CHAPTER TWO

THE NETHERLANDS IN WORLD WAR ONE

July 1914

It is difficult to assess the level of Dutch intelligence regarding the prospect of an invasion into the Netherlands in 1914. The strong public stance of impartiality and neutrality that the government had pursued since the turn of the century had made it hard to justify collecting infor- mation on possible aggressors, at least officially. It seems highly likely, however, that the Dutch were aware of the 1905 Von Schlieffen plan which included a German invasion of Dutch Limburg as part of an overall German plan to invade Belgium. As early as 1877 the British Foreign Secretary had predicted that in the event of a German attack on France ‘we may be fighting for Holland before two years are out’.1 What seems less likely is any knowledge of the Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke’s later revision that took the attacking German forces around the Netherlands.2 Most of the intelligence on the increasingly fragile European situation that made its way back to the Netherlands seems to have been as a result of informal enquiries. Snijders certainly had his con- tacts in Germany and as Dutch officers were often invited to make visits to German military units for the purpose of ‘observation’ it is reasonable to assume that his information was relatively accurate. Businessmen and holidaymakers were also asked to report back on things they might have

1 Fortuin, J.A., ‘Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog’, Militaire Spectator, 149 (1980), p. 21. Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral p. 65 and Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 80, Ponting, Thirteen Days, p. 45, Cecil, G., Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 4 Vols (London: 1921–1923). VolII, p. 126–9 p. 373 quoted in Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914, p. 133 and p. 493 and Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 88. 2 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral p. 65, Moeyes, Buiten Schot, p. 80, Ponting, Thirteen Days p. 46, Oostendorp, Th., ‘Duitsland en de Nederlandse neutralieit 1914–18’, Militaire Spectator 134, (1965) and Fortuin, J.A., ‘Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog’, Militaire Spectator, 149 (1980), p. 21–35. Kennedy claims that although the Schlieffen Plan had been in existence for some time, it was only the massive increase in the strength of the German army in 1913 that made the plan feasible. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914, p. 448 and Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld Oorlog. Part 2 p. 4.

22 chapter two seen during their travels. Likewise embassy staff, not allowed to collect intelligence in any official capacity, often passed information privately to friends in the government or military.3 The gaps in Dutch intelligence gathering become apparent, however, when, in the middle of July 1914, Snijders was allowed to leave the Netherlands for three weeks holiday in Scandinavia, with the full approval of the Dutch government for his absence. The timing of Snijders’ vacation indicates that most of his reliable (in his view) intelligence came from Germany, as many of the leading German military figures were also on holiday at this time4 After hearing of Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum he immediately began his journey back to the Netherlands but did not actu- ally make it back to Dutch soil until after the start of the Dutch mobilisa- tion. In the meantime, as soon as the Minister of War, Bosboom, was told of the ‘Api Api’ telegram and its implications in the early hours of 26 July 1914 he gave instructions for an immediate partial mobilisation.5 Snijders returned home the following day, 27 July.6 On 27 July 1914 Queen Wilhemina called a meeting of her ministers and it was agreed that the government would issue a statement reaffirming Dutch neutrality. At the same time plans were put in place for a full mobil- isation on 1 August unless the international situation rapidly improved, something it was not expected to do. The population of the Netherlands was, understandably, nervous. The financial markets dropped rapidly in the expectation of war.7 As a trading nation the Netherlands would be hard hit if the seas were no longer safe for her merchant ships. Measures were put in place by the Dutch Minister of Finance, Treub, both to try and prevent any run on the banks and to try and stabilise the financial mar- kets. Once the mobilisation had been announced many Netherlanders started to stockpile food and other essentials. They also withdrew their savings from the Dutch banks, demanding that they be given hard cur- rency and not paper money. The Dutch stocks of copper and silver coins were severely reduced and this shortage of coins in circulation lasted

3 One of the best assessments of the state of Dutch intelligence gathering in the pre- war period can be found in Hubert Van Tuyll van Serooskerken’s ‘The Dutch Mobilization of 1914: Reading the “Enemy’s Intentions’,. p. 711–738. Klinkert and Abbenhuis also consider the topic in their work on the mobilisation. 4 Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War. p. 190. 5 Bosboom, In Moeilijke omstandigheden, p. 2. 6 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, p. 64. 7 Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914–1918, p. 131 and Brugmans, H., Geschiedenis van Nederland onder de Regeering van Koningin Wilhelmina, (Amsterdam, Scheltens & Giltay, no date). p. 120.