THE ROLE OF MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT IN REFUGEE ACCEPTANCE RATES IN

SWEDEN

by

Taylor Elizabeth Lundquist

Honors Thesis

Appalachian State University

Submitted to the Department of Geography and Planning

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts

May 2021

Approved by:

Kara Dempsey, P.h.D, Thesis Director

Kelly Chernin, P.h.D, Second Reader

Richard Crepeau, P.h.D, Departmental Honors Director Abstract

The Swedish Migration Agency states that to apply for asylum in Sweden, a person must be either a victim of or at risk of persecution in their home state (Swedish Migration Agency, 2017).

Over the past decade, refugee acceptance, asylum seekers fleeing from violence, and victims of environmental or natural disasters have become an international topic of debate. The discussion on who must accept asylum seekers and why has been the cause of much political tension. For instance, there was a sudden decrease in acceptance rates from 2016 to the present day in

Sweden. This paper focuses on Syrian refugee acceptance rates that illustrate the change.

Statistically, Sweden accepts a majority of asylum seekers from Syria compared to applicants from other states. However, there was a shift after 2016 from 0.3% rejection of Syrian refugees to 6.9% in 2017 (AIDA, 2020). The main focus of this paper will be the discrepancy between the narrative of the Swedish government and the media. The study then explores what the main contributing drivers of the rapid change in refugee acceptance could be. While there are many contributing factors to the reduction in asylum seeker acceptance rates, I argue that the media highlighted the unparalleled rise in the alt-right Sweden Democrats and their xenophobic rhetoric, which strongly influenced public attitudes and migration legislation.

Key Words: Asylum, Parliament, Media, Sweden Democrats

1 Introduction The European Commission defines an asylum seeker as “a person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes'' (European Commission, 2019, para. 1).

Traditionally, Sweden grants a large number of asylum seekers asylum status in comparison to other European Union (EU) member states, providing humanitarian and subsidiary protection.

Sweden was among the highest three receiving European states that accepted asylum seekers in

2014 during the European Migration “Crisis” with a total of 142,207 according to the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014). Of the EU member states, Sweden has consistently been in the top countries of asylum seeker acceptance. However, this statistic shifted in 2016 and 2017 when Sweden’s rejection rate significantly increased from around

22.2% to 52.9% (AIDA, 2020). To understand this increased rejection rate, this paper examines changing narratives within the Swedish media, including headlining xenophobic Swedish political parties’ anti-immigration agenda, and the Swedish government’s justifications - such as the implementation of the new Covid 19 legislation - for the state’s altered policy.

The Swedish government justified its rising rejection rate of asylum seekers by suggesting that it no longer should shoulder the majority of the responsibility for asylum acceptance within the EU, and claimed that other member-states are not accepting or required to accept as many asylum seekers as Sweden. This justification is inconsistent with the narrative of

Swedish media. Therefore, the following study explores such governmental explanations as to why the asylum rejection rate has fluctuated, while also presenting evidence of Swedish media’s

“anti-immigrant” agenda through an analysis of news/media articles, parliament meeting minutes, and government officials’ speeches. More specifically, this study intends to discover the true reason for the shift in acceptance and rejection rates and to inspect the Swedish public’s

2 response to the shifts. It aims to answer the following questions through analysis of parliamentary minutes, speeches, media, and news outlet coverage:

● How has the media’s portrayal of asylum seekers and migrants in Sweden

impacted rejection rates?

● What role did the rise of the Sweden Democrats play in the adoption of the

anti-immigrant agenda?

