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Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-06 Loss of Control Or Loss of Flight Path During Go-Around Or Other Flight Phases

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European Aviation Safety Agency Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-06 Loss of control or loss of flight path during go-around or other flight phases RMT.0647 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The objective of this NPA is to mitigate the safety risk of loss of the normal go-around (G/A) flight path, or loss of control of the aircraft during G/A or other flight phases executed at low-speed. This NPA proposes to amend CS-25 to ensure that: — the design of large aeroplanes is such that the G/A procedure with all engines operating (AEO) can be safely conducted by the flight crew without requiring exceptional piloting skills or alertness. Risk of excessive crew workload and risk of somatogravic illusion must be carefully evaluated, and design mitigation measures must be put in place if those risks are too high; — the design of large aeroplanes provides an adequate longitudinal controllability and authority during G/A and other flight phases (focusing on low speed situations). The proposed changes are expected to provide a fair safety benefit against an acceptable cost impact for large aeroplane manufacturers. Action area: Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I) Affected rules: CS-25 (Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes) Affected stakeholders: DAHs and operators Driver: Safety Reference: SR FRAN-2013-025; FRAN-2013-026; FRAN-2013-042 Rulemaking group: Yes Impact assessment: Full Procedure: Standard 6.7.2015 11.5.2017 2018/Q1 TE.RPRO.00034-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 82 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2017-06 Table of contents Table of contents 1. About this NPA ..................................................................................................................................... 3 1.1. How this NPA was developed ................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. How to comment on this NPA ................................................................................................................... 3 1.3. The next steps ........................................................................................................................................... 3 2. In summary: Why and what .................................................................................................................. 4 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale ............................................................................... 4 2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives ................................................................................................... 4 2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals ........................................................................ 4 2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals ........................................................... 5 3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail ...................................................................................... 6 3.1. Draft Certification Specifications (Draft EASA decision amending CS-25) ................................................ 6 4. Impact assessment (IA) ....................................................................................................................... 13 4.1. What is the issue ..................................................................................................................................... 13 4.2. How it could be achieved — options ...................................................................................................... 25 4.3. What are the impacts .............................................................................................................................. 26 4.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 33 4.5. Monitoring and evaluation ..................................................................................................................... 35 5. Proposed action to support implementation ....................................................................................... 36 6. References ......................................................................................................................................... 37 6.1. Affected/Related regulations .................................................................................................................. 37 6.2. Affected decisions ................................................................................................................................... 37 6.3. Other reference documents ................................................................................................................... 37 7. Appendices ........................................................................................................................................ 38 Appendix 1: List of occurrences analysed by the RMG ...................................................................................... 38 Appendix 2: Synthesis of the responses to the questionnaire sent to large aeroplanes manufacturers – RMT.0647 ........................................................................................................................................................... 70 Appendix 3: Evaluation of the proportion of large aeroplanes (operated by EASA Member States operators in commercial air transport) that are equipped with a system reducing the G/A thrust ................................. 75 TE.RPRO.00034-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 82 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2017-06 1. About this NPA 1. About this NPA 1.1. How this NPA was developed The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme under RMT.0647. The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the inputs of the Rulemaking Group RMT.0647. It is hereby submitted to all interested parties3 for consultation. 1.2. How to comment on this NPA Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/4. The deadline for submission of comments is 11 August 2017. 1.3. The next steps Following the closure of the public consultation period, EASA will review all comments received on the NPA. Based on the comments received, EASA will develop a decision amending the certification specifications and acceptable means of compliance for large aeroplanes (CS-25). The comments received and the EASA responses thereto will be reflected in a comment-response document (CRD). The CRD will be annexed to the decision. 1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ ?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216). 2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management-board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure). 3 In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and Articles 6(3) and 7) of the Rulemaking Procedure. 4 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster ([email protected]). TE.RPRO.00034-005 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified. Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 82 An agency of the European Union European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2017-06 2. In summary: Why and what 2. In summary: Why and what 2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale A number of commercial air transport large aeroplane accidents or serious incidents occurred either during/at the end of a go-around (G/A) phase, or with the aeroplane close to the ground (but not in G/A mode) and with the pilots attempting to climb. A loss of the normal G/A flight path or loss of control of the aircraft has been observed in relation to inadequate awareness of the aeroplane’s state, or inadequate management by the flight crew of the relationship between pitch attitude and thrust. Unusual pitch-up trim position has also been a factor in some occurrences in other flight phases. For more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by this proposal, please refer to the regulatory impact assessment (RIA) Section 4.1. 2.2. What we want to achieve —
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