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The European Anti-Fraud Office... Ten Years Later

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The European Anti-Fraud Office... Ten Years Later Februar 2009 Santers Fall 33 Paul van Buitenen The European Anti-Fraud Office... Ten Years later On 9 December 1998, Paul van Buitenen, an official working for the Financial Control Department of the European Commission, blew the whistle to the European Parliament on irregularities happening in the European Commission. As a result, the European Parliament refused to grant discharge to the European Commission and a committee of five independent experts examined the allegations. Coming from five different Member States, these experts were two former presidents of the European Court of Auditors (Dutchman and Frenchman), two law professors (Belgian and Italian) and an auditor-general (Swede). The day after the publication of their interim report of 15 March 1999, the Commission under Jacques Santer had to step down. Less known, but more important, is issue, the European Commission did denominator and that is the function- the final report of the same Committee nothing to change this situation. This ing of the EU Anti-Fraud Office OLAF, of Independent Experts, dated 10 Sep- brings us to the derailments of OLAF. which performed investigations in all tember 1999. This report contained of these cases. It appeared that OLAF’s numerous and very valuable proposals functioning was crucial to the lack of for an administrative reform of the OLAF as common denominator results in these cases. Not so much on European Commission, but these re- Since the Dutch voters elected me in the work floor of the Anti-Fraud Of- commendations were never properly 2004 (with 7,3% of the national votes) fice, where often proper investigative followed, despite assurances from the with a mandate to fight fraud as a Mem- work is carried out, but more at the Commission that they would be. In this ber of the European Parliament (MEP), top, where OLAF management is re- final report, the experts heavily criti- followed by my nomination as Member luctant to take the right decisions with cised the way the Commission had set of the EP Committee on Budget Control regard to the opening of investigations up OLAF. OLAF was still an internal (Cocobu), I have received many indica- or the referral of cases to the national Commission department, but enjoyed tions of irregularities happening within judicial authorities. These indications full operational independence from the the EU institutions. These indications were confirmed by criticism in official Commission, thus avoiding supervisory were related to a very wide range of reports on OLAF, coming from the EU powers for the Commission. In addition cases, from European Commission de- Ombudsman, the EP Committee on the experts noted that the Supervisory partments such as the Luxembourg- Budget Control (Cocobu), the OLAF Su- Committee of OLAF lacked the legal ba- based EU statistical office (Eurostat) pervisory Committee and the European sis to exercise real supervisory powers and the EU Publication Office (Opoce), Court of Auditors. over OLAF. Despite several parliamen- or the renovation of the European Com- tary questions in which I addressed this mission Brussels headquarters (Berlay- mont building), to the new buildings Parliamentary questions of the European Parliament in Brussels, During my mandate, I asked 184 parlia- Former civil servant at the European Commission, and several fraud cases in the EU Com- mentary questions. Of these, 81 parlia- Paul van Buitenen is now a member of the European Parliament for the Netherlands (Group of the Greens/ mittee of the Regions. In most of these mentary questions addressed OLAF’s European Free Alliance). files there appeared to be one common possible shortcomings. These questions 34 Dossier forum 283 were often based on information from independence. The Supervisory Com- The allegations against OLAF OLAF sources. Almost every parliamen- mittee of OLAF is powerless. Despite tary question was met with an evasive some highly critical reports, there has What are the allegations against OLAF? answer, not admitting what had gone been no proper follow-up, as the Super- 1� OLAF breaches the rights of those wrong. The replies officially come from visory Committee lacks the legal basis under investigation. Suspects are not the Commission (Commissioner Kallas), to exercise adequate supervision. Not informed properly, or are not given the but in effect, all the replies are written only was this indicated in September chance to defend themselves. OLAF dis- by OLAF and the Commission is just a 1999 by the independent external ex- tributes defamatory information, and letter box for OLAF’s replies to all par- perts, but the European Court of Audi- witnesses may find themselves being liamentary questions concerning OLAF. tors also confirmed this lack of super- suspected without proper information. One of my