CONGO: THE ELECTORAL DILEMMA Africa Report N°175 – 5 May 2011 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. OPPOSITION AND MAJORITY GETTING READY FOR THE BATTLE ............ 2 A. THE MAJORITY ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL ................................................................................... 2 1. A strategy combining a charm offensive and taking control ....................................................... 3 2. Internal reorganisation of the majority ......................................................................................... 5 B. A PLURALIST OPPOSITION IN SEARCH OF UNITY .......................................................................... 6 1. Dialogue and regrouping .............................................................................................................. 6 2. Leadership struggles, internal dissension and local competition ................................................. 7 III. THE ELECTIONS IN 2011: A VERY RISKY RACE AGAINST TIME ................... 9 A. RISK OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ................................................................................................. 9 B. RISK OF BIAS ............................................................................................................................. 11 C. SECURITY RISK .......................................................................................................................... 13 1. Insecurity in the East and repeated incidents in the West .......................................................... 13 2. The missing security plan .......................................................................................................... 14 IV. AVOID THE ELECTORAL DILEMMA BECOMING A POLITICAL CRISIS.... 16 A. SPEED UP PREPARATIONS AND PREPARE A CONSENSUAL ALTERNATIVE CALENDAR .................. 17 B. TAKE PRACTICAL MEASURES TO ENSURE THE TRANSPARENCY AND HONESTY OF THE VOTE ................................................................................................................................. 17 1. Essential measures to promote transparency ............................................................................. 18 2. Essential measures to promote inclusion ................................................................................... 18 3. Pre and post-electoral external monitoring ................................................................................ 18 4. Create credible dispute resolution mechanisms ......................................................................... 20 C. DESIGN A TWO-LEVEL SECURITY INTERVENTION SYSTEM ......................................................... 20 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 21 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ............................................................................. 22 B. MAP OF MONUSCO TROOPS AND SECURITY INCIDENTS IN THE DRC ............................................ 23 C. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ................................................................................................................ 24 D. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 27 E. INITIAL ELECTORAL CALENDAR, 6 AUGUST 2010 ............................................................................ 29 F. ELECTORAL CALENDAR, 30 MARCH 2011 ....................................................................................... 31 G. ABOUT CRISIS GROUP...................................................................................................................... 33 H. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2008 ..................................................... 34 I. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 36 Africa Report N°175 5 May 2011 CONGO: THE ELECTORAL DILEMMA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS After four years of electoral inertia and in a stalled democ- year late, the National Independent Electoral Commission ratic process, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is (NIEC) is in a race against time. Registration is already con- preparing its second set of democratic elections in a hurry troversial, funding of the electoral cycle is incomplete, and and on a rolling calendar. Opposition parties are trying to the electoral calendar published on 30 March, though it unite, thus far without success, and the international com- partially respects constitutional deadlines, is problematic. munity is not in charge, as in effect it was the first time, in 2006. The Congolese authorities face a dilemma: respect The international community’s role is far more limited than the constitutional deadline and organise botched elections, in 2006, when it organised, financed and secured all aspects or ignore that deadline and slide into a situation of uncon- of the elections. However, it still provides 40 per cent of stitutional power. In both cases, the government’s legiti- the funding, gives technical assistance and maintains about macy would be seriously questioned. The only way out of 17,000 UN troops in country. Given the risks of electoral this Catch-22 situation is to both speed up preparations illegitimacy, bias and violence, it should not stay in the and negotiate a contingency electoral calendar and politi- background but instead make clear to the Congolese poli- cal agreement to manage an almost certainly necessary ticians that a postponed election would be better than a transition period. More attention must also be paid to put- botched one. ting in place essential measures for transparency and in- clusiveness, as well as a security system that will ultimately The international community, including through the UN require important UN help. If these steps are not taken, Security Council and an inclusive donors forum, should foreign partners should disengage lest they lend undeserved make clear the need for the Congolese authorities to in- credibility to a fundamentally flawed process. clude essential measures in the electoral system and apply the same standards as in 2006. In this respect, stepped-up Instead of signalling consolidation of democracy, the political engagement is required, and new Special Envoys coming elections present at best a logistical problem and for the U.S., France and EU should be appointed; the at worst a new cause of destabilisation for a country that Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the has still not recovered from the long wars that marked the United Nations (SRSG) has an equally significant role to end of the Mobutu era and its denouement. President Joseph play. In order not to become trapped in a biased process Kabila’s ruling party has already launched its campaign, that could all too easily become as violent as that which even before the official start of the electoral season, while Côte d’Ivoire recently experienced, technical and financial the opposition is trying to find its “champion” for the assistance should be contingent on constant and precise presidential contest. More than logistical difficulties give monitoring of the freedom to campaign, respect for politi- reason for concern. At the start of the year, a constitutional cal pluralism, political violence, access to state media, review removed the presidential election’s run-off round, dialogue with the Congolese authorities and state funding making it a single winner-takes-all round to the incum- for the NIEC, as well as the opportunity for civil society bent’s benefit, other electoral law changes favouring the groups to do their own monitoring of the process. ruling party may happen soon, as the draft bill is still being discussed. Within what is a general climate of insecurity, Congolese politicians and the international community intimidation of Kabila’s opponents has already become should anticipate now the very real possibility that the 5 apparent. Despite last-minute integration of some armed December constitutional deadline cannot be met. Negoti- groups into the Congolese army, insecurity is still rife in ating a transition agreement with the opposition, setting a the Kivus, while unexplained security incidents, including new deadline for organising the elections and limiting the an attempted coup, have occurred in the west. business of government to routine matters during the tran- sition would not yet guarantee a free and fair election, but Technical preparations are lagging. Neither the new elec- it would avoid having a likely unconstitutional postpone- toral law, the voters list, nor the budget are ready. Set up a ment of the elections become a crisis of legitimacy. Congo: The Electoral Dilemma Crisis Group Africa Report N°175, 5 May 2011 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS g) establishing a standard method for those who want to challenge the results, extending the time within To the Congolese Government: which such challenges can be made and publish- ing the results by voting stations. 1. Administer an oath of neutrality to all civil servants and respect it. To Parliament: 2. Release funding for the NIEC immediately. 9. Ensure the inclusiveness of the electoral process by: 3. Pay the police. a) giving the vote