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Severity, Probability and Risk of Accidents During Maritime Transport of Radioactive Material Final Report of a Co-Ordinated Research Project 1995-1999

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Severity, Probability and Risk of Accidents During Maritime Transport of Radioactive Material Final Report of a Co-Ordinated Research Project 1995-1999 ХА010263/: IAEA-TECDOC-1231 Severity, probability and risk of accidents during maritime transport of radioactive material Final report of a co-ordinated research project 1995-1999 WJ IAEA 32/44 July 2001 IAEA SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish standards of safety for protection against ionizing radiation and to provide for the application of these standards to peaceful nuclear activities. The regulatory related publications by means of which the IAEA establishes safety standards and measures are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety, and also general safety (that is, of relevance in two or more of the four areas), and the categories within it are Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. • Safety Fundamentals (silver lettering) present basic objectives, concepts and principles of safety and protection in the development and application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. • Safety Requirements (red lettering) establish the requirements that must be met to ensure safety. These requirements, which are expressed as 'shall' statements, are governed by the objectives and principles presented in the Safety Fundamentals. • Safety Guides (green lettering) recommend actions, conditions or procedures for meeting safety requirements. Recommendations in Safety Guides are expressed as 'should' statements, with the implication that it is necessary to take the measures recommended or equivalent alternative measures to comply with the requirements. The IAEA's safety standards are not legally binding on Member States but may be adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities. The standards are binding on the IAEA for application in relation to its own operations and to operations assisted by the IAEA. OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS Under the terms of Articles III and VIII.C of its Statute, the IAEA makes available and fosters the exchange of information relating to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an intermediary among its members for this purpose. Reports on safety and protection in nuclear activities are issued in other series, in particular the IAEA Safety Reports Series, as informational publications. Safety Reports may describe good practices and give practical examples and detailed methods that can be used to meet safety requirements. They do not establish requirements or make recommendations. Other IAEA series that include safety related sales publications are the Technical Reports Series, the Radiological Assessment Reports Series and the INSAG Series. The IAEA also issues reports on radiological accidents and other special sales publications. Unpriced safety related publications are issued in the TECDOC Series, the Provisional Safety Standards Series, the Training Course Series, the IAEA Services Series and the Computer Manual Series, and as Practical Radiation Safety and Protection Manuals. PLEASE BE AWARE THAT ALL OF THE MISSING PAGES IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE ORIGINALLY BLANK IAEA-TECDOC-1231 Severity, probability and risk of accidents during maritime transport of radioactive material Final report of a co-ordinated research project 1995-1999 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY /A ЕД July 2001 The originating Section of this publication in the IAEA was: Radiation Safety Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramer Strasse 5 P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria SEVERITY, PROBABILITY AND RISK OF ACCIDENTS DURING MARITIME TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IAEA, VIENNA, 2001 IAEA-TECDOC-1231 ISSN 1011-4289 © IAEA, 2001 Printed by the IAEA in Austria July 2001 FOREWORD In the 1990s, the maritime transport of radioactive material, in particular the shipments from France to Japan of plutonium, of high level vitrified wastes and of fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, attracted much publicity. hi 1992, a Joint International Atomic Energy Agency/International Maritime Organization/ United Nations Environment Programme Working Group on the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel and other Radioactive Materials by Sea considered many safety aspects associated with plutonium transports. The group recommended that the three organizations adopt a draft code of practice for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium, and High Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships. The group further considered a number of issues related to accidents at sea, accident statistics, risk studies and emergency response. The group concluded that all the information available in this area demonstrated that there were very