Item 5 – Annexe 1

BNFL/DRS submission to the Greater London Assembly Committee of Inquiry

1. Electricity Generation

Some 22 per cent of the UK’s electricity is generated by , a third of which comes from nuclear power stations owned and operated by the British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) Group.

The balance of nuclear generated electricity in the UK is provided by British Energy plc and a small amount is imported from France (via the cross-channel interconnector), a nation that has over 70 per cent of its electricity generated by nuclear.

If nuclear generated electricity was replaced in the UK by coal fired generation, based on year 2000 emissions; an additional 79 million tonnes of carbon dioxide per year would be discharged into the environment.

2. London’s Electricity

Electricity demand for Greater London and the south-east exceeds the supply available in the capital and the region and demand is met from power stations in a wide area including the midlands and beyond.

Consumption of electricity in the inner London Electricity area was 23,437,000 MWhs in the year 1999/2000. The total output from the south-east region Magnox stations at Dungeness, Bradwell and Sizewell, the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) station also at Dungeness and the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) station at Sizewell was 17,696,990 MWhs.

This represents a south-east region nuclear generated electricity component that is in excess of 75 per cent of the total electricity demand for inner London.

Clearly, it is impossible to establish precisely where the electricity generated by the south- east region nuclear stations is consumed - as all electricity is pooled into the national grid. However, it is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of electricity consumed in the capital is nuclear generated.

The five south-east region nuclear power stations as well as the stations in Northern France, via the cross-channel interconnector, contribute to meeting this demand. The used from Sizewell A, Bradwell and Dungeness A&B is transported via the London area to in Cumbria.

3. Global Warming and Climate Change

In July last year, the new Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority published a statement on ‘The State of London: Environment’.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 2 of 14 13 March 2001

It states that: “London’s future must be clean and green. The environment is not an optional extra to be added on to other policies as and when time and resources allow.

“London’s economic future as well as the quality of life of every Londoner depends on the capital leading the way as a sustainable world city.”

The statement refers specifically to the emissions that contribute to climate change. “We must make London a world leader in fighting dangerous climate change. Every year, the city emits 60 million tonnes of carbon dioxide.

“I [the Mayor] want to make sure that London plays its full part in meeting climate change targets, and in particular the Government’s stated target of cutting carbon dioxide emissions to one fifth from their 1990 level by 2010.

“A city which successfully reduces its carbon dioxide emissions will be well placed to benefit from the expanding market in green technology and renewable energy production which will be a major part of the world economy in the next century.

“I will ensure that all my strategies include as part of their environmental assessment an estimate of the contribution they will make to the climate change target.”

If the problem of global warming is to be tackled effectively, then nuclear generated energy can have a key role to play. As far as carbon dioxide emissions are concerned, nuclear power is making a major contribution globally. Nuclear stations do not impact on climate change. World wide, nuclear energy avoids the emission of 1.8 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide, the major contributor to the ‘greenhouse effect’, each year.

Despite the recent setback at The Hague, under the Kyoto Agreement, the developed world has set targets for reductions in carbon dioxide emissions of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels in the next few years. The UK has further set a more challenging target of 12.5 percent - so far the UK is on track.

This has been managed by the scaling down of reliance on coal-generation, switching more towards natural gas and nuclear power. Although it does not produce the levels of greenhouse gases that coal does, natural gas still makes a considerable contribution to our climate change account.

Nuclear power currently provides around 22 per cent of electricity in the UK. But, all but one of the UK’s nuclear power stations may well be closed by 2025. By that year, it is estimated that the nuclear share of the generation market in the UK could be down to only three per cent.

BNFL supports the continued generation of electricity by nuclear power. Through our Westinghouse subsidiary we have developed a series of designs for the future.

4. Management of Used Nuclear Fuel

Fuel for nuclear power stations is made from uranium ore, which is made into fuel rods that are used in nuclear power stations to generate electricity.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 3 of 14 13 March 2001

The average life of a nuclear fuel rod in a power station is four to six years. During this time, waste products build up in the fuel rod that make it less efficient. Used fuel from all but one of the UK’s nuclear power stations is transported to Sellafield for reprocessing or storage.

Reprocessing separates out the three per cent of waste from a typical fuel rod. Reusable products remain, consisting of 96 per cent uranium and one per cent of plutonium.

