Stanford Professor Terry Karl
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMIGRATION REVIEW IMMIGRATION COURT MIAMI, FLORIDA ) In the Matter of: ) ) (b) (6) Jose Guillermo GARCfA-MERINO ) ) ) In removal proceedings ) ) ) EXPERT REPORT OF PROFESSOR TERRY L KARL / I. SUMMARY OF OPINION: On the basis of my expertise, described in Part 11below, I have reached the following "/ conclusions: The Record: During the tenure of Jose Guillermo Garcia Merino, Minister of Defense in J El Salvador (October 1979-April 1983), El Salvador's Armed Forces (meaning both its military and security forces), engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of massacres, torture and arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, and other gross violations of human rights. Violence was indiscriminate and aimed largely at non-combatants. During the time General Garc/a t exercised decisive command and control over the military and security forces, these gross and systematic violations of human rights were among the highest in Latin America and the world. [Part III below i. • Military Responsibility and Impunity under Defense Minister Gareia: In the context of repression and later civil war with the Frente Farabundo Martipara la Liberacidn Naeional, (henceforth referred to as FMLN), the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) were responsible for the overwhelming majority of these human rights abuses. State terror was a deliberate policy characterized by clear patterns of conduct. Nonetheless, throughout General Garcia's tenure as Minster of Defense, no offÉcer was ever held accountable or prosecuted for human rights abuses. This total impunity could not have occurred without the direct knowledge, assistance and participation, both through acts of omission and commission, of Minister of Defcose Garcia. IPart IV below]. • Context: General Garcfa's pattern of deception, which characterized his tenure as defense minister, is evident by the manner in which he secured this highest office. In October 1979, General Garcfa was appointed Minister of Defense, the most important decision-making post in the military, by dissembling about his policy preferences and his existing alliances. At a time when demands for reform were at an all- time high, he portrayed himself as a reformer who would seek political dialogue with the opposition, but instead when he had already formed an alliance with right-wing extremist officers seeking a military solution to El Salvador's problems. [Part V below I. • The Power and Authority of Defense Minister Garcia: General Garcla, as Minister of Defense, was the single most powerful person in El Salvador from January 1980-April 16,1983, a role he exercised in both a dejure and de facto capacity. With no effective civilian control over the military, Minister of Defense Garcia had the authority to command the entire military and security forces, plan strategy with others, and order aAn ImportantNoteonTermiuology:TheSalvadoranArmedForces(ESAF)includesthearmy,navy,and air forceas wellas the securityforces,meaningthe NationalGuard,NationalPoliceandTreasuryPolice.In this report, Iwill usethe terms "armedforces,""military,"El SalvadoranArmedForces,orESAFto referto all combined forces.Theterm"securityforces"is limitedto theNationalGuard,theNationalPolice andthe TreasuryPolice. Note alsothatGeneralGarciaheldthe rankofcoinnel duringmuchof thetimediscussedbelow,butsincehe was eventuallypromotedto general,this reportwill referto him inthis highercapacity.Manydeclassifieddocuments refertohimas "colonel."Traditionally,"colonel"was the mostpowerfulrankintheESAF,withtheexceptionof the presidentof the country,a militaryofficerwhowas giventhe rankof general. 2 /, (_ /_e''_¸¸_ actions. He hadthe duty to promote and demote other officers, investigate crimes, and punish military officials who committed such crimes. [Part V1]. • Defense Minister Garcia's Assistance and Participation in Human Rights Violations After Taking Office: Minister of Defense Garcia used his extensive powers to facilitate and assist in widespread human rights abuses from the moment he took office. On the one hand, he built up the repressive capacity of the military towards non-combatants. On the other hand, he manipulated appointments to reinforcethe role of extremist officers seeking "total war" and produce the calculated defeatof reformists inside the military." In the case of San Luis Finea, in particular, Garcia's acts of commission and omission gave a "green light" to mass murderand state terror.