France, Italy and the Reawakening of Historical Rivalries © 2017 IAI by Jean Pierre Darnis The leaders of France, Italy, Spain and majority stake, thus reneging on an Germany met in Paris on 28 August agreement between Italy and France’s ISSN 2532-6570 for a summit hosted by President previous government. Diplomatic Emmanuel Macron in the latest relations had already been tested indication of France’s efforts to assume earlier that week when President a key leadership role in the post-Brexit Macron organized a peace conference EU. Yet, the event is also an occasion on Libya without inviting the Italian for the French president to smooth government that considers itself a key ruffled feathers among EU partners, player on the Libyan dossier. The two particularly in Rome, after a series of events, which are unrelated, created a diplomatic spats led to a plummeting perfect storm among Italians, resulting of relations and the resurrection of old in some public spats and a queue of grievances between the two countries. French ministers flying to Rome to A second, and arguably more important patch up relations. Joint declarations bilateral summit between France and and photo ops have not healed the Italy is also scheduled for 27 September wound, however, and tensions persist. in Lyon, another indication of the need to patch up relations and promote an Current Franco-Italian disagreements outward image of cooperation between recall the events of 2011, when France the two EU neighbours. and the United Kingdom took the lead in a military intervention in Libya. The Tensions between France and Italy Italian government at the time was soared in July following the French hampered by political troubles at home government’s decision to nationalize and a weak Berlusconi presidency that shipbuilder Stx/Chantier de l’Atlantique was unable to build upon good relations rather than give Italy’s Fincantieri a with the Gaddafi regime to fulfil what Jean Pierre Darnis is Head of the Security, Defence and Space Programme at the Istituto Affari IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 17 | 10 - AUGUST IAI COMMENTARIES Internazionali (IAI). 1 France, Italy and the Reawakening of Historical Rivalries could have been a “natural” mediating Such investments are entirely normal role for Italy. within an integrated EU market and should not raise eyebrows if it were Another factor contributing to Italian not for the impression among Italians frustration is a lack of understanding that France is not as willing to welcome of the true dynamics behind French investments on its own shores. interventionism in Libya. Italy has always seen the 2011 intervention as Well before the present Fincantieri a French attempt to take Italy’s place spat, the Italian state-controlled energy © 2017 IAI in Libya, both economically and company ENEL sought a 2006 takeover diplomatically. This view does not of the French-based utility company sufficiently take into account former Suez. The attempt was blocked by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s French government, which instead belated reaction to the Arab Spring created the state controlled GDF-Suez and his missing the train of Tunisia’s group in order to keep the company revolution. His intervention in Libya in French hands. Tensions over was therefore an attempt to catch up Fincantieri are therefore reopening ISSN 2532-6570 to the Libyan Arab Spring, jumping old wounds among Italians who see on the winning side to oppose the French state as protectionist and authoritarianism and corrupt regimes. nationalist. This error of judgement regarding The 2011 military intervention in Libya French logic reveals the extreme also created a rift between France and sensitivity of Italy towards anything Italy in terms of military policy. From regarding Libya, a factor that finds its the 1990’s onwards, France and Italy roots in the country’s tortuous colonial have often been involved in the same past. From the French standpoint, Italy multilateral military interventions, also appears difficult to understand from the Balkans to Afghanistan. The and handle, with its alternate phases of 2006 reshuffle of the UNIFIL mission in weak leadership and repeated domestic Lebanon, co-lead at the time by France political troubles. and Italy, might represent the highest point of military and diplomatic The same year as the Libya convergence between the two countries. intervention, French investment in NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya was Italy – such as Lactalis’s takeover of badly perceived by Italy even if Rome dairy company Parmalat or LVMH’s was part of the coalition and conducted acquisition of jewellery maker Bulgari an impressive bombing effort in Libya. – also contributed to the perception The growing instability in the area that of a French conquest of the peninsula. followed the overthrow of Gaddafi is Tensions go back as far as 2002, with seen by Italy as a direct consequence of Electricité de France’s takeover attempt the military