The process involves the removal of the metal casing from around the solid fuel and dissolution of the fuel pellets in hot and concentrated nitric acid. Uranium, plutonium and waste products are then dissolved and separated from each other using several chemical processes. BNFL carries out these operations at Sellafield in Cumbria. The recovered uranium and plutonium can be reused as a fuel in nuclear power stations.

5. Transport

• Transport in the UK

Used nuclear fuel has been transported in the UK by rail since 1962. During that time more than 6 million miles have been travelled without an accident involving the release of radioactivity.

The nuclear industry prefers the use of rail as the primary mode of transport for used nuclear fuel - as it is for many other cargoes of this type. Transporting by road would be relatively lengthy and involved process.

The containers used for the transport of new fuel are also governed by domestic statute, which are based on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regulations that ensure the safe transport of radioactive materials.

• Transport Operations

Direct Rail Services Ltd., (DRS) carries out the rail transport of used nuclear fuel from power stations in the UK. The company is a licensed rail freight operator and a subsidiary of BNFL. Formed in 1995 and operating on a commercial basis the following year, DRS has a first class safety record and is certified to ISO9002 quality management.

Rail transport, particularly of used nuclear fuel, is now a core part of BNFL’s business. DRS forms a part of BNFL’s overall in-house transport portfolio, which also includes road and sea transfers.

Broadly, the most direct rail routes are taken between power stations and the Sellafield site in Cumbria and DRS has the facility to operate throughout the UK.

• Transport in the South-East

For business, operational, safety and security reasons, DRS marshalls three trains in London, from the Dungeness, Bradwell and Sizewell power stations, into a single train for

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 4 of 14 13 March 2001

onward transport to Sellafield. This helps to minimise the overall number of train movements.

The transport and marshalling of used nuclear fuel flasks are both safe operations and the joining of trains reduces the total number of journeys. The risks associated with both these operations are miniscule and broadly similar, and can be even further reduced by minimising the number of journeys.

6. Rail Safety

The transport of used nuclear fuel is tightly regulated by the relevant authorities that govern the rail and nuclear industries. The principle regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials by road and rail are the Radioactive Material (Road Transport) (Great Britain) Regulations 1996 and the Packaging Labelling and Carriage of Radioactive Material by Rail Regulations 1996.

These regulations reflect the internationally accepted standards contained within the IAEA’s Safety Series No 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 1985 edition (As amended 1990).

As in other member states, the UK regulations are in the process of being amended to reflect the latest revision of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, namely the 1996 Edition (Revised) of the Safety Standard Series No TS-R-1.

Implementation of the new regulations within the UK is not expected to significantly affect the transport of used nuclear fuel.

Transports strictly conform to the above regulations administered by the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), which issues Certificates of Approval. The system adopted in the UK fully recognises and embraces IAEA international transport regulations.

• Safety Case

The Safety Case for the transport of used nuclear fuel rests with four main elements.

− The strength of fuel flasks (purpose built containers for carrying used nuclear fuel – See Section 7 ‘Safety and Used Fuel Transport Flasks’): It is extremely unlikely that a fuel flask could be breached in an accident − Accidents which could damage a flask are extremely unlikely − Even if a flask was damaged the release of radioactive materials and the radiological consequences would be small − Planned and practical emergency action would be effective in minimising any impact

• Safety and Rail Transport

Continued safe and reliable transport of used nuclear fuel is the number one priority for DRS, which has a fully approved Railway Safety Case in accordance with the Railways

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 5 of 14 13 March 2001

(Safety Case) Regulations 2000. Railtrack and HM Railways Inspectorate (HMRI) routinely review the Safety Case.

All locomotives and wagons used by DRS meet strict Industry Technical Specifications. Operations are conducted by personnel drawn from the rail and nuclear industries who receive continuous training to industry standards. The company also operates a Planned Preventative Maintenance regime based on engineering specifications.

DRS continues to play a key role in the formulation and implementation process for action plans resulting from recommendations made in the light of accident inquiries. Compliance audits by Railtrack and HMRI are undertaken on a regular basis. The company is fully committed to safety and quality and welcomes the opportunity to fully participate in the development and implementation of rail industry initiatives.

In view of the nature of traffic operated by DRS, all available communication channels are made available to staff. Regular and close liaison with HMRI and Railtrack ensures that a proactive approach exists to address any issues.

The relevant authorities regularly check compliance with Railway Group Standards, from which all technical and operational procedures must be formulated, legislation and Nuclear Industry Regulations. Additionally, annual compliance operations audits covering the Railway Safety Case are undertaken along with verification audits, which are also conducted annually.

