FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : GROUND RULES FOR SOVIE T AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMEN T IN REGIONAL CONFLICT S AUTHOR : Nils H . Wessel l CONTRACTOR : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Inc . PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Nils H . Wessel l COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 621-1 0 The work leading to this report was supported in whole or in part from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie t and East European Research . GROUND RULES FOR SOVIE T AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT I N REGIONAL CONFLICT S The author wishes to express his appreciation for the invaluabl e assistance of Joanne S . Gowa, who contributed initial drafts o f several sections of the study . He is also indebted to Richard E . Bissell and Harvey Sicherman for their comments on portions o f the draft . The author requests comments from readers and ask s that they be sent to : Nils H . Wessel l Foreign Policy Research Institut e 3508 Market Stree t Philadelphia, PA 19104 CONTENTS Executive Summary of Chapter 1 (Ground Rules) i Executive Summary of Chapter 2 (Horn of Africa) ii i Executive Summary of Chapter 3 (Southern Africa) v Executive Summary of Chapter 4 (Yugoslavia) vi i Chapter 1 Ground Rules : Concepts and Approaches 1 Chapter 2 The Horn of Africa : Ground Rules for Soviet an d American Involvement 5 5 Chapter 3 Southern Africa : Ground Rules for Soviet an d American Involvement 9 1 Chapter 4 Yugoslavia : Ground Rules for Soviet an d American Restraint 12 8 Chapter 5 Conclusions : Ground Rules Reassessed 159 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY GROUND RULES : CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES The report seeks to devise, and in three subsequent sec- tions apply, ground rules to govern Soviet and American involvemen t in areas of present and prospective regional tension . This sectio n analyzes the concept and relevance of guidelines and outlines pos- sible approaches . In recent years, both Soviet and American officials have im - plied that there is or ought to be a "code of detente ." But th e most ambitious bilateral efforts to enact such a code, the 1972 Ba- sic Principles of Relations and the 1973 Agreement on Prevention o f Nuclear War, were flawed at the outset by the vagueness of the mu- tual commitment to foreswear "efforts to obtain unilateral advan- tage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly ." Late r misunderstandings were inevitable . Although the Soviet-American talks at the working level o n conventional arms transfers (CAT's) and the Indian Ocean have bee n suspended for some time and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dim s prospects for early bilateral agreements, ground-rules for U .S . - Soviet behavior have immediate relevance in the multilateral con - text of the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co - operation in Europe (CSCE) to be held in Madrid in November . More - over, in the intermediate future circumstances may once again be - come more propitious for bilateral negotiations on measures of mu- tual restraint . Two valid premises underlie the view that formally agree d ground rules might ease regional tensions by restraining superpow - er involvement : 1) existing modes of conflict regulation are in - adequate and 2) explicit agreements as opposed to tacit "rules o f the game" create some autonomous pressure on states toward compli - ance . But the expectation that such accords can radically trans - form the behavior of states is in all probability misplaced . To avoid the pitfalls of highly generalized commitments t o restraint, a series of specific approaches is needed in four broa d categories : 1) limitations on conventional arms transfer s 2) confidence-building measures including advanc e notification of and limits on military activi - ties 3) naval limit s 4) mechanisms of joint political consultation . Controls on CAT's can contain the level of conflict betwee n regional actors while reducing the likelihood that the U .S . and USSR will get drawn into a conflict between client states . Quanti- tative and qualitative limits, particularly on the transfer of ad- vanced weapon systems, as well as prior U .S .-Soviet consultation s on CAT's can be varied by region as appropriate . Confidence-building measures that might be incorporated in - to a code of detente include : limitation of military maneuvers , more stringent requirements concerning advance notification of ma- jor military maneuvers, prior notice of small-scale military maneu- vers, limits on the introduction of military personnel and advisers , prior notice of major military movements, and zones of disengage- ment and limited deployment coupled with assured early warning . Naval controls could include limits on maneuvers and deploy - ments, but limits on overall ship inventories are of doubtful nego- tiability under the best circumstances and would not deal with th e question of restraints in particular regions . In some cases , agreed limits on access to naval support facilities might enhanc