1x-.f 70-12,396

AKINYELE, Caleb Ibitayo, 1938- ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERALISM AS A DOMINANT FACTOR IN NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1960-1966.

The American University, Ph.D., 1969 Political Science, international law and relations

I University...... Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann .. Arbor, .. Michigan I ]

© Copyright by Caleb Ibitayo Akinyele ! 1970 ' ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERALISM AS A DOMINANT FACTOR IN NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1960-1966

by

CALEB IBITAYO AKINYELE

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of the American University in

Partial Fulfilment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Signatures of Committee

Professor Whittle Johnson (Chairman).

Professor Emmet V. Mittlebeeler

Professor A

Dean of the School of International Service AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Date... vDtJpooiuucxj X7U7 LIBRARY The American University Washington, D.C. NOV 51969 WASHINGTON. O. C Dedicated to my Parents Preface

Great Britain started colonizing Nigeria at about the second

half of the nineteenth century. From this time until October 1, I960,

the date Nigeria became independent, the British introduced liberalism

into the country as a political, economic and social philosophy.

Although there exists a relatively large volume of (mostly

scattered) literature on Nigerian foreign policy, the question of

how the philosophy of liberalism, especially the Anglo-American style,

has continued to influence Nigeria’s foreign (as well as domestic)

policy even after independence, has not yet been investigated in an

adequate chronological perspective. This largely factual, historical

(and yet basically theoretical), study is meant to fill that gap.

I hope the work will be found helpful particularly by students

of Nigerian political affairs and in general by students of African

studies.

This dissertation begins with a cataloque (in Chapter I) of

certain basic theories of international relations and political science which form part of the tools of analysis used in the body of the

research. Then it proceeds with a brief review (Chapter II) of the

origin, the different types, and the essential traits of liberalism.

In Chapter III, attention is directed at an examination of the processes whereby internal variables in Nigeria conditioned the country's exter­ nal behavior.

iii In order to reveal certain uniformities and similarities between the liberals1 external behaviors (described in Chapter II) and

Nigerian characteristic response to international stimuli, this student

(in Chapter IV), perused and analyzed all the speeches made by Nigeria's representatives in the General Assembly of the United Nations from the end of I960 up to the end of 1965.* In Chapter V, a quantitative exercise of Nigeria's relations with the East, the West, and the third world was undertaken.

In addition to liberalism (the dominant factor) and domestic politics, there were other factors that influenced Nigerian foreign policy during the period under investigation. The inputs of two of these - the international system and the continent of Africa as a sub­ system in the global system - are discussed in Chapters VI and VII, respectively.

In the concluding paragraphs it is inferred that, apart from the primacy and pervasiveness of liberalism, any attempt to present a cause-effect relationship among the several other factors that also shaped Nigerian foreign policy during the period probed could be as difficult and unproductive as the task of straining the mud out of the waters. Also, a few words are uttered on the future role of liberalism in Nigerian foreign policy.

^Other similarities in the foreign policies of Nigeria and the Anglo-American liberals are also indicated when necessary in sub­ sequent chapters.

iv This student is indebted to his dissertation committee Chairman,

Professor Whittle Johnston as a result of whose patient tutelage this student became interested, in the fall of 1967, in investigating the nature, the role, and the implications of the dominance of liberalism in Nigerian foreign (as well as domestic) policy. Dr. Johnston's devoted counsel, support, and direction at every point in this study is obviously reflected in the quantity and quality of the literature that form the ingredients of this study and also in the pertinence of the dissertation to the enterprise of international relations.

I am also much grateful to the other members of the committee:

Professor Emmet V. Mittlebeeler and Professor Absolom Vilakazi.

Their criticisms resulted in great improvements in both the substan­ tive and stylistic presentations of my ideas in this exercise.

Nevertheless, the author.is accountable for all errors, latent or apparent, in the study.

v LIST OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

THE HISTORY OF LIBERALISM

A. Classical Liberalism. The Age of Mercantilism. The Concepts of Natural law and the Harmony of Interests. The Harmony of Interests: Example from Economics. The Theme on Equality. The Theme on (international) law. The Liberals on War and Peace. The Theme on Moralism.

B. Realistic Classical Liberals C. Why Classical Liberalism Survived D. Contemporary Liberalism

1. Twentieth Century International Millieu 2. Hie Theme on Peaceful Change 3. The Theme on International Law 4. The Theme on International Organizations

INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Nigerians and Their Cultures 1. Tribes in Nigeria 2. Religions in Nigeria B. The Peaceful Change from Dependence to Independence C. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Nigeria 1. Political Parties and Foreign Policy 2. The Push of Southern Radicalism 3. The Pull of Northern Conservatism D. Economics and Foreign Policy in Nigeria

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Non-Alignment and Nigerian Foreign Policy B. Idealistic Moralism and the Theme on Equality C. The Theme on International Law D. Humanitarianism and Nigerian Foreign Policy E. Independent Actions in Nigerian Foreign Policy F. The Role of Indecision in Nigerian Foreign Policy V. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Theoretical Setting B. Nigeria end the West C. Nigeria and the East D. Nigeria and the Third World E. Summary

VI. THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. New Realism: The Permanence of Conflict 1. The Permanence of Conflict: The EconomicCase 2. The Permanence of Conflict: The Political Case 3. Summary B. New Idealism: The Possibility of Peace

VII. THE IMPACT OF AFRICA ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. The Quest for a Change B. Two Lap act s of African Affairs on Nigerian Foreign Policy 1. African Cultural Identity and Nigerian Foreign Policy 2. Nigerian Foreign Policy on the Place of Africa in the Global System

VIII. CONCLUSION

2 T-T3T ffl? TABLES

TABLE PAGE

1. Nigeria: Distribution of Population According to Religions (1963 Census) 74

2. Population of Dominant Tribes in Nigeria (millions) 81

3. Offers of Loans to Nigeria from Foreign Sources During the First Two Tears (1962 and 1963) of the Nigerian National Development Plan. 107

4-. Nigerian Imports from and Exports to the United States, 1955 to 1965 169

5. United States and Nigeria: Comparison of Vital Statistics (1962-1966 averaged) 171

6. American Universities and Educators Cooperating with Nigerian Schools, 1961-1966 172

7. Population of the European Economic Community, I960 to 1976 (thousands) 180

S. Gross National Product of the EBC at Constant Market Prices, 1960-1966 (1966=100 fbillionsi) 181

9. Average Annual Growth Rates of the Gross National Product of the EEC at Constant Prices, I960 to 1966 (1966=100) 182

10. Comparison of Values of Nigerian Exports to and Imports from the UK, and the EEC, 1960-65 (pillions) 184

U . Nigerian Imports from and Exports to France, 1960-1965 (Millions) 190

12. Selected Destinations of Nigerian Exports: 1960-1965 (Smillions) 201

13. Selected Sources of Nigerian Imports 1960-1965 (^millions) 202

14. Nigerian Diplomatic Relations, January 1962 219

15. Nigerian Diplomatic Relations, 1960-1966 220

3 T.TST fig CHARTS

CHART PAGE

I. Nigeria: Total Annual Exports to Africa (Excluding South Africa), EEC, United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Areas, 1960-1965 (trillions) 215

XI. Nigeria* Total Annual Imports from Africa (Excluding South Africa), EEC, United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Areas, 1960-1965 (^millions) 216

III. Graphical Representation of Countries in Which Nigeria had Embassies, 1960-1966 221

LIST OF MAPS

MAP PAGE

I. Federation of Nigeria 68

II. Nigeria* Main Cultural Groups 71

A CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The first discovery of the researcher who enters the United

Nations' library for the first time is the fact that information on the Organization itself and the individual member states is very voluminous and remains largely unarranged in any simple manner.

In the circumstances, the possible ordering of any selection from the bundles of available documents constitutes the first task of the investigator. The selection below is based upon certain theories of international relations. We shall, therefore, devote this chapter to a statement of a few of the theories, hypotheses and concepts.

Theories. Hypotheses, and Concepts

The term "theory” has many functions only two of which are rele­ vant to this paper. Firstly, theory will provide and govern explana­ tory hypotheses, assumptions, propositions, models, postulates, or principles. For instance, since the study of actions among states presupposes the existence of both individual states as actors and an arena on which they act, react, and interact, we shall assume that the

United Nations represents that stage. The UN is also conceived as a universal system divided into a network of subsystems.

^Professor Morton Kaplan has presented six models of inter­ national systems: the balance of power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, universal, hierarchical and the unit veto systems. See Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Polities. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957). However, for the purpose of brevity and simplicity, this student choses McClelland^ classification. Oar next postulate is definitional. We distinquish between domestic and international politics. Broadly generalized, international politics differs from national politics in that in the former, we are concerned with the study of the politics of war, survival, disorder, and disorgani­ zation. But, in domestic politics, order, organization, restraint, control, and survival are taken for granted. Furthermore, in domestic politics, the state is endowed with the exclusive monopoly of the legitimate use of force. In international politics, there is no cen­ tralized power; consequently, no state possesses any monopoly of power beyond that possessed by other acting units.

The diversities among actors in the international system notwith­ standing, there are certain latent and manifest similarities, confor­ mities and uniformities of behavior. It will be the second function of theory to help us unravel these patterns of uniformity in bahavior.

Then, with the aid of other relevant theories of international relation, we shall analyse and interprets the similarities established.

Basic Tools of Analysis

The study of International relations requires the use of a number of basic analytical tools. Some of these form the pillars upon which

Accordingly, only the role of Nigeria (a sub-system) in the UN (our hypothetical universal system) is being examined. See Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), especially, pp. 1-32.

^See Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War (New York: Frederick A. Fraeger, 1966), pp. 88-100. See also Theodore A. Couloumbis, "Traditional Concepts and the Greek Reality," in Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 166 .

6 this dissertation rests. For the purpose of gaining a clearer under­ standing of the complex forces which form international relations, a sound grasp of these concepts is a necessity. We shall, therefore, review briefly in this chapter only those concepts to be employed as this research progresses.

The Concept of Status Quo

On the international scene, a state is assumed to be a status quo power if it pursues polioy aimed at the preservation of an existing

(oftener than not, advantageous) position. This definition connotes conservatism.

On a broader philosophical perspective, status quo states* image of human affairs is that of a continuous, sustained, endogenous, and upward sloping cosmos. Such a world can be progressive only if it conserves its past and traditions. Progress itself implies that everything grows out of a preceding stage and the preceding stages contain the seed of subsequent ones.

This process of continuity does not exclude change. However, such change must be evolutionary, and peaceful, not ruptured by revolutions. Status quo states are therefore defensive and evolu­ tionary minded in their foreign policies. Because of this, it is assumed that the words "conservative," and "status quo" share similar conno­ tation.

The Concept of Revolutionary or Revisionism

A state is revolutionary if its foreign policy is directed at forcibly or violently altering existing (perhaps unfavorable) situations.

7 If the alteration is achieved or attempted fay the overthrow of the

ruling class, or government or the prevailing condition, then it is

called a revolution.

The distinction between status quo and revisionism or revolutionary

is not qualitative. Indeed, revisionism is one of those processes

which enables a dynamic society to reexamine itself by questioning

the relevance and validity of old situation and challenging official

explanations in the light of new possibilities and prospects. How­

ever, just as revisionism could be justified if it ousts an unpro­

gressive, static and repressive status quo, so also can the latter be

defended against uncreative, unnecessarily destructive, and unimagi­

native revisionism or revolution. It is further submitted that

revisionism is not a permanent force. Indeed, experience has shown

that once revisionists succeed in gaining favorable grounds, they

tend to assume a policy designed at conserving or preserving that state

of affairs. In other words, they put on the attire cf creative status quo.

''Moderate Approach11

Closely related to but quite different from status quo powers are

states with what this student has termed the "moderate approach."

Generally speaking, states with the "agitative approach" could easily pass as offsprings of the revolutionary states, and those with the "moderate approach" could be viewed as sharing similar political and philosophical linearity with status quo powers. However, "agitative" or "moderate" approach is used only when describing the foreign policies of non-nuclear powers in the United Nations. These are often

8 called the third world, or, as most of them chose to be called, non- aligned, neutralist, or uncommitted states.

Political Realism and Political Idealism

The search for an applicable interpretation of the nature of man, society, and politics has always constituted one of the concerns of political philosophy and political movement. There exists a rivalry between two schools of thought in this regard. The first believes in the attainability of absolute morality, rationality, and perfection in man and society. It assumes firstly, that a harmony exists among the specific interests of individuals and the general good (however defined) of the community; that occasionally power could be used for the common good; and that it could be either reduced or eliminated in the settlement of disputes.

Secondly, injustices, violence, and conflicts are not a part of the natural order of things. If they prevail, they are a product of human prejudices, dearth of knowledge and understanding in the indi­ vidual and the imperfect institution he finds himself. Therefore, these defects in man and his society could be remedied through education, reform, the use of reason, and general enlightenment. The proponents of this thesis are known as the political idealists. They are the perfectionists who perceive the universe with optimistic lenses.

On the other hand, or, at the opposite extreme, the political realists submit the antithetical dialectics that the generic trait of man and society is evil and that among the species of the evil in man

9 and society are irrationality, injustices, violence, conflicts, imper- 3 fection and what John H. Herz calls the "power and security dilemma."

The world consists, the realists argue, of opposing interests and conflicts which must .be temporarily balanced. To improve society, the political scientist must work with and not against, those forces.

Therefore, the realists aim at the realization of the "lesser evil rather than of the absolute good."^

We must hasten to warn that there has never been an occasion on which any liberal government has embraced realism in its totality to the exclusion of idealism or idealism to the exclusion of realism.

Nevertheless, even though the Liberals1 philosophy of government and politics is a blend of both postulates, it is idealism which has always received the greater attention. We shall consider another theory: the theory of equilibrium.

The Concept of Equilibrium

In international relations, we watch units that act and react.

Let us assume that a variety of forces surround an object some pulling in one direction, others tending in the opposite direction, let us further assume that the factors in both directions have equal force.

Ihen the object will not move. It is at rest. It is this posture

(often termed a position of balance) that we shall call equilibrium.

----- John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), especially pp. 1-128.

^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Fourth ed.), (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p.

10 This situation does not imply that the units involved are or will

all be happy and will therefore remain constant. Indeed, the vagrant, uncertain, volatile and dynamic nature of the international system

incessantly breeds disequilibria. Theoretically, and as already noted,

the revisionists will clamor for changes and status quo powers will

resist changes.

We shall distinguish particular, partial, or specific equailibrium

from general or universal equilibrium. In the former concept, we under—take a micro-analysis of the particularistic equilibrium extant

in a subsystem at a specific time. But general equilibrium is often

arrived at after a macro-analysis of the whole universal system in its

aggregative form.

From this concept, we may deduce another distinguishing feature between realists and idealists. The realists state that even though there is constant tendency towards balance in nature, and that though there may be partial equilibrium, it is temporary: there is never the

achievement of absolute universal or everlasting equilibrium. The

idealists dismiss the realists as pessimists. To them a period of disequilibrium is temporary and transitory: equilibrium is the law

of nature.

The Concept of "Image11

In a classificatory exercise, Kenneth Boulding outlines the

several definitions or forms of image. In this research, we shall make use of some of the most important ones.

11 According to Boulding, "spatial" image denotes a nation's location in the universej "temporal" image features its conception of time and its place in it. The image of "reality" or "unreality" portrays the extent to which a nation's image is near or far from some external or internal variables such as ideal legal or some other institutional norms. An image is. considered "public" or universal!btic if it is widely shared by other nations. On the other hand, a "private" image is that which is peculiar to only one nation or individual, A private image is also said to be particularistic.It remains for us to state the approach of this research.

The Approach of this Study

Two schools of the theory of international relations are at present in vogue. The first is the "classical" school and the second is the

"scientific" school. These have also been called the anti-behavioral . and the behavioral schools, respectively. Somit and Tanenhaus presents a symmetrical outline of the arguments advanced by the proponents " of each school substantiating their respective positions.

The Behavioral School

This school of political thought states that political science can eventually evolve into a science capable of prediction and expla­ nation. Therefore, students of the discipline should continue to search for regularities and uniformities in political behavior. It is urged that quantitative data be secured and that findings be based upon such measurable data.

^Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), see especially, pp. 47-63.

12 Furthermore, the scientific school suggests that research should be theory oriented and theory directed. In other words, political inquiry should start from systematically developed theoretical formulations, which will, in turn, produce applicable hypotheses, and that the later should be verifiable against empirical data.

The behaviorists assert that since'political behavior is only an aspect of social behavior, the science of politics will profit significantly if it draws from the skills, techniques, and the experi- ences of other social sciences. In other words, political science should trail the interdisciplinary path. Some of the leading supporters of the behavioral school are Morton Kaplan, Kenneth Boulding, David Easton and Charles A. McClelland. The views of the behaviorists are being challenged by the anti-behavoirists.

The Anti-behavioral School

On the other hand, the classical school deplores the purely quantitative, scientific and empirical approach proposed by the behav­ iorists. This school agrees that it is desirable that research be supported by theory. However, it blames the scientific school for the letter's inordinate quest for general theory at the expense of

(or ignoring simple) less complicated and yet more productive inquiry.

It is charged, for instance, that the pre-occupation with the search for phenomena like "low-level,11 "middle-level," and "general theory," has resulted in the proliferation of models, concepts, and theories that cannot be adequately or successfully utilized in analyzing political behavior.

13 In broad terms, the classical school does not deny the usefulness of drawing from the Experiences of other social sciences. However, it is warned that indiscriminate borrowing and application of inappro­ priate concepts and techniques can make the establishment and preser­ vation of the identity of political science, as a separate discipline, difficult.

Therefore, instead of the quantitative, scientific and empirical approach, the classical school proposes the verbal-philosophical, intuitive and qualitative approach. This method of political analysis relies heavily on the political scientists' ability to make objective judgment. Some of the leading proponents of this school are Hans J.

Morgenthau, Edward H. Carr, Raymond Aron, and Stanley Hoffmann.

It is to be noted, that the advocates of each of these two methods of political analysis often differ among themselves on a number of points. It is even suggested that to classify supporters into one or the other school is an ambiguous exercise. According to David Easton, himself a behaviorist,

"Card-carriers' in the behavioral movement are not easy to distinguish from fellow-travelers, tolerant sympathizers, occasional supporters, or ambivalent critics. A person may be seen by traditionalists as belonging to an opposing camp, and yet the latter group at the same^time may disown him for diametrically opposite reasons.

However, the above represents the basic concensus that can be 7 detected from their respective positions. We also hasten to Intimate

^David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 5. 7 Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967)

H that despite ("because of or perhaps so as to resolve) these differences in methodology, international relations has recently been combining some of the attributes of both schools.

This student believes that both methods are indispensable, therefore, they will be combined in the course of this research. However, because of the nature of the study - a review of the performance of

Nigeria in the United Nations from 1960~to 1966 - the final product will draw more assistance from the classical than from the scientific school.

At several stages, mathematical models and statistical data will be injected to enrich conceptual explanations with clarity. The disci­ pline that plays a major part in the body of this study is history. We therefore turn to state the function of the historical approach.

The Historical Approach

This study is intentionally historical. Liberalism is an on-going and continuous concern whose past and prosent (and perhaps, or therefore, the future) are woven together in an endless chain. In order to understand its nature, we must know its history and point out the various forms it successfully assumed before it became what it is today.

This retrospection is necessary. According to Carl L. Becker,

"we can not properly know things as they are unless we know how they g came to be what they are." Or, in the words of Edward H. Carr, "You cannot look forward intellegently into the future unless you also are pp. 173-194- and 205-211. For further readings on the "classical" and the "scientific" schools, see Hedley Bull, "International. Relations Theory: "The Case for a Classical Approach," World Politics. (April, 1966), pp. 361-377.

Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth- Century Philosophers (New Haven: Tale University Press, 1966), p. 19.

15 prepared to look back attentively into the past.... History deals with a line or procession of events, half of which lies in the past and half in the future.11 You cannot have an appreciation of "one half 9 unless you also concern yourself with the other half."

As we shall soon see, in the liberalism of the era of Enlighten­ ment, or, specifically, in the liberalism of the age of Pains or

Jefferson, there was the strong policy of political independence or non-involvement in foreign affairs but economic internationalism or universalism. Today, and once more as we shall soon demonstrate,

Nigerian foreign policy is bifurcated along similar lines: political independence and economic interdependence. We shall use the historical approach as a theoretical tool to help us discover the phenomena whose principles are exemplified in this seemingly unvarying (even though time has changed) political behavior culminating in the uniformity or similarity of foreign policy between the Anglo-American liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the Nigerian foreign policy decision makers of the nineteen-sixties. •'

In the circumstances, this study rejects, at least tentatively,

E. H. Carr* s idea that nin history the presumption is not that the same thing will happen again, but that the same thing will not happen again.11'*’® On the other hand, this student does not believe that history necessarily repeats itself in identical form, much less to postulate that similarities are identities. The content of our

^Edward Hallett Carr, The New Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 6-7.

10ibid.. p. 6.

16 research will, again tentatively, uphold Arnold Toynbee's proposition summarized by Carr that "history consists of the same things happening over and over again with minor variations in different contexts.

Finally, we warn that in our use of the scientific method and in our search for uniformities, regularities, conformities, and simi­ larities, in the behaviors of the different political units and actors to be considered below, we shall, as much as possible, avoid falling victim to the distortion contained in Science Is a Sacred Cow about the booze-head who wanted to discover why he was inebriated. His experimentation, neatly summarized for us by Carroll Quigley, went somewhat like this: on Monday I drink whisky and water and get drunk; on Tuesday I drink gin and water and get drunk; on Wednesday I drink vodka and water and get drunk; on Thursday, I think about this and decide that water makes me drunk, since this is the only common action

I did every d a y ! ^

ibid. ♦ p. 5. Underscoring mine. We intend to show that even though the time is the twentieth century and the scene Africa, post-Independence foreign policy in Nigeria is similar to the post- Ihdependence foreign policy enunciated by Jeffersonian liberalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

■^Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilization. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961) p. 9.

17 CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF LIBERALISM

It is an irony to note that one of the most important and the most striking features about the Liberal tradition is its intellectual

disunity. Therefore, a consistent and unified liberal policy is

always difficult, if not impossible to present. Nevertheless, it is warned that irrespective of the diversities in the views of the poli­

tical philosophers and thinkers we are about to consider, they were

all Liberals.

The only qualification to be made is that throughout this work,

Liberalism refers only to the Anglo-American concept known for its flexibility and broadmindedness as is reflected by its inherent divi­

sion of opinion. This is in contrast to the m. ,'e dogmatically inflexible

continental liberalism. This distinction does not make the latter less acceptable to its exponents. As a French minister once said:

It is better to have five governments and one policy like France, than to have one government and five policies, like England.

Anglo-American liberalism is chosen because, as will later be

shown, Nigeria was a British colony for about one-hundred years.

Before and after Independence (until January, 1966), the evolving

system of government in the country was federalism: a Liberals1 method of bringing several political units under one government.

■^■Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 19^6), p. 223. One of the problems of research will be to show how the British

and Ameiican tradition of liberalism dominated Nigerian foreign policy

especially in the United Nations in the sexennial 1901-1966.

Liberalism is divided into two historical periods Classical

Liberalism, from the age of Mercantilism up to the early part of the twentieth century - more precisely, the beginning of the First World

War. The second period, termed contemporary liberalism, is from the

end of the First World War to the present.

Classical Liberalism

It is difficult to understand liberalism without some knowledge of

Western Europe, and especially England, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. At about the sixteenth century, the Middle

Ages had passed and Western Europe was rapidly emerging from feudalism.

The authority of the Catholic Church had been challenged and, indeed,

shattered by the Protestant Reformation.

As a result, not only in England, but also in Spain, France and the Netherlands, nation states came forth with strong central govern­ ments. People thought in national terms and believed that by adopting proper government policies a country could increase its wealth and power.

Of historical significance to this period, especially between the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and to the origin of liberalism, was the appearance of the adventurous merchant class whose rather unorganized but vocal views on political economy have been labelled

"Mercantilism.”

19 The Age of Mercantilism o The Mercantilists were proponents of enchanced national interest as opposed to individual inters stsj they espoused the principle of govern­ ment intervention in the political economy of the nation. Regarding international trade, they were protectionists. They advocated strict law, order, and the sanctity of private property rights and parliamentary government.

The Concepts of Natural Law and the Harmony of Interests

It is against the background of the economic and political philosophies of the Mercantilists that we must consider the concepts of natural law, the harmony of interests, and orthodox liberalism which evolved in the eighteenth century.

In their philosophy of life, proponents of natural law opposed government regulations and intervention. The concept became a significant evolution of thought which gripped Western Europe. It had its strongest support in the Newtonian metaphisical dictum which asserted that every natural phenomenon was governed by certain natural laws. For example, basic to the law of gravity and the seemingly immortal story of the "fallen apple" was Newton’s extrapolation of the law of gravitation and the concept of the unity of nature.

According to Bronowski, the idea that struck Newton was that the same "force of gravity which reached to the top of the tree, might go on reaching out beyond the earth, and its air endlessly into space....

2Enke asserts that "they were not economists. In fact, until Adam Smith in a later century called them ’mercantilists,1 as a group, they even lacked a name." Stephen Enke, Economics for Development. (New Jersey: Frentice-Hall, 19&4), P» 67.

20 Newton traced in them two expressions of a single concept: gravitation and unity.As we shall shortly see, most Liberals either expressed themselves in terms of or associated their ideas with the metaphysical theory of the uniformity of nature and natural law.

The concept of natural law permeated political affairs. Liberty was viewed as a natural state of affairs, and restrictions, such as those inherent in mercantilism, were unnatural. Abbe Morellet is quoted as writing to Lord Shelburne that "since liberty is a natural state and restrictions are, on the contrary, the state of compulsion, by giving back liberty, everything resumes its own place, and every­ thing is in peace..., provided only that thieves and murderers continue to be caught."^

The generic term which embraces nearly all aspects of the Liberals* thoughts on natural law, the nature of man and his society is the

"harmony of interest.11

The concept of the harmony of interests was closely tied to the notion that if each man pursued his own interest intelligently, the interests of « n men would be found to be harmonious because, accord­ ing to natural law, harmony prevailed in nature. This philosophy is usually associated with the age of Enlightenment. It set forth a division of duty between the individual and the state.

The Harmony of Interests: the Example from Economics

Economic freedom was the reigning monarch in the minds of the harmonic liberals. The philosophy of a natural harmony of interests

% . Bronowski, Science and Human Values. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 15.

^Alan Bullock & Maurice Shock, eds., The Liberal Tradition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. xxv.

21 in economic affairs was first and persuasively enunciated "by Adam Smith with the publication of his Wealth of Nations in 1776. Smith felt that the concept of natural order spread to the operations of most economic matters in a community. Bentham explained that a community was an artificial body composed of individual persons.

If left unrestricted, Smith thought, the individual would, through self-love or selfishness promote the wealth of the community through the help of the invisible hand; he said that:

...every individual...neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. But he is led by an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention,*

Regarding international economics, Smith asserted that voluntary exchange was normally beneficial to the parties concerned and that the propensity to make exchange transactions was present only in man.

He remarked,

...nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog.

Smith, Richard Cobden and John Bright were the most idealistic of the harmonic liberals. They belonged to the Manchester School of

Free Traders which opposed the mercantilists’ principle of trade restriction. Cobeden envisaged an England whose majesty would be based on her foreign trade. The Manchester School thoughtthat trade drew nations and peoples of diverse racial, linguistic and religious backgrounds together. Cobden said:

5Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations (1776), (New York: Modern Library edition, 1937), p. 423. 6ibid.. p. 1 4 . I see in the Free Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravita­ tion in the universe - drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace.

Therefore, trade and commerce made for peace. Cobden continued:

I believe that the motive for armies and great navies will die when man becomes one family and freely exchanges the fruits of his labor with his brother man.

There was a general reliance on the natural market mechanism to

Judicially distribute economic amenities among individuals in the

community. Everything purchased or sold had its natural and "just11 market price, established by the natural operation of the proportion of the

supply to the demand. Therefore, no price regulation was thought necessary. Employing Newtonian metaphysical language, Richard Cobden said:

to make laws for the regulation of trade is, as wise as it would be to legislate about water finding a « level, or matter exercising its centripetal force.

Fain, Jefferson, and Bright shared identical optimism about the ameliorating influence of international commerce. They were all products of the Enlightenment era whom the contemporary writer, Reinhold

Niebuhr, would call the "children of light"*^ because of the levity of

^Bullock and Shock, op.oit.. p. 53.

8ibid.. p. 53.

9ibid.. p. 54-

^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, I960).

23 their ideas about the roots of international rivalry and the simplicity of their prescription for the elimination of such conflicts.

Of particular importance, however, to this study is the Jefferson­ ian dualism, or, better still, his dilemma. Jefferson witnessed the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. He viewed the conflicts as purely European affairs which, politically, demanded American neutrality. However, based on the theme that commerce made for peace, commercial interdependence was to continue uninterrupted.

We shall return to this point again when we come to consider

Nigeria* s policy of economic alignment and political non-alignment.

It is enough at the moment to point out that the policy goes back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Theme on Equality

Hie liberals' view on equality was closely associated with indi­ vidual freedom. Freedom was regarded as a social quality. The cry of Bentham in 1793 was: "emancipate your colonies." Adam Smith devoted a good part of his Wealth of Nations to an eiqposition of the evils of the fiscal and monetary policies, the Navigation Acts, commercial laws with which the British insulated themselves against international business competition with other imperial powers.

The demand for freedom included freedom of assembly, speech, religion. Early this century, in 1909, Hobsorfe theme was mainly on "equality of opportunity." He questioned:

Is a man free who has not 1 equal opportunity* with his fellows of such access to all material and moral

24 means of personal development and work as shall bute to his own welfare and that of his society?

It is also important to note that the Liberals1 view on equality was influenced by the events of their era: the American War of

Independence, the cry of Ireland for self-determination, the overthrow of the monarchy in France and the subsequent emergence of the powerful revolutionary motto: Liberte, Egalite, Frateraite.

Of relevance to our discussion is the issue of equality especially of states on the international scene. John Stuart Mill wrote:

The community of nations is essentially a republic of equals...the smallest and least powerful nation, in its capacity of a nation, is equal of the strongest.

We shall come back to examine the issue of freedom and equality in contemporary setting and the significant position it occupied in

Nigerian foreign policy in the United Nations between I960 and 1966.

The Theme on (International) Law

The harmonic Liberals were concerned about how to eliminate war, disorder, and lawlessness among nations and eventually to achieve the- nonor and the just interests of their country peacefully. Richard

Cobden, speaking in the House of Commons in 1349, put his solution in this simple term:

..• * •.my plan is, simply and solely, that we should resort to that mode of settling disputes in com­ munities, which individuals resort to in private life

•^•Bullock and Shock, op.cit.. pp. 190-192.

^ i b i d .. pp. 108-118.

-^Bullock and Shock, op.cit.. pp. 75-76.

25 Cobden wished to refer international disputes to arbitrators who would have absolute power to dispose of the question submitted to them. He relied on world opinion and morality to force nations to abstain from violation of treaties. In his thinking,

if you make a treaty with another country, binding it to refer any dispute to arbitration, and if that country violates that treaty, when the disputes ariBes, then you will place it in a worse position before the world.^

The purpose here is briefly to develop the idea of the Liberals' reliance on treaties, international law, arbitration and conciliation.

We shall return to this point as this paper progresses. Let us examine another theme in the Liberals' views of politics: the issue of war and peace.

The Liberals on War and Peace

Among the Liberals consistently against wars among nations were

Bentham, Cobden, Paine and Jefferson. Benthan traced the causes of war to what he called the "sinister interests" of monarchs. He once said: "...we have one partial, one separate, one sinister interest, the monarchical, the interest of the ruling one with which the uni- 15 versal interest has to antagonize." Bentham*s solution was the abolition of this institution.

Broadly speaking, the Liberals perceived different causes of war and therefore proposed different solutions. Cobden viewed large-

^ibid., p. 77 .

■^Ibid., pp. 39-40.

26 scale military establishment as provocative to other states and a major cause of conflicts. Paine, as well as Jefferson, believed that war, unless in self-defence never served the true interests of nations.

Paine ashed:

What has England gained by war since the year 1733? Nothing at all. °

In additon to commerce, )?aine had the feeling that universal democracy would include international peace. He did not find the roots of wars in man. He said "man, were he not corrupted by govern­ ments, is naturally the friend of man; human nature Is not of itself vicious."I?

Having rejected the "first image,"-1-0 he found the causes of war in the "second image," that is, the state and Its imperfect institutions. The solution would be the search for more perfection in governmental institutions.

The Theme on Morality

The liberals made no distinctions between the moral standards to be applied to the individual and the morality of the group.

Since they proposed a harmony between the individual's interests

-^Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds., The Anglo- American Tradition in Foreign Affairs. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 128.

17ibid.. p. 133.

l^In his book, Man. the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), K. N. Waltz outlined three conceptual images* man, the first image; the structure of his society the second image; and the lawlessness of the’international society (or system), the third image. Waltz then examined the part played by each of the images in the outbreak of wars among nations. Waltz's "images" are not related to those proposed by Boulding to which we referred in the theoretical part of this study.

27 and those of the society, it was difficult for them to conceive of any diversities in the moral obligations of both. Thus Jefferson, grappling with this issue set what amounted to a norm. He said:

I know of but one code of morality for men whether acting singly or collectively....If the morality of one man produces a Just line of conduct in him, acting individually, why should not the morality of one hundred men produce a Just line of conduct in them acting together?^

He thought that nations were under a moral code which was similar to that which the individuals ought to observe.

Paine refined Jefferson's conception when, concerning moralism and national honor, he wrote:

...that which is the best character for an individual is the best character for a nation; and wherever the latter exceeds or falls beneath the former, there is a departure from the line of true greatness.

Dr. Johnston, commenting on this issue, observed that this line of argument played a prominent role in the thought of Woodrow Wilson, and it became one of the criteria by which a rough demarcation between the "idealists" and "realists" can be made. The idealists on the one hand, decry the lower standards of morality in international politics and express the desire to elevate it to the level of domestic morality.

On the other hand, the realists maintain that because of the basic differences between international system and the domestic system - disorganization in the former and organization in the latter - the

^Wolfers and Martin, op.cit., p. 133.

20ibid., p. 128.

28 standard of morality in the domestic system (politics) must necessarily be higher.^

In attempting to solve (or shall we say reconcile or further explain) this dilemma, Reinhold Niebuhr brings the realists’ and the idealists’ views on morality a step lower to the morality of-the individual and that of his state. Niebuhr’s synthesis is lucidly outlined in his Moral Man and Immoral Society.

We shall return to a discussion of the Niebuhrian synthesis when we come to discuss contemporary Liberalism. Later, it will be shown that it was the Liberals’ moralistic idealism that gained pro­ minence in Nigeria's foreign policy.

In the pages above, we have discussed only a few of the areas of man and his society and the international system where the Liberals' idealistic views permeated. There were several other Liberals exposing their views on other aspects of society. For instance, reform.

In 1831, Thomas Babington Macaulay wrote that conflict always "arises when a section of a society previously of no account expands and becomes strong enough to demand a place in the system suited, not to its former weakness, but to its present strength.’’ If the demand is granted all is wellj if it is refused, then comes a "struggle between the young energy of one class and the ancient privileges of 22 another.

Henry George put his proposal for the elimination of animosities among nations and the way to foster international understanding as

Whittle Johnston, "Commentaries on Paine" (unpublished), used in the Course Liberal Theories of World Politics. Spring 1968, p. 2 . 22 Bullock and Shock, op. cit., p. 21. .

29 as follows: "The diversities of climate, soil, and configuration of the earth1s surface operate at first to separate mankind, they also operate to encourage exchange. Commerce, itself a form of association or co-operation, operates to promote civilization, by building up interests which are opposed to warfars, and by dispelling ignorance, 23 the fertile mother of prejudices and animosities.11

Bentham* s philosophy of utility meant the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," meaning the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals all pursuing their own enlightened self-interest.

The cure proposed by the utilitarian for the sinister interest of the monarch and aristocrats was universal suffrage and the ballot. For economics, the prescription was laissez-faire and reliance on the inter-play of natural forces to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

At the same time as liberalism produced a set of idealists, it also produced realistic philosophers.

Realistic Classical Liberals

Alexander Hamilton was one of the realistic Liberals of the

Enlightenment era. He criticized the "commerce makes for peace" thesis of Jefferson, Paine, Cobden and Bright. He asserted that the irrationalities of politics superseded the harmonies of economics.

Neutralism could not be effective unless the neutral created a navy

^Henry George, Progress and Poverty. (New York: Modern Library) p. 512.

_— -~^W61fers and Martin, op. cit., p. 154.

30 which, if it could not vie with those of the great sea powers, would, at least, be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two belligerents. Neutrality was essential but it was to be strategic. Thus, he said "a price would be set not only upon our friendship, but also upon our neutrality.^ Hobhouse concluded the case for the realists; he said that "the older internationalism based on a belief in humanitarian ethics and in the peaceful tendencies of commerce is dead."

One of the most articulate challenges against the theory of the harmony of interests was also posed by Alexander Hamilton. He observed that much growth came from competition. There was no lasting peace with which an individual's interests would be in conformity. Instead, at best, individuals and society are in a state of controlled tension.

Whereas the harmonic Liberals accepted the possibility of conflict but passed it off as temporary or transitory, Hamilton saw conflicts as one of the permanent features in a community.

What the realistic Liberals said was that the regulations of the various and interfering interests formed the principal task of legislation in society, and involved the ordinary operations of the government. A balance must be struck between or among colliding interests. Such a balance would not be final, it would be an unstable equilibrium which had to be rebalanced in the light of the historic and organic factors within the system.

^4-Wolfers and Martin, op. cit., p. 154.

31 In his commentaries on Hamilton, Dr. Johnston suggests that it is at this stage of Hamilton's observations that some aspects of

"systems theory" may seem to have a role to play and that it is one of the illusions of a too-generalized approach to think that any given model can be transferred to a setting where the organic conditions differ.25

The applicability of the "systems theory" to Hamilton's views becomes more relevant when we assume that "any system is a structure that is perceived by its observers to have elements in interaction or relationships and some identifiable boundaries that separate it 26 from its environment. We arrive at the same inference if we introduce the definition of a system by a classical Liberal, Hobhouse.

He saw society as an organism composed of interacting, interdependent 27 living parts, not an aggregation of self-interested individuals. '

Instead of the simple static harmonic situation, the systems theory then enables observers to study the interactions among all the social entities and interests, including the study of the special circumstances circumventing the interactions. We shall later have more to say on the "systems theory." Let us now turn to Hamilton's realism on the moral behavior of nations.

Hamilton rejected the moral norm set by Paine and Jefferson below which, it was postulated, a nation should not fall. Whereas Jefferson

25w. Johnston, Commentaries, op. cit., p. 21.

2%cCle11and, op. cit., p.20. 27 L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 41. was of the opinion that when man’s reason had

discovered God's will,gman's conscience would impel him to obey it.

Hamilton asserted that unless through compulsion, "man will not 29 conform to the dictates of justice."

According to Hamilton, group morality is lower than individual

morality. He said:

Regard to reputation has a less active influence when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a nrnber than when it is to fall singly upon one.^u

It is useful that Hamilton called attention to the fact of the

diffusion of the sense of guilt in mob action. When we deal with

aggregates of persons, the behavior of individuals tend to cancel

each other out and become submerged in the behavior of the group

as a whole.

Hamilton and Mahan after him, offered no simplistic solution

to the problem of war. They both repudiated the Benthamian charges

against "sinister interests." They also rejected the Marxian monis­

tic thesis that economic (capitalism) caused international wars.

Hamilton said that jealousy, the desire for preeminence, the

clash of important international personalities, as well as commercial

struggles, were the chief causes of war. In Mahan's conception,

struggle was the generic trait of human relations of which war was

a species.

2%olfers and Martin, op. cit.. p. 156.

29ibid.. p. U 3 .

3°ibid.

33 We noted earlier that Paine attacked war by showing that it had no beneficial result. Mahan objected and suggested that the advantages of power and position were in favor of the British after the Napoleonic warsj therefore, war had its profits. In the views of the idealistic liberals, arms and weapons generated conflict and caused wars. Instead of the arms race, Cobden had recommended that:

The only naval force required in a time of peace for the protection of commerce, is just such a number of frigates and small vessels as shall form an efficient sea police.

Mahan dismissed Cobden*s idealistic simplicity. He viewed arms as an effective deterrent to war. In other words, the possession of force need not necessarily produce an inclination to warj organized force might be an instrument of peace.

When we come to the chapter on contemporary Liberalism, we shall show how Mahan*s views on the "primacy of struggle" influenced the thinking of a neo-realist such as Morgenthau who insists that "inte- national politics, like any other politics, is a struggle for power."32

In proposing both economics and politics as continuation of interna­ tional struggle, Mahan became successor to Clauswitz who labelled politics as a continuation of war by other, means.

Mahan was skeptical about the efficacy of arbitrations. He noted that problems would arise regarding final authority, the power and form of arbitrations and the enforcement of its decisions. He revealed two major obstacles.

^Bullock and Shock, on. cit.. p. 54*

-^Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 25.

34 Firstly, in a situation of uneven distribution of power, any arbitration between a militarily strong state and a relatively weak state would be influenced by the preponderance of power which would enable the stronger state to obtain its desire. Secondly, compulsory arbitration would not work because, unlike in the domestic situation, there were no extensive legal systems on the international scene.

Since her inception into the United Nations, Nigeria has held firmly to the demand that the rule of law be observed by states in their dealings with each other. On several occasions, she had been frustrated by the nature of the international system and the propen­ sities of nations to anarchy. We shall return to the theme on law among nations when we deal with contemporary Liberalism; we shall later observe the conceptual gap between Nigeria's foreign policy demand for lawfulness and the prevailing lawlessness on the global scene. We shall at that time note that the gap has its roots in the early Liberals' legalistic idealism.

At any rate, even if there were, on the international scene, an extensive system of legislation comparable to that in the domestic system in efficiency, we are warned not to be overly optimistic.

Hobhouse said:

Thus, to the common question whether it is possible to make men good by Act of Parliament, the reply is that it is not possible to compel morality.

In Hobhouse, we see the origin of E. H. Carr's view on the excessive emphasis placed on legislation. Carr says:

33Bullock and Shock, op. cit.. p. 193.