7. Safety and Used Fuel Transport Flasks

All used nuclear fuel is transported in heavily shielded, purpose built containers known as flasks. Constructed from forged steel, more than 30 centimetres thick, each flask typically weighs more than 50 tonnes.

There are two types of flask used to transport used fuel from nuclear power stations in the UK. Although the flasks are very similar, one type is used to carry Magnox fuel and the other Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) fuel.

Essentially, both are steel boxes with dimensions of about 2.3 metres high and 2.2 metres by 2.5 metres wide. Each has a steel lid, which is bolted down. Flasks usually contain not more than about two and a half tonnes of used fuel.

• Flask Testing

The design for an approved flask must be capable of surviving a sequential series of demanding tests, which simulate the damage that would result from a very severe transport accident. All types of UK used fuel transport flasks have passed these tests, which are derived from IAEA regulations.

The tests include:

− A drop test from 9 metres at the most vulnerable angle on to an unyielding surface followed by:-

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 6 of 14 13 March 2001

− A drop test from 1 metre onto a vertical steel punch, again in then most vulnerable position, followed by:- − A fully engulfing fire with a flame temperature of at least 800 degrees centigrade, for 30 minutes, followed by:- − Immersion under 15 metres of water, for at least eight hours.

Testing has been carried out since the 1960s as part of the flask safety case justification. Flask designs have evolved throughout this period and are always designed to comply with all the latest regulatory requirements.

• Testing Methodology

During each evolutionary stage, the flasks and component parts have been tested to ensure that they always meet the changes as regulations are developed. It is a mandatory requirement to demonstrate that each flask design meets regulatory requirements, which include performance characteristics imposed by prescribed test conditions, before receiving a licence to operate.

Apart from major structural components, such as the body and lid of the flask, other parts are either changed or replaced in accordance with approved operational, maintenance and service schedules.

A number of tests and checks are carried out on critical components prior to every shipment to ensure that they meet the highest standards dictated by regulations. Corrective action is always taken if relevant standards are not met.

• Testing Sequence

The sequence of testing is applied in a logical order, that is impact followed by fire, as this is more onerous because some flask designs have certain thermal protection features that may be damaged under impact.

• Drop Testing

At first glance, the regulatory drop test of 9 metres may not appear to reflect a realistic accident scenario with, for example, most railway viaducts standing at least 30 metres above ground.

However, the test is set up to subject the package to the most severe dynamic forces. The flask is dropped from 9 metres on to an unyielding target, which does not absorb impact energy but reflects the force back into the container to cause maximum damage.

In real circumstances, most targets, such as tarmac, are yielding. A flask can withstand a significantly higher drop without exhibiting the same degree of damage as would occur from a 9-metre drop on to an unyielding target.

Mechanical test requirements for Type B (flasks) packages were introduced in the 1964 Editions of Regulations. Type B packages are licensed so they can be consigned on to all modes of transport and IAEA test requirements are, therefore, intended to take into

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 7 of 14 13 March 2001

account a large range of accidents for land, sea and air transports which can expose the package to severe dynamic forces.

• Fire Testing

Thermal testing of the flask involves a fully engulfing fire with a flame temperature of at least 800 degrees centigrade, for 30 minutes.

For additional reassurance, trains carrying used fuel are timetabled to avoid passing or being followed by other freight trains carrying highly flammable materials when travelling in restricted areas such as tunnels.

• Flask Valves

Magnox and AGR flasks contain sealed valves that are used to prepare the flask for transport. The valves are closed, sealed and doubly locked shut prior to transport. This ensures that none of the material contained within the flask can be released either accidentally or on purpose during transport.

• Recreating Accident Conditions

Sequential series flask testing is designed to simulate the damage that would result from a very severe transport accident. In 1984, an organised demonstration of the structural integrity of a nuclear flask was made to provide additional public information.

The test involved the crashing of a 140 tonne locomotive into a flask laid across a railway line at an angle designed to cause maximum damage. The train reached 100mph before impact and was totally destroyed in a trial that resulted in superficial damage to the flask with no loss of containment.

• Independent Confirmation

Evidence was presented to the Sizewell B and Hinkley Point C Public Inquiries on the estimated probability of an accident to a fuel flask. The inspectors concluded that the estimated probability of a serious accident was so small that argument over the exact probability was of no material significance.

