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Home , Cihan News Agency, Humanitarianism

, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism

Bruce GILLEY* Abstract Introduction The emergence of Turkey as a major This article traces the evolution of Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy as an example of the actor in humanitarian diplomacy and new humanitarianism associated with emerging assistance raises new and important countries. It discusses both the promise as well questions for both Turkey and as the challenges of the new humanitarianism. humanitarianism. This paper will It then introduces the idea of “middle power consider how the Turkish engagement activism” in international affairs as one way with humanitarianism can be to understand Turkey’s behavior. This lens is then used to identify the aspects of Turkey’s understood as a form of “middle power behavior that are more likely to endure as activism” in international affairs. The contributions to global humanitarian affairs. middle power approach serves as a useful It identifies state-centered humanitarian , framework to explain Turkey’s behavior regional approaches, and the supplementing of and to predict the emergence of a “new with political and economic humanitarianism” that is resulting from goals as aspects of the Turkish approach likely to endure and to appeal to other emerging actors. the efforts of Turkey and other middle powers such as South Korea. Key Words The paper begins with a narrative review of Turkey’s humanitarian Humanitarianism, humanitarian diplomacy, diplomacy and assistance and the emerging powers, middle powers. controversial issues it has raised. This is followed by a consideration of humanitarianism and the current issues it faces as a result of the emergence of non-Western states as prominent actors * Associate Professor and Director of Graduate in the field. The middle power lens is Programs in Public Policy, Mark O. Hatfield then introduced as a means of sorting School of Government, Portland State out several unresolved questions about University, Urban Center, 6th Floor, Portland, OR, 97202 USA the new humanitarianism. Theoretical E-mail: [email protected] and policy implications follow.

37 PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2015, Volume XX, Number 1, pp. 37-58. Bruce Gilley

assistance would likely double. But the The turning point in Turkey’s Syria crisis only accelerated a trend in rise as a global humanitarian Turkey’s rising humanitarian status that superpower came in 2011 when had been taking shape since the end of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip the Cold War. In the aftermath of the Erdoğan decided to launch a US-led war in Afghanistan in particular, major assistance mission to war- Turkey launched the Initiative to torn Somalia after a visit to the provide a combination of humanitarian aid and infrastructure rebuilding to country in August with his wife Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the and six cabinet members. early assistance was centered on the subsequent regional crises in the , especially in Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey’s Humanitarian Libya. Turkey’s NGOs became active in Diplomacy Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt during and after their political revolutions, The sudden emergence of Turkey providing humanitarian assistance and “from dwarf to giant”1 in international assisting migrant populations. humanitarian assistance has raised a host The turning point in Turkey’s rise of new issues. In 2013, Turkey gave US$ as a global humanitarian superpower 1.6 billion in official humanitarian aid, came in 2011 when Prime Minister making it the third largest donor after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to the U.S. and UK. This giving has been launch a major assistance mission to accompanied by parallel diplomatic war-torn Somalia after a visit to the efforts to create humanitarian space and country in August with his wife and six by an expansion of non-official giving. cabinet members. The visit, intended Between 2007 and 2012, the Turkish to highlight the plight of drought Red Crescent provided humanitarian victims, ended a 20 year period where aid to 70 countries, delivering US$ 2.5 no major foreign leader had visited the billion worth of humanitarian aid in capital. The one-day visit was prosaic 2012 alone. at the time- the airplane carrying the Much of this aid has involved assistance businessmen, journalists, and NGOs to the more than 1.6 million refugees damaged its wing on landing while the from Syria living in Turkey by early 2015, government barred the local press from either in camps or in urban areas. If in- attending- but has since loomed larger kind contributions for the Syria crisis in Turkey’s own historical imagination as are included, Turkey’s humanitarian the emblem of its new humanitarianism.

38 Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism

The effective mobilization of it was interested in humanitarianism government, university, NGO, and beyond its own region or nearby Muslim private sector partners in Somalia populations. Erdoğan despatched his allowed a nation-building exercise deputy prime minister, Beşir Atalay, without force. “With its unrivaled and the president of the Disaster and on-the-ground rebuilding effort and Agency generous scholarship program, Turkey (AFAD), Fuat Oktay, to the Philippines is using Somalia as the first great to coordinate Turkey’s relief works on the display of “virtuous power,” wrote ground. Turkey even gave US$ 200,000 Harte.2 The Somalia initiative attracted in 2014 for the construction of a water wide attention because it eschewed tank to serve an elementary school on pure humanitarianism and instead an Indian reservation in Oregon in the embraced business ties, peacebuilding United States. In 2016, Turkey will initiatives, education, infrastructure and host the first UN World Humanitarian , and even military aid. Summit, which Davutoğlu has described Turkey has cited the Somalia example as it as “the most important international a model for its engagement with .3 summit ever held in Turkey.”4

