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And Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

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And Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FY 2006 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) February 2006 Table of Contents Summary Requirements by Title …………………………………………………………1 Detailed Justification by Appropriation Chapter I. Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance and Revolving Funds …………………………………………………3 A. Military Personnel B. Operation and Maintenance C. Revolving and Management Funds Chapter II. Modularity, Procurement, and Research and Development……...14 A. Army Modularity and Marine Corps Force Structure Initiative B. Procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Chapter III. Support to Iraq/Afghanistan and Other Coalition Partners……....59 A. Support to Allies and Coalition Partners · Iraq and Afghan Security Forces · Support for Coalition Partners · Other Support B. Other Incremental Costs Chapter IV. Military Construction and Classified………………………………65 A. Military Construction B. Classified i Department of Defense FY 2006 Supplemental Request Summary of Requirements The Department requests $67.9 billion, of which $65.3 billion is available for the Department of Defense, in FY 2006 to respond to the demands of ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while carrying on its daily operations around the globe, and to fund other critical requirements. This funding will finance the incremental costs above the peacetime budget that are necessary to sustain the Department’s commitment of time and resources to combat terrorism worldwide. The summary displays the supplemental request in six major cost categories: Summary of Requirements by Title Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance: The Department requests $42.4 billion to support continuing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This supplemental funding is critical for stabilization and security operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations in support of the GWOT. In addition, operation of the theater consolidation shipping point is funded in this request for war reserve inventories, prepositioned stocks, and inventory augmentation to support deploying troops and ongoing operations. Further, the Department requests $0.5 billion for revolving fund financed activities. Procurement and Research and Development: The Department requests $17.2 billion to finance the procurement of critical equipment and for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs, including some classified programs, in support of OIF and OEF. Other Activities: The Department requests $7.8 billion to fund other activities to include - the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds ($5.9 billion); urgent military construction projects ($0.5 billion) and classified and other programs. 1 Department of Defense FY 2006 Supplemental Request Summary of FY 2006 Supplemental Request by Appropriation ($M) Military Operation and Proc. & Military Personnel Maintenance RDT&E Construction WCF Other Total Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) - 100.0 100.000 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 2,197.8 2,197.8 Iraq Security Forces Fund 3,703.0 3,703.0 Military Personnel, Army 6,506.2 6,506.2 Military Personnel, Navy 761.7 761.7 Military Personnel, Marine Corps 834.1 834.1 Military Personnel, Air Force 1,145.4 1,145.4 Reserve Personnel, Army 126.1 126.1 Reserve Personnel, Navy 110.4 110.4 Reserve Personnel, MC 10.3 10.3 Reserve Personnel, Air Force 1.9 1.9 National Guard Personnel, Army 96.0 96.0 National Guard Personnel, Air Force 1.2 1.2 O&M, Army 18,050.3 18,050.3 O&M, Navy 2,793.6 2,793.6 O&M, Marine Corps 1,622.9 1,622.9 O&M, Air Force 6,088.2 6,088.2 O&M, Army Reserve 100.1 100.1 O&M, Navy Reserve 236.5 236.5 O&M, Marine Corps Reserve 55.6 55.6 O&M, Army National Guard 178.6 178.6 O&M, Air Force Reserve 18.6 18.6 O&M, Air National Guard 30.4 30.4 O&M, Defense-Wide 3,559.9 3,559.9 O&M, Inspector General 1.1 1.1 Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug 192.8 192.8 Defense Health Program 1,153.6 1,153.6 Aircraft Procurement, Army 533.2 533.2 Aircraft Procurement, Navy 271.3 271.3 Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 389.9 389.9 Procurement, Marine Corps 2,900.6 2,900.6 Procurement, Defense-Wide 331.4 331.4 Procurement of Ammo, Army 829.6 829.6 Procurement of Ammo, AF 29.0 29.0 Procurement of Ammo, Navy & MC 331.0 331.0 Other Procurement, Army 7,663.7 7,663.7 Other Procurement, Navy 168.0 168.0 Other Procurement, Air Force 1,517.0 1,517.0 Missile Procurement, Army 203.3 203.3 Weapons Procurement, Navy 95.9 95.9 Proc of Weapons & Tracked Combt Vehicles, Army 1,133.3 1,133.3 RDT&E, Army 429.0 429.0 RDT&E, Navy 140.0 140.0 RDT&E, Air Force 67.1 67.1 RDT&E, Defense-Wide 145.9 145.9 Defense Working Capital Fund 516.7 516.7 Military Construction, Army 413.4 413.4 Military Construction, Defense-Wide 35.2 35.2 Military Construction, Air Force 36.1 36.1 Total 9,593.3 32,735.8 17,179.2 484.7 516.7 7,347.2 67,856.9 * May not add due to rounding includes funds for National Intelligence Program. 