How to Defeat the Vandals in Combat 115 Chapter 3 How to Defeat the Vandals in Combat Unlike some aspects of Roman North Africa in late antiquity, such as Saint Augustine, and Egypt, the Vandal Wars and the reconquest are subjects that have attracted limited attention.1 Again, Procopius is the principal source for most of what he describes,2 and most narrative accounts merely follow his lead.3 The war itself marks the beginning of Justinian’s campaigns of recon- quest; it also contributed significantly to the fame of Belisarius. This chapter is divided into the same three sections as the previous chapter, following an his- torical overview. Thus, the first significant section focuses on the literary qualities of Procopius’ descriptions of combat in the Vandal Wars, and in the process we delve deeper into select aspects of modern narrative theory, at least where relevant. Topics include the role of narrative order, the role of the narra- tor, the use of narrative markers like names and numbers, and some of the ways that the combats fit into the larger narrative. The principal emphasis of this section is on exploring some of the ways that Procopius, the implied author, attempts to guide readers in the Vandal Wars. In other words, we look at the ways that Procopius, more here than in the Persian Wars, leads his read- ers and listeners towards the particular lessons that he is expounding. In the third section, on explaining combat, we look at the different character of much of the combat (the increase in asymmetric combat), the different factors that shaped its outcome from morale (much more prominent in the Vandal Wars 1 There has been a fair amount of work on Corippus, on whom see the works of Cameron (1996a: 12–25; 1996b: 167–180), Zarini (1997, esp. 3, esp. 3–63), the introduction to Shea’s translation (1998: 1–62), and Schindler 2007. More recently Conant’s (2012) book discusses issues of iden- tity amongst other things in late Roman Africa, and discusses Procopius in part (esp. pp. 196–305). Cf. Merrills and Miles (2010) on the Vandals. 2 As a comparison, the eastern focused Malalas (18.81) devotes a lone entry to the Vandal War, and even then only in relation to Belisarius’ triumph. On the other hand, the ninth century chronicler Theophanes (Chron. 186–216), having found nothing of note in Malalas excised much of Procopius’ narrative and included it in his chronicle, and to such an extent that it is one of the most detailed entries in the text. Why he decided to devote so much attention to Procopius and Africa is another matter, particularly since by his time Africa had long since fallen out of Roman hands while Italy, which receives short shrift, was still, at least to some degree, a part of the Byzantine world. Cf. Marc. Com. 534. 3 Stein (1949: 311–328)’s account is little more than a summary of Procopius, though with good reason, I would argue. Cf. Bury 1923: 2.124–148. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004310384_005 116 Chapter 3 than the Persian Wars) to the soldiers’ desire for plunder, and in keeping with the increased efforts of Procopius to guide his readers, the insertion of, and/or reference to, military maxims in a number of the engagements. Finally, we come to the section on generalship, and where in chapter two we explored the ways that the narratives were organized around the generals and the respec- tive performances of Belisarius and Khusro, here we shift to Procopius’ efforts to set up Belisarius for comparison with those Roman commanders identified in the Vandal Wars’ introduction, and to what degree he meets the criteria that he expounded there. Thus, in this chapter we are made even more aware of the effort to which Procopius goes to give his military narrative a didactic quality. 1 The Vandal Wars In 468, a large, combined force comprised of troops from the western and east- ern Roman Empires embarked on an expedition, under Basiliscus, against Vandal North Africa to retake Carthage.4 Despite the not inconsiderable forces at their disposal, the campaign was a dismal failure, and it would be some decades before they tried again. In 533, a Roman military expedition set off from Constantinople bound for North Africa with the express aim of recon- quering some lost territory, particularly in and around Carthage. The Roman victory was rapid, with success at Carthage (533), Ad Decimum (533), Tricamarum (533), and Mt. Papua (533) all coming in rapid succession, and ultimately bringing about the end of the Vandal kingdom. With that said, con- solidation of the newly conquered territory took quite a bit longer, with the hostilities not drawing to a close until the 540s. Much of the unrest was caused by Justinian’s failure to adequately pay for the troops who had participated in this expedition, and who had played such an integral part in Rome’s success.5 The Romans also struggled, at times, to come to terms with the Berbers. 4 For a long time the primary discussion of Byzantine North Africa (from 533 onwards) was that of Diehl (1896), which is still relevant. Pringle’s (1981) two volume study of fortifications brought much of the military issues surrounding the Byzantine period up-to-date, though even it is now three decades old. Cameron’s (2000: 559–569) overview touches on the main issues with the conquest and occupation. Modéran’s (2003: 35–38, 313 – 414, 565 – 633) detailed study of the Berbers in late antiquity discusses some aspects of the Roman reconquest. Zarini (1997: 34–46) is also of interest in this regard. 5 See Kaegi 1981: 41–63..