Humanitarian diplomacy and Historical Drivers assistance is a policy instrument th th involving the use of non-coercive Throughout the 18 and 19 centuries, organization (communication, European powers variously negotiated and intervened in the Ottoman Empire negotiation, advocacy, in the name of the saving mobilization, persuasion, etc.) (mainly Christians).5 Arguably, the whole and material provision by external idea of humanitarian diplomacy and, if actors with the intention of necessary, intervention, arose in European assisting vulnerable populations relations with the Ottomans. Turkey with basic needs in target itself also dealt with the humanitarian countries. implications of Caucasus migrants of the 1860s and 1870s and then the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Beyond the Middle East and Africa, non-governmental activism that plays Turkey has taken actions that spread its such a prominent role in contemporary footprint even wider. The Philippines humanitarianism, including the nursing typhoon of 2013 provided an early advances associated with the British opportunity for Ankara to show that social reformer Florence Nightingale,

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arose in European dealings with the Nations Security Council non-permanent Ottoman Empire. The forerunner of seat in 2009-10. However, it is better to the Turkish Red Crescent Society was see both agendas as linked to common formed in 1868 as the Society in Aid of underlying structural conditions, internal Ill and Wounded Ottoman Soldiers. and external, that have made Turkey both Democratization in Turkey after able and willing to play a larger role on 1983 unleashed a wave of civil society the international stage. organization, spurred on by rapid With rising influence, however, economic growth. The end of the Cold has come rising scrutiny of Turkey’s War also put new external demands on humanitarian practices. These issues Turkish foreign policy, beginning with can be essentially grouped into three the needs of populations in Kazakhstan, categories: political neutrality, pro- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Islamic bias, and professionalism. Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency Issue 1: Political Neutrality (TIKA) was established for this purpose in 1992. An almost constant rumble of The question of political neutrality has war on Turkey’s borders- the Iran-Iraq war arisen because of the assumptions long of the 1980s, the Balkan and Armenia- made about the nature of humanitarian Azerbaijan conflicts of the 1990s, the Iraq assistance and diplomacy. Humanitarian and Afghanistan wars of the 2000s, and diplomacy and assistance is a policy the Syrian crisis of the 2010s- led to rising instrument involving the use of non- demands on its humanitarian capacity. coercive organization (communication, This combination of internal reforms and negotiation, advocacy, mobilization, external pressures has forced Turkey into a persuasion, etc.) and material provision 6 more active humanitarian stance. by external actors with the intention of By the second term of the AKP assisting vulnerable populations with government (2007 to 2011) under basic human needs in target countries. Erdoğan, the foreign ministry was It differs from traditional foreign already noting the rising importance policy in that it steers clear of political of humanitarian assistance in Turkey’s issues and avoids coercive methods foreign policy. This unlocked a genuine (threat, sanction, intervention). Many enthusiasm for humanitarianism in actors such as the ICRC’s (full name, Turkish society. Some local media abbreviation in parenthesis) Régnier have linked the sudden enthusiasm for insist that humanitarian diplomacy must humanitarian diplomacy and assistance be “politically-neutral” and “value-free” to Turkey’s successful bid for a United in order to be classified as such.7

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This has meant that the rise of “new region. “Turkey’s humanitarian interests humanitarian powers” like Turkey has in Somalia over the past years are not attracted scrutiny from that community. enough to explain why Turkey has Turkey’s close integration of its official become one of the main actors in the aid with its political goals- the head of country,” wrote a Somalian newspaper.9 the Turkish Intelligence Organization A journalist in Turkey, meanwhile, (MİT) from 2010, Hakan Fidan, was commented: “While Turkey’s soft power the head the Turkish Cooperation and approach seems so far to have won the Development Organization (TİKA) from hearts and minds of some Africans, the 2003 to 2007- has raised eyebrows. The rhetoric Turkish officials use is disturbing Western humanitarian aid community to many others. A phrase I often hear has grown up with the High Liberal punted around by Turkish officials, assumption that an explicit or barely- ‘Whatever we are doing in Africa, we concealed political agenda is inconsistent are not expecting anything in return’, with . undermines their aid. The recipients do not want to be considered so naïve In the case of Somalia, Turkey’s they would believe such self-sacrificial “political stand”, for instance, has claims.”10 involved not asking questions to the host government about the uses of aid or about Such political questions also extend to conditionality in the form of governance Turkey’s key INGOs. The politicization reforms. As a Turkish journalist put it, of Turkey’s humanitarian INGOs began quoting a discussion with the Somalian when the Turkish Red Crescent Society ambassador to Turkey, “Turkish aid… was a big fund-raiser in the U.S. for does not come with many strings the Turkish War of independence in attached.”8 This political choice has given the 1920s. In recent times, attention the assistance operation a de facto bias for has centered on the Humanitarian Aid the state and the sitting government, one Organization (İHH), which operates in reason why Turkish diplomats and aid over 100 countries. In 2010, İHH led workers have been the targets of attacks an ill-fated “freedom flotilla” to provide by radical Islamists who claim that the humanitarian relief and construction country is a front for Western “invaders”. supplies to Gaza in 2010, which had been Indeed, Turkey has explicitly made under an Israeli blockade since 2006. the combatting of Islamic extremism Israeli commandos stormed the boat, a key justification for its humanitarian killing nine (another later died of injuries). giving in Muslim countries. It has also The mission was planned shortly after prompted speculation in the local media Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that Ankara has broader designs on the walked out of a panel meeting that