35 Even today, it is easy to exaggerate the role of legis- lationj and it may still be true to say that most important changes in society and in the balance of forces within it are effected without legislation. Therefore, it may be unnecessarily pessimistic to rush into the conclusion that the absence of an intemationl legis­ lature rules out any international procedure of peaceful change.^

The realists argue that no society exists without some measure of inequality and factions. According to Madison, "the causes of faction cannot be removed, .. .relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. "35 Qn the issue of reform, we observe the same realism that government intervention might not be the sole solution. According to Herbert Spencer, those who call for government interference took for granted "first, that all suffering ought to be prevented, which is not true; much suffering is curative, the pre­ vention of it is prevention of a remedy. In the second place, it takes for granted that every evil can be removed; the truth being that with the existing defects of human nature, many evils can only be thrust out of one place into another place.

Every constructive social doctrine rests on the conception of human progress. Liberalism saw progress in the individual being left alone to pursue his own interests. The idea of a self-regula­ ting society reduced the role of the state. Therefore the Liberals became habituated to the notion that in a free and progressive nation, it is a good policy that the government should be weak.

^Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years1 Crisis. 1919-1939, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p* 212.

35»rhe Federalist. (New York: M o dem Library edition), p. 57.

^Bullock and Shock, on. cit.. p. 183.

36 In the introduction to the book The Liberal Tradition both

Bullock and Shock concluded that every institution in England felt the impact of the Liberal philosophy and that at the deeper level of instinctive feeling Liberal ideas became "a part of the national character, finding expression in the tradition of ’fair play. t»37

However, It is Hobson who provides us with the closing remark on this discussion of classical Liberalism. He said: "Liberalism will prob­ ably retain its distinction from Socialism, in taking for its chief test of policy the freedom of the individual citizen rather than the strength of the State.It was a movement away from Hobbes to Locke.

B. Why Classical Liberalism Survived

But how is it possible that the conflicting principles and doctrines of Classical Liberalism, should have survived and (even to this day) continued to hold Its place in the hearts of people and in the official edicts of governments?

Among several reasons, we shall consider only three: Firstly, in its early stage of development, Liberalism was a new supplement to religion; secondly, it was backed by historical events; and thirdly, it fitted the relatively atomic nature of the responsibility of governments: a responsibility spectacularly uncharacterized by the need to make "hard decisions."

^Bullock and Shock op. cit., p. liv.

38ibid.. p. 190.

37 One of the significant results of the rise of the nation-state system was the separation of theological duties from state and govern­ ment functions. There was a decline in the power of the Church which had earlier wielded both the spiritual and secular swords. Men began to look for explanations for the unknown through metaphysics instead of the Deity.

Accordingly, phrases such as natural law, the harmony of interests, utilitarianism took hold of the Liberal intellectuals. According to Schumpeter, for the intellectual who had ’’cast off his religion, the utilitarian creed provided a substitute for it. For many of those who had retained their religious belief, the classical doctrine became the political compliment of it.”^ Thus, wrapped in the toga of religion, the concepts needed no further verification. This teleo- logical belief was further butressed by the Newtonian revelations of unity and the uniformity of nature as observed in the law of gravity.

Secondly, liberalism tended to be "self-evident.” Once the

Liberal tradition was established, it became accepted; its rationality, though not empirically demonstrated (and, perhaps, more often than not, undemonstratable), became "self-evident." For instance, the forms and phrases of Classical Liberalism were associated with events and develop­ ments in the American history.

Louis Hartz observes that the United States owes its existence to the struggle against the Benthamian "sinister interests," that is,

■^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 265.

38 the monarchy and the aristocrats in England. Yet, the grievances of the .Americans were presented as a case of the ’'people” versus its "rulers."

The implication was clearly reflected in the content of the Declaration of Independence: "man has his inalienable rights."^ This was derived from the Liberals' theme on equality, liberty and justice.

Perhaps a contemporary example can throw more light on this issue.

On November 19, 1968, the Government of Mali was overthrown by a military coup. In their first broadcast after the coup, the military leaders said:

The Military Committee of national liberation will henceforth assume political and administrative powers pending the formation of a government with democratic political institutions as a result of free elections.43.

As long as nations struggling for independence continue to employ the liberal argument, its logic is self-evident and it needs no further proof. According to Hartz, when "one's ultimate values are accepted wherever one turns, the absolute language of self-evidence 4.2 comes easily enough."

While we do not wish to stop to examine these reasons for their validity, the dangers inherent in the assumption of "self-evidence" are so apparent that a word or two have to be said. The "self-evident" thesis is ambivalent and ambiguous. It can dasily shelter under its broad- brimmed umbrella, leaders who appreciate slogans and phraseologies that not only flabbagaster the masses, but also enable successive leaders

40l,ouis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), p. 57-59. ^ ~The Washington Post. (November 20, 1968), p. A. 17. Hartz, op. cit.. p. 58.

39 to evade responsibility and, at the same time, crush their opponents in the name of the people and the pleading that their cause is honorable and 11 self-evident.11

And finally, liberalism, especially in its idealistic form, survived up to the beginning of the twentieth century, not becuase it was close to reality, but because there were relatively few press­ ing issues. For instance, since the two world Wars in this century and especially the post-World War II, - the atomic and nuclear weapons era - the issues of relations among nations and within nations require more than idealistic liberalism.

Comparing the mid-twentieth century to earlier centuries

Schumpeter wrote that, in the field of economics

There is so little to quarrel about in a world of peasants which, excepting hotels, banks, contains no great capitalistic industry and there are no great decisions to be made.43

In the fields of political science (the study of national politics) and international relations, Walter Lippmann said:

The hardness of governing was little realized in the early 1900’s. For more than half a century ...there had been a remarkable interlude during which the governments rarely had to make hard decisions.... For several generations, the West had flourished under governments that did not have to prove their strength by making hard decisions. It had been possible to dream with­ out being rudely awakened. As long as peace could be taken for granted, the public good could be thought of as being immanent in the aggregate of private transactions.44

43Schumpeter, op. cit.. p. 267.

44-Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy. (Mentor Books,

40 If in the earlier centuries "it had been possible to dream without being rudely awakened," in this, the twentieth century,

especially since the 1940's, heads of states have not been sleeping peacefully, let alone dream dreams. When they do sleep, they go to

bed with national and international problems heavy on their minds, they dream of these problems, and are usually rudely awakened by the urgent demands, the expediencies or the exigencies of the problems.

As a result, there has been a corresponding change in the classical form of liberalism. We shall consider the nature of the change in the next chapter which we designate as "Contemporary Liberalism."

41 C. Contemporary Liberalism

In the preceding pages, we have attempted to show that political idealism was the major force behind the political development, politi­ cal movements, and political transformations in the world of the classical liberals, believing in eternal harmony, peace, and progress and the complete elimination of injustice, oppression, inequality and the rule of force or violence.

Furthermore, because of the relatively peaceful, and untroubled

Age of Enlightenment in which the harmonic liberals found themselves, an age in which life and liberty were both secure and assured, and the pursuit of private happiness reigned unchallenged, the classical liberals viewed man and his nature, the state and the role of govern­ ment with optimistic simplicity.

However, the events of the twentieth century have strained these idealistic impulses and seriously questioned the continued validity of the premises adduced for their relevance.

Insight into the new conditions and realities of the twentieth century international system which confronts the political idealists has given rise to counter-type of political thought: political realism.

Political realism demands that political relations among states should reflect the facts b o m out of contemporary situations and not out of idealistic romanticism with an obsolete past.

In order to mate our observations on political realism and contemporary liberalism more meaningful and intelligible, we must quickly look at situations on the international scene in the twentieth century. We shall then discuss three of the several areas where the

42 the political realists challenge the long-standing beliefs, values, and institutions of classical liberalism and call for a re-examination j the theme on peaceful change, moralistic and idealistic legalism, and the theme on international organizations.

1. Twentieth Century International Millieu

In the field of economics, the collapse of the gold standard in the 1920's, closely followed by the Great Depression in the 1930's led to the emergence of the Keynesian economics, articulately pre­ sented in The General Theory of finployment. Interest, and Money.

A fundamental thesis submitted by Keynes was that a government could rescue its domestic economy and people from the painful clutch of the vicious circle of economic recession, depression, inflation, de­ flation, unemployment, and so forth, by actively directing, regulating, and hence interferring with the "natural" national and international economic orders: an affront to laissez-faire. In his book, The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes wrote:

The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest.

In fact, defying Adam Smith's postulate of the "invisible hand,"

Sirkin Gerald has recently written a book with the title The Visible

Hand in praise of economic regulation and planning.^

^Cited in Bullock and Shock, on. cit.. p. 254

^Sirkin Gerald, The Visible Hand. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

43 In this century, the doctrine of peaceful change has been severally rejected: first by Germany and her allies in the two World Warsj and secondly, especially since the last World War, by smaller (and occasionally by big powerful) states.

Besides this, in earlier periods, the process of metamorphosis in the world was gradual and relatively slow. In this century, however, most changes were episodic and effected forcefully. At the end of the World Wars, the maps of Europe and Africa showing political boundaries were redrawn and redrawn. There were episodic changes also in the 1960's when several African countries became independent and inundated the United Nations' General Assembly.

Then there is the fact that contemporary revolutions in communi­ cation and transportation have shrunk international distances and boundaries and the world itself has been contracted into a small planet of interdependent multistates. Advances in the production of, and the perfection in, weaponry of war have dethroned nineteenth and early twentieth centuries insular powers such as England and continental powers such as France or Germany, only to enthrone the

United States to occupy the power vacuum in the Western world and the Soviet Union in the Eastern world, respectively. Indeed, Hoffmann seems to be correct in his observation that "in the nineteenth century, the British rex had to behave as dux; in a bipolar world, rn there is a clash of duces, and no rex."

^ S t anley Hoffmann, The State of War. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 163.

44 With this brief background, the proposition is now submitted that the international system has undergone fundamental changes which make the twentieth century a revolutionary period. Of course, there is nothing absolutely surprising about it, for change (for better or for worse) and mutability are a law as well as the barometer of life. We now turn to consider some of the criticisms hurled against the idealistic liberals by the political realists. We begin with the liberals' concept of change on the global scene.

45 2. The Theme on Peaceful Change

Liberalism accepts the fact that one of the irreversible laws of the human phhnomena is the law of change. According to Carl L. Becker,

"what is peculiar to the modern mind is the disposition that ideas, concepts, and the truth of things as well as things themselves, are changing entities.

Contemporary Angolo-American liberalism is aware that to maintain the old order under changed circumstances may be, in fact, to initiate a revolution. In the past, this is what had distinguished British liberalism from Continental liberalism. In the words of David Lloyd

George, "British liberalism is not going to repeat the fate of

Continenetal liberalism. Continental liberalism has been swept on one side because it refused to adapt itself to new conditions."49

In the view of the liberals, change is not only inevitable, it is also necessary, and can be good. The liberals advocate construc­ tive evolutionary change; they condemn revolutionary change not aimed at progress but the destruction of all traditional values, especially, freedom, Justice, and order. Nevertheless, they agree that some change may be achieved through the use of force.

The Liberals perceive their role in the world very much germane to the achievement of the "ideal end," that.is, the godd society of

^Becker, op. cit.. p. 19.

^Bullock and Shock, op. cit., p. 211.

46 equality, of freedom and of abundance. The ideal end is the corollary

of the Christian belief of the Heavenly City, or St. Augustine’s City

of God.

The role of force is to be reduced; violent change is to be replaced by peaceful change. In the liberals' "value" imagpj* the functionalism or dysfunctional!sm of change is to be measured by proximity to or remoteness of the results of change from the achieve­ ment of the "personal" image, i.e. the norm of the ideal end.

The liberals saw harmonous progress as the goal of social organi­

zation. Social and political problems thus consisted in reconciling

conflicting forces to purposeful change conducive to social progress and the attainment of the ideal end. But violence and force could not be totally eliminated. Thus "permissible" limits were set, beyond which reform-oriented conflict must not be pushed. With the postulate of conflict, the liberals assume the task of conflict resolution.

According to Herbert Spencer,

the fundamental facts are that among men in a society life is maintained by certain activities. These activities are to be carried on by each within the permissible limits, and not beyond those permissible limits. The maintenance of the limits by consequence, becomes the function of the agency which regulates society.

In other words, if a movement or an activity aimed at change traverses the "permissible" limits, it easily becomes a movement to destroy.

Some of the instruments of eliminating injustices and fostering change available to the Liberals are the democratic institutions:

-^Bullock and Shock, op. cit.. p. 185. (Underscored words mine).

47 Congress, Executive, Judiciary, Parliament, etc. Macaulay once said:

I support this bill because it will improve our institutionsj but I support it also because it tends to preserve them, -r

The purpose of these institutions is to insure that citizens

are not driven to the side of revolution because they are hopples sly

excluded from power and decisions.

Speaking in the House of Commons on behalf of the Manchester

Chamber of Commerce, orthodox Liberals such as Cobden, Smith and

Ashworth had prescribed universal justice as a way of converting

alienation to legitimacy: Cobden said:

The continuance of the loyal attachment of the * people to the established institutions of the country can never be permanently secured on any other grounds than those of universal justice.-^

However, change and reform have to be peaceful and gradual. Cobden remarked that

If you exclude.. .the masses of the people from the franchise, you are running the risk of what that sagacious old Conservative statesman once said. He said, 'I am afraid we shall have an ugly rush some day.' Well, I want to avoid that ’ugly rush.’ I would rather do the work tranquilly and gradually. ”

In this brief review of the liberals' theme on peaceful change, we mention that the idealistic lieberals are dedicated to the

establishment of the ideal end on earth. They believe in peaceful

change and gradualism. In the domestic setting, idealistic liberalism

^Bullock and Shock, op. cit.. p. 21.

5^fbid.. p. 4 8 ,

53ibid., p. 139.

43 possesses the channels through which sources of alienation are fed

into the domestic system and through congressional or parliamentary

procedures, and it can convert such alienation into legitimacy by

effecting reform and social justice.

At the same time, every liberal state possesses exclusive

right to the use of force, though rarely perceptible, in implementing

its will within its political jurisdiction. It has the machinery

for the distribution of political amenities to reward and encourage

allegiance or punish or discourage disloyalty. Let us see what the

realists have to say on the idealistic liberals1 characteristic

impulse of peaceful change.

The first, and perhaps by far the most important and devastating attack on liberalism, especially Anglo-American liberalism, is on the idealized projection of its own national (private) image into the international system. Realists argue that the projection is not based on a critical analysis of the world scene. This is what

Stanley Hoffmann calls the "sin of transposition."-^ The liberals are indicted for transferring their domestic experience to the inter­ national scene, with its different kinds of realities, therefore, making domestic experience largely irrelevant.

Reinhold Niebuhr calls the liberals the "soft Utopians" because of the levity of their mind and the simplicity with which they grapple with the issue of change in the international system. Theliberals are challenged by (to borrow another appellation from Niebuhr) the

^Stanley Hoffmann, "The American Style: Our PaBt and Our Principles," Foreign Affairs. (January 1968), p. 376.

49 "hard Utopians," who uphold opposite views and embrace violence and 55 revolution as the only means of effecting change.

The political realists submit that in the international system there is no liberal "emotional" image, that is, affection towards an ideal community or the desire to set things right, because there # is no community feeling among the different interacting units.

We noted earlier that in their domestic situation, so that

"to change" may not become "to destroy," the liberals set certain parameters which violence must not transcend but within which the conflicts involved in the process of change can rage and wane. It the global system, however, there are no established limits or guide lines regulating the use of violence to effect change. The liberals are therefore faced with the problem of how to reconcile their national "particularistic" image of nonviolence with the "univer- salistic" anarchy on the world scene.

Political organizations exist because perfect harmony does not exist among the conflicting interests of individual states.

Therefore, conflicts and politics are inseparable. In domestic politics, the chance of peaceful settlement of issues depends on the existence of institutional arrangements that promote consultation, negotiations, the resort to alternatives, and desire of the parties to arrive at beneficial solution, and, indeed, not to take the law

55narry R. Davis and Robert C. Good, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, I960). For further clarification on the "soft" and the "hard" Utopians see especially pp. 12-36.

50 into their own hands. Similarly in genuinely democratic states,

citizens put their faith for a change of an inefficient, or an unpopular, or unpleasing government on an impartial ballot box

and legislative processes.

International politics is total politics in which nothing is

barred. There is no universal legislature. There are no instruments

of checks and balances possessed by domestic authorities. In

disputes, more likely than not, states wish to be (and often are)

judge and jury in their own cause. The threatened or actual use

of force is a normal and conventional method of bringing about impor© tant political change.

The realists warn that the liberals should not close their minds

to the likeliness that the congressional, parliamentarian or demo­

cratic procedures may fail in certain states so that convulsion may

ensue. Eventually, then, the government is any government or any

group that successfully upholds a claim to the exclusive use of

physical force in enforcing its rules within that territorial area.56

Instead of the liberals1 monistic concept of nonviolent and

peaceful change in world politics, Raymond Aron proposes a rational

combination of the art of convincing without using force, "diplomacy,11 57 and the conduct of military operation, "strategy.11 Similarly,

Carr remarks that a successful foreign policy muBt oscillate between

^^Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis. (New Jersey: PrenticeSHall, Inc., 1963), p. 12.

^Raymond Aron, Peace and War (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), pp. 21-46.

51 the two opposite poles of "utopian conception of a common feeling of right and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to 68 a changed equilibrium of forces.''^

The concept of "equilibrium of vital forces" is a Niebuhrian synthesis. The political idealists neglect power and base peaceful change or settlement of disputes on a singular criterion of inter­ national morality. Niebuhr who recognizes the relativity of most political values, rejects the idea. He says international problems have their historical, spatial and temporal dimensions. Man, being a historical and social creature, cannot, therefore, make his moral judgment in a vacuum or with unflinching moral absolutism. Although one’s decisions are usually influenced by his personality images,

"the community in which he lives sets (or must set) the standards by which he judges himself. Usually, norms are the compromises between the rational moral ideals of what ought to be and the possibilities of the situation as determined by given equilibria of vital forces,"^

It is at this point that both Carr and Niebuhr arrive at a confluence of thought. They both prescribe (at least in part)

"situational ethics." Carr advises that while contact must be made with the past and the future, it is the realities of the present which must be given precedence. In the views of the realists,

^Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis. 1919-1939. op. cit., p. 223. 59 Davis and Good, op. cit., pp. 332-335.

521 therefore, it is the situational power relationship that matters.

This is what they understand hy Niebuhr's "vital forces."

Next we take a look at the realists' criticism of the idealistic liberals' idiosyncracy of moralistic legalism.

3. The Theme on International Law

One of the oldest principles in the Liberals' philosophy of law is the doctrine called pacta sunt servanda; treaties and formal obligations must be observed. The idealistic Liberals have been assailed by the political realists because the former not only embrace the doctrine of the sanctity of law, but they also demand conformity with the concept from other states.

This feeling, that is, the legalistic impulse, is an important element in the Liberals' theory of relations among states. It is even a moral philosophy in time of war or emergency. Kennan says

"whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the 60 lawbreaker and feel a moral superiority to him.” Following Kennan,

Hartz observes that moralistic legalism among the Liberals' 'Is essentially a Lockean faith" which made the war (World War II) not only a crusade for democracy but also a chance to expose Germany as

"breaker of treaties and hence violating the fundamental principles of contract.

Contemporary critics of idealistic and moralistic legalism argue that international law suffers several defects. We shall consider

^Theodore P. Greene, ed., Wilson at Versailles. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1966), p. 97.

53 only five of these shortcomings. Firstly, international law rests on a weak base of institutionalization. Secondly, it is capable of different interpretations: a weakness of ambiguity. Thirdly, it is amorphous and it has limited authority over and among nations.

Fourthly, traditional international law is obsolete and contemporary international law is premature. Fifthly, it tends to perpetuate the status quo, which revisionists wish to overthrow.

Political realists argue that unlike domestic or national law, international law lacks any important institution of self creation, enforcement and revision. E. H. Carr asserts that this and other

’•defects are due, not to any technical shortcoming, but to the embryonic character of the (international) community in which it functions." As a result, the only way to adapt it is to ignore it whenever it runs counter to equitable conduct or contrary to a state’s vital interest.

International law lacks a common standard of application or a common norm of interpretation. For example, during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, the case for the conservatives - the British, the

French, and consequently, Israel - was presented to the world on the legality of a previous treaty. The trio pleaded pacta sunt servanda. On the other hand, the revisionists, the Egyptians

(strongly backed by the Soviet Union) stood on the reverse: clausula rebus sic stantibus, that is, in international law, treaty obligations are binding if the conditions prevailing at the time of the conclusion

------j-— Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, op. cit., p. 178.

54 of the treaty continue to prevail. In other words, international treaties are no longer binding if the conditions precedent to their consummation changed. The Egyptian authorities therefore clung to the- legality of the rights of sovereignty.

But, both doctrines - pact a sunt servanda and clausula rebus sic stantibus - if carried to their logical conclusion and in the absence of a third party, could be reconciled only by the power relationship of the parties to the dispute. There is a vicious circle implied: when the power relationship alters the treaty becomes ineffective, necessitating a new. round or bout of conflict.

It is further argued that, because it lacks any enforcement device, international law is weak. In the same way as international morality is weaker than national morality, b o , the realists contend, is international law weaker than the state law of stable society.

Abba Eben once said 'international law is the law which the wicked 63 do not obey and which the righteous do not enforce.11

One of the reasons for the feebleness of international law is that its sphere of influence can not be easily delimited. For instance, domestic law not only gives regularity and continuity to a society, at the same time, it is also reflective: it is the express­ ion of the social, economic, and political variables in the nation concerned. It is a living creature because (at least theoretically) it constantly accommodates and adjusts to changing circumstances in

^Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations. (London: The Macmillan Company, Limited, 1965), p. 4.

55 the "particular" and "definite" domestic community concerned. But, international law, it is contended, has no solid, definite, or par­ ticular community within which to operate.

A fourth weakness of international law is that states interested in the preservation of the status quo always vigorously assert the inviolability and absoluteness of treaties; however, countries whose interests are adversely affected by a treaty often repudiate it as soon as they are capable of doing so with impunity.

The French policy towards the enforcement of the Treaty of

Versailles and the eventual German revolt crystallizes this obser­ vation. Wolfers writes that "by treaty after treaty, by signature after signature, France sought to chain Germany to the status quo and to make any move of liberation by which she might seek to free herself not merely illegal, but a breach of promise to a larger group of nations," Wolfers continues, that "just aB in legal phraseology one speaks of the limits of legitimate defence, one might be tempted to define the limits of legitimate security."^ Wolfers is saying in effect that the French, in order to pin the Germans down to the status quo, carried their reliance on international law and treaties beyond the limits of marginal utility, if we may borrow a term from economics.

Finally, the realists assert that traditional international law is obsolete and certain principles of contemporary internationl

^Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

56 law are premature. Two, among the most important critics her§, are

Stanley Hoffmann and George F. Kennan.

Kennan argues that changes in the technology of World War I rendered some of the provisions of the maritime law of the time

"obsolete." Nevertheless, President Wilson still explained American participation in the War through the Germans' determination not to restrict submarine warfare especially after having sunk the British liner Lusitania with the loss of more than 1200 lives, including

12S Americans.

According to Kennan, the United States demanded compliance with outmoded international maritime law, the observance of which had become physically impracticable. Indeed, each side felt that

victory and survival depended on the violation of one or another of them. ^

The belligerents in Europe were unwilling to permit any legal abstract­ ions stand in their way in the use of their defensive weapons.

President Wilson had "no alternative but to fight - ironically, for the right to be neutral.

Stanley Hoffmann gives the '.’obsoleteness" thesis a wider per­ spective . He submits that the transformations of the twentieth century are not reflected in traditional internationl law. Therefore, it is obsolete. Among the great changes are diplomacy which now

^Kennan, op. cit.. pp. 57-58.

^Morton Borden, America's Ten Greatest Presidents. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1962) p. 223.

57 embraces the whole world for the first time; multiplicity of major actors has been replaced by bipolarity; empires have collapsed and new nations have emerged; nuclear weapons, limited wars, and guerilla wars now co-exist; the distinction between matters of domestic jurisdiction and those regulated by international law has vanished.

Hoffmann continues, we are now in

"a period of irreconciliable oppositions, ideological clashes, .wars without declaration, armistices with­ out peace, nonbelligerency without war, and aid,to insurgents without recognition of belligerency. '

We might comfortably add the hijacking of commercial planes without actual aerial conflict or land war. Because international law does not reflect these realities, it has offered in Hoffmann*s conclusion, ’'opportunities for disorders" and many of its provisions have been violated.

Hoffmann brings another insight to this discussion. He examines the new rules drawn out of and based on the lessons of the failure of the earlier balance of power system. He declares that these are premature. The Charter of the United Nations is an example. In the Charter’s political framework, it attempts to curb states' freedom to resort to war in the settlement of political disputes. Thus states are forced to be subservient to miles administered by international organization. The efficacy of this formula presupposes a

stable world...not divided by ideological conflict .... (A stable world) in which public opinion and "world parliamentarism" would keep disputes at a reasonably low level.

^Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War, op. cit., p. 110.

^Hoffmann, The State of War, op. cit., p. 113.

58 4. The Theme on International Organization

Several attempts have been made to secure international peace

through international organizations. The Concert of Europe met

several times between 1815 and 1822 to deal with pressing interna­ tional problems. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 established

a Bystem of international relations which was stopped by the First

World War. Inis Claude says that the "Hague System" made a beginn­ ing" significant enough to figure as one of the major contributions of the nineteenth century to present-day world organization."^ The

League of Nations must be added to the unsuccessful trials at achieving international peace through international organizations.

In 1905, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proposed the formation of a "league of peace" to be headed by the British. Notwithstanding the failures of earlier attempts, the concept has not lost its hold on the idealistic liberals. Thus, today, there are the regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, and the

Organization of African Unity; and also global organization such as the United Nations.

It Is rationalized that global organizations would not become part of a system of alliances and counter-alliances. It would, therefore, not split the world into hostile blocs. It would militate against discrimination between different power regions. Universal organizations, the idealists argued, had another advantage over alliances. The latter are often directed against known enemies;

69inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, op. cit., p. 24.

59 the former would be directed against aggressors in general. Therefore,

no state would be provoked.

Writing in 1879, Henry George thought that international organi­

zations would be one of the vehicles of progress. According to him, civilization came to being where men were brought into association

and integration. Association or integration gave rise to a collective power stronger than the sum of individual powers. Geroge compared

society to a boat:

...her progress through water depends upon the exertion devoted by all the crew to propelling her. Her progress is lessened by any expendi­ tures of force in fighting among the crews or in pulling in different directions.

From here the functionalists argued that ‘'regional,11 (that is, geographically limited) and "general" (that is, geographically unlimited) organizations would serve usefully in matters of economic cooperation. Some problems are so large and international that they

could be effectively handled only by global agencies. Others are characteristically local or regional, and could be treated on regional basis.^

The liberals place high value on dialectics, as portrayed in the Socratic dialogues, as a means of attaining moral, ethical, and political truth. In their thinking, "debate" and freedom of speech in international organizations would give the democratic idea a feather of pride.

^°Henry George, op. cit., p. 508.

^ S e e Claude. >5words Into Plowshares, op. cit., p. 95..

60 The theory of collective security, advanced as one more advantage of international organization and associated with President Wilson, originated from various political thinkers. We begin with Gilbert

Murray’s theory of "united strength, and individual weakness." In 1918,

Murray said:

a number of nations which act together can be strong enough to check an aggressor though no one of them alone is so strong as to threaten its neighbors. If two nations be bound by a treaty and one choses to break the treaty, he has only one enemy. But if there are ‘ twelve nations, the offender has eleven enemies.

The other side of the coin of collective security, the Wilsonian version, bears on the postulate of the existence of an interdependent community of nations all sharing one common interest: the maintenance of peace and order. About President Woodrow Wilson, Claude writes:

The world is conceived not as a we-group and a they-group of nations, engaged in competitive power relations, but as an integral we-group in which danger may be posed by "one of us" and must be met by "all the rest of us."73

Moreover, President Wilson believed that the common interest of society had been grossly neglected because of traditional diplomacy with its characteristics of power politics and an inordiante worship of particular interests. Therefore, he said:

the business of government is to organize the common interest against the special interests.

72Bullock and Shock, op. cit., p. 269. 73 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations, op. cit., p. 114.

7^Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, op. cit., p. 255.

61 In President Wilson^ idealism, this was the role of government

in the American domestic scene. However, this duty was not to he

localized} the domestic experience was to be transferred to the

international scene as a potential panacea for the latter1s ailment

of anarchy. America would mediate in Europe because they are

the mediating nation of the world; we (the Americans) are compounded of the nations of the world, we mediate their blood,.., tradi­ tions ..., sentiments..., and passions....We are able to understand ail nations.

In the words of Dehio, "fortunate United States, her generosity born of abundance, would replace domination, oppression, exploitation,

Bolshevism, and colonialism with the spirit of free co-operation.

We have mentioned only a few of the arguments adduced by the political idealists to justify their faith in international organi­ zations to bring peace to the world. However, the realists were not convinced.

Political realists argue that organizations do not always solve or eliminate conflicts.

At best, they are useful as a means of arbitration. International organization aims at minimizing the use of force by states. But, according to the realists, the less a community is held together by cohesive forces in the texture of its life the more it must be held together by power.

The advantages of the Socratic dialogues or the "grand debate" has also been seriously questioned. If the free expression of

^^Wolfers and Martin, op. cit.. p. 266.

^Dehio, op. cit.. p. 273.

62 opinion is allowed, false opinions will find utterance and will mislead many. Indeed, it is argued, one of the most important skills

in politics is the capacity to conceal one’s real position and create

belief in one's bargaining position. Walter Lippmann then adds

that "an unregulated right to speak cannot be maintained. By a kind 77 of Gresham1 s law, the more rational is overcome by the less rational."

Ridiculing the system of free discussion in the defunct League of

\ Nations, Andre Maurois said;

Every year...a great and sacred orator... preaches before the Assembly of nations a solemn sermon on the text of the Covenant. Then the congregation sings its favorite psalms: Psalm 159, Disarmament- Security; Psalm 137, must politics, Gentlemen, have precedence over economics? It is excellent thing for the disbeliever to undergo Church discipline, for ceremonial of any kind lulls to sleep and calms the passions. At Geneva, the art of sayingnothing has almost reached perfection.

Similarly, the idealists’ notion of the existence of a discernible common good and collective security do not gain much hearing among political realists. They contend that in domestic affairs, the common good is not easy to identify or achieve. The observation of Eric Goldmann that "if some groups are dominant in 79 the country, they will be dominant in any plan the government undertakes" is further reinforced by the following comment on the problems of social democracy and the distribution of economic amenities:

^Walter Lippmann, on. cit.. p. 100.

^Cited in David Thomson, Democracy in France (London: Oxford University Press, 194-6), p. 204.

^Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (Vintage edition, 1936), p. 272.

63 Social democracy in practice has meant much more in redistributions toward the deserving middle class and the people who know how to get on the gravy train than it has for the poor who are supposed to be the principal beneficiaries.

Further-more, the realists maintain that international organi­ zations are weak because of the many meanings and uses attached to

•them by different members. Different meanings always result in dissimilar and more often conflicting aims, and policies.

In his remarks on the attitudes of the great powers towards the United Nations Inis Claude stresses the fact that both the

U.S. and the U.S.S.R, turn the Organization from a vehicle of great power collaboration in the leadership of the world toward peace and order as originally conceived into a venue for the waging of cold war political and ideological struggles. He says "they are much more concerned with their fortune within the arena than 81 with the values of the arena itself.

But there is a historical precedent:France, Britain and the

League of Nations. As we said elsewhere, the immediate keynote of

French foreign policy after the First World War was "security," that is, "garanties de securite contre une aggression de l ’Allemagne.

On the other hand, Britain did not want the League to be directed against either Germany or any particular country. However, only after the Germans acquired the air power which could strike Britain

^Kenneth Boulding, "The Many Failures of Success," Saturday Review (November 23, 1968), p. 30.

®^Inis Claude, The Changing United Nations. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 38.

^^Wolfers, on. cit.. p. 11. did British pacifism evaporate. It was then and only then that a harmony of policies among the insular and continental powers emerged.

Nor was collective security ever efficacious, historically.

When Ethiopia was attacked by Italy, it was lamentably found that the threat of economic or financial sanctions would not deter an aggressor. Despite Ethiopia*s grievance and the proven case of

Italy* s open aggradizement, France and Britain did not wish to, and, therefore, did not go too far in applying the sanction against the known culprit: Italy.

Similarly, when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1932, Sir John

Simon, the British Foreign Secretary was quoted as saying that

"Britain did not believe that the League, by strongly applying the economic sanctions, should "seek to start a larger fire in order to 83 put out a smaller one.'* Therefore, Ethiopia and China paid the price.

Almost parallel examples are provided by the United Nations and economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The moral is that in international community, no state gladly convicts or punishes an aggressor or a disturber of the peace who, according to the existing situation, is more likely to be one's potential friend or ally than an immediate enemy or rival. Under such circumstances, commitments to collective actions are no more than lip service or redherrings.

We shall return to elaborate on this issue when we discuss the United Nations and sactions against disturbers of the peace.

— Sir John Simon, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates. Vol. 283, Col. 439, (November 24, 19337.

65 SnmniftTV

In recapitulation, we have, in the preceding pages, taken a quick look at the objections raised by the political realists against the idealistic liberals' themes on peaceful change, international law, and international organization. The realists, in effect, are saying that the contemporary structure of the global system no longer corresponds to models derived from or used in classical diplomacy.

Obviously, an international system that is now dominated by the two giant nuclear powers and a moralistic third world can no longer be adequately diagnosed with the tools of nineteenth century

European system of states. According to Carr, in the past, Roman and British imperialism were commended to the world in the guise of the pax Romana and the pax Britannica. Today, however, when no single power is strong enought to dominate the world, and supremacy is vested in a group of two nations, old principles, and modes of behavior among states are obsolete precisely because they reflect a dead system.

Great Britain imported democratic liberalism into Nigeria. It is the purpose of this dissertation to show, in the face of frantic denial, that Anglo-American liberalism continued to influence and, indeed, dominated Nigerian foreign and domestic policies even after the granting of sovereignty had enabled her to direct internal and external policies as she pleased.

66 However, to understand Nigerian foreign policy, we mast understand more than Anglo-American liberalism, the dominant factor. Any attempt to isolate or severe foreign policy from its social and internal context mast invariably distort or do violence to it. Therefore, before preceding to test our hypothesis of the dominance of liberalism in the country's external behavior, we must consider the domestic sources

of its foreign policy, that is, we shall, in the next chapter, isolate

the many internal variables which, in one way or another, added

significant inputs into foreign policy decision making. In this way, we hope to avoid the predicaments of the wayside bicycle repairer.

He painted one of the several spokes in his bicycle's wheel green

and yellow because, he thought, it was that single spoke that kept the others rotating. Of course, the distinguished spoke joined the others in rotation.

67 > ;y'i'

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68 CHAPTER III

INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In our last conclusion, we stressed that foreign policy had

several dimensions. On February 20, 1961, Dean Rusk, the then

American Secretary of State, made an informal remark to the State

Department’s policy-making officers. He described the variables

shaping and influencing foreign policy as "a galaxy of utterly complicated factors - political, military, economic, financial, legal, legislative, procedural, administrative - to be sorted out and handled within a political system which moves by consent in relation to an external environment which cannot be under control,”^

In other words, In addition to external factors which are largely outside the control of a government, there are a number of forces at work within a society which shape, influence and contribute to the quality and contents of its external response. In Nigeria, as in most African countries, the most Important of these factors are cultural - tribal, linguistic, and religious - factors, and the structural patterns of political parties, and the domestic economy.

We begin with a cultural factor: tribes in Nigeria.

%.S. Congress, Sub-Committee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Administration of National Security. (Washington, D .C.: Government Printing Press, 1962), p. 23. A. The Nigerians and Their Cultures: The Tribes.*

As shown in the map below (Map II), the three dominant lin­ guistic groups in the country commonly referred to as "tribes" are the Muslim Hausas inhabiting the Northern Region j the Torubas in­ habiting the Western Region and the Ibos living in the Eastern

Region. There are also a great number of other tribes too numerous to identify.

Ctae major characteristic of the tribes in Africa is that they are impermeable. The various tribes religiously maintain their separate and distinctive identities. One can not become part of a tribe in Nigeria; one is born into it. One can settle in a village and become part of the community, but one can not become a part of the specific tribe that owns it. Most Nigerians (and, on a broader perspective, most Africans) are part of social groups that anthropologists call descent groups or lineage. A lineage consists of persons related by descent through one of their parents. If descent is traced via the father it is patrilineal, if through the mother, matrilineal.

Beyond the immediate family circle is the extended family.

Lineage membership carries with it certain traditional rights and responsibilities. Each has property rights: land, cattle, a

#The greater part of the discussion on "The Nigerians and their Cultures," is taken from the substance of lectures on Cultural Area Analysis of Africa delivered by Professor Absolom Vilakazi in the Fall 1967 and the Spring of 1968 semesters, re­ spectively. However, this student is responsible for any mis­ interpretation .

70 V

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f y

o O

h Q

f- 71 r

A share In a business, etc... On the other hand, lineage kins are expected to support one; another in obtaining compensation or redress for wrongs or injuries inflicted by exogenous parties. The collec­ tive security of all is the responsibility of each.

A functional definition of a descent group, therefore, is an arrangement of persons that serves the attainment of legitimate social and personal ends. Politics has become the most important of these ends. In subsequent pages, we shall produce evidence of close correlation between the structure of tribes and the develop­ ment of political parties in Nigeria.

Several observers (and even Nigerians themselves) often refer to Britain as the architect of Nigeria. Chief Awolowo, the Yoruba political leader, once said:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geogra­ phical expression..., a distinctive appella­ tion to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those iho do not.

Chief Akintola, another (late) Yoruba leader also said that ’'Britain

...has been able to weld together a number of peoples who perhaps otherwise would have remained to this day as warring tribal groups."^

Indeed, in those early years of colonialism, there were many weldersj welding was not coordinated; therefore, the final products were haphazard. For example, the Republic of Dahomey, Nigeria’s western neighbor, is largely populated by Yoruba-speaking people:

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom. (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 194-7), pp. 47-53.

^Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, The Political Awakening of Africa. (New Jersey: Printice-Hall, Inc., 1965) p. 61.

72 the same tribe as the Yorubas in Western Nigeria. It is always a joke (a reality anyhow) that the military force in Dahomey is on loan from Nigeria: over fifty-percent of Dahomey's military men are

Yorubas. Similarly, the Republic of Niger, Nigeria's northern neighbor is inhabited by Hausas, the same tribal group with the Hausas of Northern Nigeria.

This tribal heterogeity has not threatened Nigeria's external relations with her immediate northern and western neighbors. No Fan-

Yoruba or Pan-Hausa emotion has occurred since independence. There are three major reasons for this. In the first place, the neat com- partmentalization of Africa which resulted from the Berlin Conference of 1885, separated these tribes economically (diversties of money and currency), culturally (diversities in the languages of metropolitan countries), and institutionally (governmental and legal systems), to mention only a few.

Secondly, the states themselves, accept the division. For instance, in a major foreign policy statement in the General Assembly immediately after the attainment of Independence in I960, the Nigerian

Prime Minister said that his country had "absolutely no territorial or expansionist intentions."^ Indeed, when Morocco wanted to appro­ priate Mauritania in 1961, the Nigerian Foreign Minister said:

^United Nations, General Assembly. Official Record. Fif­ teenth Session (Plenary Meeting), October i960 . I am not happy to find one African state raising a question of boundary dispute with another state. We know that the imperialists Powers divided Africa arti­ ficially, let us leave the boundaries as they are.5

Thirdly, Niger and Dahomey have not collectively or individually raised any territorial ambitions against Nigeria.

B. Nigerians and Their Cultures; Religions

Christianity and Islam coexist relatively amicably in Nigeria.

West European missionaries, the spreaders of the gospel of Christ, penetrated Southern Nigeria from the Atlantic Ocean. Mohammedanism

came down from the Mediterranean across the Sahara Desert into

Northern Nigeria,

There Is not a clean dichotomy of Christian South or Muslim

North. Each area possesses a hybrid of Christians and Muslims.

Nonetheless, as could be observed from Table I below, there are more

Christians in the South than in the North, and more Muslims in the

North than in the South.*

Table 1

NIGERIA; DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO RELIGION ~(1963 Census)

Region

North 2,881,4-37(9.7#) 21,386,450(71.7#) 5,540,773(18.6#) West* 4-, 995,691 (-48.7#) 4,458,531(43.4#) 811,625( 7.9#) East* 9,573,622(77.2#) 29,964( 9.3#) 2,790,876(22.5#) Lagos* 363,384(54.6#) 294,694(44.3#) 7,l68( 1.1#) Mid-West* 1,393,009(54-9#) 106,857( 4.2#) 1,035,973(40.0#) Source; Federal (Nigerian)"Ministry of Information. Unity in Diversity." (Lagosj Nigeria: Times Press Ltd., 1967) p. 3.

*Throughout this study, the Eastern, Western, Mid-Western Regions of Nigeria and Lagos the nation's Capital are grouped together and refered to as the South (of Nigeria).

74 Religions link Nigeria to the external world and therefore

become an input factor in the Nigerian foreign policy. Almost one

half of the country's population is Muslim. Each ’year, a sizeable number of Nigerians make the pilgrimmage to the holy land: Mecca in

Saudi Arabia - a reason reason why the Nigerian authorities have

established and developed close diplomatic relations with Saudi

Arabia and the Republic of Sudan,

Happily, the powerful sentimentalism of Muslim brotherhood which

characterizes North Africa and the Middle East is conspicuously absent

in Nigeria. Therefore, no strong movements have been made by Nigerian

Muslims to join the Pan-Arab or Pan-Islam crusade. Of course, on one

or two occasions, the (late) Northern Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, made

statements to the effect that Northern Nigerian Muslims would join

the bandwagon of the Mohammedans North of the Sahara Desert. Such

statements were for domestic consuptionj they were political. It is

the North's usual way of resisting Southern domination. On the other hand, it is a force of cohesion: it keeps the Muslim Notth an inte­

grated unit.

We shall continue our discussion of internal factors in

Nigerian foreign policy by reviewing very briefly constitutional

developments in Nigeria.

