Political Dynasty and Party Institutionalization: a Case Study of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Pdip) 1999-2015
POLITICAL DYNASTY AND PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA PERJUANGAN (PDIP) 1999-2015
BY
SYIFAK MUHAMMAD YUS
A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of requirement for the degree of Master of Human Sciences in Political Science
Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences International Islamic University Malaysia
OCTOBER 2016
ABSTRACT
Political dynasty is a common practice in Indonesian politics. It is compounded by the dependency of political parties on their leadership figures. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) is considered as the biggest political party in Indonesia’s post-Suharto era. The existence of Sukarno’s political dynasty in PDIP is not only seen as part of their history but also as the identity of the party and becomes their uniqueness. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of Sukarno’s political dynasty towards PDIP institutionalization and how it works with the existing liberal democratic system in Indonesia. This research is based on two theories: elite theory and party institutionalization theory. However, political dynasty theory as an extraction of elite theory is also used in the framework to provide better understanding of the concept. In this research, the PDIP institutionalization is measured by combining Levitsky’s (1998) model with the Mark Weatherall’s (2013) approach as well as Basedau and Stroh’s (2008) model. This research is a qualitative study that includes field research to seek information through observation and interviews. The results of the findings show that the Sukarno’s political dynasty has contributed to the institutionalization of PDIP.
ii ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ABSTRACT IN ARABIC
اﻟﺴﻼﻟﺔ اﳊﺎﻛﻤﺔ ﻫﻲ ﳑﺎرﺳﺔ ﺷﺎﺋﻌﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻹﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻴﺔ، إ�ﺎ ﻣﺮﻛﺐ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺗﺒﻌﻴﺔ اﻷﺣﺰاب اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺎ廬ﺎ اﻟﻘﻴﺎدﻳﺔ، إن ﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﻔﺎح اﻟﺪﳝﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻲ ﻳﻌﺪ أﻛﱪ ﺣﺰب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﰲ إﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻴﺎ وأﺳﺲ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺳﻮﻫﺎرﺗﻮ، وﻻ ﻳﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ وﺟﻮد ﺳﻼﻟﺔ ﺳﻮﻛﺎرﻧﻮ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﰲ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﻔﺎح اﻟﺪﳝﻘﺮاﻃﻲ اﻹﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻲ ﺑﻮﺻﻔﻪ ﺟﺰءًا ﻣﻦ 庎رﳜﻬﻢ ﻓﻘﻂ، وﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﻮﺻﻬﺎ ﻫﻮﻳﺔ اﳊﺰب ًأﻳﻀﺎ وﻳﺼﺒﺢ ﻃﺎﺑﻌﻬﻢ اﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪ، ﻏﺮض ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻫﻮ دراﺳﺔ 庄ﺛﲑ ﻋﺎﺋﻠﺔ ﺳﻮﻛﺎرﻧﻮ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﲡﺎﻩ َﻣﺄْ َﺳ َﺴﺔ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﻔﺎح اﻟﺪﳝﻘﺮاﻃﻲ اﻹﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻲ، وﻛﻴﻒ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺪﳝﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ اﻟﻠﻴﱪاﱄ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﰲ إﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻴﺎ، ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ُﻣﻄَّﻮرة ًاﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺘﲔ: ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ وﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﺄﺳﺴﺔ اﳊﺰب وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﺈن ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺴﻼﻟﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﲤﺜﻞ اﺳﺘﺨﻼﺻﺎ ﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ وﻫﻲ ﻣﺴﺘﺨﺪﻣﺔ ﰲ إﻃﺎر اﻟﺒﺤﺚ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻟﺘﻮﻓﲑ ﻓﻬﻢ أﻓﻀﻞ ﻟﻠﻤﺼﻠﺢ، ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻓﺈن ﻣﺄﺳﺴﺔ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﻔﺎح اﻟﺪﳝﻘﺮاﻃﻲ اﻹﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻲ ﻣﻘﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﲨﻊ ﳕﻮذج ﻓﻴﺘﺴﻜﻲ (1998) ﻣﻊ ﻣﻨﻬﺞ ﻣﺎرك وﻳﺪرال (䚎 (2013ﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﳕﻮذج 䚎ﺳﻴﺪاو وﺳﱰوﻩ (2008) ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻫﻮ دراﺳﺔ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ، ﺗﺘﻀﻤﻦ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﳌﻴﺪاﱐ ﻟﻄﻠﺐ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﳌﺮاﻗﺒﺔ واﳌﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ، وﻗﺪ أﻇﻬﺮت ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ أن ﺳﻼﻟﺔ ﺳﻮﻛﺎرﻧﻮ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺗﺴﺎﻫﻢ ﰲ ﻣﺄﺳﺴﺔ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﻔﺎح اﻟﺪﳝﻘﺮاﻃﻲ اﻹﻧﺪوﻧﻴﺴﻲ.