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included Israeli president Shimon Peres at the Iranian government as a de facto the annual Davos Summit in 2009 after official representative of Turkey. making several barbed comments about Turkey’s difficulties in embracing the Israel. While Ankara tried to dissuade the principle of political neutrality may group from carrying out the mission, and stem from its own past. For many years, while İHH had negotiated in good faith Turkish disagreements with foreign with Syria and Israel to open official aid powers on humanitarian assistance corridors to Gaza, the mission was clearly to its own Kurdish populations has designed as an act of protest rather than reflected the ineffably politicized nature humanitarianism. In 2014, an İstanbul of humanitarian aid. However, as court started prosecuting in absentia the expectations of political neutrality have four Israeli military commanders who led become commonplace, Turkey finds itself the raid. out of step with the Western humanitarian Elsewhere, the İHH has issued highly community, which expects at least some charged political statements on the status degree of separation between political of Turkic-speaking Uighurs in China’s agendas and humanitarian needs. As the far western Xinjiang territory, calling Cihan News Agency concluded: “There are for a statement of humanitarian concern humanitarian organizations…that act less on the issue from the Organization of like aid groups and more like the tools of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).11 intelligence services. Such ‘humanitarian’ organizations may help intelligence In 2003, Turkish military intelligence agencies cover up their operations in was claimed to be using the Turkish Red foreign territories. However, they severely Crescent as cover to move weapons from damage the credibility of Turkish citizens Turkey to Turkmens in Iraq. US military as the friends of those in need.”12 members detained eleven Turkish military officers for their involvement Still, two factors mitigate the charge of in the operation and led them off in politicization. One is the simple point hoods (hence it is known as the “hood that humanitarianism is a type of public event”). And in three kidnapping cases- policy. As the former UN Emergency a kidnapped Turkish journalist in Syria Relief Coordinator and UN Under- who was released in Iran, the rescue Secretary-General for Humanitarian of two Iranian Revolutionary Guard Affairs Jan Egeland puts it: “Blankets officers from Syria, and the release of two and food rations are provided when Turkish Airlines pilots by Hezbollah in inadequate political and security Lebanon in return for nine members of measures fail to address the root causes of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard- İHH the crisis.”13 That is, all actors engaged in seems to have coordinated closely with humanitarian diplomacy or assistance are

42 Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism pursuing “political” or “public” agendas integration into that effort of civil society – whatever mixture of self-interest, and business organizations. And since commitment, and sympathy that the trend has been growing influence entails. Several scholars have questioned of Islamic civil society and business the notion that humanitarianism organizations- the traditional secular should be separated from political and Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s developmental goals.14 Association (TÜSİAD) is today Secondly, the issue of the “narrow” challenged by the Islamic Association political interests Turkey sometimes of Independent Industrialists and pursues as part of its humanitarian Businessmen (MÜSİAD)- this translates assistance needs to be separated from into more Islamic pressures on Ankara’s the “broader” political interests it is humanitarian foreign policy. pursuing. These latter concern normative There is an irony here since the origins of attempts to build a more cooperative and Western humanitarianism were in caring inclusive international order, a question for Christian groups at risk in the decaying we return to below. Turkey has made Ottoman Empire.15 However, there is humanitarianism a key dimension of its little evidence thus far that the Islamic foreign policy, with explicitly political orientation undermines the delivery of goals of transforming the international humanitarian aid and much evidence that order. Such broader political interests do it inspires it and makes it more effective not discredit its humanitarianism, given and durable. Islamic-inspired İHH and their normative underpinnings. partly state sponsored the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), founded in Issue 2: Islamic Bias 1868, have a cultural inroad in many of the countries where Turkey operates such as The second issue that has been raised Afghanistan and Somalia, allowing them about Turkey’s emergence as a global to provide education and healthcare in an humanitarian actor is the role of Islamic effective manner. It has also given Ankara foundations and cultural linkages. The more influence in encouraging peace and concern is that humanitarianism may be humanitarian space among Sunni groups. delivered in a manner that promotes a The search and rescue team of the TRCS regressive version of or which favors was one of the first to reach afflicted areas Muslim over non-Muslim populations. in Pakistan following a 2005 earthquake This is especially the case since the because of its cultural ties. The İHH has Turkish model of humanitarianism even been put in charge of developing a involves a close linkage between official code of conduct for Islamic humanitarian giving and actions by the state and the organizations for the OIC.

