France, Italy and the Reawakening of Historical Rivalries

IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2017 IAI 1 Internazionali (IAI). Jean Pierre Darnis isHead of the Security, Defenceand Space Programme at theIstituto Affari rather thangive Italy’s Fincantieri a shipbuilder Stx/Chantier del’Atlantique government’s decision tonationalize soared inJuly following theFrench Tensions between France and Italy the two EUneighbours. outward imageof cooperation between to patch up relations andpromote an in Lyon, anotherindication of theneed Italy isalso scheduled for 27September bilateral summit betweenFrance and A second, andarguably more important grievances between the two countries. of relations and the resurrection of old diplomatic spats led toaplummeting particularly inRome, afteraseries of ruffled feathers among EUpartners, for theFrench president tosmooth EU. Yet, theevent isalso anoccasion a key leadership role inthepost-Brexit indication of France’s efforts toassume Emmanuel Macron inthelatest for a summit hosted by President Germany metinParis on 28August The leaders of France, Italy, Spain and by Jean Pierre Darnis Historical Rivalries France, Italy andtheReawakening of with theGaddafiregimetofulfil what was unable tobuild upon good relations and aweakBerlusconi presidencythat hampered bypolitical troubles at home Italian government at thetimewas in amilitary intervention inLibya. The and theUnited Kingdom took thelead recall theevents of 2011, when France Current Franco-Italian disagreements wound, however, andtensions persist. and photoops have nothealed the patch up relations. Joint declarations French ministersflying to Rome to in some public spats and a queue of perfect storm among Italians, resulting events, which areunrelated, created a player on theLibyan dossier. Thetwo government that considers itself akey on Libya without inviting theItalian Macron organized apeaceconference earlier that weekwhen President relations hadalready beentested previous government. Diplomatic agreement betweenItaly andFrance’s majority stake, thus renegingon an IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2017 IAI 2 the full takeover happened in2012. tensions that werenotresolved until which resulted inhigh diplomatic of Italy’s energycompany Edison, Electricité deFrance’s takeover attempt Tensions go back as far as 2002, with of aFrench conquest of thepeninsula. – also contributed to the perception acquisition of jewellery maker Bulgari dairy company Parmalat or LVMH’s Italy – such as Lactalis’s takeover of intervention, French investment in The sameyear asthe Libya political troubles. weak leadership andrepeated domestic and handle, with its alternate phasesof also appears difficult tounderstand past. From the French standpoint, Italy roots inthecountry’s tortuous colonial regarding Libya, afactor that finds its sensitivity of Italy towards anything French logic reveals theextreme This error of judgement regarding authoritarianism andcorrupt regimes. on thewinningsidetooppose to theLibyan Arab Spring, jumping was therefore anattempt tocatch up revolution. His intervention inLibya and hismissingthetrainof Tunisia’s belated reaction to the Arab Spring French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s sufficiently take into account former diplomatically. Thisview does not in Libya, both economically and a French attempt to take Italy’s place always seenthe2011intervention as interventionism in Libya. Italy has of thetrue dynamics behindFrench frustration is a lack of understanding Another factor contributing toItalian role for Italy. could have beena“natural” mediating France, Italy andtheReawakening of Historical Rivalries divergence. In order toavoid the further confirmed thisstrategic The 2013French operation in Mali the military intervention. seen byItaly asadirectconsequence of followed theoverthrow of Gaddafi is The growing instability intheareathat an impressive bombing effort inLibya. was partof thecoalition andconducted badly perceived byItaly even if Rome NATO’s 2011intervention inLibya was convergence betweenthetwo countries. point of military anddiplomatic and Italy, might represent the highest Lebanon, co-lead at the time by France 2006 reshuffle oftheUNIFILmission in from the Balkans to Afghanistan. The multilateral military interventions, have often beeninvolved inthesame the 1990’s onwards, France andItaly Italy intermsof military policy. From also created ariftbetweenFrance and The 2011military intervention inLibya nationalist. the French state asprotectionist and old wounds among Italians who see Fincantieri aretherefore reopening in French hands.Tensions over group inorder tokeep thecompany created the state controlled GDF-Suez French government, which instead Suez. Theattempt wasblocked bythe of theFrench-based utility company company ENELsought a2006takeover spat, theItalian state-controlled energy Well before thepresent Fincantieri investments on its own shores. that France isnotaswilling towelcome not for theimpression among Italians should notraiseeyebrows ifit were within an integrated EU market and Such investments areentirely normal IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2017 IAI 3 Italy’s 19thcentury history. complex historical implications given an uneasyalternative that also has its relations with France andGermany, Europe meansItaly has toturnback account, this“continentalization” of interesting approach. Taking Brexit into central Europe, arather original and observe Macron’s activism towards with Germany. Furthermore, one can Macron has aclear European strategy at present. of added value seems difficult