B. The Peaceful Change from Dependence to Independence

This student submits that the movements involved in the political

and constitutional developments in Nigeria and, especially the trans­

ition from a dependent to an independent nation, were evolutionary,

75 gradual and peaceful. Therefore, they carried the trade-mark of liberalism famous for its inordiante obsession with parliamentary procedures.

The transplantation of liberalism into British colonies around the globe in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was not very much dissimilar to the natural phenomenon one observes in the botanical world. Those seeds which after fruition, do not fall directly under the parent stem are conveyed to other grounds perhaps by wind or sometimes by birds or other natural agents where they germinate, develop new seeds which, in their turn, are carried either far away or to surrounding soils; then the process begins all over again. In the words of J. L. Hammond,

Great Britain acts as the right hand of Providence in regenerating the world, and no technical ob­ stacles must be allowed to interfere with her mission of carrying from continent to continent , the energies of a just and sublime civilization.

An aspect of the sublime civilization imported into Nigeria by

Britain was democratic liberalism. Broadly conceptualized, the making of Nigeria is similar to the building of a brick edifice: bricks are successively laid on one another and welded together by either cement or some form of matter. After much experimentations, a moderately clear picture of Nigeria as an administrative unit became discernible at about the beginning of this century.

In 1900, the Royal Niger Company handed over to the British

Government the administration of the Muslim North which was renamed

^Bullock and Shock, op. cit.. p. 233.

76 (the Colony and Protectorate of) Southern Nigeria. Finally, on January 1,

1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated into one and designated Nigeria.

Each of the three units - the Colony of Lagos, the Northern and the Southern Protectorates - was headed by a Lieutenant-Governor but the whole country was under the suprintendence of a Governor-General.

Roughly demarcated, the path to independence had five stages.

We have already described 1900 to 1914 as a period of consolidation.

The second phase, 1914-1946, was devoted to the development of political institutions: democratic and parliamentary institutions. In the third phase, a Constitution - the Richards' Constitution - was intro­ duced and it became effective on January 1, 1947. Irrespective of the opposition that greeted the document, it was unique in two (among several) ways. Firstly, it introduced the concept of regionalism into

Nigeriaj regionalism delineated the final structure of the country.

Secondly, it gave a chart of progress to the nationalists. Progress was conceived to be a perpetual process oriented towards eventual political emancipation.

With the crystallization of the structure of the country -

Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions, respectively, all forming the constituent parts of the Federation of Nigeria - the fourth step was taken between 1957 and 1959. On August 8, 1957, self-government status was granted to the Western and Eastern Regions, that is, the South, but not to the North.

77 Speaking on the issue of self-government for the North, Tafawa

Balewa, (then the Minister of Transport) thought the Southerners were rushing things. He said that while his Region would not oppose the idea of self-government, the North was not ripe enough for any autonomy.

Prophetically, he said "anything done in a rush and without careful 7 preparation is bound to break into pieces." Because of this the North had to wait until 1959. In March that year, it became self-governing.

The last stage in the British experiment was the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1, I960.

Although all these stages were conceived and supervised by

Britain, they were achieved only after extensive bilateral negotia­ tions and discussions between Nigerian nationalists and the repre­ sentatives of the British Monarch at what were known as Constitutional

Conferences held alternatively in Lagos, the Nigerian Capital, and

London.

The entire procedures won internal legitimacy in Nigeria because they were supported by Nigerian leaders. Dr. Azikiwe, the spokesman for the dominant Ibo tribe of Eastern Region, supported an independent

Nigeria with democratic institutions. He said:

Democracy is the goal of progressive humanity and indigenous political philosophy of Nigeria is essentially democratic.

The northerner and the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Alhaji#

Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa, embraced democracy for the country.

Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates Official Report. Vol. II, Session 1957-58, pp. 728-741.

%namdi Azikiwe, Political Blueprint of Nigeria. (Lagos, Nigeria: African Book Co., Ltd., 1943), pp. 8-64. #A title of respect used before a proper noun to designate

78 On January 13, I960, the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, visited Nigeria. This was part of his tour of Africa, in the course of which he embarrassed the South African advocates of apartheid with his celebrated speech on the "wind of change’' blowing through the great Continent of Africa.

Welcoming the British Head of State to the Nigerian House of Representatives, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa said*

Our procedure in this House is modelled, as Mr. Macmillan will have seen, on that of the House of Commons... .We can justly claim to have captured the spirit as well as the letter of the parliamentary system. expressing his abhorrence of revolutionary states, the Nigerian

Prime Minister continued:

.. .we have been very sorry to see that in some newly independent countries, after a few years of parliamentary democracy,.. .power has been seized by one section of the country. 10

Obviously, the Nigerian Prime Minister was chiding neighboring

Ghana for the revolutionary tendencies practised by President Nkrumah.

Chief Awolowo, leader of the Yorubas, the Western tribe, though happy with parliamentary procedures, expressed some reservation about the future success of the Federation. Chief Awolowo had contended that Nigeria should have been broken into eighteen Regions or States

(all along ethnic and linguistic lines) instead of three. a Muslim who has visited Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Muhammed and the spiritual center of Islam.

9Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "On maintaining Parlia­ mentary Democracy," in Sam Epelle, Nigeria Speak3. (Lagos, Nigeria: Longmans, 1964), p. 39 J-Ojbid.. p. 39.

79 In recapitulation, Nigeria gained independence from Britain in a peaceful, gradual, and evolutionary manner. After independence, she retained the democratic and parliamentary principles. Having been validated by the history of political development in their own country, Nigerians transferred their "personal" image, a domestic experience of conservatism, to the international scene and insisted that, in non-governing states, the transition to independence should be gradual and not unreasonably hasty or detrimentally fast; it

should be peaceful not violent; independent states should, above all, conduct themselves with "responsibility" and not display "irresponsi­ bility."

When we discuss the United Nations, decolonization, and the

general problem of change on the international arena, we shall cite

empirical cases to support the inference that the sentiment of peace­ ful change became an explicit doctrine of foreign policy decision makers in the country. Let us add another dimension to our statistics of factors that affected Nigerian foreign policy: Nigerian political parties.

Political Parties and Foreign Policy in Nigeria

From I960, the year of independence, to January 1966, when the

civilian government of the Federation of Nigeria was overthrown by a military coup, political parties in the country corresponded to what

Ruth Schachter calls "patron" parties in contradistinction to "mass” parties. According to Schachter, the patron party is made up of a

80 core of traditional leader a and notables in a district. The mass

party on the other hand, is a national party that reaches (at least

theoretically) into all villages, towns, and cities.^

As we observed earlier, the three major tribes in Nigeria are

the Hausas in the North, the Yorubas in the West and the Ibos in

the East. As can be observed from table 2 below, each of these tribes

numbers more than seven million. Each is large enough and therefore

represented the dominant group which formed the base for one of the

three Nigerian political parties.

Table 2

roDUJ.)anon 01 uominann Trices in Nigeria 1m1.Li.10nj North East West and Mid-West

Population of Region 29.8 12.4 10.3 2.5

Dominant Tribe in Hausa/ Region Fulani Ibo Yoruba I jaw and Edo

Population of Dominant 0.9 (Ijaw) Tribe 13.6 7.8 10.3 0.9 (Edo )

Sources: Nigeria; The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race, by F. A. 0. Schwarz., Jr., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 140-141. Obafemi Awolowo', Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution, (Ibandan, Nigeria, Oxford University Press,1966) p. 2 4 . Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge: the Cambridge: the Cambridge University Press, 1964) pp. 2-3.

U Ruth Schachter and Thomas Hodgkin, "French-Speaking West Africa in Transition,11 International Conciliation. 1959**1960, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I960), No. 528, p. 418. See also Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (London: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 68-75.

81 In the North, the political party was the Northern People' s

Congress, (NPC)j the party in the West was the Action Group (AG); and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East.

Although surrounded by a cluster of several other ethnic minority tribes and sub-tribes, the dominant tribes controlled the political parties in their respective regional spheres of influence.

This triangularity - the political - cultural-regional features - was the main reason for the introduction of Federation into Nigeria.

As an authoritarian, radical regime on Nkrumahist lines would hardly have been practicable in so diverse a country, hardly anyone suggested it.

The dominant tribes in the South - Ibo and Yoruba - had between them the: most educated men in the country; ironically, they shared the most irreconcilible rivalry. None of their leaders had nation­ wide support. Broadly viewed, some of them had no national spirit.

For instance, on an Ibo Union's Day celebration in 1949, Dr. Azikiwe, the Ibo tribesmen leader, said:

it would appear that the God of Africa has created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages. The Ibo nation cannot shirk its_responsibility from its manifest destiny.

Sir Adeyemo Alakija dismissed such statement as ethnocentric.

On behalf of the Yorubas, his own tribesmen (and ironically committing the same sin of ethnocentricity), he replied:

Kalu Ezera, op. cit.. p. 91.

82 It is a big tomorrow for our (Yoruba) children. The Yorubas will not be relegated to the back­ ground in the future.

So bitter was the Yoruba-Ibo inter-tribal feud that, according to Kalu Ezera, both sides "threatened to end it with violence by- buying up all available matchets (cutlasses) in the local shops 1/ and markets."

From I960 to 1966, the Federal Government was a coalition of the Conservative Party of the North, the NPC, and one of the radical parties of the South, the NCNC. The history behind the coalition is significant for the ensuing pattern of national politics and foreign policy.

In December, 1959, a general election was held throughout the country. In the election campaign, each outlined its foreign policy.

Awo (nickname for Awolowo, Premier of the West) strongly favored alignment with the Western Powers. He said that any sort of neutralism in African foreign policy was:

an unmitigated disservice to humanity.. .no more and no less than the projection, of the deep- seated prejudices which those nations (e.g. Ghana, Guinea and Mali) have had towards some of the countries of the Western democracies.

On the other hand, the NCNC of Eastern Region, put forward a policy of non-alignment with any power bloc. The NPC of the North

-^Kalu Ezera, op. cit.. pp. 82-104.

•^ibid.. p. 93.

■^Obafemi Awolowo, AWO: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. (New York: Cambridge University Press, I960), p. 310.

83 made and gave no foreign policy statement. It simply promised

"justice and progress for all." However, there was no doubt that

it was more conservative and more pro-Western than even the AG of

the Western Region.

Following the election results, no single party won enough

seats to form a government, but the NPC of the North won the

largest number of seats; it then had the choice to form a coalition

government with either the AG or the NCNC. The Northern party NPC

chose to coalesce with the NCNC, the Eastern party. James Coleman

wondered why and what precipitated the coalition of

the aristocratic, conservative, gradualist, pro- British, Northern People's Congress and the egalitarian, radical, impatiently, nationalist anti-British National Council of Nigerian Citizens.

No doubt, had foreign policy been the main campaign issue, the more likely coalition should have been NPC and the AG. Both were

preponderantly pro-Western as opposed to the neutralist NCNC. More­

over, all Muslims in the country are either Westerners or Northerners.

No Easterner, that is, no Iboman is a Muslim. Domestic issues and

the stand of each party on the issues shaped the pattern of the

ensuing alliance.

During the election campaign, the stand of the Western Region,

and its leader Chief Awolowo, was made clear: creation of new States

^James S. Coleman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., Foreign Policy in a World of Change, (New York: Harper and Row., 1963), pp. 363-364-.

84 (eighteen to be precise) or Regions out of the existing three, all

along tribal, linguistic and ethnic lines. The Action Group Party maintained that an undivided Northern Region with more than half the

population and about seventyfive per cent the land area of the country

was an unhealthy state of things for any federal system. Chief Awolowo

repeatedly quoted John S. Mill who warned of Imbalance in federal

structure. Mill wrote that in order to avoid fear of domination and

insure feelings of equality in a federation,

there should not be any one State so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. '

But the North was relatively behind the South in nearly every­

thing, especially in education and political development. The only

real security it had was its disproportional size and population.

A divided North, the NPC conceived, would be deprived of the only

security it had against Southern supremacy.

The AG party went farther. By promising self-determination

within the Federation of Nigeria to minority tribes in all regions

(if it won the election), It was able to win twentyfive out of the

one hundred and seventy-four seats allocated to the North (out of a

total of three hundred and twelve seats in the House of Representatives),

It thereby deprived the North of the possibility of winning the

necessary majority seats which would have permitted it to form the

government all alone. In the South, the AG also snatched fourteen

*^J. S. Mill, Representative Government, (Everyman edition), pp. 367-368.

85 seats from the Eastern Region by tantalizing the minority tribes in that Region with the same offer of self-determination within the

Federation of Nigeria after the creation of more States.

The NCNC of Eastern Region remained silent. Bat it watched the coming and going of the Action Group with great anxiety. It proposed no creation of new States. And if any new States were to be created, it would not be in the East: its territorial jurisdiction. The NCNC made no significant political excursion into the North during the campaign and therefore deprived that Region of no electoral seats.

Moreover, it was the political rival of the AG.

Therefore, both the Northern party, the NPC, and the Eastern party, the NCNC, at last, had something in common: a joint hatred for the third party, the Action Group. This explains (though only partly) why the NPC picked the NCNC for the coalition. In subse­ quent pages, we shall see why several observers called the consortium an "unholy alliance.11

In broad terms, two main political groups could be concep­ tualized in Nigeria during the period under discussion: the southern radicals and the northern conservatives. Their respective - push and pull - impacts on foreign policy are probed below.

Southern Radicalism and Northern Conservatism

The relevance of the word "push" and its antonym "pull" used below hinges on the fact that in Nigeria, during the period covered by this study, there existed certain domestic and foreign issues, and situations towards which, on the one hand, the southern radicals were

86 pushing Nigeria and, on the other hand, away from which the northern conservatives were pulling the country. Outstanding examples of such issues (which we shall shortly explore below) were nationalism and self-determination, that is, independence from colonial domination.

The second was neutralism in foreign affairs, especially in the East-

West ideological conflict. Then there was the southern radicals* push aimed at dislodging the country from the West (London and Washington) and reorientating it towards Moscow countered by the northern conser­ vatives' who were obdurately pulling the country back to the Western camp. We begin with the push of Southern radicalism.

The Push of Southern Radicalism

The radicals of the South were in three groups. Firstly, there were those NONC Members of Parliament who, even though their party was in the coalition government, refused to be tamed or bullied into silence or compliance with the government's pro-Western foreign policy just because they were a part of the government.* Then there were the Action Group party's Members of Parliament who, not forming a part of the coalition, became the official opposition. But these never behaved like the traditional "loyal" Opposition. They were led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo who, having lost the bid for the Office

#We indicated earlier that the NCNC proposed a foreign policy based on neutralism. The radicals among them who, having succeeded at the election, never bowed to the government's pro- Western position; rather, they continiied to espouse neutralism.

87 of the Prime Minister at the election, became Opposition Leader.**

The third group is not easy to define. Those in this group were outside the Federal Parliament; nevertheless, they pulled a tough cord; they joined strength with radical Members of Parliament.

Prominent in this class of recalcitrants were the trade unions and the students’ unions. In Nigeria (as true in many developing countries), there are legions of unemployed, job-seeking school leavers, and university students. Commenting on them, Walter Schwarz says that they

have long provided permanent recruiting material for the private armies of thugs retained by politicians. In Port Harcourt during the General Strike in 1964, most of the demonstrators and pickets were ’applicants' (i.e. unemployed) - a remarkable episode in the history of strikes.13

However, themost vocal, most dynamic, and most virulent

Southern radical movement was the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC) founded in I960. The main target of NYC was the Western bloc. In the con­ ception of NYC, all expatriates (i.e. foreigners) in Nigeria - the

Peace Corps, the Representatives of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Western European visitors, and all - were agents of neo-colonialism.

**We have observed that Chief Awolowo, before and during the election campaign, had presented a pro-Western foreign policy. After the election (which was apparently unfavorable to him), he switched and became an anti-Western radical. The reversal of position was one of the major causes of the rift within the AG party in the Western Region from about the time the country became independent. An intra-party squabble developed. The upshot of thein-fighting was the dissolution of the Western House of Assembly controlled by the party, the suspension of all consti­ tutional processes, and the imposition of a state of emergency in the Region by the Federal Government, which action further led to resistance by the advocates of State’s rights.

13Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 24 .

88 At its first annual meeting in 1961, it elected the extremist,

Dr. Tunji Otegbeye as President. Dr. Otegbeye (a medical doctor)

immediately advocated nationalization of all oil companies and foreign

(mainly West European) businesses and commercial firm?.

This statement embarrassed the Federal Government. Indirectly

responding to Dr. Otegbeye's pronouncements, the (late) Chief Okotie-

Eboh, the Minister of Finance, said

The fact that one bearded man in Lagos rises up and preaches nationalization and communism does not mean that the people in the North, East, and West are going to accept it.1*?

Another fly contaminated the oitment when in the same November

of 1961, Chief Awolowo, the Opposition Leader, proposed a motion in

the House of Representatives. He moved

that this House approves in principle the nationa­ lization of basic industries and commerical under­ takings gf vital importance to the economy of Nigeria.

Chief Awolowo argued that "nationalization was an indispensable tool of socialism. Nationalization would eliminate the vices of

capitalism. With nationalization, foreigners would no longer own the people's instruments of production. It is said that only "sixty families control and rule America's dollar empire." Perhaps the

Chief would have liked to add that yet there were over two hundred million people in the United States. The vice of capitalism, the

Chief continued, was the unreasonable promotion of "self-interest."

■^Chief Qkotie-Eboh, House of Representatives Debates. November 17, 1961, p. 19.

^Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) p. 110. Therefore, he said, that under nationalization, the interests of all would be promoted. The "harsh, remorseless, impersonal and outdated mechanism of supply and demand would not guide the distribution of 21 political amenities and economic rewards."

The Minister of Finance was forced to state and defend the

Government's position by putting forward a counter motion (which won by an overwhelming majority):

That this House...deplores irresponsible statements on nationalization which have recently been made in Nigeria and overseas.2^

When we come to discuss Nigeria in the United Nations, we shall see how the Nigerian Foreign Minister continued to restate and defend Nigerian Government's non-nationalization stand.

In April, I960, some radicals in the NCNC party called upon the Prime Minister to set up a separate Ministry to handle Pan-

African affairs. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was never an admirer of Pan-Africanism as a political movement. He rejected the sugges­ tion but added an African Division to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Later on, we shall see that he preferred

"human dignity" and "human personality" to any specific "Nigerian" or "African" dignity or personality.

However, in May 1961, he appointed Dr; K. 0. Mbadiwe (a radical nationalist) personal Adviser on African Affairs. Several observers

21ibid., pp. 110-111.

22ibid.

90 viewed the appointment as thoughtful. The Economist said the appoint­ ment was the ” shrewdest domestic politicals .move” because the Prime

Minister could then be nlistening to the extreme nationalists with- 23 out needing to take their advice.

In August, 1961, Dr. Mbadiwe encouraged the first nAll-Nigerian

People’s Conference in Lagos. The Conference discussed RNigeria’s

Hole in African Affairs.*1

At the Conference, Ghana was lauded as the hero and the champion of freedom in Africa. The Federal Government of Nigeria and the

Prime Minister were called stooges of imperialism and enemies of

African unity. A student from the University of Nigeria at Nsukka said nI would prefer to be a prisoner in Ghana than to be a free O/ citizen in this country.” Another delegate said "everyone is

Impressed by Mr. Nkrumah of Ghana because he shows he is militant. 25 So, Sir, we want our Federal Government to show they are militant.”

How this militancy could be demonstrated, the delegate did not suggest.

Others denounced the association of Nigeria with the moderate French

African States rather than with the militant States of Guinea, Mali, and Ghana.

In the end, the Conference came up with several recommendations aimed at dragging Nigeria out of the Western camp and thereby decorticate it of much of itB liberal influence.

2% h e Economist. (June 17, 1961), p. 12A0.

^Claude S. Phillips, Jr., op. clt.. pp. 56-57.

25ibid.

91 Regarding Africa, it was recommended that the Government should grant asylum to nationalists fighting for freedom in other parts of

Africa. The Algerian Provisional Government should be accorded full recognition. An African Common Market should be formed and Nigeria should have nothing to do with the European Economic Community.

The Nigerian Government should rid itself of "Communist-witch- hunting0 by throwing its door wide ajar to the Communists. The ban on the importation of Communist literature should be lifted. Communist professors, lecturers, and academicians should be permitted to teach in

Nigeria. No Nigerian wishing to travel to or study in Communist states should be denied passports. Mr. Nkrumah and Mr. Khrushchev should be invited to Nigeria. Nigeria should recognize and at the same time establish diplomatic relations with East Germany. Above all, the Soviet Union should have identical diplomatic privileges with those granted to the United Kingdom and the United States.*

Regarding the West, the volume of news and information on the

United States and the United Kingdom on Nigerian radios was too much.

It should be drastically trimmed down. All agents of neo-colonialism should be denied entry into Nigeria, especially those penetrating in the guise of participation in International Conferences.** The

*This is justified; USSR's diplomatic Mission in Nigeria was limited to 10 Diplomats; other Embassies endured no such restriction. The U.K. and USA each had 100 diplomatic car plates; only 5 were allocated to the USSR. Phillips, ou. cit.. p. 58.

**Such as the Conference of American Diplomats held in Nigeria in 1961.

92 penetration and movements of those pretending to be the friends of 26 Nigeria should be closely scrutinized.

So profund was the Southern radicals* anti-British and anti-

American feeling that no opportunity of venting it was neglected.

In 1962, .Ambassador J. M. Udoohl, the Nigerian Ambassador to the

United States in Washington, named his son "John”. Probably thinking that he was extending the conventional ndiplomaticn cordial relations among states into areas of personal relations and sentimental ism, he explained that he named his son after the American Presdient, John F.

Kennedy. On April 14, 1962, in the Nigerian House of Representatives, a member of the Opposition charged that the Nigerian Ambassador had become a staff member of the U.S. State Department, "the proof being 27 that he had named his son "John" after President Kennedy."

The sources and varieties of radicalism in the South were too numerous to enumerate. Now and then ad hoc groups would spring up around an issue, an idea, or a particular leader. As with other influence or pressure groups, they desired to change or influence the government's foreign policy.

However, resentment of the Western bloc was not strange. One wonders if there was any novelty in Chief Awolowo*s condemnation of the capitalist's reliance on the "impersonal" parametric functions of

26por full account of the recommendations of the All- Nigeria People's Conference, see Phillips, o p . olt.. pp.54-62.

^House of Representatives Debates, (April 14> 1962) p. 22. See also Claude, op. clt.. p. 101.

93 supply and demand In the determination of price and, consequently, the distribution of economic amenities in a society.* Condemning the free,

democratic and relatively prosperous America, J. S. Mill once said

that "the life of the whole of one sex is devoted to dollar-hunting Og and of the other to breeding dollar-hunters.n

Or, consider Henry George's dissection of (private) landowners.

He said that the land-owners exploited the laboring group, thereby

received economic rewards "without producing;" while the producers,

the laborers, produced "without receiving; the one is unnflustly 29 enriched; the others are robbed," Similarly, in 1909, David Lloyd

George questioned: "who made ten thousand people owners of the soil,

and the rest of us trespassers in the land of our birth?" He con­ tinued, "Landlordism is the greatest of all monopolies in this land."^

Summary

We shall end our discussion on Southern radicalism by making

a preliminary observation. Attacks on Government by radical groups inside and outside government strengthens our proposition of the liberals' influence on Nigerian foreign (and domestic) policy. It is the misfortune, as well as it is the glory of liberalism, that it is

#This is a direct attack on the harmonic liberal, David Ricardo, who said "the market price of labor is the price which is really paid for it from the natural operation of the proportion of the supply to the demand. David Ricardo, The Principles of Politi­ cal Economy and Taxation (2nd. edn., London, 1819), see especially chapter 7 "On Wages,"

^G. Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists, (Mentor Book, 1952), p. 93. ^^Henry George, on. cit.. pp. 341-342. ^Bullock and Shook, on. olt.. p.200 and p.220, respectively.

94 required to tolerate the vocalization of several conflicting opinions within its political jurisdiction. This remindB us of our earlier statement that England has one government but five policies.

Discussion and criticism of government’s foreign policy was open in Nigeria. Freedom of the press and of speech were neither suppressed nor strangled anywhere in the country. Indeed, the

Nigerian press has been widely praised all over the world (if perhaps not so muoh for its quality, then at least) for itB openness.

Schwartz says:

its freedom, variety and liveliness have long been the envy of other African countries who have had, at best, a competently assembled government sheet and, at worst, the muzzled press of Nkrumah.

We shall now consider the damping influence of Northern con­ servatism on Nigerian foreign policy.

The Pull of Northern Conservatives

In earlier discussion we noted the reluctance of the NPC

(Northern People’s Congress) to demand self-governing status for the

Northern Region at the same time the Southern Regions demanded and were granted self-government. At that time, the Northern spokesman,

Alhaji Tafawa Balewa said that wanything done in a rush and without careful preparation is bound to break into pieces.11 Therefore, selfgovernment came to the radical South first and then to the gradualist Northern territory.

In 19-47? Chief Avolowo wrote that the Hausas and Fulanis of the North ”are extremely conservative, and take very reluctantly

^Saerson and RQson, op. oit.. p. 62.

95 to Western civilization. Inspite of their lower cultural background, the

Ibos would certainly qualify for self-government, long before the

Hausas."3^ A decade after thiB statement was made, the situation that warranted it had not changed Bignificantly. The Northern leader fllhaji Tafawa Balewa reluctantly confirmed it. In a House of Repre­ sentatives debate in 1957, he said:

Now in the field of Western education, the South is farther ahead of the North and let us admit that whatever efforts the North may make, it will take some years before we can hope to reach parity with the South. We hope that the people of the South should exercise a little patienoe to give us time to catch up.

The uneven political development of the North and the South has to do with the.'history of the colonization of the country.

Being geographically situated on the Atlantic Ocean, the South was the first port of entry of tie British and, consequently, Western civilization.

At a time when sehoolB and missionary activities were flourish­ ing in the South, Islam, the traditional education and civilization of the Muslims, virtually dominated the entire North, The British

Government, through its colonial policy, did not encourage the two

(Christianity and Islam) civilizations to meet.

Northerners were extremely fanatical about Islam. They had no tolerance for infidels. Therefore, the British could have been oharged with willful contamination of the purity of Muslim

^Eaerson and Kilson, on. oit.. p, 62.

33ibid.. p. 70.

96 civilization had they promoted a hasty exourBlon or penetration of

Christianity into the North.

After the Second World War, the situation changed tremendously.

The 'North was opened to the flood of missionary educational activi­ ties. Nevertheless, improvement was not achieved overnight. In 1957,

Alhaji Tafawa Balewa said:

Mr. Speaker, people often forget that the people of Southern Nigeria came to be associated with the British pattern of legislative assembly about 1922. But we from the North have only come to be associated with such a body in 1947. ^

In other words, the South had almost a quarter of a century’s lead in the art and practice of parliamentary, democratic, and constitutional government.

Northern conservationism could also be seen as partly a resis­ tance to the erosion of Muslim feudal tradition caused by contact with the South. For Instance, in the big Northern cities, indige­ nous Muslims live in "Birai” - a large walled settlement. Others from the South, mainly Christians, live in "Sabuwan gari," meaning new settlement for strangers.

Northern women are barred by religion and local feudal tradi­ tion from voting or participating in elections. As a matter of fact, it is undlgnifying andnot a sign of respectability for the wife of a good Mulsim to be seen in public in daytime. They night-shop.

Therefore, in the Northern cities, night markets are rife.

% M d . . p. 71.

97 It may be tentatively suggested that piety to religion, feudal tradition, and the slow development of education are responsible for the conservative nature of the North. Writing in 1968, Schwarz has said that

this backwardness has been especially marked in the North where it is still reinforced by Mo slim feeling. Few episodes more forcefully illustrated it than the marriage of the Federal Prime Minister^ daughter in 1963 at the age of thirteen. Since then, the North has produced its first woman lawyer. In the South, women have invaded all the professions.-**

Before I960, nearly all civil servants in the Southern Regions were Nigerians. But administration in the North continued to lean heavily on non-natives, mainly Britons. The lingering presence of the British in Northern Rgion*s essential services incessantly came under attack by the agitative Southerners. The latter saw no sense in remaining unemployed in the South while vacancies were filled by

Expatriates in the North. The response of the North was communicated once for all in 1957 when AlhaJI Tafawa Balewa in the House of Repre­ sentatives said:

Man at times, Sir, is by nature Buspicious, and it is therefore natural for the people of the North, though greater than the South in strength, to fear domination. (Some hon. Members: Nol) I am sorry to say, Sir, that those fears still exist.

In I960, there were, in the Northern civil service as a whole about 1,500 British officers in senior posts and only about 500 VI Northerners. In 1968, there were still over 1000 British officials.

35scbwarz, op. cit.. p. 50.

^^Enerson and Kilson, op. cit.. p. 70.

37schwarz, op. cit.. p. 248. The polioy of the North towards expatriates vaB therefore a contrast to that of the South. In the views of the Northerners, opprobiums suoh as imperialists, capitalists, conloniallsts, neo­ colonialists j or anti-British, anti-America, pro-Russia attitudes were nonsensioal Jingoisms useful only in the South.

In all these things, the North refused to behave like a swing­ ing door that pusheB easily. Various left-wing groups, socialists whose anti-Western and certain admirations for certain Soviet and

Chinese systems oriented them towards the Communist bloc, never gained the nnTnpHfflmt.fi of a hearing in the North. In fact occasional contri­ bution to anti-colonialism movement in Northern Nigeria was aimed only at freeing other African countries from colonialism and from any external pressures. It was not in any way aimed at the destruction of local feudalism, capitalism or liberalism.

This partly explains why the Prime Minister (himself a Northerner and leader of the Northern political party), apart from his slnoere commitment to the promotion of universal human dignity, was reluctant to identify himself with the Southerners' suggestion that some pro­ paganda songs be chanted in praise of a "Nigerian" or an "African1 personality. The nationalists and radicals would have demanded that he begun charity at home by "Nigerlanizing" or "Africanizing" the

Northern civil service.

As a matter of fact, in older to check any excessive anti-

Western emotionalism in his .administration, during the first year of

Independence, the Prime Minister retained the Ministry of External

AffalrB and Commonwealth Relations under his oontrol. Ironically,

99 also, he retained Peter Stallard, a Briton, as his Personal Secretary and also Head of the entire Federal Civil Service I

In August 1961, he finally appointed Mr. Jaja Wachuku as Minister of External Affairs. However, it took a well organized, and noisy,

"Stallard Must Go" campaign in the South to force the Prime Minister to accept the resignation of Mir. Stallard.

The Southerners' position was that keeping a British senior official serving as Secretary to the Cabinet was incompatible with sovereignty, national pride, and security. The North saw the employment of Stallard as a gesture of goodwill or a sign of fair- treatment to expatriate officials in the country, especially in the

North.

Summary

Those who always criticized Nigeria for being pacific or gradual did not know the extent and implications of the country's internal diversities and the restraints which the preponderance of the North had on the country. If they knew, then they overlooked the facts.

Quantitatively, the North was greater than the South in land area, population, and representation in the Federal Parliament. Qualitatively, in educational and political development, it trailed the South.

In a democratic Betting, and especially in a subsystem dominant 38 political system like Nigeria, it is easier for the greater

^ I n addition to being "subsystem dominant," a political system may be "system dominant." For definitional clarifications see Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957) pp. 3-20. See alBo Stanley H. Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, I960), p. 120.

100 subsystem to dominate the smaller ones than for the latter to swallow the greater part. In other wordB, according to Eric Goldman,

"if some groups are dominant in the country, they will be dominant in 39 any plan the government undertakes.11

We must infer that Nigeria inherited this dilemma from the

Liberals. George F. Kennan observes that the United States shares similar problem. He says:

We see that very often in our own country. It is sometimes easier for a strong and authoritative government to shape its external conduct than it is for a democratic government locked in thores of domestic political conflict.

Nonetheless, the coalition and consequently the interaction between the Southern Radicals and tie Northern Conservatives were instrumental in producing a Nigerian brand of foreign policy with a trade-mark of "moderate approach."

Apparently, because of the "pull" of the North, foreign policy had been less dynamic than It would have been had the radicals of the South had their way. But, even though foreign policy was never more radical than domestic policy, the "push" of the South tilted it towards a middle course (neutralism) drew it some distance away from the original overly pro-Western posture.

F.nnnnm1na and Foreign Polinv in Nigeria

In considering the present, it is probably always useful to remember the past. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century,

39Eric Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny. (Vintage Books, 1955), p. 272.

^George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy. (New York: Norton & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 44.

101 the African economy was rudely awakened from its seemingly natural lethargy by the scramble for colonies by major European powers.

For •tills, there were Beyeral reasons two of which were the search for raw materials for the nascent industries in Europe and the search for markets for manufactured products.

It is not submitted, however, that the partition of Africa had only economic motives: there were political motivations, for example, imperialism. Hans Morgenthau sees imperialism as an ideology. In the nineteenth century, it had a biological argument strongly but- ressed by social Darwinism. Wien translated to the vernacular of international politics, imperialism became a philosophy of the survival of the fittest which,. Justified the domination of the weak nations by the strong and more powerful ones. Horgenthau says:

According to this philosophy, it would be contrary to nature if the strong did not dominate the weak and if the weak tried to be the equal of the strong.^*

Nineteenth-century imperialism was universal. George F. Kennan notes that

nineteenth-century imperialism took place every­ where in a highly competitive atmosphere j so that to refrain from being imperialistic your­ self did not generally mean to spare the area in question from becoming the victim of imperialism.^

The trade of a colony was characterized by the exportation of raw materials and agricultural products to and the importation of

^Morgenthau, op. cit.. p. 89.

^George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and ' Stalin. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19*30), p. 261.

102 manufactured and some capital goods from the metropolitan country.

This system had its origin in Mercantilism; it was the old colonial system. When the British legalized and consolidated their holdings in Nigeria after the Berlin Conference on the Partition of Africa in 1885, the system was developed.

In a colonial economic setting, all geese layed all their golden eggs in one basket. The Nigerian economy was agricultural and therefore, export-oriented; her major export market was Britain;

Britain provided all Nigerian Import demands. The medium of exchange was the British pound sterling; consequently, all Nigerian currency reserves were in the British sterling; all the sterling reserves were with the Bank of England. The latter controlled all borrowing and credit transactions in Nigeria.

One of the immediate results of independence was the discontinua­ tion of this trade and economic bilateralism. It was replaced by a new structure of multilateral trade and economic connections. In the new setting, Nigeria strove to capture foreign markets for her exports and reasonable markets from which to buy her growing imports.

In other words, just as Britain lost her monopsony over Nigerian agricultural commodities, so also did Nigeria lose the trade pre­ ference and guarantee she had for the sale of her agricultural pro­ ducts in British markets. This is a significant loss in these days when stable markets are scarce to find. Therefore, the first economic objective of Nigerian foreign policy was to find foreign markets for growing domestic exports.

103 The Nigerian economy is mainly agricultural. Although the country has substantial industrial potential, this has not been fully exploited.

Major agricultural exports are cocoa, peanuts, palm produce, wood products, cotton, rubber, to mention only a few of the most important ones.

Agriculture absorbs about 8 0 % of total labor force in Nigeria.

In 1963, farm products accounted for about 65% of total Gross Domestic

Product. In 1965, GNP was $4.5 billion; per capita income was $114; annual growth rate of GNP over i960 and 1965 was 5%> but population grew at a rate of 2 , 1 % thereby diminishing the growth rate of the economy to about 2 . 5 % . ^

In 1962, the Nigerian Government launched the first post-

Independence National Development Plan, 1962-1968. In addition to the need for foreign markets, the Development Plan introduced another foreign policy implication: the search for foreign finance. Nearly seven billion pounds (one pound = $2.80), it was proposed, should be invested by 1968.

The Search for Foreign Markets

Because of the nature of her eoonomy and the importance of the rural sector and agriculture, about $257 million was earmarked for improvements in and extension of agriculture. All thing being equal, an increase in expenditures on agriculture should result in higher volumes of farm harvests which are useful for developmental and fiscal purposes only after they have been converted into cash. The conversion could be done only on international markets.

^Africa; Economic Growth Trends. (Washington, D.G.: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, January, 1968), p. 14.

104 Nigerian domestic market is too small for the sale of the increased

agricultural outputs. M a m Smith once said: "the extent of the divi­

sion of labor is limited by the size of the market. Slightly t paraphrased, unless foreign markets are secured, the extent of earnings

from agricultural production might be limited by the size of Nigeria’s H internal mart. This is why, betveenl960 and 1966, the country expanded

old and established new and numerous bilateral and multilateral trade

links with different countries suoh as the U.S., Japan, India, some

Latin American countries, Canada, and other Commonwealth countries,

African countries, Chechoslovakia and later USSR in Eastern Europe.

Reciprocal trade agreements were made with the European free Trade

Area countries. The most important of the trade contracts was the

Lagos Convention between Nigeria and the six European countries of 45 the EEC, which was signed in Lagos on July 16, 1966.

The Search for Foreign Finance.

In addition to the various internal sources of finance and

capital accummulation, the Plan document stated that the "Government

of the Federation expects to receive approximately one half of the

total cost of the capital programmes by ways of "foreign loans and 46 grants." Therefore, extensive contacts had to be made with foreign

investors, creditors, public and private international financial

^ F o r full details of the negotiations preceding the Lagos Convention, see this student’s Nigeria and the European Economic Community (Unpublished) Master’s Dissertation Presented to Howard University Graduate School of Economics, 1966.

^Federation of Nigeria, National Development Plan. 1962-1968. (Lagos: The Federal Ministry of Economic Development

105 institutions with a view to obtaining the necessary funds. This is why the Nigerian Government had, in both its domestic and foreign policies, to strongly dissociate itself from statements made by Opposition

Members in the House of Representatives on nationalization of foreign assets. In the United Nations, the Nigerian Foreign Minister made

speeches denouncing small states pursuing an economic policy of expropriation of foreign holdings. In the words of the Prime Minister,

African states that nationalized foreign assets, holdings, and invest­ ments had had "irresponsible" Independence.

Table (3) shows promises made to Nigeria by the several foreign

sources contacted. As will be observed, the countries that indicated willingness to help were mostly West European Countries, the United

States, Canada, and Israel, These are countries where Western

Liberalism has had its major successful impacts or countries not unfriendly to Liberalism.

To recapitualte, during the period under review, two major economic objectives were prominent in Nigerian foreign policy: the

search for foreign export markets for the disposition of domestically produced goods, mainly agricultural products. Secondly, the necessity to secure foreign funds for the execution of national economic programs aimed at bringing the country to a state of economic adulthood.

106 TO '3

o a ■ 0 . •o 8 0 m e •H3 3 © Fh

6b a ft 9 0 o o o 0 ft ■a rl 0 £ a 0 o o to Q) o 5 •rl Fh Pi J -P ft i—t a s * *H •S Tj § 0 m o 0 fh § § 0 0 vO g 9> 0 f t ON tj 0 t> £ Fh 6b 8 O H Q) o 0 0 *3 o .o 0 0 tl o rp 0 Fh 0 *H 1 0 0 ,Q £3 s w 9 1 0 -p 1 >0 ■ $ p .g •H O 0 bo 0) H ed -P m *d Tit o m ff Fh 0 PQ ■85 ■P 0 O Fh 0 U o •p rH ft £»-P +> Fh of 0 rQ O 0 u r-l •H TJ •rl ■8 Ss; hO-p Q. 0 *H O 0 •«-» • 0 0 "S 0 cri 0 0 '—' o 9 o I ft o o ft ft dr 312 0 ca *0 1 ft g P4 H -4’ in c- to c- m o to vo o m m OlOt-H UN fl ■ • • a • • « • • • • * • • 0 o o o CMOOH to 4 N rl H to C*\ •r rH m H O' 1 1

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u 1964). Lagos, Apapa, Press, National (Nigerian 1964- of 3 No. Paper Sessional Report Progress o

co First 1962-68 Programme, Development Government Federal Source: Nigeria, of Republic Federal CHAPTER IV

NIGERIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Introduction

On October 7, I960, at the 893rd Plenary Session of the General

Assembly, Agenda item No. 20 was nAdmission of Nigeria to the United

Nations." After the President, Mr. Frederick H. Boland of Ireland,

had proclaimed the Federation of Nigeria as the ninety-nineth Member

of the Organization, twenty-six Representatives delivered welcome

addresses.#

Lord Home of the United Kingdom thought that Nigeria, "because of

her domestic experience, would make great contribution to the United

Nations.” Mr. Wilcox, on behalf of the United States, said that his

country was "profoundly moved because millions of our citizens have

their racial origin in Africa.”

Mr. Mazurov, Representative of Byelorussian Soviet Socialist

Republic, said “socialist countries have always supported Nigerians

in their struggle for national liberation from the age-old slavery

of colonialism.” The emergence of Nigeria "once again demonstrates

beyond all doubt that the very existence of the infamous system of

colonialism is historically doomed."

*For full text of all speeches, see United Nations General Assembly, Official Records. Fifteenth Session. Plenary Meetings 864-907, 19&0-19&L. Mr. Sekou Toure, the President of Guinea, said that his country was linked closely to Nigeria by the "hard realities of the world and the cruelty with which we were treated during a dark period in our history...11

After all the addresses were delivered, the Nigerian Prime

Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, thanked Member States and their

Representatives. He put forward four essential principles of his country's foreign policy.

Firstly, Nigeria wished to remain on friendly terms with all nations and support the United Nations. Secondly, Nigeria had no territorial or expansionist intentions. Thirdly, Nigerians would not forget their "old friends." Nevertheless, "we do not intend to ally ourselves as a matter of routine with any of the Power blocs.

We are committed to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded." Fourthly, Nigeria hoped to work with other "African states for the progress of Africa" and to assist in bringing "all

African territories to a state of responsible independence."

At the beginning of this study, we said that Nigerian foreign policy from I960 to 1966, was greatly influenced by. liberalism. A corollary of this thesiB is that the fountainhead of the liberal elements manifested by Nigeria is to be found in the Anglo-American tradition of liberalism. Therefore, throughout this section (and when appropriate in subsequent chapters) we shall use the histori- m cal-comparative theory of political analysis to identify recurring

109 similarities between Nigerian external behavior and the postulates of the Anglo-American liberals on the subject of international politics.

Theorhfclcal Setting

The a priori principle of the historical-comparative approach is that old materials (manuscripts, official records and documents), if carefully perused and analyzed, could reveal certain regularities or constants or similarities in the political behaviors of states.

