Secretary Joseph Pilling of State Head of the Civil Service Post suspended

2004 Permanent Under-Secretary Joseph Pilling of State Head of the Civil Service Post suspended Appendix B 225

26.

1996 Permanent Under-Secretary Russell of State Hillhouse 1997 (before the Permanent Under-Secretary Russell general election) of State Hillhouse 1997 (after the Permanent Under-Secretary Russell general election) of State Hillhouse 1998 Permanent Under-Secretary of State 1999 Permanent Under-Secretary Muir Russell of State 2000 Permanent Under-Secretary Muir Russell of State 2001 Permanent Under-Secretary Muir Russell of State 2002 Permanent Under-Secretary Muir Russell of State 2003 Permanent Secretary 2004 Permanent Secretary John Elvidge

27. Welsh Office

1996 Head of Department Michael C Scholar 1997 (before the Head of Department Rachel Lomax general election) 1997 (after the Head of Department Rachel Lomax general election) 1998 Head of Department Rachel Lomax 1999 Head of Department Jon Shortridge 2000 Head of Department Jon Shortridge 2001 Head of Department Jon Shortridge 2002 Head of Department Jon Shortridge 2003 Head of Department Jon Shortridge 2004 Head of Department Jon Shortridge

The 47 first-time appointments made under the New Labour between 1997 and 2004 are underlined and highlighted in bold. Notes

1 Introduction

1. The Westminster model is defined in detail in Chapter 2 and Table 3.1. It can briefly be understood as being built: ‘on the assumption that there is Parliamentary Sovereignty; all decisions are made within Parliament and there is no higher authority. Legitimacy and democracy are maintained because ministers are answerable to Parliament and the House of Commons is elected by the people. Decisions are taken by cabinet and implemented by a neutral Civil Service. This view is derived from the Whig notion of the constitution being in self-correcting balance.’ (Smith 1999: 10). 2. In terms of this specific example of , Blair (1998) declared that: ‘I attach great importance to preserving a unified Civil Service working for all three administrations in , Cardiff and Westminster. We do not want anybody who works in the Welsh Office or the Scottish Office to feel that they are being cut adrift from the Civil Service. I also attach great import- ance to establishing efficient machinery for close working between the UK Government and the devolved administrations.’ 3. For a survey of the Anglo-Governance School of literature, see Richards and Smith (2002), Marinetto (2003) and Bevir and Rhodes (2006). 4. Examples include Harris and Garcia (1966), Theakston and Fry (1989), Barberis (1996), Richards (1997), Theakston (1999, 2000). 5. One could question this characterisation of the literature (and the associated methodological approach it employs). In many cases, the studies conducted by these authors do in fact undertake the type of qualitative analysis of the beliefs of bureaucrats which Rhodes advocates. But that is a debate to be had elsewhere! 6. The claim is that: ‘Modernist empiricists rewrote Whig historiography to construct an ahistorical Westminster model’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2006: 74). Although as Smith (2007: 2) observes: ‘... we are not informed who these mod- ernist empiricists are (Lijphart is the one example but he is one out of many who have taken a different approach). Indeed, this modernist empiricist approach is a straw man that exists very infrequently within British political science.’ 7. Interpretative approaches have a long tradition within sociology, most not- ably in the works of Berger and Luckman (1967), Goffman (1969) and Garfinkle (1967), but it can be argued that traditionally, public administration and political science have tended to be more behavioural and positivist in their approaches (see Kavanagh 2003, Kenny 2004). The recent works of Bevir and Rhodes (2003a, 2006) can be seen as an attempt to invigorate the interpretiv- ist approach in political science, in particular within the British context. 8. For a critique of this approach and these four traditions, see Smith (2007). 9. See Smith (1999) for a summary of this literature.

226 Notes 227

10. Such an argument can be closely aligned to an historical institutionalist account. 11. The phrase ‘bringing the state back in’ is associated with the renewed inter- est shown in the state during the mid-1980s, by such exponents as Skocpol (1979), Mann (1988) and March and Olson (1989). 12. One could argue that in methodological terms there is little difference between trying to understand the ‘formal and informal rules of the game’ as understood by agents, as opposed to interpreting their ‘webs of belief’. This prompts a further debate, in that what Bevir and Rhodes have done is take a particular methodological approach associated with interpretivism and presented it as an epistemology. Finally, there is of course an irony here. The impact of Bevir and Rhodes’ interpretivist approach on the sub- discipline of public administration means that the various strands of new institutionalism, which were seen as ‘state of the art’ in the early to mid- 1990s, are now increasingly regarded as ‘traditional approaches’ to studies in this area. 13. For a discussion of some of the methodological issues involved in this approach, see Devine (1995), Richards (1996a) and Marsh et al (2001). 14. There are four ESRC projects on which this research draws: The Changing Role of Central Government Departments in Britain ESRC Award No.L124251023 [Research conducted 1995–1998], Labour and the Reform of Whitehall: Inheritance, Transition and Accommodation ESRC Award No.R000222657 [Research conducted 1998–2000], Public Service Delivery Programme: Analysing Delivery Chains in the Home Office ESRC Award. No.RES.153-25-0037. [Research conducted 2005–7] and Building Bridges between Political Biography and Political Science – A Methodologically Innovative Study of the Core Executive under New Labour ESRC Award No. RES-000-22-2040. [Research conducted 2006–7]. The numbers of interviews are identified in Appendix A. Where quotes have been used and there is no citation, this implies it was taken from an interview with the author. 15. Unusually, there were a small number of interviews with Labour ministers offered solely on the grounds of ‘background information’ and were non-attributable, or under Chatham House rules.

2 Labour and the Civil Service: Governing in the Shadow of the Westminster Model

1. Rhodes et al (2003: 8) observe: ‘The Westminster model refers to the lan- guage map, questions and historical story used to capture the essential features of the British system that, through sheer longevity, form the con- ventional or mainstream story.’ For more detail on the Westminster model see Smith (1999) or Richards and Smith (2002). 2. There is a substantial literature on the British Political Tradition. The view emphasised here is that it involves a limited liberal conception of represen- tation and a conservative notion of responsibility. For a detailed overview of this debate see: on representation and responsibility, A.H. Birch, op.cit., and D. Judge, Representation (: Routledge, 1999); on the British political tradition, see D. Marsh, The British Political Tradition, University of 228 Notes

Essex, Mimeo, 1980; A. Tant, British Government: the Triumph of Elitism: A Study of the British Political Tradition and its Major Challenges (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993); D. Marsh and M. Read, Private Members Bills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); D. Marsh and A. Tant, ‘Democracy Under Mrs. Thatcher: Towards a Centralisation of Power’, in M. Haralambos (ed.), Developments in Politics (Ormskirk: Causeway Press, 1991); M. Evans, Charter 88: A Successful Challenge to the British Political Tradition (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); D. Marsh and P. Kerr, Ideas and Institutions: The British Political Tradition and Constitutional Reform under New Labour, University of Birmingham, Mimeo, 2001; D. Marsh, ‘It’s Always Happy Hour’ in C. Hay (ed.), British Politics Today (London: Polity, 2002) and M. Evans, Constitution-making and the Labour Party (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 3. Jennings was also explicitly attacking Dicey as a Liberal, suggesting his views on the constitution were: ‘... concerned almost entirely with the rights of the individual. He was imagining a constitution dominated by the doctrine of laissez faire.’ (Jennings 1959: 55) 4. A common theme of ‘Liberal’ thinking on representative government is that only ‘educated’ people can realistically be involved in government and repre- sentatives have to use their own judgement rather than, to coin Joseph Chamberlain’s phrase, ‘truckle with the multitude’ (quoted in Jennings 1966: 1). 5. It is worth recalling the infamous misquotation associated with Douglas Jay, an economist and Labour politician, that the ‘the man in Whitehall knows best’. What Jay had actually written in The Socialist Case in 1937 was that: ‘... in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people than the people know themselves.’ Unfortunately for Jay, it was the parody of this quote that became popularised in Westminster folklore and would go on to haunt him, in the same way that another familiar misquotation ‘Crisis, what crisis’ would haunt Jim Callaghan some forty years later. Nevertheless, the irony here is that the mantra ‘the man in Whitehall knows best’ was one that the Labour leadership seemed more than willing to accept. 6. The key elements of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) proposed a pro- fessional, meritocratic and permanent Civil Service (for more details see Hennessy 1989; Richards 1997). 7. Although, as we see below, most notably after 1945, a variety of critiques were to develop from both the Left and Right challenging this view. 8. Derived from Lord Haldane’s Report of the Machinery of Government Committee: Ministry of Reconstruction (1918). 9. Parallels can be drawn between the evolutions of the guild socialist view of a society of associations with no overriding dominant organisation and the ideas associated with modern conceptions of governance. The lexicon of modern governance is littered with references to ‘governing without govern- ment’, ‘the hollow crown’, ‘heterarchy’ and ‘fragmentation’ conveying an image of governing as a complex network of organisations, where there is no single dominant organisation and governing is based on an eclectic mix of hierarchies, networks and markets. Notes 229