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Syria- all are crisis situations that were Turkish model of and are marked by limited Western humanitarianism involves a efforts to find effective political solutions close linkage between official or sufficient humanitarian assistance to giving and actions by the predominantly Muslim populations. state and the integration into The…[lack of] Western attention thus that effort of civil society and provides a credible justification for the business organizations. Turkish government to fill the gap and focus on Muslim populations affected 17 Also, secularists in Turkey, despite by war and disaster.” In other words, avowedly being more internationalist Turkey’s INGOs have both a functional than the “parochial” Islamists, lack the advantage and a normative justification motivations for carrying it out. As Tabak for paying particular attention to puts it: “Why have nationalists, liberals humanitarian crises involving Muslim or socialists, while having the frames of populations. international engagement, not developed cross-border institutional humanitarian Issue 3: Professionalism, 16 action, while Islamic groups have?” He Effectiveness, and argues that the AKP has unlocked not only a revived Muslim sensibility and civil Sustainability society space but has also encouraged a globalist rather than exclusionary Islamic The third line of critique of Turkey’s sensibility. “The idea of ummah has, in humanitarianism revolves around its this sense, been replaced by an Islamic various departures from “best practice” internationalism that suggests having as developed primarily among Western cross-border humanitarian engagement INGOs, the Western-dominated United as a holder of Islamic religious identity, Nations humanitarian system, and yet without having a focus exclusively on Western governments. As Akpinar has Muslims.” noted in her study of Turkey’s Somalia foray, despite the political payoffs, the Moreover, the attention to humanitarian effort has been constrained by Turkey’s needs of Islamic populations may remedy lack of capacity and expertise, its focus a blind spot in Western countries. As on personalistic and one-off actions, and Binder and Erten put it: “It is worth its lack of public support at home and noting that the key crises that…[define] regional support abroad.18 Turkish humanitarian assistance- Bosnia, the Kashmir earthquake, the plight of The financing and political support of the Rohingya in Myanmar, Somalia and Turkey’s various humanitarian endeavors

44 Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism raises issues of both transparency and humanitarian summit, foreign minister sustainability. Because Turkey is still a Davutoğlu stated: «Hopefully, İstanbul developing country, the government will become a UN hub of international has not made its external spending a mediation, development, peace activities, high profile issue and thus reliable and humanitarian and women issues.»19 consistent figures are not always easy to While this blurs the boundary between come by. In addition, since up to 75% humanitarian assistance and other forms of spending on major crises has come of foreign policy, this critique is odd not from budgetary allocations but coming at a time when the global foreign from government-organized , assistance agenda is being reorganized there are questions about how “donor around the principles of resilience and fatigue” could more easily undermine national ownership, both of which put the sustainability of Turkish efforts. a premium on long-term integrated aid The question of the domestic political and on aid that is defined by the affected support for an enlarged international national community itself (which may giving campaign is crucial. Whether the want bridges instead of blankets). In idea of a “grand restoration” of Turkish that sense, Turkey’s broadening of the identity through humanitarianism is humanitarian agenda is consistent with enough to motivate everyday support emerging trends. remains to be seen. In addition, Turkey’s humanitarian assistance has been seen as personalistic and uncoordinated, working as it does “If I request computers from mainly from the prime minister’s office the UN, they will take months rather than from an autonomous and and require a number of professionalized agency and lacking any assessments. They will spend institutionalized status, such as a line item US$ 50,000 to give me US$ in the budget. Turkey is not a member 7,000 of equipment. If I request of the OECD’s Development Assistance computers from Turkey, they Committee (DAC- although it has been will show up next week.” offered membership). It has resisted attempts by the UNHCR to co-manage its Syrian migrant camps (although six Turkey has also raised eyebrows by UN agencies were involved in helping it its broadening of the definition of serve the camps) and has also rejected a humanitarianism to include development role in the camps for Western INGOs. Its assistance, peacebuilding, and much else, officials insist that broader coordination as in Somalia. After announcing the 2016 with the DAC or the UN system would

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hamper its rapid response to crises such The lack of official coordination with as that in Syria. “Here at the MFA, we regional and Western actors means that can either respond to the Syrian refugee it is difficult for partners to scale with crisis or discuss with other donors on Turkish efforts, potentially reducing how to engage more closely,” Binder and overall impact. Yet much of this is Erten quote one official saying.20 The simply a reflection of the newness of mayor of Mogadishu is more blunt: “If Turkey’s efforts. The quick scaling up of I request computers from the UN, they its international engagement and thus will take months and require a number of professionalism- which the 2016 World assessments. They will spend US$ 50,000 Humanitarian Summit (WHS) provides to give me US$ 7,000 of equipment. If I a strong driver for given the 2-year request computers from Turkey, they will process of consultations leading up the show up next week.”21 summit- suggests that these transitional issues will decline in importance. More Ankara sees multilateral coordination fundamental differences about the on humanitarian diplomacy and purposes and design of aid are likely to assistance as imposing unnecessary remain. costs on its rapid actions and broader foreign policy aims. The Ministry of Emerging States and Disaster and Emergency Management Humanitarianism Authority (AFAD) argues that the UN and EU procedures for doing The issues raised by Turkey’s humanitarian reconstruction projects humanitarianism can be usefully framed are too cumbersome and prevent rapid in two different contexts: emerging responses. At the same time, Turkey states and middle powers. Despite recent touts its attainment of a high-level of interest in the role of emerging states, to “interoperability”- its systems can easily date most scholarship on humanitarian work with those of others- which is a basic diplomacy and assistance has focused on aid principle long-espoused by the aid INGOs and international and regional community but difficult to implement institutions, especially the UN system. because each has its own internal system This seems to reflect the normative bias designed to ensure accountability to its mentioned above that excludes state own stakeholders. It can get UNICEF behavior from the field by definitional workers into the field far faster than rival fiat. Minear, for example, writes that countries even though it lacks official states “instrumentalize assistance and coordination systems. protection activities.”22 Smith insists that