APPROVAL PAGE
I certify that I have supervised and read this study and that in my opinion; it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Human Sciences in Political Science.
…………………………………….. Danial Mohd. Yusof Supervisor
I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Human Sciences in Political Science.
…………………………………….. Tunku Mohar Tunku Mohd Mokhtar Examiner
This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Political Science and is accepted as a fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Human Sciences in Political Science.
…………………………………….. Tunku Mohar Tunku Mohd Mokhtar Head, Department of Political Science
This dissertation was submitted to the Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences and is accepted as a fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Human Sciences in Political Science.
…………………………………….. Rahmah Bt. Ahmad H. Osman Dean, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences
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DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own investigation, except where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.
Syifak Muhammad Yus
Signature…………………....………. Date …….……………….
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COPYRIGHT
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA
DECLARATION OF COPYRIGHT AND AFFIRMATION OF FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH
POLITICAL DYNASTY AND PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA PERJUANGAN (PDIP) 1999-2015
I declare that the copyright holder of this dissertation are jointly owned by the student and IIUM.
Copyright © 2016 Syifak Muhammad Yus and International Islamic University Malaysia. All rights reserved.
No part of this unpublished research may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the copyright holder except as provided below
1. Any material contained in or derived from this unpublished research may be used by others in their writing with due acknowledgement.
2. IIUM or its library will have the right to make and transmit copies (print or electronic) for institutional and academic purposes.
3. The IIUM library will have the right to make, store in a retrieved system and supply copies of this unpublished research if requested by other universities and research libraries.
By signing this form, I acknowledged that I have read and understand the IIUM Intellectual Property Right and Commercialization policy.
Affirmed by Syifak Muhammad Yus
……..…………………….. ……………………….. Signature Date
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DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my parents, bang Kautsar, kak Iyak, and my entire family
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Praise be to Allah (SWT) who gave me ability to finish this research. I would like to deliver my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Danial Mohd. Yusof. With his support, guidance, patience and advice, I can successfully complete this thesis. I am glad for having you as my supervisor. I also would like to thank to Assoc. Dr. Tunku Mohar Tunku Mohd Mokhtar for his positive idea and suggestion. As the examiner and Head of Department of Political Science, he was very helpful and kind. I also would like to express my gratitude to my lectures Prof. Dr. Wahabuddin Ra’ees, Prof. Dr. El Fatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Md. Moniruzzaman, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ishtiaq Hossain, Assoc. Prof. Dr. S. M. Abdul Quddus, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Garout E. Suleiman, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Rashad Muhammad Bakashmar, Dr. Muhammad Fuzi Omar, Dr. Khairil Izamin and all academic staff at the Department of Political Science for their support.
Furthermore, I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Mixil Mina Munir, Rahmat Sahid, Pilian Hutasoit, Poltak Agustinus Sinaga and Ridho Suwandi who introduced me to the interviewees and provided me with books, information and PDIP’s documents.