10. The 1924 Zinoviev Affair did little to enhance the Party’s view of the Foreign Office, with many in the PLP believing that the ‘Red Letter’ scare could be traced directly to the doors of the Foreign Office. 11. This was an issue that was to surface again, most notably in 1976, when for some, the Treasury mistakenly advised the Labour Chancellor Denis Healey of the need to secure a loan from the IMF which he agreed to. 12. As we see in Chapter 5, it is ironic to note that this is a theme that the Blair Administration returned to after 1997. 13. Theakston (1992: 111) suggests that it was experience in the wartime coali- tion that turned leading Labour ministers in the 1945 government into ‘pragmatic insiders’. A more instrumental argument could be offered that suggests the Civil Service had ‘delivered’ during the war years, so why should the Attlee Government expend substantial political capital on reforming Whitehall when it already had such a large policy programme to implement. 14. Instead, the Attlee Government tidied up a few electoral anomalies and confirmed the limitations on the powers of the . 15. In a much quoted and particularly withering passage, Laski points the fin- ger of failure at Whitehall’s elite band of top administrators. He called for: ‘Innovation on a grand scale, utter frankness, relentless attack upon obstruct- ive interests, rapid adaptation to the unexpected, the ruthless rejection of men who do not rise to the occasion, these are the qualities for which war calls in officials; and they are pretty exactly the qualities against which the main genius of our Civil Service has been directed’. (Laski 1942: 6–10) 16. Some analysts of relative economic decline have focused on culture (Wiener 1981; Barnett, 1986; Sampson, 1983), others on the role of finance and the City of London (Pollard, 1992; Hutton, 1995), some have pinpointed insti- tutional weaknesses (King, 1975; Marquand, 1988), while others have iden- tified the effects of empire (Hobsbawn, 1968; Kennedy, 1988; Callaghan, 1997). For a general discussion see Gamble (1995, 2000). 17. What Wilson actually told the Party conference was: ‘The Britain that is going to be forged in the white heat of this revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated methods on either side of industry.’ 18. Following the publication of the Plowden Report in 1961, the Public Expenditure Survey Committee [PESC] was created. It was made up of the principal finance officers of all the major spending departments in Whitehall. The role of the PESC was to consider reports from the Treasury on the forecasts of every department’s expenditure. The rationale underpin- ning the Committee was to introduce both a planned approach towards public expenditure and, in so doing, regularise the system. In particular, to assess the overall projected spending of all departments against forecasts of the growth of national income. Previously, as the Plowden Committee had observed, the approach to expenditure had been piecemeal and ad hoc and the Treasury had failed to adopt a strategic overview on projected government expenditure. PESC was coupled to the introduction of Programme Analysis and Review [PAR] in which different departmental programmes were both costed and their benefits assessed. PAR was intended to ensure that departments had clear objectives and stated their priorities 230 Notes

The perceived benefit of both PESC and PAR was that, after 1965 [when the process was conducted at Cabinet level] decisions on government pro- grammes and expenditure could be prioritised based on an overall strategic- ally assessed view (see Chapman 1997). It could be regarded as an attempt to professionalise the Treasury’s approach to public expenditure. Lipsey (2000: 153) argues that: ‘PESC was for years the most important single deter- minant of what went on: the stuff of official wheeling and dealing, the focus of ministerial hopes and fears, and ultimately, the most significant influence on what individual citizens did or did not get by way of public services.’ Lipsey (2000: 157–8) observes that PESC went through a number of phases: the first from 1969–1976 involved planning in real terms only – which: ‘led to spending spiralling out of control’; this was followed by the introduction of cash limits, a requirement of the 1976 IMF loan negotiated by the Callaghan Government; the next phase was an attempt to plan spending in cash terms alone, which also: ‘ended in disaster, with minor fluctuations in inflation mattering more to the true level of public spending than the decisions of Cabinet.’ The final phase was the introduction of the Star Chamber by the 1979 Thatcher Government to resolve difficulties that arose between the Treasury and other departments. In 1992, the Star Chamber was replaced by the Cabinet’s Economic and Domestic Policy (Expenditure) Committee [EDX], which had responsibility to consider pres- sures for greater spending, by some departments within the constraints of available financial resources. The life cycle of PESC and its successor EDX ended under the 1997 Labour Government which introduced the Comprehensive Spending Review. Here, capital and current spending were separated out from each other, and departments were asked to complete comprehensive spending reviews [CSR] of everything they did. The Treasury would then issue each department with figures based on their CSR which would set out their spending for the next three years. The effect was to increase the power of the Treasury over departments and induce them to think in the longer term, rather than over spend in their first year. Clearly, a path can be traced from the publication of the Plowden Report in 1961 and the subsequent establishment of PESC, up to the introduction of the CSR in 1997, in which the Treasury has made numerous attempts at pro- fessionalising its management of public expenditure and, in so doing, controlling it. 19. See Chapter 6 for a demographic profile of ministers and civil servants. 20. Balogh, a life-long friend of and his personal economic adviser, revisited some of the themes aired in the Apotheosis when he, along with two other former civil servants Roger Opie and Dudley Seers, wrote a highly critical appraisal of Whitehall and its role in the policy-making pro- cess, pointedly entitled Crisis in the Civil Service. 21. The group who compiled the report included some notable politicians, Anthony Crosland and Shirley Williams, as well as Thomas Balogh, but the key actor was the secretary of the group, Ogilvy-Webb, Head of the Treasury’s Historical Branch (see Stone 1997: 49). 22. For a summary of this literature see Richards (1997). 23. For a review of Fulton see the special edition of Public Administration, Autumn, 1968. Notes 231

24. Somewhat ironic, in the light of the well recorded views of Wilson concern- ing his worries about elements plotting against his government (see Wilson 1974; Wright 1987; Haines 1977, 2003; Pimlott 1993; Donoughue 2003 and two television documentaries that coincided with the thirty years since Wilson’s resignation as Prime Minister – BBC 2’s documentary The Plot Against Harold Wilson, broadcast on 16 March 2006 and ITV1’s Harold: The Wilson Years, broadcast on 19 March 2006). 25. The irony here is that the reform mantle was taken up by the Heath Government. In October 1970, a White Paper The Reorganisation of Central Government led to the establishment of the Central Policy Review Staff [CPRS] and the introduction of new arrangements for the scrutiny of policy formulation and implementation – the Programme Analysis and Review [PAR]. 26. There is of course a critique of Whitehall offered by Tony Benn formulated during the course of his time as a minister in the Wilson/Callaghan Administration. His views on Whitehall are discussed in Chapter 6. 27. Bearing in mind Labour’s willingness to work within the constitutional parameter of the Westminster model, then from Whitehall’s perspective, it comes as little surprise to find that it viewed its relationship with successive Labour governments as unproblematic (after some initial doubts about the Party prior to it first forming a government in 1924 – see Theakston 1992; Stone 1997). 28. This labelling of an ‘Old Labour model’ is used in the context of the direc- tion the Party went in under the leadership of Blair in the 1990s and its re- branding as ‘New Labour’. 29. Indeed, up until 1979, it can be argued that the only period in which Whitehall’s evolutionary trajectory notably changed occurred in the 1850s, in the light of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. The possibility emerged of further change in the 1940s following the impact of war on Whitehall. But the Attlee Government believed it to be in its own interests to revert to pre- vious working practices.

3 Theorising Whitehall: Labour’s Response to the Conservative Inheritance

1. The virtues of the public choice approach when explaining bureaucratic behaviour are predicated on a number of claims: parsimony, theoretical clarity, deductive reasoning and the interchangebility of individuals using predictive modelling. For a general critique of this approach see Green and Shapiro (1994) or Hay (2002). But in the more specific British context, what is interesting about public choice accounts of bureaucracy is their contrast- ing view of the nature of British government and the direct challenge they present to the Westminster model (see Chapter 6). Despite the criticism public choice accounts received, there is clear evidence that they had an impact, in terms of offering an understanding of bureaucratic behaviour embraced by centre-right think-tanks such as the Institute for Economic Affairs and, subsequently, the 1979 Conservative Administration, which they used to explain the growth of government in the post-war era (see below and Cockett 1995; Campbell and Wilson 1995; Hindmoor 2006). 232 Notes

2. The Parliamentary Conservative Party has always been a broad church (see Gamble 1994; Ludlam and Smith 1996; Hay 1996; Kavanagh 1997; Gilmour 1997; Heath 1998). Certainly, under Thatcher, it contained an array of fac- tions offering differing ideological perspectives, and the neo-liberal wing of the Party was never fully dominant (see Crewe 1989; Gamble 1994; Richardson et al 1995). It is unsurprising that the Party had an ambivalent attitude towards the Civil Service. ‘Progressive’, or ‘One-Nation’ Conservatism, regarded Whitehall as one of the great institutions of the state that needed protecting. This position was at odds with those on the ‘neo-liberal’ wing, who demanded some form of radical, political reform. Their view was that the elite in Whitehall were too closely associated with consensus politics and were partly responsible for Britain’s relative economic decline. 3. New Public Management [NPM] defined and discussed below. 4. It should be noted that the most sophisticated account of the Next Steps pro- cess from a public choice perspective is offered by James (2003). His starting point is to recognise the divergent theoretical approaches to explaining reform and he sets up a simply dichotomy: should Next Steps be seen as a project underpinned by a notion of ‘public interest’, in order to achieve the ‘3Es’– greater efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the delivery of public services; or, should the reform programme be understood as an exercise in the promotion of self-interest by senior Whitehall officials keen to protect their own role in the policy-making process? To address this dichotomy, James poses three questions: why did the reform programme come about; how has the executive model developed in practice; and has it improved the performance of central government? His answers lie in the compilation of extensive quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence, in the form of budget analysis, performance data, primary and secondary documents, as well as a number of interviews with senior officials to substantiate the public choice account of reform: officials did act in a self-interested fashion. Not surprisingly, he concludes that improvements in the ‘3Es’ left much to be desired. 5. The literature on New Public Management is extensive and here is not the place to reappraise it. There is no single definition of NPM. It is an amorph- ous term that contains elements of business/management theory, fused with neo-liberal, public-choice accounts of bureaucracy. Hood (1991) argues that NPM is an ‘ill-defined concept’ which can be portrayed as a theme ‘for all seasons’. A useful check-list of themes associated with NPM is offered by Greer (1994, p.8): ‘a shift to disaggregation in public services organisation; a preference for limited term contract employment of senior staff over trad- itional career tenure; wholly monetised incentives rather than the traditional structure of control in the public sector through a mix of non-monetary factors (ethos, status, culture) and uniform fixed salaries; top managerial ‘freedom to manage’ over a network of constraints (notably by central per- sonnel agencies) on action by line management; a divorce of provision from production (or delivery) in public service; an emphasis on cost cutting; a shift from policy management with the focus primarily on efficiency and cost of service delivery – leading to an emphasis on quantifiable methods of performance and investment appraisal and efficiency criteria: a shift from process to outputs in controls and accountability mechanisms.’ Notes 233