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“state diplomats pursue a multifarious chosen Turkey over Switzerland as set of interests responding to a specific the site for the first UN humanitarian national interest [while]…humanitarian conference in 2016 is an awareness that officials pursue an international interest the rules of the game are being redefined in respect of a narrowly focused mission, by the states of the “global South” and which is to respond to humanitarian that without engaging them directly need.”23 there is a danger that humanitarianism as a universal enterprise will fall apart. Yet beyond the obvious point that every humanitarian operation run by INGOs The emergence of new economic or UN agencies depends critically for powers in humanitarianism can be funding and support on sovereign states, seen, and foreseen, visually by looking sovereign states may act more morally and at national contributions to the UN’s ethically than INGOs and international Central Emergency Response Fund institutions in given crises precisely (CERF) from its launch in 2006 to because they have a choice of policy 2014. As can be seen from Figure instruments. The term “humanitarian 1, there is a significant relationship diplomacy” originated in a book that between a country’s development level asked how the U.S. government could be (GDP per capita) and its contributions more effective in securing basic human to the CERF. In effect, richer countries rights for vulnerable populations.24 give more because they can afford to. It may be that domestic resistance to Even if it was possible or desirable “foreign aid” declines once a country’s to exclude sovereign states from the economy reaches a point where the definition of humanitarian actors in basic needs of the population have the past, that position is untenable been met. What is important to note today in an era of emerging powers that is all of the so-called emerging powers- aspire to make their own contributions of which Turkey, South Korea, South to global humanitarianism in the name Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia are shown of the state. “The South continues to here- are large over-contributors. These voice that humanitarian assistance countries make humanitarian assistance should transcend the concept of relief a priority because it fits well with their and be linked with national priorities,” active diplomatic agendas that seek to asserts the former head of the OIC’s increase influence through such good humanitarian operations in a briefing international citizenship. These countries paper.25 The reason why UN Secretary have both the capacity and the will to General Ban Ki-moon appears to have reshape the global humanitarian agenda.

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Figure 1: Contributions to CERF Relative to Development Levels

South Korea Brazil South Africa Turkey

15 20 Indonesia 10 Total CERF 2006-14 (US$, log) CERF Donations Total 5 7 8 9 10 11 GDP Per Capita 2010 (US$, PPP, log)

Binder and Meier’s survey of Turkey, goods; do not closely track internally nor India, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and require transparency and monitoring China shows that non-Western states of the funds from host nations (“hands differ systematically from Western ones off approach”); prefer to align their in their approaches to humanitarian practices with regional organizations assistance and diplomacy. As we have such as ASEAN or OIC rather than seen with Turkey, they find that these with the UN-led system; and prefer to nations have a broader conception of funnel aid through their own national humanitarianism; are more likely to INGOs rather than through others. embrace state-to-state cooperation rather Turkey in particular has stressed that it than by-passing the host-nation state; has a boots-on-the-ground approach to are more often motivated by immediate humanitarianism. It is willing to put crises in their own regions; prefer in- its aid workers, teachers, doctors, and kind assistance using their own national volunteers in harm’s way as part of their

48 Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism mission. “We don’t just unload aid at Egeland puts it: “The emerging and de the airport and leave the scene,” AFAD facto economic powers outside of the Director General Fuat Oktay said in Western hemisphere must be engaged 2015.26 to promote and protect humanitarian operations.”28 As the ranks of humanitarian Just as important, it may be that there actors become more non- is an opportunity to learn from non- Western powers. A practical and engaged Western, the substantive nature learning from non-Western countries of humanitarian diplomacy and may yield lessons and opportunities assistance may change. especially as humanitarianism moves into unfamiliar terrain and complex This has opened up a wide chasm with situations. As Egeland puts it: “The the DAC-centered approach of the West. danger is that humanitarianism, a Of the 40 members of the Western- universal imperative and shared inter- backed Good Humanitarian Donorship cultural system of principles, become Initiative, only four (South Korea, Japan, so Westernized in its funding, staffing, Mexico, and Brazil) are non-Western, organizational structure, and political which means its aim of the “development profile, that it risks long-term adversity of consensus around a comprehensive in many non-Western settings.” agenda for good humanitarian donor The problem, then, is how to separate policy” will remain elusive. As Binder and the wheat from the chaff in engaging Meier conclude, this growing disconnect non-Western humanitarianism. How can between emerging state humanitarianism existing humanitarian actors ensure that and Western humanitarianism threatens engagement with emerging non-Western to undo decades of painstaking work to actors is leading to better policies and create coordinated and well-informed outcomes rather than entrenching new policies. “Without dialogue, non- regressive and repressive forms of aid? The Western donors may systematically problem arises because of the assumption repeat the errors that traditional donors that authoritarian states like Russia and made in the past.”27 As the ranks of China, which do not hold themselves to humanitarian actors become more account in their domestic politics, are non-Western, the substantive nature of unlikely to be held to account in their humanitarian diplomacy and assistance foreign politics. Alongside this, other may change. This makes it imperative for major powers like India and Japan, despite the two groups to coordinate on setting their democratic credentials domestically, principles and operative approaches. As are too burdened by great power concerns

