British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma: with Special Reference to the Crown Colony Scheme

■Article■ British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma: With Special Reference to the Crown Colony Scheme

●

Chan, Chai-fong

1. WWII and Reid's Plan, the Crown Colony Scheme1) Lord Wavell was the Governor-General of India, as successor to Lord Linlithgow, from October 1943 to March 1946. In his term, the British faced the most difficult and momentous period in India, not only from the internal challenge from Indian National movements, but also from the Second World War. In Burma, not long after Reginald Dorman- Smith became the second Governor after Burma's separation from India in 1937, the Burmese Government evacuated to Simla, the summer capital of India in early 1942, and returned to Burma only after October 1945. Japanese troops assaulted India's northeastern frontiers after conquering Burma in March 1944, then were finally defeated and withdrew from Assam, the eastern province of British India, after July 1944.

磐彩鳳 Chan, Chai-fong, Ph.D. Course of Graduate school of the University of To- kyo. Subject: South Asian History. Publication: "British Colonial Policy in the Naga Hills: With Special Focus on Con- trol Area Policy," The Komaba Journal of Area Studies, No. 3 (The University of Tokyo, 1999), pp.167-87. * This article follows a study of the author's MA dissertation: British Colonial Policy in India's North-East Frontier: With Special Reference to the "Crown Colony" Plan (2000). British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 77

Robert Reid, then Governor of Assam, wrote a note in November 1941 proposing to combine the frontier areas of Assam and the adjacent frontier areas of Burma into a British colony.2) It underlined the strategic importance of India's northeast frontier in relations with Tibet, China, 78 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

Burma and Japan. Moreover, Reid's endeavor was inextricable to the conduct of extending British administration over the unadministered areas of Assam-Himalayan frontiers and the undefined Assam-Burma borders.3) British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 79

The war created a chance for the British to focus attention on Indo- Burma borders and to re-think the proposal of amalgamating the adjoining frontiers. Reid's proposal was followed by an animated discussion in Wavell's Government, Dorman-Smith's Government, and at their Home Government in Britain. This paper will focus on the debate from 1942 to 1946 on the then future status of the frontier areas adjoining Assam and Burma, especially on Reid's scheme as to whether to exclude these hill tracts into a separate North-East Frontier Province or a "Crown Colony." This frontier province, or separate colony scheme, originally intended to cover the adjoining hilly tracts of India and Burma, the Shan States, and the Chittagong Hills of present Bangladesh, into a separate political entity under the direct control of a Crown Agent (see maps). However, Reid's scheme was severely criticized as a "divide and rule" trick that stirred tribal secessionism.4) To judge its causes would go far beyond the scope of this paper; the aim here is to examine why this scheme came out in the last phase of British rule, and how it was debated in the high circles of the British Government. The response of the politicians of Assam and the tribes will be briefly mentioned. In this preparatory work, the substance and influence of British colonial policy toward tribes of India's North-East Frontier is of primary focus, but the frontier areas of Burma, then a British colony, will also be considered.

2. The Ideas of Separating or Amalgamating Hill Tribes by 1942 The idea of amalgamating the "Backward Tracts" of Assam and Burma was initiated in 1928.5) Following the recommendation of the Simon Commission to separate Burma Province from the Indian Empire,6) N. E. Parry and J. H. Hutton, two British officers of Assam, made the suggestion of establishing a new "North-East Frontier Province." They proposed combining the hill tracts bordering Assam and Burma, and put- ting them under the control of the Central Government.7) Hutton held that the tribal peoples in the hills had nothing in common with the plains people of Assam racially, historically, culturally or linguistically. The solution was, therefore, the formation of a North-East Frontier Province or Agency, which would embrace the northeastern frontier districts of Assam and those areas on the northwestern frontier of Burma.8) He em- 80 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001 phasized the importance of the proposal from the view of a frontier defense as well as a safeguard towards tribal peoples. The Government of Assam agreed with him, concluding that "the proposition that a North- East Frontier Province, or at least some unified form of administration for the portions of Assam and Burma, which adjoin, has great attrac- tions," in August 1930.9) Parry and Hutton's conception of amalgamation developed for several reasons. If the separation of Assam hills were accepted by the Simon Commission, it would reduce the difficulties inherent in the creation of so small a unit; the peoples of the Assam hills were ethnologically more akin to the peoples of the adjoining Burma hills; and the distribution of these hill tribes ran across the political boundary. The above suggestion found no place in the final plan of constitutional reforms, which resulted in the Government of India Act of 1935. In addition, the British Government showed no interest in Assam's frontier by that time. The scheme of amalgamating backward tracts of Assam and Burma, however, was revived by Reid, who was inspired by Hutton and J. P. Mills, Reid's Secretary from 1937 to 1942.10) The ideas of Hutton and Parry were not adopted in 1935, but they were to become controversial during the last period of British rule in India. Under the Government of India Act of 1935, the Backward Tracts of Assam were divided into "Partially Excluded Areas" and "Excluded Areas."11) The administration of excluded areas became the sole responsibility of the Governor of Assam. The partially excluded areas were placed under the ministers and were subject to the Governor's discretionary control.12) Indian nationalists criticized the whole system of exclusion and the Governor's arbitrary "safeguards" because these were inconsistent with a full measure of self-government, and any real merger of the hills and plains, while the constitutional premises endorsed a future fusion of backward tracts with Assam as the ultimate goal. For accepting the backward tracts as part of Assam already, the Government Act of 1935 contemplated the conversion of the excluded areas into partially excluded areas and the conversion of the latter to ministerial areas, but did not counter the reverse process.13) Burma, as suggested by the Simon Commission, separated from India when the Government of Burma Act of 1935 came into force in April British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 81

1937, with Ba Maw as the first Prime Minister. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for India and Burma, suggested that the separation of Burma from India was the natural consequence of the introduction of self-government.14) He said the racial type, culture, and geographical position of Burma belonged not to India but to the projection of the main bulk of Asia and the Indo-Chinese peninsula.15) Following this outlook, Reid wrote that Amery's point of view applied just as closely to Assam's excluded and partially excluded areas as to the "Tribal Areas. "16) Reid said that no other line could fulfill British duty to the primitive peoples without separating them from ministerial control of the plains of Assam, and concluded that he was in favor of Hutton's idea of a North- East Province or Agency. His proposal embraced the entire hill fringe from Lushai in the south to the Balipara Frontier Tract in the north, including the Chittagong Hills Tract of Bengal, the Nagas and the Chins Areas of Burma, and the Shan States (see maps).17) Furthermore, the salient point of the note under discussion was that Reid planned to remove the areas mentioned above from both the Indian and Burmese Governments.18) He wrote: I would put this under a Chief Commissioner and he in turn would, I imagine, have to be divorced (as is Burma) from the control of the Government of India and put under some appro- priate department at Whitehall.19)

Reid's scheme, in the sense that the proposed amalgamated hill tracts would be a separate British colony controlled by a Crown Agent, as Burma, was known as the "Crown Colony" scheme, or a "Separate Agency" scheme. The Governor-General, Lord Linlithgow, was the first person who received Reid's note and sent a copy to the Secretary of State, Amery, in March 1942.20) Amery was personally attracted to the Reid plan and commented upon it:

Supposing that Pakistan does come off, there will be possibly two Muslim areas, the whole of the States, Hindu British India...and finally at least an important primitive hill tribe area such as that which Reid has very interestingly outlined in the memorandum which reached me by the last mail.21)

Reid's note came at a time when India was in the final phase of its struggle for independence. It added a new dimension to the partition of 82 Journalof the JapaneseAssociation for SouthAsian Studies, 13, 2001

India in that it could have resulted in another partition, along with the birth of Pakistan.22) Amery saw a chance to manipulate Reid's ideas to reserve all the excluded areas to the Britain Government, as he tried to keep the Princely States out of India's future self-government.

