Ground Rules for Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts

FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : GROUND RULES FOR SOVIE T AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMEN T IN REGIONAL CONFLICT S AUTHOR : Nils H . Wessel l CONTRACTOR : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Inc . PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Nils H . Wessel l COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 621-1 0 The work leading to this report was supported in whole or in part from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie t and East European Research . GROUND RULES FOR SOVIE T AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT I N REGIONAL CONFLICT S The author wishes to express his appreciation for the invaluabl e assistance of Joanne S . Gowa, who contributed initial drafts o f several sections of the study . He is also indebted to Richard E . Bissell and Harvey Sicherman for their comments on portions o f the draft . The author requests comments from readers and ask s that they be sent to : Nils H . Wessel l Foreign Policy Research Institut e 3508 Market Stree t Philadelphia, PA 19104 CONTENTS Executive Summary of Chapter 1 (Ground Rules) i Executive Summary of Chapter 2 (Horn of Africa) ii i Executive Summary of Chapter 3 (Southern Africa) v Executive Summary of Chapter 4 (Yugoslavia) vi i Chapter 1 Ground Rules : Concepts and Approaches 1 Chapter 2 The Horn of Africa : Ground Rules for Soviet an d American Involvement 5 5 Chapter 3 Southern Africa : Ground Rules for Soviet an d American Involvement 9 1 Chapter 4 Yugoslavia : Ground Rules for Soviet an d American Restraint 12 8 Chapter 5 Conclusions : Ground Rules Reassessed 159 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY GROUND RULES : CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES The report seeks to devise, and in three subsequent sections apply, ground rules to govern Soviet and American involvemen t in areas of present and prospective regional tension . This sectio n analyzes the concept and relevance of guidelines and outlines possible approaches . In recent years, both Soviet and American officials have im - plied that there is or ought to be a "code of detente ." But th e most ambitious bilateral efforts to enact such a code, the 1972 Ba- sic Principles of Relations and the 1973 Agreement on Prevention o f Nuclear War, were flawed at the outset by the vagueness of the mutual commitment to foreswear "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly ." Late r misunderstandings were inevitable . Although the Soviet-American talks at the working level o n conventional arms transfers (CAT's) and the Indian Ocean have bee n suspended for some time and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dim s prospects for early bilateral agreements, ground-rules for U .S . - Soviet behavior have immediate relevance in the multilateral con - text of the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co - operation in Europe (CSCE) to be held in Madrid in November . More - over, in the intermediate future circumstances may once again be - come more propitious for bilateral negotiations on measures of mutual restraint . Two valid premises underlie the view that formally agree d ground rules might ease regional tensions by restraining superpow - er involvement : 1) existing modes of conflict regulation are in - adequate and 2) explicit agreements as opposed to tacit "rules o f the game" create some autonomous pressure on states toward compli - ance . But the expectation that such accords can radically trans - form the behavior of states is in all probability misplaced . To avoid the pitfalls of highly generalized commitments t o restraint, a series of specific approaches is needed in four broa d categories : 1) limitations on conventional arms transfer s 2) confidence-building measures including advanc e notification of and limits on military activi - ties 3) naval limit s 4) mechanisms of joint political consultation . Controls on CAT's can contain the level of conflict betwee n regional actors while reducing the likelihood that the U .S . and USSR will get drawn into a conflict between client states . Quanti- tative and qualitative limits, particularly on the transfer of ad- vanced weapon systems, as well as prior U .S .-Soviet consultation s on CAT's can be varied by region as appropriate . Confidence-building measures that might be incorporated in - to a code of detente include : limitation of military maneuvers , more stringent requirements concerning advance notification of major military maneuvers, prior notice of small-scale military maneuvers, limits on the introduction of military personnel and advisers , prior notice of major military movements, and zones of disengage- ment and limited deployment coupled with assured early warning . Naval controls could include limits on maneuvers and deploy - ments, but limits on overall ship inventories are of doubtful nego- tiability under the best circumstances and would not deal with th e question of restraints in particular regions . In some cases , agreed limits on access to naval support facilities might enhanc e mutual