low levels of radiological risk and environmental consequences from the transport of radioactive material. The group further recommended that the matter be kept under review by the three organizations involved. hi its ninth meeting, held in Vienna in 1993, the Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SAGSTRAM) recommended that a new co-ordinated research project (CRP) be set up to study the fire environment on board ships. This task was meant to tie in with the recommendations of the Joint Working Group to keep matters related to sea transport of radioactive material under review. The resulting CRP on the severity of accidents in the maritime transport of radioactive material involved participants from five countries and extended over a period of approximately five years. This TECDOC represents the final outcome of the work done in the course of many meetings spread over five years. A list of contributors to drafting and review can be found at the end of this report. The IAEA officer responsible for this publication was X. Bernard-Bruls of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety. EDITORIAL NOTE This publication has been prepared from the original material as submitted by the authors. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the IAEA, the governments of the nominating Member States or the nominating organizations. The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA. The authors are responsible for having obtained the necessary permission for the IAEA to reproduce, translate or use material from sources already protected by copyrights. CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. SCOPE 2 2.1. Type of materials and packaging 3 2.2. Types of ships 3 2.3. Accident environment 4 2.4. Effects of accidents 4 2.5. Summary of the findings 4 3. HOW RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IS TRANSPORTED AT SEA 5 3.1. Regulatory framework 6 3.1.1. International regulations 6 3.1.2. National regulations 8 3.2. Radioactive material package preparation and shipping process by sea 8 4. PROBABILITY OF SHIP ACCIDENTS 10 4.1. Introduction 10 4.1.1. Lloyd's databases 10 4.1.2. The МАШ, UK 11 4.1.3. International Maritime Organization 11 4.1.4. Bureau Veritas 11 4.2. Reference studies and statistical analyses of accidents 11 4.2.1. CEPN/EPSN (January 1999, France) 11 4.2.2. SRD - AEA TECHNOLOGY-NTL (UK) 13 4.2.3. SeaRAM - SNL (May 1998, USA) 14 4.2.4. JNC (November 1998, Japan) 14 4.2.5. GRS, EC report (November 1998, Germany) 15 4.3. Main results 15 4.3.1. All categories of accidents 16 4.3.2. Fire accidents 16 4.3.3. Collision accidents 18 4.3.4. Collision and fire accidents 21 4.3.5. Foundering 21 4.4. Discussion 21 4.5. Use of actual route statistics for theoretical routes 22 5. FIRE BEHAVIOUR ON SHIPS 23 5.1. Fire scenarios, frequency, effect of ship type 23 5.1.1. Fire scenarios 23 5.1.2. Frequency 24 5.1.3. Effect of ship type 26 5.2. Determination of frequency-probability, severity and duration 30 5.2.1. Frequency-probability 30 5.2.2. Severity and duration 35 5.3. Assessment of risk 39 5.3.1. Lange, et al 39 5.3.2. Yamamoto, et al. study on engine room fire 42 5.3.3. Yamamoto, et al. study on plutonium transport operations 42 6. COLLISION SEVERITY 44 6.1. Background 44 6.2. Mechanics of ship-to-ship collisions 45 6.3. Magnitude offerees acting on RAM packages 46 6.4. Conclusions 46 7. CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS TO SHIPS TRANSPORTING RAM PACKAGES 47 7.1. Hypothetical accidents 47 7.2. Accident probabilities 47 7.3. Radioactive release to the atmosphere 48 7.3.1. Accidents at port (using MACCS calculations) 49 7.3.2. Accidents while sailing a coastal route (using RADTRAN calculations) 50 7.4. Accidents at sea 51 7.4.1. CRIEPI studies 51 7.4.2. IPSN-CEPN study 52 7.4.3. Sandia study 53 7.5. Discussion 53 8. DISCUSSION 54 8.1. Background 54 8.2. Regulations 55 8.3. Packages 55 8.4. Ship accidents 55 8.5. Ship collision and ship fire frequencies 56 8.6. Ship collision and ship fire severity 56 8.7. Severe accident probabilities 58 8.8. Consequences 59 8.9. Technical conclusions 60 9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 61 REFERENCES 62 ANNEXES 1-7 Annex 1: Statistical analysis of accident data associated with sea transport (data from 1994-1997) 67 Annex 2: Evaluation of the safety of vitrified high level waste shipments from the UK to continental Europe by sea 81 Annex 3: Dose assessment for public by packages shipping radioactive materials hypothetically sunk on the continental shelf 91 Annex 4: Study of accident environment during sea transport of nuclear material: Probabilistic safety analysis of plutonium transport from Europe to Japan 107 Annex 5: Study of accident environment during sea transport of nuclear material: Analysis of an engine room fire on a purpose built ship 118 Annex 6: Probability and severity of fires on board ships carrying radioactive materials 128 Annex 7: SeaRAM: A US DOE study of maritime risk assessment data and methods of analysis 13F CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW 179 1.
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