6. For a similar conclusion, see Campbell and Wilson (1995: 294–301). 7. For a more comprehensive account of the nature of power-dependency between ministers and civil servants see Rhodes and Dunleavy (1995); Smith (1999); Richards and Smith (2002); and Chapters 2 and 6. 8. It should be pointed out that, within the social sciences, ‘governance’ is a much used and much contested term (see Richards and Smith 2002). Even within the narrower contours of political science, different sub-fields, for example, public administration and public policy, international relations and comparative politics, attach different meanings to the term. It is there- fore important to point out that the literature on governance from which the arguments here are developed draws predominantly from the ‘Anglo- governance school’ (see Chapter 1). 9. As we see in Chapter 5, while the language of communitarianism faded from the New Labour lexicon after 1997, the principles concerning an ‘enab- ling state’ and attempts at empowering actors beyond Whitehall manifested itself in various Government reforms – see for example Office of Public Service Reform (2002) Reforming Public Services: Principles into Practice or Department for Local Communities and Local Government (2006) Strong and Prosperous Communities – The Local Government White Paper. 10. Etzioni’s influence on New Labour thinking is most obviously seen in the 1995 Spectator lecture ‘The Rights We Enjoy Reflect the Duties We Owe’. This coincided with the publication of Etzioni’s (1995b) Too Many Rights, Too Few Responsibilities. 11. Notable influences on the stakeholder narrative include Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1995, 2000) and Hutton (1995) – see Gould (1998). 12. As with communitarianism, after 1997, the language of stakeholding faded from the discourse of New Labour. But the themes concerning social capital, devolution of power away from the centre and ensuring that respon- sibilities came with rights in state-civic partnerships remained (see Chapter 5). 13. If Marquand’s (1999) Progressive Dilemma identified the need for the Party to retain the loyalty of its core constituency, while at the same time offering a political package with mass appeal, then one variation on this dilemma for New Labour was how to embrace some elements of the Thatcherite project, while not being seen to abandon its social democratic goals. 14. The focus of the analysis is on Northern Ireland, , and .

4 Transition in Government

1. When Blair entered on the 2 May 1997, it was only the sec- ond time he had been in the building, the previous occasion being an offi- cial dinner for President Clinton in November 1996 (Kavanagh and Seldon 2000: 240; Rentoul 2001: 324). 2. , Jack Cunningham and Ann Taylor had all served as junior ministers in the 1974–9 Labour Government. In that government, John Morris had served as Secretary of State for Wales and Blair appointed him as his first Attorney General [1997–99], but outside the Cabinet. 234 Notes

3. This chapter does not directly address the view of the Labour Party as to whether or not eighteen years of Conservative government led to the politi- cisation of the Civil Service. This theme is explored in Chapter 6. 4. For a discussion of the methodology underpinning this research, see Chapter 1. It should be pointed out that of the four ESRC Research Projects on which much of the qualitative data in this book is drawn, one in par- ticular, Labour and the Reform of Whitehall: Inheritance, Transition and Accommodation [ESRC-R000222657] specifically addressed issues concern- ing the 1997 transition. For the details of the number of interviews con- ducted by the author, see Appendix A. 5. Catterill (1997: 81) notes that as far as Alec Douglas-Home was concerned, if talks with the Opposition were to go ahead, then he wished to know noth- ing whatsoever about them. 6. Of course, given that the Prime Minister decides on the election date, pro- vided that there is a maximum term of five years, this would mean 18 months before the last feasible election date. 7. In his diary, Tony Benn narrates an amusing incident concerning the October 1974 transition, when the Department of Industry incorrectly handed him the wrong brief. They had prepared two briefs, one for Benn and another for: ‘...an incoming Labour minister if not Mr. Benn.’ (Benn 1982: 54; cf. Hennessy 1989: 510) In this case, Benn was handed both briefs. 8. Unlike most permanent secretary’s, Michael Bichard’s earlier career was in local government where he had been Chief Executive of Brent and then Gloucestershire Local Authorities. In 1990, he became Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency and he went on to become Permanent Secretary at the Department for Employment in 1995. When Richard Wilson retired as in 2002, there was some media speculation that Bichard was on the short-list to replace him, although the job went to Andrew Turnbull from the Treasury. 9. It should be pointed out that pre-1997, McCartney was a shadow minister in the DfEE team and so his comments reflect his impression on entering the DTI after the election. 10. For details on New Labour’s approach to policy formulation see Marsh, Richards and Smith (2001). 11. It is interesting to note the diary entry by Paddy Ashdown (2000:146) on the 28 February 1992 which records a meeting he had with the then Cabinet Secretary Robin Butler and the to the Queen, Robert Fellowes over the issue of a hung parliament: ‘I made it clear to them that we would not want to see a minority Conservative Government removed until there was an agreed Government to put in its place ... In other words, we would operate on the basis of a “constructive vote of no confidence”. Both Fellowes and Butler seemed relieved, as this would take the pressure off the Queen, although Fellowes did say that it was perfectly possible the Queen would grant a second dissolution to Major if the Tories were the lar- gest party and he really pressed it. This came as a shock, as we have always worked on the basis that she wouldn’t do that. But Butler told me that in those circumstances, everybody would be advising the Prime Minister not to put the Queen in a difficult position. I warned him that we would be Notes 235

asking for the Civil Service to help in any hung parliament and that, if he wanted to know our thinking, he might send someone over to see the FDP in Germany, as we would be modelling our approach on what happened there.’ 12. Although, see Ian McCartney’s own views above on the transition. 13. Robert Hazell is the Founder and Director of think-tank, the Constitution Unit at University College London, which specialises in constitutional reform and comparative constitutional studies. 14. Private information. 15. To an extent, interest groups take on a similar policy advisory role for oppos- ition parties as the Civil Service does for governments (see Marsh, Richards and Smith 2001).

5 Labour and the Civil Service: From Managerialism to a Reconstituted Westminster Model

1. Hailsham was criticising the Westminster model and the extent to which it conferred too much unchecked power on the executive. 2. See, for example, Crossman (1975), Castle (1984), Heseltine (1987), Healey (1989), Benn (1990), Jenkins (1991), Ridley (1991), Lawson (1992), Parkinson (1992), Howe (1994), Mowlam (2002), Cook (2003, Donoughue (2003), Short (2004), Blunkett (2006). 3. It can be argued that such conflicts were as prevalent in the corporatist era as they are today. 4. Blair made this comment in a speech at the Venture Capitalists Association conference in London on 6 July 1999. He observed that: ‘... try getting change in the public sector and the public services. I bear the scars on my back after two years in government and heaven knows what it will be like after a bit longer. People in the public sector were more rooted to the con- cept that “if it has always been done this way it must always be done this way” than any group of people I have come across.’ 5. Blair’s sentiments are not far removed from the ‘reinventing government’ discourse associated ten years earlier with the American centre-right com- mentators Osborne and Gaebler (1992). 6. This was a 1998 internal report by the Cabinet Secretary Richard Wilson, on what reforms were required for modernising Whitehall. As Seldon observes (2004: 424): ‘At his first meeting with Blair, Wilson picked up on the Prime Minister’s desire for a stronger Cabinet Office, allowing Blair more effective control over the government, and produced proposals accordingly; the final draft reached Blair in April ... [H]e agreed to its implementation, creating a new “Performance and Innovation Unit” at its heart to complement the Treasury’s role in monitoring departmental progress and other changes to improve policy initiation, co-ordination from the centre and the delivery of policy. Only with the passage of time did Wilson understand that Blair not only sought more effective control – he wanted more personal control over Whitehall too.’ Labour also created a range of other co-ordinating units including – the Regional Coordination Unit, the Social Exclusion Unit and 236 Notes