The Inquiry Consultants to the Greater London Council (GLC) agreed that the risk from used nuclear fuel transport was so low as to be of no concern, and the GLC accepted that conclusion.

The DETR recently confirmed that the transport of used fuel continues to pose no threat to public health or the environment. An independent survey, commissioned by the DETR, involved 300 individual checks upon flasks and transport vehicles which all proved to be within guidelines.

All flasks are routinely checked between journeys and maintained as required in the approved maintenance schedules.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 8 of 14 13 March 2001

8. RADSAFE Emergency Procedures

• The Plan

To deal with the extremely unlikely event of an accident involving a fuel flask, a new single, co-ordinated transport emergency plan was introduced in Great Britain. Called RADSAFE, the plan has evolved from a number of existing plans

− The Nuclear Industries Road/Rail Emergency Plan − Irradiated Fuel Transport Flask Emergency plan − Scottish Nuclear Limited Irradiated Fuel Transport Flask Emergency Plan

In creating RADSAFE, the intention was to build on the good features of each of the plans and to ensure there is no confusion about which plan is activated.

RADSAFE is based on the requirements of the Emergency Services and draws on the comprehensively exercised and demonstrated - in London and elsewhere - principles of the national CHEMSAFE plan. The key principles of RADSAFE are:

− Early provision of general advice to the emergency services − Guaranteed response − Provision of a framework for media support − Ownership of ‘clean-up’ actions

• Consultation and Purpose

The authors of the RADSAFE plan consulted extensively with the rail industry and the relevant national organisations and associations. In particular, the Association of Chief Police Officers (APCO) and the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers (CACFOA) were approached. Both agreed to disseminate RADSAFE information amongst local fire and police services.

The plan covers England, Scotland and Wales and is restricted to events involving the transport of civil radioactive materials. The specific purpose of RADSAFE is to provide expert assistance to the emergency services following an incident involving the transport of radioactive material.

This is achieved by providing early information at the scene of the event and responding to the event with technical support within a target time. RADSAFE establishes clear responsibility for ‘clean-up’ of the event and issues a 24-hour national notification telephone number.

• Framework

The plan creates a framework primarily for expert advice and technical support. RADSAFE also sets out standards of response, personnel, equipment and performance with a comprehensive communication and media-briefing network.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 9 of 14 13 March 2001

Local Authorities are also fully briefed through the document ‘Arrangements for Public Information for radiation Emergencies Affecting London’. Additionally, in line with previous communication exercises for previous plans, BNFL made a presentation on RADSAFE to the London Emergency Planning Forum (LEPF) last year. The Emergency Services across London Boroughs are members of the LEPF.

Subsequently, all members of the London Emergency Planning Forum were invited to attend RADSAFE training and representative groups will continue to be invited to attend flask emergency exercises.

Any response to a major incident would follow the principles laid down in the Home office document ‘Dealing with Disaster’ using the local all hazards emergency plan. Railway Group Standards mirrors the structure of the Emergency Services response procedures.

The Railtrack Zone Production Control constantly monitors train movements and would initiate any emergency action if an accident occurred.

• Demonstration Exercises

An important element in the plan is to have a prearranged programme of annual demonstration exercises led by RADSAFE participants such as British Energy, BNFL Magnox Generation and the UKAEA. Such exercises were also held regularly under previous Emergency Arrangements. Once the next exercise date has been agreed, the London Emergency Services will be invited to attend.

• Health Physics Support

A Health Physicist from the nearest nuclear facility would respond to any incident under RADSAFE. It is recognised that it might take between one and two hours to arrive at a location in Central London. Therefore, prior to the arrival of the expert responder, the plan provides for immediate relevant advice to be given to the Police and Emergency Services.

In addition, the responder would be in constant contact with the local Emergency Services at the scene and would be able to make an ongoing assessment of the situation and provide continuing appropriate advice.

Information and guidance is also always available from the UKAEA Constabulary and the despatching site prior to the arrival of an expert.

9. Radiation from the Flask

The safety of used nuclear fuel consignments is sustained by the formal regulatory structure based on international standards enshrined in UK legislation.

The observance of these regulations is enforced by the operators and a number of Government Regulatory Agencies, such as the DETR, Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and Government Advisory Bodies like the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB).

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 10 of 14 13 March 2001

The regulators have wide ranging powers to check that BNFL are fully compliant and can enforce improvements and prohibit any activity with which they are not completely satisfied.