The main question, however, is how, in any case, on the assumption of full self-government we could maintain control of the excluded areas even if there is a clear case for doing so. One suggestion is that assuming that a number of Indian States stand out of the new arrangements, the excluded areas might be administered by officers under the Crown Representative.23)

On Amery's recommendation, Reginald Coupland, then professor of Oxford University, expressed a similar scheme in his voluminous report on India's future.24) Coupland advocated Reid's plan by pointing out that the Mongoloid block bordering India and Burma belonged neither to the Indian nor Burmese "nation." Out of external defense, however, the future Governments of India and Burma might associate with the British in a joint system of defense to protect these areas.25) His book distributed Reid's ideas in broader way to the world. Therefore, the Reid scheme was also known as Coupland's plan.

3. High-level Debates over Reid's Scheme: 1942-44 In the exile of the Burmese Government, British officials in charge of the scheduled areas of Burma held a series of meetings concerning the after-war reconstruction of the Frontier Areas from November 1942. Responding to Reid's note, C. W. North, a member of the Burma Fron- tier Service, suggested amalgamating the Frontier Areas of Burma with the tribal areas of Assam.26) The officers of the scheduled areas of Burma dismissed the proposal at its fourth meeting.27) However, Governor Dorman-Smith was attracted to it. Dorman-Smith visited Assam in January 1943. He had an opportu- nity to discuss the possible amalgamation of the tribal areas on both sides of the frontier with J. P. Mills, Secretary to the then Governor of Assam A. G. Clow.28) Mills was the leading expert on tribal matters of Assam and was regarded as an advocate of the Reid scheme. Dorman- Smith asked R. E. McGuire, Secretary of the Scheduled Areas Depart- BritishColonial Policy on FrontierAreas Adjoining Assam and Burma 83 ment in the Burma Government, to visit Assam and discuss with Mills the political, financial and economic implications of amalgamation.29) After a secret meeting with Mills, and probably with Reid as well, McGuire composed a memorandum and sent it to John Walton of the Burma Office to advocate a separate administration of the hill tracts of Burma.30) On the Burmese Government's behalf, McGuire suggested the possible amalgamation of the scheduled areas of Burma with Assam. Although different from having one agency, as was advocated by Reid, McGuire proposed at the initial stage to start with two agencies instead, one for the Assam areas and another for Burma. He added that a separate agency for Burma was the only solution, which would allow the fulfillment of the United Kingdom's trusteeship and which, by the ultimate aim of the federation with Burma, should satisfy the political aspiration of the Bur- mese.31) Corresponding to McGuire's proposal, Reid noted that he preferred to treat the two agencies as one from the start and called it the "North Eastern Agency or Province." It could be divided into two for administrative purposes and allow the Governors of Assam and Burma to ad- minister them as a matter of convenience, but Reid insisted on the unity of the charge and on a single system of finance.32) From these statements we could find that the "Crown Colony" scheme was no more than a tentative conception of Reid, and that it could be modified to accommodate to the political changes. In Britain, the Reid scheme was discussed at the India Office between Amery, Lord Wavell, shortly before the latter left England to take charge as India's Governor-General, and Dorman-Smith who was then in Lon- don to discuss Burma's future.33) The debate over some form of amalgamation or transferring the responsibility of backward tribes to an external authority reached a conclusion among Wavell, Dorman-Smith, and Amery by the end of 1944. In mid July 1944, Wavell met Dorman-Smith in Simla to discuss the arrangements of the tribal tracts in Burma, Assam, and possibly Bengal. Dorman-Smith suggested that these tracts should be formed into a separate unit and administered directly by either the Governor-General or the Governor of Burma.34) Following this, Wavell wrote to Amery that the tribal areas were part of India. He doubted whether the British Government could separate them except as part of a treaty arrangement 84 Journalof the JapaneseAssociation for SouthAsian Studies, 13, 2001 contemplated in the Cripps Declaration.35) Amery, in his reply, agreed with Wavell that this was a matter to be dealt with in the treaty arrangement and not subject to constitutional changes introduced in the Prov- inces of India. One arrangement propounded by Amery's adviser was that the tribal tracts should be financed by British Government in Lon- don and to be embodied in the treaty negotiated with the United King- dom, the Provincial agency would also have to be utilized.36) This was a proposal similar to what Coupland suggested in his report, which said that India, Burma and the United Kingdom all had a share of responsibility for the Assam-Burma frontiers, and would thus perhaps be a form of "condominium. "37) Amery suggested, instead, that he preferred the arrangement should be on the lines of the High Commission territories in South Africa. The tribal tracts should remain directed by officers under the Crown Representative or British High Commissioner on the lines of the Mandates Commission until after the inhabitants had been consulted, and thus the British Government could feel justified in transferring them to the Indian Government.38) Furthermore, he quoted another alternative that referred to the great advantage of a solution on the lines of control by an international organization, since a purely British control was likely to be opposed, and expected to be less unpalatable to Indian opinion.39) Here we are not going to discuss in detail the situation of the High Commissioner territories in South Africa or the ideas of mandates, but it is necessary to point out that what Amery envisaged had some analogy to Reid's scheme. The territories treated as British Protectorates or Man- dates can be regarded as backward tracts of India. The British Govern- ment or the League of Nations accepted responsibility for their administration and for meeting their regular deficits until their peoples could have secured full rights of citizenship or stood on their own feet.40) At this point we can assume some kind of agreement had been reached between Wavell and Amery about the possible amalgamation of tribal tracts between Assam and Burma, despite differences of opinion. Amery preferred some kind of British colony under the direct control of the Home Government in London, with the Crown Representative as its agent in accord with Reid's Crown Colony scheme. The separate administrative unit Wavell envisaged could be a Province to be placed under the Indian or the Burmese Governments. Facing the challenge from the BritishColonial Policy on FrontierAreas Adjoining Assam and Burma 85

Indian National Movement, the differences between Wavell and Amery's positions were most pronounced. Wavell revealed his position saying: I cannot see British Government of the future spending large sums or making great efforts for the backward tribes; nor Indian Governments of the future willingly accepting British or international interference or supervision.41)

Earlier in July 1944, he said that constitutionally it would have been easy to make a separate province when the Act of 1935 was being drafted, and when Burma would be reoccupied, it might be possible to make a fresh start there. A change in India, however, would be far from easy.42) Wavell's intention was to say that the political situation in India was no more like that in which Hutton put forward a similar scheme in the 1930s. Anticipating the severe opposition of Indian Nationalists, Wavell solidified his position against any scheme of transferring tribal tracts to an external authority at a time when the mood of the time was strongly against the above proposals. In these circumstances, to cede rule of the backward tribes to the British Government and to air this issue publicly would be viewed with suspicion by Indian Nationalists as an attempt to find reasons for limiting the scope or pace of constitutional progress in India.43) In December 1944, Wavell wrote to Amery: The removal of these tribes from the jurisdiction of the Provin- cial government and their transfer to the control of an outside authority, a British High Commissioner, the Crown Representa- tive, or an international body seems to me quite impracticable."

