Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton

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Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton INTELLIGENCE BRIEF Coercive Labor in Xinjiang: Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton December 2020 Coercive Labor in Xinjiang: Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton Contents By Dr. Adrian Zenz Executive Summary . .2 Executive Summary 1 . Introduction to Cotton in Xinjiang . .3 ew evidence from Chinese government docu- 1.1 Mechanization and Manual Labor in ments and media reports shows that hundreds Xinjiang’s Cotton-Picking Practices .........3 of thousands of ethnic minority laborers in Xin- N 1.2 Changes in the Size and Composition jiang are being forced to pick cotton by hand through of Xinjiang’s Cotton-Picking Workforce ......5 a coercive state-mandated labor transfer and “poverty alleviation” scheme, with potentially drastic conse- 1.3 The Significance of Cotton Picking quences for global supply chains. Xinjiang produces 85 for Xinjiang’s Poverty Alleviation percent of China’s and 20 percent of the world’s cotton. Through Employment Policies .............9 Chinese cotton products, in turn, constitute an import- 1.4 Implications for ant basis for garment production in numerous other Coercive Labor in Cotton Picking ...........9 Asian countries. 2 . The Coercive Nature of Xinjiang’s Previously, evidence for forced labor in Xinjiang per- Transfer of Rural Surplus Laborers . 10 tained only to low-skilled manufacturing, including the 2.1 History of Labor Transfer ..............10 production of textiles and apparel. This report provides 2.2 ‘Precise Poverty Alleviation’: new evidence for coercion specifically related to cotton Targeting Every Household ...............10 picking. These findings have much wider implications, affecting all supply chains that involve Xinjiang cotton 2.3 Intensified ‘Battle’: Militarized as a raw material. Training and Thought Transformation ......12 2.4 Implications .........................13 On Dec. 2, 2020, the United States placed a Withhold Release Order on cotton produced by the Xinjiang Pro- 3 . Evidence of Coercion in the Recruitment, duction and Construction Corps. However, this entity Transfer, and Management of Transferred only produces 33 percent of Xinjiang’s cotton and only Laborers in Xinjiang’s Cotton-Picking Sector . 13 0.4 percent of its highest-quality long-staple cotton. 3.1 Overcoming ‘Laziness’: How the This report provides evidence for coercive labor related State Mobilizes Minority Cotton Pickers ....13 to all cotton produced in Xinjiang. 3.2 Streamlined Process: Continued on next page Efficient Large-Scale Operations with Guaranteed Outcomes ...............16 3.3 Evidence Regarding Average Incomes for Cotton Picking ...............18 3.4 Implications .........................19 COVER: A farmer harvests cotton in a field in Hami, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. (PULATI NIYAZI/Getty Images) 4 . Conclusions . 19 2 December 2020 Executive Summary Continued from previous page The evidence shows that in low. State policies have greatly cers. Government supervision 2018, three Uyghur regions increased the numbers of local teams monitor pickers, checking alone mobilized at least 570,000 ethnic minority pickers, reducing that they have a “stable” state persons into cotton-picking reliance on outside Han Chinese of mind, and administer political operations through the govern- migrant laborers. The intensive indoctrination sessions. Some ment’s coercive labor training two- to three-month period of regions put Uyghur children and and transfer scheme. Xinjiang’s cotton picking represents a stra- elderly persons into centralized total labor transfer of ethnic mi- tegic opportunity to boost rural care while working-age adults norities into cotton picking likely incomes, and therefore plays a are away on state-assigned cot- exceeds that figure by several key role in achieving the state’s ton-picking work assignments. hundred thousand. poverty alleviation targets. These While not directly related to the targets are mainly achieved campaign of mass internment, Despite increased mechaniza- through coercive labor transfers. these labor transfers can include tion, cotton picking in Xinjiang persons who have been released continues to rely strongly on Cotton picking is grueling and from internment camps. manual labor. In 2019, about 70 typically poorly paid work. Labor percent of the region’s cotton transfers involve coercive mo- The data presented in this report fields had to be picked by hand bilization through local work provides strong evidence that – especially the high-quality teams, transfers of pickers in the production of the majority long-staple cotton predomi- tightly supervised groups, and of Xinjiang’s cotton involves nantly grown in southern Xin- intrusive on-site surveillance by a coercive, state-run program jiang’s Uyghur regions, where government officials and (in at targeting ethnic minority groups. mechanized picking shares are least some cases) police offi- 1. Introduction to Cotton in Xinjiang 1.1 Mechanization and Manual Labor in Xinjiang’s Cotton-Picking Practices Xinjiang produces over 