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International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (Infce)

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International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (Infce) international Nuclear Fuel yirvry. /vi^p А-Г,, 6 /y Cycle Evaluation ФЛЯК ртгроР^Я OV "РТРГ^ WP"fTvrç OFOïTP 5 Таг> 1 РГРС71 ViO.6^8 <"!il] action of Biaic Tnf orrait., т.. October 197^ m-*r?~ 2 TÍFTF 'ЖТ.б/lO U-J4 Spent Fuel Storage and ^Г""4 Fuol DeconVof 197^ Transportation. ф-,,01- 7 ГГРСК VÍ0.6/11 Technical and V.ronorric Analycio ar.d Dooo^hor 197Я Sp0ci.1I Contributions on HWR Spent Fuel Storage. Tin)- ." TTTFOF 'K.6/12 Spooi il Contribution on the Hand! in <- Doccnho-r 197R -глс1 stor.a~i of Ce1? Spent Fuo]. 'Pin!- S TÎÎFOF. WC.6/13 Technical and Fcononia 3na\yaio and Tooo^itor I970 • Special Contri butiona on ^p Sr«nt TïMrti Storage ^nd ^ronoao^t^tion• Ta.a!' 6 7?7FCF У(].£/\°- ijnalrai.a of Institutional ''at+ora рогр-^ъ^п 1979 Tar1- 7 TTÍFOF VÍG.6/9 Analysis of Particular Maoda of Tinvombor 197Я Devi, opina; Countrion, T T>~,_rv Я WFCF '.го. f\ /} / An ouvrir; of +h" Saeoial Nooda of т)оо',г"Ъ"г 107^ Tnduatria1 '"oun+rioa with a Limitée! ^luc] ear Poafor p^r.'^'o^po, ¡г T?,e]' 1 ^o-port auam^ri 7,er, on а оо11Я'*"Т^г—o,r—^o^Jn^T*4' "baai • tho dato r-ii^T-s] -i r¿\ y~r +>o r^oT^+i[r-ñ r^ + i n ~ otates rolo.t.od to nuol^^p povrer fore— cant, s^ent fuel ~enoration, /Ш storaae capacity, AF.Î atorado oep- aoi't.Tr, APT? stora~o and +ropoaort avstons. r 0-0 'T'aeh "oTiOTta 2— ' ЯЯОТУЯО tho aa^nt fuol atona ond transport situation aeeordin" to n^a.otir tynos. Information on tho toehnioa1 description of aa^nt fuol existing storage nj1d t.rnnnort toohniaiioo, oró; tnr-Virp "41-1 under do vol ounont and on ooata i а .^"оп. m 1 r -i~i' f} sus>nari 7, os, tho туе a oat. 1 r-^nl Ггтюног ' for aa -nt •fuol -2- protoctior., accounting and control of nuclear material by states, >ion— aroli ferat^ or. of* rurlc^vr 'леатюпс• assurances "Гот* national r.eocss +o miel ear material contained ir. srer+ fuel, arc! protection of* tech­ no! oror. The irrt.: tutional practice fo"" spent fuel piorno and trans­ port is described. Рог the period up to the year 2025 a prorriocis and recommendations related to 1r-~al framework and institutional models are ~ivcr. • The special needs of devalo •in,'- countries and industrialized countr" ^s with a limited nuclear power proTaiam^ with resneot to spent fuel manaaomert are analyzed in Taak Re^o^t" 7 and 3. International Nuclear IHFCE WG.6/8 Fuel 31 October I978 Cycle Evaluation Submitted to and reproduced Iy the IAEA Co-Chai лпяп/ИС. 6/4 PINAL DRAFT "Collection of basic information" The Members of Task 1 of Working Croup 6 wish to present the final draft of "Collection of Basic Information". The draft consists of an Introduction, an Overview, five tables with the responses to the Questionnaire issued by Working Group 6. In submitting this response, we wish to thank the contributors and the Members of the Task group. Specifically we acknow1edge the efforts of Mr. G. Fayl (CEC), H.P. Kapteinat (Federal Republic of Germany), P. Rocco (CEC) and C.B. Woodhall (USA). Sincerely4 yours, Task Co-Ordinators INPCE WG.6 Task 1 October 1978 Co-Chairmen/WG.ó/4 PINAL DRAFT "Collection of basic infornœtion" - 2 - TABLE OP CONTENTS Introduction Cvervi ew Summary Tables ТаЪ1е 1 Nuclear Power Forecast Section A: Response to Questionnaire Section B: Forecast for countries not responding to Questionnaire Table 2 Spent Fuel Generation Section A: Response to Questionnaire Section B: Forecast for countries not responding to Questionnaire ¿able 3 At Reactor Pool Storage Capacity Table 4 Away from Reactor Storage Table 5 Transportation Systems Annex 1 Questionnaire Annex 2 Country Responses Argentina Republic of Korea Austria Netherlands Australia Norway Belgium Philippines Canada Portugal Denmark Republic of South Afri Finland Spain Prance Sweden Federal Republic of Switzerland Germany united Kingdom India USA Indonesia USSR Ireland Venezuela Italy Japan Annex 3 Countries with forecasted Nuclear Power Programe* (Working Group 1A/2A) not responding to Questionnaire - 3 - I. IHTHÛDUCTION In order to establish a data base for Working Group 6, Spent Fuel Management, a questionnaire, Annex 1, for collecting basic information on spent fuel management was sent to all members of the IMPCE Study and Task 1 was created to compile the data base. Subsequent follow-up letters as reminders and requests for additional information resulted in receiving responses from twenty five countries (see Annex 2). July 1st, 1973, was the closing date for the data collection in order to complete the task. Additional information and comments were encorporated in the final draft following the October 1973 Working Group Meeting. The responses varied in exxont and completeness from detailed information to statements that the countries have no planned nuclear power programmes. It was possible to organize the responses to certain