the Women’s Unit, all of which increase the capacity of the centre. For details see Richards and Smith (2004b). 7. In December 2005, the CSMB was replaced by the Permanent Secretaries’ Management Group (PSMG) made up of all first Permanent Secretaries. The group meets four times a year to ‘consider issues of concern to the Civil Service as a whole’. It is supported by a Permanent Secretaries’ Steering Group composed of a smaller group of Permanent Secretaries. In March 2007, the make-up of that group was: Chair: Gus O’Donnell (Cabinet Secretary); Members: Richard Mottram, David Varney, David Normington, Suma Chakrabarti, Alex Allan, Nicholas Macpherson, Gill Rider, David Rowlands and . 8. A number of task forces have exceeded a 24-month lifespan. For example, the Better Regulation Task Force, Skills Task Force and the New Deal Task Force. There is of course a debate concerning defining what constitutes an NDPB – with sub-categories of Executive, Advisory or Tribunal NDPBs etc. – which I have no intention of rehearsing here, but see Cabinet Office (2006). 9. Michael Barber is an academic who became an advisor in the Department of Education before being appointed as the Head of PMDU. As one Cabinet Office official observed: ‘Barber was appointed for his analytical approach and he was very keen to appoint people outside of Whitehall to work with him.’ 10. When Michael Barber, the first Head of the PMDU left in 2005, he took up a post with McKinsey as an expert partner in its Global Public Sector Practice. Barber (2007) published an account of his time in government which expressed a sense of frustration at the lack of power at the centre. He argued Britain should follow the Australian model and create a new depart- ment incorporating Number Ten and the Cabinet Office. 11. Street Crime is an obvious example of one such policy. During the first six months of this initiative, the Prime Minister was holding a weekly meeting with the dedicated unit in the Home Office dealing with this policy, in order to be updated on its progress (see Geddes et al 2006). 12. Gains (2003) points out that there remains the continuing problem of defin- ing agencies, exacerbated by the process of devolution. This means that the official figures for agencies in the New Labour era are open to interpretation. 13. In this context: ‘devolution is defined as the handing over of power from central government to a constituent part (e.g. to local government); delega- tion means entrusting another with the authority to act as agent’. (Office of Public Service Reform 2002: 16) 14. One of the four key principles of public service reform referred to above. 15. The Report has identified £20 billion in what it refers to as ‘efficiency gains’ to be made by 2007–8, partly based on cutting 84,000 posts in the Civil Service. From that figure, 60 per cent is targeted to be directly released to fund front-line delivery services (Gershon 2004: 3).

6 The Core Executive under Labour: Politicising Whitehall?

1. The Report defined the formal nature of the relationship between ministers and civil servants: ‘The Government of the country [cannot] be carried out Notes 237

without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a pos- ition duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, char- acter, ability and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent, influence those who are from time to time set over them.’ (The Northcote- Trevelyan report was reprinted in Cmnd 3638: 1968, pp. 108–119) The prin- ciples it established was a Civil Service that was: permanent and impartial, in which officials were accountable to their ministers, who in turn were account- able to Parliament; recruitment was to be based on merit; and a greater emphasis on professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness. 2. The Carltona Doctrine establishes the principle that the actions of civil ser- vants are synonymous with the actions of departmental ministers. Civil ser- vants should be perceived as the alter ego of their minister. The principle was created by a 1943 ruling made by the then of the Rolls, Lord Greene in the case of Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] in which he stated that: ‘In the administration of government in this country, the functions which are given to ministers (and constitutionally properly given to minis- ters because they are constitutionally responsible) are functions so multifari- ous that no minister could ever personally attend to them ... [therefore] The duties imposed upon ministers and the powers given to ministers are nor- mally exercised under the authority of ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case’ (see Freedland 1995; Foster 2001). 3. Almost two decades later, returned to this theme, although he offered a slightly different view on why he believed Whitehall to be so obstructionist. In March 2007, following some injudicious and very un- mandarin like comments made by the former Cabinet Secretary Andrew Turnbull, expressing concern about ’s ‘Stalinist ruthlessness’ in the way he ran the Treasury, Nott wrote a letter to The Times: ‘Politicians want to get things done in government – and too often the Treasury, com- bined with the collective conservatism and “process-obsessed” civil servants, frustrate them, not out of any opposition to the politics, or to the politicians themselves, but from the love of process’ (Letter to The Times, 21 March 2007). 4. Niskanen argues that bureaucrats, as rational actors, wish to maximise their own welfare and they achieve this goal through maximising budgets because it increases promotion prospects, status, the ease of running the bureau and gives individuals a greater opportunity to deliver their goals. As we saw in Chapter 3, an adaptation of this approach was offered by Dunleavy (1991) and his ‘bureau-shaping model’. 5. As we saw above, public choice theory is as an approach which draws from the tradition of classical economics, offers a sceptical view of the state, chal- lenges a number of the tenets of social democracy, has been promoted by right-wing think tanks such as the Cato Institute in America and the Institute for Economic Affairs in the UK (see Hindmoor 2006) and formed part of the post-1979 Thatcherite narrative. Not surprisingly, it has made few in- into the discourse and ideas of the Labour Party. Even in 1976, with the intro- duction of Cash Limits by the Labour Chancellor Denis Healey and the sub- sequent drift from Keynesianism to monetarism during that Government, 238 Notes

this was not prompted by any intellectual volte face by the Party leadership, but by the necessity to respond to the demands made by the IMF. 6. This was partly Crossman’s own fault, having requested, when in the Department of Housing, that he wished to see every official decision approved in his name. 7. Crossman’s Permanent Secretary at Housing. 8. The Marxist-Leninist principle of democratic centralism concerns a particu- lar approach to state organisation. Within a one-party state, such as the former Soviet Union, the notion of democracy relates to the ability of party members to discuss and debate policy. The element of centralism is based on the view that once the Party has adopted a particular policy following a majority vote, Party members then have to abide by that decision. This principle is clearly outlined in the fourth and final Soviet Constitution: ‘The Soviet State is organised and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones. Democratic central- ism combines central leadership with local initiative and creative activity and with the responsibility of each state body and official for the work entrusted to them.’ 9. See below for details of the role a Prime Minister plays in top appointments in Whitehall. 10. Richards (1997: 240) has argued that one consequence of a Civil Service with a less robust approach to offering critical advice is the high-profile policy failures during this period. For example, Butler, Adonis and Travers (1994) contend that the whole saga of the botched attempt to reform Local Government finance in the mid-1980s might have been avoided if Terence Heiser [permanent secretary] and other senior officials at the Department of Environment had been prepared to stand up to Baker, Patten, Ridley and Thatcher and highlighted the shortcomings in the Charge. It could be argued that, in the 1990s, such incidents as Jonathan Aitken’s Paris hotel bill, Neil Hamilton’s resignation and, most notably, the Arms to Iraq affair, which all reflected poorly on both the Government and the Civil Service, might have been avoided, or at least better handled, by advice from a more critical Civil Service. 11. Callaghan was being interviewed on the BBC 2 programme Behind the Headlines about the actions of the then Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, Peter Middleton, in relation to the Treasury’s involvement in the Norman Lamont/Miss Whiplash affair (see Richards 1997). 12. It is worth noting that pre-dating the Party’s New Labour make-over, a prominent future Blair minister made openly critical comments about the senior Civil Service. In the lead up to the 1992 General Election, , as Shadow environment spokesperson argued that the depart- ment was ‘riddled with Tories’ suggesting: ‘... they are place men. People have been given preferment because they were Thatcherites’ (The Times 10 February 1992). 13. In terms of understanding Whitehall’s grading system and how it has changed over the last 15 years, it is worth pointing out that during the 1990s, a whole series of personnel reforms were introduced: the Efficiency Notes 239

Unit’s Career Management and Succession Planning (1993); a White Paper, Continuity and Change (1994); a second White Paper, The Civil Service: Taking Forward Continuity and Change (1995); and the Senior Management Review (SMR). Gradually, the system was changing from one in which indi- viduals gained entry into a career to one in which the individual was appointed to a specific job. This was reflected in two central aims: to break down the hierarchy in the upper echelons of the senior Civil Service to increase delegation and diversity of advice within the policy-process; and to eliminate layers of management among the 3,000 top civil servants in Whitehall. It was the 1995 Senior Management Review that had a pro- nounced effect on the policy-making process. It led to the creation of the Senior Civil Service, the removal of a whole bureaucratic tier [Grade 3] and the devolution of responsibility down the Whitehall hierarchy (see Marsh et al 2001: 55). The aim was to break down the hierarchical and gradist culture of Whitehall, but the extent to which this has proved a success is somewhat equivocal. However, for the sake of clarity, twenty years ago, the Prime Minister would have approved the appointments of the top two grades in Whitehall – Permanent Secretaries (Grade 1/1a) and Deputy Secretaries (Grade 2). While today, the Prime Minister still approves all appointments to the equivalent of these two grades, Permanent Secretaries have retained their formal titles, but the title of Grade 2 Deputy Secretary has been aban- doned and reclassified in a similar way to the EU model, referred to now as Director-Generals (also sometimes referred to as Under Director-Generals and Directors). In March 2006, the Cabinet Secretary Gus O’Donnell launched a new leadership framework for the Senior Civil Service (SCS) comprising the top 200 posts. This broadly equates to the old Grade 1 and 2 ranking in Whitehall. 14. Previously, it was the Office of Public Service that was involved in this pro cess. The 1998 Wilson Review (see Chapter 5) recommended the merging of the Cabinet Office with the Office of Public Service to bolster the link between policy formulation and delivery (see Fawcett and Gay 2005: 43). 15. The Commissioners derive their duties and powers from the Civil Service (1995) and the Diplomatic Service Order in Council (1991). They are responsible for: ‘... interpreting the principle of selection on merit, on the basis of fair and open competition, for Civil Service recruitment. They also hear appeals from Home civil servants under the Civil Service Code ... The Orders in Council require the Commissioners to: maintain the principle of selection on merit on the basis of fair and open competition in relation to selection for appointment in recruitment; prescribe and publish a recruitment code on the interpretation and application of this principle, and approve the use of exceptions to it; audit recruitment policies and prac- tices within the Civil Service to establish whether the recruitment code is being observed; approve appointments through recruitment to the most senior levels in the Civil Service and certain other specified senior posts; hear and determine appeals in cases of concern about propriety and con- science raised by civil servants under the Civil Service Code which cannot be resolved through internal procedures, and report on such appeals.’ (Civil Service Commissioners 2003) 240 Notes