[Part VIII. • Defense Minister Garcia's Authorization, Assistance and/or Participation in Human Right's Violations by Protecting and Promoting Known Abusers and Presiding over the Descent into State Terror: Minister of Defense Garcia protected and promoted officers with strong evidence of crimes in their records.Working with the High Command, he authorized or presidedover actions, including numerousmassacres, which resultedin the extrajudicial killings of thousands of non-combatants, tortureand other forms of violence. Under his authority, and partially as a result of his actions, El Salvador descended into organized state repressionterrorand mass murder.[Part VIH]. • Defense Minister Garcia's Assistance and Participation in Human Rights Violations Through a Pattern of Deception, Deniability, and Failure to Conduct Investigations: By denying the existence of human rights abuses, blaming these abuses on disinformatlon and propaganda, and then failing to investigatethem, General Garcia obstructedjustice. After May 1980, General Garcia made no attempt at all to investigate human rights abuses, with the exception of those involving the murdersof U.S. citizens. [Part IX]. / • Defense Minister Garcia's Assistance and/or Participation in Human Rights s'" Violations Is Illustrated through Five Specific Cases of Atrocity: o Case 1: the Rio Sumpui massacre: This May 1980 massacre demonstrates the denial and failure to investigate mass killings that characterized General Garcfa's " actions in all 59 massacres listed in Appendix Ill. o Case 2: the murders of six FDR leaders: These November 1980 extra-judicial killings of the leaders of the civilian leR opposition shows Defense Minister Garcia's support and encouragement for extrajudicial assassinations as well as his failure to investigate the security forces involved. / o Case 3: the murders of four American churchwomen: These December 1980 ,,J planned assassinations reveals the role of the Defense Minister in labeling these women "subversives," a veritable death sentence in El Salvador at the time. It also demonstrates the enormous external pressure necessary to have Defense Minister Garcia conduct any investigation whatsoever as well as his involvement in a cover-up to protect the officer involved in the murders of these women. o Case 4: the Sheraton murders: These January 1981 extrajudicial killings again illustrates that Defense Minister Garcia only orderedinvestigations under strong external pressure brought to bear in the murders of U.S. citizens. Once again, t_ Defense Minister repeatedly stonewalled this investigation and protected the officers involved in this crime. o Case 5- the El Mozote Massacre: demonstrates the Defense Minister's cover-up of the largest mass killing in contemporary Latin American history as well as his protection of the commanders involved. In sum, through all of the actions, failures to act, and deliberate deniability documented below, Defense Minister Garcia authorized, assisted, facilitated and/or participated in the worst civilian slaughter in Salvadoran history. II. EXPERT CREDENTIALS 2 The detailsof my expertise and my professional knowledge of El Salvador follow: I am the Gildred Professor of Latin American Studies and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. I am also Sanior Fellow (by courtesy) of the Freeman Spogli Institute for / International Studies and Bass University Fellow for Excellence in Teaching. Prior to my appointment at Stanford, I was Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University. I received my Ph.D. in Political Science at Stanford University in 1982, with Special Distinction. I served as Stanford's director of the Center for Latin American Studies for twelve years (1990-2002), during which period it wa..sdesignated a "major center ofexceUence" by the U.S. Department of Education.l am a specialist in Latin American politics, especially Central American politics, military authoritarian rule, the organization and practices of militaries, civil wars, and the political economy of developing countries. I have extensive experience studying and analyzing haman rights abuses and government responses to them. I speak Spanish and conduct my research in that language in Latin America. I have received numerous awards, prizes and fellowships for my work on Latin American politics, and especially Central America. Most recently,I was awarded the Latin American Studies Association Honorary Martin Diskin Memorial Lectureship, and I received a Doctor of Humane Letters, honoris causa, from the University of San Francisco. Earlier, the Order of Rio Branco was conferred upon me by President Femando Henrique Cardoso of the Republic of Brazil in recognition of service to Brazil and Latin America. The MacArthur Foundation, the 2SeeAppendix!: KarlCurriculumVita 4 Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation the Open Society Institute, and other foundations have supported my work. At Stanford University, I have received the three highest teaching prizes and the university's volunteer service prize. The thesis of my book,