to define two approaches but apositive process potential convergences betweenthe mainly on Libya. Thereareobvious area, whereas Italy tendstofocus anti-terrorism for theentire Sahel a vision of regional stabilization and Today, France continues to develop that hastaken placesince2011. indicator of thestrategic divergence with France, Italy’s absence is a clear Africa within acooperative framework has increasedits military capabilities in whereas Italy did not. While Germany Germany andIreland replied positively, terrorism prevention. Countries such as military forces needed for domestic its missions abroad inorder torelieve treaty. Paris againasked for help on the solidarity clause of European Union terror attacks in Paris, France triggered French. A few years later, after the 2015 air support that hadbeenasked bythe Monti even vetoed limited logistical The Italian government lead by Mario not backed byits European partners. mandate. Paris asked for help but was militarily intervened inMali with aUN northern militias andjihadists, France seizing of the capital Bamako by France, Italy andtheReawakening of Historical Rivalries be taken rapidly. “diplomatic initiative for Libya” would announced inaninterview that a 14th of July celebrations, Macron challenge from Libya. Duringthe a common solution tothemigration president saw Italy pushinghardfor July 2017,thefreshly elected French partners. For example, during June and policies canresult indifficulties with Macron’s tendencyfor proactive l-un-l-autre-5130477. macron-l-europe-et-la-france-indispensables- emmanuel-macron/exclusif-emmanuel- 2017, http://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/ in investisseurs’” des et Français des confiance la conforter veux Macron: “Exclusif ‘Je Backfisch, Michaël 1 and its aspirations togain anewform uncomfortable with anactivist France hole of ill feelings for Italy which is cycle inFrance isbecoming ablack relations inEurope, thisnewpolitical stance seemstobepositively affecting to observe that while Macron’s proactive centre of hisinitiatives. It isparadoxical a reformist agenda for Europe at the strong evolution of French politics with Macron iscertainly thesymbolof a sense, nowhere insight. analysts said madeperfect industrial on Fincantieri/Stx, adeal that many France andItaly, with acompromise an explosive environment between The result of all thesetensions is this “Macron-style” reaction. Libya on theagendahadresulted in they hadput on France about putting failed tounderstandthat thepressure to Macron’s public declaration and apparently notpaidenough attention many Italians bysurprise.Thesehad Libya summit inParis seemedtocatch

Michel Urvoy, François-Xavier Lefran and and Urvoy,Michel Lefran François-Xavier 1 Afew days later, the Ouest-France , 13 July , 13 IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2017 IAI 4 ghosts from thepast. while avoiding tostirup toomany be neededtocreate astronger Europe international projection. All thiswill their internal constituencies and strategic interests while balancing Italy, which need todefinecommon key member states such asFrance and but thisalso requiresaneffort between further advance European integration there will be a window of opportunity to After theGermanelections inSeptember call. also represents animportant wake up elections coming up nextspring,but it complex situation for Italy with political calls for amore incisive Italy. It isa European game, an acceleration which to reconfigure themselves tothenew the EUandall political partnershave a relatively low profile, theUK isout of the move afterdecadesof maintaining be seenasaturningpoint. France ison moment for bilateral relations can also of leadership inEurope. Thisdifficult France, Italy andtheReawakening of Historical Rivalries 28 August 2017 IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2017 IAI 5 Latest IAICOMMENTARIES France, Italy andtheReawakening of Historical Rivalries www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo Brunetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy etc.). and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects (Documenti IAI,IAIWorking Papers, (Affarinternazionali), two series of research papers (Quaderni IAI and Research Papers) publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational Spectator), anonline webzine and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends abroad andisamemberof various international networks. More specifically, themain end, it cooperates with otherresearch institutes, universities andfoundations inItaly and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences andpublications. To that economy andinternational security. Anon-profit organisation, theIAIaimstofurtherand Founded byAltiero Spinelli in1965,IAIdoes research inthefields of foreign policy, political Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 17 |01 17 |02 17 |03 17 |04 17 |05 17 |06 17 |07 17 |08 17 |09 17 |10 06 3224360 06 3224363 to theBrink Mattia Polvanesi, Ten Years On:GazaBlockade Brings Society for Africa Make aReal Difference? Marcel Plichta, Macron’s Africa “Problem”: Will aMarshall Plan Rome Must StepUp totheTask Nathalie Tocci, TheTime for European DefenceHas Come: Adrian Eppel, Making Senseof Rising German-Turkish Tensions Lorenzo Falchi, Italy and France at Odds over Libya? Historical Rivalries Jean Pierre Darnis,France, Italy and theReawakening of Bobby McDonagh, Why Europe Matters More Than Ever Game Jean Pierre Darnis,Macron’s Foreign Policy: Not aZero Sum International Layers Cinzia Bianco, TheIntra-GCC Crisis:Domestic, Regional and Giorgio Gomel, Violence Grips Jerusalem