16. The role of the Corporate Development Group, led by Gill Rider is to: ‘Identify and manage proactively the development of top talent across the Civil Service; intensify the current drive to build world-class HR capability in each government department and agency; develop a people strategy for the Civil Service which supports high achieving, high quality public services.’ (Cabinet Office 2007: http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/reform/ leadership/index.asp) 17. For details of the methodology employed and the limitations of this par- ticular approach, see Richards (1997: 76–77). Due to the size of the data sets, the results presented below are only at the level of Permanent Secretary. For the data on all the appointments within the top 200 group during the Blair era, go to: http://www.shef.ac.uk/politics/staff/daverichards.html 18. This refers individuals drawn from a narrow, socially-homogenous back- ground, characterised as being predominantly: ‘an all-male, white, middle and upper class, private and Oxbridge educated elite which is self-perpetuating’. For details on past surveys of the social and educational background of the mandarinate see Richards (1997: 73–76). The Blair Administration’s mod- ernisation programme for the Civil Service has, as one of its aims, the cre- ation of a more socially representative bureaucracy. From the outset, targets were set to increase staff from under-represented groups in the senior Civil Service: two keys targets were to increase the percentage of women in senior posts from 17 per cent to 35 per cent and ethnic minorities from 1.6 per cent to 3.2 per cent between 1998 and 2004. 19. The data collected for the quantitative analysis covers the period 1997–2004: first, this coincides with the targets specified above; and second, by 2004, Blair would have been responsible for approving all first-time appointments to permanent secretary level, due to the natural turnover of senior officials. This allows for an appropriate passage of time to assess any potential influ- ence he may have rendered on the appointments procedure. 20. For details of the epistemological, methodological and interpretational problems involved in this particular approach see Chapter 1 and for a fur- ther discussion see Richards (1996a), Marsh et al (2001) and Richards and Smith (2004a). For details of the number of interviews conducted by the author see Appendix A. 21. The data in this cohort does not include horizontal transfers at this level. 22. In July 2007, despite Whitehall resistance, the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme was overhauled. The previous scheme had set the retire- ment age at 60, was inflation proofed and based on final salaries. The new scheme has raised the retirement age to 65 and pensions are no longer cal- culated on final salaries, but on career averages. 23. Mavis McDonald was Permanent Secretary to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister since its creation in May 2002 until 2006. She joined the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in September 1966; served in the private office of the Minister for Housing and Local Government and the Secretary of State for the Environment and was Private Secretary to the Permanent Secretary. Subsequent posts included financial management, human resources, local government finance and reorganisation and social housing policy and programmes. From 1995 to 2000, she was Director General at the DOE and then the Department for the Environment, Notes 241

Transport and the Regions (DETR). From 2000 to 2002, she was Permanent Secretary of the Cabinet Office. 24. The Cabinet Office’s biographical note on Howell James notes that: ‘Howell James started his working life in the media as head of promotions at Capital Radio. He was head of publicity at the launch of TV-AM, Britain’s first com- mercial breakfast television channel. In 1984 he became Special Advisor to Lord Young in the Cabinet Office, and moved with him to the Department of Employment and Trade and Industry. In 1987, he joined the Board of Management of the BBC as Director of Corporate Affairs. He joined Cable & Wireless as Director of Corporate and Government Affairs in 1992 where he was responsible for Cable & Wireless’s press, public and government rela- tions in the , North America and Hong Kong. Howell became Prime Minister ’s Political Secretary in 1994. He was a Founding Partner of Brown Lloyd James, a corporate PR Company ... He joined the Cabinet Office as Permanent Secretary for Government Communications in July 2004.’ Http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/about_ the_cabinet_office/howell_james.asp 25. A 2003 Cabinet Office survey revealed that five government departments had no senior ethnic minority staff. The Commissioner for Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips, noted that while progress in increasing representation of those from a minority background had improved at lower levels in Whitehall: ‘... across both the public and private sectors, we have what I call the “snowy peak syndrome”. A mountain represents an organisation’s workforce. At the base you find large numbers of women and ethnic minority workers whereas at the summit you find a small amount of white, middle class men. The snowy peaks won’t melt overnight, but if there is a real commitment to equal opportunities and fair employment practices from the top we can reverse this trend.’ 26. This cultural issue in Whitehall alluded to by Sue Street is important. Over the last two decades, I have interviewed a number of female permanent secretaries [it is not a large group] and asked each about their own path to the top in Whitehall. Their replies were all strikingly similar, if somewhat ironic – they felt their peers regarded them as ‘good chapesses’. 27. Early on in his first year in office, Blair had admitted to one of his very senior officials that he felt that the Civil Service was just like a Rolls-Royce, but he was unsure how to work it. Private information. 28. Private information. 29. Wilson’s Whitehall career followed a very traditional path. He was educated at Radley College and Clare College, Cambridge where he graduated with a Master of Laws (LLM). In 1966, he was called to the Bar but instead decided to become a civil servant, entering as an assistant principal at the Board of Trade. He subsequently served in a number of departments including the Department of Energy before becoming the Head of the Economic Secretariat in the Cabinet Office under Mrs Thatcher from 1987–90. He served a further two years in the Treasury before being appointed Permanent Secretary of the Department of the Environment in 1992 and then Permanent Under Secretary of the Home Office in 1994. See Theakston (1998); The Times, 2 August 1997. 30. Which subsequently became known as the Wilson Review – see Chapter 5 for details. 242 Notes

31. As we saw in Chapter 5, on leaving Whitehall, Wilson’s criticism of the Blair style of government became more vocal. 32. See for example, , 4 June 1998 – Burns Leaves Treasury after ‘Inevitable’ Split. 33. The irony here is that, when in opposition, some Labour spokespeople claimed that this role had been undermined by 18 years of Conservative Administration. 34. But understandably, these views were offered off-record. It is worth reiterat- ing that the fact of ministers and permanent secretaries failing to get on with one another is not uncommon. One could recall the various run-ins Richard Crossman had with Dame Evelyn Sharp in the Department of Housing in the 1960s or the litany of clashes that occurred between minis- ters and permanent secretaries in the 1980s (Richards 1997). 35. As the former Cabinet Secretary, Richard Wilson (2002) observed: ‘There was a complaint awhile ago that the Civil Service was being politicised because it was being used to implement the political manifesto of the gov- ernment. That is what we are there for.’ 36. A further analysis reveals that during Labour’s first two terms, the govern- ment appointed 208 special advisers. Subsequently, ten individuals from this cohort went on to become Labour MPs and one became an MSP. The most high-profile case of a special adviser turned parliamentarian is that of . There were also three former Labour special advisers who stood as Labour candidates and contested but lost at the 2005 General Election. Since 1997, being a special adviser is rapidly becoming an obvious route for those with aspirations for a Parliamentary career. 37. There have been other occasions when a Labour Minister and Whitehall have fallen out with one another over the issue of special advisers. One obvious case, as we saw above, is that of Tony Benn during the Labour Administration of 1974–79 and involved his two political advisers Francis Morrell and Francis Cripps and a particularly conflict relationship with the Department of Energy (see Richards and Smith 2004). 38. For a more detailed account of this affair see Blick (2005: 13–15), Richards and Smith (2004) and the Select Committee on Public Administration (2002). 39. These examples of profanity in this affair are a shock to the normal assump- tions about the urbane and unflustered world of senior mandarins, as per- sonified by the character of Sir Appleby. Mottram was subsequently moved to the Department of Work and Pensions in the same month that Byers resigned. 40. Interview conducted under Chatham House rules. 41. For a detailed study of former generations of permanent secretaries, see Barberis (1996). Bibliography

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Note: Page numbers in bold italics refer to tables. administrative autonomy, 98–100, Barber, Michael (Head of Prime 138 Minister’s Delivery Unit), 104, 1940s–mid-1970s, 100–2 109, 118–19, 122, 123, 124, 139, late 1970s–mid-1990s, 102 189, 196, 236 n.9–10 1990s–present, 96–7, 102–3, Barberis, P., 128 201–2 Bayley, Hugh (Labour’s Shadow Administrators, The (1964), 25–6 Health team) Adonis, A., 33, 37, 195 on 1997 transition, 174 Advisory Non-Departmental Public on Whitehall relations, 71–2 Bodies (NDPBs), 113, 236 n.8 BBC Radio, 129, 171, 177, 178–9 agencies, multiple service, 39–40, 43, Beckett, Margaret (Labour’s Shadow 130–1 Secretary of State for Trade and enhanced autonomy, 133–7, 138 Industry), 70–1, 81–2 failures, 131–2 on Department of Trade and number, 132 Industry mindset, 174 performance measurement, on Department of Trade 123–4 and Industry transition, Alderman, K., 188 82–3, 86 Anderson, P., 5 ministerial experience, 80 Anglo-governance school, 3–5 Belsky, J., 114 Apotheosis of the Dilettante, The Benn, Tony, 20, 106 (Balogh), 25 experiences with Whitehall, Armstrong, R., 17, 181 149–51, 242 n.37 Ashdown, P., 79 on Whitehall during transition, Asymmetric Power Model, 54–5, 56, 63 98, 139, 203 Berlanger, G., 33 Attlee, Clement Bevir, M., 4, 5, 6–7, 13, 29, 30, 32, on Whitehall, 147 46–7, 48, 97, 99, 201 Attlee government (1945–51) Bevir and Rhodes interpretive Whitehall and, 18–21, 147 approach to governance, 6–7, audit mechanisms 226 n.7, 227 n.12 public sector bodies, 121–4 Bichard, Michael, 68, 234 n.8 Blackburn, R., 58 Bailey, Hugh (Junior Minister at Blair, Tony, 57, 79, 200, 233 n.1 Department of Social Security) lack of Cabinet experience, 66–7 on 1997 transition, 174 on politicisation of Civil Service, Bakvis, H., 42 172–3 Bale, T., 45 on public service delivery, Balls, Ed (Labour’s Shadow Treasury 103–4 Special Adviser), 70 role in senior appointments, 163 Balogh, T., 25, 148 on strong centre, 107–8 Bank of England style of policy-making, 108–9 operational independence, 75–6 on Whitehall, 2, 235 n.4