However, the assumption has been vehemently criticized by political theorists who, though not seriously disputing, itb usefulness for political analysis, nevertheless, suggest that political scientists should deal with more than old manuscripts and records.#

*An outstanding critic of the method was Woodrow Wilson who proposed the nman of the world" approach. In his view, the _ Btudent of politioal science "must frequent the streets, theatres.. counting-houses, the hails - yes and the lobbies - of. legislatures.” Wilson, of course, recognized that the student should neither be exclusively engaged in what he termed the "wiseacre observation among busy men," nor should he abandon books and documents. Books would remain the stabilizing material, that is, the "ballast" but not the whole freight. See "The Study of Politics," New Princeton Review. Vol. Ill (1887), pp. 188-189. See also Somit and Tennenhaus, op^_cit., p. 3^. Then there is the British political scientist, Sir Ivor Jennings who, though not attacking the historical-comparative approach, seemed to embrace the Wilsonian postulate. Writing on the colonies of Great Britain, he once said that "constitutional development... is always empirical." Therefore he posited "the man on the spot" method. In British colonies, especially in West Africa, the men on the spot were the Governors and the Govemors-General who were in constant touch with and frequently consulted local opinions (the opinions and views of the natives) through the traditional chiefs. See Sir W. Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government. (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 165.

110 Perhaps next to the Nigerian archive, the United Nations is the repository for the largest records of speeches on foreign affairs uttered' mainly at the Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly by

Nigerian representatives during the period now being analyzed. A n : examination of these records and documents provide some information regarding Nigeria*s foreign policy on non-alignment, the issue of international morality, equality among states, international law, and humanitarianism. From the documents, we discern the Importance of independent actions and the role of indecision in Nigerian foreign policy.

Before proceeding to outline Nigeria* s stand on nonalignment as enunciated in the United Nations, we must make one observation and state a proposition. Non-alignment or neutralism is posited as a theory of international relations. Since current ideas on the con­ cept have historical precedence, we compare the views of pre-World

War IX neutrals (mainly the small states acting in the European states system) with the current thinking of the group now known as the **third world** in the United Nations. Next, we note that neu­ tralism or non-alignment has been used in many ways with different connotations. For the elucidation it will lend to our discussion, we briefly comment on only a few of the most important ways the concept has been defined and used.

It is proposed that Nigeria was one of those stateB in the

United Nations which, because of certain disqualifications, could not be regarded as neutrals; it is further asserted that Nigeria was aligned with the West economically and politically.

Ill A. NON-AUGHNMENT AMD HJCRRTATJ -FOREIGN POLICY

The origin of contemporary concept of neutralism is often traced to the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung in 1955. However, neutra­ lism (the desire of small and militarily vulnerable states not bo be involved in conflicts among the bigger powerful states) emerged con­ currently with the appearance of the nation state system. We shall begin our discussion not by concerning ourselves with the development of the classical concept; rather, we shall state the major differences between it and contemporary neutralism.

Classical TJmitraliam or Non-Aliqmnnnt.

In the classical setting, neutrality drew its meaning and rele­ vance from the very existence of hostilities towards which states were or desired to be neutral. Therefore it had no relevance in time of peace or in the absence of major conflicts. Neutrals avoided

Joining alliances; they refused to combine their power with those of others. But they were not opposed to the existence of or the formation of alliances among other countries. Indeed, oftener than not, alliances insulated the traditional neutrals' position of aloofness.

The harmonic Liberals - Jefferson, Paine, Bright and Cobden - favored political isolationism and economic international interde­ pendence. On the opposite end was Hamilton, who, as we saw in earlier reference, knew the role and usefulness of the military power of a neutral and its neutral rights. With Hamilton, neutrality was to be a strategic position. Furthermore, he said:

112 "A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality.1,1

neutralism and Contemporary International System

The m o d e m concept of neutralism is a contrast to the earlier version. Contemporary neutrals refuse to assume a posture of aloof­ ness in international affairs. For instance, in 1962, the Nigerian

Foreign Minister said:

...in matters pertaining to common humanity we cannot be neutral.. .beoausg we happen to be members of the human race.

Unlike traditional neutrals, modern neutrals are opposed to the formation of power "blocs" and "alliances." In the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly in October, I960, the Nigerian Prime Minister said: "Indeed, I hate the very ideas of blocs existing at all in O the United Nations." The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Mr. Wachuku, expressed similar dissatisfaction with power blocs in Africa when, in 1961, he regretted that Africa had been split intti three groups

"Casablanca group of powers; the Brazzaville powers; and the non­ committed powers. None of the three are powers at all. A house / divided against itself .cannot be effective."

The m o dem principle of neutralism began with the Afro-Asian

Conference held at Bandung in April, 1955, and a subsequent Conference

^Arnold Wo Ifera and Laurence W, Martin, eds., The Anglo- ATntvHnsn Tradition in Foreign Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956) p. 154.

201aude S. Phillips, Jr., op. cit.. p. 105.

^United NationB General Assembly, Official Records. Fifteenth Session, (October, I960), p. 537. ^United Nations General Assembly, Official Records. Fifteenth Session, 965th Plenary Meeting, (April 15, 1961), pp. 314-319.

113 at Belgrade In September, 1961. At these two Conferences, African and Asian leaders tried to outline relations among themselves and the world at large. Participants at the Bandung Conference were regionally defined. In a final communique, among other accords, they agreed on

abstention from the use of arrangements of collec­ tive defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.-*

The Belgrade Conference was not based on regionalism, but on non- commitment (however defined).

Why Non-Alignment?

Before we consider the place and role of non-alignment in

Nigerian foreign policy, perhaps it would be useful to state some of the more general reasons why small states remained non-aligned.

A small weak state wishing to avoid the risk of being caught amidst the big powers1 conflict could reasonably take shelter under neutralism.

States with no territorial ambition, such as Nigeria, could be beset by gigantic internal problems, even though it does not intend to court enemies from this or that side of the divided world, posi­ tive nonalignment in foreign affairs could still be used to forge internal harmony. Thus, neutralism presents the opportunity to escape domestic problems. According to Robert C. Osgood, "it is much easier to demonstrate wisdom and political potency by resolving

5 "Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, April 24, 1955,” in Abdul A. Said, The African Phenomenon. (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), p. 185.

1 1 4 . the problem of the world than by tackling the obdurate issues of domestic policy."^ On some occasions, neutralism- may spontaneously emerge from domestic disharmony.or from a breakdown of decision making machinery! there is no legitimate authority able to make commitments abroad.

Of course, there are individual small states that play one great power against another demanding and actually receiving valuable prizes for either their "friendship” or "neutrality." But, the desire to be neutral, and for all neutrals to act collectively can be motivated by the Aesopian wisdiom that "in union there is strength." States can join with one another to achieve common policy objectives. By so doing, those with little prestige and status or power can enhance their influence. Some students of international affairs call this

"strength through weakness." Others see it as the "tyranny of the weak." The rationale for collective action is that if militarily weak states do not cooperate, they will remain incoherent, a situ­ ation which facilitates domination by big powers.

George Li ska submits the psychological thesis that alignment or non-alignment can be interpreted through the presence or absence of n fear. Small states close, and therefore, vulnerable to either the

Sino-Soviet bloc or the United States are more fearful and therefore more cautious than, say, African states looated South of the Sahara.

Remoteness gives theflatter natural protection but no immunity.

Proximity makes for constant fear and anxiety.

~ ^Laurence W. Martin, ed., Wmi-KrAHsm and Nonalignment. (New York: Praeger, 1962) p. 9. ^George Liska, "The * Third Party1: The Rationale of Non- alignment," in Laurence W. Martin, op. cit., p. 80-92.

lag Similarity of aims and commonality of issue can also cement the edifice of non-alignment. For example, despite their differences, the neutrals are in unison in the demand for complete liquidation of colonialism and the demand for disarmament so that scarce material and financial resources could be liberated for use in the more pro­ ductive projects of economic development. Non-alignment gives a newly independent nation its identity and voice in the world. Before independence, its external affairs had been conducted by proxy: that is, by its colonial master. After independence, alignment with, or some commitment to, any one of the big powers means a renewed loss of freedom of action, independence, voioe and identity.

As a matter of fact, neutralism is not limited to only the small powers. At one time or the other, in the first quarter of this century,

England and the United States tried neutralism as a foreign policy.

The "ideal of splendid isolation" in British foreign polioy before the First World War, envisaged a balance of power in Europe to which

England was not to be a part. The Labor, Conservative, and Liberal parties debated on whether to be or not to be committed in the power rivalry among the! continent powers. Bullock and Shock observes that when war came it caught the Liberals unprepared and the "instinctive reaction of liberal opinion was to call for a polioy of neutrality g and to hold aloof from European conflict." Similarly, the United

States eschewed World War I when it commenced. Later, however, ironically defending her rights to remain neutral, she teamed up with the Triple Ihtente, the counterbalance to the Triple Alliance.

'Bullock and Shook, op. cit., p, liii.

116 In the preceding pages, we considered neutralism in its classi­

cal as well as contemporary settings. As we intimated earlier, it

seems that there exists a confusion about the several meanings of neutralism or non-alignment. For the light it will throw on later discussion, we now prooeed to note a few of the many ways the concept has been utilized or defined.

Neutralism as a Political Role

The firBt of these definitions is that which links the concept

to role playing. Crabb says "neutrality implies that a country has

been reduced merely to the role of a spectator in global affairs.

If we apply the tool of analysis ("role and personality") suggested

by Heinz Eulau,^ we can equate the "personality" of the state con­

cerned to that of a spectator who, because of his passive role of neutralism, he is detached from the actions, reactions, and inter­

actions among other units around him.

However, as we have just Baid, the neutrals themselves refuse to pursue policies based on indifference to global Issues. Accord­ ing to Francis 0. Wilcox, "as for the role of most of the uncommitted

countries in the United Nations, their leaders are quick to point out that neutralism does not mean non-involvement in the great 11 issues of war and peace."

^Cecil V. Crabb, The Elephantb and the Grass (New Yorks Praeger, 1967), p. 6.

^Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 100-107.

•^Laurence W. Martin, o p . cit.. p. 124.

117 The dissimilarity between Crabb and Wilcox points to the basic thesis in this section that there exists a profound confusion in the use of the term neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment and uncommitted.

Crabb*s definition applies essentially to states that have been

"forcefully** or legally" (through international treaties or agreements) neutralized or demilitarized. Neutralization is, therefore, a policy forced upon a state - such as Laos - by some exogenous (perhaps superior or more powerful) states, blocs or Organizations. Thus the neutra­ lized state has little or no freedom of action or policy flexibility.

But the states that fall within Wilcox’s definition, for example,

African states, mejeot such imposed role. They see themselves playing the role of a bridge between two competing camps, a third party whose unique position enables it to view with objectivity the issueB and tensions of the cold war.

The more complex a system, the greater the number and variety of political roles. Role playing demands the ability to meet some standards or prescribed rules. Rightly or wrongly, before 1966,

Ghana claimed to possess the qualifications and therfore was attracted to the role of neutrality. But we shall prove later that Nigeria did not possess the conceptual and definitional personality - or the traitB - necessary to play the role of a neutral. We shall also show that the desire, therefore to play the role of a neutral was forced on Nigerian authorities to make ohanges in their oountry's internal and external policies.

118 Situational or Conditional Neutralism

A seoond usage of neutralism refers to a factual situation out of which one wishes to stay. Crabb says that nonaligrunent "is the condi- 12 tlon of those who remain at peace while others are fighting." There­ fore "conditional" or "situational" neutralism can exist only in re­ ference to a state of war or armed confrontation. The leader-of Cambodia, commenting on the nearby Sino-Soviet rivalry, has been quoted as saying that Cambodia's "neutralism is not a doctrine...it is a reality, it is 13 an attitude dictated by fact and situation."

However, since no situations and conditions are ever permanent in international affairs, "situational" or "conditional" neutralism is always transitory. According to Arnold Wolfers, before World War II,

England remained almost neutral or impervious to the incessant warnings by the French against the German menace. But when the military situa­ tion changed, that is when the Germans possessed the air power that could reach and strike England, the British reversed their posture and joined the continental powers in planning "guranties de securite contre une agression de 1'Allemagne.

Neutralism as a Symbol

There is another tendency for all who adher to a common cause to symbolize themselves with a distinctive label: neutralism repre­ sents such a label. Symbolic neutralism Indicates a realistic concern

■^Crabb, op. cit.. p. 6.

■^Crabb., op. cit.. p. 65.

■^Arnold Wolfers, op. cit.. p. 11.

119 for an international issue - e.g. decolonization - to which the foreign policies of most nonaligned states are committed.

Nonalignment then becomes a "visible symbol of a nation's dedica­ tion to anticolonialism and a method of arresting colonial, tendencies."

Regarding the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, for instance, Crabb observes that in finding a solution,

"the influence of thenonaligned countries, symbo­ lized by the U,H. Secretary General U. Thant, was highly instrumental. "15

Even if a nation is not so committed, "vigorous, (if largely symbolic) 16 assertions are sometimes required."

The short-coming of symbolic non-alignment is: its ambiguity. States with "moderate" approach and those with "agitative" method carry the same membership card. Under such circumstances fellow-disciples dis­ own themselves for diametrically opposite reasons. Some fo the ambiguity is usually caused, on the one hand, by the excessive idealism of the

"moderates," and, on the other, by the irritating and uncompromising realism of the "agitative" states.

Strategic Neutralism

At first sight, neutralism is seen as the strategy of the mili­ tarily weak. A weak state weighs all possible choices and finally decides that abstention from conflict best safeguards it security.

Or, as Poland did in the 1930's, the state concerned tries to save itself by starting a policy of strategic neutralism. In 193A»

Crabb, op. cit.. p. 86.

l6ibid.. p. 63.

120 according to Wolfera, Poland "signed an agreement with Germany... j she

remained however, an ally of France and also tried to improve her 17 relations with the Soviet Union.

The strength of the Hamiltonian "strategic" neutralism was its

realism about the role of power. Contemporary neutralism, however,

is dictated by the realities of vulnerability. Strategic neutralism

is not a substitute for actual military power. This is brought out

by Poland's fate in the War. Wolfers concludes that "while this new

policy of contradictory pacts may have saved her (Poland) from early IS disaster, it did not change the inherent weakness in her position."

Wnualiprment and Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Two versions of Nigerian foreign policy were presented during

the period under investigation. The first - the official Nigerian

version, as distinct from that of the general public in the country - was that Nigerian foreign policy was politically and economically

independent, that is, not aligned to any of the two - Eastern or

Western - power blocs. We see such indications in the statement by the

Prime Minister in 1962. He said that "having secured political inde­ pendence, we are determined to see that this is also expressed in 19 economic terms." Speaking in the House of Representatives in 1963, he rejected the call to Nigeria to seek association status in the

European Economic Community. He said:

The problems which now confront developing countries are so far-reaching that the issue of association or

•^Wolfers, on. olt.. p. 126. l8ibid. -*■9Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria Looks Ahead," Foreign Affairs (October,1962), p. 136.

121 non-association with the Community had become relatively insignificant..,. I can, however, Bay at this stage that our policy will be directed towards a search outside the EEC for supplementary market s. 20

The Prime Minister's reason was that association with the EEC

(the most economically powerful and integrated group in the Western world which rivals the U.S. in Gross National Product, high income, large consumer market, and backed by tremendously effective purchase- ing power) would compromise Nigeria's independence and neutral status.

The second version was by Douglas G. Anglin. Mr. Anglin sugges- 21 ted "political nonalignment and economic alignment." This student rejects both these and submits the postulate that Nigeria was eco­ nomically and politically aligned with the Western bloc. The first half of this proposition, political alignment with the West, will be proved here. The other half will be supported with empirical and quantitative facts when we come to discuss Nigeria and the West.

Nigerian Foreign Policy and Political Alignment with the WeBt

We began the discussion on non-alignment by equating it to the concepts of "role and personality." The attributes of such perso­ nality, in contemporary international politics is, statistically defined, maintaining an equidistance between the two major power blocs.

Oddly enough, there is a variant: small states that move closer to the East than to the West have always usurped the title (with all its ooncommitant rights) "neutralism."

^Tafawa Balewa, Federation of Nigeria. Parliamentary Debate, 1st Pari. 1962-1963, Joint Session, Col. 2707-17.

^Doughlas G. Anglin, "Nigeria and Political Non-alignment." Journal of Modern African Studies. No. 2 (1964), pp. 247-263.

122 If the maintenance of equidistance from both giants or/and closer relations with the Eastern bloc or/and complete detachment from the

Western world was/were the attribute(s) of that conceptual personality,

Nigeria could not play the role of a neutral because it did not possess those predispositions.

The idea of grouping small states into those with the "moderate11 approach and those with the "agitative" approach has its origin in the overt breach which cropped up at the Belgrade Conference. At the

Conference, two problems emerged: (a) having assumed the postulate of non-commitment, who were to be invited? and (b) what were to be discussed?

Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Indonesia, Cuba and other pro-Communist states insisted on plaoing anti-colonialism, neo-colonialism and condemnation of Western imperialism first on the agenda. These are the states whose foreign policies have been described as "agitative."

On the other hand, Nehru of India supported by Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia (states with the "moderate" approach) advised that the neutralists* duty was to be "mediationj* therefore, this should take precedence over sentimentalism and emotional denunciations of colon­ ialism.

Nest, the definition of noncommitment was largely to decide who would attend the meeting. Once again, the "agitative" states favored a "narrow" conception of non-commitment. But the states with the

"moderate" approach pleaded for a very "flexible" or elastic defi­ nition that would accord universal!am and respectability to the

123 Conference and enable it to deal with ’’transcendent International as 22 distinct from local and regional issues.n In the end, Nehru’s more /- constructive advocacy prevailed: nnon-commitmentn was given a broad definition. Twenty-one nations (but not Nigeria) participated in the

Conference.

Even though, at the insistence of Nehru of India, the definition of non-commitment was made flexible and elastic, Nigeria could not qualify politically for participation at the Conference in 1961.

At that time she was overtly pro-Western. According to Crabb, Nigeria ndid not conceal its ideological links with the West and its opposition 23 to the views of militant African states like Ghana.”

We already mentioned that at the All-Nigeria People’s Conference held in Lagos in August 1961, serious charges were levied on the Nigerian

Government by the Southern radicals. At that time, Nigeria had a mili­ tary defence pact with Britain; certain aspects' of internal security equipment - cable and wireless services - were in the hands of the

British.^

In 1962, some radical members of the Federal Parliament suggested that the Government set up a Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose of putting the government on a more positive course of non-alignment. The foreign Minister, Mr. Jaja Waohuki, denounced the suggestion and it was defeated by a mere voioe vote.^ In other words,

^Ceoil Y. Crabb, pp. pit., p. 24.

^Crabb, op. cit., p. 25.

^Phillips Jr., op. cit.. p. 25.

25ibid., p. 101.

124 the Government preferred to remain on itB pro-Western stand. Moreover, a Briton, Mr. Stallard was the Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretary and

Head of the Federal Civil Service. Nigeria and Britain share certain strong cultural bonds. The highest judioial authority still remained in England; the situation had not changed since the days of colonialism.

Therefore, appeals could still be made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Furthermore, within the same cultural framework, prominent Nigerians still received traditional Eaglish titles such aB "Sirs” An absurdity and a Kangaroo*s tail to anti-

Western States, Ghana for instance.

There is an educational nexus. In 1963, when no one desiring to study in Moscow could obtain a passport, the Education Division of the

Consulate General of Nigeria in New York estimated that 1647 Nigerian 26 students were attending American colleges and universities. The

African-American Institute's statistical division shows that (between

1964-1965) 1861 Nigerian students entered the U.S. distributed around 27 the country in the institutions of higher learning.

It is this student's view that these figures represent an under­ estimation. The number of private, self-supporting, students has never

(and perhapB can never be) correctly accounted for. All in all there are now between 6000-8000 Nigerian students in the United States, about 15,000 in England, and another 4,000 in other West European countries, especially West Germany and France.

^Consulate General of Nigeria, Education Division, New York, Directory of Nigerian Students in the Americas. 1963-196A.

^African-American Institute, African Students at U.S. Uni­ versities. (Washington: African American Institute, 1967) p. 49.

125 In the early sixties1, a Nigerian version of Macarthyism, the fear of Communism, prevailed in government oiroles. At that time, the ban on Communist literature was not yet lifted; we already noted that the Russian diplomatic representatives were severely limited.

Nigeria recognized West Germany hut it did not recognize East Germany.

It is submitted that the Nigerians could not help being pro-

Western in their internal and foreign policies. We must look for constants in human behavior. Apart from education and thejudiciary, for historical reasons, the West and Nigeria share certain other cul­ tural and institutional similarities. Most members of the Nigerian elites received their eduoation in the West, the Nigerian domestic educational system is Western. Nigerian political and economic systems and institutions are Western.

Between 1961 and 1965* an average of 233 Peace Corps volunteers went into Nigeria annually to assist the country in its educational, agricultural, and other economic efforts aimed at bringing Nigeria up to a state of economic adulthood. A program such as this was successful in Nigeria largely because the volunteers and their hosts speak the same Ehgllsh language. The table below shows the? number of Peace Corps volunteers that went into Nigeria, between 1961 and

1965.

126 Peaoe Corps Volunteers in Nigeria 1961-65

1961 109 1962 192 1963 252 1964 381 1965 232 1.166

Source: U.S., Peace Corps, Africa Region Programme Office, (Washington, D.C., 1969)- An exchange of letters between this student and Mr. John Salamaok, Chief Office of Volun­ teer Support Reports and Special Studies, February 20, 1969.

Broadly speaking, shared cultural and institutional uniformities could not be and are not sufficient to explain the pro-Western nature of the foreign policy of Nigeria. Surely, Ghana inherited the same

Liberal tradition, yet the dynamism, and eyen the pomposity of this state’s domestic and foreign policies accorded it some degree of reputation on the international level far in exoess of its actual military and economic capabilities. Between 1956 when it became independent and 1965, Ghana evolved anti-Western and Pro-Communist foreign policy.

There are many reasons for this. We shall mention a few more latter, but let us reintroduce George F. Keenan1 s proposition that it is easier for an authoritative government to shape its external conduct as often as the spirit moves it, than it is for a democratic government hamstrung by domestic political conflict.

We already noted the seemingly irreconcilible tensions which existed between the Northern conservatives and the Southern radicals in Nigeria. We also mentioned the amorphous wrangling among the fifty-five million people, the major tribes, and the three major antagonistic political parties. One party proposed Pan-Africanism;

127 the other demanded the creation of a Nigerian personality; some citizens moved towards Moscow and Peking; others said "old friends (or known

enemies) were better than new friends (or unknown enemies),11 therefore

some remained with London and Washington; others yet clamored for neutralism. The Prime Minister himself spent all his life constructing domestic and foreign policies based on the postulates of gradual evolvement and univeri s all 'human dignity. In such anarchic setting, it is impossible for policies to be easily harmonized or reversible.

In the words of Andre Philips "To have a dialogue there must firBt be two andnot an anarchic crowd: Socialism, Neutralism, democracy, pacifism."^

The statement which decisively and categorically threw Nigeria into the Western camp appeared in a Lagos newspaper on October I960, a few dayB after Independence. It was made by the Leader of Opposi­ tion Chief Awolowo, in the Federal Parliament. Chief Awolowo saids

Because I believe that the ideals and aspirations of Nigeria should consist in individual freedom, the rule of law, liberal democracy, and the pursuit of a welfare state, I unhesitatingly declare my sym­ pathy for an association with the Western Bloc in whose fold these ideals and aspirations are firmly upheld.... I believe in the ends which Communism professes... but I seriously doubt the honest pur­ suit of these ends by Communist leaders, and in any case wholeheartedly abhor the methods by which they try to achieve these admirable ends. What I have preached and still preach is close and unwavering collaboration with Britain and the Western World in defence and propagation of the ideals of liberty, equality, respect for human dignity for which they stand in contradistinction to the Communist Bloc.

28'Andre Philip, Atlantic Community Quarterly. (March, 1963) p. 71.

^Daily Express (Lagos Newspaper), October U, I960, p. 5. See also, Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, Foreign Policies in a World of Change. (New Xork: Harper & Row, 1963# p. 398.

128 Thus, inspite of contrary assertions, during the period 1960-1965,

Nigeria was markedly pro-Western ideologically, diplomatically, and culturally. In its economic affairs, Nigeria relied on assistance from mainly Western countries.

But we hasten to warn that pro-Westernism in the Nigerian foreign policy did not imply an antithesis: anti-Eastemism. This is why the

Nigerian Prime Minister, having said that his country would not "forget old friends," at the same time added that Nigeria would not align it­ self "as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs." The

Government became more and more (gradually though) liberal on the

Communist issue. It even received some assistance from the Eastern bloc. Other thaw demonstrating adherence to her policy of impartiality in world affairs, Nigeria did not taunt the West with her nascent liberal policy towards the East. In contrast, militant states like

Ghana sought to deride the West and add to its international impor­ tance when ever It received aid from the Communist side.

In conclusion, on different occasions, Nigerian spokesmen asserted that their country was not to be considered a neutralist country. In the General Assembly, in 1961, the Foreign Minister said:

Nigeria Is not neutral and must not be considered as a neutralist country. I say this because there have been misnomers and misinterpretation and countries have been called neutralists. Nigeria is independent in everything...so that neutralism used in a broad sense should exclude Nigeria.-3 *

30gnited Nations General Assembly Official Record, Six­ teenth Session, 1031 Plenary Meeting (October, 1961), p. 339.

129 B. Idealistic Moral!era, and the Theme on Eniml it.v

We noted earlier that classical liberalism made no distinction

between individual and collective morality. Paine said "that which

iB the best character for an individual is the best character for

a nation." Jefferson spoke more to the point. He said, "I know of but one code of morality for men whether acting singly or collectively."

We also noted the Hamiltonian realism that "regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to

be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one."

Furthermore, we indicated how Hamilton has influenced contemporary

Liberal realism as illuminated in Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral Man and

Tnimrvpal Society. In one of his beautiful observations, Niebuhr says

"group pride and collective egoism are a more pregnant source of injustice and conflict than purely individual pride.

We begin our consideration of moral!sm and humanism in Nigerian foreign policy in the period under observation with the first assump­ tion that they were Jeffersonian; that Is, Nigerian authorities

entered the world scene masked with the conception of moral man and moral society. Our second proposition is that on the international

scene relations among interacting units are determined more often by politics and power relationship, than by moral consideration. Our third proposition is that human it arianl sm in Nigerian foreign policy had its roots in and waB a by-produot of moral!sm.

■^Davis and Good, op. cit.. p. 90.

130 Writers like James N. Rosenau, the author of Domestic Sources of Foreign Polioy. point out the fact that more than ever before, the foreign policy of governments is more than simply a series of responses to external stimuli. Forces at work within a society also influence 2 and indeed, transform the nature and substance of its external conduct.

This is largely the case with Nigeria.

On April 19, I960, Mr. E. Akwiwu and Dr. Kalu Ezra, both Members of Parliament from the "radical" south proposed, in the Nigerian

Federal Parliament, the creation of a department to be charged with the responsibilities of "African personality" and "Nigerian personality. with the two Hon. Members. He said;

I am rather surprised to hear some expressions in this House since some of our Hon. Friends returned from a Conference in Accra, Ghana.... The -Africans I regard as human beings, like any other race in the world... X speak of a human personality. We in Nigeria are to project a human personality.^-

The Prime Minister* s view prevailed. The refusal to project either a "particularistic" African or "private" Nigerian image put

Nigerian authorities on a collision course with the advocates of absolute "Pan-Aficanism."

The pursuit of a "general" (and perhaps vague) human personality was one of the clues to most of Nigeria's "independent" actions in the

United Nations. Speaking in the General Assembly in October, i960,

^Tamas N. Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Polioy. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-10.

% a m Epelle, o p . cit.. pp. 52-53.

131 the Nigerian Prime Minister said that new nations had an advantage in international affairs:

the accession to independence makes a clean cut with the past, and presents us with the opportunity to enter the field of international relations untram­ melled by prior commitments.

Liberals in .America have always capitalized on their neutrality in European struggle. President Wilson thought the United States could •’mediate" among the Europeans because of its innocence. One finds a similar theme still guiding governmental policies to this day. For example, in the Agency for International Developments i Program Presentation t> the Congress outlining the President's foreign aid request for Fiscal Tear 1969, AID emphasizes the need for regional cooperation. Citing America's noninvolvement in historical imperialism in Africa, the Agency remarks that the U.S. could easily help African states to form regional groups:

The absence of long-standing involvement with but a few African nations makes the U.S., particularly suited to such a role in Africa, and our own history of inter-state cooperation provides praotical and rele­ vant experience. tj Once again the "sin of transposition"' is committed. Most of the states to be persuaded or bullied into forming regional groups have yet to attain the domestic stability which made the American experience successful. They are not yet all in harmonious terms with one another. Furthermore, interstate cooperation was successful in

--- — — g-‘* "■ United Nations Official Dnmmant. 15th Plenary Session. of the General Assembly, October 7, I960, p.

^AID. U.S. Foreign Aid in Africa Fiscal Year 1969. (Washings AID), p. 14.

^Hoffmann, "The American Style: Our Past and our Principles," op. cit., p. 376.

132 in the U.S. beoause people were more adamant "on making progress at g home rather than making troubles abroad." Some of the new states

prefer making trouble abroad to making progress at home. More

important, the States In the U.S. cooperate within a domestic frame­

work with a powerful Federal Government able to promote as well as

compel cooperation. Relations among African States are international.

No matter how much goodwill or goodness an outside state possesses

or wishes to show, it is viewed with suspiolon.

Then there is the theme on equality. Earlier we commented on

the Nigerian Foreign Minister's statement that the chief cause of

international disputes is the ambition of one state to dominate

another state and that Nigeria had no territorial ambitions. The only

way to achieve peace was through equality. Again, in October, 1962,

he said* "we have made it clear in our African policy that any

African state, big or small, rich or poor— it does not matter whether

the population is only twenty, thirty, forty; two hundred, three

hundred thousand, so long as such a country exists— is equal to any v\9 other African country.

Eere again we see the Liberals' influence. John S. Mill once

said:

the community of nations is essentially a republic of equals. Its purposes require that it should know no distinction of grades, no rights or privileges enjoyed by some and refused by others. »

®A. M. Schlessinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 567.

9Ujr. General Assembly, Official Record. 17th Session (1153 Plenary Meeting) October 1962, p. 509.

133 Bat for a recent thinking on equality among nations in the international system, It is to Tannenbaum that we: must turn. Be states that with the rise of sovereign nation-states there emerged the political Idealism of a system of equal, free and self-determining nationalities, each organized into its own state and living peacefully side by side in an international organization such as the United

Nations. In such an international body, in the view of Tannenbaum, peace could only come through equality of all the coordiante states.^

Therefore, the absence of equality is the only barrier to peace and international cooperation.

Idealistic liberalism has been vehemently criticized by the realistic liberals on this Issue of equality. According to Niebuhr, no "society will ever achieve perfect equality... .It ought to be, but it never will be fully realized. The ideal equality is qualified 11 in any society by the necessities of social cohesion." If Inequali­ ty is a cause of faction, Hamilton said that such causes of faction cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

Regarding colonialism, especially the liberation of Africa from foreign domination and imperialism, the Nigerian Foreign Minister offered only two alternatives. In the foreign policy statement in

l^T. P. Greene, op. cit.. pp. 99-112.

•^Davies and Good, op. cit.. pp. 175-176. The Federalist (Modem library edition), p. 57.

134 the General Assembly at the Fifteenth Session in Ootober, i960, he said "...he who is not with us in this matter must be considered against us."

When we turn to racial discrimination, the Nigerian Representa­ tive took an independent course from the agitative and revolutionary states that saw no difference between racial problems in South Africa and the United States. After orystalizing the dissimilarities, he invited South African authorities to "emulate” what was happening in the United States. In the General Assembly in October, 1962, he referred to the "history that was written in Mississippi" where the weight of the U.S. authority was used to "uphold the rights of an

African by descent." He concluded,

I would say here, rather than castigating that country that Nigerians will always have a sympa­ thetic understanding of the problems involved.-^

Between October 1962, and September, 1963, several agitative states urged expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. Inspite of the case against South Africa, the Nigerian Representative saidt

It would be a sheer waste of time. It is better to bring South African authorities here, expose them to a certain amount of humiliation and indignity and keep on whipping them until they learn their lesson.*1^

■^U.N. General Assembly, Offioial Records. 15th Session Vol. 2 (November, I960) p. 1234.

■^UN. General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session (1153 Plenary Meeting) Ootober 1962, p. 512.

135 Indeed, following the same "moderate approaoh" Nigeria disagreed with the Liberian Representative who, in Ootober, 1961, proposed expunging from the United Nations records a speech by the South African

Foreign Minister Erio Louw in the General Assembly. The Nigerian

Representative called for only a censure. He said, in effect that no matter how offensive South African policy was to Africans, Foreign

Minister Louw was, in a democratic assembly, entitled to a freedom of speech.

Ironically, in the exercise of his "freedom of speech," the South

African Foreign Minister, justifying hiB government's withdrawal of freedom and independence from blackmen in South Africa, had quoted the Nigerian Prime Minister's statement in connection with the need for-preparation before the granting of independence to African countries.

The Prime Minister had said: "I do not believe African non-self- governing territories will benefit from immediate granting of inde­ pendence."^

Disagreeing with the use of force, we saw how the Nigerian Foreign

Minister advocated peaceful settlement. In a note of moralistic rationality, often displeasing to the ears of agitative radicals, the Foreign Minister, in October, I960, said: "Nigeria is broadminded enough to appreciate the forces of history. We do not want to treat the white minority in South Africa as aliens of South Afrioa to be driven into the sea or destroyed or expropriated."

■^■U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 15th Session (December I960) p. 1236.

136 Nigerian Representatives made a series of appeals (or, perhaps challenges) to the moral sentiments of statesmen. At the! 18th Session in September, 1963, the Foreign Minister addressed the south African representatives: nIf you say you are Africans, behave as Africans and conduct yourself as Africans. You are not the only Africans. 15 There are many millions of other Africans.

On another occasion, in the contest for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council, after both Mauritania and Ethiopia had withdrawn their oandidacy, all the African states chose Nigeria to contest the election on their behalf. Some states were not happy.

They murmured loudly. The Nigerian Foreign Minister remarked that when by a democratic process the majority of states decided that they had a candidate, it was a contribution to the African unity to acquiesce to the wishes of the majority.

He said that the actions of the grumbling states was "an invidious means" of causing rifts in the African Organization. He concluded;

President Sekou Toure spoke of African unity. , It is now time to demonstrate that African unity.

Indeed, Nigeria invited other states to willingly "bring forth" or "show righteousness." In the General Assembly in October, 1965, a Nigerian Representative said:

All thoBe who care to give substance to their professions of love and Justice, freedom and respect for fundamental human rights must surely

135. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session (1221 Plenary Meeting) 'September 1963, p. 7. 16 UN. General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session (1348 Plenary Meeting) October .1965, p. 3. j y't

137 recognize that there is no testing ground more apt for the demonstration of their dedication to these principles than in South Africa where a white minority continues to oppress and persecute the majority non-white population.*^

These appeals or challenges to states to speak out overlooks the different restraints on individual states. The constant call on other states to behave morally is one of the most creditable episodes in

Nigerian diplomacy. It is an example of the benevolent Impulse in­ herited from orthodox liberalism. In a House of Commons Debate in

1911 Josiah Wedgwood said that nthe majority of Englishmen place IE moral results of our foreign polioy above the material results.11

However, excessive morality can easily become an abstraction devoid of reality. This is why Niebuhr says that "the children of light...are usually foolish beoause they do not know the power of self-will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the national and the: international community.

Obviously, the crosB of righteousness or morality stays low on a scene of anarchy. Inviting the South African authorities to extend equality to aover the non-white population, or suggesting to

President Sekou Toure to "demonstrate African unity," or requesting the remaining states in the United Nations to convert their sermons

"" ~ U.N. General Assembly, Official Record. 20th Session, (l348 Plenary Meeting) Ootober 1965, p. 3. 18 Bullock and Shock, op. cit.. p. 247.

^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of light and the Children of Darkness (New Yorki Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1944) p. 11.

138 on "love, justice, freedom" among men into action is, if we could bor­ row a saying from George F . Kerman, like "asking everyman who believes in the truth to stand up - the liars are obliged to be the first to 20 rise." No nation wants to be bullied or persuaded into moralism against its wish.

Speaking at Birminham in 135$, John Bright said:

I believe there is no permanent greatness to a nation except it be based upon morality. I do not care for military greatness or military renown.

Similarly, playing down the role of power in international relations, the Nigerian Foreign Minister questioned: "What is true greatness?"

Is it because one produced a rocket and had weapons for destruction?

"Is that greatness?" That you produced a thing which should be used for the good of humanity and then turned it against yourselves, "is that not madness?" Should insanity be equated with greatness?"

Nigerians will not term anybody "great" who, after building a magni- 22 ficent edifice, sets out to use petrol to b u m it.

We are reminded of the idealistic simplicity of classical liberalism as shown in the statement of V. P. Byles on a debate on the Array Estimates in the House of Commons in February, 1907. Byles urged Britain to cultivate a friendly policy with the nations of the earth instead of "destroying one another. The greatness of Britain rested not on the science of war, but on the arts of peace..,.

20-- George F. Kennan, American THplnmacv. 1900-1950. (Chicago: The University of Chicgo Press, 1951), p. 2A.

^Bullock and Shook, o p. cit.. p. 90.

139 What did we want a striking force for? Whom did we want to strike?

Why did we not shake hands instead of striking at all?"*^

The Foreign Minister then said if great leaders no longer had the capacity tolead, the Organization should seek among itself new leadership "based on morality, objectivity, and recognition of those finer elements that are found in man and human society. These moral qualities which the great powers seem to overlook are found in 24 the smaller states." In the conception of the Nigerians, the role of'the smaller states in an international dispute is, through inter­ vention, to reduce or minimize the use of force, heighten or maximise the input of morality and thereby displace insanity by restoring sanity.

We now turn to consider the liberals' theme on international law.

Tho RuIr of Law and the Sanctity of Treaties

Another area in which the liberal legacy influenced Nigerian foreign polioy was in the adherence to the sacredness of the pledged word and the sanctity of treaties. The tenacity with which Nigeria upheld international law originated from the emphasis on the rule of law on the Nigerian domestic scene. We shall, in our analysis, be guided by these assumptions. Firstly, that the rule of law had universal applicability in Nigeria; secondly, it has limited appli­ cation on the international level; and thirdly, that religious

^Bullock and Shock, oe. cit.. p. 238.

^TT.N. General Assembly, Official Records. Sixteenth Session (October 1961), p. 347.

140 devotion to the sanctity of treaties gave Nigerian foreign policy a tinge of excessive idealism.

In Nigeria, the rule of law is practised on a dual level: the traditional and Western levels. First, there is the traditional justice of the Muslim in the conservative North as practised by the

Alkali Courts. Then there is the Customary Court in the South. The latter is a lay justice from which lawyers are excluded. However, it is subject to constant government supervision and Improvement.

More important, its decisions could be appealed up to the highest judicial level.

Second, there are the Magistrates and other higher courts. Judges to these are appointed from a wide choice of practised, experienced and able attorneys. They constitute a system similar to English judi­ cial system. British procedures are in vogue. Lawyers and judges must wear wigs and gowns.

Speaking in the General Assembly in November, 1963, the Nigerian

Foreign Minister said:

In the Constitution of Nigeria can be found some traditional English liberties, and in it also are reflected and condified certain Nigerian customary laws. In many respects, this Constitution of Nigeria parallels the American Bill of Rights.

Commenting on the legal system in Nigeria, Mr. Walter Schwarz has the following to say:

The formidable backlog of oases in high courts, and the inordinate number of lawyers, testify to the lovepof litigation for which Nigerians are famous.

-kr.N. General Assembly, Official Records. Eighteenth Session, 1261st Plenary Meeting, (November 1963), p. 15. 9 "'■Schwarz, op. cit.. p. 44-

1*1 From the time of Independence up to January 1966, domestic

politics inposed a heavy weight on the judiciary. Some judges

budgedj many others firmly resisted political harrassment. An

example in the latter group was Mr. Justice Oyemade. A (Western

Region) Government party supporter had been murdered. On the

ground of insufficient evidence, Mr. Justice Oyemade refused to

convict an accused. Consequently, a pro-Govemment lawyer sub­ mitted an affidavit sworn to by two men (apparently government

supporters) who indicated that they felt that the Judge’s verdict was biased and therefore demanded removal of the case to somewhere

else.

Mr. Justice Qyemade rejected the affidavit; fined the lawyer

twenty-five pounds (about seventy dollars); and gave the two men

six months prison terms for contempt of court. He then roared:

I will not allow myself to be intimidated into sending innooent persons to jail. Even if this means losing my job, I am still sure of leading a decent life. The only thing we have now in this country is the judiciary. We have seen politicians changing from one policy to another and one party to another. But the only protec­ tion the ordinary people have against these inconsistencies is a fearless and upright judiciary. 3

This courageous protection of the innocent against victimiza­ tion by a corrupt government seems to lend strong force to Niebuhr’s

statement that ’’man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible:

Daily Times (Lagos, Nigeria), July 28, 1965. Also cited in Schwarz, op. cit.. p. 4-6.

242 but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.It is significant to note that Mr. Justice Oyemade was not dismissed.

Mr. Schwarz comments on the strength of the legal profession in Nigeria.

Concerning the conducts of Judges he says:

Certainly none was dismissed for a 'bad' judgment - as Sir .Arku Korsah was dismissed by Nkrumah in 1964.

Following the idiosyncracy of classical liberals Nigeria wanted the rule of law to prevail in the United Nations General Assembly as it prevailed in her domestic environment. Nigeria's rigid adherence to the rule of law can be discussed under two broad headings: Econom­ ics and International Law, and International Treaties and Political

Relations.

Rp.nnnmicg and International Law

Nigerian authorities, motivated by the domestic example, main­ tained that not only was national law to be impartial and effective, it was to be a show-case manifestly placed before the world community so as to demonstrate the country's reliability at home and credit worthiness abroad. When the threat of nationalization and confiscation of foreign assets prevailed in the early 1960's little was known of the individual African statesj rather foreign investors, and businessmen generally were impressed by the examples of the small agitative states that had shown that foreign investors entered at their own risk,

^Davis and Good, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, op. cit., p. 186 5 Schwarz, op. cit., p. 46.