In spite of Wavell's opposition to Amery's ideas of "reservation" of backward tribes from future self-governing India, it is interesting to know why Amery was adamant about the idea of direct control under a Crown Representative or High Commissioner. If we examine Amery's motivation, we may find a fear of losing control over India. He contrived to keep as many areas as possible outside provincial control, and put them directly under the control of the United Kingdom.45) Reid's idea of cutting the excluded or scheduled areas out of Assam and Burma was coincident with his desire to maintain British grip on India as long as possible. 86 Journalof the JapaneseAssociation for SouthAsian Studies, 13, 2001

4. Some Alternative Proposals of the Reid Scheme: 1945- 46 Even though Reid's Crown Colony scheme or Amery's ideas of Brit- ish Protectorates for the whole excluded areas of India were opposed by Wavell, some proposals as alternatives were under official discussions at the same time. For example, to create a Chief Commissioner's Province of a tribal administration union of Assam with Burma under the control of either an Indian or Burma Government, or to set up a federal agency directly controlled by the Central Government, were considered less unpalatable proposals to the Indian opinion.46) These developments in- dicated nothing but the impracticability of transferring tribal tracts to any external authority or reserving tribes purely to the sole responsibility of the United Kingdom. We might hypothesize here that though Wavell expressed his opposition to the conception of a British colony or Protectorates, some sort of administration unit between India and Burma, or the idea of a central agency were not all denied. It was a reasonable guess to say that the Reid scheme could have been discussed at the Home Government in London when Wavell was asked to return. As Andrew Clow , Governor of Assam from May 1942, stated on 19 April 1945:

Lord Wavell was credited with taking home a plan under which our hills [of Assam] and the adjoining hills of Burma and Bengal, would become a separate entity ruled solely by Great Britain.")

It might be reasonable to say that Reid's colony scheme continued to be an issue in the high circles of British Government, despite no evidence to show any related official action taken by then or after. No concrete material of Reid's scheme referred by Wavell during his stay in London from 23 March to 1 June 1945 has been found so far. On the other hand, we saw frequent correspondence between the India Office and Olaf Caroe, Wavell's Secretary of External Department, in a secret file titled "the question of administrative co-ordination between tribal territories in Assam and Burma", from September 1944 .48)The correspondence originally had more to do with the northern frontiers of Assam , as whether they should be excluded areas of Assam, or "Tribal Areas" under the control of External Department. It began in a letter dated 19 British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 87

September from R. T. Peel, head of External Department in the India Office, to Caroe to ask him to organize a discussion between officials of the Governments of India and Burma on the matter of administrative co-ordination.49) The request was under the assumption that when Caroe's proposal to convert the Assam's northern frontiers into "Tribal Areas" was gaining political ground, the wider question of the future administration of the Assam tribal territories as a whole could be considered together.50) In the background, a series of movements to reactivate the "McMahon Line" into a valid border was undertaken under Wavell's authority in October 1943. This "forward policy," as it was called then, was a policy settled by his predecessor government.51) Wavell had a conference with Caroe, and Basil Gould, Political Officer in Sikkim and for Bhutan and Tibet, on northeast frontier problems, on 25 March 1944, in which he supported the idea of a forward policy of pushing the border line up to McMahon Line on northern frontier of Assam.52) Caroe led the way in extending British control towards the "McMahon Line Tribal Areas," and J. P. Mills was the person in charge of the actual administration of the vast areas under a special assignment as the Governor's Advisor on Tribal Affairs.53) Partly because of his rich experiences in the North-West frontier, Caroe was disposed to treat the Assam's frontier as an inextricable problem, and a matter of vindicating an external frontier of India.54) More probably it was because he was the leading advocate to establish the validity of the McMahon Line as the frontier of India. Caroe suggested that the northern frontiers of Assam, from the north bank of the Brahmaputra Valley to the McMahon Line, should be moved out of the sphere of the Assam Government.55) In view of any question of frontiers, this should be a task beyond Provincial capacity and undertaken by the Central Government. Caroe proposed to convert Assam's northern frontier areas into "Tribal Areas" under the definition of Section 311 (1) of Government of India Act of 1935.56) Continuing to the letter of 19 September 1944, Peel wrote another letter on 1 February 1945 to Caroe on Amery's behalf. He wrote that Amery was inspired by Caroe's above attempts and suggested that, if it were possible, to convert the excluded areas south of the Brahmaputra Valley to the Tribal Areas on the lines proposed for the areas north of 88 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

the Brahmaputra.") Peel continued to assert that the desirability of some form of coordination between the frontier tracts of Assam and Burma, or even the possibility of some form of amalgamation, should be discussed at the official level as a first step.") Under his suggestion, Caroe held a meeting with McGuire and Mills as the representatives of Burma and Assam respectively in Delhi on 10 March 1945.59) The meeting was aimed to discuss "the possible readjustment of the Assam-Burma frontier and the Tribal Areas and the desirability of some system of co-ordination or amalgamation in the administration of these areas. "60) In the very beginning, it was noted that the meeting was an informal one, and in no way committed the Government of Burma on one part or the Government of Assam and much less the Government of India on the other. Besides, it was noted as well that the conclusion was merely a tentative proposa1.61) Nevertheless, 'informal' was in name only, it is important to say that the India Office made the first triangle meeting possible between the Government of India, and the Governments of Assam and Burma to discuss the Reid scheme. McGuire made it clear again that his Government was not in favor of amalgamation of tribal territories, but that there should be an agency on the Burma side and on the Indian side under separate forms of administration. The agencies on each side contemplated federating with Burma or India eventually, but meanwhile administered outside the ministerial sphere by cadres that would not be common but would be under Burma or India in each case, and might be exchangeable.62) The question of the readjustment of the frontier between Assam and Burma was briefly discussed.63) On the India side, it was understood that Clow preferred to envisage a future in which the Tribal Areas and excluded areas should be merged into the Province of Assam rather than cut off from it. And at that stage, he was inclined to regard the proposal to convert the excluded areas into Tribal Areas as retrograde, at any rate in the areas south of the Brahmaputra Valley.64) From the importance of a common frontier to have the tribes on both sides of the India-Burma border less than one control was emphasized in the meeting. And it was assumed that the United Kingdom would have a residual responsibility for the defense of the frontier as a whole, and making a contribution as well.65) Finally, the possibility of coordination British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 89 of the administration of the areas on both sides of the frontier was examined on the assumption that apart from the readjustment suggested in the Naga areas, the India-Burma frontier would remain roughly as it was.66) The record was not sent out to the India Office before 12 July since Caroe was waiting for Clow's comments, which was regarded essential.67) The solution of the meeting was noted in India Office's minute paper as follows: The solution suggested by the agreement of the meeting was the formation of a Province rather on the lines of Baluchistan, the same official acting as Chief Commissioner for the Brahmaputra Valley and the partially excluded areas, as Resident for Manipur and the Khasi Hill States, and as Agent to the Governor-General for the remainder of the province (less the Surma Valley, which would fall naturally to Bengal), e.g. the present Excluded Areas converted to Tribal Areas. It should be the aim in the respect as of these last areas to prepare term for entry into a federal India of the future on the basis of their own institutions, no steamroller of British-Indian practice and procedure having been passed across them.68)

The solution aimed to accommodate the heterogeneous forms of administration in Assam, the partially excluded areas, Tribal Areas and the adjoining Princely States, into a sole political entityunder the control of a British officer, probably a Chief Commissioner. The reason for taking Baluchistan as a model might be because it was a frontier province, and it consisted of State territory, a small area of British India and Tribal Areas, which was just as complicated as Assam. Following this proposal, India Office became active and took the initiative in causing a stir in the Home Government in London. A veteran official in India Office stated:

I invite attention to Mr. Gibson's Government [the Burma Office]. If H. M. G. decide to create a new Chief Commissioner's Prov- ince, partly on grounds of defense, it may well be necessary to stimulate for this in the proposed Treaty with the new Govern- ment of India, and this may not be very easy if it is to be a condition subject to which the new constitution of India will have to be made. One rather fears that the proposal may have come to the fore too late to be worked out and brought into effect in time to anticipate other structural arrangements within British India." 90 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