261 262 Index

Blair government (1997–2007) bureaucracy distrust of Whitehall’s ability for see Civil Service; senior Civil policy advice, 112–13 Service first cabinet, 73 Burnham, P., 200 first term, 115 Burns, Terry (Labour’s Shadow governance and, 47, 104–5 Permanent Secretary of media strategy, 186–7 Treasury), 70, 76, 175 Millbank model of control, 106, Butcher, T., 32 142, 156, 157, 182–3 Butler, D., 195 senior appointments demographic Butler, Robin (Major’s Cabinet make-up, 169–71, 240 n.18, Secretary), 60, 66, 70, 173, 178, 241 n.25 234 n.11 senior appointments, outside, Byers/Moore/Sixsmith/DTLGR affair, 167–9 181, 183–4 senior appointments, Byers, Stephen, 183–4 quantification, 164, 172–3 senior retirements, early, 175 Cabinet Office, 47, 105, 113, 195 state-centric, core executive contacts between Blair’s office control, 105–6, 129–30, and, 66–7 138–40 organogram, November 2005, 118 use of special advisers, 180–92, role in senior appointments, 161 242 n.36 sovereignty, 15 Whitehall politicisation, 10, 156–7, Caborn, Richard, 77 172–3, 175–80, 193 Callaghan, James, 46, 49, 106, 147 Whitehall relations, 141–2, role in senior appointments, 162 173–4 Whitehall and, 148, 154 Whitehall’s preparedness for, Cameron, David, 198 82–91 Cameron, S., 91 see also New Labour’s reform Campbell, C., 4, 32, 34, 44, 146 programmes Carltona doctrine, 143, 237 n.2 Blick, A., 23, 26, 27, 181 Carpenter, N., 19 Bligh, Tim (Douglas-Home’s Carrington, P., 41 Principal Private Secretary), cascading culture of targets, 133 59 Castle, B., 106, 149 Blue books, 62, 82–3 Catterill, P., 58, 59 costing mechanism, 83–4 Chadwick, A., 46 Blunkett, David (Labour’s Shadow Chapman, R.A., 24, 29 Education and Employment Charles, N., 170 Secretary), 67–9, 83, 172 Chau, P-K., 58 Bogdanor, V., 29, 129 Child Support Agency, 131–2 Bower, T., 75, 76, 81 Childs, S.L., 171 Brazier, R., 58, 59 Citizen’s Charter, 40–1, 121 Breton, A., 33 Civil Service, 1 Brittain, S., 33 concerns about effect of Brivati, B., 20, 49 Conservative administration Brown, Gordon, 67, 75, 79, 149 longevity, 154–6 relationship with Burns, 76, criticism, 5–7, 149–51, 238 n.10 175 Dossiers, 62, 82–4 Bulpitt, J., 45, 101–2, 193 ethical framework, 16–18 Index 263

Civil Service – continued Clark, David (Labour’s Shadow impact of Labour’s reform Defence Secretary), 72, 74 programme, 10 on discussions of government implications of Prime Minister’s machinery, 66 Delivery Unit, 126–7 on Whitehall’s preparations for moral integrity, 17–18 New Labour government, 87 New Labour’s distrust of, for policy Clegg, S., 42 delivery, 112–13 Cline, C.A., 21 non-governmental organisations Coates, S., 153, 154 and, 63–4 Cockett, R., 33 number of employees, 34, 135 Cohen, N., 81, 181 political neutrality, 16–18 Cole, G.D.H., 15, 19 politicisation under Blair Committee on Standards in Public government, 10, 142, 156–7, Life, 113, 181, 192 172–3, 175–80, 193 Committee on the Civil Service politicisation under Thatcher see Fulton Committee government, 153 communitarianism preparedness for New Labour Etzioni, 49–50 government, 82–91, 154 Gidden’s, 49–50 senior level see senior Civil Service New Labour’s, 50 see also minister-civil servant comprehensive spending review relations (CSR), 230 n.18 Civil Service Code (2006), 198–9 Conservative governments Civil Service Commissioners, 158, Westminster model and, 43–5, 197–8 239 n.15 Whitehall and, 36–7, 41, 152, 153–4 Civil Service Management Board Conservative’s reform programmes (CSMB), 111, 236 n.7 institutional reform, 37–42 Civil Service reform personnel reform, 35–7, 238 n.13 Attlee government, 21–3 Whitehall reform, 32–5, 42–5 Blair government, 52–4, 105–8, Cook, Robin, 79 129–30, 193–4, 196–7, 200–1, Coombes, R., 177 235 n.6 Cornes, R., 45 Conservative government, 32–5, Corry, Dan (Labour Special Adviser in 41–5 Trade and Industry), 86 Labour leadership and, 20, 29–30 Crisp, Nigel (Permanent Secretary at MacDonald government, 18–21 Department of Health) Major government, 36–7, 40–1 appointment, 164 Thatcher government, 35–6, 37–40 early retirement, 177 Westminster model and, 2–4, Crossman, Richard, 20, 106, 144, 199–200 238 n.6 Wilson/Callaghan government, 28–9 criticism of Whitehall, 25, 149 Wilson government, 23–8 on importance of Party manifesto, Civil Service transition (1997), 9–10, 151–2 57–8, 91–4 Crowther-Hunt, Lord, 27 1996 pre-election period, 64–72, Cunningham, Jack (Labour Shadow 74 – 8 National Heritage), 74 background, 58–64 ministerial experience, 80 process, 64–5 on Whitehall contact, 65 Westminster model and, 9–11, 200 Cutler, T., 122 264 Index

Dahl, R., 58 Kinnock-Major-Butler revision, Daniel, C., 113 60–4, 91, 92–3 Davies, J., 97, 138 Dowding, K., 32, 33, 44 decentralisation, 38, 39 Drewry, G., 32 Decentralising the Civil Service Driver, S., 45, 46 (Rhodes et al), 53 Dunleavy, P., 4, 32, 146 ‘declinism’, 23–5 Dutton, D., 100 Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) economic decline, 23, 229 n.16 1996 pre-election transition Whitehall’s role in, 24 period, 67–9 Eden, R., 121, 122 Department of Health English, Michael (Labour MP), 28 1996 pre-election transition English, R., 23 period, 71–2 Etzioni, A., 50 Public Service Agreement, 123 Evans, M., 7, 12, 14, 15, 20, 30, 46, Department of Social Security (DSS) 48, 198, 199–200 1996 pre-election transition period, 65, 69, 87 Fairclough, N., 46, 197 Department of the Environment, Fawcett, A., 192 Transport and the Regions Fielding, S., 46, 49 (DETR), 62, 75 Financial Management Initiative 1996 pre-election transition (FMI), 38–9 period, 72 Finlayson, A., 46 merger, 76–7 Fiorina, M.P., 33 transition, 91 Flinders, M., 88, 132 Department of Trade and Industry Foot, Michael, 63, 151 (DTI) Foreign Office 1996 pre-election transition MacDonald government views on, period, 64, 67, 70–1, 81–2 20–1 press and media relations, 186 Forward Strategy Unit (FSU), transition, 82–3, 86–7, 88 111–12 Department of Transport, Local Foster, C., 4, 32, 44, 76, 79, 108, Government and the Regions 131, 146, 157, 175, 181, 188, (DTLGR), 183–4 201 see also Department of the Foster, Derek (Labour’s Shadow Environment, Transport and Chancellor of the Duchy of the Regions Lancaster), 72 devolution, 10, 134, 138 Fowler, N., 17, 41 impact of, 2 Freedom of Information, 87, 92 Differentiated Polity Model, 53–4, Fry, G.K., 32, 33 56, 139, 203 Fulton Committee, 26 features, 54 criticism, 27–8 Dobson, Frank (Labour’s Shadow Fulton Report (1968), 23 Minister for Environment), 72 importance to Thatcher Dolowitz, D., 35, 146 government, 35–6 Donoughue, B., 110, 111 recommendations, 26–7 Dorey, P., 111 Douglas-Home rules, 58–60 Gaebler, T., 137 civil servants’ lack of awareness, 64 Gains, F., 133 Index 265