243 It became necessary for those who were honeBt, or those who thought

they were honest, to keep explaining their stand on foreign economic

assets In their countries. Therefore, Nigerian national leaders

devoted much time to reiterating the country* s position on national!-

zation.

The Nigerian Foreign Minister in October 1963, in the General

Assembly, elaborated on what the Nigerian Prime Minister had earlier referred to as "responsible" independence. He said:

states with "responsible" independence, would intend not to exploit others....Above all a state bent on expropriating the property of others must be regarded as a state with "irresponsible" independence.

This statement was prompted by the nature of the economic trans­ formations aimed at in the Nigerian National Development Plan. 1962-

1963. One of the basic financing assumptions in the Plan was that fifty per cent of all the capital expenditures will be met from external sources. Financial assistance from international sources took the forms of loans, grants, and investible funds, whose safety must be guaran­ teed by international agreements. A b an example, in 1962, an "Invest­ ment Guarantee Agreement" was consummated between the United States and Nigeria. Its purpose was to safe-guard United States' private and 7 government financial interests in Nigeria.

%.N. General Assembly, Official Records Eighteenth Session, (Ootober, 1963), p. 9. 7 U.S., Department of State, Treaty Affairs Staff, Treaties in Force. (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1968), p. 158.

1 U The realiBt, Alexander Hamilton, onoe said: "States like individuals who observe their engagements, are respeoted and trusted; t while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct.'

Following this dictum, the Nigerian authorities wanted to create a

"personal" image of their country based upon honesty, respectability, and reliability.

Religious adherence to the principle of the sanctity of inter­ national law and agreements was also thought to be necessary; it was constantly reiterated anddemonstrated so that Nigeria could fulfill her moral roles in international affairs. Indeed, to very great extent, Nigeria succeeded in creating a respectable image. This ob­ servation is supported by Professor Paul D. Fro8hl*s observation in

1965 that "in Nigeria laws and regulations are readily obtainable both

*t:the national and regional levels. Perhaps most import for foreign investors, most government ministries have developed fairly consistent 9 approaches to the reception and treatment of foreign investment.,t

Dr. Proehl wrote at a time when the reliability factor in the deline­ ation of the law and policy of new nations towards foreign investment was doubtful.

Furthermore, we must draw attention to a seminar on the "Consti­ tutional Problems of Federalism in Nigeria" which was conducted in

------— n------Paul 0. Proehl, Foreign Enterprise in Nigeria. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 196$)"p. 3. 9.. ., Lagos, Nigeria, In August 1960.^° Nigeria played host to oyer fifty lawyers, jurists, and experts in constitutional and international law i who came from the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and 11 Ghana.

Again, in January 1961, the Conference of the International

Congress of Jurists was held in Nigeria. It was attended hy leading lawyers from many parts of the world to discuss "Human Bights and 12 the Rule of Law." A Nigerian is also one of the Judges in the

International Court of Justice.

However, when we turn (if we may borrow a phrase from Stanley

Hoffmann) to "the law of the political framework" concerning treaties, rules and commitments governing political units and settlement of 13 border disputes, the reverse of the domestic experience was the case.

This was the area where the conceptual gap between the images of

"reality" and "unreality" revealed to the Nigerians that their affinity for nacta stmt servanda was a "private" and not a "public" image, that is, the rule of law reigned only in Nigeria’s particular domestic

setting; not at the universal level, and specifically speaking, not in the United Nations.

^Epelle, op. cit.. p. 54 •

^Epelle, op. cit., p. 54.

^ i b i d .. p. 83.

^Hoffmann, The State of War, op. cit., p. 97.

146 International Treaties and Political Relations

In one of the addresses of welcome to Nigeria "by 26 members of the United Nations on October 7> I960, the British Ambassador, Lord

Home, said that Nigeria’s Independence rested

...firmly on law, order and, justice; for these are the foundations of national stability and these are the standardsria wish to follow in international conduuu.

The Nigerian Prime Minister then replied that his country would uphold the principles of the Charter. The test of legalism came sooner than expected. Shortly after Nigeria became a member of the

UbN. , the Secretary General set up a Conciliation Commission to probe the facts of the conflicts in the Congo. The Nigerian Foreign

Minister was the Chairman of the Commission.

The Congo conflict was vexlngly complicated. The most dis­ turbing dimension was the existence of anarchy. As a result, there was no clearly recognizable government with which the Commission could deal. Probably guided by his country's experience in constitutionalism, parliamentarian!am and legalism, the Nigerian Foreign Minister de­ clared that inter alia, what was known as nLoi fondamentale" must prevail in the Congo. He stated that no solution could be arrived at in the Congo without upholding the "Loi fond ament ale.n Anybody in the Congo who sought authority must justify it under the "Loi funda­ mentals. n

■^U.N. General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (October I960), pp. 864-907.

147 Since the concept of "Loi fondamentale" recognized the Congo as

an entity, a union of six provinces, "the pronouncement immediately

opened the way to more divisions among the Congolese. One of the

points of contention was the attempt of Katanga, one of the six pro­

vinces in the federation of Cong Leopoldville to secede. "Loi

fondamentale" favored the federalists who nevertheless did not possess

the necessary effective military capability to enforce their will or

authority on the entire territoiy. In the views of the secessionists

it was like condemning them without a hearing. They had a de facto

case based on the possession of a territorial area, a population,

and an effective government powerfully backed by numerous Belgian military men and equipment.

Worse still, both secessionists and federalists had supporters

inside and outside Congo Leopoldville. Indeed on examining the

situation one saw convincing evidence that the division over the

application of "Loi fondamentale" was not restricted to only the

Congolese; members of the Commission themselves were similarly divided.

When this reality came to the Chairman he frustratingly remarked that

in the U.N.,

there are New York Congolese politics, as distinct from from Congo Leopoldville or Katanga Congolese politics. The earlier we close the gap the earlier we shall solve the problem of the Congo. ^

In the end "two addenda" were submitted and attached to the

Commission's Report: one from the legalists and the constitu- tionists; the other from the factual (secessionists) side.^

15u .N. General Assembly, Official Records. 15th Session, Vol. 3, (944th Plenary Meeting) (December, I960), pp. 317-318.

l6ibid.

348 We are not concerned with any further details. But we wish to say that the Congo issue had its political, legal, factual and human aspects. Upholding one factor— "Loi fondamentale"— and ignor­ ing the others was disturbing especially when enough human and fact­ ual evidences were quickly shifting the grounds upon which the monistic concept stood.

The Chairman with the Commission gained the confidence of the

Congolese only after he became flexible. Nonetheless, he still murmured his disappointment at the Fifteenth Session in November I960 when he said:

One sees how the interplay of human frailities has complicated the nature of the Congo problem.^7

Because of her adherence to the principle of oacta sunt servanda.

Nigeria experienced another frustration during the Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1965. At that time, certain member states, notably Albania, France and the Soviet Union, refused to honor cer­ tain monetary obligations regarding the United Nations peace-keeping i

Charter be applied against the defaulters. Article 19 stipulates that:

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly.....

•^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records 15th Session, (944th Plenary Meeting I960), p. 317. IS Accounts of the Albanian Representative's recalcitrancy are to be found in U^N. General Assembly Official Records. 19th Session, (1329th Plenary Meeting) 16th February, 1965. All quo­ tations are from this source.

149 On February 1, 1965, the Secretary General addressed the General

Assembly thus:

in the best interests of this Organization, a confronta­ tion on the applicability of Article 19 should be avoided at the present Session of the General Assembly.

The Representative of Albania, Mr. Budo, charged that it was

the United States* manipulation of the U.N. which had brought the

Organization to that plight. He concluded that it was incumbent

upon peace-loving and freedom-loving member states to see that the

"General Assembly should begin its work immediately in accordance

with the Charter and the rules of procedure." After many Repre­

sentatives spoke in favor of "not to decide issues by voting,*1 the

Chairman, Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana, said "....as the Assembly

knows, we have spent a number of weeks and months trying to resolye

this problem. I appeal to the Representative of Albania to allow me to continue with the proceedings for this afternoon." Like the

Shakespearian Shyloek who ignored all. humanitarian appeals and firmly stood on his bond, the Albanian remained impervious to all pleas.

Then the Representatives of Guinea joined hands with the Albanian

He said ’'Albania, like any other delegate, is entitled to use its powers by rising to a point of order." He made a motion for adjourn­ ment. The Albanian read rule 78 of the General Assembly’s Rules of

Procedure which requires motion for adjournment which comes "during

the discussion of any matter," to be "immediately put to the vote."

Then he asked the Assembly to decide "by means of the vote," whether or; not it wished to adjourn.

150- Mr. Bindzi of the Cameroon was infuriated. He said

.. .we have seen the coming and going between the delegations of Guinea and Albania... .It has been said that pacts and treaties must be applied: pacta sunt servanda. If the Albanian demands application of rules of procedure, he must agree that we too...are entitled to express our opinion.

Mr. Astrom from Sweden added: "...it is my feeling that the Chairman has the discretionary power and authority to adjourn this meeting under rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure." Finally relieved, the

President adjourned the meeting under rule 35 of the Assembly's

Rules of Procedure.

This short account is interesting because first, it shows how difficult it is to arrive at a compromise especially when a member state or group of states remain uncompromising. Secondly, there is the lesson that neither the provisions of the Charter nor those of the Rules of Procedure of either the Security Council or the

General Assembly could be applied inflexibly without t a M n g into account the nature of the issue under discussion.

The Nigerian Foreign Minister realized earlier that legalism could have brought about a confrontation, especially, between the

United States and the Soviet Union: two units whom diplomacy should perservere to keep apart, if the good health of the Organization were to be preserved. The Nigerian Foreign Minister in a note of dis­ pleasure later said:

We are painfully aware that in these matters legal arguments and pronouncements have failed

151 to provide the answer, where positions have been taken on the basis of other considerations.

Thirdly, the importance (though notorious) which the agitative state of Albania gained confirmed Hoffman's observation that

the influence of lesser states seeps through the dikes built by the larger states' power. ^

Logically, we may add that the wider or narrower the dikes the bigger or smaller the influence of the smaller states.

Fourthly, more important .however, was the fact that the Soviet

Union's refusal to pay her allotted shares of the costs of U.N. peacekeeping operations and the U.S. demand for a penalty against the law-breaker under Article 19 of the Charter were a continuation of the transcendent cold war rivalry by other means: instead of the conventional use of the veto, this time it was through financial means. Indeed, Inis Claude was of the opinion that the U.S.S.R.*s troika proposal, and the refusal to pay the dues represented

not so much an effort by the Soviet Union to extend its veto power as to retrieve some of veto power that it had lost.

Claude concluded that the U.S.S.R. had applied the lesson "that it probably learned from the U.S.— that 'Yes' or 'No' can be expressed 21 in financial as well as in verbal terms."

Fifthly, inspite of the antagonism and frontal appearances of firmness by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on this dispute, an irony

^Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War, p. 145. ^Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Changing United Nations. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. rl. ^ Tbid.. p. 41. ■®®The vote was 97 for, 2 opposed and, 13 abstentions. See U.N. Document A/PV. 1330 of February 18, 1965, pp. 28-34*

152 finally developed: both big powerb voted together to defeat the 22 Albanian motion. Having witnessed such a turnabout, and the ramifications of this issue, one wonders if the much dreaded great powers' confrontation which, according to the President, the General

Assembly "spent a number of weeks and months trying to solve," was not mere saberrattling and brinkmanship?

Summary

We began our consideration of the importance of the rule of law in Nigerian foreign policy by stating its universal application on the domestic level. Our submission was that Nigeria's personal image of the "law-man" was private not universal. In addition to the events in the General Assembly just related, the validity of our proposition was evident in 1965. At the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly in October 1965, the Nigerian Permanent

Representative happily announced that his country had filed with the Secretary General, a declaration of acceptance of the compul­ sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice because

Nigeria believed that the Court:

represented one of the symbols of man's belief in a world of law and order where truth and justice prevail. ^

However, this "symbol of man's belief" was so considered by only

Nigeria and a few other member states. That it was not universally accepted could be discerned from his statement of regret that the

^T h e vote was 97 for, 2 opposed and 13 abstentions. See U.N. Document A/PV. 1330 of February 18, 1965, pp. 28-34. 23 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. Twentieth Session, 1343th Plenary Meeting (October 1965), p. 2.

153 Court remained little more than a symbol because too many states 2A "have refused to give the Court their trust and confidence.

Our last statement was that Nigeria's reliance on law to settle all international issues was moralistic idealism. It was one of the weaknesses of its foreign policy: not because there is any virtue in remaining lawless among lawful peoples, but because lawfulness could be a vice especially in a situation characterized by lawlessness: 25 "to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness."

Idealism, legalism and constitutionalism permeated nearly every aspect of Nigerian decision-making or implementation of pre­ vious decisions. Regarding South Africa, the Nigerian Represen­ tative would want the same rule of law which* was used by the United

States to enforce racial equality to be employed by the South Africans.

He said:

All we want South Africa to practice today is the mile of law. There must be one law for all the people of South Africa. 1°

On signing the nuclear test ban treaty, Nigeria's emissary

Mr.Jaja Wachuku, said that he was "constrained to remind the great powers of what they already know: the sacredness of the pledged word 27 and the sanctity of treaties."

^ibid.

^%rom A Lasting Peace, cited in Kenneth W. Waltz, Man the State and War, op. cit., p. 181.

^tl.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1121st Plenary Meeting (Sept. 1963), p. 8.

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 20th Session, 1348th Plenary Meeting (Oct. 1965), p. 2.

154 Reinhold Niebuhr defines his conceptual "children of light" as

"those who seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more universal good." He goes further "it must be understood that the children of light are foolish not merely because they underestimate the power of self-interest among the children of darkness. They underestimate this power among them- 28 selves." What Niebuhr is saying in effect is that any international organization, e.g. the United Nations, is no more than a fraternity with some bad brothers. The sooner the "children of light" realize this fact, the better, more realistic and objective their foreign policy will be.

This legalistic or parliamentary dogmatism deprived Nigerian foreign policy of realism. The legal idealism is also characteristic of the Anglo-American liberals, who often stand on abstract princi­ ples or assumptions^ rather than on an exact examination of issues as they are. This is one of the major criticism of the foreign 29 policy of the democracies as seen by George F. Kennan.

Even after the majority of the U.N. members had agreed to aban­ don the Charter and find solution to the Organization^ financial crisis on grounds other than the enforcing the'legal provisions of the Charter, Nigerian representative still chided the recalcitrants for their departure from legalism and constitutionalism. The

Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light.... op. cit., p. 11.

^Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950. op. cit., pp. 50-65.

155 Foreign Minister said:

An important principle of belonging to any club is acceptance of the obligation to abide by the rules, and this applies equally to members in this Organization.

It is not suggested that Nigerian foreign policy was devoid of realism, but because it did not distinguish between what "ought” to be and what actually "was." It drew no demarcation line between the necessity to be lawful at all times and the feasibility of remaining lawful all the time especially in the General Assembly where situations and circumstances are always versatile and politics perpetually ram­ bunctious .

This partly explains why several agitative states condemned

Nigeria for pacififism and undynamism. A state religiously upholding the concept of the sanctity of the pledged words and the inviola­ bility of treaties on the international level is a co-traveller with and an ideological ally of the status quo powers.

Next we discuss the humanitarian aspect of Nigerian foreign policy.

Humanitarianism and Nigerian Foreign Policy

It is difficult to relate Nigeria's policy on humanitarianism to the accomplishment of any specific diplomatic gain or objective except the concern for human life. We noted how, inspite of tough pronouncements, the Nigerian Representative said that the white minority of European descent in South Africa "who say they are

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 19th Session,

1302nd Plenary Meeting, (Dec. 1964).

156 Africans because their forebears came to Africa and settled, and know

no other place they may call their own” were neither to be destroyed,

drowned, nor expropriated but persuaded to "adjust themselves and

behave like Africans" since they called themselves Africans.

We come across the theme on humanitarianism when, after a Con­

ciliation Committee for the Congo had been appointed at the Fifteenth

Session of the General Assembly in October I960, the Soviet Union and

the United States engaged in accusations and counter-accusations.

With the impatience of a new Member yet unaccustomed to the propensity

to bickerings in the General Assembly even after a decision had been

taken, 1he Nigerian Foreign Minister urged Members to "...think of

the people of the Congo. What benefit can we desire in this Assembly

if we sit here debating and trying to score points when people of the Congo are dying? It is not the legality or illegality, it is 31 the humanitarian aspect which should concern us."

The same humanitarianism was shown in December, 1964 when American planes dropped Belgian paratroopers into the Congo to rescue white

civilians who were held as hostages. In the heated debate that follow­

ed, Nigeria rejected the charge of "aggression," plot to "exterminate

the black inhabitants," etc.. and took side with the United States on the ground that the dropping of the paratroopers was necessary and

justified because the action saved human lives.

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 15th Session, December, I960, pp. 851-853.

157 For this non-conformity, a departure from thevusual anti-imperialists crusade, several agitative states inside and outside Africa questioned the sincerity of Nigeria regarding the struggle to liberate Africa from imperialism.

Humanitarianism in Nigeria foreign policy has its roots in absolute moralism. Both of these afforded Nigeria flexibility of policy in two ways. In the first place, absolute humanitarianism was a latent element in foreign policy. But as soon as human lives were threatened or endangered, it became a manifest factor, it thereby permitted deviation from established principle. It permitted independent action.

In this case, Nigeria could easily have claimed the same pride with Arthur Fonsonby who remarked in the House of Commons in 1909 that "throughout the last half-century it has been to our (the British) credit that the greatest success we have had has been our strong OO feeling of humanitarianism." Of course, no one necessarily needs to be a liberal in order to be humanitarian, but liberalism presents a conceptual framework for the explanation of one’s response to specific stimulus.

On the other hand, frustration, largely a result of inability to achieve a moral goal, was the most frequent cause of indecision in

Nigerian foreign policy. We shall therefore consider the role of indecision and independent actions in the Nigerian foreign policy.

■^Bullock and Shock, on. cit.. p. 244-•

158 Independent Actions in Nigerian Foreign Policy

In August, I960, the Nigerian Prime Minister set out his

Governments policy for the conduct of foreign affairs. He said

Nigeria would not blindly follow the lead of anyone. As far as possible, the policy for each occasion would be selected with a proper ’'independent" objectivity.

In November, I960, before approving the Government’s foreign policy, Members of Parliament in Nigeria demanded a realistic atti­ tude to world affairs and urged that the Government shoulwd maintain 33 an ’’independent" posture in international relations. Once more, in the General Assembly in October 1961, the Foreign Minister reiter­ ated the'Government1 s position when he said Nigeria "is independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of

Africa."

The significance of the occasions on which "independent” actions were taken was that they were always in direct conflict with posi­ tions previously outlined, on the one hand, by the Nigerian Government, and on the other hand by the non-aligned states. An example was the rescue mission in the Congo and Nigeria's refusal to join other agitative states to condemn the United States for her role in the venture.

Based on repeated warning that "the thirty-five African states in the United Nations would eventually rescue their brothers from

^ S a m Epelle, op. cit.. p. 72.

159 3L an oppressive and illegal regime," ^ one would have expected Nigeria to jump on the congested bandwagon of condemnation. We also previously- observed Nigeria’s rejection of "instant" or "immediate" liberation or granting of independence to African countries still under colonial rule,

We noted the ensuing row highlighted by the Soviet Union’s insinuations that Nigeria was with the Western powers.

Indeed, as late as March 1965, the Prime Minister, in a statement on foreign policy said;

I know that in the world today, so many people are taken away by emotions, a thing of the past. Phrases like neo-colonialism, imperialism and others were good for a nation struggling for independence. But Nigeria is independent and we have passed the stage of using such catch phrases. ^

This statement is reminiscent of the speech made by a great British liberal, Anthony Eden. Mr. Eden was the British Foreign Secretary in 1936. Speaking in Warwich in January that year, Mr.Eden said:

...these old phrases "pro" this country o r ’hnti" that country belong to a past epoch.36

We now turn to consider the role of indecision in Nigerian foreign policy.

The Role of Indecision in Nigerian Foreign Policy

One of the major causes of indecision in Nigerian foreign policy was the impossibility of achieving a specific highly rated goal pre­ viously determined and based on definite standard of moralism or

Idealistic legalism. Faced with nonconformity by other States, and

***^3ir Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria: Impartial in International Conflicts," Federal Nigeria (March-April, 1965), p. 18.

^Anthony Eden, The Times (London), (January 18, 1936), p. 8.

i60 the unattractiveness of the alternatives available, Nigeria always remained undecided. When she decided, it was an independent decision.

On several occasions, indecision was expressed through abstension from voting on issues.

In the first place, Nigeria advocated universal!sm. In the welcome address to Gambia, Maldive Islands and Singapore in October,

1965, the Nigerian delegate said:

The admission.. .takes the Organization another step towards the attainment of the principles of universalism. It is in this light that my Government must view with regret the absence of the People’s Republic of China.

However, as could be observed from the following Draft Resolution, the request for the admission of The People’s Republic of China had always (indeed, monotonously) been accompanied by Soviet Union’s call for the removal of the Republic of China:

Resolve to remove immediately from all U.N. organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-Shek clique who are unlawfully occupy­ ing the place of China in the United Nations.

Invite the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representative to the U.N.

A typical Nigerian position frequently reiterated was

Nigeria cannot accept the proposition that ex­ pulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations is a condition prerequisite,., for the admission of the People's Republic of China.38

3^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 20th Session, 1348th Plenary Meeting, October, 1965, p. 3.

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 16th Session, 1071th Plenary Meeting, December 5, 1961, p. 926.

161 Under such ambivalent circumstances, and faced with the pressure to act, inaction itself is tantamont to action. Unable to decide to act this or that way, Nigeria always abstained from voting.

Another factor generating indecision is that in international politics, issues do not occur in separate packages as envisaged by

Nigerian diplomats. For instance, we quoted the Nigerian Prime

Minister as saying, in August i960, that "...the policy for each occasion* will be selected with proper independent objectivity."

In international affairs, because of the fact that conflicts are not transitory, but enduring,an event always has its antecedents.

This gives the older States a comparative advantage over the new

States. The former's past diplomacy often provides them with a guide to action or inaction. Usually, then, present behavior could be a continuation of the past. For instance the U.S. attitude towards the admission of Red China has roots dating back to the inception of the Organization itself, the liberals* theme on peace­ ful change and Red China's insistance on the spread of upheavals and revolutions. We noted the alarming statement by Red China's

Head of State the "Africa is ripe for revolution."

When the Soviet Union vetoed the admission of Mauritania in

1961, the Nigerian Foreign Minister said:

We thought that reasonable people would appre­ ciate that Mauritania was an African country. I cannot see how the problem of Outer Mongolia or the problem of Red China should be connected with Mauritania.39

*Underscoring, mine.

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 16th Session, 1031st Plenary Meeting, October, 1961, p. 34-2.

162- The Soviet action (with no malice against Mauritania) had roots in the Western powers’ veto which had kept Mongolia out of the United

Nations long before Mauritania ever dreamt of independence. The Soviet

Representative said:

The United States and other Western Powers are pursuing a policy which is being rightly con­ demned by all those who want the U.N. to be truly universal. They voted against so much as placing on the agenda the question of admission of the Mongolian People’s Republic to the United Nations. We are now being asked to admit to the U.N. a state concerning which a number of serious controversial points have been raised.

The Nigerian Representative could not see any connection between the problems of Mauritania and Mongolia; however, in international politics, the ability to postulate and prove a similarity between two diameterically opposed events or multilateral events, is the hall­ mark of successful diplomacy. The Soviet Union demonstrated this

11 connection" when she insisted that the admission of Mongolia was a condition precedent to the admission of Mauritania. Both were ad­ mitted in December, 1961.

Furthermore, indecision itself, whether converted to or re­ flected in abstension, is another way of deciding to permit other states to make major decision on one's behalf. Hie State concerned thus suffers a reduction in its freedom of action.

It is fair to state that Nigeria was not the only culprit.

In the General Assembly, several small non-aligned States often

4-Ou .N. Security Council, Official Records. S/PV. 911, December, I960, pp. 4-0-41.

163 band together and cloak their indecision in the guise of abstension.

Big Powers also take similar action. This is a normal characteristic of coalition diplomacy. According to Kennan, "coalitions find it possible to agree, as a rule, on what not to do. This is the reason why their tendency is so often to do nothing at all."^

^•Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, op. cit., p.45.

164 CHAPTER V.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Theoretical Setting

‘ This Chapter is both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically,

this student, over the objections raised by Hedley Bull, and Edmund

Stillman and William Pfaff, believes that simple quantitative data

could be useful in describing and analysing inter-state relations and

the degree of community that exists between or among such states over

a period of time.

For example, Karl Deutsch. suggests communication flows - e.g.

quantity of mail or telephone traffic - as an operational index of 1 political cohesion. Bruce Russett's "trends within the North

Atlantic Community1' is based on the results shown by an examination

of variables such as trade (imports and exports), student exchange,

tourism, the volume and frequency of letters exchanged among citizens.

Stillman and Pfaff have criticized this approach. They call it

the "engineering approach." They both write that

-4farl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," and also "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," in Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Tascano, The Integration of Political Communities (New York: Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 4-6-97. 2 Bruce Russett, Trends in World Politics. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), see especially pp. 33-54. Americans are passionate in their love for technology.. .which will match the physical science in its certainty....The belief in techniques is evident in the repeated attempt to find systems...capable organi­ zational or technological,solutions, of achieving political ends.

Similarly Hedley Bull, perhaps much more constructive than

Stillman and Pfaff, has accused the scientific school as being

"distorted and impoverished by a fetish for measurement." Never­ theless, he raises certain basic questions such as "Are figures of communication flow an index of political community at the interna- tinal level or a cause of it?" Otr, "does communication flow con­ tribute to producing the vital elements of mutual identification or does the latter arise in some quite different way?"^ In one way or another, it is confessed that the methodology utilized below are subject to Bull's criticism because answers to the question he raises might throw more light on the usefulness of the quantitative theory. Nevertheless, probingflae queries is beyond the scope of this study.

We hasten to say that although systems, models, or techniques may not solve problems, however, from quantitative data systematic­ ally assembled and analyzed, certain reliable regularities can be deduced; explanations to political events can be made more intelligible.

Moreover, some propositions, hypotheses, and projections can be made.

^Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, Power and Impotence The Failure of America's Foreign Policy. (New York: Vintage, 1967) pp. 4-0-4-1 4- Hedley Bull, op. cit.. p. 372.

166 Since international situations are never permanent, whether or not the forecasts will materialize cannot be guaranteed; but it does not necessarily follow that the premises upon which such exercise in judgment are based are faulty. Deviations from projections could be a result of the vagaries in the international system itself rather than a reflection of inaccuracies in models, or tools of analysis.

In the preceding pages, we have been joining the links in the chain which bound Nigeria to the liberals. We have outlined the interactions of organic (cultural, linguistic, religion, legal, etc...) factors in the relations with Britain. We shall now piece out our argument with additional data. To limit repetition to a tolerable extent, we shall omit further mention of Britain and devote the section on "Nigeria and the West" to an examination of only Nigeria and the

United States, the European Economic Community, and France.

A. Nigeria and the West: The United States

Until and during the early postwar period, the prevailing

American policy towards Nigeria was to leave Nigerian problems to the

British Government, the colonial power in that country at the time.

Except for the activities of some U.S. missionaries, a few scholars, and businessmen, and a small number of consular representatives,

Americans cared very little about Nigeria.

The same was true of the average Nigerian. His knowledge of the Americans was limited to activities in Hollywood. Nigerian students trained in the U.S. were few in number. Therefore, they could

167 not convince their kins that there was much mare to the U.S. than the

noisy adventures of the cowboys, which, nevertheless, were very

thrilling and widely Imitated.

Of earlier U.S. links with Africa, and hence Nigeria, the great­

est of them in its consequences was the slave trade which provided the

U.S. with the ancestors of about a tenth of its present population.

In the 1960's , and especially after Nigeria became independent, it

became imperative that the U.S., as the leader of the Western world,

be profoundly concerned with what happened in Nigeria, a country that

occupies 356,669 square miles land areaj or, roughly surveyed, equals

the combined sise of California, Oregon, and Nevada, with over

55 million Africans.

Both the U.S. and Nigeria share a similarity. Inside Africa,

Nigeria has the largest single concentration of Africans. Outside the continent, the U.S. has the largest single concentration of people of African descent.

We have shown in earlier pages that from I960, the number of

Nigerian students in the United States increased by leaps and bounds.

There is a Nigerian Enbassy in Washington, a Consulate and a United

Nations Representation in New York. On the other hand, the U.S. has

an Eknbassy in Lagos, the Capital of Nigeriaj there is a U.S. Consulate

in each of the three regional headquaters - Ibadan, Kaduna, and Enugu ■ in Nigeria.

Like the relationship between Nigeria and England, which was a mixture of trade and aid, or that with the EEC which was predominantly

-163 trade, the relationship between the United States and Nigeria was economic, but of a somewhat different variety: mainly the extension by the United States of economic aid to Nigeria with very small but growing trade.

Before Nigeria became independent, Nigeria1s trade was sub­ servient to the British commercial system. Since I960, however, the pattern has changed. The directions of import and export activities have been diversified. Trade links between Nigeria, European coun­ tries, Japan, and the United States have increased significantly. As can be observed from Table 4 below, there were encouraging increases in the values of trade between the U.S. and Nigeria in the decade

1955 to 1965.

TABLE 4

NIGERIAN IMPORTS PROM AND EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1955-65

Imports Exports Year millions) millions)

1955 15.3 34.0 1956 15.1 35.2 1957 18.2 34.0 1958 27.2 22.6 1959 22.2= 33.1 I960 32.4- 44*4 1961 33.3 53.5 1962 41.9 50.7 1963 50.1 48.6 1964 B1.0 40.1 1965 92.6 73.4

Sources: Same as for Tables 12 and 13

169 In January, 1964, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a compedium entitled Business Firms in Nigeria. It was intended primarily for the use of U. £L.manufacturers and exporters seeking reliable agents, or trade partners in Nigeria. In 1966, the U.S.

Bureau of International Commerce, under the auspices of the Depart­ ment of Commerce, published another brochure called .American Firms.

Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Nigeria. This document contained the names of about one hundred and fifty selected American businesses in Nigeria.

We already noted the Investment Guarantee Agreement of 1962 between Nigeria and the U.S. Government which permitted the U.S.

Agency for International Development to underwrite investment projects undertaken in Nigeria by/ U.S. firms against "risks of expropriation, 5 currency inconvertibility, and war and civil disturbance."

To a great extent, the U.S. and Nigeria share several smili- larities: they were both colonized by the British, their philo­ sophy of government drew largely from the British experience of liberalism.^ Nigeria and the U.S. are democratic countries and they both have a federal system (Presidential in the U.S. and Parliamentary in Nigeria).

%.S. Overseas Business Reports. (April, 1964), p. 14*

^Louis Hartz, op. cit., p. 25. Hartz states that American liberalism has no feudalism. Nigerian liberalism, however, is uncompromisingly conservative and feudal; indeed more so than the English tradition.

:i7o TABLE 5

THE UNITED STATES AND NIGERIA: .COMPARISON OF VITAL STATISTICS (1962-1966 AVERAGED)

U.S. Nigeria

Population 192 million 55 million Gross National Product $681.2 billion $3.1 billion Per capita income $2,411 $84.0 Per centage of labor in agriculture 556 8 0 % Education: High School Graduates 2,395,599 87,894 Per centage of. illiteracy 2.4$ 7 8 $ Colleges and Universities 2,337 (in *66) 5 (in '66)

Sources: U.S.Economic Ihdicator (October. 1966). Nigerian Economic Indicator. (1966). National Educational Association, Research Report 1965-R1. U.S. Monthly Labor Statistics. (Jan. - June, 1966) . The Mor.ld Almanac and Book< of Facts. (1969) (Doubleday edition, 1968), p. 344.

The above comparison at once conjures up a vision of Gulliver and

Lilliput relationship - an undersized Lilliput indeed! As the Table shows, because of shortage of financial and several other resources,

Illiteracy in Nigeria (though not the worst in the world) stands at about 78/6 compared to U.S. 2.4$* Any wonder then that it was said in the 1950s that "more pupils graduated from Chicago High schools 7 than from all the high schools of Africa."

The United States has what Nigeria wants for her economic develop­ ment: capital funds, entrepreneural ability, educational institutions and the potential to reverse the Nigerian 7 8 % illiteracy into 7 8 % literacy. Moreover, if one does not change agriculture, perhaps he cannot change the economy. The U.S., possessing the most modern and

7W . Goldschidt, ed., The United States and Africa. (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 131.

171 -AMERICAN LijjiViiittSITIES AND EDUCATORS COOPERATING WITH wtp.totatj .granni-g to o tS I •H •P ■H ■s ■S £ 3 i 03 1 © © U ra O P © O u O 8 0 £ 3 w e ! $ & 8 Vi & s I •H "S e» Pi J © P "P _ *H © to -p fn © m +> tn m o o *H at §) a Q ta

CM tpI tH I I It £ t§ 1

s g ® - ^ 5 1 & & & - © 4-t •a 1 UN •H -P •H ■s8 •P raaJ © © ho © L| vO 172 e I O © CO r ca P & & 3 ra DO O o o © ■a to S3O ■s m m m O O sH -p ©

ON m © m .a £ 3 . 8 bD*rl . 8

Sources: AID, Prnprflmne for Progress: U.S. Cooperation with Nigeria Nigeria* Trade Journal, 1961 to 1965. Nigerian Morning Poat Daily Hmes (Nigeria), 1961 to 1965. efficient agricultural techniques in the world, has the capacity to assist in revolutionarizing and transforming the mainstay of the Nigerian

economy: agriculture.

On December 12, 1961, the U.S. Government announced that it would provide the Nigerian Government long-range loans and grants totalling

225 millions in support of the Nigerian Development Plan. During the period 1962-1964, U.S. Development loans, technical cooperation, supporting assistance and food for peace totalled $21.2 (1962), $27.4 g (1963), and $46.0 (1964), respectively.

In addition to development funds, certain U.S. universities and educators assisted in the planning and maintenance of higher educational institutions in Nigeria. They mainly engaged in the transfer of skills and knowledge. These and the Peace Corps helped to prepare Nigerians to carry out their country's plans for economic and social development.

Table (6) shows some of them, where they were and what they were doing.

B. Nigeria and the Nest: The European Common Market

On the question of whether or not Nigeria should seek associa­ tion with the EEC in September, 1962, the Prime Minister said:

The problems which now confront developing countries are so far-reaching that the issue of association or non-association with the Community had become rela­ tively insignificant... I can, however, say at this stage that our policy will be directed towards a 9 search outside the EEC for supplementary markets.

"U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 1950-1964,11 Africa Report. (Washington, D.C.: African American Institute, December 1964), p. 10.

^Sir Tafawa Balewa, Federation of Nigeria. Parliamentary Debates. 1st Parliament 1962-63, Joint Session, Col. 2707-16.

173 Many external as well as internal factors motivated the Prime

Minister to stay out of the EEC as an Associated State. Earlier, we

outlined the country’s foreign policy, especially the pursuit of

positive non-alignment. It was argued then that association with

the EEC might be incompatible with non-alignment.

On November 24, 1962, The Times (London) carried an article that

suggested that West Germany through the "Hallstein Doctrine" wanted

to use the EEC benefits to stop African countries from according

East Germany diplomatic recognition. The EEC was again viewed as a

regional organization for holding the Western Alliance together in

its anti-Communist crusade. Arnold Rivkin indicated that

the U.S. seeks to forestall Communist penetra­ tion by averting the creation of situations in which Communism can thrive. When such situations exist, however, the U.S. seeks in concert with other Western states, to frus­ trate the Communist bloc’s efforts to exploit them.

The most important among the Western States with which such con­

certed action is sought are the members of the EEC and Britain. Most

of these are in the NATO. It was partly because of this that, accor­ ding to James Maade, other European nations such as

the Swiss, the Austrians, and the Swedes, felt unable to join the EEC because to do so might compromise their position o f ^ neutrality in international politics.

^Arnold Rivkin, Africaland the West (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 69.

am.es Meade, U.K.. Conwnnnwealth. and Common Market. (Herts, England: The Steller Press Limited, 1962), p. 17.

174 At the very time when the Nigerian Government was making it clear that it would not take any part in European political matters, the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, said that "although the Treaty of Rome is concerned with economic matters, it has an important political objective, namely, to promote unity and stability 12 in Europe." While the Nigerians were interested in the political stability of Western Europe, they were not ready to get caught up in it. Moreover, on April 12, I960, a Member of the Federal Parliament 13 warned that "Nigeria must not inherit anybody's prejudices."

The Preamble to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity states that all Africans are

determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sove- reingnty and territorial integrity of their states and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms.

There were constant cries of neo-colonialism from Eastern Europe and Africa. The Russians charged that the highly-developed and indus­ trialized powers were interested only in continuing the "classical colonial relations of exchanging industrial goods for cheap raw materials."^

In the eyes of those African States who were signatories to the

Charter but were non-associated States, the association method was

^N. Mansergh, ed., Documents and Speeches on Comonwealth Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 662.

■^Sam Epelle, on. cit.. p. 49.

•^Common Market. (October 1962), p. 193.

175 clumsy. Guinea had pulled out of it in September 19581 and had joined the defunct Ghana-Guinea-Mali Federation. President Sekou Toure, of

Guinea, dubbed the arrangement a tricky way to make all Africa the continent of the proletarian people. Elsewhere, charges > were advanced that the ex-colonial masters were planning to retrieve lost positions in Africa through economic ties which would make the Africans per- 16 petual "hewers of wood and drawers of water;11 ' that it was a great obstacle to the growth of industries in Africa and, that it would hinder the formation of an African Common Market. In addition to the above, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa remarked that, without adequate safeguards, "association with the EEC can 16 easily perpetuate economic dependence."

Therefore, when the time came to make known his Government1 s stand on the British application for membership in the EEC, the

Nigerian Prime Minister, with the dispositions of an uncompromising conservative, said that if Britain joined the Common Market there would be a disturbing change in the prevailing pattern of trade between

Britain and Nigeria as well as other Commonwealth countries. He pointed out that the latter would not only lose their preferences in the British market, but they would also be faced by the formidable

— A. A. Mazrui, "African Attitude to the EEC," Interna­ tional Affairs, (January, 1963), p. 28. ' 16 United Nations, The Impact of Western European Integra­ tion on African Trade and Development. (New York: U.N. December I960), UN Economic and Social Document E/GN. 14/72.

176 common external tariffs of the European Community. Therefore, the

Nigerian Government

does not believe that the present pattern of our economy can he changed simply by intensi­ fying existing economic relations with West­ ern Europe.

Exhibiting the liberals' tendency to revert to the development

of models or formulation of international organizations for the solu­

tion of regional economic problems, the Prime Minister said:

Our most urgent need, like the Latin Americans' is an internal market large enough to absorb the products of our growing industries, and this need points towards local co-operation and harmonization of African economies.

However, in 1962, Nigerian attitude towards the EEC was a vivid

example of what we earlier termed "situational" or "conditional" neutralism. Even though the Nigerian Foreign Minister said that

"Nigeria is not a European country, and therefore, the EEC cannot be

relevant to Nigeria," he also subtly concluded that "But surely at a

later date, Nigeria can negotiate with the Community, deal with it as 19 an independent State, in a bilateral sense and in a friendly manner."

In the discussion that follows we explain why in 1963, Nigeria applied

"in a friendly manner," for membership in the Brussels institution's

association status system.

"^Mansergh, ed., op. cit.. p. 663.

18ibid.. p . 663. 19 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session, 1153rd Plenary Meeting, (October, 1962), pj 509.

177 Why Nigeria Sought Association Status with the EEC

In a good and responsive liberal state, as soon as it is necessary to set out national economic objectives, both domestic and foreign policies must, as much as possible, be reconciled to them. With the launching of the National Development Plan, in 1962, and with the need to obtain half of the entire capital fund from abroad (from mainly

Western sources), the earlier animosity to the EEC and its Associa­ tion status system began to wane.

There developed a new atmosphere in which Nigeria found herself disposed to ask for a place in the European Economic club. This is why we said that some aspects of Nigerian nonalignment policy was

"situational." That is, it was versatile. It adjusted to changing situations and conditions.

There was, no doubt, some truth in most of the charges made by-

Africans against the EEC. But there was less force in them than was apparently believed by some of the most vocal opponents of African * participation in the EEC. Some of the charges could be countered. Of) For instance, the Younde Convention categorically encourages

the maintenance or establishment of customs unions or free-trade area between one or more associated states and one or more third countries in so far as they neither are nor prove to be incompatible with the principles and provisions of the Convention.2-*-

2(-*Younde Convention is another name for the Convention of Association (Washington D.C.: EEC Information Service) 1963. The eighteen Associated states are: Burundi, Cameroon, Central. African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville^ Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. 21ibid.. p. 3 . It can be also argued that there is nothing wrong with being a primary producer, or with being a "hewer of wood and drawer of water," at this stage of African economic development, especially if wood is in demand and those who need it are ready to purchase it. This con­ tention need not, in any way, imply a neglect of the need to indus­ trialize. It merely points to the experience of many now industrialized countries - Britain, Japan or the United States.

Improvement in the production of raw materials must firstly, precede, and secondly, continue to accompany any successful industria­ lization in Africa. In his book, The Stages of Economic Growth.

Professor Rostow emphasizes the same point repeatedly. He says: "An environment of rising real income in agriculture, rooted in increased productivity may be an Important stimulus to the new m o d e m industrial 22 sector."

However, there were more significant reasons why Nigeria sought association status with the European Community. The initial antagonism was merely a reflection of the mood of the immediate post-independence period. Basically because of the memories of recent colonial history, and as portrayed in the radicalism of the South in Nigeria, mass opinion tended to be sensitive and suspicious. Indeed, the warning of

Lenin still lived. Barbara Hard refers to this in her book,

The Rice Nations and the Poor Nations

Any form of foreign investment particularly investment from a predominantly Western or

22W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. (Cambridge University Press, I960), p. 22.