I also would like to thank my family for their total support especially my Bang Tu and Kak Iyak. This study is impossible without their assistance. My father, Bang Yek, Kak UUn, Bang Fadhal, Kak Hurul, Bang Hendra, Kak Miskul, Bang Bay, Kak Novi, Sulthan and Ummi are also supportive all the time. I am lucky to have them as family. I also would like to thank Fitri Irfani for her patience and sacrifice during my study. Finally, I would like to thank two of my best friends Lilyati Lajman and Ammar Hatem for their friendship.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ...... ii Abstract in Arabic ...... iii Approval Page ...... iv Declaration ...... v Copyright ...... vi Dedication ...... vii Acknowledgements ...... viii List of Tables ...... xi List of Figures ...... xii
CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL DYNASTY AND PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN PDIP: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ...... 1 1.1 Introduction...... 1 1.2 Statement of Problem ...... 6 1.3 Significance of the Study ...... 7 1.4 Research Questions ...... 8 1.5 Research Objectives...... 8 1.6 Literature Review ...... 8 1.6.1 Political Dynasty ...... 9 1.6.2 Party Institutionalization ...... 13 1.6.3 The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle ...... 18 1.7 Theoretical Framework ...... 22 1.8 Hypothesis ...... 33 1.9 Methodology of Study ...... 33 1.10 Chapter Outline of the Study ...... 35
CHAPTER TWO: THE BACKGROUND OF PDIP: ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT ...... 37 2.1 Introduction...... 37 2.1.1 Fusion and Its Conflict ...... 37 2.1.2 Sukarno and the PDI ...... 39 2.1.3 Reform Era and 1999 Election ...... 41 2.1.4 2004 Election ...... 42 2.1.5 2009 Election ...... 44 2.1.6 2014 Election ...... 45 2.2 Political Stream and Ideology ...... 47 2.3 Conclusion ...... 52
CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL DYNASTY ...... 54 3.1 Introduction...... 54 3.2 Megawati’s Leadership and Dynastic Recruitment ...... 57 3.3 Party’s Image and Symbolization of Ideology ...... 61 3.4 Guided Democracy ...... 65 3.5 Conclusion ...... 72
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CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION ...... 73 4.1 Introduction...... 73 4.2 Value Infusion and Reification ...... 75 4.3 Natiowide Organization ...... 83 4.4 Party Membership ...... 88 4.5 Stable Rules and Structures ...... 92 4.6 Conclusion ...... 95
CHAPTER FIVE: THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ...... 97 5.1 Introduction...... 97 5.2 The Flourishing of Sukarno’s Political Dynasty in Indonesia’s Democracy ...... 97 5.3 The Maintaining of Sukarno’s Political Dynasty in PDIP ...... 102 5.4 The Effect of Sukarno’s Political Dynasty towards the Institutionalization of PDIP ...... 105 5.5 The Extent of the Institutionalization of PDIP ...... 108 5.6 Conclusion ...... 111 5.7 Recommendation for PDIP ...... 112 5.8 Recommendation for Further Studies ...... 113
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 114
APPENDIX 1: STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR PDIP CADRES ...... 124
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 External Dimensions and Indicators of PDIP Institutionalization 28
Table 1.2 Internal Dimensions and Indicators of PDIP Institutionalization 28
Table 4.1 Demography of PDIP voters in 2009 and 2014 election. 86
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Theoretical Framework: Sukarno’s Political Dynasty and Party Institutionalization 28
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CHAPTER ONE
POLITICAL DYNASTY AND PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN PDIP: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The first President of Indonesia, Sukarno passed away in 1970. But it appears that his legacy still exists in the country’s contemporary politics. As the father of Nation, his name still commands many loyal followers. During Sukarno’s era, he established
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and it was the largest party in 1955 election. Later, under Suharto’s rule, together with other four nationalist political parties, PNI merged into Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) and became the largest faction in PDI. In 1999, because of unsettled conflict of leadership in PDI between Budi Hardjono and
Megawati, PDI pro Megawati declared new name for their party, namely Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) while PDI pro Budi Hardjono remained as
PDI.