e mutual confidence . Finally, some mechanism for the negotiation and monitorin g of any agreements establishing ground rules would contribute to in - stitutionalizing observance of mutual restraints . The Standing Consultative Commission for SALT might provide a rough model . Although these four approaches might well advance the in- terests of arms control and the containment of regional conflict , there are important reasons why the Soviet Union might wish t o avoid negotiation of ground rules with the United States . By thei r nature ground rules would seek to limit the freedom of action o f parties to them . Although the principle of mutual advantage sug- gests that the results of such negotiations should confer roughl y equal benefits on both parties, Soviet leaders, no less than thei r American counterparts, may be expected to harbor doubts on thi s score . The fluidity of regional political dynamics, existing com- mitments to regional actors, and the vicissitudes of Soviet-Ameri - . can relations will inevitably create a solid basis in Moscow fo r arguments favoring a cautious approach to negotiating ground rules . Soviet leaders will undoubtedly be mindful of the fact, moreover , ii that the initially symmetrical impact of agreed "rules of the game " may, over time and under changing circumstances, give advantage t o the other side . No less importantly, Soviet official's may be reluc - tant, even under conditions of uniformly symmetrical restraints, t o surrender their freedom of action . This may be especially tru e with respect to the freedom to maintain Soviet influence with al - lied states in Eastern Europe and to provide support for friendl y regimes and revolutionary movements in regions where Soviet an d American interests are in conflict . Many Soviet officials have in the past, for instance, clear - ly believed that conventional arms transfers enhance Soviet influ- ence with recipients despite occasional examples to the contrary . Moscow might also prove reluctant to limit CAT's in any bilatera l agreement with the United States that left France and Britain fre e to provide arms to pro-Western clients . With respect to confidence - building measures, the Soviets may resist constraints on Sovie t military activities that serve a demonstrative or threatening func- tion, especially in areas like Eastern Europe where Soviet determ- ination to maintain the status quo influences public and elite per- ceptions of the limits of the possible . Appearances are important in other respects . Merely by agreeing to conduct negotiations so directly affecting the interes t of other international actors, the Soviet Union may convey the im- pression of Soviet-American collaboration at their expense . Thi s danger itself constitutes a substantial disincentive to agreement . Sectors of the Soviet national security bureaucracy may be expecte d to raise objections to the negotiation of ground rules impinging o n their missions and capabilities . By way of example, officials i n the Party responsible for forging the maximum degree of unity with - in the international Communist movement, including non-ruling Com- munist parties in the Third World, would likely resist any regim e of mutual restraint that promised to introduce strains in relation s with those parties . Although opposition on ideological grounds t o collaboration with the chief imperialist power has apparently bee n of declining importance under Brezhnev, such sentiments continue t o enjoy considerable support among some officials, who might be mor e inclined to advance their objections under a successor regime . Be - cause negotiation of ground rules would inevitably involve the dis- closure of information and attitudes regarded as matters of nation - al security in the Soviet Union, elements of the security apparatu s would almost certainly support those objections . In light of th e key role arms sales play in generating "hard" currency foreign ex - change earnings, economic and foreign trade officials favoring poli - cies of detente in other areas might well make common cause wit h "hardliners" in this area of ground rules . iii The United States, by its actions and policies, may exer t a degree of influence on the Soviet decision-making process con- cerning ground rules . The United States may do so by creatin g either positive incentives or negative disincentives designed t o develop Soviet interest in forging rules of the game . As a "re - ward" for Soviet participation in this effort, the United State s might hold out the prospect of a broader and deeper array of coop- erative relationships than heretofore has been realized . Thi s strategy might lead the United States to extend to Moscow positiv e benefits in areas of technology transfer, reduced tariffs, credits , and agricultural exports in the expectation that Moscow woul d respond by agreeing to regulate its involvement in areas of region - al tension . It is unclear, however, whether this broad strategy , which foundered on human rights and emigration issues in the 1970 s as it sought to moderate Soviet policies in the Third World, woul d be more successful in the 1980s .