179 cn o o O o o o vO -j- cn i> CM m o o rH O' O'ft ftCM ft O'ft cn cn O'ft O'CM rH cn ro o m NO in •H3 a •s to o o o r-1 H % £ o & in cn NO NO 1 sft •V ft a ft ft P4 s o mo o inCM CM lf\ 'd vO H

o NO H cn O' o of 5 nO CM NO 2* cn ain O' ft Ift ft O' ft ON £> H to m xn O £h n H o vO CM in to d CMCM CM vO £ CM o cn o NO CM rH o o cn to CM O' ft ft ft •> ft H O' o cn 5t ir\ u\ c- s£h NO m NO -sfr O' m rH NO NO c*- cn Eh cn on nO 1—1 rH to m cn NO n cn ft ft ft ft Oft NO a O' NO cn o rH i m in o NO a OS -n}- o •sf O' o O in m CM. in nO I—1 in cn CM cn o O' ft ft ft ft •rH rH O' m cn O' P in in 5 vO

180 TABLE 8

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AT CONSTANT MARKET PRICE, 1960-66 (1966 = 100 - in ^billions)

Gross National Year Product

I960 241.7 1961 254.6 1962 268.7 1963 280.3 1964 296.6 196 5 310.2 1966 322.0

Source: United States, AID, Gross National Product. Growth Ratesnand Trend Data by Region and Country. July 25. 1968 (Washington, D .C.: AID, Statistics and Reports Division Office of Program and Policy Coordination Agency For International Development, 1968), p. 13 Table 3f.

TABLE 9

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AT CONSTANT PRICES, I960 to 1966 (1966=100)

Aggregate Gross Per Capital Gross Year National Product National Product

I960 5.3 4.4 1961 5.3 4*4 1962 5.5 4-4 1963 4-3 3.0 1964 5.8 4.7 1965 4.6 3.5 1966 3.8 2.8

Source: The same as for Table 8 above.

181/ 182 ex-imperial government had hidden ig^it, the tentacles of continued control.

Table (7) shows the population of the EEC. As can be seen, the population was about 173.5 million in 1963, and it was expected to grow to about 200 million in 1976. Table (3) shows the total gross

National Product of the Community from I960 to 1966. As can be dis­ cerned, the average annual growth rate from 1969 to 1966 was about

5/6j and for the same period, the growth rate of tie per capita income was constant at about 4$*

These statistics of steady growth in the economy of the Brussels institution had great significance for the Nigerian National Develop­ ment Plan. In addition to the planned increased expenditures on agriculture, there was also some emphasis on industrialization.

But industrialization commonly requires expensive capital installations which become economic only if they can be employed upon a sufficiently large scale; like agriculture, large-scale indus­ trial production requires sizeable markets with adequate ''effective demand.11^ If we may paraphrase Adam Smith once again, the extent of industrialization may also be limited by the size of the market.

A narrow market implies that an optimum factory unit cannot be established; or, if it is, maximum capacity will not be fully uti­ lized or attained. Therefore, speaking theoretically, overhead costs will be inadequately spread, resulting in.high unit cost. The latter

^Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations. (New York: Norton Inc., 1962) p. 121. ^4-This term is used in the Keynesian sense. It is often associated with the high purchasing power of the consumers in the more industrialized countries as opposed to the low incomes of

183 reduces the competitive position of the industries concerned through

high prices. High prices reduce profits: a disincentive to further

investment.

Most of Nigeria's trade is with Western Europe. Table 10below

indicates the value of trade between the EEC and England, Nigeria's

traditional export market. As can be seen, Nigerian exports to the

United Kingdom has tended to decline.

TABLE 10

C CMPARISON OF VALUES OF NIGERIAN EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM THE U.K., AND THE EEC, 1960-65 (^million) European United Kingdom Economic Community Year ImDort Exoort Import Export

I960 256.0 2 2 3 . 1 1 2 5 . 7 1 A 3 . A 1 9 6 1 2 3 8 . 6 213. A 1 3 3 . 6 1 6 2 . 2 1 9 6 2 206. A 1 9 7 . 1 1 1 6 . 3 1 5 8 . 7 1 9 6 3 19 8 . A 2 0 7 . 2 132.8 1 9 3 . 7 1 9 6 A 2 2 0 . 3 2 2 5 . 8 176.6 2 1 5 . 9 1 9 6 5 238.2 258.6 203.2 269.6

Sources: Same as Tables 1 2 and 1 3.

However, it is not at the moment suggested that the EEC will necessarily replace the United Kingdom as Nigeria's most impor­

tant foreign commodity export market, but this might happen.

From the above expositions, the EEC therefore constituted an

expanding foreign market from which it would have been unwise for underdeveloped countries. It is the aggregate of (a) consumption expenditure and (b) investment expenditure, and (c) government expenditure. See Dudley Dillard, The Economics of J. M. Keynes (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Frentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 48.

ISA Nigeria to exclude herself permanently because of devotion to some amorphous abstract concept - non-alignment - with its nebulous objectives and whose profitability was questionable. Association with the EEC, however, strenghtened the bond of relationship with the Western bloc. We shall soon assert the absence of such ex­ tensive trade connection with the Soviet Areas. Before doing this, we must say a few words about Nigeria's diplomatic relations with

France.

Nigeria and France

In what the Nigerian Government termed as a general disrespect for world opinion, and specific disregard of the fe&lings of various

African States, France exploded atomic devices in the Sahara Desert three times before Nigeria became independent in I960. On each of those occasions, the Nigerian Government communicated the disapproba­ tion of Nigerians through Great Britain to the French Government.

The general fear was that since the Sahara winds always blow south­ ward, they might carry atomic fallout to Nigeria: an unhealthy state of affairs for any densely populated State.

Shortly after independence in the latter part of I960, the French conducted a fourth test. Radical members of Parliament immediately demanded that "trade and commerce between Nigeria and France be 2c frozen." The Prime Minister, renowned for unprecipitative actions,

^ S a m Epelle, op. cit., pp. 2025.

185 rejected the idea of freezing French assets. The final action was the severance of diplomatic relations with France in 1962. Simul­ taneously, French ships and aircrafts were denied landing facilities in Nigeria.

This student is of the opinion that, the Prime Minister's restraint notwithstanding, the move was hasty. The response was a case of overreaction. In fact, Nigeria was the only African country to break diplomatic relations with France on this issue. On a broader perspective, the British tested in Australia about three hundred and fifty miles from any cityj the Americans tested in

Nevada, only about one hundred miles from Las Vegas or about two hundred and fifty miles from Los Angeles j and the Russians somewhere behind the iron-curtain. None of these countries were harrassed. The

French test was carried out in an area in the Sahara Desert that is 26 about "nine hundred miles away from Nigeria." Moreover, the French must have had the permission of the African State or States that had sovereign jurisdiction over the testing area.

The Nigeria decision had another important dimension. It was an example of the impulse of messianism characteristic of that country especially on matters that affected the African continent. On several occasions in the General Assembly, the Nigerian Foreign Minister had * said:

It is Nigeria's duty whether it likes or not to do everything possible within its power to 37 see that the Continent of Africa is liberated.

^ S a m Epelle, op. cit.. p. 22. 2^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, (September, 1963), p. 10.

186 It is not denied that Nigeria and, indeed, every country in the world, must join hands in eradicating the humiliation of man by man. But such principle could not be extended to cover the

Issue of the development of nuclear weapons. If it Is to be extend­ ed, it could be done only very cautiously and definitely not by

Nigeria acting alone. As the Prime Minister himself later confessed,

"neither the U.K., nor the U.S., nor any country in the world could 28 stop Prance from exploding the bomb.

Since Nigeria was then an independent nation, she could have scored long-run maximum diplomatic points had the collective (though sometimes impotent) action of the United Nations been substituted for the unilateral';move by liberal Nigeria eager to set things right.

Of course, it is not argued that the Secretary General, Mr. U. Thant, could have been able to persuade or talk de Gaulle and inflexible

Prance out of conducting the test. However, future embarrassments could have been averted. But the opposite argument has much force because in September 1965, all the independent African States in the United Nations sent a letter to the Secretary General request- 29 ing the denuclearization of Africa.

"When the diplomatic feud over the bomb test in the Sahara

Desert is placed on the scale of power relationship between Nigeria

^Sarn Epelle, op. cit.. p. 24. 2g U.N.General Assembly, Document A/5975, of September 5, 1965. and France, one recognizes the soundness of the Hamiltonian proposition

that the rights of a neutral (or a small) state are, more often than not, inviolable only to the extent that the neutral (or small) state possesses

the military capability to claim and defend those rights. Although

Nigeria made a small short run diplomatic gain from that event j as we

shall presently see, the long run economic implication was significant.

Nigeria. France and the EEC

Dahomey and Niger which depended on the Nigerian air and shipping ports to get their exports to French markets and imports from France were the first to suffer the immediate consequence of the diplomatic action. Following approaches from the two States, the ban on the use

of transportational facilities was removed. But the lesson was learnt: in a situation of interdependence, the ramifications of a State's diplomatic action are never confined to only the actor's domestic premises. Perhaps this is why it is said that the

Assyrian conqueror, who is leading his captive by a cord, is bound with that cord himself. He forfeits his liberty as long as he retains his power.30

The Nigerian Government was willing to resume protocol relations with France as evidenced by the Foreign Minister's statement that

"if the French are willing to come back, we shall certainly receive them. But President deGaulle did not establish diplomatic rela­ tions. Obviously, in a zero sum game, the gains of one player are

^L.T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 26. ^^Nigerian Morning Post. (March 17, 1962).

188 the loss of another. France saw the diplomatic fend moral!) success of

Nigeria entailing her own humiliation and then sought retribution.

The French got the awaited opportunity to teach Nigeria a dip­ lomatic lesson when the latter applied for association status with the

EEC in 1963. Ordinarily, France is the most recalcitrant and incon­ gruous member of the Common Market. It would perhaps have been sur­ prising had she failed to lay obstacle after obstacle on the way in the attempt to shut Nigeria out of the EEC, as an associated state.

In the ensuing negotiations, France said thefc the advantages to the eighteen associated African states already with the EEC would diminish if Nigeria (with a population almost equal the combined popu­ lation of all the eighteen States) was also granted association status.

There was nothing new in the French excuse. Indeed, similar argument concerning the dilution, or swamping, of advantages was ad­ vanced by the French in 1963 against the admission of Britain into the EEC when President deGaulle said that Britain’s attempt to drag the whole of the Commonwealth into the EEC was like having "an 32 elephant in a bathtub."

The Nigerian application was submitted in Brussels on September

10, 1963. Mostly because of the unfavorable dispositions of France, almost three years elapsed between the exploratory talks and the signing of the Agreement in Lagos on July 16, 1966. Hence it was called the Lagos Convention.

"Britain and the Common Market," Times (London), (July 13, 1962), p. 30.

189 Table (11) below shows the import-export activities between

France and Nigeria from I960 to 1965.

TABLE 11

NIGERIAN IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO FRANCE, 1960-1965 ($ millions)

Year Imports Exports Balance of Trade

I960 13.7 18.0 + 4.3 1961 16.3 27.2 + 10.9 1962 18.8 18.9 + 0.1 1963 20.9 45.0 + 24.1 1964 27.8 28.0 + 0.2 1965 33.9 51.1 + 17.2

Sources: Same as for Tables 12 and 13

As can be discerned from this Table, France was the debtor and

Nigeria the creditor. Although the Nigerian-French diplomatic situ­

ation lent support to the statement of George F. Kennan that

the origin of mo d e m diplomatic institutions lay in the relations between enemies, not between friends, one wonders if a developed country with which a developing state main­ tained favorable balance of trade for five consequtive years, especi­ ally in these days when balance of payments problems are rife, was an enemy after all.

This is why this student, using an economic argument, stated that the discontinuation of diplomatic relations with Franey by the Nigerian Government was not based on a rational calculation of the letter's national (economic) interests.

^ G . F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. op.cit., p. 183. We now proceed to consider the relations with the Soviet Areas.

Nigeria and the East

The only Eastern country with which Nigeria maintains full dip­

lomatic relations from 1962 up to the present (1969) is Russia.

Before i960, Nigeria had very little to do with the Russian sphere

of influence in the world. Indeed a British anti-Communism law which was extended to cover the colonies, forbade the importation,

circulation, and the possession of communist literature. It was a

criminal and punishable offence to sympathize with the Communist in

any form.

We already mentioned the discrimination against and restrictions

on the Russian diplomatic representation in Nigeria. We stated

that even though Nigeria recognized West Germany, she did not recog­ nize East Germany. We also stated that passports for travelling to

Communist countries for whatever purpose, were never easily pro­

curable.

More fundamentally, however, are the facts that, unlike the

Western nations with which Nigeria shares certain social and organic -

cultural, religious, linguistic, legal - bonds, the East had no such

human nexus with Nigeria. For instance, language. As a social

animal, man at first sight, remains suspicious of those with whom

he cannot communicate. It could be argued forcefully that without

a common language, friendship, love, marriage are all unlikely or at

best, difficult.

191 Take another factor, religion. There are no Russian Churches in Nigeria to either rival or match the long and deep acquaintance c£ the natives with Methodist, Lutheran, Roman Catholic and other

Churches. This student asserts without reservation that no history of education in Africa could be authentic unless its sources are drawn from the activities of the West era missionaries.

While it is more likely than not that a common faith and language may enhance the development of close relationship, there are other basic factors to consider. Firstly, Reinhold Niebuhr, as we mentioned earlier, sees the Communists as the "hard Utopians," who insist that the laws governing the function of human society demands the violent overthrow everywhere of governments that do not accept the ideological tenets of Communism and the enthronement of governments that do. As we already observed, this is contrary to the Nigerian style of liberalism which is deeply rooted in evolutionary, gradual, non-violent, and peaceful development of society.

Secondly, the Communists bifurcate society: there are the property owners and the landless masses. Or, the opposing pos­ tures of the capitalists and the proletariats. Just as the second return of Christ is the cherished dream of orthodox Christians, so also has the idea of an inevitable conflict between the two classes

(resulting in the triumph of the proletariats) been the postulate of the fanatic disciples of Karl Marx.

1 % In Nigeria, private property rightB are strongly respected.

We already alluded to the bilateral agreements between foreign investors (whom the Communists would call exploiting Western cap- talists). In other words, Nigeria leans more on the economic philosophy of capitalism, to the reverse of which - socialism and nationalization - the Soviet Union is sentimentally attached.

We noted that the Nigerian Prime Minister condemned nationali­ zation and expropriation; he branded any African country bent on confiscating foreign holdings as having "irresponsible11 indepen­ dence. Even the property of the uncompromising white minorities in South Africa was not to be expropriated or seized. No further unsophistication could be displayed on this issue than when the

Prime Minister, having rejected the idea of freezing French assests in 1962, said that if the assets were frozen, "we may not know 33 what to do with them."

We also noted the importance of constitutionalism and parlia­ ment arianism in the art and practice of government in Nigeria. The implication of this was the reliance (on international issues) on the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the opposite of which - clausula rubis sic stantibus - the Soviet Union upholds.

In his opening address in January 1961, when the Prime Minister opened the Conference of the International Congress of Jurists in

Lagos, he expressed alarm at the spread of undemocratic processes

-^Sam Epelle, o p . cit.. p. 84-.

19.3 in some African countries. He said;

We have witnessed all too frequently the ease with which Government representing only a sectional interest have been able to twist and- change the shape of their laws. In some cases this...has been carried out...in cold blood. In other cases resort has been had to the excuse that government security justi­ fies the action. ^

Similarly, anxiety was expressed, over the deviation from the principles of peaceful change by the Nigerian Foreign Minister in the General Assembly in 1964. He said while the old imperialism was disappearing, new imperialism in different guises was rearing its head. This was a direct comment on the statement made by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, in 1964. Throughout the tour of Africa made by Chou En-lai, he stressed the theme of

"Afro-Asian solidarity.11 It was then he said that "Africa was ripe for revolution."

Obviously, Ghana or Guinea and other agitative states did not share the same social, organic, political, economic and juridical heritage with the States of Eastern Europe, yet they were pro-

Russian. Why not Nigeria? From i960 to January 1966, the Nigerian political scene was "sub-system dominated." But Ghana, Mali, or

Guinea and most of the small agitative states had "system-domi­ nated" patterns of government.

A "sub-system dominated" system like Nigeria under which exe­ cutive power is shared among four Regional Premiers and one

^ S a m Epelle, op. oit.. p. 84 .

194 Prime Minister, must necessarily find it difficult to adjust rapidly to fast moving circumstances, especially when, in addition to other internal problems, it was the conservatives who formed the largest sub-system. It was easier to echo one voice in, say, Ghana with only one President.

Moreover, events in the agitative countries that had sympathized* with the Communists and embraced socialism, nationalization, and expropriation had not been encouraging enough to persuade Nigeria to join them in the much publicized festival behind the "iron curtain." If anything, the various brands of autocracy which were transplanted into these states where they had no social base or organic foundation had not faired better than Christmass treesj objects of only seasonal decoration. The ultimate lesson was that the flower garden of human relations blooms better when tended with natural manure than with artificial fertilizer.

Oskar Lange advised that "A socialist government really intent upon socialization has to carry out its program at one stroke or give it up altogether. Socialism is not an economic policy for the t i m i d . N i g e r i a had not the socialistic determination.

Mr. Yussuf Maitama Sule warned that "gradual development of ideas and thoughts is more lasting. We must start fromthe known to the unknown."^

Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19^4), pp. 29-30. *36 Colin Legum, op. cit.. p. 47.

195 Niebuhr says that "we cannot understand Communism if we fail to realize that it is a variant of the same utopianism with which the 37 whole liberal world is infected."' Therefore, a similarity or a common denominator - utopianism - is conceptualized between Commu­ nism and liberalism. From the analysis already submitted it is clear that Nigeria was strongly infected by the idealism of the

"soft Utopians:" the Anglo-American liberals. On the other hand, lacking the social, historical, religious, linguistic, political, economic and; juridical tendencies of the "hard Utopians," that is, the Communists, Nigeria therefore lacked their ideological and philosophical "infection."

Nigerian Attitude to the Soviet Areas and the Nest

It must be realized that no meaningful interpretation could be attached to the behavior of the Federal Government towards Eastern

Europe without a statement and an understanding of the restraints which the actions, interaction, and reactions of the diverse sub­ groups in the country placed on the foreign policy decision makers in the center. For this purpose, we refer to a research conducted by Lloyd A. Free in 1964 entitled Attitudes. Hopes, and Fears of

Nigerians.

The following three (among several others) of the questions posed and answered are relevant to this essay.

------3 7 --- Davis and Good., op. cit.. p. 26.

^Lloyd A. Free, The Attitudes. Hopes and Fears of Nigerians. (Princeton, New Jersey: Institute for International Social Research, 1964).

196 Question 1: In the present world situation, do you think that on the whole, Nigeria should (1) side with the U.S., tr.K., and their allies; or (2) side with Russia and its allies; or (3) side with neither?^

Answer: > Political Parties ' N.P.C. N.C.N.C. A.G.

Side with U.S., Britain, etc. 51% . 2156 30% Side with Russia 456 — Side with neither 4956 54% 50% Qualified answers - 21% 10% No opinion — — 10% 10096 100% 100%

It will be seen that the NPC, the party of the Northern con­ servatives, would not side with Russia at all. They would side with the U.S. in the first instance and then, with less than half their strength, pursue neutralism. The next conservative (though much less conservative than the NPC) was the A.G. Its first policy would be neutralism, then side with the U.S., but not with Russia at all. The only party that would side with Russia (though no more than a token support only 4%) was the NCNC.

Question 2: Which do you think would be better in terms of Nigeria's own interest; (1) for Russia, Red China and the other Communist powers to be stronger militarily; (2) for the United States, Great Britain and their allies to be stronger; or (3) for there to be a balance of mili­ tary power between the two sides?^-

Lloyd A. Free, op. cit.. pp. 5-6.

^°ibid., p. 7.

197 Answer: Legislators Total N.P.C. N. C.N. A.G.

Russia and allies stronger -% -% -$ -$ U.S., U.K., etc. stronger 3 B% 47$ 25$ 10$ Balance of military strength 31% 24$ 34$ 50$ Both sides should reduce armaments (volunteered) 26% 29$ 29$ 30$ 2% 8$ Other qualified answers wuwy

-$ H H o-$ o No opinion .. % 100% 100% 100%

Significantly, again, none of the three parties thought Russia should be stronger than the Western powers. Of course, there is a high score for neutralism which would seem to justify the government's position that Nigeria would not align itself as a matter of routine but that foreign policy would be based on what was considered good for the country.

Question 3: Do you think Nigeria's relations with Russia should be closer than they are now, less close, or about the same as they are now?^l

Answer: Legislators

Closer 47$ Less close 27$ Same as now 18% Qualified answers 2% No opinion 6% 100%

This last question and its answers support our earlier division of the country into the Southern radicals and the Northern conservatives.

^ •ibid.. p. 17.

198 Freed said that seven out of the ten members of the NCNC and eight out of the ten members of the AG favored closer relations with

Russia, as compared with only one-quarter of the NPC. He con­ cluded that "the neutralistic NCNC and AG members would, in all logic, be more desirous of closer relations with Russia than the 42 more pro-Western oriented NPC members.

We shall have more to say on this topic when we come to the summary on this chapter. We now turn to examine Nigeria and the t Third World.

D. Nigeria and the Third World

Apart from the East-West political dilemma, the Middle-East crisis, African Unity, and the problems of decolonization and racial conflicts in Southern Africa were the most pressing issues in the Nigerian foreign policy in the period I960 to January, 1966.

Foreign policy on the Middle East crisis was largely shpped by the Nigerian people's version of their foreign policy goal.

Like orthodox liberals, Nigerians believed in the peaceful coex­ istence of the self with the other in a society or in an inter­ national community. They believed in the sovereignty of all nations.

In the General Assembly in October, 1965, the Foreign Minister said that "Nigeria believes in the sovereignty Of all nations.’1 In the

General Assembly in October, 1965, the Foreign Minister said that

"Nigeria believes in the sovereignty of all nations, but Nigeria A3 also believes in the interdependence of soverign nations."

4% b i d .. p. 17. 43 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 20th Session, 1348th Plenary Meeting (October, 1965), p. 4*

199 The Middle-East crisis has triangular - religion, economics, and politics - foreign policy implications for Nigeria. Firstly, as we already know, Nigeria shares the traditional civilization of Mohammedanism, the religion which unites the Arabs historically, morally, politically and culturally. On the other hand, Southern

Nigeria is predominantly Christian. Moreover, education programs in the Muslim North are partly executed by the Government and partly by Christian Churches.

Secondly, during the period covered by this study, Israel was economically more important to Nigeria than the Arab country of

Egypt. Israel extended a loan of $5 million to Nigeria towards financing the National Development Plan. In addition, in May, 1964,

Federmann Enterprises Limited, a private Company in Israel, was given an Investment Guarantee by the Federal Government for its 4*5 capital holding in the Western Region of about $2 million. Again, statistics of the External Public Debt of Nigeria as at September 30,

1964, included another $14 million loan from Israel, which was z.6 expected to be amortized in full by 1970.

These loans and other private investment accounted for the increases in Israel's trade with Nigeria which, as can be observed from Tables 12 and 13, is by far higher in value than the commer­ cial relations with Egypt.

- ^ Federal Republic of Nigeria, Development Programme. 1962-68. First Progress Report. March 1964. (Lagos, Nigeria: Nigerian National Press, March 1964), pp. 26-27, Table 1.21. 46 ibid., pp. 26-27, Table 1.22.

200 SELECTED DESTINATIONS OF NIGERIAN EXPORTS: 1960-1965 (^millions) vO 3 rH OS UN NO NO CJ> os NO ON CM a $1 rH OS H W . o . W W-jo «H O O . . W «tH O d O d o EH +3 E E E 43 H E s 4 I o h h m h d a) h o

to ON C5J. O to CM CM CM ON UN ON •sf CM to CM CM CM CM H CM ON CM 3 UN CM 3 NO CM CM -si- UN CM CM ON CM .d a n g UN tO N U N O N i - s s O •sf -sf rH ON H ON ON ON ON H ON rH si-ON UN UN si-ON ON CM rH ON CM ■SM a o d # a • « • « I • • n • • • • » • • C C O ONC-OOONO CO O C"O O n CM UN O UN CM n

O\ O O nd •rl • oj ON ON to ON cm CM O' CM ON $ CM O ON O O rH rH CM rH CM CM u h § 3 m

n CM Us 0 CM. d m a> n

n n ON n o n u NO • * CM O' i—J tO rH tO rH ON ON UN CM r H rUN Hvj-tO t-j C UN t> M C M C - C - ON UN O' ■si- rH O' '4 CM vO rH CM CM ON ON CM CM rH vO to rH to S+ r-jS+ rH to to CM rH £> CM UN ON ON NO t - O C O - O • « + £ UN r-i H CM -vf-NO CM r-iUN H O M "C — H C— CM C" CM H O tO CM CM CM ON ON ON O CM NO'tO O O t ' O ON H O J O O i n f s O o •

CM UN CA t> t> CO CA UN CM

• n O •S Wl^Ht5!3 ^ * m n bo ) § § a) r OON O O rH rH CM ON ON NO CM rH n O O CM C"- 3 UN i—E to to CM t6 NO t- n n O- O O • ‘ OO n n O O

to M O CM H CM rH ON NO M CM CM CM CM H C" ON O O' CM ■uf CM O ON H O -shrH UN CM 201 •-s • • • • * s * • 0 CM CM CM to d rH tO to OM O O N ( CM CM ON vO o O O M MC M CJ CM CM CM o ON ■sf rH ON to to rH rH rH O rH rH rH 43 I n to id • • • • • 0 ® 0

« •

1 o o o 0 5(t # # d d UN to NO ON !> OCM NO C- rH si O' UN d O o UN UN ON 3 o ON ^4* CO •d 43 13 t 43 e (D m 0 0) • d d .d sd **• CM O C" a) o d CM n H *4- to CM o o o S - O •Si- O O d d d • • • • • • •

O M CJ CM h 4 POM s

d *d ON o- NO ON V\ n u ■sf ON ON ON O' 4 d -4- 0) o u d SELECTED SOURCES OF NIGERIAN IMPORTS: 1960-1965 (^millions) nO H in nO n n CMW.EH H Eh m O EH vO H O On H ON o w o O EH O *3^ V5. O Vi H Vl r* Vi ^ Vi Vt Vt r— O CD Ct O -P o O rt O O ct $ E -P -P Eh <£ 4- •p *p *p O h o O

v O c r \ r o - J ■ 0 0 H CM 00 ft CM In ft-vO CM H cyNO ONO NO t>-Hi- vO t>m C" O to n C NO M cn i n ^ r O CM O - H H JNO S M o ^ NO f O en N O'*t> cn ^4- CM cm cmu cn $ CM CM O O H M CM CM rH O on o CM r-j to H $ Ot t O o M CM CMCM to O ONtO t> H ON O o o # n f t f t • f t f t •»»■»■» • ■ rH cn CM cn rH no cm c- C- -4 C- c- r r tr t( * D h ass s a s I g g CQ d c \ o to to cn cn to to o in on-4 i > n o j O ^- m n - tO Cn o ON CM

m on m n NO cn CM cm n -< cn ■nh to cn cn o> cn o> cn n cm cn o on 4 on CM cM in i O h O O * Ei h • cn - to to in fl no cm O > > n

NO no cm> nono o m CM cn cnc^to O sfCM o oto to no rH n cm CM CM c*- cm O v -*+m to m cnonto-nfNOH a CM rH to irH — | r H o n o n noo cn nH H CM rH H HJ-cn cn H M H CM CM CM o moNono moNono O to o cn cn c- c- cn cn o to to to O w O 1 m Si n £ -P £ © M c n C m M rH H cm on no On O ©

H

noo cn cm on O fs H n -sj-on r>

to o NO ON •Hi- e'­ no -4 n CM rH rH CM -4- c- cm O

t r o in H cm on

4 c - m c- cn -4- CM o rH CM no NO n rH en ■Ht in to a o> rH on 0> O rH CM N O C— fr- O Ha &

202

» • n

tH rH cn ■ <• cn ON cn O CM H on Hr nO O cn rH rH rH O o n i t s > l CM to to rH O HvOsf rlvO d ^ rH *8 in o • • • * n * • • • • n C— "4* h [ O IT isi isi IT o pq n cn on

sfrt NO o O o to o on r- o O ON O £> ■ ■

o cn fl

NO NO -4- to O CM* H CM 3 to rH -4- m o 4 ON C- cn m cn cn on m ■Hf CM •Hf cn -p •d tQ +3 ■8 & n © 01 a) • ft ft P cd •P gsj .S •H O do tH CO d I o - 00 to rH o 4 CM C- on o cn -t cm o cn o A tO lto fl O rt u * ’

Cn (St O CO NONO cn O cm t- NO o m o m m o no c- o on o Ci O nto on tH H tH 1 X> 01 0 +s ’ S S I • « • • • • • o on * Itt m

E0 O NO N cn NO cn ON m O ft © U CQ

•

o ON o to CM n m to NO m NO m c cm ON rH in O O ■ • ft ’ NO rH rH $ o 2 NO NO NO n h i m —I R H Wl .fi O I to I * g a s o h o © p M Vi £ n 2 a tH t=> S a 6 © U o o © O * * iSt

So on O' ON

& Td •p 3 ! t I Vi £ 1-P a x © i Q t=> CO o © © & 3 S 9 © 0 t c R ©

# ON 3 H 1 © u m o o o o rH XI ’E | % q & © © t© Ck d Thirdly, Nigeria shares with Egypt the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Article 2(f) of the Charter states the ''Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies especially...for defence and security." However,

Nigeria's limited capability aside, she could not align herself com­ fortably with any side in the Middle East imbroglio without causing serious cracks in her own seemingly patched internal structural set­ ting.

In the circumstances, Nigeria resorted to the policy that carried no risk. Since both belligerents are Members of the United Nations, she always rblied on and supported the United Nations (according to

Article 1 of the Charter) "to take effective collective measures for the preservation and removal of threats to the peace." On this specific issue, it is "symbolic" neutralism that pervaded Nigerian foreign policy. We noted earlier that symbolic neutralism indicates a realistic concern for an issue that threatens international peace and security. In other words, Nigeria joined other States in de­ manding a cessation of hostilities between the Arab States and

Israel.

The problem here is that the United Nations' measures, though often "collective," is always more symbolic than effective. Reali­ zing this weakness in the United Nations, and like classical liberals,

Nigeria called for permanent peace and harmony. Regarding the Middle

East and the Indo-Pakistan crises, the Nigerian Representative said, in 1965) that:

203 The U.N. must not allow Itself to become simply an agency for the maintenance of ceasefires. A cease-fire must always be seen as only a preliminary to further action.

Nigeria, therefore, supported the creation of a permanent peace­ keeping force which would be "available in emergencies without embarrassing delay. Nigeria has been spared much embarrass­ ment in these crises by the policy of impartial non-alignment which she genuinely pursued from 1960-1966.

Nigerian Foreign Policy in Africa

Since Nigeria sought implementation of her policies on de­ colonization and apartheid in South Africa in joint action in the

United Nations, we shall postpone Its discussion and probe the problem of African Unity and Nigerian foreign policy.

We begin this study with a brief review of the history of Pan

Africanism.^ The first Pan African Conference was held in London in 1900 when, Dr. H. Sylvester Williams used the term Pan-Afri­ canism to express the desire of people of African origin in

Europe, and the Western Hemisphere to achieve some political free­ dom. Earlier, Dr. William E. Burghardt duBois said "if the Negro were to be a factor in the world's history it would be through 4.9 a Pan-Negro movement."

Later the leadership was shared by both Dr. duBois and Mr. Marcus

Aurelius Garvey. The; in-fighting which characterized African Unity

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 20th Session, 1348th Plenary Meeting, October 1965, p. 2. 48This short review of the origins of Pan-Africanism and African Unity was taken from several sources including Colin Legum,

204 in the early 1960s could be traced to the relationship between these two, and their respective approaches to the issue of unity.

Dr. duBois, a moderate, supported the founding of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He was the editor of Crisis an NAACP publication. On the other hand,

Mr. Garvey, a militant, advocated a return to Africa. ,"He cooperated with the Ku'.Klux KLan, who shared his ideas of expatriating all the

Negroes.’’^0

Between 1919 and 1945, there were five subsequent Conferences at Paris 1919; London and Brussels in 1921; London and Lisbon in

1923; New fork in 1927; and Manchester, England, in 1945* Earlier

Conferences were concerned with the demand that Africans must have a voice in their own Governments. It was at Manchester in 1945 that delegates for the first time, demanded independence for African countries.

Thus bred on foreign soil, Pan-Africanism was imported into

Africa when the First Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra in 1958. The second Conference of Independent Afri­ can States was held at Addis Ababa in I960. At the Conference,

Ghana’s Foreign Minister, Mr, Ako Adjei said: "to us in Ghana

Pan Africanism (Praeger, 1965); Abdul A. Said, The African Phenome­ non (Boston: fll.lyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968); Doudou Thiam, The Foregin Policy of African States. (Praeger, 1965).

^Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (Praeger, 1965), p. 24.

^Legum, op. cit.. p. 26.

205 the oonoept of African unity is an article of faith.... We sincerely believe that the Independent States can and may some day, form a real political union - the Union of African States."

Commenting on this statement, the Nigerian delegate, Alhaji

Yussuf Maitsma Sule said:

...at this moment, the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature... We in Nigeria cannot afford to form Union by surrendering our sovereignty. President Tubman's idea of the associations of States is therefore more acceptable.

Two clear trends of future developments emerged at this Conference.

First the Unitarian school championed by Ghana, advocated macro­ nationalism and demanded immediate political union. Nigeria, with her liberal philosophy of gradualism put forward the case for the micro-nationalists by advocating federalism. Commenting on the federalists, Doudou Thiam says

They speak of the "nations of Africa" and not of the "African nation." It must be said that the very circumstances in which the African states have achieved sovereignty militate against the immediate appearance of the Great African Nation. ^

Secondly, the pattern of the eventual bipolarization became discernible when the Nigerian delegate continued his address:

"if anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a messiah to lead Africa, the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear be

51ibld.. p. 46.

52ibid.

-’^Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States. (New York: Praeger, 19o5) p. 8.

206 ct > ■ defeated." ^ This was an affront to Dr. Nkrumah whose* inbessant sermon on "unity tinder one single leadership" was becoming an irritating pomposity. Doudou Thiam says:

Centrifugal forces had brought about the collapse of the old federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. These forces are still far from spent. Then there is a by no means negligible human factor - a very lively rivalry between the political leaders, thet majority of whom would rather be big fish in a little pool than small fish in a big pool.^5

Meanwhile, the misunderstanding sharpened and power blocs began to emerge. Welcoming Nigeria to the United Nations in October I960,

President Sekou Toure of Guinea said:

.. .We read in the press that Nigeria will soon take on the role of leadership in Africa. Some say that Ghana is afraid of Nigeria; others that the members of the French Community are also afraid of Nigeria. Those who speak of thirty-five million Nigerians never mention the six hundred and fifty million Chinese.. We are not concerned with numbers, but with quality.

The Brazzaville Groupappeared in October I960 when the group members - all ex-French African States - held a Conference in Abidjan in order to see what mediation could be attempted in the Franco-Algerian war. However, the Group later got around to

^Legum, o p . cit.. p. 47. 55 Doudou Thiam, op. pit., p. 8.

*^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 15th Session, 1960-61, 864 and 907 Plenary Meetings, pp. 521-538.

^Cameroun, Central Republic of Africa, Congo (Brazzaville) Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad.

207 rejecting Dr. Nkrumah’s political union. Then came the Casablanca

Group: Morocco, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, ITAR, Libya and also the

Algerian Provisional Government. This Group was formed in January

1961.

Next a major regrouping occurred in May 1961 when the Brazza- 58 ville powers and eight other states, including Nigeria, met in

Monrovia, Liberia. They were the Monrovia powers.

Ghana, the mascot of the Casablanca powers denounced the new development as spurious. The pro-Government newspaper, Evening

Star declared that

the very moment the BBC and other imperialist broadcasting brassbands began their phoney adulation of the so-called virtues of the Monrovia slave mentality slogan of ’unity without unification' students of African history suspected with considerable concern the genesis of this new brand of His Majesty’s Voice, just to discover that it was only the hand that was Esau. The imperialists chose Monrovia because they believed Liberia^ is still pulling the economic apron-strings.

This language infuriated most Nigerians. The West African

Pilot, a leading Nigerian newspaper, picked the challenge. It said:

Dr, Nkrumah says Pan Africanism means nothing unless it transcends the artificial barriers and boundaries imposed by colonialism. Ghana is in union with Guinea. They do not yet have one parliament or currency.. .the so-called union remains a scrap of paper. Without his police and paramilitary groups such as the Builders Brigades and the Young Pioneers, Dr. Nkrumah knows he will be facing a revolt any day. Xet this is the man^_ who goes before the world preaching unity.... ------— pg— Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ethiopia and Libya. Tunisia assumed observer Btatus. 59 Legum, op. cit., p. 54*

6QWest African Pilot. (Nigeria), (May 18, 1961) With this and subsequent exchanges, the bifurcation was complete, albeit temporarily, among, ironically, those planning to be united.

Thenceforth, Nigeria began to pursue a policy of functionalism.

Economic cooperation was emphasized. Political union was pushed aside.

Ghana and the Casablanca states played the political gong louder while little attention was paid to economic cooperation. But since economic

cooperation required political actions and the latter could be

successfully performed if the former provided thee means, both groups kept running into one another.

Here the student finds a similarity with the popular American anecdote related by George F. Kennan about the two crosseyed men who bumped into each other on a street in Philadelphia. The one

said "why in hell don’t you look where you’re going?” To which the other replied "why in hell don’t you go where you are looking?"6^-

After Liberia, the Monrovia Group met in Lagos, Nigeria, in

1962. A compromise was aimed at between this Group and the

Casablanca powers, but the latter were absent from the Lagos Con­ ference ostensibly because the Algerian Provisional Government was not invited. From Lagos, the meeting moved to Addis Ababa in 1963 where the Heads of all thirty-two independent African States formed what is now known as the Organization of African Unity.

From I960 to January, 1966, events in Africa produced a dual­ ism in Nigerian foreign policy: economic idealism and political realism.

^^Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

209 Economic Idealism

Nigeria saw economic cooperation as the centripetal force of unity in Africa, and political union the centrifugal force. But

as a result of the compartmentalization of the Continent, the racial,

historical, religious and economic bonds were still severed by political boundaries. After independence in late 1950s and early

196O3, the economies of African countries resembled a chain of unrelated capital projects.

This is why, as can be seen from Table 12 and 13. Nigeria* s

trade with African States (and indeed, intra-African trade rela­

tions as a whole) excluding South Africa, was almost insignificant.

As the Table show§, improvement began after Nigeria started her

economic development programme. One of the objectives of the

Development Plan was to create some harmony with the scattered eco­

nomic projects of neighboring states. In the United Nations in

1962, the Foreign Minister said:

Our Six Tear Development Plan is geared to creating a welfare state which will be of service to people of Nigeria, to Africa, and, in,our humble way, to the world com­ munity. 2

Because of the size of the Continent and the enormity of its

diversities, economic cooperation, in the Nigerian plan, was to

be achieved, first, on regional basisj and later on a continental

basis. According to the Prime Minister, there would be

------5SjJ •N. General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session, 1153rd Plenary Meeting, October 1962, p. 509.

2 1 0 a North African grouping, which would include the Sudan; a West African grouping, which would extend to the River Congo; and an East African grouping, which would include almost all the Central African countries.°3

The Progress Report. 1964. on the Plan stated that any move

towards economic unity in Africa could not succeed unless there were ample infrastructure: transportation and communication. The

immediate focus was on West Africa. Nigeria extended her tele­

communication system to link about twentyone African countries. In transportation, she concentrated on rail, road, and air links with her neighbors. In order to increase intra-West African trade, Nigeria entered into trade agreements with Togo, Dahomey, Cameroun, Senegal, 64 Chad, Niger, and Mali.

Here again, we see a strong liberal influence on foreign policy: economic interdependence binds nations together. In a declaration almost similar to the voice of President John F. Kennedy who once admonished President Nasser of Egypt "to concentrate on making progress at home rather than trouble abroad,"^5 the

Nigerian Foreign Minister called upon African States in the United

Nations to "keep power politics aside" and concentrate on "service politics: service to our population, peoples, and the African country."^

^3irAfrican Common Market," Federal Nigeria. (June-July 1963), p. 3.

^National Development Plan Progress Report. 1964* op. cit., p. 26. 65 Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., A Thousand Days. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 567.

^ U . N . , General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session 1153rd Plenary Meeting, October 1962, p. 512.

211 The Economic Commission for Africa and the Economic and Social

Council of the OAU assisted in these regional projects. The United

States Agency for International Development assisted in the develop­

ment of regional cooperation. In its statement on U.S. objectives,

U.S. Foreign Aid in Africa indicates that "in its new emphasis on

assistance to African interstate efforts...aid to regional projects

and institutions is designed to make the most of what the countries

do have by sharing with others in programs of mutual economic

benefit.11 ^

Were the countries actually ready to cooperate and share what

they had with one another? This is the line of argument presented

by the exponenets of regionalism and functionalism. They equate

regional cooperation to a snowball that grows by accretion. Eco­ nomic cooperation in one section tends to stimulate its duplication

elsewhere. However, there are the problems of competition and the

harmonization of different regional interests, which leads Claude

to say "that the makers of the several snowballs are as likely to

throw them at each other as to use them for creating a single (LG snowman." Events in Africa and in most underdeveloped countries

outside Africa have made It difficult for students of international

relations to counter Claude with an opposite argument.

------U.S., Agency for International Development, U.S. Foreign Aid in Africa. FI. 1969. (Washington, D.C.: U.S., AID, 1969), p. 14*

212 Political Realism

Nigerian foreign policy decision makers abhorred the use of force and dictatoral measures. However, the politics of the early

1960s was a vivid example of what Ernest Gellner calls "total politics" in which nothing was barred. Political affairs and developments inside and outside African states were described with expressions such as electoral crisis, assassination plots, conspira­ cies, foreceful toppling of governments, coups d'etat, massacres, all leading in each case to the establishment of military govern­ ments .

Nigeria remained one of the few countries yet unshaken by military exercises. But the real danger lay in direct tribal clashes, indirect aggression, subversion, clandestine instigations where the guilty parties could not be seen and where responsibility was hard to fix. Decision-makers in Nigeria were forced to acknow­ ledge the risk of a defenselessrmation when President Sylvanus

Olympio of Togo was assassinated in January, 1963.