The existence of Sukarno’s family and their historical struggle during
Suharto’s era became the factor for PDIP to claim as the continuity of Sukarno’s party. The influence of Sukarno’s name that was inherited by his family can be seen in
1999 election. Actually, there are two PDI at that time: one was PDI that led by Budi
Hardjono and another was PDIP led by Sukarno’s daughter (Megawati Sukarnoputri).
Election result shows that PDIP was the winner of the 1999 election by gaining
33.76% of votes while PDI only gained 0.62% of votes. The figure of Sukarno has become the identity for PDIP. That is why it has been witnessed that in many of the party’s activities, Sukarno’s picture is always displayed as the party’s symbol. It seems PDIP would portray itself and its struggle as the continuation of Sukarno’s
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struggle. Due to Sukarno’s undying influence, among all of the parties, the Indonesia
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) has grown to be the largest party in Indonesia.
PDIP won two out of four elections in the Reform era.1
In addition, there is common perception among PDIP cadres that only
Sukarno’s heir can lead the party.2 That is why Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati
Sukarnoputri was elected as the party chairman after the party separated itself from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1999. Recently, in April 2015, when PDIP held its regular congress, Megawati was once again appointed as chairman for the
2015-2020 tenure by acclamation. In addition, the mechanism of the party’s leadership succession in congress remains in question when the party decided to eliminate the voting mechanism. The mechanism of congress is like the way how
PDIP ensures Megawati stays in power because the timing of the abolishment of voting to elect party’s leaders at all levels are decided just several months before the congress was held.3
However, PDIP claims that the abolishment of vote is a transformation of
Sukarno’s political inheritance, namely guided democracy. Moreover, Megawati’s children: Muhammad Prananda Prabowo (son) and Puan Maharani (daughter); have also been appointed as central board officials. Megawati’s reappointment as
1 The conflict of leadership in PDI was started in 1993 when Megawati was elected as the Chairwoman. Megawati’s leadership was not acknowledged by government. Even in 1999 election, Government considered PDI that led by Megawati was the illegitimate party. In order to be legitimate and has right to contest in election, she changed party’s name to PDIP. The elaboration about the history of party and influences of Sukarno’s figure to the voters of the party would be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 2 Former PDIP Secretary General, Tjahyo Kumolo argues that only Sukarno’s family can sit as the chief. See “Ketua Umum PDIP Hanya Untuk Trah Sukarno”, Tempo.co,
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chairwoman in 2015 and the appointment of her two children as party officials illustrates how the party attempts to maintain Sukarno’s family power. In addition, the appointment of Megawati by acclamation demonstrates the influence of Sukarno’s political influence legacy.
In addition, Sukarno’s family members who are PDIP cadres were also elected as members of parliament for the period of 2014-2019. Among them are, Sukarno’s son Guruh Sukarnoputra, as well as Sukarno’s granddaughters Puan Maharani and
Puti Guntur Sukarnoputri. Later, Puan Maharani was appointed by the current
Indonesian President as Coordinating Minister of Human Development and Culture.
Therefore, the extraordinary power held by Megawati to decide party’s official symbolizes of Sukarno, and “unwritten agreement” that only Sukarno’s heir can lead the party are the example how Sukarno’s political dynasty perpetuates itself in PDIP.