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to be trusted with defining a people- centered humanitarianism. There is a Middle powers enjoy a strong need for credible non-Western actors to hand in wielding influence in emerge who can serve both to innovate discrete areas in which they have and to represent an increasingly complex task-specific capabilities- either field. Here it is necessary to switch to the by acting as catalyst, facilitator, second frame of reference. or manager.

Democratic middle powers have Middle Powers and several advantages as entrepreneurs in Humanitarianism the international system in an area like humanitarianism. One, most obvious, Both Turkey and South Korea as new is that they are not great powers humanitarian actors share the feature of and thus bring a unpresumptuous being democratic middle powers in the sensibility to their role. For instance, international system. Middle powers Binder notes that India finds the term are the 20 or so countries that rank “emerging donor” beneath its dignity as immediately below the eight countries a presumptive great power. But Turkey generally acknowledged as established or warmly embraces the term as signaling new great powers (in today’s world: the its rising global significance.29 Middle United States, China, Britain, France, powers are willing to accept that they Germany, Russia, Japan, and India). are one of many actors and this creates a They consist of the states with rankings capacity for consensus-based leadership. roughly in the 10th to 30th range across Middle powers also enjoy a strong hand a range of capability indicators. This in wielding influence in discrete areas in group includes Brazil and South Korea which they have task-specific capabilities- at the high end of the capabilities scale to either by acting as catalyst, facilitator, Malaysia and South Africa at the lower or manager. This generates a pro-active end. Those firmly in the center of the diplomacy that has been variously category include Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, described as “niche diplomacy”30 or and Australia, along with EU-middle “middle power activism”.31 It is because powers like Poland and Spain. Middle of these systemic incentives to engage in powers, on this view, belong to the set of consensus-building, rule-creation, norm all “primary states” in the world system entrepreneurship, and multilateralism when contrasted to the “secondary that the “new humanitarianism” states” category to which the other 160- of a country like Turkey should be odd states belong. taken seriously. New principles of

50 Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism humanitarianism emanating from to define a middle power-like foreign Beijing, New Delhi, or Moscow are policy.32 Procedurally, middle powers have inherently non-credible, both because the unique ability to broker coalitions these states are positionally located as and achieve consensus in cases where great powers where the national interest great power approaches fail. President and the global interest are less likely to Bush’s ill-fated “core group” (U.S., Japan, converge (especially acute for Beijing and India, and Australia) that was announced Moscow since their national interests are to deal with the 2004 Asian tsunami was not defined through democratic politics) abandoned after just eight days in the face and because followership is unlikely to of pressure from states that wanted the emerge from their regional rivals in any effort centered on the UN. case. By contrast, middle powers can easily assemble similar core groups in dealing Humanitarian diplomacy with crises in their regions (Turkey in the commands widespread case of Syria, South Africa in the case of normative consent within Zimbabwe, Indonesia in the case of the the international system; Asian tsunami) without raising similar creates opportunities for good concerns. Such actions require the “soft” international citizenship, capabilities, such as coalition-building 33 multipolarity, and institution- and network leadership, that are middle building by middle powers; and powers’ strengths. They fit into the peace-building and conflict-mediation may be important to promoting role that comports with middle power peace. interests and ideals. They also manifest a cosmopolitan moral dimension to foreign policy that middle powers often By contrast, a credible humanitarianism take as central to their self-identity. In is a natural behavior for middle powers particular, humanitarian diplomacy like Turkey. Substantively, middle power commands widespread normative populations, acting through democratic consent within the international politics, have repeatedly generated foreign system; creates opportunities for good policies that put a premium on good international citizenship, multipolarity, international citizenship. This perhaps and institution-building by middle explains why three of the four non- powers; and may be important to Western states that belong to the Good promoting peace. In other words, Donorship Initiative are middle powers middle powers like Turkey are natural and the fourth, Japan, variously seeks humanitarian actors.