Of course, we must mention the famous "Treason Trial" in the country in which Chief Awolowo, leader of the opposition in the

Federal Parliament, and Chief Enahoro were among the thirty-one accused. The main charge was that the accused

between December I960 and September 1962... formed an intention to levy war against our Sovereign Lady the Queen within Nigeria in order by force or constraint to conpel our Sovereign Lady the Queen tochange her measures and counsels and manifested such intentions by overt acts detailed below.

~^Since Nigeria, though independent, was not yet a Repub­ lic, criminal charges were still acts against the Queen (or the British Crown). Eight overt acts were listed against the accused. See Schwarz, Nigeria op. cit., pp. 140-141.

213 In the Modernization Budget of 1963-64, the Minister of Finance,

Chief Festus S. Okotie-Eboh (later a victim of assassination in

January 1966) said, painfully, though:

Unfortunately history and recent events, both within and outside Nigeria have compelled us to think afresh. We intend therefore to strengthen our defence and security forces even though this will involve us in substan­ tial expenditure.... We intend to preserve inviolable the security of Nigeria against external foe and internal traitor alike."®

Subsequent increases in budget expenditures and expanded train­ ing programmes for domestic military forces pointed to the realiza­ tion by the Nigerian authorities that the heavenly circumstances had not yet prevailed on earth in which the use of force in international relations could be discarded.

E. Summary: Nigeria and the East, the West, and the Third World

Lloyd Free asked the legislators and public cross-sections in

Nigeria to indicate their opinions on various countries on a ladder scaling device whose rungs ranged from 10 at the top the most favor­ able level, to zero at the bottom, the least favorable. The follow- 71 ing result was obtained: Legislators Public The United States '8.3 8.6 . Great Britain 6.9 8.2 United Arab Republic 5*4 6.9 Russia 4.6 6.7 Ghana 3.3 5.2

Apparently, the scores for the West was higher than that for the Soviet Union. The higher score for the U.S. is explained by the gradual reduction in Britain's economic aids to Nigeria and

Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance, The Modernization Budget. 1963-64. (Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, Lagos, Nigeria, 1964), p. 6. ^L l o y d A. Free, op. cit.. p. 9.

214 irn

m

cilteci-Slta tcs

IB

$o — n L‘ L- L- L d t J'- —■—

^?6

A. Nigeria and the United Kingdom

Economically, Britain is declining. She has granted independence to many of her colonies, so most of her sources of power and wealth are on the decline.

The British have brought us up and were very help­ ful. They are nowadays not as helpful as expected.

B. Nigeria and the United States

America is a friend to Nigeria.

The Kennedy Administrations* fight against all forms of racial discrimination.

... the Government sent the Peace Corps to help us in the teaching field.

They are helpful to all countries.... The people are prepared to forgo their meals for those with none.

C. Nigeria and the Soviet Union

Russia has given an example of how a backward country can grow in a short time.

They (the Russians) are good in science but useless to Nigeria

The country (Russia) is not helpful or useful to us.^2

Let us now extend these attitudes and usefulness criteria to the field of economics. Chart I shows the direction of Nigerian exports. Western Europe took a decisive lead, from I960 to 1965.

The curve of exports to the U.S. rose towards the $80 million

^ A l l attitudinal quotations are taken from Lloyd A. Free, op. cit., pp. 11-18.

217 mark in 1965; while exports to Soviet areas was just a little over

$20 million for the same period. Exports to African countries

(excluding South' Africa) which was over $20 mil lion in 1964 took a dive in 1965, $17 million.

A clearer pattern emerged in import activities. See Chart II.

While the curve of imports from Britain continued to fall, that for the EEC maintained its upward direction. Imports from the U.S. had the steepest slope of all. Soviet areas and Africa had, relatively- speaking, the smallest shares of Nigerian import trade.

Two observations are pertinent at this juncture. Firstly, these economic statistics support the thesis that rapid changes took place in the relations of Nigerian economy with the interna­ tional economy in the period now being investigated.

Secondly, regarding the Nigerian National Development Plan, since we observed earlier that about half of the total planned capital funds was to come from abroad, from mainly Western sources, it was normal for significant trade and commercial transactions to accompany the flow of funds from the West to Nigeria.

Nigeria: Changes in Diplomatic Relations

We could comfortably use the same economic argument to inter­ pret changes in diplomatic representation between I960 and 1966.

We remarked that inter-state economic policies required political

(mostly protocol)actions. Increases in diplomatic representation were the direct results of increased economic cooperation with

African (especially the neighboring) states. Outside Africa, it

218 TABLE 14

NIGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, JANUARY 1962

Category (jouncries uountjrles in Whicn Represented in Nigeria Nigeria Has Embassy

Commonwealth Australia Canada - Ghana Ghana India — Pakistan — Rhodesia & Nyazaland - Sierra Leone Sierra Leone United Kingdom United Kingdom

Communist Countries USSR -

Non-Communist Belgium Countries Western Germany (Bonn) W. Germany (Bonn) Ireland — Western Italy - . Europe Netherlands — Norway - Portugal - Spain - Sweden — Switzerland — United Kingdom* United Kingdom*

Western Canada* Hemisphere United States United States

Middle East Israel and N. Africa Lebanon — Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Sudan Sudan Turkey - U.A.R. — Asia Japan -

Africa Cameroon Cameroon Chad - Dahomey - Monrovia Ethiopia - Group Ivory Coast Ivory Coast Liberia Liberia Niger — Senegal Senegal — Congo(Leopoldville)

Casablanca Ghana* Ghana* Group Guinea Guinea* ^Duplicate Listing of Member of Commonwealth. Source: Black and Thompson. Foreign Policies in a Changing World. P. cd d •H .3 © •S 0 ■8 in ON •H S 3 a Si! r H O . - P • * 3 fl tQ t[ § s td *H 'D o I TJ a 3 h> Pl, to p q d t H P M C O ^ 4-* \0 ca

£ •8 ca r£ 0 ■8 £ 0 fr Hr H tJ t d t 0)J 8 01 N c d - P 0 td M c d , g 1 1 3 * S - ^ C A c n * > £ > cd . d 0 >d • c d Q• 1-3 SCM 4 • t • * ' a) ■ 8 o CA da g O \Q ir\ •H r H *6) M r l 3 •s 1 I U 9 0 0 0 1 H S © £ 3,0 1PQ 5 CPm Q0 01 a > •fM r l - p 0 0 0 O C M 0 O O 3

•P 0 d M C 0 r“ ■ P £ CO* 0 E bd ci 0 O CO* Pm O w o O W CL, °i5

C c C, faO(D Odo f l tet.Q ?H O W C Eh ISJ

c d Cl t S £ cd o • r t T J 3 cm g cd o id * H cd -p3 B-i03 g 1h 1o og-s o WHIMOO

220 Bn:

■fl-l S IE

9

Of course, apart from the primacy of economics, Nigerian diplomatic network covered a larger part of the globe at the begin­ ning to 1966 than at the end of I960. Please see Tables 14- and 15.

Other reasons for establishing diplomatic relations were historical links ; the presence of large number of Nigerian students (e.g. in the U.S.); Nigerians making religious trips abroad (e.g. the annual pilgrimmage of Northern Muslems to Mecca was the rationale for the existence of the Nigerian Bnbassy at Saudi Arabia); military reasons

(e.g. with Congo Leopoldville where Nigeria, during the Congo crisis, had a contingent attached to the U.N. forces); the politics of African Unity resulted in the establishment of diplomatic rela­ tions with several African states in the Monrovia and Casablanca power blocs. Needless to say that other criteria were finance and the availability of qualified Nigerian diplomats.

Tables 14 and 15 have been converted into Chart III. If we exclude Africa temporarily, we detect a close correlation between, on the one hand, Charts I and II and, on the other hand, Chart III.

Firstly, the Western powers had more trade relations with

Nigeria than any other regions of the world. Therefore, more of

Nigeria's diplomatic yarn was utilized in weaving the web of inter­ state ties with them than with, say, the Soviet areas. Secondly, the Charts no doubt present ideas as to where Nigeria’s own economic interests lay and could be utilized as a guide to the establishment

222 of priority in foreign policy. Finally, the favoritism which the diplomatic and economic indices showed towards the West further substantiate the thesis of liberal influence on Nigerian foreign policy during i960 and January, 1966.

223 CHAPTER, VI

THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In the preceding chapters, we stated that Nigerian foreign policy had been strongly influenced by the liberals’ concept of international politics. The nautre of the success or failure of foreign policy can not be determined in the abstractj it must be tested in the hot furnace of international politics. It is then that, through the process of evaluation, the consequences of policy may become manifest. It is then, and only then, that the decision to retain, abandon, or modify an initial policy can be made.

In this section, we examine Nigeria’s foreign policy on the two most pressing issues - economic development at home and peaceful change in Africa. We then observe the consequences

(success or failure) of policy actions. It is because the conse­ quences gave foreign policy in Nigeria new directions that we term the section "New Realism."

That conflict is permanent on the international scene is another aspect of our conclusion on the topic "New Realism." We expatiate upon this inference by reviewing very briefly the nature and causes of oonflicts within and among the new nations as well as betwen the two giant powers: the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Our subsequent conclusion is that since conflict is eternal, and no society incessantly confronted by imminent destruction can remain creative and imaginative for long, the conditions for the reduction of violence has to be deviced. We therefore add a last section: "The

Possibility of Peace."

Every foreign policy has its elements of change and continuity.

So it is with Nigerian foreign policy. We discuss "The Possibility of Peace" under the assumption that Nigeria's desire to play a sig­ nificant role in the search for a formula for peace imposed upon her diplomacy (and indeed demanded) certain reorientations and changes which would equip and qualify her for the task. It is under this section that we discuss Nigeria's contributions to stability in the international system. Attempting to stabilize an arena that has been characterized as in a state of war and which has never acted as if it is in a state of peace is in itself an idealistic endeavor. This is why we term the last section "New

Idealism."

A. TJELJ REAT.TSMt The Permanence of Conflict, the Economic Argument

Earlier, we said that the Federal Government assumed that fifty per cent of the total capital expenditure in the 1962-68

Development Plan would come from foreign sources. The First Pro­ gress Report showed the experience in the first two years. Instead of the fifty per cent, it was reported that "in 1962-63, only about fourteen per cent of the actual expenditure was financed from "I external sources."

•^First Progress Report, op. cit., p. A*

225 The second Progress Report, 1964, stated that "the position in

1963-64 was below expectations.... The proportion of foreign aid to 2 total capital expenditure was eleven per cent." Furthermore, the

two Reports consecutively recorded the same dissatisfaction with

the foreign aid policies of donor states. The 1964 Report stated

that:

All external financial assistance offered was tied.... In no case could the'loan money be drawn in cash. Lenders had to be satis­ fied on the merits of particular projects. Plans and designs of projects had to be prepared to suit the lender's requirements. Only projects attractive to foreign lenders could be completed.^

We may ask what were the domestic and foreign policy implica­ tions of this? Firstly, the Nigerian public (hopefully) have learnt the lesson. The sale of "Development Bonds" was initiated at

about that time. Secondly, the Nigerian experience with foreign

aid once more demonstrated how, to the disgust of recipients, the donors who usually "paid the piper" had always "called the tune."

With only a little more than ten per cent of the total capital

expenditure provided by foreign investors, it had been the donors who must first be pleased regarding which projects to embark upon.

In addition to other irritations, the Report stated that satisfying the specifications of donors "constitutes a drag on the: maintenance

of the priorities of the National Plan.

^Progress Report. 1964, op. cit., p. 34. 3 First Progress Report, op. cit., p. 4 and Progress Report 1964. op. cit., p. 32. ^Progress Report 1964. op. cit., p. 32.

226 Apparently, the lesson here is that, as in decision-making in politics, themore a country relies on others through- foreign aid to finance its own internal economic development plan, the less the degree of control or freedom of action it would have in directing or making major decisions regarding the course of its domestic eco­ nomic development. Thirdly, and most important for our policy analysis, is that because of the disappointingly low inflow of foreign aid the 1964- Report stated that the Federal Government was forced to make "strenuous attempts to attract external aid from all sources including the 'Eastern bloc' countries which have not c financed Nigeria's development plan so far."

We see how internal economic difficulties have introduced a new dimension to the course of Nigerian foreign policy. Domestic political instability also contributed its share. Between I960 and 1964, there were several major election crises in the country.

One of them led to the imposition of a State of Bnergency in 1962.

The presentation of details of all the crises in Nigeria is beyond the scope of this study. We must, however, state that political crises in any country is a disincentive to the attraction of foreign loans and investments.

But, on a broader perspective, the descripancy between the

"planned" external aid and the aid "actually" received in Nigeria

^ibid., p. 34.

227 must be seen as one of the consequences of the instability in the international economy at the time under study. The international economy was (and is still being) troubled partly because the total quantity of gold - the international medium of exchange - circulating could no longer provide all the financial liquidity needed for the increased volume of world commercial transactions and no satisfactory substitute or supplement has yet been introduced.

In addition to (and partly because of) the gold crisis, the major potential donors in Western Europe had their own domestic economic problems. The United States1 balance of payments problem snowballed into the dollar crisis. From I960, the United States gradually and persistently reduced its foreign aid programme. It also introduced controls to curb the outflow of domestic (public and private) capital.

In the United Kingdom, economic crisis finally led to devalua­ tion of the pound sterling. In theoretical and classical economics, all things being equal, the first immediate effects of devaluation are a reduction in imports and an increase in exports. Devaluation would, therefore, be ineffective if Britain's imports were not drastically curtailed. We have noted the decline in Britain's imports from Nigeria in earlier pages.

Other West European countries were directly or indirectly jolted economically. The French franc was equally troubled. Al­ though West Germany seemed untrohbled, however, since the inflation

228 of the 20* s, the country had maintained an incessant vigilance over

Its domestic prices; anything that would cause price instability had been avoided. For the Nigerian econony to muster the assumed foreign fund for implementing the economic development programme the reverse of these different protective policies in the West had to be undertaken.

Just as in the medical world different ailments call for differ­ ent prescriptions, the various economic problems of the more developed

Western countries demanded varying economic policies - none of which favored exportation of capital and money to other countries. We therefore conclude that because of their own domestic economic problems and their national economic interests, the great (largely

Western) powers curtailed their economic assistance. This inference leads us to the statement of a proposition which, in the absence of a better appellation, we call the "law" of inverse relations in the fortunes of small powers in international political and interna­ tional economic matters. If some reservations are kept in mind, it sometimes seems that in the international relations of the 1960's, the deeper the political conflict among the great powers, the higher the status of small powers; but in economics, the less developed countries' gains from international commercial exchange sink low in times of international economic crisis. The reverse of this pro­ position is also true.

Refraining from his country's earlier optimism about inter­ national economic cooperation as an approach to peace, at the

229 nineteenth Session of the General Assembly in December, 1964* the

Nigerian Representative said that

A grave threat to peace is the division of the world into the ’’haves" and the ""have-nots,11 the so-called North and South division caused by the reluctance of the industrial countries to share wealth and economic prosperity with their less fortunate brothers.

Towards the close of 1965, at the twentieth Session, another

Nigerian Representative said that "the -increased prosperity of the industrial countries contrasts;sharply with the increased misery 7 of the developing countries."

Nigeria therefore realized that it is not necessarily true that international economic cooperation among the industrial states always promotes the cause of peace; and that the assumed harmony does not always exist among the various economic interests of all states all the time. Indeed, it is suicidal for a state to sacri­ fice its own domestic economic interests so that some other state might develop.

Similarly, in the field of practical politics, Nigeria’s policy of peaceful change did not conform to the realities of the international system. We shall now turn to consider colonialism and racial troubles in Southern Africa to prove our statement.

------z— U.N. GenerAl Assembly, Official Records. 19th Session, 1302nd Plenary Meeting, December, 1964., p. 7.

?U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 20th Session, 1348th Plenary Meeting, October, 1965f p. 4*

230 B. The Permanence of Conflict, the Political Argument

Foreign policy objectives are the state of affairs that a state attempts to bring about through participation in interna­ tional diplomacy, and foreign policy is the course of action designed to reach the objectives. During the period now being considered, it was Nigeria's aim to assist in the decolonization of Africa and the establishment of democratic government in Africa especially in areas below what Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen calls the

"battle line.

The battle line separates the major battle grounds - Angola,

Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa •

southwards from East, West, Central and North Africa. There are two destabilizing characteristic features in the battle zone: colonialism and racial conflict. Simply restated, the political control by a white minority is under challenge from disfranchised black majority. The following figures show the white and non-white population in the area:

Country Whites % Non-Whites %

Angola 172,529 3.5 4,657,920 96.5 Mozambique 65,798 1.1 5,678,564 98.9 S. Rhodesia 177,124 4.6 3,631,356 95.4 S. West Africa 73,464 13.9 452,540 86.1 South Africa 3,088,492 19.3 12,914,305 80.7

Source: United Nations Statistical Office and U.N. Demo graphic Yearbook, 1963 (New York: U.N., 1964).

^Waldemar A. Nielsen, African Battleline. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 1.

231 The conflict which Africa below the "battle line" depicts goes

on continuously inside and beyond Africa. The roughest polemics

on the conflict goes on in London, Lisbon, Washington, Moscow,

Peking, and the United Nations. The capitals of the independent

African states continue to engage themselves with the issue.

Angola and Mozambique are under Portugal. As distinct from

the philosophy of apartheid in South Africa, the colonial policy of

Portugal has been to integrate the African people into the Portu­

guese nation. This policy demands civilizing and Christianizing#

the natives through saturation in Portuguese culture. Africans

thus acculturated will qualify, and gain the same rights and pri­

vileges as a b o m Portuguese. This is the theory of assimilation.

If we may digress a little, France also contemplated "assimi­

lation" in her colonial policy. She later changed to the theory

of "association." To some African states, "association" is equally

an offensive policy, to some others a tolerable theory of inter­

state relations. Association envisages development of states

according to their geographical, ethnic, and social characteris­

tics, but with each state retaining its own native institutions.

However, there will be formalized cooperation with France. Accord­

ing to Abdul Said:

#The Catholic Church in Portugal is responsible for imparting this type of education to the Africans. This is one of the reasons why Christianity has been linked with imperialism and Africans have said that the "missionaries" came for their (i.e. the Africans) "goods" and not their "good."

232 The policy of association was rooted; in the belief that economic betterment of a region was to be undertaken by natives and Frenchmen within a general framework of mutual interest and a sort of "fraternity but not equality." Association involved an implicit contractual agreement which envisaged co-operation and co-existence of two different societies placed in artificial contact. °

An empirical example of how the system of association was intended to function was (and is) to be found in the arrangements made by France (with the agreements of the other members of the EEC), to grant the eighteen ex-French African countries the status of

"association" with the European Community.

However, after Guinea refused the association status, and pulled out of the French Community in 1958, and with the ensuing massive drive for self-determination in the early nineteen sixties which culminated in rebellion in Algeria, France changed her inten­ tions. Nevertheless, as is the case with English-speaking African countries, association (especially economic ties) between France and French-speaking African states is still very strong. We shall state the effects on French-speaking Africans cf France’s early policy of "assimilation" when we consider "African personality."

This short digression presents us with another opportunity to state that the contrast between Portugal’s inflexible colonial policy of assimilation and the flexible, simple and more practical

9Abdul A. Said, The African Phenomenon. (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), pp. 38-39.

233 British policy of eventual independence constitutes another signi­ ficant difference between continental thought and British liberalism.

Great Britain abandoned the "civilizing" mission long ago, but up till now, Portugal still pleadB it.

Inherent in Portugal's policy is the idea that there are two classes of citizens: a superior, first-class, and civilized Portu­ guese and an inferior, second-class, and uncivilized African, But

Louis Hartz reminds the European crusaders of their own barbarism and incivility in these words:

The "backward peoples" of the East and else­ where might have derived a fine ironic joy from seeing half of the people who were supposed to civilize them suddenly denounce the other half as barbarians since their origin. ^

He then questions "where, indeed, after 1914» was a 'backward 10 person' to turn with any real assurance of being civilized."

At any rate, because of the policy of assimilation, Portugal contends that its territories in Africa are, by constitutional law, not colonies, but "provinces" of Portugal."^ This has two implica­ tions: since she regards the territories as provices, Portugal exonerates herself from the charge of colonialism; at the same time, she exempts herself from and ignores the provisions of Article 73(e)

-^Louis Hartz, op. cit., p. 294-

■^Nielsen, o p . cit.. p. 17.

234 of the U.N. Charter concerning non-governing territories, which requires colonial powers

to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General ...statistical and other information relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respect­ ively responsible...

Commenting on Portugal's policy on the book and the actual reality in the territories, lie. W. A. Nielsen says:

In every society, there is a gap or a lag between stated goals and economic and social realities. Between the verbiage of Portuguese policy and purposes in Africa and the actual condition of the natives there is not a gap but a bulf.

What has been Nigeria's policy?" Peaceful change. In 1962,

Holden Roberto, an Angolan nationalist and leader of the Angolan

Revolutionary Government in Exile, approached the Nigerian Govern­ ment for help. Sir Tafawa Balewa said that his country would help train only administrative and medical staff for the Provisional

Government of Angola but would not train Angolan armed forces or police. In October that year, the Prime Minister said;

We abhor violence....Nigeria's position, b o m of her experience has been that peaceful and constitutional methods must first be exhusted in the struggle for freedom.*^

Here again, we see the typical unreality in the thought of the Niebuhrian "children of light." The Nigerian leader mistook the

^ibid., p. 18. 13 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria Looks Ahead," Foreign Affairs, (October, 1962), p. 138.

235 smooth progress of his country for the orderly progress of others.

Broadly perceived, one could say that Nigerian foreign policy on

■racialism and colonialism was domestic politics and policies pro­ jected beyond the Nigerian political boundaries. For, if Nigeria gained independence without violence, what could be more natural than that Angola and Mozambique should have a similarly gratifying pattern of evolution?

Ofcourse, we realize that Nigeria did not possess the military power to bring about a forcible'end to colonialism. We do not reject compromise or friendly discussion of issues. Indeed, while we believe that clean conscience rarely transforms an unjust.social system, in certain cases, we must reject tie thesis that politics results from a conflict of interests not of ocnscience. In other words, in a liberal society, those who speak up against the in­ justice of a bad social practice are not primarily its victims only. In the words of Niebuhr,

slavery would have persisted if only the slaves had recognized its oppression. A moral element thus enters into every successful challenge of Caesar's author­ ity.1^-

But Niebuhr's dictum is relevant only as long as his Caesar is comparable to President Kennedy who, on forcefully integrating the

^Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937) p. 28$.

236 the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama, appealed to his moral

American society in these words:

I hope that every American will... examine his conscience.,.. This nation was founded by men of many nations and backgrounds. It was founded on the principles that all men are created equal and that the rights of everyman are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened.

If the dictates of reason and the exercise of prudence necessi­ tate the pursuit of racial harmony in the United States through persuasion, and perhaps limited violence, an opposite policy was

(and is still) required in Angola and Mozambique where the Caesar was Salazar. For Nigeria dealt with Great Britain, the insular power with a conservative but more progressive liberalism. But Angola and Mozambique are dealing with Portugal, a typical example of an unyielding continental power with an uncompromising, conservative orientation. For instance, in the Portuguese National Assembly in

I960, Dr. Salazar said that those who were dedicated to emancipa­ ting Portuguese Africa:

...come too late. The job has already been done. The unity does not allow of transfers, session, or abandonment. The juridical figures of the plebiscite, the referendum, auto-deter- , mination do not fit into its structure either.

This is the leader with whom Nigeria continued to use per- suation. Nigeria was one of the very few African nations that was

Allan Nevins, ed., President John F..Kennedy. The Burden and the Glory. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 181. 16 U N. General Assembly, Official Records. 16th Session January 1962, pp. 1205-6.

237 so oddly naive as to believe that the conflict with Portugal (which

eventually is likely to be solved through the use of force) could

be settled peacefully by mere words of mouth.

James S. Coleman, one of the very few objective scholars on

Nigerian and African political affairs, said that

There can be little question that Nigeria's policy regarding racialist and colonial regions in Africa is remarkably, indeed unnaturally, conciliatory and gradualist for an African government.^

Nigeria continued to maintain diplomatic links with Portugal

through the latter's diplomatic representatives in Lagos. In the

early nineteen sixties, Sir Roy Welensky's Government in the Federa­ tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a nuisance to all African nati nalists. Oddly enough, in June 1962, a Nigerian delegation visited the Federation. Sir Roy Welensky was their host. African nationalists, including Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia (now

Zambia) scorned and laughed at the Nigerian visitors. Kanyama Chiume

of Nyasaland (now Malawi) remarked that "one only hopes this bunch

does not represent the true Nigerian.

As if to add indignity to indignity, the Nigerian Prime Minister

later indicated his willingness to visit the Federation of Rhodesia

and Nyasaland and South Africa and also to exchange Ambassadors with with South Africa. But, he continued:

^Coleman, op. cit., p. 4-04.

238 We shall continue to use all the means at our disposal especially at the United Nations to en­ sure that the last vestiges of racialism and colonialism are wiped off the face of Africa. “

Nigeria often pleaded her case of cooperating with the United

Nations to work out peaceful solution to international disputes.

The Organization remained) helpless and powerless while changes have been sought through unconstitutional method especially in Southern

Rhodesia and through revolutionary means elsewhere.

Even on the floor of the General Assembly discussions on change were never peaceful, let alone the actual change itself. Relations among the great powers in the Security Council, the organ upon which, in Article 24, the Members of the United Nations delegate the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," are rarely cordial. Perhaps this is what jus­ tifies the existence of the Organization, for if all states have little or nothing to quarrel about or fight over, international organizations for the maintenance of peace would almost be unnecess­ ary.

Describing the helpless predicaments of the small powers in the

U.N., Barbara Ward says that they are like

children who go out into the great school of the world only to find the professors shooting, it out in just those classrooms where they had hoped to get their education. ®

^ Sir Tafawa Balewa, Foreign Affairs (October 1962), p. 138. 20 Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962) p. 129.

239 In spite of the conciliatory approach and the plea for peace­ ful change, South Africa did not deviate from the obnoxious policy

of apartheid; Portugal’s colonial and exploitative claws sunk deeper into the skins of Africans in Angola and Mozambique: and Southern

Rhodesia, rather than yield to the practice of genuine democracy, took advantage of Great Britain’s vacillatory contemplations on what to do and declared its independence unilaterally. Dialogues in the U.N. and economic sanctions have yet to produce a reversal

of policies in these battle zones. The conclusion that must be drawn here is that as long as the minority continues to dominate

the majority in Southern Africa, conflict will dominate the area.

We now turn to expand upon some of the frictions and tensions

in the international system.

C. Summary 21 It is said that "international politics is a state of war.”

Although no major big-power war Is envisage^,among the small'powers

there are local and serious conflicts, Israel and the Arab coun­ tries in the Middle-East. Kashmir remains a bone of contention

^Raymond Aron's proposition is that the theory of Inter­ national relations is the offspring of the "state of war." He asserts that "states have not emerged from the state of nature. There would be no further theory of international relations if they had." See Raymond Aron, Peace and War {New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 7. See also Hoffmann, State of War, op.cit., p. vii And Davies and Good, op. cit., p. 91. Carl Schmitt also "Posted the opposition of friend and enemy as the origin and essence of politics." See Raymond Aron, op. cit., p. 292.

240 between India and Pakistan. In a domestic setting, political systems exist because perfect harmony does not exist among conqpeting units.

From I960 to January 1966, the four regions ini Nigeria, each large enough to attempt to dominate thejcountry or, at least, blackmail the other regions during any dispute, co-existed on a delicate balance of power, Since the last World War, it would seem that no other national or international dispute bears irrefutable testimony to the truth in Niebuhr’s remark about the danger and precariousness of a balance of power system than the January 15, 1966, coup, the subsequent July 29,1966, counter-coup, and the present civil war in

Nigeria which began on July 6, 1967, and is still raging, Niebuhr says:

A balance of power is in fact a managed anarchy. But even so it is a system in which anarchy invariably overcomes the management in the end.^2

Each side in these conflicts continues to plead its case before international jurors who have long since abandoned the search for the aggressor or the victim. This must be so, for ifnations could agree on what is just and unjust in international affairs, much pro­ blems could be avoided. George F. Kennan questions: "where is the right or the wrong of the Kashmir disputes? How about the con- 23 flict between the Israeli and the Arabs?"

^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Tdght. and the Children of Darkness, op. cit., p. 174* 23 ^George F. Kennan, Realities in American Foreign policy. _[New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 36.

241 If we may expand our discussion on the permanence of conflict within small states a little further, we find that the major prob­ lem there is that the new countries are still in their transitional stage. In most of them, traditional patterns of social relations having been disturbed by colonial rules, the new identity or new forms of government has not taken root. Therefore, the traditional governmental framework (which is taken for granted in the older states) is the very thing that is at stake within the political community it is supposed to regulate in the new states.

In most of these states, the rules of the game themselves are not stable; they are constantly undergoing tranformation. This is why political elections in the states resemble the basketball com­ petition we spectate annually among the metropolitan high-school kids in which only the first few exhibition rounds are played like basketball; the second rounds are played like wrestling matches; the third round like ice-hockey; the final round is alwasy like a boxing duel between the two finalists. The stakes become higher after each round; the outcome of each round also determines the rules for the next. It Is this escallation that eventually cul­ minates into what Ernest Gellner calls "total politics in which nothing is barred.11^

^■Ernest Gell"0" Thought and Change (Chicago: Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, 1 , p. 67.

24.2 Bat this is not the end. The egg of conflict incubated in

domestic politicals instability has a natural way of becoming the

chicken ofInternational rivalry. In other words, domestic con­

flicts in less stable countries do have their spill-over effects:

they easily become international conflicts. In a recent study Inis

Claude asserts that a small state (especially the mini-states, the

number of which has increased recently in a spectacular manner) may

cause an international conflict through ’'passive provocation.”

Because of its weakness, economic inviability, incoherent socio­ political and bureaucratic institutions, a small state may repre­

sent a kind of "vacuum” virtually inviting the competitive intru­

sion of outside powers. Therefore the state contributes to and pC causes (though innocently) international conflict.

In addition to "passive provocation," big-power rivalry

is eternal and it has innumerable sources. As a result of

technological improvements, the international system has contracted.

The universe has become so crowded and small that neither the

United States nor the Soviet Union can expand without stepping on

the other's toes and thereby cause some intolerable disequilibrium.

The size of one determines the sphere of influence of the other.

At the twentieth Session of the General Assembly in the Fall

of 1 9 6 5 » the Nigerian delegate regretted the unhappy situations

^ I n i s Claude,Jr., Economic Development Aid and Inter- nati nal Political Stability. Unpublished Address presented to the International Political Science Association, Seventh World Congress, Brussels. September 18-23, 1967.

243 caused "by the armed conflict between India and Pakistan over

Kashmir. The President of the Session, Mr. Amintore Fanfani of

Italy, in his. inaugural speech said:

As I speak to you, guns are thundering in Asia. Houses are crumblingj men are dying .... Some of the armies which are fighting now belong to states members of the United Nations which asked to sign our Charter, which prohibits theg^ use of force because they were "peace-loving.11

Earlier, at the Seventeenth Session, the Nigerian Foreign

Minister had wondered "why the big-powers deliberately wanted to 27 keep Berlin off the United Nations1 precinct." As long as there are international disputes which the United Nations would want to settle but could not settle because the big powers keep them off the precinct of the U.N., and as long as there are international problems which the big powers could Bettle but do not want to settle, conflicts will remain permanent.

Perhaps the world is still fortunate that most conflicts re­ main local and the local wars are fought with conventional weapons.

With nuclear ewapon, no longer can final triumph be expected to follow initial setbacks and the world left undestroyed as in earl­ ier world wars. In the words of Niebuhr, if the misfortune of an atomic conflict should befall mankind,

We may be quite certain that on the night before the conflict begins some psychological association will bestow a medalvvupon an out­ standing scientist for having found thekey to the problem of eliminating aggressiveness from human life. ^ - IT.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 20th Session, 1332nd Plenary Meeting, September, 1965# p* 3. 2^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 17th Session, 1153rd Plenary Meeting, October, 1962, p. 511-

28uavies and Good, op. cit., p. 63. 244 At the same time as conflict remains permanent, the search for peace must remain a perpetual endeavor. In one of the closing chapters of his book, Politics Among Nations. Hans J. Morgenthay says that:

If conflict were inevitable, our discussion might end here. But since conflict is not inevitable the conditions for its reduction and the possof peace remains to be considered.

We shall: now explore the possibility of peace among nations and the part played by Nigeria.

B, New Idealism; The Possibility of Peace

Our proposition of the permanence of conflict would seem to support the Biblical saying in the Book of Joel:

Beat your plowshares into sword^and your o spears: let the weak say,

However, there is hope. Mankind is encouraged by the Book of Isiah:"

"..Land they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation.We shall now consider some of the various forces and factors which have worked and are still working for peace among nations.

^Hans J. Morgenthau, o p . cit.. p. 531.

30«Joel 3:10," The Holy Bible.

3l«Isiah 2:4," The Holv Bible.

245 The deaf ears which South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portu - gal turn to the call of reason to terminate atrocities against, and set free, the Africans in Angola and Mozambique especially and also the determination of all independent African states "to eradicate

(if not peacefully, then violently) all forms of colonialism from

Africa" are a bad omen for the international system. However, the fact that Britain, France, and Belgium liberated most if not all, their colonies in Africa enhanced the chances of international peace. Further successes of the anti-colonialist campaign meant that with the passage of time, colonialism would recede as an explosive international issue.

In earlier pages, we noted the existence of what we loosely called a third bloc or the neutral powers. This bloc although lacking a military force of its own, serves as a catalytic agent in the duel between the two world powers. The neutralists stand on moral and ethical grounds. As long as nuclear weapons are rendered less decisive in the conduct of international quarrels, their strength will continue to increase especially in the

General Assembly.

During the period now being probed, the hope for the possibility of peace was supported by the successes achieved by the small states in their relations with the big powers. At the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, in September,1963, the Nigerian delegation observed that his country's participation on the Eighteen Nation

Committee on Disarmament was another way of relaxing international

246 tensions and breaking deadlock by diluting the strength of the big- powers on the Committee. He said:

Previously, it had always been a matter of the great powers of one power bloc negotia­ ting with another power bloc and naturally suspecting one^gnother and never coming to any agreement.

After congratulating the great powers on the successful con­ clusion of the test-ban treaty, the Nigerian Foreign Minister in open elation said:

...for once, the great powers have done what we (that is, the smaller powers) would like them to d o . 33

Relations between the great powers were also very promising in the period. One of the outcomes of the detente (or perhaps the reason for its emergence) was the great change that took place in the foreign policies of specifically Moscow and Washington.

The aspect of change included their awareness that a huge and growing area of international political relations lay (or was allowed to lie) outside the scope of the cold war. Those areas included Africa and (with the exception of Cuba) Latin America.

According to Charles Lerche, Africa determined to remain neutral, and ''Americans eventually concluded that & neutralist Africa was also a non-Soviet A f r i c a . "34 We hope the Russians consoled them­ selves with similar sour-grape rationalization. ^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. Eighteenth Session, September 1963, p. 7. 33 ibid.. p. 7.

■^Charles 0. Lerche, Jr.. The Cold War and After. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 1965; p. 93.

247 One significant contributing factor to the U.S. and U.S.S.E. exclusion of these areas from the cold war's battle grounds was

Dag Hammer skj old's concept of "Preventive Diplomacy" as an approach to peace. Generally speaking, the concept aimed at keeping the great-powers off the. scene of conflicts (for example, Congo) by' keeping the United Nations in those areas. Moreover, neither the

Soviet Union nor the United States opposed the African countries' letter of September 1965, sent to the Secretary-General requesting 3c for the denuclearization of Africa. The letter spurred small hemispheric states in Latin America to request denuclearization of their own territory.

At the nineteenth Session in December 1964, the Nigerian Foreign

Minister read a statistics of favorable moves made by the great powers towards the reduction of international tension. There was the talk of "bridge-building" between the East and the Nest, largely through economic cooperation, foreign trade and especially the wheat purchase agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, in 1963.

There was also the test ban treaty of 1963. In the fiscal year

1964, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. announced significant reductions in their respective military expenditures. A "hot-line" linked

Moscow to Washington, Both powers agreed not to station weapons of

3%.N. General Assembly Document A/5975 of September 5, 1965.

248 ■1

destruction in outer space. The Foreign Minister then concluded

that "these steps encourage the world to hope for better things to

come.”

In further pursuit of peace, the United Nations established

an Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In 1961, the Nigerian

Prime Minister said 11on the outcome of the disarmament negotiations 37 hangs the peace of the world and the happiness of mankind.11

However, the move was an idealistic one incapable of achieving all

its objectives. In the first place, the Committee was not universal.

France, a Member of the U.N. is not represented. The People's Repub­

lic of China, a nascent nuclear power is not represented. Secondly,

some students of international affairs have seriously questioned the

wisdom of disarming combatants who have not voiced a desire to ter­

minate their imbroglio.

Inis L. Claude, Jr., asserts that the problem of power is eter­

nal. Therefore, it is not to be eliminated; rather it is a "pro­

blem to be managed." He says that

Since the time of Cain, it has been evident that man have the inherent and ineradicable power to kill eachcother....If most men have been spared the fate of Abel, this is because in most societies, the power of men to kill their brothers has been kept under reasonably effective management. 38

--- U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 19th Session, 1302nd Plenary Meeting, December 1964, p. 6.

^Cecil Crabb, op. cit., p. 100.

^Inis L. Claude Jr.. Power and International Relations. (New York: Random House, 1962; pp. 6-7.

249 Claude is of the opinion that the disarmament approach has very- little to offer. Even if complete disarmament was achieved, nations would still have the capacity to devise deadly ewapons because "man 39 cannot unlearn what he knows about the means of creating power,"

Stanley Hoffmann states that the best method to eliminate power politics played with deadly weapons is "to get rid of those to whom it has become as necessary as opium to drug addicts.In other words, the prescription is to eliminate the states instead of disarming them. He asserts that "instead of indicting the weapons, L1 we indict their owners." But he fails to suggest who would effect the indictment.

In October 1963, the Nigerian Representative at the General

Assembly said, rather despondedly, that "big powers are playing hide and seek with us. They talk big on disarmament with no serious or /2 genuine intention to disarm." These are the same big powers whom

Hoffmann would like to see indicted. No one expects the big powers to indict themselves. Moreover, states are still the highest acting units in international affairs. They are, therefore, still the judge and jury inyfcheir own cause.

The concepts of balance of power, collective security, and world government represent three fundamental aspects of Claude's thesis on "power management." If anything at all, evidences from

39ibid., p. 8. 40 Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War, op. cit., p. 151.

^ibid., p. 151 ^U.N, General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session, October, 1963.

250 historical records converge on one conclusion: none of these approaches to international peace has ever managed power effec­ tively. Because the equilibrium which each approach .managed to preserve was without sufficient force to hack it up. Hence such equilibrium was "potential anarchy which becomes actual anarchy in the long run."^ Hoffmann comes back to blame force and the use of force. He questions"how many goals couldnever have been sought if leaders andnations had not been able to use force?"^

Preventive Diplomacy, the Grand Debate, Trusteeship, and

Functionalism are other methods of power management which have not been able to bring total peace to the world. There is a native proverb among the Ondos, a clan in the Yoruba tribe in Western

Nigeria. It goes like this: when a village herbalist prescribes more than ten herbs for the cure of a simple stomach pain, none of the ten herbs is good and the stomach pain itself is not simple but complex.The question of peacein contemporary international system is a complex one.

The Nigerian delegation’s view was that instead of engaging in a contemplation of the old theories of peace that had failed, it would be better to seek new ways with sincerity. In Dehio's words, "on a sinking liner, it would be senseless to fight for the best accommodations instead of rushing to the pumps.

^Niebuhr, The Children of Light and op. cit., p. 174.

^Hoffmann, The State of War., op. cit., p. 255. 45 Dehio, op. cit., p. 287.

251 Between October I960 and Januaiy, 1966, Nigeria supported almost all the effort to achieve peace inside and outside the

United Nations. As noted earlier, she followed a "moderate approach" in the conduct of her foreign policy and in her contributions to the discussions on international disputes. Nigeria contributed men and military logistics to the United Nations operations in the Congo.

It was a member of the Eighteen Nation.Committee on Disarmament.

We already noted how in the General Assembly at the Twentieth

Session in October 1965> the Nigerian delegate indicated that his country was one of the very few countries to file with the Secretary

General a declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice because she believed that the

Court "represented one of the symbols of man’s belief in a world of law and order."

Nigeria's attitude towards the U.N. peace keeping activities was one of positive support for the Organization. Speaking on the

252 Congo in April, 1961, the Prime Minister said:

It is not true that the U.N. have failed...., but though we criticize the United Nations, we must all agree that it i.s the only body which can do such work..

In order to: make peace possible between India and Pakistan, in 1965,

"at the invitation of the Secretary-General, Nigeria contributed men to the team of observers required to assist in the maintenance 47 of the cease fire,"

Even with the apparent failure of the United Nations to restore peace either in the Middle-East, or Kashmir, or Berlin, or any­ where else, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, thought that the Organi­ zation has succeeded. In September 1963, he said:

Even if the U.N. enables us simply to let off steam, to let off bottled energy which might have resulted in something more dangerous, then the Organization serves a useful purpose

In the Annual Report on the Work of the Organization in 1967, the Secretary-General was of the same opinion. He said "Quite apart from its.'more positive functions, the United Nations provides an invaluable repository and a safe target for blame and criticism /Q which might otherwise be directed elsewhere.

In order to play her role as a genuine third power between the fueding two giants, Nigeria abrogated the Anglo-Nigerian Epelle, op. cit., p. 102. 4-^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, . 20th Session, 1346th Plenary Meeting, October 1965, p. 2.

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, September, 1963, p. 7. .

^United Nations, Introduction t) the Annual Report of the Secretary-General. June 1966 to June 1967. (New York: U.N.. 1967) Supplement No. la(A/6701/Add.l), p. 8.

253 Defence Pact in January 1962; the ban on Communist literature was lifted; restrictions on acceptance of scholarships from Soviet areas was reviewed; trade agreements were signed with some East

European states as well as with the Soviet Union.