Due to the dominance of Sukarno’s family members in the PDIP, the party has faced many critiques from various quarters. In addition, the party has also been criticized because of leadership issues. However, a scholar such as Mietzner argues that almost all Indonesian political parties are not free from the influence of their overpowering leaders. He also states that political dynasty is a growing trend in
Indonesian politics.4 Political dynasty simply can be defined as the desire of a certain family or elite to perpetuate its power. Because of the limitation of time in holding such position, elite tend to prepare their own descendant to replace their position.5
Therefore, the appointment of Sukarno’s family as party’s official and as candidate of
4 Mietzner, M. “ Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of Party System”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, (May 2009). Available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=100187 (accessed 21 October 2015). 5 Priyono, Bayi. “Legal Implication on the Phenomena of Family Involvement in Election Associated with the Democracy Values”, The International Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 2015): 001-029. Retrieved from
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Member of Parliament portrays how Megawati perpetuates Sukarno’s dynasty by preparing her own heredities.6
Furthermore, party institutionalization is simply can be defined as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”.7 In order to measure the institutionalization of PDIP, this research utilizes two measurements: value infusion as external measurement and behavioral routinization as internal measurement.8 However, scholars like Harjanto argue that political dynasty has caused weak institutionalization of political parties in Indonesia. Thus, PDIP could not be considered as a well institutionalized party.9 Sukarno’s political dynasty and lack of leadership recruitment are seen as factors which reduce the level of party institutionalization for PDIP. Although PDIP leadership model is dynastic and very centralistic, PDIP has always been Indonesia’s top three largest parties for the past three legislative elections since 1999 to 2015. This only goes to show that Sukarno’s political dynasty provides electoral benefit to the party and that people do not really consider it an issue.
As the world third largest democratic country (after United State of America and India), the journey of democracy in Indonesia is interesting to be discussed. From time to time, the format of Indonesia’s democracy has changed to several models. At least Indonesia’s democracy can be divided into four periods: liberal democracy 1949-
1958 and the Guided Democracy in 1959-1965 (both of the models occurred during
Sukarno’s era), the Pancasila Democracy or the New Order 1966-1998 (Suharto’s era), and Reform era (1998-present). In addition, since Reform era, Indonesia’s
6 The discussion about political dynasty will be elaborated clearly in chapter three. 7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 12. 8 The further discussion about the institutionalization of PDIP will be talked more in chapter four. 9 Harjanto, Nico. “Politik Kekerabatan dan Institusionalisasi Partai Politik di Indonesia”, Analisis CSIS, vol. 40, no. 2 (2011): 138-159.
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democracy is assumed as electoral democracy because it successes to perform free and fair election after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime.10 Since the fall of Suharto,
Indonesia’s democracy also allows the existence of multi parties including the opposition party. The introduction of opposition parties in Reform era begun when
PDIP proclaimed itself as an opposition party towards Yudhoyono’s governance from
2004 to 2014. In present time, the tradition of opposition party is continued by Partai
Gerindra. They proclaimed the party as opposition after their presidential candidate
(Prabowo Subianto) was defeated by Joko Widodo (PDIP’s cadre) in 2014 election.
Furthermore, there are many problems that can be considered as the threat for consolidating democracy in Indonesia such as corruption, neo-patrimonialism11, weak political parties and horizontal conflict.12 Indonesia’s democracy is shaped by Neo- patrimonialism socio-political system which is blended with liberal democratic values13 as well as values of Demokrasi Pancasila14. Although Indonesia’s constitution calls Indonesia’s democracy as Demokrasi Pancasila, the Indonesia’s election is influenced by the nuanced of Liberal Democracy and Neo-patrimonialism culture. Indonesia adopts the principle of “one man one vote” in election to perform democratic rules. Unfortunately, it leads to problems of vote buying and personalism.