confidence . Finally, some mechanism for the negotiation and monitorin g of any agreements establishing ground rules would contribute to in - stitutionalizing observance of mutual restraints . The Standing Consultative Commission for SALT might provide a rough model . Although these four approaches might well advance the interests of arms control and the containment of regional conflict , there are important reasons why the Soviet Union might wish t o avoid negotiation of ground rules with the United States . By thei r nature ground rules would seek to limit the freedom of action o f parties to them . Although the principle of mutual advantage sug- gests that the results of such negotiations should confer roughl y equal benefits on both parties, Soviet leaders, no less than thei r American counterparts, may be expected to harbor doubts on thi s score . The fluidity of regional political dynamics, existing commitments to regional actors, and the vicissitudes of Soviet-Ameri - . can relations will inevitably create a solid basis in Moscow fo r arguments favoring a cautious approach to negotiating ground rules . Soviet leaders will undoubtedly be mindful of the fact, moreover , ii that the initially symmetrical impact of agreed "rules of the game " may, over time and under changing circumstances, give advantage t o the other side . No less importantly, Soviet official's may be reluc - tant, even under conditions of uniformly symmetrical restraints, t o surrender their freedom of action . This may be especially tru e with respect to the freedom to maintain Soviet influence with al - lied states in Eastern Europe and to provide support for friendl y regimes and revolutionary movements in regions where Soviet an d American interests are in conflict . Many Soviet officials have in the past, for instance, clear - ly believed that conventional arms transfers enhance Soviet influence with recipients despite occasional examples to the contrary . Moscow might also prove reluctant to limit CAT's in any bilatera l agreement with the United States that left France and Britain fre e to provide arms to pro-Western clients . With respect to confidence - building measures, the Soviets may resist constraints on Sovie t military activities that serve a demonstrative or threatening func- tion, especially in areas like Eastern Europe where Soviet determ- ination to maintain the status quo influences public and elite per- ceptions of the limits of the possible . Appearances are important in other respects . Merely by agreeing to conduct negotiations so directly affecting the interes t of other international actors, the Soviet Union may convey the im- pression of Soviet-American collaboration at their expense . Thi s danger itself constitutes a substantial disincentive to agreement . Sectors of the Soviet national security bureaucracy may be expecte d to raise objections to the negotiation of ground rules impinging o n their missions and capabilities . By way of example, officials i n the Party responsible for forging the maximum degree of unity with - in the international Communist movement, including non-ruling Com- munist parties in the Third World, would likely resist any regim e of mutual restraint that promised to introduce strains in relation s with those parties . Although opposition on ideological grounds t o collaboration with the chief imperialist power has apparently bee n of declining importance under Brezhnev, such sentiments continue t o enjoy considerable support among some officials, who might be mor e inclined to advance their objections under a successor regime . Be - cause negotiation of ground rules would inevitably involve the dis- closure of information and attitudes regarded as matters of nation - al security in the Soviet Union, elements of the security apparatu s would almost certainly support those objections . In light of th e key role arms sales play in generating "hard" currency foreign ex - change earnings, economic and foreign trade officials favoring poli - cies of detente in other areas might well make common cause wit h "hardliners" in this area of ground rules . iii The United States, by its actions and policies, may exer t a degree of influence on the Soviet decision-making process concerning ground rules . The United States may do so by creatin g either positive incentives or negative disincentives designed t o develop Soviet interest in forging rules of the game . As a "re - ward" for Soviet participation in this effort, the United State s might hold out the prospect of a broader and deeper array of coop- erative relationships than heretofore has been realized . Thi s strategy might lead the United States to extend to Moscow positiv e benefits in areas of technology transfer, reduced tariffs, credits , and agricultural exports in the expectation that Moscow woul d respond by agreeing to regulate its involvement in areas of region - al tension . It is unclear, however, whether this broad strategy , which foundered on human rights and emigration issues in the 1970 s as it sought to moderate Soviet policies in the Third World, woul d be more successful in the 1980s .

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