At the United Nations, on December 10, 1965, Nigeria was elected to a non-permanent seat in the Security Council to serve from 1st January, 1966 to December 31, 1967. ___

254- CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT OF AFRICA ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Thus far, we have been emphasizing the dominance of liberalism on Nigerian foreign policy. Since the continent of Africa also exerted some influence, the nature and extent of such influence on foreign policy remains to be stated. The discussion on the impact of Africa on Nigerian foreign policy is divided into two parts.

We begin by examining the different concepts, directions and the nature of the "quest for change in Africa." The ideas of some of Africa's leaders of thought on change are presetted. We also investigate similar nationalist movements which occurred in Europe in thenineteenth century; the relevance of the European experience to the issue of nationalism and change in contemporary Africa is stated.

We find that despite historical handicaps, Nigeria cooperated with other African countries in developing an African cultural iden­ tity. Indeed, Nigeria is the most fertile ground for the develop­ ment of such African value. However, the country retracted from patronizing and disavowed the drive made by some agitative states in

Africa to transform the concept of "African image" or "African personality" into a continental idealistic slogan or an anti-

Western crusade. Next, we relate Nigeria's demand that Africa be represented in the most important organs of the United Nations, especially the

Security Council. We find that the aim of foreign policy here was to project Africa as a strong and respectable entity which would influ­ ence or actually direct (when it could) the movements of international events.

The Quest for Change

Since the end of World War II, international politics has grown to be an exceedingly close affair. According to Abdul Said, the process has brought "the established 'natives' of the system into sharper confrontation with a substantial number of recently-arrived

'intruders' to the system." The resultant dualism produced by the merger of the tribal values of the so-called intruders with Western ideas and values and the realitites of contemporary international system has given rise to a concensus among the intruders, especially the African states among them that there must be a change.

Consequently, two schools emerged. These may be called the divergent and the convergent schools of change. The divergent school called for the rejection of Western system. Dr. Nkrumah was (and still is) one of the high-piests in this sbhool. He proposed an

■'■Abdul A. Said, op. cit.. p. 22. The so-called natives of the system seem to think that things have fallen apart. A former British diplomat, Sir Charles Webster complained that "Our ambassa­ dors did not fit in easily with the new world produced by the war. They had been brought up to deal with gentlemen, a class no longer in control in most countries." See Sir Charles Webster, The Art and Practice of Diplomacy (London: Ghatto and Windus, 1961), p. U S.

256 alternative, African socialism, which would take account of the traditions, the history, and the environment of an African society which, he said, was still largely unchanged, despite the Western 2 influences to which it had been subjected.

Mr. Sekou Toure, another divergent, also proposed African socialism, grounded on trade unionism. He examined socialist, communist, and Christian trade unionism and repudiated all three,

Christian trade unionism was based on respect for the established order and hierarchies, and would, therefore, tolerate no revolu­ tionary movements. Socialist trade unionism was humanized capi­ talism because it housed both labor and capital under the same roof. Communist trade unionism was rejected because it advocated class struggle. Sekou Toure said 'in the name of genuine demo­ cracy, we forbid all suplication of trade unions. Democracy is 3 all well, but Africa is fundamentally communocratic."

The "communocratic" sofeiety is a community-society in which the worker and artisan, peasant and tradesman will all be united by one spirit of solidarity. This doctrine sees the interests of the citizens as one. This is the rationale for advocating a one party system and the existence of a single trade union in

Guinea.

^Doudou Thiam, op. cit., p. 37.

3ibid.,

257

i - t j ♦ Nigeria and Senegal belong to the convergent school. Both

were less brashfull and noisy on the issue of socialism, Pan

Africanism or any other slogan.* Mr. Leopold S. Senghor, the

Prime Minister of Senegal, advocated a "democratic socialism"

which would tie in with the old ethical current of the French

socialists. He said:

Historically and culturally, we belong to this current....The French socialists - from Saint-Simon to Leone Blum - insofar as1hey are idealistic, fulfill the require­ ments of the Negro-African soul, the require^ ments of men of all races and all countries.^

Senghor rejected Marx's atheism. He said that African

socialism must represent all African transcendent values,

values which were essentially cultural and religious.

What was true of the Senegalese Head of State's foreign policy was equally true of Nigerian Prime Minister's. We

already noted Nigeria's position on the issue of the creation

of a united states of Africa. The Prime Minister maintained that ideological slogans and idealistic generalities had less to offer in the form of solution for African problems, especi­

ally after independence. He said that failure to appreciate

^Nigeria hated slogans and therefore produced none. Senegal (with no over affinity for slogans, nevertheless) is the birthplace of "negritude" a specie of the concept of "African personality." A working definition of "African personality is given below.

^Leopold Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 46.

258 the necessity for reality would add to the precariousness of the issue of African unity. The preferred route was to move from the known to the unknown. We noted how he rejected the idea of creating a particular "Nigerian11 or "African" personality and said "we in Nigeria are to project a human personality."

The idea of racial inter-dependence or universalism could also be seen in Senghor's thinking. He questioned:

Why should what was good for France and Black Africa in the first half of the twentieth century no longer be so in the second half? Could logic have ceased to be French and common sense Negro-African?5

It would not be too much to say that the liberal policies of the convergent school could be appreciated by the enemies they made among other African states. The divergent school’s representatives - Guinea, Mali and especially Ghana - often accused Nigeria and Senegal of cowardice in hoisting the Pan

African flag. The relationship between both schools would seem to validate Raymond Aron's statement that "those who fight 6 under the 3ame flag do not always worship the same god."

Although, ideological contradictions and a diversity of routes seem to imply different destinational objectives, it is clear that as the Africans revolted in the past against the philosophy of colonial domination, so are they now revolting

^Senghor, o p . cit.. p. 15.

^Raymond Aron, Peace and War. (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 293. 259 against things as they are, especially independence without genuine freedom. Consequently, both divergents and convergents have postulated only one objective: building a distinct African identity, or call if African personality. In popular parlance, it is simply called nationalism in Africa.

A useful study has been done on nationalism in European 7 countries in the nineteenth century by Hans Kohn. For the light this work will throw on our study, perhaps we may briefly state some of its essential points. Kohn discusses the influence which ’’peoples” whom he called "prophets” exerted on nationalism in England, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia. We have dis­ cussed the founding fathers of Anglo-American style of liberal­ ism. We need only add that the public philosophy in England and American then was "individual liberty.” J. S. Mill's book

On Liberty, was a monumental edifice to the movement. In France after the Napoleonic revolution the theme was on "equality, liberty, and fraternity."

The effects that the movements in England and France had on Italy, Russia and Germany, are very important to developments in contemporary Africa and we shall now examine them. In France,

Michelet lived in a nation, but in Italy, Mazzini’s task was 8 "to create one." He had to look to the past for inspiration.

^Hans Kohn, Prophets and Peoples (New York: Collier- Macmillan Limited, 1946) 3rd ed., 1966. 8,-u^ He said that the native soil had to be consecrated through warlike deedsj there must be faith in God and the peoplej art must not be an haphazard enterprise, it must be a manifestation and a reflection of the national appirations, in short, art in Italy must be Italian. He said "without a country and without liberty, we might perhaps have some prophets of art, but no art. Therefore, it is better to consecrate our lives to the question - are we to have a country?"^

Kohn observes that ?by his pen and his word, " Treitschke

"had prepared the Germans of his generation for Bismack's deed."^ The problem was the "unification of Germany."

Treitschke believed that power was the only means of achieving the goal not individual liberty. The state was the instrument of might. A state without might was incomplete. He said

"whatever Germany had gained in the last centuries it owed to Prussia's sword.Treitschke hardly understood moral restraint in International relations.

In Russia, the problem was simple to identify. Kohn says that "Russia's feelings for (Western) Europe were ambivalent in their strange amalgam of attraction and hatred, of inferio- 12 rity and superiority." Dostoevsky proposed that only through attachment to the Russian soil oould ‘'Russian intellectual 13 draw life-giving forces." and rid themselves of the attractions of Western Europe. Therefore, the task of his life was "to bring the Russian intellectuals back to the true traditions of the Russian folk and soil."-^ Secondly, the Western Church could not, in Dostoevsky's view, revive a decaying civilization.

He demanded a return to God. His God was Russian God and his religion was the nation. He was a "prophet not of universal

God but of the Russian God in whom he saw 'the way, and the truth, and the life.'"15 Dostoevsky's third panacea was "war."

He said "we need war and victories," to promote the liberty and brotherly union of all other nations."^

Today, nearly every African "prophet" is faced with one or more of the social, intellectual and political problems which confronted the national prophets in Italy, Russia and Germany in the nineteenth century. What troubled the Russians of

Dostoevsky's generation bothers all independent African countries: the desire for self-assertion and the difficulty or rejecting Western Europe's values. The intellectual and moral stir in European African colonies known as national movement, was entirely a product of the contactof the colonies

^ibid.. p. 129.

U ibid., p. 133.

15ibid.. p. 136. cultural contact with the West, The collision of Western ideas with traditional African life awakened the African desire for nationhood and led to an agitation against the continuation of European domination over the Africans, In Russia, at about the nineteenth century, the question was "was Russia to become a part of Europe, was she to follow the lead of Europe, and accept its values and standards, or was Russia to remain conscious of and to cultivate her deep difference from Europe?"!?

Mazzini's Italy was disunited. So are many African states today. Indeed some cynics have questioned whether to use the conventional terms such as "national policy," "national interests" to describe the course or courses of action employed by most of the states to achieve their domestic or foreign policy objectives, when apparently they have not cohered enough to form a "nation."!^ With no guidance or confidence in the future, Italy leaned backwards to its history for inspiration.

Today, concepts like "Negritude," defined as the entire civi­ lized values and cultural entity of the African Negro, and

"African identity" represent similar movement: the forging of of the attempt to forge national unity, national identity,

!?ibid.. p. 126. 18 This remark was expressed at a Conference in the fall of 1964 on African specialists which explored the factors which shape foreign policies in new African states. A participant said "terminological precision might suggest that the term 'national interest' is not appropriate when one is dealing with countries which are not yet nations." See Vernon McKay, African Diplomacy. (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 179.

263 or a national image through Identification with traditional values based on whatever could be salvaged from the ruines of colonial past, especially traditional arts and religions.

Like Treitschke, some “hard Utopians1' among African leaders have relied on power, especially state power (backed by someone else's military arsenal) over the individual, ignor­ ing the fact that traditional practices and conventions draw their validity from individual liberty and universal ideas.

We shall state further relevance of the European experience at other points in this discussion.

The preferred change today is a movement back to Africa.

The slogan (continental rather than national), is "African personality." To begin with, tie concepts "African image,”

"African identity," and "African personality," and a "class­ less" African society have their myths and realities. The idea that there is no need for opposition parties or duplica­ tion of trade unions in Africa because there are no opposed classes, the slogan of the divergents* school of change, is a myth. This thesis is somewhat based on the fact that the traditional African councils operated on the basis of concensus.

In the traditional councils, all dissenting view were heard and once a decision had been taken, opposition was with­ drawn or dissentients maintained their silence. But time has changed, and is changing. Traditional African councilman took decisions on a day to day (or Issue by issue) basis. They

264 did not have to establish any long lasting national policy.

They were not elected by majority votej they did not decide issues by majority vote in the cabinet; and they did not have to go back to voters to renew their mandate.

On a broader perspective, with a few exception, traditional councilman's decisions were local. Their actions were neither affected nor complicated by the changes caused by contemporary revolutions in technology: rapid mass communication system; or ideological problems such as the confusion presented by the rivalry of international socialism, communism, and democracy; or problems of international economic cooperation, prosperity or depression; or tie problems of rising social expectations.

Most important of all they did not have to participate in inter­ national organizations where the search for peace is elusive.

Moreover, because it is now possible to have one's finger on someone else's weapon's trigger, the Africans can no more fight their own wars. According to Mr. Nyerere,

If we fight our own wars, we shall fight them with bows and arrows and we shall thank God we are not a civilized people.

This is why Dr. Ezekiel Mphahlele says "the African is changing; which makes nonsense of the African personality as a political concept."^

^Cecil V. Crabb, op. cit.. p. 99. See also Africa Today. (December, 1961), p. H .

^Ezekiel Mphahlele, The African Tmagft (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 92.

265 Secondly, there is also the idea of monism based on the

contention that there is a homogeneity of people, institutions,

and state; or that the people equal the party which equals the

unions. A postulate of classness. African countries are not

homogeneous. Indeed, the respective interests of the different

groups inside the numberous countries are never identical. For

instance, the job seeking educated Africans, unionized laborers,

high-status and low-status salaried workers and the unskilled,

uneducated, and unemployed do not share common interests, in

any of the African countries.

Thirdly, African personality is a broad idea. Mr. Senghor

warned that it could become a nebulous cliche and aspiration on devoid of fundamentals. But the most penetrating and devas­

tating (yet most objective) attack on African personality has

been staged by the realist from South Africa, Dr. Ezekiel

Mphahlele. He said African personality "will remain but a

glorious myth."^

Dr. Mphahlele enumerates the cultural ethnic and other

cleavages which separate one African country or tribe from

the-other and across which cuts the nexus of African personali­

ty. The North African Arabs are close to Africa culturally.

Kenya, Tangayika (now Tanzania), Southern Rhodesia and Sodth

Africa are multi-racial communities. In Angola and Mozambique,

the Portuguese feudal/.lords simply conceive themselves as living

in a part of Portugal, virtually.

^■Doudou Thiam, op. cit.. p. 31. ^Mphahlele, op. cit., p. 92.

266 For Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Nyasa (now Malawi), and Northern RhodeBia (now Zambia), the issue is pretty clear.

When they say they want freedom, they mean they want an entirely

African government.2^ Kenya can have only a government with

Africans in majority. "I personally cannot think of the future of my people in South Africa as something in which, the white man does not feature. Whether he likes it or not, our destinies are inseparable."^"

Furthermore, Dr. Mphahlele says that most dependent and independent African states still retain the par p y system of parliamentary democracy. They have the capitalist economy.

He then questions "how is the African personality expressed in all this imitation?" He continues, that for all the talk of

Socialism in certain parts of West Africa, Africans have amassed capital and have enormous interests in property.

Traditional communalistic system of land ...holding is yielding room to private enterprises. Programmes for redistribution of land and other social reforms are non-existent. He then concludes that "on the political plane, therefore, all these different meanings we attach to freedom makes nonsense of the

African personality."

From the above analysis, we see that if there is anything consistent about the concept of African personality, it is the

--- Unless other pages are indicated, for Dr. Mphahlele's views on "African personality" presented her, please see ibid., pp. 19-21. inconsistency in what exactly the term means or involves.

Or, on the other hand, what do Africans mean when they use the

term? From extensive research conducted by this student,

"African personality" has been employed as a generic term

among whose terminological species are expressions such as

"Pan Africanism," "African unity," "African image," "African

socialism," "freedom in Africa for Africans," "Negritufe,"

and recently, "Black power." It is not unusual to hear

nationalists associate African Common Market with the term.

With all these varieties, it is not unlikely that there

must be similar confusion in use. According to Professor

Clair Drake (formerly of the University College of Ghana),

"African politicians, vary their verbs when thqytalk about

the African personality. Some will say we must 'project1 it;

others want to 'asert1 it; others again will 'establish' it;

others want to 'promote' it."^5

The search for an African personality or identity is a product of contemporary nationalism or may we say ethnocen-

trism. Indeed, it is said that the Chinese in earlier times had always put China in the center of the universe and would

call the peoples on their borders barbarians, since within

the broad limits of their experience, other peoples clearly

lacked the arts of civilization. At the height of his pride,

the average Chines would draw some fun from his tribal proverb

that:

^ibid., p. 24.

26See Barbara Ward, op. cit.. p. 114.

26$ God first made the African and overbaked T-Hm black, and then God made the Europeans and underbaked him white, but then God made the Chinese and baked them exactly right.2®

But the Chinese are yellowl In this century, one's color and race is the best. Witness the new dance among the Afro-American.

It is called "I am. black and proud.”

Having shown the amorphism and nebulosity in the term "African personality" owing largely to the mutations that have taken place in indigenous African tradition, we ask, in what aspects of the

African life were the development of African identity sought? What part did Nigeria play in the movement to foster the identity? What were the foreign policy implications? It is these questions that we will now turn to probe.

Two Impacts of African Affairs on Nigerian Foreign Policy

Broadly viewed, as have said before, the Africans assert that the establishment and development of the African personality cannot be jettisoned. Because of their usefulness, especially their contributions to social stability, African cultural values must be preserved and developed further. Moreover, the search for an

African identity has its pilgrims. For instance, the black pop­ ulation in the United States are now saying that:

the extent to which black Americans can and do "trace their roots" to Africa, to that extent will they be able to be more effective on the political scene.

------T~ Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 45•

269 These pilgrims mast not be disappointed. The transcendent

African values must be preserved. In addition to this, the inter­ national system would be richer and would thrive better if all its cultural diversities were adequately protected.

During the period under discussion, African affairs exerted influence on Nigerian foreign policy in three important ways: economic, cultural and political. The economic impact was stated in an earlier chapter when we reviewed the extent and' the nature of Nigeria's economic cooperation with other African states. We shall now review the cultural aspect.

A. African Cultural Identity and Nigerian Foreign Policy

Nigeria seemed to agree with Dr. Mphahlele's delineation of the areas of the African life where the search for an African per­ sonality is "relevant" and must be pursued. Dr. Mphahlele says:

The only thing that can be really said to be capable of expressing an African per­ sonality lies in those areas of cultural ^ activity that are concerned with education and and the2arts, and this requires no slogan at all.

The French colonial policy of "assimilation" deprived

French-speaking African states of their African tradition. In the hey-days of colonialism, citizens in French colonies were educated to speak and think like Frenchmen. They were (just as in the

Portugal case of assimilation) to become an integral part of Metro­ politan France.

Tlphehlele, Op. Cit.. p. 21.

270 Ernest Gellner associates the exportation of France’s cultural image with the parochial evolutionists theories of the nineteenth century. He writes:

In French colonial empire education was centra­ lized and homogeneous. Hence children in out­ posts of empire used textbooks similar to those used in Lille or Dijon. Apparently one of the elementary textbooks spoke of "nos ancetres. les Gaulois",.., and thus little Berber, Senegalese, Malagasy, or Tahitian children solemnly repeated: "nos ancestres, les Gaulois.11

"Well," remarks Gellner, "their ancestors were not the Gauls.

In Nigeria (and indeed in other English-speaking African countries) Britain did not attempt to create a new African who would be a replica of a Briton. Therefore, under the administrative prin­ ciple of "indirect rule," the aspects of African tribal system which were not incompatible with colonial policy were not disrupted.

Broadly generalized, in the colonial days, eneulturation took place in English-colonies whereas accultration dominated French colonies.

This is why the average French-speaking African is usually regarded as representing the Westernized African who is evidence of the violence done to traditional African cultural values. Dr. Mphehlele says that,

It is significant that it is not the African in British-settled territories, a product of indirect-rule and one that has been left in his cultural habitat - who readily reaches out for his traditional past.

^Gellner, op. cit., p. 28.

271 It is rather the assimilated African, who has absorbed French culture, who is now . passionately wanting to recapture his past.^-

With the French-speaking Africans playing only a limited part,

Nigeria, because It has preserved links with: its past, played a very large part in creating and developing the African culturalimage.

Nigeria contains the largest concentration of Africans on the Con­ tinent, and the tribal, linguistic, ethnic, religious, and social diversities in the country makes it a natural field of research for those scholars interested in the Black studies.

However, there were difficulties. Side by side with the attempt to create a separate cultural identity, there continued to survive in the country a deep-rooted admiration for some Western values, especially a healthy respect for education. Thus the country was in the situation of rejection and acceptance in which Russia found her­ self in the nineteenth century when, as we noted earlier, the latter*s spirit of nationalism was beginning to form.

As it was with Russia, so it was (and it stillis) in Nigeria.

It is the intellectuals that are more frequently exposed to the

Western values. In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, "the writer or scholar in a former part of the British or French empire still 5 seeks recognition from London or Paris."

^Mphahlele, op. cit., p. 25.

^Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa. Politics of Independence. (New York: Vintage Books, 1961) p. 65.

272 The impact of Western ways, especially the twentieth century’s modernity, on African birth has always been depicted by Nigerian poets and playwrights in sometimes moving and sometimes feliticious novels, plays, and books. For instance, in The Lion and the Jewel, by Wole Soyinka, the oyinbo's# way of life inf luenced the^half-educated school teacher who desired to modernize his village to reflect the changes of the twentieth century. He imitated the oyinbo. In another novel, Things Fall Apart. Chinua Achebe exposes the dilemma of a traditional chief who revolted against the Church Missionaries but later became their victim.

In summary, Nigeria cooperated with other African countries to develop an Africa "cultural" identity. However, she refrained from patronizing either "African personality" (as either a continental slogan or an anti-Western jingoism) or "African socialism" as a pro-

Eastem banner. We shall now turn to consider how Nigeria projected the continent of Africa as a strong force in international affairs.

B. Nigerian Foreign Policy on the Place of Africa in the Global System

In his maiden address at the United Nations, the Nigerian Prime

Minister said that his country hoped to cooperate with other African states for the progress of Africa, and during the period being investigated, Nigerian foreign policy vigorously projected Africa as an important force in world affairs. Nigeria insisted that Africa

#In the Yoruba language (the language of most Western Nigerians), this word means white-man.

273 be represented in all the important organs of the organization

(so also did other African states). For the purpose of brevity, we shall observe Nigeria's contributions to the seemingly lengthy debates which finally led to granting Africa a non-permanent status in the Security Council.

Since 1957, there had been agreement on increasing member­ ship of various United Nations bodies, but there was never an 6 "agreement on how to attain the objective." Article 23 of the

Charter stipulated that in addition ot the five permanent seats six non-permanent seats shall be elected to the Security Council

...due regard being especially paid...to the contributions of Members to the maintenance of. international peace and security...and also to equitable geographical distribution.'

What was known as a 194-6 "gentlemen's agreement" divided the world into five regions and distributed the non-permanent seats in this manner:

two seats for Latin America, one each for the British Commonwealth, the Middle East and Africa, Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

From 194-6 to 1962, the Middle East and African seat was consistently occupied by the Middle East (especially by Arab states).

The everpresent Middle East crisis and the corresponding absence of any major crisis in the greater part ot Africa before the 1960s might

^Everyman's United Nations: A Basic History of the Organization. 194.5-1963 . 7th edn.. (New York: U.N.. 1964.) p. 67.

^Article 23 was amended by General Assembly Resolution 1991 (Eighteenth Session, of December 17th 1963). The non­ permanent seats were increased from six to ten, the number

274 have justified the exclusion of African states from the Security

Council, hut up to I960 there -were less than ten African states in the U.N. Those in the General Assembly could not muster sufficient votes to wrest the non-permanent seat from the Arab states.

In the 1960*3, however, the United Nations changed significantly in the number of members, in scope of task and function, in opera­ ting costs, and other respects. From the Fifteenth session in I960, the General Assembly's bus of world problems took on more difficult and explosive freights from Africa: the Congo crisis, the Algerian revolt, and racial violence in South Africa. Moreover, the un­ ending crusade against colonialism in the continent gained more recruits. The number of African states in the Organization had increased from four(Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa), not two countries (Liberia and Ethiopia) in 1946 to thrity-two in 1963.

According to Inis Claude,

...every victory for self-determination produces a new member state of the United Nations which adds to the strength of the anti-colonial forces in the Organization.

Yet Africa, as a regional group, a sub-system, or an acting unit in the international system remained without a share in the appor­ tionment of the non-permanent seats.

Expressing the displeasure of African states over this state of affairs, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, in April 1961, told the

General Assembly that African states did not want

^Claude, The Changing United Nations, op. cit., p. 57.

275 any more planning for Africa without Africans. The African must occupy the central position when his fate is to be determined. In all matters pertaining to Africa, the African must be consulted at all stages. My country will not consider itself bound by any de­ cision concerning Africa in which Nigeria has not been consulted or in which Nigeria has not participated.-1*®

Harping the same theme in 1962, the Nigerian Foreign Minister urged the United Nations to leave the Congo affairs to the Africans to handle. He said:

For a long time, we have left this question to be handled by everybody. When a matter of this nature is handled by everybody, it means that it is nobody’s business.^-1-

The rationale behind the demand for African participation in

African affairs was that it is an African that could best repre­ sent a legitimate African view on the different international pro­ blems. It is an African that could best safeguard the interests of

Africa, and portray to the United Nations’ secretariat the yearnings of Africans and suggest the best approach to the solution of the problems in the continent. The Foreign Minister once said that the United Nations had been,

viewing African problems with an alien eyej alien interests fight one against the otherj that is why there have been mistakes.1

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 15th Session, 985th Plenary Meeting, April, 1961, pp. 307-319. 11 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 17th Session, 1153rd Plenary Meeting, October, 1962, p. 514-.

^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 16th Session, 1031st Plenary Meeting, October, 1961, pp. 345-34-6.

276 While the space at our disposal does not permit us to examine each of the Foreign. Minister's statements, we must point out that it is not necessarily true that errors and mistakes had been made because African problems were not handled by Africans. Isfit true that as soon as Africans begin to handle their own problems, there would be no more mistakes?

For almost all their life, the Europeans had handled their own affairs} that had not prevented them from jumping at each others' throats. If the presence of the "third world" in the U.N. is to prevent the big powers from clashing, cannot an alien view, equally a third view, be more impartial and more objective than the views of African countries that might probably have aligned themselves with this or that side to a dispute which originates from the

African continent?

Of course, certain problems are global and can be solved by universal agencies. Others are regional and can be settled through regional organizations. Indeed, Article 52 of the U.N. Charter t stipulates that "...the Security Council shall encourage the develop­ ment of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements..." Although the Congo crisis was regional, its solution called for the mobilization of exfcra-regional. resources which only a universal body could provide. Furthermore, the first

Congo crisis occurred before the Organization for African Unity came into operation.

277 Of course, apart from projecting Africa as a strong force on the international scene, Nigeria demonstrated her policy to see

the U.N. as a universal system preserved. The preservation of the

U.N. aids Nigeria's security and is beneficial to her national

interests.

278 However, the flaw in the Foreign Minister's statement can not nullify the legitimacy of the demand that Africa he represented in the Security Council, In the Seventeenth Session, the Foreign

Minister continued his effort. He said that Africans were not asking,

to have any interference with the permanent seats... .“What interests us is the non-perma­ nent seats. The Afridan states have made it clear that they want representation. ^

We are reminded of the issue of representation in liberal

societies. Nigeria, with that liberal trait, thought that the wrong of inadequate representation could best be redressed by con­

stitutional means. Indeed, the struggle for inclusion of Africa in the Security Council seems to confirm V. 0. Key's statement that

% new group may have to fight for reorientation of many of the values

of the old order.11

However, to Nigeria, the fight for representation was not an

end in itself, but a means to an end. Once an African country

gained entry into the Security Council, Africa would have more say

on the issues of war and peace. Of course, Nigeria realized the

limitations of non-permanent seats. The Foreign Minister himself

once remarked that,

■^V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics. Parties, and Pressure Groups. (New York: Thomas V. Crowell, 1964), p. 57.

UN.General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, September, 1963, p. 13.

279 ....one permanent seat is more powerful than twenty non-permanent seats, because it has the right of veto.-1**

Nevertheless, apart from prestige considerations, partici­ pation in the Council could (perhaps) eliminate the need for lectures on the real meaning of "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" because the

African states (indeed any other small state) occupying non-perma­ nent seats would experience the burden by sharing the responsibility.

Furthermore, the dominance of the big-powers could be slightly di­ fused if the number of small powers on the Security Council increased and the non-permanent members had more opportunity to express their views.

During the 18th Session in September 1963, Nigeria continued her effort to pee representations on the different organs of the

U.N. reflect the increase in the strength of Member States from

Africa. The Nigerian Foreign Minister wondered why all the thirty- two African states had been kept outside the decision-making process.

He questioned: "are we only going to continue to be veranda boys?"^

When we discussed the liberals* th me on peaceful change, we remarked that they set certain "permissible" limits. In their views, changes were to be carried on within and not beyond those limits.

•^U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, September, 1963, p. 13. 16 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, September 1963, p. 13.

280 Nigeria’s quest for change in the U.N. was strongly influenced by this liberals' precept. The changes which she demanded were neither limitless nor indiscriminate. To prove this point, let us consider the Soviet Union's three-man directorate proposal for the office of the Secretary-General known as the "troika proposal" of 1961.

Nigeria was among those states that rejected the>idea. The Nigerian

Foreign Minister said:

We do not agree with the Soviet Union about the troika proposal. That would not work. It would weaken the authority of the Secre­ tary-General. Anything that weakens the Organization is inimical to the interests of the smaller states and the world.

Nigeria opposed the Soviet proposal because it would sharpen national differences and divide into three the world which the

Organization was persevering to unite. Of course, it was apparent that the use of the veto in the Security Council has taught the small states that whatever influence that would acrue to them through the troika, would be easily negated.

Moreover, the more a nation's stake intheintemational system as a corporate body, the more unpalatable the troika or any other proposal that diminishes the authority of the Secretary=General would be. We have noted that Nigeria (and all the small states) relied on the U.N. for economic development, as a safeguard against renewed colonization, an instrument for the abolition of colonialism and racial prejudices.

17U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 16th Session, 1031st Plenary Meeting, October 1961, pp. 345-346.

281 Secretaries-General are not unaware of this. In I960, Dag

Hammarskjold, when intimidated by the same Soviet Union to resign

said:

...1 have a responsibility to all those States Members for which the Organization is of decisive importance, a responsibility which overrides all other considerations. It Is not the Soviet Union or, indeed, any other big powers who need the United Nations for their protection} It is all the others.

Therefore, Nigeria called for only one "strong, independent,

and completely impartial Secretary-General,11 at the head of the

Secretariat. But the opposition to the troika concept did not mean that Nigeria favored the status quo especially as it had

stood since. 194-6. Instead of the troika, Nigeria demanded a regional representation for Africa. The Foreign Minister said:

Africa insists on full and effective parti­ cipation in all aspects of the organization of this body. My delegation will demand and insist that one of the Under-Secretaries on the 38th Floor, in the politcal set up should be an African. °

Like any other political issue in the U.N., the delay over the enlargement of the non-permanent seats in the Security Council

could be related to the cold war. For instance, at a point in the

debate in 1963, some Eastern Powers had said that it (i.e. enlarging

the Council)

——————— Wilder Foote, ed., Dae Hammarskjold. Servant of Peace (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962) pp. 318-319. 19 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 16th Session 1031st Plenary Meeting, October, 1961, pp. 345-34-6.

282 would be a good thing only if the People's Republic of China comes in. ^

The Nigerian Foreign Minister then said that

...this is irrelevant to the issue.^

At another juncture, the Soviet Representative took some indirect (perhaps sparring) punches at the United States and the

United Kingdom by; suggesting that:

In order to get two seats for Africa, we should take one from the Commonwealth and one from Latin America.^2

The Nigerian Foreign Minister quickly replied that,

... speaking for my own delegation, the Africans do not want to take any seat from Latin America and let nobody cause any conflict between us and the Latin American countries. ^

In the end, Article 23 of the Charter was revised at the

Eighteenth Session by General Assembly Resolution 1991(A) dated

December 17, 1963. It came into effect on August 31, 1965.

Africa as a geographical region was apportioned its place on the non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Nigeria was elected to a non-permanent seat in the Council on December 10, 1965, serving from January, 1966, to December 1967.

______on- U.N. General Assembly, Official Records 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, September, 1963, p. 13.

21ibid. 00 U.N. General Assembly, Official Records. 18th Session, 1221st Plenary Meeting, September, 1963, p. 13.

23ibid.

283 CONCLUSION

We have seen that in international political and economic matters, Nigerian external behavior was oriented towards Anglo-

American liberalism, though other factors as well have affected foreign policy. Changes in foreign policy have been brought about by the autonomous functioning of the variables extant on the global scene, and the continent of Africa, as a region or a sub­

system in the total international system, has had an impact on foreign policy. When we considered how internal factors affected foreign policy, our inference was that domestic politics was con­ trolled by the conservative north of the country.

In this concluding section, we turn to consider the possibility of a cause-effect relationship among the different factors that shaped Nigerian foreign policy, and take a look at the future of liberalism in Nigerian foreign policy.

We must confess that any attempt to submit a definitive causal interpretation of the order in which these factors influenced foreign policy could be as difficult and futile as the task of un­ scrambling scrambled eggs.

In foreign policy decision making, input factors rarely occur in isolation. The major factor is usually found in conjunction with less important factors. An example from economics might be illus­ trative. Economists have never agreed upon a completely satisfactory definition of inflation, but the conventional causal explanation identifies inflation with an increase in money supply.

A cause-effect relationship could be established if prices rise after the increase in money supply. Similarly a confusion can develop in the cause-effect relationship, for it does not necessarily follow that a price rise will follow the increase in the quantity of money. The diagnosis may be wrong because in some situations prices rise without an increase in money supply.

The confusion of cause-effect is further heightened by the fact that other automomous factors - supply and demand, equilibrium, and human behavior - also affect the diagnosis of our conceptual inflation. Furthermore, the general term inflation has many species: chronic inflation, cost-push or demand-pull inflation, repressed inflation, etc.. Therefore, no general and permanent cause-effect explanation of inflation is possible; consequently, no once-for-all policy can be laid down.

This is perhaps why in the social sciences, predictions have been very disappointing; yet, the theorist or the social scientist must invest each event with a causal interpretation. In a broad sense, some economic laws and rules have assumed the form of pre­ cision as close to the exact sciences as possible, but in the study of international relations, no such near-perfect rules have yet evolved.

A taxonomy of all the factors which shape a foreign policy decision may reveal that a factor may play either a major or

285 a minor role; it may be either a dependent or An independent variable; it may play a reversible role. Let us consider a specific example.

We already note that in 1961, Nigeria, wanting to play the role of a genuine neutral, or attempting to avoid being branded pro-Western, refused to apply to the EEC for associate membership.

With the liberal impulse, she proposed economic regionalism among

African states and the creation of an African common market. Among;,', other forces here, we see, first, the influence of the international system: the desire to be unaligned. Then there is the effort to patronize Africa by assigning new roles to the continent. But a third factor, national economic interest, was not sufficiently taken into consideration.

Time itself is a strong factoral input. In the short or long term, it is true that new configurations may evolve which means that in foreign policy decision making, established causal rela­ tionships are never permanent. They may change with time and also new relationship may emerge. We see this two years later, in 1963, when it was found that the cart had been placed before the horse because the primacy of national economic interest was neither emphasized nor anticipated. With the lauching of the National

Development Plan, it became apparent that increased agricultural outputs would lack enough external markets unless the country reversed its earlier antagonism towards the Common Market and applied for association with it.

286 Just as the international system (as a separate entity consti­ tuting an input factor into foreign policy) influenced the' 1961 decision, it was also an input factor in the reversal of policy in 1963. The difference was that in 1961, foreign policy makers were perhaps masked with idealistic blinkers. They perceived the global scene as a dependent factor which could be manipulated.

However, in 1963, realism (especially the expediency of national economic interest) asserted itself in its naked form. The global factor was correctly seen as an independent variable. Thus national interest elbowed out the idealistic policy of remaining economically unaligned with Western Europe.

It is difficult to prove that the 1963 decision was the effect of the 1961 decision. Apparently there was nothing wrong with the parametric functioning of the variable inputs. Rather there was something wrong with the policy scientists who, through faculty subjective perception, fed the process with wrong variables.

The only logical output was a strong case of negative feed-back.

Similarly, an etiological analysis of why Nigerian foreign policy remained overly influenced by Anglo-American liberalism and was therefore pro-Western, which overlooks the preponderant weight of northern conservatism, would be as incomplete as playing

Hamlet without the Danish prince who was murdered. In their recent report on situations in Nigeria entitled Report of Special

Ennt "Finding Mission to Nigeria. Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.,

Member of the United States House of Representatives from Michigan, and Hon. J. Herbert Burke, Member of the United States House of

Representatives from Florida, say that:

237 ...though the least modernized and economically advanced, the Northern Region, because of its large population, dominated the Federal Assembly. With political parties largely operating upon a regional tribal base, shifting coalitions of parties for the most part failed to prevent ^ northern control of the Federal legislature.

Reinhold Niebuhr perceives the power of the dominant group when he writes that "The political power in any society is held by the group which commands the most significant type of non-political power, whether it be military prowess, priestly prestige, economic ownership or the ability to manipulate the technical processes of 2 the community."

Our inference therefore that foreign policy was domestic poli­ tics exported to the external scene implies that since the pro-Western conservative north, the unit in majority, dominated the Federal

Parliament, the radically oriented southern minority has less con­ trol over decisions on foreign matters.

The observation that foreign policy was predominantly oriented towards liberalism and pro-Western is not an opprobium. It appears that the most realistic policy for a new government (like Nigeria) that had to establish a balance among competing internal tribal forces, maintain domestic stability, and, at the same time, parti­ cipate effectively in international diplomacy, (at least for as long as it did);, was to start from a known course, and in this case,

^U.S. 91st Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Special Factfinding Mission to Nigeria (Washington, D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969)> p. 5.

%einhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934-), p. 151.

288 liberalism. Of course, this implied imitating Anglo-American values.

However, the tendency by small states to Imitate foreign (Western) values at an initial stage of development (when a national identity has probably not yet been formed), is not limited to Nigeria alone.

Lipset notes that:

Even now, when American intellectual life is at the height of its powers large numbers of American intellectuals in all fields feel towards Britain and especially towards Oxford, Cambridge and London, what Roman intellectuals in antiquity often felt towards Athens.^

The West European cultural attire which Dostoevsky labored to strip from the Russians had been acquired from the reign of Peter the Great onwards. According to Dehio, "Eastern powers tried to gain admittance to the diplomatic maneuvers of the Western world ...

They were at pains to go some way toward adapting themselves to

Western civilization."^ Even after the revolutionary break with the West, the Russians, in the 1920's still approached the West for credits: money and capital; secondly, they wanted trade; and finally,

they wanted diplomatic recognition from the major capitalist governments, partly because it could give added protection against renewed military intervention; and partly because they had already become aware of the political value of prestige.-*

^Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1967), p. 81.

^Dehio, op. cit.. p. 93.

^Kennan, Russia and the West, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

289 Any wonder then that Walter Lippmann writes that "until 1917,

the model for a new government anywhere in the world, even in

Russia, was liberal democracy in the British, the French or the 6 American style."

But not withstanding the initial imitations, Russia eventu­

ally enriches the international system with a distinct form of

Eastern values. The United States, though a traditional child of

Britain, as we Baid before left much of British feudalism and the

custom of primogeniture behind in order to build and sustain a

social system where the qualities of achievement and equality

have produced a respectable democratic government.

Lipset presents a study which states that Canada and Australia

share the basic values, but each has evolved different styles of

liberalism. He says:

Australia differs from the United States in being slightly more equalitarian but less achievement oriented, universalitis- tic, and specific. It also seems less universalis tic;: and more equalitarian than Canada. Canada differs somewhat from the United States on all four dimensions of equalitrianism, achievement, universal!sm, and specificity, while Britain in turn is less oriented toward these values than Canada.^

Kaspar Naegele, a Canadian, says that "in contrast to America, g Canada is a country of greater caution, reserve, and restraint."

lippmann, op. cit.. p. 13.

^Lipset, op. cit., pp. 284.-288.

^Kaspar Naegele, "Canadian Society: Some Reflections," in Bernard Blishen, et. all., eds., Canadian Society. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1961), p. 27.

290 It is needless to say that these differences are in large measures partly a product of the geopolitical factors in each of the liberal societies named. Nigeria will evolve its own distinct style of liberalism. She can not permanently resign herself to the unimaginative boys' play of "imitate my leader."

In this play, boys smiled where the leader smiled and frowned where he frowned. Apparently, originally there was a friend to whom the leader smiled and enemy at whom he frowned. Nigerian liberalism must encounter its own enemies on the international scene at whom to frown and her own friends to whom to smile.

Finally, because of the present civil war, some erudite scholars of Nigerian political affairs might say that the foreign policy analysis undertaken here already belongs to the past. This statement itself is a prophecy. In underdeveloped countries (especially in Africa) where politics has almost replaced economics as the dismal science, no one writes or prophesizes without risking being proven wrong by lunch time if he wrote at breakfast time. This is perhaps why, in the preface to his book Foreign Enterprise in Nigeria, Paul 0.

Proehl cautiously says that

To describe any dynamic institution in print that does not appear almost immediately is a precarious undertaking. Language is swiftly overtaken by events. The author experiences the hapless predicament of the dismounted rider who sees his horse galloping into the distance. When the institution under study is the conglomeration of forces and factors that constitute a new and developing nation, the task is even more hazardous.

291 Ideologies shift; constitutions are altered; governments change; ... poli­ tical parties wax and wane; sectional, racial, or linguistic differences erfl.pt. and divide the people along new lines..°

Therefore, rather than project the past and the present into the future, or hazard any prophecy on the future role or place of liberalism in Nigerian foreign policy, we shall, merely conclude our study with an "either-or" statement on the future usefulness of the exercise.

It is most likely that future foreign policy analysts will view the year I960 as the beginning of, and 1966, the terminal point of a six-year period of innocent* participation in global diplomacy in which liberalism was an important factor in Nigeria1 s foreign policy, A study that records and analyzes Nigeria's foreign policy

(as we do here) during the sexennial of the conceptual diplomatic innocence must be found useful.

On the other hand, if, because of unpredictable developments in a future Nigeria, this dissertation will in the end prove t& belong to the past, then, at least, it will provide those who will be formulating and implementing foreign policy (especially Nigerian diplomats) with an idea of what their country's external political

%*aul 0. Proehl, Foreign Enterprise in Nigeria. (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina PreBS, 1965), p. ix.

*Since independence, except for the breaking of diplomatic relations with France, no other event diverted Nigeria from pursuing a policy of friendliness to all nations. In the current civil war, however, several stateB have influenced and are still influencing the courses of the war through what they either say or did not say, what they do or did not do, etc. When the war is over, no matter

292 behavior was before it changes to the new form with which they will be engaged.

how it ends, the actions or inactions of states in the international system will contribute new inputs into Nigeria*s ensuing foreign policy towards the respective states. Since the earlier period (i960 to January 1966) was not affected by the events of the latter period, it is called a period of innocent diplomacy. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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