2 Department of Defense FY 2006 Supplemental Request CHAPTER 1 MILITARY PERSONNEL, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE AND REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS Detailed Justification The FY 2006 emergency supplemental requests funds so that the United States may continue its security stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism in other locations. The supplemental request includes $9.6 billion for Military Personnel requirements and $32.7 billion for Operation and Maintenance. The global war on terror deployments are in addition to the usual daily military operations around the globe. Without additional funds in FY 2006, the Components would have to use funds from their readiness and investment accounts to finance the continuing costs of military operations. In FY 2005, military personnel and operation and maintenance costs averaged about $4.5 billion per month for OIF and $0.8 billion per month for OEF. Absorbing costs of this magnitude would seriously degrade combat operations and would weaken the nation’s ability to react to future threats. Military operations costs include the military pays associated with mobilizing Guard and Reserve forces as well as special pays for deployed service members. It also includes the broad functions financed by the Operation and Maintenance costs supporting day-to-day operations in theater. These range from the operation of base camps (dining facilities, laundry, and housing) to flying hours, steaming days, supplies and maintenance. The supplemental request assumes an average monthly deployment of about 138,000 troops in Iraq and 18,000 troops in Afghanistan with short term increases in the in-country end strength during troop rotation transition. 3 Department of Defense FY 2006 Supplemental Request MILITARY PERSONNEL PERSONNEL COSTS This supplemental request totals $9.6 billion for military personnel pay. This request is net of the funds received in Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006 and finances the incremental pay, special pay, and entitlements above the normal monthly personnel compensation costs for military personnel participating in or directly supporting ongoing military operations. It also includes the costs to pay additional military personnel maintained on active duty above the normal end strength levels to sustain the readiness levels of deploying units. The following table provides a breakout of the supplemental requirement for military personnel costs: Incremental Pay and Allowances for Mobilized/Deployed Personnel:* (Dollars in Millions) Marine Air Army Navy Corps Force Total *** Active Forces 1,062.4 156.3 75.6 109.0 1,403.3 Reserve Forces: Reserves 1,524.6 407.3 229.2 393.4 2,554.6 National Guard 2,670.4 - - 336.3 3,006.7 Total Incremental P&A 5,257.5 563.6 304.8 838.7 6,964.6 Over Strength 380.2 273.0 653.2 Pre and Post Mobilization Training 63.0 73.3 - 136.3 Recruiting & Retention 305.1 1.6 34.4 341.1 Increased Foreign Language Proficiency Pay 33.7 10.6 3.7 11.2 59.2 Death Gratuities 202.0 117.6 45.2 178.6 543.5 SGLI Extra Hazard Payments ** 183.2 82.9 39.2 94.6 400.0 Traumatic Injury Protection Extra Hazard Pmts 288.4 21.5 141.3 22.4 473.5 Insurance Premiums for OIF/OEF Personnel 15.2 1.0 2.8 3.0 22.0 Total Military Personnel 6,728.3 872.1 844.4 1,148.5 9,593.4 * Totals may not add due to rounding. ** Servicemembers Group Life Insurance (SGLI) claims in excess of projected peacetime level. *** Does not include the Coast Guard requirement of $26 million for death gratuity payments. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH): The following amounts are included in the $9.6 billion request above for incremental pay and allowances for mobilized/deployed personnel, over strength, and pre and post mobilization training: 4 Department of Defense FY 2006 Supplemental Request MEMO ENTRY COSTS FOR BAH (Dollars in Millions) Marine Air Army Navy Corps Force Total Active Forces (193.0) (27.1) (21.8) (9.7) (251.6) Reserve Forces: Reserves (231.2) (96.4) (64.7) (66.4) (458.7) National Guard (419.4) - - (55.0) (474.4) Total Incremental BAH (843.6) (123.5) (86.5) (131.1) (1,184.7) In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the President invoked his authority (10 U.S.C 12302) to order to active duty Ready Reserve members and delegated his authority to the Secretary of Defense in Proclamation 7463 of September 14, 2001.
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