Gamble, A., 5, 23, 33, 58, 139, 143, Hennessy, Peter, 17, 21, 22, 26, 32, 37, 144, 145, 148, 151 58, 78, 144, 147, 148, 153, 154 Garrett, J., 23, 27, 28 criticism of Number Ten, 187–8 Gay, O., 192 on Douglas-Home rules, 62–3 Geddes, A., 123, 137 on New Labour’s preparations to Gershon, P., 135, 137 take office, 79 Gershon Report (2004), 135–6, 137 on Whitehall’s approach to party Giddens, Anthony, 49, 51, 52, 130, manifestos, 82, 83 138 on Whitehall’s covert nature, Gilland, K., 200 59–60, 71 Gould, P., 47, 50, 104, 108, 179, Heseltine, Michael, 38, 178 189 Hewitt, Patricia (Health Secretary), governance, 233 n.8 177 interpretive approach, 6–7, 226 n.7, Hill, M., 134 227 n.12 Hindmoor, A., 145 narratives, 3–5, 46–7, 96, 97–8 Hitler, Adolf, 22 New Labour attitude, 47–8 Hojnacki, W.P., 152 Grant, W., 81, 200 Holliday, I., 97–8, 138 Gray, J., 201 Home Office Green, D., 126 1996 pre-election transition period, Green, D.G., 35, 43 64, 70, 88–9 Green, T.H., 16 Public Service Agreements, 124 Greenleaf, W.H., 139, 143 transition process, 86 guild socialism, 19 Hood, C., 42, 103, 121, 122 Hoskyns, J., 35, 43, 144 Hague, D., 17, 22 House of Commons, 26 Hague, William (Major’s Secretary of Howell, Kim State for Wales), 74–5 on special advisers, 185 Hailsham, Lord, 98, 144 How to Be a Minister (Kaufman), 79 Haldane Model of Relationship, Hughes, R., 79 16–17, 44, 143, 194 Hunt, N., 26 Hale, S., 49, 169 Hupe, P., 134 Hall, P., 30, 200 Hyman, P., 104, 109, 110, 115, 116, 190 Halligan, J., 43 Hyndman, N., 121, 122 Hames, T., 33, 37 Harman, Harriet (Labour’s Secretary Ingraham, P., 36 of State at Social Security), 87 institutional reforms Harris, J., 100 Major government, 40–1 Harris, K., 14 Thatcher government and, 37–40 Hattersley, R., 91 Hay, C., 33, 45, 49 James, O., 32, 44, 121, 122, 123, 132 Hayward, J., 9 Jay, P., 33 Hazel, Robert, 89, 235 n.13 Jenkins, Roy, 29, 79 Healey, Denis (Callaghan’s Jennings, Ivor, 15 Exchequer), 29, 106 Jessop, B., 46, 97, 100 Heath, E., 33 Johnson, N., 144 Heffernan, R., 20, 45, 46 joined-up-government (JUG), 47, 105, Helsby, Laurence (Douglas-Home’s 106–8, 114 Cabinet Secretary), 59 problems, 114–15, 129 266 Index

Jones, B., 14, 18, 30 intellectual wing’s critique of Jones, G., 122 Whitehall, 19–20, 22–3, 148 Jones, M., 91 Labour Party Jones, N., 180–1 centralist and statist approach, Judge, D., 15, 27, 144 13–14, 30, 45 debate within, on Whitehall’s Karran, T., 30 failings, 23–6 Kaufman, G., 47, 79, 81 intellectual wing’s critique of Kavanagh, D., 33, 47, 58, 60, 99, Whitehall, 19–20, 22–3, 148 104, 106, 107, 142, 163, 186, policy review process, 46–7 188, 190 re-branding, 46, 197 criticism of Whitehall, 187 revisionist path, 46 on New Labour’s preparations to see also New Labour take office, 64, 66, 79 Labour’s reform programmes, 14 on Policy Unit, 109, 110 Attlee government, 21–3 Keating, M., 14, 18, 30 conservative approach, 29–30 Kellner, P., 27 influence of Westminster model, Kelman, S., 139 9–11, 29–30, 197, 199–200 Kenny, M., 23, 30, 45 MacDonald government, 18–21 Keynesian-Welfare state Whitehall reform, 10, 19, 26–8 political control vs. administrative Wilson/Callaghan government, autonomy, 100–2 28–9 Kilfoyle, Peter (Labour’s Shadow see also New Labour’s reform Education team) programmes on 1997 transition, 72 Lansbury, George (MacDonald’s on early senior retirements, Cabinet minister), 21 174–5 criticism of Treasury, 21 King, A., 24, 33, 142 Laski, Harold, 19, 25, 30, 148 Kinnock, Neil, 46, 63 criticism of Whitehall, 5, 23, 169, acceptance of Whitehall inherited 193, 229 n.15 from Conservatives, 152–3 stand on individual liberty, 21 Whitehall and Opposition Layton-Henry, Z., 200 consultation, 60, 77 Leggett, W., 49 Kooiman, J., 106 legislature Krook, M.L., 171 in Parliamentary Democracy, 15 Le Grand, J., 100, 102 Labour governments Letwin, S.R., 35 impact of Westminster model on, Leyland, A., 114 10–11, 15–16 Liaison Committee, 107–8, 110, 112, Whitehall relations, 146–52 115 see also under individual Liddle, R., 47, 48, 51, 104, 115, 155, governments, e.g., Attlee 179, 195 government Lilley, Peter Labour leadership costing of Labour’s policies, 84, 92 role in Shadow Teams consultation Ling, T., 122 with Whitehall, 65 Lipsey, D., 21, 29, 76, 148 Whitehall reform and, 20, 29–30 Lodge, G., 108 Whitehall relations, 147 Longstreth, F., 30 Labour movement Lovenduski, J., 171 impact on Labour Party, 13–14 Lowe, R., 102 Index 267

Lowndes, V., 32 New Labour shadow team, 72–4, Ludlam, S., 46, 49 78–9 minister-civil servant relations, Mac- 16–17, 41, 44, 236 n.1 see also Mc- conspiratorial view, 144–5, MacAskill, E., 91 149–51 MacDonald government (1924, constitutional view, 143–4, 147 1929–31) during Blair government, Whitehall and, 18–21, 147 173–4 MacDonald, Ramsay during Wilson government, 26 brand of socialism, 18–19 public choice view, 145, 231 n.1, Mackintosh, J., 144 237 n.5 Major, John special advisers and, 182, 183–6, role in senior appointments, 190–1, 192–3 162–3 ministerial experience on Whitehall, 42 New Labour, 79–81 Major government ministerial responsibility, 15 institutional reform, 40–1 Westminster model, 100 personnel reform, 36–7, 238 n.13 Minogue, K., 35 Whitehall and Opposition Modernising Government consultation, 60, 61, 77 programme, 2, 97, 129, 133, 197 Mallalieu, J.P.W., 22–3 monistic state, 19 Management Information System for Moore, Jo, 183–4 Ministers (MINIS), 38 moral integrity managerialism, 42, 43 civil servants and, 17–18 Mandelson, P., 46, 47, 48, 51, 104, Moran, M., 24, 103 108, 115, 155, 179, 195 Morgan, K.O., 148, 149 Marinetto, M., 97–8 Mottram, Richard (Permanent Marquand, D., 7, 14, 19, 24, 27, 30 Secretary), 66 Marsh, D., 5, 7, 9, 16, 32, 33, 35, 40, Mount, F., 15 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, 54, 96, 97, 102, Mowlam, Mo, 188 109, 129, 140, 143, 146, 150, 179, Mulgan, G., 106–7, 108, 109, 117, 124, 189, 199 130 policy-making study, 99 Martell, L., 45, 46, 49 Nairn, T., 5 Massey, A., 16 National Health Service (NHS) Mathers, H., 123, 137 targets, 123 Mc- New Deal for Lone Parents, 87 see also Mac- New Labour, 45–6, 52–3, 197 McAnulla, S., 138, 139 concerns about effect of McCartney, Ian, 71, 174, 186 Conservative administration McKibbin, R., 13 longevity on Whitehall, 154–6 Melhuish, E., 114 ideational development, 48–52 Metcalfe, L., 41 lack of Cabinet experience, 79–80 Migue, J., 33 preparations for taking office, Miliband, R., 5, 21, 30, 144, 148, 169, 78–82, 154 190 response to governance narrative, 48 Millbank model of control, 106, 142, shadow front bench, 72–4, 78–9 156, 157, 182–3 see also Blair government; Labour minister(s) Party 268 Index