The scope of the above proposal for a new Chief Commissioner Prov- ince covered only Assam and its adjacent areas, without reference to the areas of Burma. But, the Burma Office was informed at the initial stage since it might interrelate with the future status of the frontier areas of Burma as well. It was true that any sort of movement like this was far from easy, and the India Office acted in the wrong circumstances. The political changes will be referred to later. The movement, however, was finally ended by the successor of Amery, new Secretary of State for India and Burma, Lord Pethick-Lawrence.70) By April 1945 in Burma, on the other hand, a very large part of the hill areas had been liberated from Japanese occupation and were once again under British rule. Amery, the Secretary of State for Burma, was prepared to acknowledge the moral responsibility and trusteeship of the British Government for the welfare of the Burma Scheduled Areas and the need for protecting them in their development towards self-government when self-government was granted to the rest of Burma.71) This meant that a separate administration of the Scheduled Areas directly under the Governor had been decided and was to continue after the military period. In May, the British Government issued a White Paper that stated that the policy aimed at the eventual voluntary inclusion of the hill people in the constitutional structure of a United Burma. More importantly, the conditions would not be ripe for such inclusion for a considerable time.72) The statement of the White Paper was merely the status quo and lacked concrete suggestions for change. The question of when and how the desirable form of inclusion should be enacted was suspended. We might assume that at this moment Amery and Dorman-Smith were still at- tached to Reid's scheme of separating the administration of the Sched- uled Areas of Burma, and also the possibility of joining with Assam. Nevertheless, the rapid change during the Japanese occupation was tremendous and beyond what Amery and Dorman-Smith could have imagined. The misery of human life and the severity of social and political disorder demanded the relief for everything but British rule.73) The uprising of Burmese nationalism during Japanese occupation put the British governance in difficulty, and any conception of separation of the frontiers impossible. Moreover, along with the defeat of the Tories in the first general election in Britain after the war, a change in policy British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 91 towards Burma as well as India was anticipatory. Subsequently, the policy of the British Government was developed along the lines of pro- viding active encouragement for the eventual federation of the Frontier Areas with the rest of Burma. Dorman-Smith, in spite of his personal sympathy for the frontier tribes, was forced to concentrate on dealing with Burma nationalists and ended up supporting Reid's scheme.74) He confessed to the new Secretary of State for Burma, Pethick-Lawrence that he was wrong for trying to remove the Frontier Areas from the Ministerial jurisdiction and for the lack of a thorough policy towards the Frontier Areas of Burma in August 1945:

A number of decisions have been delayed owing to our flirting with the Reid idea of a separate Agency for the Burma-Assam frontier areas [and our] failure to give sufficient weight to the recommendations of the Frontier Service officers who met at the Conference in 1942.75)

Dorman-Smith abandoned the Reid scheme immediately after the stepping down of Amery, which could be regarded as an effect due to the defeat of Winston Churchill's government. This question will be touched on in the following paragraph. Gradually, the issue of Frontier Areas of Burma was subdued as being a Burmese political issue. The alternative proposal of Reid's 'one agency' idea, namely, a separate administration regime under the Governor that was committed to in the White Paper, was strongly criticized.76)

5. Atlee's Government and British Officials' Opposition against Separation of Tribes From the above discussion, we may conclude that there is hardly any evidence showing that the Crown Colony scheme was accepted authori- tatively. Some historians said that although the Government of India rejected the scheme, Winston Churchill, then British Prime Minister, approved of it, but the successive Labor Party Government vetoed it.77) This might be true in the sense that Amery, a member of Churchill's Cabinet, strongly wished to reserve the excluded areas as well as the Princely States out of India, along with the creation of Pakistan.78) Churchill expressed a similar attitude by remarking that he "should not have ob- 92 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

jected to the entire scope of the great Indian peninsula under the excluded areas."79) Also on the eve of M. K. Gandhi's and M. A. Jinnah's talk on 9 September 1944, Wavell wrote to Amery that in order to make the tone friendly, one criticism should be avoided: The first is that we have dragged in the Depressed Classes and encouraged them and other vocal minorities to obstruct a settle- ment. This was the Prime Minister's doing, and the criticism is to some extent justified." This was a straightforward criticism of Churchill's "divide and rule" concept, not to mention the famous comment made by Wavell as well on 29 March 1945 stating that Churchill "seems to favor partition [of India] into Pakistan, Hindustan, Princestan etc.,"81) which seems to indicate Churchill's views on the subject. It was true that the Reid scheme opened broad discussion in the Gov- ernments of India and Burma, and also in their offices in London. How- ever, it failed against serious objections. In addition to the opposition of Indian opinion, the scheme faced its own inward resistance. Clow's words revealed the root of resistance:

When the British Government was reluctant to transfer its power and grant independence to India, it was unlikely to say that the British Government had prepared to set India and Burma on a self-governing footing that should undertake the administrative and financial responsibility for a patchwork of sparsely populated hills.82)

The sensation caused by the triangle meeting of 10 March 1945 needs more consideration and further investigation, but we are confident of saying that the defeat of Amery signaled a premature death of the Reid scheme. Amery stepped down after the Labor Party came to power in July 1945. The new Prime Minister, C. R. Atlee, proposed to promote the early realization of full self-government in India by negotiating a treaty between the British Government and the constitution-making body." He announced on 4 December that a Cabinet Mission would go to India by the end of March 1946 to help Indians frame their own constitution. By that time, both the British and Indian people had a growing feeling that India could no longer be directly governed as a colony and that its independence would come in a form determined British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 93 primarily by the nature of the confrontation.84) Under these circumstances, Pethick-Lawrence replaced Amery as Sec- retary of State for India and Burma in August 1945, who soon came to accept Wavell's earlier views on the backward tribes. The agreement reached between Pethick-Lawrence and Wavell was that it was impracticable to transfer responsibility for the backward tribes from the Prov- inces to an outside authority, whether that should be a British High Commissioner or under a United Nations' Mandate.85) Indian general opinion was strongly opposed to the constitution of a foreign territory within its natural boundaries, not to mention Coupland's ideas of asking Indian Government to contribute towards the maintenance of the ampu- tated member.86) On the other hand, Wavell and his government showed a continual concern for backward tribes, and the measures of extending administration over the northern frontier of Assam were undertaken from 1944 onwards.87) After receiving the letter from Pethick-Lawrence on 24 Au- gust 1945, Wavell sent a letter to the Governors seeking opinion and advice on the problems of backward tribes on 11 October 1945.88) It is interesting to note that in the correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State on backward tribes from September 1944 to Au- gust 1945, Assam's case was taken as an exception.89) Wavell, as well, wrote separately to Clow on the same date. In response, Clow wrote to Wavell on 23 October 1945 and bluntly stated that the transfer of responsibility of backward tribes to an external authority should be ruled out, and in the long run there was no future for the Assam hills separated from the plains.90) Clow continued to say in his note that the inclusion of the hills in Assam or their separation was not a question that concerned the hill tribes alone. The mutual economic dependency between the hills and plains, and the influence of separation towards the plains tribes, which outnumbered the hill tribes by two to one, had been ignored.91) Apart from possible political difficulties, there were cogent objections to such a scheme. Geographically the proposed colony would have a bizarre shape and be completely lacking in cohesion. Economically it would be isolated and its interests would be ignored by both Burma and India, so that it would have to relapse even further into the economic self-sufficiency of a primitive type. Administratively, there would be grave difficulties in 94 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001 securing and retaining suitable cadres of officers.92)