There is also a comprehensive safety regime within the associated transport system, supporting the maintenance of the highest standards of safety and compliance.

The steel walls of the flask prevent almost all radiation from being emitted externally. Radioactive material within the flask will emit all three types of radiation – alpha, beta and gamma. AGR flasks may also emit very low amounts of neutrons.

With flask walls at least 30 centimetres thick, all alpha and beta radiation external emissions are prevented. The thick walling also substantially reduces emissions of gamma radiation although a small amount of gamma radiation is detectable close to the flask exterior surface.

• Radiation Dose Rates

Staff and the general public are not subjected to any significant radiation doses. Typical values of dose rate levels on the flask surface are 50 microsieverts (the units of radiation dose) per hour reducing to approximately 20 microsieverts per hour at 1 metre and 0.2 microsieverts per hour at 10 metres.

DRS personnel, who regularly work with flask trains, are not categorised as classified radiation workers because surveys have shown that the doses received are broadly similar to those that could be expected from background sources.

They are familiar with the requirements contained in the Railway Group Standards and Working Manuals for Rail Staff, on both time and distance limits for working near flasks.

To gain some perspective of dose it is important to point out that a member of the public in the UK can expect to receive an average dose of 2,200 microsieverts from natural radiation each year. The average is subject to wide fluctuations depending mainly on geographical location.

One hour’s exposure, one metre from a nuclear flask, is approximately equivalent to the radiation dose from cosmic radiation on a return flight at cruising altitude between Manchester and Malaga.

The maximum distance that radiation can be detected from flasks is 30 metres. More typically, radiation from flasks would not be detectable beyond 10 metres. Radiation decreases rapidly with distance from the flask.

In accordance with the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999, an area within six metres of the flasks, when loaded with used fuel and when stabled in a marshalling yard, is a radiation supervised area. Railway Group Standards reflects the requirements.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 11 of 14 13 March 2001

• Radiation Protection

NRPB, the radiation protection watchdog in the UK, has published information about the radiological effects on the population along the routes of nuclear trains. A study, conducted by NRPB in 1995, concluded that: “the transport of irradiated fuel give estimates of dose to members of the public that are extremely low, about 5 microsieverts a year for exposure at the boundary of a marshalling yard and nearly 1,000 times less for transient exposure from passing flasks.”

The population as a whole is not exposed to an additional 5 microsieverts from this source. It is estimated that the number of people so exposed in the UK is less than 1,000.

There have been a number of studies into a number of ill-health outcomes, along or near to main railway routes, which put forward views about exposures to a wide range of materials. But, as stated by the NRPB, the contribution from used nuclear fuel flask transport would be indiscernible.

The extremely low levels of radiation emitted depart with the flask. There is no residual radiation. Used fuel inside loaded flasks is a source of radiation, which leaves no trace once the train has left. In many ways, it is similar to a moving source of light. Once the source has moved on, no trace of light remains.

• Radiation from the Nuclear Industry

The current legal limit for exposure to the public from the nuclear industry is 1,000 microsieverts a year, as laid down by the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999. This is in line with the International Commission for Radiation Protection (ICRP), which also recommends a limit of 1,000 microsieverts a year.

The 1,000 microsieverts a year limit relates to public exposure to all current and historic man-made radiation except medical exposures. Alongside this limit is a 300 microsieverts a year dose constraint for exposure to a single source, excluding the impact of historic man-made radiation.

10. Contamination

• Flask Handling

At most UK nuclear power stations, the loading and unloading of flasks is performed underwater in purpose-built storage ponds that contain water that has become contaminated. As a consequence of this process, small amounts of contamination can be deposited on the outside of the flask.

At some locations, including Sellafield, the flasks are loaded ‘dry’ in specifically designed cells using remote handling techniques. Hence the outside of the flask does not come into contact with active pond water. This ‘dry’ handling greatly reduces the opportunity for such low-level contamination to be deposited on the outside of the flask. All used nuclear fuel is transported in flasks that are filled with water.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 12 of 14 13 March 2001

On removal from the pond, the flask undergoes a stringent cleaning and monitoring programme to remove any contamination from the external surface of the flask prior to despatch. Prior to despatch, the flask is again monitored to ensure it complies with transport regulations.

• ‘Sweating’

In transit, flasks may be exposed to changes in conditions, such as air temperature or humidity, and this can sometimes cause some absorbed traces of contamination to rise to the surface or ‘sweat’ out of the paint.