questions, however, led to vision in its special report on OLAF in the opening of an official investigation 2005. Finally, in Parliament there is no 2� There is no proper appeal procedure into OLAF’s mistakes in a particular political support to initiate an investi- against OLAF’s decisions unless one case. The results of this investigation gation into OLAF, as the head of OLAF, goes to court, and even then it is the are kept secret, but off-the-record it is Commission which may face condem- known that the report contains find- nation, not OLAF. ings of wrongdoings on the part of the OLAF director-general, Mr Brüner. OLAF hardly performs internal 3� OLAF hardly performs internal in- OLAF, however, issued a press release investigations in the vestigations in the EU institutions, al- on 21 November 2008 that everything EU institutions, although the though the office was created mainly for was found to be satisfactory in the office was created mainly for this reason. Of its 450 staff (including anti-fraud office. Despite irritation in temporary staff), working in 22 units the Commission over the OLAF press this reason. plus management, only 100 staff work release, which was factually incorrect, on investigations, and of those 100, they did not issue a corrective press only one unit of 15 men works full time release. Mr Brüner, was re-nominated in 2006 on internal investigations. This has led under heavy political pressure from the to frustration among investigators. German Chairs of the two biggest polit- Dialogue ical groups (Hans-Gert Pöttering and 4� There is a common thread of undue delays and unexplained periods of inac- In March 2008, Mr Brüner complained Martin Schulz). All this has had a disas- tivity during the investigative phase of to me that my parliamentary questions trous effect on the attitude of OLAF’s OLAF investigations. were paralysing his service and I there- management. Hiding behind their ‘oper- fore agreed to suspend submitting par- ational independence’, ignoring the Su- 5� In some cases the final reports have liamentary questions. Between March pervisory Committee and immune from been sent to the national judicial autho- 2008 and September 2008, an intensive cases in the EU Court of Justice, some rities when cases have passed the sta- dialogue took place between Mr Brüner members of OLAF’s management now tute of limitation; in others, the lack and me in which more than thirty let- think that they are above the law. of relevance of the case has led these ters were exchanged and several meet- authorities not to open the case. ings took place, either with Mr Brüner himself or with other OLAF representa- 45-page note with allegations 6� There is an overall lack of rigorous tives. Unfortunately, however, this dia- In a final effort to convince the Euro- and systematic organisation in both the logue did not deliver the clarification pean Commission to open investiga- indexation and the filing of OLAF doc- requested. In addition, many meetings tions against OLAF, I submitted a 45- uments. Confidential documents are have taken place on the irregularities page note to the Commission and OLAF lying on the floor or are not registered. in OLAF, between me and Commission on 25 November 2008. On 9 December Safes are not properly secured after representatives, the OLAF Supervisory 2008, I distributed an anonymous ver- working hours. Committee and the Cocobu. Although sion of this note to the press. In this my allegations were heard with inter- note I focused on four cases of irregula- 7� When being challenged on its short- est, no one felt the urge to undertake rities, which serve as examples of what comings, OLAF does not hesitate to any action. is going wrong in OLAF. So far, there send, as a matter of routine, mislead- has been no official reaction to the note, ing briefings to Commission and Par- and informally I hear that hardly anyone liament or to issue misleading press No supervision and above the law bothers to examine it. The 45 pages statements, in an effort to conceal its As indicated earlier, OLAF is still an in- are broadly dismissed as irrelevant or shortcomings. ternal Commission department and can- a repetition of known allegations. The 8� OLAF is sensitive to political pres- not therefore be individually challenged German coordinator of the Christian sure, although the office was supposed in court. Despite the fact that the Euro- Democrats in Cocobu, Frau Dr. Grässle, to resist such pressure. pean Commission has been condemned has taken the lead in dismissing my ac- on several occasions for OLAF’s mis- tions as irrelevant and as the product of 9� OLAF selection processes for man- takes, the European Commission claims a frustrated person. Other MEP’s follow agement positions are often rigged and that it cannot intervene in OLAF, be- this reasoning without showing any in- performed as a smokescreen for the se- cause of respect for OLAF’s operational terest in reading the note.
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