6. The Pakistan Demand and Its Influence on Tribal Politics in Assam In spite of the secret debates between the British officials, the politicians of India, especially the politicians in Assam and the tribal commu- nities came to know Reid's scheme eventually and reacted to it in different ways. By the end of World War II, the Government ofIndia avoided attempting publicity about the issues concerning the backward tracts.93) Through advocacy by Reid himself and the publication of Coupland's Report, Reid's scheme was known to British and Indian leaders.94) The tribal people came to know of it probably through the British officers posted in the hills. With Assam's politics in mind, the Congress Assembly Party had officially absented itself from the Assam Legislative Assembly for about three years. The 4th, 5th and 6th Ministries headed by Muhammad Saadulla, member of the Muslim League, existed unevenly from August 1942 to February 1946. Throughout Saadulla's terms, the politicians in Assam seldom paid attention to the hill tribes partly because of lack of concern, and mainly because of the geographical and political isolation of the tribes from the plains.95) It was not far wrong to say that by 1946 most of them were unaware of Reid's scheme and any form of "forward policy" which had started at their northern frontier.96) Gopinath Bordoloi, a Congressman and a follower of Gandhi, who became the Chief Minis- ter of Assam for the second time in February 1946, was regarded as a person with a deep understanding of the tribal questions and who identified with the legitimate aspiration of the tribal people.97) He expressed his fear of the Coupland scheme and the possibility of amalgamation of Assam in Bengal in a telegram to Gandhi in January 1946:

Governor is touring interior of the excluded areas apparently can- vassing support of the scheme which it is feared include also amalgamation of Assam in Bengal thus giving virtual effect to Coupland's scheme.98)

Meanwhile, the growing demand for Pakistan by the Muslim League and the grim prospect of a divided India heightened the Assamese people's British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 95 nervous concern over their future political and cultural status. Unre- stricted immigration from Bengal was increasingly being viewed as a calculated move to turn Assam into a Muslim-majority province, so that it could qualify itself for inclusion into East Pakistan.99) It was the advent of the Cabinet Mission that served to raise the concern of the politicians of Assam of the future status of tribal tracts, not only because of the allotment of tribes in the legislature, but also because their fusion became essential to Assam's communal politics.100) Assam's leaders became aware that the representatives of the hills could exercise a moderating and balancing influence in the communal politics. Moreover, the ampu- tation of the hill tracts from Assam would make it too small to secure enough area and population as a separate Province. Clow stated on 28 March 1946 in a discussion at the Viceroy's House on the tribal question: The Hindus felt that the majority of the tribesmen in Assam would strengthen the case against its inclusion in Pakistan. The Muslim tended to stress the fact that the Hindus (like them- selves) were a minority in the Province and that they had the tribes were in the same danger of Hindu domination.101)

The reaction of the tribes to Reid's scheme were various in different areas and different times. In general, the tribal leaders of the partially excluded areas inclined to be connected with the Province of Assam,102) but more leaders in the excluded areas expressed their fear by 1947 of being swamped by the plains peoples of Assam. In Naga's case, the resolution of a meeting on 10 April 1945 read, "An administrative unit comprising the hill districts of Assam and the neighboring hill tracts should be formed under the British Crown. "103)This move was ascribed to the inspiration of the British officers and the missionaries of the Bap- tist Mission.104) However, the Nagas changed their opinions on various occasions. In a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Mission in 19 June 1946, the Naga National Council (NNC) said: This Council strongly protests against the grouping of Assam with Bengal. The Naga Hills should be constitutionally included in an autono- mous Assam, in a free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interest of Nagas.105) 96 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

After the NNC solidified to become the sole political party in the Naga Hills, its assertion became aggressive along with the change of its leadership. Finally, it reached to extremes to declare its independence in May 1947.106) The details of tribal political movements and the effect rooted in the Crown Colony scheme are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it was said that because of Reid's advocating the separation of the Assam's hills into a British Colony, the leading tribesmen were led into a false sense of security and discouraged in attempts to face the problem on their own side.107) A historian evaluated that in order to prepare the ground for the possibility of the Reid scheme, some British officials in charge of the hill districts took initiative in forming district-level political bodies in which the tribal elite could participate.108) The effect of Reid's scheme towards tribal mind and their politics will be left for further study.

Conclusion

British officials in Assam had for many years taken the view that the hill tribes needed an entirely separate administration and special treat- ment from the central government. As a result, one of the proposals put forward by Hutton and Parry was for the establishment of a North-East Frontier Province in 1928. With Reid's reassertion in 1941, the idea of amalgamating the hill tracts of Assam and Burma was approved by Burma's Governor, Dorman-Smith, during World War II, in accord with the proposal of Assam's officials. Reid stressed further the necessity of a common administration of the frontiers solely by the United Kingdom. The war created a chance to attract British attention to Indo-Burma borders and to underline the importance of the common frontier of Assam and Burma. Meanwhile, Reid's scheme came at a time when India was in the final phase of its struggle for independence. According to Churchill or Amery's position of "divide and rule," it once added a possibility of resulting in another partition, along with the birth of Pakistan. The idea of creating a British tribal colony on Assam-Burma borders failed, however, not only due to the resistance of Indian and Burmese Nationalism, but also because of the opposition of Wavell and the new Secretary of State, Pethick- BritishColonial Policy on FrontierAreas Adjoining Assam and Burma 97

Lawrence. Moreover, the scheme was also an attempt against the premise of British policy towards tribes itself, eventually doomed to inward re- jection. The Government Act of 1935 of India removed the excluded areas in Assam from the supervision of the Home Government in London, and from the responsibility of the Governor-General or his departments in Delhi. Constitutionally, the Governor of Assam held exclusive discre- tion over the excluded areas, and these areas became part of the sphere of the Provincial Governments. Reid's attempt of transferring the adjoining frontier areas of Assam and Burma into a separate British colony, or Amery's analogous ideas to treat backward tribes as British Protectorates or the United Nations' Mandate, were all regarded nothing more than a retrograding step against future self-government granted to India and Burma. Namely, to remove any slice of tribal tracts out of India or Burma was regarded as a breach of the policy of assimilating excluded areas underlying the constitutional Act of 1935. Although Dorman-Smith was personally attracted by Reid's scheme, the Burmese officials were against territorial amalgamation. McGuire proposed to constitute two agencies for Assam and Burma each by separating the administration of hill tracts from the plains, but emphasized at the ultimate aim of federation with Burma. Corresponding to McGuire's ideas, Reid changed his Crown Colony scheme to a different version, to be as a North Eastern Agency or Province. Namely, in order to accommodate political changes, there were other modified forms of Reid's plan. A Chief Commissioner's Province scheme was proposed to com- pose a hill sub-province under Assam or Burma. A federal agency directly controlled by the Governor-General of India was also proposed. Moreover, Caroe's attempt to move areas north to the Brahmaputra Valley by defining them as Tribal Areas out of Assam and British India can be regarded as a variation of Reid's scheme. The India Office's suggestion to include the excluded areas south of the Brahmaputra Val- ley into Caroe's category of Tribal Areas was nothing but an action with Reid's scheme in mind. In conclusion, Reid's scheme continued to be a political controversy in British high levels up to 1946. The meeting held at the Viceroy's House on 28 March 1946 was an official confirmation of its end. The defeat of Churchill's party and Amery in July 1945 signaled the failure 98 Journalof the JapaneseAssociation for SouthAsian Studies, 13, 2001

of the scheme, and the authoritative opposition of Clow, the last British Governor of Assam, threw the scheme out at the meeting held by Caroe on 10 March 1945. The meeting concluded to create a province along with Baluchistan, as an alternative, which was no more than an endeavor to accommodate all the inconsistent areas (the partially excluded and excluded areas, Tribal Areas and the States) under a compound territorial entity with a variety of administrations. It obtained sympathy of the India Office and the Burma Office, but Pethick-Lawrence rejected the proposal finally and held that it was a matter to be subjected to the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. Caroe's proposal of legislat- ing the northern frontier areas as de jure Tribal Areas was rejected as well. Mills, however, remarked in September 1945 that: The present States and Tribal Areas are in fact legally colonies since a "colony" is defined in the Interpretation Act of 1889 as "any part of His Majesty's domi nions exclusive of the British Islands and British India. "109)