Sweating does not mean that the contents of the flask are leaking in any way. The concept of sweating is well known and understood. The cause of surface contamination on flasks is a recognised phenomenon documented in IAEA Safety Series Guidelines. The IAEA acknowledges that “this situation presents no significant hazard.”

• International Common Report 1998

Concern, expressed in the media and by certain politicians, led to the Competent Authorities of France, Germany and the United Kingdom producing a Common Report, dated 24th October 1998, covering surface contamination of nuclear fuel transports.

They considered contamination data relating to flasks, rail wagons and railheads. In addition, the radiation monitoring data from people involved with the transports was also assessed. They also reviewed how the measurements were taken.

Following this comprehensive review, it was concluded that:

− “…exceeding 4Bq/cm2 (guidance level) is unlikely to present a significant hazard because of the pessimistic assumptions used”,

And,

− “…As far as health is concerned, the non compliance of with the 4Bq/cm2 standard did not have any radiological consequence”.

In a report published by the DETR, the effect of ‘sweating’ was noted on a number of packages monitored in the UK. The potential exposure to the public was assessed and the conclusion reached was:

− “Potential doses are significantly lower than current statutory dose limits and current international recommendations for dose to members of the public.”

Flask monitoring is carried out prior to despatch and on arrival using a range of instruments for the measurement of radiation. No flask, flatroll or transporter leaves a power station or Sellafield with loose contamination above 2 Bq/cm2. Sometimes, an arrival survey may detect contamination above the standard level of 4 Bq/cm2 and such flasks are again thoroughly cleaned during the turnaround and formally reported between stations and Sellafield.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 13 of 14 13 March 2001

11. Community Involvement

• ‘Cricklewood Dialogue’

In the summer of 1998, DRS announced their intention to use Cricklewood sidings in North London as a marshalling site for trains carrying used nuclear fuel. Following expressions of public concern, a series of communications, meetings and discussions with a broad range of stakeholders took place facilitated by The Environment Council (TEC). This dialogue sought to resolve the problem that arose following the announcement by DRS.

In March 2000, a collective resolution was unanimously agreed at a meeting attended by a cross-section of community groups, businesses, non-governmental organisations, DRS, BNFL, Railtrack, Councils and Politicians.

The papers relating to the ‘Cricklewood Dialogue’, including the agreed resolution, have been provided to the Inquiry by The Environment Council and are available on the Environment Council website www.the-environment-council.org.uk

• The Jointly Agreed Sampling and Monitoring Working Group

Continuing commitment to the ‘Cricklewood Dialogue’, has resulted in BNFL and DRS becoming engaged with a Working Group of stakeholders on a project which involves the further independent investigation of whether there is radiological contamination on sidings visited by trains carrying used nuclear fuel. The decisions within the Working Group are made collectively.

Both BNFL and DRS are represented on the Jointly Agreed Sampling and Monitoring Working Group along with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Cricklewood Against Nuclear Trains (CANT), Nuclear Trains Action Group (NTAG), Wilkinson Environmental Consulting and the London Borough of Brent.

A contractor was recently appointed by the Environment Council on behalf of the Working Group to carry out monitoring for contamination on rails, ballast, sleepers etc at a number of locations. Methodology and choice of contractor were jointly agreed. The results of the survey are expected later this year.

The rail sidings and marshalling yards used by trains carrying used nuclear fuel are the subject of regular monitoring, carried out on behalf of DRS by Scientifics Ltd. To date, no contamination has been found on rails, ballast or sleepers etc. The DETR also carry out monitoring.

• BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue

The BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue involves a wide range of organisations and individuals interested in or concerned about nuclear issues. Its aim is to inform BNFL’s decision making process about the improvement of their environmental performance in the context of their overall development.

Item05 Annexe 1(b) Page 14 of 14 13 March 2001

The dialogue is open to national organisations and regional groups as well as expert and specialist concerns. If the GLA holds the belief that it is affected by the issues, thinks it can contribute, or wishes to participate, then The Environment Council should be contacted.

Representative working groups have been established under the BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue to examine topics such as:

− Waste − Discharges − Spent Fuel Management Options − Plutonium − Transport

BNFL is committed to open communications and engagement with stakeholders.

12. Future Developments

BNFL will be, in line with the resolution agreed at Cricklewood, undertaking a review of transport operations in the south-east after the final used fuel had been removed from Bradwell in around 2005.

Item05 Annexe 1(b)