Durkheim, Mauss, Classical Evolutionism and the Origin of Religion

DURKHEIM, MAUSS, CLASSICAL EVOLUTIONISM AND THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

WOUTER W. BELIER

The prevailing paradigm of the nineteenth century scholarship was classical evolutionism ; at the end of that century, however, this paradigm fell into disfavor. Accordingly, the studies of Durkheim and Mauss were written in the aftermath of evolutionary theories. Although neither was a hard-core evolutionist, evolutionistic schemes were always more or less implicit in their work. However, because they differed from classical evolutionists in how they applied this scheme, a monolithic interpretation of evolutionary theory in late-nineteenth century scholarship is not possible. This article examines both the developments within, and the differences between, Durkheim's and Mauss's use of evolutionary models, and the scholarly reception of their work.

1. Introduction

At the end of the nineteenth century the schemes of classical evolutionism fell into disfavor. This was partly due to the accumulation of ethnographic studies which ensured that the global speculations of the early "armchair" theorists proved untenable. In fact, as early as 1896 Boas had criticized the unilineal character of the evolutionistic paradigm, and in 1918 Laufer described the paradigm of cultural evolution as "inane, sterile and pernicious" (Harris 1968: 293). In Europe interest soon shifted from evolutionary interpretations to the description of social systems as functioning wholes. Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss carried out their research on society in the latter days of classical evolutionary theories. Reading their work today, it is clear that they participated to a high degree in this paradigm. For example, for both Durkheim and Mauss the religion of the Australian aborigines was crucial for studying the origins of religion and prayer. However, despite their obvious dependence on the evolutionary theories of their time, they also criticized these theories. Analyzing their various statements on evolution suggests that there was a lack of coherence to their thought, a lack of coherence that resulted in a certain dichotomy when it came to the reception of their work. Whereas their evolutionistic statements were em- 25 phasized and criticized by some, others declared those same statements to be of minor interest when compared to the innovations Durkheim and Mauss made in the study of society. Sadly, neither interpretation leads to a clear assessment of the evolutionistic aspects of their theories. In this article I will first survey the divergent receptions which met the theories of Durkheim and Mauss. I will then examine the differ- ing ways in which evolutionary theories were actually incorporated into their work. Studying their writings in this less monolithic way might shed more light on the internal oppositions between Durkheim and Mauss in the Annee sociologique group.

2. 7fie reception of Durkheim's and Mauss's evolutionism

Few writers would contest that evolutionary theories are found in Durkheim's work. For example, although Pickering deals with the topic of evolutionism only in the margins of his study on Durkheim's sociology of religion, he nonetheless labels Durkheim an "evolutionist in the broad sense of the word" (Pickering 1984: 106). In support of this he quotes a letter from Durkheim to Richard, dating from 1899, in which Durkheim refers to "a certain number of elementary no- tions (I do not say of logical simplicity) which dominate all man's moral evolution" (cited in Pickering 1984: 107). Pickering concludes: "Here indeed is Durkheim's confession of evolutionism!" (1984: 107). Despite this widely shared conclusion, in the reception of Durkheim's oeuvre we come across two distinct schools of thought: on the one hand, his statements are emphasized and criticized, on the other, they are regarded as largely irrelevant to Durkheim's thesis.

2. Durkheim's critics

Already in 1914, Durkheim's evolutionary approach was criticized, as in when Wallis referred to Durkheim's use of an unacceptable "principle of evolution" (1914: 255-257). Schmidt was of the same opinion: "Durkheim revelled in the most orthodox forms of Evolu- tionism" (Schmidt 1931: 116). Van Gennep criticized Durkheim's identification of the stage of the Australian's material civilization with that of their social organization. His point was that the more one knows of the Australians, the more one realizes that their societies are very complex and are therefore far removed from the simple and