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In particular, democracy is the key new middle power that is using factor that makes middle powers like humanitarianism to build its “national Turkey credible in a way that Iran, brand”. In articulating the motivation say, is not. Turkey, along with South to be a global leader in reshaping world Korea, Indonesia, and South Africa, order through humanitarianism, Ankara are emblematic of new democratic has emphasized both its comity with non-Western middle powers that will UN General Assembly sentiments (thus define the humanitarian agenda.34 As emphasizing its representativeness) and its democratic states, they have a credibility great power-like power capabilities (thus as humanitarian actors, yet they do not emphasizing its capabilities).37 The middle bring a High Liberal cosmopolitanism to power ambitions of Turkey are articulated their work, instead bringing a distinctive by Çevik, a political science professor at Global South sensibility that respects state Ankara University, who writes: institutions, maintains the integrity of Through these institutions and nationality laws, and links humanitarian organizations, Turkey is not only trying to establish herself as a humanitarian work with the quest for regionally-owned assistance provider, but also as mediator political solutions. In Mogadishu in 2011, in regional conflicts by operating with Erdoğan did not seek to snub or shame regional partners and gradually building the West but rather to uphold its values: trust through local partners. One can argue that Turkey is providing an “The tragedy in Somalia is testing modern example of niche diplomacy through values. What we want to emphasize humanitarian value-based policies. is that contemporary world should Indeed, Turkey’s humanitarian rhetoric and value-based policy resembles the successfully pass this test to prove that notion of ‘niche diplomacy’ that is Western values are not hollow rhetoric,” commonly associated with middle he said.35 It is notable that just three days powers. Goodwill supporting good works and performing good deeds pay off after his visit, the first British cabinet-level in terms of international prestige where official to visit the country for 18 years- a country is rewarded for its goodness.38 International Development Secretary Thus, Turkey is able to promote Andrew Mitchell- arrived with promises a broader political agenda through of additional aid and a stronger effort. its humanitarianism linked to the As Tank writes about Turkey’s role in normative goals of good international Somalia: “[T]he guiding vision is one of citizenship by itself and a more establishing Turkey as an emerging center cooperative, rules-based, and inclusive of power with an alternative global vision world order for others. As Hasimi puts of how to conduct international affairs.”36 it: “Rather than disputing or rejecting Turkey thus is both a quintessential the relationship, Turkey has claimed to emerging power and a quintessential relocate the connection between politics

52 Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism and aid activities in a way that allows donors and beneficiaries will be organized the relationship to become part of the through the offices of states. In the wake discussion in forming a responsive new of the 2004 Asian tsunami, for instance, international order.”39 Germany suggested that its aid to victims in Indonesia would be dependent on the resolution of ethnic conflicts, which The case of Turkey’s Asian countries criticized. Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy emphasis on good neighbors’ policies as and assistance contributes part of promoting peace in Syria, Iran, to a rethink of the nature of Iraq, and Egypt suggests that the high- humanitarianism, emphasizing tide of interventionist humanitarianism is the centrality of states to this over. Again, this jibes with the emerging field as well as the ways that emphasis on national ownership in all aid it cannot and should not be activities. divorced from the complex Returning then to the distinctive political and developmental humanitarianism of all non-Western context in which it arises. countries mapped by Binder and Meier, it is likely that only some of this will translate into enduring change. In The middle power lens implies that we addition to the aspects mentioned above, should expect some distinctive traits to the broadening of humanitarianism to emerge from the new humanitarianism. include development and peacebuilding One is a preference for regional approaches is likely to continue given that it jibes and regional institutions as the center of with emerging best practices within the humanitarian response in place of the UN aid community under the concept of system or a globalized DAC.40 Turkey has resilience. shown in its work with the OIC and the Turkey is important then, because İstanbul Initiative that institutionalization it is emblematic of what to look for in will be directed not at global institutions the emerging new humanitarianism. but at regional ones. A second dimension Alongside its spending on the Syrian likely to emerge from new middle powers humanitarian crisis, Ankara has worked is an emphasis on sovereignty-respecting assiduously to broker the political deal and state-centered humanitarianism that to end the crisis, using its influence over emphasizes state-to-state relationships Russia (main supplier of arms) and Iran (departing from the “people-centered” (main supplier of manpower) to force sensibility of existing humanitarian leaders there to accept the humanitarian principles). In this new approach, both nature of the crisis and broker a

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political solution. In this and other disposition that will likely continue in ways, as a Japanese researcher writes, the near future in dealing with regional “Turkey has actively adopted the liberal humanitarian needs. Humanitarian understanding of middle power under actors need to understand that the the AKP government.”41 UN-centered and OECD-centered Theoretically, the case of Turkey’s humanitarian systems are no longer the humanitarian diplomacy and assistance only games in town. Humanitarianism contributes to a rethink of the nature is decentralizing and a new consensus of humanitarianism, emphasizing the is needed to redefine best practice and centrality of states to this field as well as then put it into effect. Cevik, who is the ways that it cannot and should not the most articulate observer of Turkey’s be divorced from the complex political new humanitarianism concludes: “It and developmental context in which is probably not realistic to expect that it arises. The case of Turkey is also an all these issues be taken care of in a important data point for middle power limited time. However coming to terms theory insofar as it provides grist for the with the nation’s actual capacity and mill in asking why it makes sense for a the expectations raised by the political non-Western middle power to behave in narrative can be highly productive in this way. terms of humanitarian diplomacy efforts Practically, Ankara’s inclination to and where the nation stands in terms of “act first, ask questions later” is a policy power.”42

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Endnotes 1 Andrea Binder and Claudia Meier, “Opportunity Knocks: Why Non-Western Donors Enter Humanitarianism and How to Make the Best of It”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884 (2011), p. 1146. 2 Julia Harte, “Turkey Shocks Africa”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2012), p. 29. 3 Mehmet Özkan, “Does ‘Rising Power’ Mean ‘Rising Donor’? Turkey’s Development Aid in Africa”, Africa Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2013), pp.139-47; Abdirahman Ali, “Turkey’s Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2011), pp. 65-73. 4 “2016 World Humanitarian Summit to Be Held in İstanbul”, Cihan News Agency, 27 September 2013. 5 Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 2011. 6 Reşat Bayer and E. Fuat Keyman, “Turkey: An Emerging Hub of and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?”, Globalizations, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2012), pp.73-90. 7 Philippe Regnier, “The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Identification of a Community of Practice and Prospects for International Recognition”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884 (2011), pp.1211-37. 8 Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey in Humanitarian and Development Aid”, Today’s , 12 August 2013. 9 “Turkey Urged to Acknowledge ‘Red Lines’ in Pursuing Interests in Somalia”, Somali Suna Times, 30 September 2013. 10 “Erdoğan’s Deep Pockets”, The Majallah, 26 August 2013. 11 “IHH Warns of Possible ‘Massacre’ in Xinjiang”, Dunya, 4 July 2013. 12 Emre Uslu, “Aid Organizations: How Humanitarian Are They?”, Cihan News Agency, 16 September 2013. 13 Jan Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy”, in Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. 14 Michael N. Barnett and Thomas George Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008. 15 C. William Walldorf, Just Politics: and the Foreign Policy of Great Powers, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 42-73. 16 Husrev Tabak, “Nongovernmental Humanitarianism in Turkey: The Quest for Internationalist Virtue”, Daily Sabah, 20 November 2014.

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17 Andrea Binder and Ceyda Erten, “From Dwarf to Giant: Turkey’s Contemporary Humanitarian Assistance”, World Conference on Humanitarian Studies: - Humanitarian Perspectives, İstanbul, 24-27 October 2013, p. 11. 18 Pınar Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2013), pp. 735-57. 19 “Turkish Foreign Minister: ‘It Is a Great Honour that Turkey Will Host the World Humanitarian Summit 2016’”, Anadolu (Anatolian) News Agency, 27 September 2013. 20 Binder and Erten, “From Dwarf to Giant” 21 Kyle Westaway, “Turkey is Poised to Cash in on a Stable Somalia”, Quartz Media, 17 September 2013. 22 Larry Minear, “The Craft of Humanitarian Diplomacy”, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds.), Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2007, p. 32. 23 Hazel Smith, “Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Practice”, in Minear and Smith (eds.), Humanitarian Diplomacy, p. 50. 24 Tom J. Farer, Toward a Humanitarian Diplomacy: A Primer for Policy, New York, New York University Press, 1980. 25 Atta Al-Mannan Bakhit, “Humanitarian Challenges: Perspectives from the South and Islamic Countries”, Annual WFP Partnership Consultation, 29-30 October 2014, Rome, Italy, p. 6. 26 “Official Says Turkey Humanitarian Hub”, Hürriyet, 5 February 2015. 27 Binder and Meier, “Opportunity Knocks” 28 Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy”. 29 Andrea Binder, “The Shape and Sustainability of Turkey’s Booming Humanitarian Assistance”, Articles and Debates, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2014), pp.1-14. 30 Andrew Fenton Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 31 John Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1998), pp. 309-28. 32 Robert W. Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order”, International Journal Vol. 44, No. 4 (1989), pp. 823-62; Yoshihide Soeya, Nippon No “Midorupawā” Gaikō - Sengo Nippon No Sentaku to Kōsō (Japan’s “Middle Power” Diplomacy: Idea Selection and Postwar Japan), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 2005. 33 Sang-bae Kim, “Middle Powers from a Network Perspective”, The Role of Middle Powers in 21st Century International Relations, Seoul, 21-22 May, 2013.

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34 B. Senem Cevik and Philip Seib, Turkey’s Public Diplomacy, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 35 “Turkish Premier Visits Somali Camp”, Anadolu (Anatolian) News Agency, 19 August 2011. 36 Pınar Tank, “Turkey’s New Humanitarian Approach in Somalia”, NOREF Policy Brief (Peace Research Institute Oslo), 20 December 2013. 37 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 41, No. 6 (2013), pp. 865-70. 38 B. Senem Çevik, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Assistance: The Fourth Largest Donor State”, at http://www.asem.org.tr/en/publication/details/87 (last visited 30 December 2014). 39 Cemalettin Haşimi, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2014), pp.127-45. 40 Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers”, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2003), pp. 165-81; Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil (eds.), Middle Powers and the Rise of China, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2014. 41 Kohei Imai, “Comparative Middle Power Diplomacies: Turkey and Japan”, Middle East Institute Papers, 7 November 2013. 42 B. Senem Çevik, “An Emerging Actor in Humanitarian Diplomacy”, at http://www.asem. org.tr/en/publication/details/88 (last visited 30 December 2014).

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