It was true that, from October 1943 onwards, the administration of the vast areas toward the McMahon Line gradually became the responsibility of Mills under a special assignment of External Department. Therefore, the northern frontiers were de facto Tribal Areas)" We may conclude that part of the British Bureaucrats' dream came into the form of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, approximately the area of Arunachal Pradesh now) when it was officially taken under the central control of the India Government after 1945. And the accepted British official view that the Hills and the Plains of Assam never co-existed as a single entity is now an accomplished face")

Notes 1) Colony was defined in the Interpretation Act of 1889 as "any part of His Majesty's dominionsexclusive of the British Islands and British India." The stages of political development of every British colonies varied, i.e. the capacity of self-governance, the existence of legislativecouncil, and how many percentages of the natives to be elected as representatives,etc. "Crown Colony" is defined here as a colony under the direct control of a Governor or Crown Agent as the agent to be responsible to the British High Commissionerwho would assigned by the King of Britain. 2) Robert Reid, "A Note on the Future of the Present Excluded, Partially Excluded and Tribal Areas of Assam" [hereafter "A Note"] MSS Eur E 278/4, Reid Collec- tion, Oriental & India Office Collections [hereafter OIOC], British Library. British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 99

3) The vast Himalayan frontiers north of the Brahmaputra Valley of Assam were beyond British administration till 1940s. Out of the fear of China asserting her authority over Tibet and the whole tribal tracts south of the McMahon line, Assam Governor Reid suggested in 1937 claiming prescriptive rights over a part of territory recognized, under the terms of the 1914 Simla Convention, as within India. R. Reid, History of the Frontier Areas bordering on Assam from 1883-1941 (Shillong: Assam Government Press, 1942; reprint ed., Spectrum Publications, 1997) pp. 294-6. On the debates over unadministered areas of Assam-Burma border, see Chan Chai- fong, "British Colonial Policy in the Naga Hills: with special Focus on Control Area Policy," The Komaba Journal of Area Studies, No. 3 (The University of To- kyo, 1999), pp. 167-87. 4) The author quoted the first Assam Congress Chief Minister, Gopinath Bardoloi's words criticizing the Crown Colony scheme, "This settles the argument as to why the tribal people were left on their own and thereby a separatist tendency inculcated in the tribal mind." Sita Ram Johri, Where India, China and Burma Meet (Calcutta: Thacker Spink & Co., 1962), pp. 238-9. 5) The areas declared "Backward Tracts" by notifications made under Section 52 (A) of the Government of India Act of 1919 were included in a slightly wider category of "Excluded Areas" under the Government Act of India of 1935. Here we refer the hill tracts of Assam and Burma mainly distributed by hill tribes; they were excluded from general administration, and the laws made by the central or the provincial legislature were not applicable to these tracts without the Governor-General's dis- cretion by 1937. 6) According to the Government of India Act of 1919, a Statutory Commission was set up for making a new Constitution in 1927. With John Simon as the head, the Commission was also known as the "Simon Commission." A report of the Commis- sion was presented to Parliament in May 1930. 7) Notes were submitted by N. E. Parry, Superintendent of the Lushai Hills, on 3 March 1928 and by J. H. Hutton, Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, on 17 March. Both were recorded in Simon CommissionReport on India, Vol. XIV : Memo- randum Submitted by the Government of Assam to the Indian Statutory Commission (London: H.M.S.O., 1930; reprinted ed., Delhi: Swati Publications, 1988) Appen- dix B. pp. 111-122. 8) Hutton gave evidence on Aboriginal and Hill Tribes before the Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on 16 October 1933. He held the position that supposing Burma were separated from India, there should be a sub-Province of Burma that would embrace the North-East Frontier Districts of Assam with the North-West Frontier Districts of Burma. Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform [Session 1932-33] Volume II-C, Minutes of Evidence given before the Joint Commit- tee on Indian Constitutional Reform (London: HMSO, 1934), pp. 2362-2394. 9) Letter from Government of Assam to the Simon Commission,No. Rfm. 8/ 8801- P.A., 12 August 1930. Views of Local Governments on the Recommendations of the Indian Statutory Commission 1930 (Calcutta: Government of India Press, 1930), pp. 408-9. 10) Andrew Clow, A note on "The Future Government of the Assam Tribal Peoples" 100 Journal of the JapaneseAssociation for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

[Confidential] (Shillong, Assam Government Press, 1945), p.29. MSS Eur F 236/ 358, OIOC. 11) Under the Government of India Act of 1935, the list of areas to be specified as excluded and partially excluded areas was submitted to British Parliament by the Secretary of State under the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas Order of 1936. 12) The partially excluded areas were the Garo Hills, Khasi-Jaintia Hills and the Mikir Hills. They could send representatives to the legislature, but were placed under ministers which were subject to the Governor's discretionary control. The excluded areas were the Nag Hills District, Lushai Hills District , the North Cacher Hills, and the Sadiya and Balipara Frontier Tracts. They had no representatives to present in the legislature, and their administration was vested in the hands of the Governor . 13) Clow, op. cit., pp. 23-26. Also see Section 91 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. 14) Even though Burma separated from the India Empire as a Crown Colony of Britain , the Secretary of State for India still supervised Burma. He functioned as Secretary of State for Burma through a separate unit in Whitehall, the Burma Office. 15) According to Reid, Amery made this comment on 3 March 1941. Reid, "A Note," p. 14. 16) The constitutional idea of "Tribal Areas" took root on the North-West Frontier of India. According to Section 311 (1) of the Government of India Act of 1935, "Tribal Areas" meant the areas along the frontiers of India, or part of Baluchistan, which were not part of British India or of Burma, or of any Indian State or any foreign States. In order to avoid confusion with the general meaning of tribal areas, capital letters are used hereafter. 17) Reid, "A Note," p. 16. 18) D. R. Syiemlieh, "The Future of the Hills of North-EastIndia 1928-1947: Some British Views," Reorganization of North East India since 1947, eds., B. Datta Ray and S. P. Agrawal (New Delhi: Concept Publications, 1996), p. 27. By the same author, "Burma: Flirting with Reid's Plan," Essays on North-East India: Presented in Memory of Professor V. Venkata Rao, ed. Milton S. Sangma (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 227-28. 19) Reid, "A Note," p. 16. 20) Reid's letter on 5 January 1942. MSS Eur E 278/4, OIOC. 21) Amery to Linglithgow, 24 March 1942. MSS Eur F125/11, OIOC. 22) Syiemlieh, "Burma: Flirting with Reid's Plan," p. 229. 23) Amery noted continuously that "this would fit in with Reid's general conception and find a parallel in Basutoland and Swaziland in South Africa." Quoted from Amery's letter to Coupland, 30 July 1943, Box 5, Reginald Coupland Collection, MSS Brit. Emp. S403, Rhode House Library, Oxford University. 24) Ibid. Amery replied to Coupland and suggested that, it would do no harm to publicly ventilate the ideas suggested by Reid. See also, Amery to Coupland, 30 July 1943. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 25) R. Coupland, "British Obligations," Report on the Constitutional Problems in India , Part III, "The Future of India" (Oxford: OUP, 1944), pp. 164-5. 26) North suggested that "the Excluded Areas of Burma and Assam could be combined British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 101