New Labour’s reform programmes, Parsons, W., 42 95–7, 129–30, 200–3, 235 n.6 Peck, E., 104, 116, 119, 122, 137 influencing factors, 201–2 Penty, A., 19 policy delivery, 104–6 see also Performance and Innovation Unit Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PIU), 111, 112 political control vs. administrative Permanent Secretaries autonomy, 96–7, 103, 105, 138, 1996–2004 listing, 205–25 201–2 appointment, 160–1 public service delivery, 123–4, role, 194–5 130–7, 138 Perri 6, 47, 104, 116, 119, 122, 137 state reforms, 45 personnel reforms, 238 n.7 strengthening Number Ten, Major government, 36–7 108–16 Thatcher government, 35–6 Westminster model and, 48, 193–4 Peters, B.G., 96, 97, 98–9, 105, 130 Whitehall reform, 52–4, 105–8, Pierre, J., 97 129–30, 193–4, 196–7, 200–1, Pilkington, C., 201 235 n.6 Pimlott, B., 27, 147, 149 Newman, J., 46, 47, 49, 50, 138 Plant, R., 58 New Public Management (NPM), 2, Plowden, F., 4, 32, 44, 146 39, 232 n.5 Plowden Report (1961), 24, 229 n.18 late 1970s–1990s, 102 policy advice 1990s to present, 102–3, 138 New Labour’s alternative sources, New Right, 33 113–15 critique of Westminster model, 145 see also special advisers pursuit of neo-liberal programme, policy advisers, 184–5 49 policy delivery Next Steps, 2, 39–40, 232 n.4 Blair government, 104–6, 130, 137 Niskanen, W., 33, 34, 145 strengthening Prime Minister’s Noll, R.G., 33 role, 108–12, 115–16 non-governmental organisations Thatcher government, 127 (NGOs) Policy Directorate, 109–10 pre-election discussions with political control, 98–100, 138 Whitehall and, 63–4 1940s–mid-1970s, 100 Norris, P., 171 1970s–1990s, 102 Norton-Taylor, R., 91 1997–present, 96–7, 103–4, 201–2 political neutrality O’Donnell, Gus (Blair’s Cabinet civil servants and, 16–18 Secretary) Pollard, S., 58, 91, 102 on Whitehall, 3, 176–7 Ponting, C., 27, 37–8 O’Neil, F., 35, 146 Portillo, Michael (Major’s Defence opposition parties Secretary), 74 pre-election discussions with power relations, 44, 99–100, 142–3 Whitehall see Douglas-Home Asymmetric power Model, 54–5, rules 56, 98, 139 Osborne, D., 137 conspiratorial view, 144–5, 149–51 O’Toole, B., 16 constitutional view, 143–4, 147 Differentiated Polity Model, 53–4, Painter, C., 122 56, 139, 203 Parliamentary Affairs, 195 Haldane model, 17, 143, 194 Index 269 power relations – continued Raynerism, 37–8 Power-dependency model, 146 Red books, 62, 82–3 Prime Minister, 108–16 costing mechanism, 83–4 public choice view, 145, 231 n.1, regulatory agencies, 121–2 237 n.5 Rentoul, J., 58, 66, 72, 75 strengthening centre, 98–9, 107, Rhodes, R.A.W., 29, 30, 32, 35, 41, 42, 189–90 44, 46–7, 49, 54, 96, 97, 99, 100, Whitehall and Conservatives, 152–4 103, 106, 115, 145, 146, 201 Whitehall and Labour, 146–52 approach to governance, 5–7, 48 Prescott, John (Blair’s Deputy Prime on governments’ approach to Minister), 67, 77, 79, 91 reforms, 203 Prime Ministers ‘hollowed-out state’ thesis, 4, 5 policy activism, 108–16 on state-centric control, 139–40 role in senior appointments, 158, study of sub-central government, 160, 161–3 102 Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit study on Whitehall during New (PMDU), 120 Labour, 53 composition, 119 on Westminster model, 13 creation, 116–19 Richards, D., 5, 7, 8–9, 12, 15–16, 17, implications for Whitehall, 126–7 18, 20, 27, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, objectives, 116, 124 41, 43, 44, 46–7, 54, 58, 68, planning process, 125 88, 92, 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, policy priorities, 124 105, 106, 107, 110, 114, 115, tools of control, 120–4, 126 123, 125, 127, 129, 137, 138, 139, principal-agent model, 39, 101, 102 143, 146, 150, 153, 158, 166, 168, limitations, 102–3 178, 179, 192, 195, 199 New Labour’s continued use of, on Callaghan, 162 130–1 on senior appointments, 152, 156, Programme Analysis and Review 157, 161, 162–3, 167 (PAR), 229 n.18 Richards, P., 50, 105 Pryce, S., 142 Riddell, P., 88, 181 public choice theory, 145, 231 n.1, Ridley, Nicholas (Thatcherite 237 n.5 minister) Public Expenditure Survey on Whitehall, 42 Committee (PESC), 229 n.18 Robins, L., 201 public-relations experts, 184–5 Rogers, B., 108 Public Service Agreements (PSAs), 121 Rollings, N., 102 targets, 120–1, 122–4, 126, 133 Rose, R., 30, 58 targets and Civil Service Routledge, P., 75, 76 appointments, 159–60 Rubinstein, D., 45 public service delivery, 139 flexibility and choice, 134 Sampson, A., 84 incentive principle, 134–6 Saward, M., 97 standards, 133 Scott, C., 122 Punnett, M., 58 Scott, D., 110, 181 Pyper, R., 201 Seaton, J., 79 Seers, D., 12, 24 Rawnsley, A., 58, 75, 76 Seldon, A., 49, 58, 60, 64, 109, 110, Rayner, Derek, 37 127, 190 270 Index

Seldon, T., 49, 66, 72, 75, 76–7, 79, Snowden, Philip (MacDonald’s 106, 115, 124, 173, 175, 182–3, Chancellor), 19, 21, 148 188 socialism Select Committee on Public guild, 19 Administration, 118, 120, 181, Ramsay MacDonald’s, 18–19 184 special advisers, 114, 157, 181–2, Senior Appointments Selection 192–3, 242 n.36 Committee (SASC), 158–9 Byers/Moore/Sixsmith/DTLGR senior Civil Service (SCS), 239 n.13 affair, 181, 183–4 accelerated promotions, 163, control of access to ministers, 190 164–6 cost, 180 appointments system, 157–60 criticism, 188–9 Blair and politicisation of, 10, impact on Whitehall, 190–2 156–7, 172–3, 175–80, 193 for media relations, 186–7 centre effect, 166–7 New Labour ministers’ views, 185–6 Conservative government and, proliferation in numbers, 180–1, 36–7, 41, 152, 153, 166 187–8 criticism, 5–6, 149 types, 184–5 demographic make-up of Squires, S., 171 appointments, 169–71, 194, stakeholding, 50–1 240 n.18, 241 n.25 state models, 53–6 early retirements during Blair comparison, 55 government, 175 see also under individual models first-time appointees, 165, 166, 170 state reform first-time promotions, 165 Blair government, 45 New Labour’s approach, 142, impact on Westminster model, 3–4 156–7 impact on Whitehall, 3–4 outside appointments, 167–9 trade union movement and, 19–20 role and expectations, 195, 198 see also Conservative’s reform Senior Leadership Committee (SLC), programmes; Labour’s reform 158–9 programmes; New Labour’s role in senior appointments, 161 reform programmes Senior Management Review (SMR) state transformation (1995), 36–7, 239 n.13 ‘decentred perspective’, 4–5 Service First, 121 ‘end of Whitehall’ approach, 4, 32, see also Citizen’s Charter 44, 146 Sharpe, L.J., 14 ‘hollowed-out state’ thesis, 4, 97 Sheldon, R., 28 ‘reconstituted-state’ thesis, 5, Short, Claire, 73, 108, 188 97–8 Sixsmith, Martin, 183–4 Steinmo, S., 30 Sloman, A., 63 Stephens, P., 29, 181 Smith, Chris (Labour’s Shadow Stone, N.T., 23, 25 Spokesperson for Health), 72 Strategy Unit, 112 Smith, John, 46 Sure Start programme (SSLP), 114 Smith, M.J., 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, Sutcliffe, Gerry, 178 18, 19, 20, 30, 33, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46–7, 54, 88, 92, 96, 97, 100, Tant, A., 15 104, 105, 106, 110, 114, 123, 125, task forces for policy advice 127, 129, 137, 138, 139, 143–4, see Advisory Non-Departmental 145, 146, 150, 199, 202 Public Bodies Index 271

Taylor, A., 98, 107, 138 Waine, B., 122 Taylor, A.J.P., 21 Wainwright, H., 20, 148 Taylor, R., 30, 200 Walden, G., 81 Templeton College seminars, 79, 80–1 Walker, D., 115 Thain, K., 29 Walkland, A., 144 Thatcher government Watkins, A., 147 Financial Management Initiative Watmore, Ian (Head of Prime (FMI), 38–9 Minister’s Delivery Unit), 119 Next Steps, 39–40, 232 n.4 Weiner, M., 16 personnel reform, 35–6 Weller, P., 42 power balance, 152–3 Welsh Office Raynerism, 37–8 1996 pre-election transition period, Whitehall reform, 33–5 74 –5 Thatcher, Margaret Westminster model, 12–13, 55, role in senior appointments, 162, 226 n.1, 227 n.1 166 Conservative governments and, on Whitehall, 42 43–5, 197–8 Theakston, K., 13–14, 19, 20, 21, 22, critique, 144, 145 26, 28, 30, 74, 79, 91, 143, 144, government transition and, 90–1 147, 148, 149, 151, 154, 155, impact of state transformation, 3–5 175, 198 influence on Conservative’s reform Thelen, K., 30 programmes, 35 Third Way, 48–52 influence on Labour’s attitude to Toynbee, P., 115 Whitehall, 9–11, 13, 29–30, Travers, T., 122, 195 146 –8 Treasury influence on Labour’s reform 1976 IMF crisis and, 28–9, programmes and, 7–8, 197, 199 229 n.11 liberal and elitist view of 1996 pre-election transition period, government, 15–16 69–70, 75–6 political control vs. administrative Conservative governments and, autonomy, 99–100, 103–4 43 public service ethos and, 16–18 MacDonald government’s views on, reconstituted, 5, 103–4, 138–40, 21 197–200 Plowden Report, 24, 229 n.18 relevance, 2–3 Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit and, vs. other models, 55 118–19 White, M., 91 Public Service Agreements, 122–3 White, S., 48 transition process, 85 Whitehall Treasury and Civil Service see Civil Service Committee, 31, 38, 162 Wickham-Jones, M., 171 Tsars, 113–14 Williams, M., 129, 147 Turnbull, Andrew (Blair’s Cabinet Williams, P.M., 149 Secretary), 57, 95, 112 Wilson/Callaghan government criticism of Whitehall, 117–18 (1974–79) on policy-making process, 191 Whitehall and, 28–9, 147–8 on senior-level officials, 194–5 Wilson, Harold, 27 on service delivery, 120 call for Whitehall reform, 26 on special advisers, 194 role in senior appointments, 162 on strong centre, 111 Whitehall relations, 147–8 272 Index

Wilson, G., 4, 32, 34, 44, 52, 108, on Whitehall, 3 146, 147 Whitehall career, 241 n.29 Wilson government (1964–70) on Whitehall politicisation, 179, Whitehall and, 23–8 242 n.35 Wilson Report (1998), 111 Wintrobe, R., 33 Wilson, Richard (Blair’s Cabinet Wright, M., 29 Secretary), 52, 108, 173, 235 n.6 on special advisers, 181, 192 Young, H., 63