Book Reviews on Global Economy and Geopolitical Readings
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Book reviews on global economy and geopolitical readings 7 4 Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century Rachman, G. (2016), Penguin Random House, London. “The West’s dominance of world politics is coming to a close. The flow of wealth and power is turning from West to East and a new ear of global instability has begun.” “An America that steps back from its global commitments, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the US-Japan security treaty, would further erode the post Cold War international order. That, in turn, would almost certainly encourage both China and Russia to seek to fill any vacuums left by US power.” Summary Western dominance in international politics is coming to an end. Wealth and power are shifting from the West to the East and a new era of global instability has begun. According to Gideon Rachman, Easternisation – the process that gives the book its title – is the dynamic which defines our age. The growing wealth of Asian countries is transforming the balance of power. This turn towards the East is affecting the lives of people in every corner of the world, the destiny of nations, and key peace and security issues. An emerging China, albeit with problems, is challenging the supremacy of the United States and the ambitions of other Asian powers, including Japan, North Korea, India and Pakistan, and it clearly has the potential to shake the whole world. In the meantime, the West is still struggling to overcome the economic crisis and political populism, the Arab world is in a state of flux, and Russia is aspiring to reclaim its status as a superpower. We find ourselves at a decisive moment in history, but Easternisation is a phenomenon which we will continue to observe for many decades to come. In this work, Gideon Rachman explains the dynamics and the implications of Easternisation, although he does not clearly specify what stances and strategies should be adopted in response to this process. The author Gideon Rachman is the chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times and author of the acclaimed Zero Sum World. In 2016, he won the Orwell Prize for journalism and the European Press Prize for commentator of the year. Previously, 1 Rachman worked for The Economist for fifteen years and he has been a foreign correspondent in Washington, Bangkok and Brussels. Key ideas and opinion The idea that the age of the West is coming to a close seems self-evident, when viewed from a dynamic city such as Shanghai or Singapore. It is not just that the evidence of growth and change is clear, but that China, in particular, has a view of the past that is naturally cyclical. With a continuous history spanning thousands of years, the Chinese are accustomed to the idea of the rise and fall of dynasties, with periods of prosperity and progress followed by periods of chaos and regression. By contrast, the United States, whose history as a nation goes back only to the Declaration of Independence of 1776, has a more linear view of history. The history of this nation has only moved one way: towards greater prosperity and global power. The notion of national decline – and even cyclical rises and falls in power – seems much stranger and more alien to Americans than to the Chinese. Rachman insists that the speed of the transformation in Asian economies and attitudes caught many in the West off guard. The ascent of China, in particular, has been spectacular. Statistics compiled by Yves Tiberghien of the University of British Columbia (Vancouver) show that the Chinese economy was just 6% the size of the American economy in 1990. By 2000, this figure had risen to 12%, by 2008 it was 30%, and by 2011 50%. Most economists, even in the West, predict that Asian growth will continue to outpace that of the West in the coming decades. However, the speed of this change has yet to be determined. In the US in particular, scepticism about the rise of China is strongly influenced by memories of previous erroneous predictions, fashionable in the 1980s, that Japan would pose a threat to America's global position. Although extrapolations about the future can prove wrong, Rachman believes that this time the situation is different. On the one hand, Japan is the home to one of America's largest military bases, whereas China is not part of the US-led military alliance in Asia. Indeed, China is the country that represents the biggest challenge to this system. The idea that Japan could become the world's largest economy was also inherently impossible, because it only had half the population of the United States. Therefore, the average Japanese would have to be twice as rich as the average American for Japan's economy to overtake that of the US. In contrast, there are approximately four times as many Chinese as Americans, so simple mathematics tells us that China only has to achieve a quarter of the GDP per capita of the US to become the world's largest economy. According to the author of Easternisation, the political implications of this shift in economic power are profound. America became the world's largest economy in 1871 and held that title until 2014. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the US alone accounted for one third of global economic output, and since the demise of the 2 Soviet Union in 1991 it has been the world's sole superpower. Today, the rise of alternative power centres in Asia – and, above all, China – raises the question of how long the United States can continue to dominate global politics. The very prospect of an end to American hegemony is already unsettling international politics and raising fears of war in Asia. Rachman notes that many academics and politicians in the United States consider that the periods in which an established great power is being challenged are the moments of maximum peril for the world. The figures put forward by the Harvard professor Graham Allison are revealing: since 1500, out of sixteen cases in which an established power has been challenged by a rising power, this situation has ended in war in twelve cases. One of China's pre-eminent strategic thinkers, Yan Xuetong, a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, also subscribes to this brutal realism. In his view of the world, Yan considers that foreign policy is essentially about power, and at times when there is a dynamic of rise and fall, emerging powers and established powers tend to enter into conflict. Yan believes that these two nations will not declare war since they both have nuclear weapons – but others are not so sure. The United States continues to be the principal military power in the western Pacific, committed to defending its treaties of alliance with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. However, the idea that US control of the Pacific can no longer be taken for granted still remains rather shocking in Washington. Robert Gates – who served as Defense Secretary for both President Bush and President Obama – explains that the Pacific had been viewed as a lake for the US navy since the end of World War II. But the Pacific is now contested territory. The US navy – which numbered almost 600 warships during the Reagan era – now has fewer than 300 ships. After an energetic building programme over the last twenty years, the Chinese navy now has more than 300 ships. What is more, most of the weaponry that China is buying is specifically designed to make it harder for the US to maintain naval dominance in the South and East China Seas. In response to these new Chinese capabilities, US military doctrine underwent a rethink: in 2010, Rachman explains, the Pentagon adopted a new concept called "Air-Sea Battle", which was specifically conceived to combat Chinese weaponry and called for taking the offensive early in a conflict with China. Alarmed by the implications of this doctrine, even some of the hawks in the US government argued that, in the event of conflict with China, the US should instead seek to strangle China economically through the imposition of a blockade. For US officials, even contemplating these scenarios involved a delicate balancing act. If America puts too much emphasis on its strengths, it risks sounding bellicose and playing into the hands of China's hawks. But if America plays down its military prowess, it can also run the opposite risk: feeding the Chinese perception of growing American weakness and the idea that the US can be challenged. This said, to what extent is China ready to declare war on its neighbours, or even the United States? What are the intentions of the rising superpower of the 21st century? In Rachman's eyes, it would appear that the country is moving away from the prevailing strategy of the period 3 when Deng Xiaoping was in power, characterised by policies of economic reform and opening to the outside world. At that time, Deng's emphasis on humility and co- operation in international affairs seemed to make good sense both for China and the US. It was a policy that gave China room for manoeuvre to transform its economy while allowing the West to share in the wealth that China was creating. Deng's successors adopted similar policies. Under Hu Jintao, who headed the Communist Party from 2002 to 2012, China followed a policy that became known as “peaceful rise”. Both the US and China had a strong interest in maintaining a global system that worked well for them both.