questions into summary tables. The tables include: Nuclear Power Forecast, Spent Fuel Generation, At ¡ieactor Pool Storage Capacity, Away from Reactor Storage and Transportation System. Some of the questions were of such a nature that a comparative evaluation of the answers was not meaningful. The summarization and overview is intended to be supportive and not directive by nature: the data presented are taken from the national questionnaires and no adjustments to the data have been made. Therefore it is recommended that when using the summarized data or for a specific question the individual country's response should be reviewed. It should be cautioned that the original country data may be calculated on different technical basis. Por the countries which did not respond to the Questionnaire but have forecasted nuclear power programmes, use was made of the Basic Data from Working Group 1A/2A. The IAEA computer code was used to calculate the spent fuel generation (Annex 3 lists countries)* The data represent country nuclear programes status as of the first half of 1978 and may require periodic updating. - 4 - II. OVERVIEW Nuclear Power Forecast (Table 1, Sections A and В) Twenty Ihree countries responded to this question and indicated future plans for nuclear power growth (Section A). By 1980, eighteen of these countries expect to have operating commercial power reactors, with country nuclear capacity ranging from 0.5 to 62.0 GV.'e. By 1990 all but one of the countries expect tc have operating nuclear power plants, with country nuclear capacities ranging from 0.5 to 157 GWe. The responding countries were able, in general, to project nuclear power growth to the mid-to late—1980s with confidence. As expected, forecasts for the year 2000 (or beyond) involved uncertainties. Section В contains the nuclear power forecast for the countries which did not respond to the questionnaire but have forecasted a nuclear power programme. These data originated from the Working Groups 1A/2A documents. Spent Fuel Generation (Table 2, Sections A and B) The spent fuel generation data are a direct reflection of the nuclear power forecast. Data in Section A were provided by the responding countries, data in Section В were calculated using the IAEA computer programme and data of Table 1 Section B. The data (as explained in the introduction to the Tables) were further processed in order to show country annual discharge and cumulative data. These data are useful, for example, for further assessment of transportation and storage studies. At Reactor Pool Storage Capacity (Table 3) This table includes information provided under questions 3,5 and 7 (see Annex 1: spare capacity requirements, current storage programmes and future plans). It seems to be я general practice that at least о ie full core discharge space capacity is maintained at reactor storage. Prom the responses it appears that approximately half the Governments or licensing authorities require this spare capacity. There is a general trend towards increasing the at reactor storage capacity in order to provide additional flexibility. - 5- Some countries even request, or are envisaging to request for future reactors, up to 10 years storage capability. Away from Reactor Storage (Table 4) This table includes information provided under questions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (need for APR storage, current programmes, future plans and anticipated storage shortfall). The majority of the countries' spent fuel management programmes foresee reprocessing of fuel and no need for "away from reactor" storage other than that located at the reprocessor site. Almost all countries anticipate no spent fuel storage shortfall provided that reprocessing capability exists to meet their needs. Most of the countries are evaluating contingency plans for national storage in the event that these programmes are modified. Transportation System- (Table 5) This table includes information provided under questions 5 end 9 (transportation system and spent fuel movement). Initially the transportation casks were predominantly road casks. The foreseen increase in spent fuel transportation requires increased payloads, which mean heavier casks (up to 100 T and more). This requires railroad and overwater transportation. International and IAEA recommendations appear to be the general basis of the national and international regulations for the increased international transport. - 6 - OTHER THEMES a) Away from reactor storage descriptions were provided, at least to some degree, by eight countries (Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and UK). Reference should be made to these specific answers. b) Costs for storage (at reactor and/or away from reactor) were provided, again at least to some degree, by Argentina, Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, and USA. It is doubtful whether these are on similar basis and caution should be used in using comparisons.
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