into a North East Frontier Agency administered by a Crown Agent and separate from political control of a possible self-governing India and Burma" at the 1st meeting of the Committee on Scheduled Areas held in Simla on 5 December 1942. M/4/2803, OIOC. 27) Ibid. The Committee summarized the points for and against North's proposal to create a separate North Eastern Frontier Agency at the 4th meeting held on 11 December 1942. The opposition points were the extreme unlikelihood of the Gov- ernment of either India, Assam or Burma accepting partition of their territory or agreeing to contribute towards the administration of an Agency altogether outside their influence, purely on the grounds of Imperial defense, etc. The Committee voted down North's proposal, and were unanimous that the Scheduled Areas of Burma should not come under Ministerial control. The Frontier Areas were kept under the direct control of the Governor, not the Ministers. 28) T. L. Hughes, Secretary to the Governor of Burma, to J. C. Walton, Burma Office, on 3 February 1943, M/4/2803, OIOC. 29) Ibid. 30) McGuire sent a memorandum on the constitutional position of the Excluded Areas of Burma to J. C. Walton in Burma Office on 21 June 1943. Other copies were sent privately to Mills on 26 June 1943, demi-officially to Olaf Caroe, Secretary of the External Affairs Department in the India Government, on 16 July 1943. See McGuire to Caroe, 6 March 1945, L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. The records of the secret meeting can be seen in Messrs. Mills, Mitchell and McGuire, "Agreed personal views on the Future of the Hill Tracts of Burma, Assam and Bengal," and "A note by Sir Robert Reid" enclosed in Amery's letter to Coupland, 30 July 1943, Reginald Coupland Collection, Oxford University. 31) Ibid. 32) Ibid. "A note by Sir Robert Reid" enclosed in Amery's letter to Coupland, 30 July 1943. 33) Wavell to Amery, 9 May 1944. L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. 34) Wavell to Amery, 27 July 1944. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 35) Ibid. The Cripps Mission with Stafford Cripps as the head was sent to India in March 1942. The problems of backward tribes was not touched then, and the declaration was not accepted by Indian leaders. However, the right of self-determina- tion, namely, the minorities were free to join future Indian Union through negotiating by treaties, was recognized by the Mission. 36) Ibid. Amery to Wavell, 28 September 1944. Amery's advisers, especially J. A. Hubback, mentioned this arrangement and the following ones. Although in Hubback's note the case of the Assam-Burma tracts was not considered, we may assume that Amery was confident of special measures to be taken by the British Government for Assam-Burma frontiers as well. 37) Clow, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 38) Amery to Wavell, 9/10 August 1944. Amery expressed the same views on.the amalgamation of the backward tracts of Assam and Burma in a letter to Coupland, 30 July 1943. See note 23. At this stage, we might presume that Wavell was in accord with Amery's views. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 102 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

39) Ibid. 40) Clow, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 41) Wavell to Amery, 10 October 1944. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 42) See note 34. 43) A. F. Morley, Principal in the Information Department of India Office , to the Po- litical Secretary of the Indian Government, 11 July 1944. L/P&J/7/6787 , OIOC. 44) Ibid. Wavell to Amery, 3 December 1944. 45) At the failure of the Cripps' Mission, Amery couldn't hide his delight and wrote, "Assuming that something of the nature contemplat ed in the draft Declaration of 1942 comes into being, we shall, I myself think , be bound to put up a fight to retain control at any rate for a time in the totally excluded areas." Amery to Coupland , 30 July 1943. See note 23. 46) Mills also suggested three alternatives, the inclusion of all the hills in Assam , the inclusion of some of the hills in Assam, and the exclusion of all the hills from Assam . J. P. Mills, "A Note on the Future of the Hill Tribes of Assam and the Adjoining Hills in a Self-Governing India." (September, 1945) MSS Eur F236/357, OIOC, p. 15. 47) Clow to J. Colville, then acting Governor-General of India , 19 April 1945. No. 397. The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Vol. 5. ed., Nicholas Mansergh (London: H .M.S.O., 1974), pp. 912-3. 48) Minute Paper of External Department of India Office, Ext. 3575/45. L/P&S/12/ 3115A, OIOC. 49) Ibid. R. T. Peel to Olaf Caroe, 19 September 1944. 50) Ibid. In an agreement with J. C. Walton, Deputy Under Secretary of State of the Burma Office, the question of the possibility of some form of amalgamation between the backward areas of Assam and Burma was put forward to Caroe . R. T. Peel to Olaf Caroe, 1 February 1945. 51) Reid, History of the Frontier Areas bordering on Assam from 1883-1941 , pp. 294-300. 52) Penderel Moon, ed., Wavell: the Viceroy's Journal (Delhi: OUP, 1973), p. 62. 53) Mills was assigned as the Adviser to the Governor of Assam for Tribal Areas; his office came into being on 23 October 1943, in pursuance of the policy set out in the Government of India's express letter, No. 6671-X/43 , 20 July 1943. J. P. Mills, "A brief general report on the North-East Frontier Agency for the period from 23 October 1943 to 30 June 1944." L/P&S/12/3114, OIOC. 54) Caroe held the position that the "McMahon Line Tribal Areas" were as important as the North-West Frontier Province. Therefore, he tried to put these areas under Central control as well. Two letters on 28 March 1944, Caroe to R. W. Godfrey, Secretary of the Government of Assam, D. 0. No. 171/S, and Caroe to R. T . Peel, D. 0. No. 172/S, were sent for information and further discussion . 55) Ibid. 56) Administration in the northern frontier areas was peculiar . Though the Governor of Assam was vested with authority over these areas, not by virtue of the provisions applicable to excluded areas of the Government of India Act of 1935, but as the Agent of the Governor-General. All the cost of administration over these tracts were borne by the Central Government and the Central Government was inclined to British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 103

treat them as Tribal Areas within the meaning of Section 311 (1) of the 1935 Act. However, a legislative sanction to convert them as de jure Tribal Areas was rejected by the India Office on 11 February 1946. 57) Peel wrote to Caroe that, "In view of the existence of a similar problem in respect of the similar areas on the Burmese side of the Assam border, which has been engaging the attention of the Government of Burma, Mr. Amery considers that it would be an advantage if the problem could be examined in the first place on the official level in consultation with officers of the Government of Burma, and he would suggest that consideration should be given to the desirability of some system of coordination between the frontier tracts of Assam and Burma, or even to the possibility of some form of amalgamation." See note 50, Peel to Caroe, 1 February 1945. 58) Ibid. 59) For the purpose, Caroe wrote to Clow to ask him to depute Mills to attend the meeting. He said that the discussion would be limited to the areas south of the Brahmaputra, and it would be of advantage to have a clear demarcation between the Excluded and Tribal Areas south of the Brahmaputra. Caroe to Clow, D. O. No. F. 244-C. A./45, 20/21 February 1945. L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. 60) The secret record of the meeting was sent to India Office along with a letter from Caroe to D. M. Cleary, on 12 July 1945. L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. 61) Ibid. An abstract of the record written by Caroe on 13 March 1945, p. 1. 62) Ibid., p. 2. 63) At the meeting, the desirability of drawing the international boundary along ethnic rather than geographic lines was emphasized. 64) Caroe's record, see note 61, p. 3. 65) Ibid. It was noted that Amery was prepared to acknowledge the moral responsibility and trusteeship of the British King for the welfare of the Burma Scheduled Areas and the need for protecting them in their development towards self-government when self-government was granted to the rest of Burma, p. 2. 66) Ibid. p. 4. 67) By the end of 1945, Clow replied in a form of a memorandum titled "The Future Government of the Assam Tribal Peoples." It was also prepared before the Secre- tary of State rejected the proposal for a British Protectorate in North-East India. In this an endeavor had been made to set out the relevant facts and to discuss possible alternative solutions. See note 10. 68) An abstract of the minute written by J. P. Ferris, India Office, 10 August 1945. See note 48. 69) Ibid. A note by P. J. Patrick, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, India Office, 27 September 1945. 70) It was hoped that the future constitution of India, including necessarily the future of the tribal areas and the excluded areas, as well as the whole question of the responsibility for defense, would shortly be the subject of the deliberations of a constitution-making body and of negotiations for the purpose of a treaty between the British King and the new Government of India. E. P. Donaldson, head of External Depart- ment in the India Office, to H. Weightman, Secretary of External Department in the Government of India, 11 February 1946. L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. 104 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