intervention. of Italy’s energy company Edison, which resulted in high diplomatic The 2013 French operation in Mali tensions that were not resolved until further confirmed this strategic IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 17 | 10 - AUGUST IAI COMMENTARIES the full takeover happened in 2012. divergence. In order to avoid the 2 France, Italy and the Reawakening of Historical Rivalries seizing of the capital Bamako by Macron’s tendency for proactive northern militias and jihadists, France policies can result in difficulties with militarily intervened in Mali with a UN partners. For example, during June and mandate. Paris asked for help but was July 2017, the freshly elected French not backed by its European partners. president saw Italy pushing hard for The Italian government lead by Mario a common solution to the migration Monti even vetoed limited logistical challenge from Libya. During the air support that had been asked by the 14th of July celebrations, Macron French. A few years later, after the 2015 announced in an interview that a © 2017 IAI terror attacks in Paris, France triggered “diplomatic initiative for Libya” would the solidarity clause of European Union be taken rapidly.1 A few days later, the treaty. Paris again asked for help on Libya summit in Paris seemed to catch its missions abroad in order to relieve many Italians by surprise. These had military forces needed for domestic apparently not paid enough attention terrorism prevention. Countries such as to Macron’s public declaration and Germany and Ireland replied positively, failed to understand that the pressure whereas Italy did not. While Germany they had put on France about putting ISSN 2532-6570 has increased its military capabilities in Libya on the agenda had resulted in Africa within a cooperative framework this “Macron-style” reaction. with France, Italy’s absence is a clear indicator of the strategic divergence The result of all these tensions is that has taken place since 2011. an explosive environment between France and Italy, with a compromise Today, France continues to develop on Fincantieri/Stx, a deal that many a vision of regional stabilization and analysts said made perfect industrial anti-terrorism for the entire Sahel sense, nowhere in sight. area, whereas Italy tends to focus mainly on Libya. There are obvious Macron is certainly the symbol of a potential convergences between the strong evolution of French politics with two approaches but a positive process a reformist agenda for Europe at the of added value seems difficult to define centre of his initiatives. It is paradoxical at present. to observe that while Macron’s proactive stance seems to be positively affecting Macron has a clear European strategy relations in Europe, this new political with Germany. Furthermore, one can cycle in France is becoming a black observe Macron’s activism towards hole of ill feelings for Italy which is central Europe, a rather original and uncomfortable with an activist France interesting approach. Taking Brexit into and its aspirations to gain a new form account, this “continentalization” of 1 Europe means Italy has to turn back to Michel Urvoy, François-Xavier Lefran and Michaël Backfisch, “Exclusif Macron: ‘Je its relations with France and Germany, veux conforter la confiance des Français et an uneasy alternative that also has des investisseurs’” in Ouest-France, 13 July complex historical implications given 2017, http://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/ Italy’s 19th century history. emmanuel-macron/exclusif-emmanuel- macron-l-europe-et-la-france-indispensables- IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 17 | 10 - AUGUST IAI COMMENTARIES l-un-l-autre-5130477. 3 France, Italy and the Reawakening of Historical Rivalries of leadership in Europe. This difficult moment for bilateral relations can also be seen as a turning point. France is on the move after decades of maintaining a relatively low profile, the UK is out of the EU and all political partners have to reconfigure themselves to the new European game, an acceleration which calls for a more incisive Italy. It is a © 2017 IAI complex situation for Italy with political elections coming up next spring, but it also represents an important wake up call. After the German elections in September there will be a window of opportunity to further advance European integration ISSN 2532-6570 but this also requires an effort between key member states such as France and Italy, which need to define common strategic interests while balancing their internal constituencies and international projection. All this will be needed to create a stronger Europe while avoiding to stir up too many ghosts from the past. 28 August 2017 IAI COMMENTARIES 17 | 10 - AUGUST 2017 17 | 10 - AUGUST IAI COMMENTARIES 4 France, Italy and the Reawakening of Historical Rivalries Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, IAI does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economy and international security.