20 percent of the world’s cotton.1 In 2019, Xinjiang. The Uyghur-majority Despite increased mechanization, Xinjiang produced 84.9 percent of regions in southern Xinjiang grow most of the cotton produced in Xin- all cotton in China. In 2018, China’s much of the region’s hand-picked jiang is still picked by hand. Hand- total raw cotton, yarn, textile, and cotton, which is of higher quali- picked cotton is more expensive to apparel exports constituted almost ty than machine-picked cotton. produce than machine-harvested 10 percent of the total value of na- They also produce nearly all of the cotton. While the government seeks tional exports.2 Some of the world’s highest-quality long-staple cotton to make Xinjiang cotton more highest-quality cotton comes from (cotton with long, silky fibers). competitive by lowering production 1 https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-forced-labor-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-toward-shared-agenda, p.5 2 https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-forced-labor-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-toward-shared-agenda, p.4 3 December 2020 labor from its extensive prison sys- tem for the arduous task. Xinjiang has also for years forced hundreds of thousands of secondary school students to pick cotton.4 Due to Xinjiang’s high produc- tion costs, its cotton production has been subsidized with central costs through mechanized har- per acre, over five times higher than government funds since 2011. vesting, it has also implemented a the 1,093 RMB (about $167) per Between 2013 and 2016, Beijing massive scheme to meet ongoing acre for machine picking. reduced the state-subsidized target manual labor needs by replacing price per metric ton of cotton by Han migrant cotton pickers with Cotton picking is seasonal labor 8.8 percent, heightening pressures local ethnic minority pickers. that takes place annually during an to reduce production costs (while approximately two- to three-month subsidizing the acquisition of har- In recent years, Xinjiang’s cost of period (September to November). vesting machines).5 manual cotton harvesting While cotton picking is paid work, it increased due to rising wages, is grueling labor from dawn to dusk Consequently, Xinjiang has heav- resulting in increased production and requires full relocation for the ily promoted mechanized cotton costs and reduced profit margins. harvesting months, and average harvesting. However, mechaniza- In the early 2010s, the cost of earnings can be below Xinjiang’s tion shares vary widely by region, producing manually-harvested minimum wage level and below and regions with and without cotton in regions under the publicly stated wages for low- substantial mechanization alike authority of the Xinjiang Production skilled factory work (see Section continue to rely on large numbers and Construction Corps (XPCC), a 3.3). Notably, cotton pickers in of manual pickers. paramilitary entity with a vast Xinjiang have long been difficult to economic network that produces find in sufficient numbers. As a re- In 2019, mechanized harvesting over a third of Xinjiang’s cotton, sult, cotton growers have relied on in the XPCC regions reached a was substantially higher than that hundreds of thousands of migrant share of 83 percent.6 However, in of that of fully mechanized U.S. workers from other Chinese prov- southern Xinjiang the mechanized cotton. Much of this cost difference inces who have to travel over long harvesting share stood at only 20 is related to higher labor expendi- distances, which further increased percent that year.7 In 2019, 30.2 tures due to lower levels of mecha- labor costs.3 In addition, Xinjiang percent (1.89 million of 6.27 million nization. In Korla, a cotton-growing has a history of using involuntary acres) of cotton plantations in Xin- region in central Xinjiang, the cost labor for cotton picking. The XPCC jiang were harvested through ma- of hand picking in 2018 was esti- especially is known to have used chinery, leaving nearly 70 percent mated at 5,706 RMB (about $874) to 3 https://archive.is/qr1Hp#selection-839.83-839.135; The increased cost of using migrant labor from other parts of China appears to be related at least in part to the fact that cotton growers paid for their round trip train fares, see e.g. http://web.archive.org/web/20201104204602/http://www.xjdaily. com/c/2018-09-26/2045657.shtml. 4 http://www.gov.cn:8080/govweb/jrzg/2006-09/04/content_376793.htm or https://archive.is/UHLHi. Starting in 1994, Xinjiang organized students from 3rd grade up to pick cotton every year. In 2005, Xinjiang organized 1 million school students to pick cotton. In 2006, the region forbade schools from sending primary school students to pick cotton. Sources: http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-08/15/content_362624.htm or https://archive.is/ZIKcU; http://web. archive.org/web/20201112173256/https://www.xzbu.com/2/view-505223.htm. 5 From 20,400 RMB/ton to 18,600 RMB/ton. http://jiuban.moa.gov.cn/fwllm/qgxxlb/xj/201410/t20141017_4107586.htm or https://archive.is/rIKYh; http:// www.cj.gov.cn/bmyy/tjj/tjbs/233541.htm or https://archive.is/Z9UE5.
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