10 Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi, and Erb, Maribeth, “Indonesia and The Quest for Democracy” in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), edited by Erb, Maribeth and Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 7-13. 11 Neo-patrimonialism is simply the modification of patrimonial so it can fit to modern state that should be based on legal-rational. Usually there are two means to exchange the power in Neo-patrimonial socio-political system: money and connections. Elites perpetuate their power through the grooming of their clique. For more detail about definition about Neo-patrimonilism, see Beekers, D and Gool B, V. “From Patronage to neopatrimonialism. Postcolonial Governance in Sub-Sahara Africa and Beyond”, African Studies Centre Leiden. ASC Working Paper, 101, (2012). 12 Ibid., 7. 13 Though far from perfect, the practice of Indonesia’s democracy is flavored by two criteria of Liberal Democracy: political liberties (liberty of media, civil liberties, and liberty of group opposition) and democratic rules (political rights, competitiveness of nomination process, elected chief of executive, and elected legislative members). See Bollen, K. “Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 4 (1993): 1207-1230. 14 The core values of Demokrasi Pancasila is deliberative and consultation through the representative body. It more based on collectivism rather than individualism as in Liberal Democracy. More detail about Demokrasi Pancasila will be discussed in chapter two.
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In addition, the nomination of candidates by political parties often does not based on merit system. Money, popularity and the connection to parties’ elites are the basic requirement for those who want to be nominated as a candidate. Thus, parties’ main purpose is to win the election and in the same time to ensure the regeneration of party’s elite comes from their own clique.
Although Indonesia has relatively free and fair election, the phenomena of candidate-centered, vote buying and oligarchy in parties remain the major challenges in every reform era’s elections. Therefore, the evaluation towards Indonesia’s democracy should not be based on the label or what Indonesia’s democracy actually is. Rather it should be based more on evaluation of its practice. The Indonesia’s democracy is still looking for the best model to accommodate diversities in culture, nation, race and religions. Thus, the evaluation of the institutionalization of political parties as the key factor of democratic country is necessary task for Indonesia’s consolidating democracy.
1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Political dynasty is a common practice in Indonesian politics. Almost all political parties such as PDIP, Partai Golkar, Partai Amanat Nasional, Partai Demokrat, and
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan have list of candidates for election who has relatives to parties’ official.15 In addition, political dynasty also occurs in local context. The widely known Atut’s dynasty in Province of Banten is one of examples that the succession of local leaders is not free from certain dynastic influence.16 It is compounded by the dependency of political parties on their leadership figures.
15 Harjanto, 138-159. 16 For more detail about dynasty in local context, see “Politik Dinasti Masih Berjaya di Pilkada 2015, di Mana Saja?” Tempo.co,
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Scholars, such as Ezrow, argue that the existence of political dynasty will jeopardize the future of democracy and weaken the institutionalization of the political party.
However, Harjanto argues that political dynasty can bring benefits to the party with regard to the election purposes. Therefore, the aim of this research is to examine the impact of Sukarno’s political dynasty towards PDIP institutionalization and how it works with the existing democratic system in Indonesia.
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The emergence of political dynasty is an undeniable fact within Indonesian society.
This study hopes to add to the ongoing discussion on the issue of political dynasty and party institutionalization in Indonesia. The findings of this study will be significant because of the following reasons. First, as the Bapak Bangsa (Father of the Nation),
Sukarno is an important figure and has many followers in current Indonesian politics.
Among others Indonesia’s Bapak Bangsa, Sukarno is the most prominent one. That was why Sukarno’s party was the winner of the first Indonesia’s election in 1955. As mentioned above, Sukarno’s previous party (PNI) was the largest party in Indonesia that merged into PDIP. Thus, his figure is believed to be one of the factors that made
PDIP to become one of the top three largest parties in the post-Suharto era. Second, while there are existing studies on party institutionalization in Indonesia, it is hoped that this study and its findings will add to the body of knowledge on the topic, particularly with regard to studies that focus only on one single party and in this case, the PDIP. Third, political dynasty is usually stereotyped with bad connotations.
However, this research differs from others because it analyzes the relation between
Sukarno’s political dynasty and the institutionalization of PDIP as well as how it operates within the existing democratic political system in Indonesia.
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Why does Sukarno’s political dynasty continue to flourish in Indonesia’s
democracy?
2. How does PDIP continue to maintain Sukarno’s political dynasty?
3. How does Sukarno’s political dynasty affect the institutionalization of
PDIP?
