"-'r--1VED 1999 JUL -8 PM 7:18 STATE OF NEVADA RULES 4 F,-.bW.,-.,.H US NRC 0 FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 100 N. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA Telephone (775) 684-1100 THOMAS M. PATTON Attorney General Fax (775) 684-1108 First Assistant Attorney General WEBSITE: htpj/iwww.state.nv.us/ag/ E-Mail: aginfo~govmail.state.nv.us June 22, 1999 Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Re: Nevada's Petition To Institute Rulemaking To Amend Regulations Governing Safeguards for Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Against Sabotage and Terrorism and To Initiate A Comprehensive Assessment Dear Dr. Jackson: Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn, on behalf of the people of the State of Nevada, has requested that this office file the attached Petition for rulemaking with the Commission. The Petition requests that the Commission initiate rulemaking to reexamine and strengthen its regulations governing safeguards for shipments of spent nuclear fuel against sabotage and terrorism in light of real world conditions. It has been nearly two decades since the Commission reviewed its regulations designed to ensure the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel shipments. It is imperative that the Commission factor into its regulations the changing nature of threats posed by domestic terrorists, the increased availability of advanced weaponry and the greater vulnerability of larger shipping casks traveling across the country. 0 ) 1. "ProtectingCitizens, Solving Problems,Making Government Work" Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson June 22, 1999 Page 2 I respectfully urge the Commission to conduct the needed risk and consequence assessment of the existing safeguards and security regulations to determine if changes need to be made, publish new proposed rules for public comment, and ultimately to make the necessary modifications to the regulations. It is my sincere belief the current regulations expose the public across the country to unacceptable levels of risk from the transportation of highly radioactive materials. If you need additional information concerning this vital matter, please contact Marta Adams of my staff at (775)684-1237. Cordially, FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA Attorney General FSDP:MA:nc cc: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission See attached list Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson June 22, 1999 Page 3 cc Governors Nevada Congressional Delegation Attorneys General U.S. Dept. of Energy U.S. Dept. of Justice U.S. Dept. of Transportation Federal Emergency Management Agency NUCLEAR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND SAFETY ISSUES THE RISK OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE AGAINST REPOSITORY SHIPMENTS ATTACHMENT A 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 Before THE COMMISSIONERS 6 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE 7 STATE OF NEVADA FOR THE AMENDMENT ) OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION ) 8 REGULATIONS CONTAINED IN 10 C.F.R. 73 ) AS THEY RELATE TO THE SAFEGUARDS FOR) 9 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENTS ) AGAINST TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE AND ) 10 FOR THE INITIATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE) PETITION TO INSTITUTE ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ) RULEMAKING AND TO INITIATE 11 RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE ) A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 12 The State of Nevada (Petitioner) hereby respectfully requests and petitions the Nuclear. 13 Regulatory Commission (the Commission), pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553 and 10 C.F.R. 2.800-804, to 14 exercise its rulemaking authority for the purpose of amending its regulations governing safeguards for 15 shipments of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) against sabotage and terrorism. Specifically, Petitioner requests 16 that the following regulations be amended: 17 (1) Design Basis Threat: "Radiological Sabotage" (10 C.F.R. 73.1(a)(1)); 18 (2) Definitions: "Radiological Sabotage" (10 C.F.R. 73.2); 19 (3) General Requirements: Advance Approval of Routes (10 C.F.R. 73.37(b)(7)); 20 (4) General Requirements: Planning and Scheduling (10 C.F.R. 73.37(b)(8)); 21 (5) Shipments by Road (10 C.F.R. 73.37(c)); and 22 (6) Shipments by Rail (10 C.F.R. 73.37(d)). 23 Petitioner further respectfully requests and petitions the Commission, in support of the 24 aforementioned rulemaking to amend safeguards regulations, to conduct a comprehensive assessment 25 of the consequences of terrorist attacks that have the capability of radiological sabotage, including 26 attacks against transportation infrastructure used during nuclear waste shipments, attacks involving 27 capture of nuclear waste shipments and use of high energy explosives against a cask or casks, and 28 -I- I direct attacks upon a nuclear waste shipping cask or casks using antitank missiles or other militar, 2 weapons. 3 I. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO EXISTING REGULATIONS 4 Petitioner believes that the Commission should amend the current safeguards reaulati 5 order to better deter, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of any attempted radiological sabotaw' 6 against shipments of speht nuclear fuel (SNF). The Commission last publicly addressed tI.c 7 consequences of terrorist attacks on SNF shipments and the adequacy of its safeguards regulations ir 8 1984. Petitioner is submitting an overview of the Commission's safeguards regulatory activities since 9 1979, and an analysis of the .Commission's 1984 proposed rule. See Attachment A, Robert J. 10 Halstead and David J. Ballard, Nuclear Waste TransportationSecurity and Safety ZIsues: The Risk oT 11 Terrorism and Sabotage Against Repository Shipments at 23-30 and Appendix B (October 1997).' 12 Petitioner believes that a general strengthening of the regulations intended to safeguard* SNF 13 shipments is necessary because of new developments in two critical areas since 1984: (1) changes in 14 the nature. of the terrorist threat; and (2) increased vulnerability of shipping casks to terrorist attacks 15 involving high-energy explosive devices. 16 A. Reexamine the Design Basis Threat: "RadiologicalSabotage" 17 The Commission should reexamine the design basis threat used to design safeguards systems 18 ito protect shipments of SNF against acts of radiological sabotage. Current regulations require 19 licensees to design safeguards systems which can protect shipments against attacks involving several 20 well-trained and dedicated individuals, hand-held automatic weap o.na~fou~r•,wheed rive land vehicle. 21 and hand-carried equipment. including incapacitating agents and explosives. (10 C.F.R. 73.1(a)(1)(i)) 22 The regulations also specif\' that the attackers may receive insider (employee) assistance (10 C.F.R. 23 73.1(a)(1)(ii)) and utilize a four_-wleN-drive-land-ve--icle--bomb-(o.0 C.F.R. 73. 1(a)( 1)(iii)). 24 Petitioner requests that the ,Commission clarify the meaning-of "hand-carried equipment" 25 within the current design basis threat. Section 73.2 does not provide a definition of "hand-carried, 26 equipment." Petitioner believes that the definition of hand-carried equipment, in the hands of several 27 28 Report prepared, for Nevada Agency for -Nuclear Projects, Carson City, Nevada -2- 1 well-trained attackers, using a four-wheel drive vehicle to carry their equipment, includes (but is not .2 limited to) the following explosive devices identified in Attachment A: (i) one or more large military 3 demolition devices, such as the U.S. Army M3A1 shaped charge weighing 40 pounds: (2') a 4 significant quantity (limited only.by the carrying capacity of the eicle) of comimercial xplos 5 packaged in crates, boxes, suitcases, or other hand-carried containers: and (3) numerous maw- 6 portable antitank weapon systems such as the Carl Gustav M2 recoilless gun (weight 15 kg), the 7 Milan antitank missile (weight 32 kg), and the infantry version of the TOW 2 antitank missile (weight 8 116 kg with tripod launcher). 9 Petitioner further requests that the Commission, as part of a comprehensive reassessment of' 10 the consequences of terrorist attacks, consider amending the design basig threat to include use ofi 11 explosive devices and other weapons larger than those commonly considered to be hand-carried or 12 hand-held, and the use of vehicles other than four-wheel drive civilian land vehicles. Well-trained and 13 dedicated adversaries could conceivably obtain and use military attack vehicles or military aircraft 14 armed with bombs, missiles, or other powerful weapons. The possibility of attacks involving stolen 15 or otherwise diverted military weapons systems should be given special consideration considering the 16 number and nature of military installations in Nevada and along the transportation corridors toý 17 Nevada. 18 B. Reexamine the Definition of "Radiological Sabotage" 19 The Commission should reexamine the definition of "•radiological sabotage." Current 20 regulations define "radiological sabotage" as any deliberate act "w~hich could directly or indirectly 21 endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation." (10 C.F.R. 73.2) Petitioner' 22 requests that the Commission clarify the definition of "radiological sabotage." Petitioner believes 23 that the wording "could directly or indirectly endanger" implies a judgment by the Commission 24 regarding the consequences of the action, as opposed to the intentions of the individuals carrying out 25 the action. Actions against SNF shipments which are intended to cause a loss of shielding or a 26 release of radioactive materials should be included in the definition of "radiological sabotage" 27 regardless of the success or failure of the action. .28 -3- Petitioner also believes that the definition of "radiological sabotage- should be amended tc 2 explicitly include deliberate actions which cause, or are intended to cause economic damage or social 3 disruption regardless of the extent to which public health and safety are actually endangered by 4 exposure to radiation. An incident involving an intentional release of radioactive materials, 5 especially in a heavily populated area, could cause widespread social disruption and substantial 6 economic losses even if there were no immediate human casualties and few projected latent cancer 7 fatalities. Local fears and anxieties would be amplified by national and international media coverage.