71) See note 65. 72) The White Paper was an official statement of British policy on Burma stated by the Secretary of State for Burma, Amery, in the House of Commons, 17 May 1945. No. 153. Burma: The Struggle for Independence 1944-1948. Vol. 1. ed., Hugh Tinker (London: H.M.S.O., 1983), p. 154. 73) Under the distressing lack of every form of activity necessary to maintain human life, nothing could be more important than the measures for the broken economy and political unrest, T. L. Hughes gave a speech to the Royal Central Asian Society on 18 September 1946, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXXIV (1947), p. 33. 74) Dorman-Smith's note of 6 April 1945 was circulated by Amery in India Committee of the War Cabinet on 7 April; it said that "It should be made clear that although our ultimate intention will be to bring about the union or federation of the Excluded Areas with ministerial Burma, and though we frame our policy in the Excluded Areas with this objective in mind, we have no intention of forcing any union or federation until the various peoples of the Excluded Areas signify their desire to amalgamate with Burma proper in some suitable way," No. 118. Burma: The Struggle for Independence, Vol. 1, p. 119. 75) Dorman-Smith to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 August 1945. M/4/2803, OIOC. 76) The acting Governor of Burma, Henry Knight, said to Pethick-Lawrence on 11 August 1946 that, "In my view it would be impossible for a Governor successfully to develop the Frontier Areas under a special regime, in face of a hostile or dis- gruntled Burma Ministry. An immense inaccessible horseshoe of forests and pov- erty with no access to the sea is a chimaera as a separate entity." No. 654. Burma: The Struggle for Independence, Vol. 1, p. 944. 77) V. Venkata Rao, A Century of Tribal Politics in North East India 1874-1974 (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1976), p. 152. And also, V. Venkata Rao, H. Thansanga & Niru Hazarika, A Century of Government and Politics in North-East India, Vol. III-Mizoram (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1987), p. 38. 78) See note 21. 79) Verrier Elwin referred in his note titled "The Aboriginals," p. 24. Oxford Pam- phlets on Indian Affairs, No. 14 (OUP, 1943) L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 80) Wavell to Amery, No. 14. The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Vol. 5, p. 30. 81) Moon, op. cit., p. 120. 82) Clow, op. cit., p. 29. 83) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 18 September 1945, No. 113, The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Vol. VI (London: H.M.S.O., 1976), p. 270. 84) Amalendu, Guha, Planter-Raj to Swaraj: Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam 1826-1947 (New Delhi: ICHR, 1977), p. 301. 85) Pethick-Lawrence to Colville, acting Governor-General of India during Wavell's visits to England in 1945, POL 8358/ 1945, 24 August 1945. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 86) Clow, op. cit., p. 29. 87) See notes 52 & 53. 88) Wavell to all Governors except Punjab, Assam, NWFP, Orissa and Sind, No. 1005. POL 9980/1945, 11 October 1945. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. British Colonial Policy on Frontier Areas Adjoining Assam and Burma 105

89) Ibid. Wavell added that Amery suggested some extra-constitutional arrangement for the protection of the aboriginal population except in the Assam-Burma tracts, for which other arrangements might be made. 90) Ibid. In reply to Wavell, Clow commented on the secret conference held at Delhi on 10 March, see note 67. Later he published a memorandum, which he prepared for the Secretary of State to reject Reid's Crown Colony scheme. See note. 10. 91) Clow, op. cit., p. 23. 92) Ibid., p. 29. 93) Wavell to Amery, 3 December 1944. L/P&J/7/6787, OIOC. 94) See note 43. 95) Clow said the Assamese, both Caste Hindu and Muslim, professed solicitude for the tribes, but neither had troubled to study the question, nor had any real sympathy with the tribes. The solicitude, which was very recent, was motivated almost entirely by considerations relating to their own differences, and especially the question of Pakistan. No. 16. The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Vol.VI I (London: H.M.S.O., 1977), p. 38. 96) Not until October 1946, was the veteran Assam politician Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri questioned at the Legislative Assembly and had shed light on the Central control over Assam's northern frontiers. Official Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates, 29 October 1946. L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. 97) He was elected as the Chairman of the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India. The report dated 28 July 1947 submitted by him became the basis of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Other members of the Sub-Committee were J. J. M. Nichols Roy, Rupnath Brahma and A. V. Thakkar. 98) Quoted from Birendranath Datta ed., Gopinath Bardoloi: A Centenary Tribute (Assam: Guwahati University, 1990), p. 27. 99) Wavell said on 22 December 1943 that the chief political problem in Assam was the desire of the Moslem Ministers to increase immigration into the uncultivated government lands under the slogan of "Grow more food," but what they were really after was "grow more Moslems." Clow also denounced to Wavell on 1 April 1946 the Muslim theory that there were many large tracts of uncultivated land to be colonized. Moon, op. cit., p. 41 & p. 233. 100) Coupland said that Assam was less troubled by religious strife than any other northern Province, and that communal riots were relatively rare. Coupland, op. cit., Part II, "Indian Politics, 1936-1942," p. 62. 101) See note 95. 102) Rev. J. J. M. Nichols-Roy, then the only tribal Ministry from the Khasi-Jaintia Hills, rejected the idea of forming the Hill areas into a Crown Colony and said their people wanted to be connected with India and Assam. He submitted a note titled "Hill District of Assam: Their Future in the New Constitution of India" to the British Cabinet Mission, pp. 1-6. Photo Eur 336, OIOC. 103) J. P. Mills, "A Note on the Future of the Hill Tribes of Assam and the Adjoining Hills in a Self-Governing India," p. 13. 104) R. S. Lyngdoh, Government and Politics in Meghalaya (New Delhi: Sanchar Pub- 106 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 13, 2001

lishing House, 1996), p. 167. 105) Quoted from the bulletin of NNC "Times of Kohima," Vol. I, No. 1, p. 3. MSS Eur F236/364, OIOC. 106) Quoted from the bulletin of NNC "The Naga Nation," Vol. I, No. 10, p. 4. MSS Eur F236/364, OIOC. 107) Clow commented on 28 March 1946 in a discussion at the Viceroy's House. See note 95. 108) A. Guha, op. cit., p. 322. 109) J. P. Mills, "A Note on the Future of the Hill Tribes of Assam and the Adjoining Hills in a Self-Governing India," p. 33. 110) Although there was no official sanction, Jawaharlal Nehru admitted in 29 October 1946 that, since the officers under Mills were paid by Central Revenues and not by provincial contribution of Assam, those areas called "North Eastern Agency" were practically treated as Tribal Areas. Official Report of the Legislative Assembly De- bates, pp. 162-4. L/P&S/12/3115A, OIOC. 111) The Assam Province and its adjoining areas are now divided into seven separate states approximately coinciding with the administrative division in the British era: Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh.