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Welcome to the NK Leadership Tracker Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST Welcome to the NK Leadership Tracker - How do the succession processes of Kim Jong Un and Kim Jong Il compare? - Can we tell if economic reforms are really underway in North Korea? - Who are the most important figures within North Korea’s ruling elite? - How has the focus area of North Korean elites changed over time? New data visualization platform reveals remarkably different succession processes, an increasing focus on the national economy, and how the North Korean leadership prioritizes its domestic agenda. WHAT: Launch of NK Leadership Tracker platform WHEN: Thursday, November 1, 09.00 EST WHO: NK Leadership Tracker is a data visualization platform which visualizes exclusive new data mined from sources including the Korea Central News Agency, Rodong Sinmun, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, and other sources. HOW: The data visualization and related analysis will be available online post-embargo at http://www.nknews.org/nk-leadership-tracker/ NK Leadership Tracker is a new data visualization project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. Offering new data mined and translated exclusively for the platform in combination with a wide range of data previously published only in raw form, the NK Leadership Tracker provides users a go- to place for all of the latest data related to political movements inside North Korea. Taking advantage of recent breakthroughs in technology, all of the data hosted at the NK Leadership Tracker comes in visualized form, greatly facilitating interaction and understanding for users of a wide range of experience levels. With these tools, visitors may download either individual slices of data, complete worksheets, or even full visualization workbooks. For those bloggers and journalists offering their own analysis, the NK Leadership Tracker visualization can even be embedded on other websites at the press of a button. After launch NK News will continue to update the NK Leadership Tracker platform, presenting new visualizations on a monthly basis while also updating data sets as regular as possible. Users will be invited to check back on a regular basis for the latest analysis and data. For more information about obtaining early access to the data and initial findings and analysis, please email [email protected] All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST TOPLINE DATA FINDINGS: 8 Significant trends identified by the tracker data All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST KIM JONG IL’S PREFERENCE FOR THE ECONOMY POST 2009 Kim Jong Il Economic vs. Military Appearances 120 100 80 60 Economic Military 40 20 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 The above graph shows a comparison of Kim Jong Il’s economic and military appearances from the last six years of his rule. Starting in 2009 there was a renewed focus on economic appearances as the regime talked about building a “Strong and Prosperous Nation” (kangsŏngdaeguk) by 2012 (Kim Il Sung’s 100th Birthday). Military appearances, on the other hand, stayed relatively flat. All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST … and KIM JONG UN’S PREFERENCE FOR THE MILITARY Kim Jong Un Economic vs. Military Appearances 70 60 50 40 Economic 30 Military 20 10 0 2010 2011 2012 Since taking over in 2012, Kim Jong Un has appeared at far more military events, leaving economic appearances to Choe Yong Rim (the North’s Premier). Some have speculated that this is to prevent Kim Jong Un from taking blame for the stagnant economy. All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST THE RISE OF THE PARTY UNDER KIM JONG UN Kim Jong Un Appearances - Elite Breakdown By Month (%) 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% Party 30% Military 20% Other 10% 0% Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun / Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Jul-12 A look at the type of figures attending visits with Kim Jong Un shows a clear preference for Korean Workers’ Party elites, compared to Kim Jong Il’s preference for high ranking military cadres. The numbers above were created by making a list of every elite who appeared with KJU since he took over power, assigning them to a particular primary category (party, military / security, state or provincial), and then tallying the total number of appearances each elite in that particular category made. The percentage is derived from dividing the category number by the total number. It shows a clear shift towards the party since the April 2012 Party Conference, although the October numbers are just about even. All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST HOW KIM JONG UN IS SURROUNDING HIMSELF WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL Security Service Comparison 25% 22% 20% 15% 11% KJI 10% 8% KJU 5% 4% 0% % Total % Military Data shows that Kim Jong Un is surrounding himself with security personnel far more than his father did at public appearances during their respective succession periods. The above graph compares members of the security forces based on the percentage they appeared (out of total elite appearances, explained in the last graph). It also shows what percentage of the military / security category figure they made up. (Kim Jong Il’s numbers are in blue, Kim Jong Un’s in red) Compared with the first three years of Kim Jong Il’s succession, security forces have been much more visible, an indication that they have played a greater role thus far. All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST HOW THE NATURE OF ON THE SPOT GUIDANCE VISITS CHANGED DURING KIM JONG IL’S TENURE The above graph shows a breakdown of Kim Jong Il’s On-Site-Guidance (OSG) tours by event type. It is notable that military events were far and away the most frequent events from 2003- 2007, the period in which the Iraq War broke out and first nuclear test was undertaken. All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST THE RISING IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY FIGURES TO THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP Comparison of Kim Family Member Appearances 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% Jang Song ThaeK 50% Kim Kyong Hui 40% Kim Jong Un 30% Ri Sol Ju 20% 10% 0% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 In the past five years, the Kim family outside of Kim Jong Il has become much more publicly prominent. Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, reemerged from a two-year long absence (2004-2005) to become a major player in the succession. His wife and Kim Jong Il’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui, emerged publicly for the first time in 2009, and was a frequent accompanier afterwards (she previously worked behind the scenes). Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il’s third son, made his first public appearance in September 2010 and quickly become a frequent accompanier as well. Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un’s wife, made her first appearance with her husband in July, a major break from the past where North Korean “first wives” were barely even acknowledged. All coverage of the leadership tracker must include the text “NK Leadership Tracker is a project jointly sponsored by NK News and the Korea Economic Institute of America. The tracker can be accessed at: http://newnknews.darklight-design.com/nk-leadership-tracker/” Leadership Tracker – Example Findings EMBARGO UNTIL THURSDAY 1 NOVEMBER, 09.00 EST THE PERSONAL IMPACT OF THE IRAQ WAR ON KIM JONG IL Kim Jong Il Appearances (before and a_er Iraq War) 18 16 14 12 10 8 # of Appearances 6 4 2 0 Dec-02 Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Kim Jong Il disappeared from the public eye from February 13th to April 4th, just as the United States was ramping up preparations for the invasion of Iraq.
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