4. To what extent has PDIP been institutionalized?
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1. To analyze why Sukarno’s political dynasty continue to flourish in
Indonesia’s democracy.
2. To analyze the maintenance of Sukarno’s political dynasty in PDIP.
3. To examine the effect of Sukarno’s political dynasty on the
institutionalization of PDIP.
4. To explain the extent of the institutionalization of PDIP.
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW
The relevant literature on this research would be classified into three major parts: political dynasty, party institutionalization, and on the PDIP itself. Even though, the research topic has been studied by many scholars, as will be shown later, there are gaps in the existing literature that can be filled up by further research. There are three reasons why PDIP is interesting to be studied. First, PDIP is the ruling party after ten years acted as opposition party towards Yudhoyono’s government. Second, PDIP was an icon for democratic struggle during Suharto’s era. Third, the existence of Sukarno’s
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family has made PDIP leadership is dynastic. On the other hand, it becomes step stone for PDIP to easily claim as Sukarno’s struggle representation.
1.6.1 Political Dynasty
Marcus Mietzner argues that political dynasty has become a growing trend in
Indonesia politics. Almost all political parties have nominated the cadres who have family relation with the elites of the party to compete in legislative election. He rejects the scholars whose notion opines of similar condition between Indonesia and the
Philippine. For him, although Indonesian political parties depend on the charisma of their leadership, the roots of Indonesian parties are more stable than in the Philippine.
Basically, there is a historical and evolutionary17 connection between the present form of the political parties and their past in terms of ideology.18 However, the article focuses more on how the elites of the party prepare their own descendant to run the party in the future, or political nepotism within the party, rather than political dynasty with regard to the general election.
According to Djati, political dynasty happens not only at national level, but also occurs at local level. He argues that feudalism and patrimonial culture could be considered as the main source of political dynasty. In the local context, the synergy between personalism, clientelism, and tribalism have developed a strong connection between bureaucrats, capitalists, and politicians in order to win the local government election. For him, there are three reasons of the emergence of political dynasty: the failure of political parties’ regeneration, the high monetary expenditure of electoral
17 The history of PDIP began when Suharto forced 1955 largest party known as PNI (Sukarno was its founding father) to merge together with other small parties into one political party, namely PDI in 1973. In 1999, PDI changed its name to PDIP. See PDIP official website http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/data/piagam-pdi-perjuangan (accessed 20 September, 2015). 18 Mietzner, Indonesia’s 2009...
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politics, and political centralization. He portrayed these instances in many cases of local government election in which feudalism rooted in society has caused people to prefer the continuity of political dynasty. Furthermore, there is a strong relation between weak institutionalized political parties with the phenomena of political dynasty.19
Similar to Djati, Alim Bathoro opines that political dynasty jeopardizes the whole process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. He points out three negative impacts of political dynasty that influence the stagnation of democratic consolidation.
First, it affects negatively on political recruitment. It means that ordinary people have limited access to be involved in politics. As a result, it reduces the political participation of people. Second, it compromises the mechanism of “check and balance” between legislative and executive bodies. Third, it increases the practice of corruption. For him, one of the motives of political dynasty is to secure economic resources. He suggests the development of middle class to reduce the breeding of political dynasty through their participation.20
Harjanto tends to cast blame on political parties as the cause of political dynasty. According to him, the preference of political parties on practicing political dynasty is because it provides benefit for electoral contests. Political familism21 has
19 Djati, Wasisto Raharjo, “Revivalisme Kekuatan Familisme dalam Demokrasi: Dinasti Politik di Aras Lokal”, Jurnal Sosiologi Masyarakat, vol, 18, no. 2 (July 2013): 203-231. 20 Bathoro, Alim, “Perangkap Dinasti Politik Dalam Konsolidasi Demokrasi”, Jurnal Fisip Umrah, vol. 2, no. 2 (2011): 115-125. 21 Familism refers to the interests of family are placed upon a person’s (each member of family) interest and it becomes a prevalence of social organization. See Garzon, A, “Familism” in International Encyclopedia of Marriage and Family, edited by En J. Ponzetti, (New York: MacMillan, 2003), 1. According to Djati, familism is the establishment of political dynasty that based on sanguinity. It is one of political dynasty sources foundation (beside tribalism, feudalism, networking and populism) where political dynasty is built. See Djati, Wasisto Rahardjo, “Revivalisme Kekuatan Familisme dalam Demokrasi: Dinasti Politik di Aras Lokal”, Jurnal Sosiologi Masyarakat, vol. 18, no. 2 (July 2013): 203-231. Therefore, according to Querubin, political dynasty is when political power is possessed or monopolized by certain families. He argues that it is common in contemporary democracy. He exemplifies that more than half elected Philippine congressmen and governors have a relative to the previous elected official. See Querubin, P. “Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and
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many resources to win the competition such as popularity, wealth, and their ability to maximize power that they have in order to get support from people. Political dynasty trend is compounded by political imagery that manipulates the image of the candidates. He also observes that parties that are centralistic in terms of policy decision have made leadership regeneration process within their party stagnant. As a result, a party’s lacks of democratic process in decision-making makes the effort of party institutionalization difficult.22 It could be seen from the work of Harjanto, that political dynasty has two contradictory dimensions. On the one hand, it reduces the aspect of democracy within the party. On the other hand, it gives electoral benefit to the party. Therefore, these two contradictory facts should be related with the elite theory that Harjanto did not elaborate. The linkage between these two contradictory facts and elite theory is in the intention of certain elites in political parties to perpetuate their power. The easiest way is by placing or preparing their heir as the future successors. In order to gain the legitimacy of the people, the grooming elite will be contested in election as part of democratic mechanism. It is easy for dynastic successors to win the election compared to ordinary candidates because they have advantages such as connection, family’s popularity and money. Thus, democracy actually is set by elites where the candidates in election are decided by certain elite in political parties. In addition, in Indonesia’s election system, people do not have access to decide who will be placed as party’s candidates. So, it seems like the aspect of democracy in internal political parties is not their top priority.
According to elite theory, every society has two classes: the ruler and the ruled. The ruler class is always the smaller number of people within the society.
Political Dynasties in the Philippines”, Harvard Academy for International and Areas Studies, (2011),
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According to Norman Wintrop, the elite theory is suitable with liberal democracy. He argues that even though, neo-elite23 theories criticized the works of Pareto and Mosca, they agreed that liberal democracy has the tendency to become oligarchic. The difference is, Pareto and Mosca were pessimistic about democracy because its basic character is oligarchy. Neo-elitist theories try to modify it so it could match with liberal democracy. For neo-elite theorists, democracy is needed to prevent elites from authoritarian behavior.24 However, no matter how scholars try to fit democracy and elite theory, oligarchy remains as a tendency in democratic system. The role of political parties is essential in democratic system. However, there is only limited people can rule the party. The decision making process in internal party is hijacked by a few people or the elites. In another word, the mechanism of decision making in party is designed and favor the elites. Thus, political parties are actually managed by oligarchic way.
Ohyekachi Duru argues that “democracy as the government of the people is incapable of realization”. Thus, democratic theorists such as Schumphter, Satori and
Dahl reconcile elite theory and democratic theory. For them, democracy is a political system where elites compete each other to receive the recognition of people in order to legitimize their authority to govern. Thus, the process of decision making becomes the
23 The work of Pareto and Mosca could be considered as the classic elite theory. It challenges democratic theory because both of them see democracy as a myth. Elites or the rulers are always the minority that cannot be controlled by the majority of people. See Duru, O. “The Relationship between the Elite Theory of Politics and the Concept of Liberal Democracy”, (2012), Available at SSRN:
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