Background and Methods

Sweden is an EU member-state, the 4th wealthiest in Europe, and the 5th richest population in the world according to the 2015 world wealth report by Allianz (Brandmeir et al.,

2015). In 2015, over 160,000 migrants applied for asylum in Sweden (Wallenfeldt, 2020), which was the largest amount of asylum applications per capita within the EU. Historically, the Swedes have a reputation for fostering a positive and welcoming society for non-citizens with a generous asylum policy for those seeking refuge. For instance, unaccompanied minors that gain asylum in

Sweden are granted access to equal education by law, provided healthcare, a temporary guardian, and temporary housing (Human Rights Watch, 2017). At first, Swedish natives even rushed to trains in Malmo to welcome unaccompanied minors. Swedish correspondent Maddy Savage states that at the time Sweden “was one of the most welcoming countries anywhere. At stations there were people with banners saying "refugees welcome", and a year earlier the prime minister had given a speech asking Swedes to open their hearts to migrants” (Evans, 2020). This depicts the welcoming attitudes of Swedes towards minors and refugees of all ages during this time.

Once a minor achieves asylum status, they are entitled to sponsor their families to have them reunited in Sweden. During this progress, immigration officials can assist the minors with the required paperwork. In addition, if the applicants lack the financial means to fund their journey

3 to Sweden, the state helps fund the trip (Braw, 2015). This additional financial support for travel funding is particularly desirable as many families cannot afford the cost of safe passage to the

EU.

Another desirable aspect of the Swedish regulatory legislation for asylum seekers is its generous welfare system, which includes a robust refugee policy. Sweden’s refugee policy includes housing, health and dental care, education for children until the age of twenty, and family reunification. In comparison, other EU member states do not provide the same amount of safety, a welcoming social climate, or resources to refugees. Greece, for example, is considered to be an undesirable state for asylum due to violent acts of xenophobia and their weak financial offerings to refugees. Thus, during an acute period of political upheaval in the Middle East,

Swedish reputation as a welcoming society and their generous welfare system inspired many asylum seekers to apply for asylum in Sweden.

However, 2016 marked a change in Swedish acceptance rates, witnessing a decrease in those granted asylum each year, a rise in hate groups percentages, and narrative. I will demonstrate that the Swedish media played a large role in the promotion and spread of xenophobia, including widely publicizing the racist rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats, an alt-right nationalist political party, which described immigrants as a detriment to Swedish society. In more recent years, surveys have shown that there this increased xenophobia and racism remains among many in Swedish society. For example, in the year 2000, the European

Monitoring System conducted a survey on xenophobia and racism in Sweden. The survey indicated that a majority of the population harbor negative attitudes toward allowing more immigrants into the state. It also showed that a majority of the population showed signs of

4 critical behavior1 and attitudes towards existing immigrants as well, and as the survey has matured, these attitudes have remained steady (Green‐Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008).

To further illustrate the findings of the Europe Monitoring System survey, I conducted a statistical analysis of refugee data from the AIDA asylum database and created two graphs to display the percentage of asylum seeker rejection rates by year in Sweden. In addition to the data present in the graphs, I did a textual analysis of Swedish news outlets to evaluate how much of the media described national immigration policy and asylum acceptance rates. The outlets chosen for examples in this paper are Aftonbladet, an independent social-democrat media outlet,

Dagens Nyheter, an independent liberal outlet, and Fria Tider, a right-wing media outlet. Each of these outlets were chosen due to their difference in political affiliation, allowing for an unbiased inspection of the content presented. I searched for the keywords “immigration” and “asylum seekers” on each media outlet site to study the content pertaining to this study (Byrman). This textual analysis also facilitated a more in-depth inspection of the Sweden Democrats’ influence in fostering an anti-immigrant agenda and connections between their narratives and the media’s promotion of this party’s xenophobic campaign. Finally, I analyzed Swedish parliament minutes to examine the government’s justifications for accepting fewer asylum seekers (Keighren, 2012).

Discussion

Media and Asylum Rejection Rates

The acceptance rate of asylum seekers in Sweden has significantly decreased since its peak in 2016, while evidence of xenophobia among Swedish citizens has risen. This is due in part to the role of the media in Swedish society. Historically, six in ten Swedish adults not only feel that news and media outlets are important, but they also believe that what the media reports

1 Behavior that is aimed towards making a transition to a new life or routine as easy as possible (Marks, 2018)

5 are to be trusted (Pew Research Center, 2018). Swedes generally trust what their media outlets report, thus making the media powerful in policymaking. It is important to understand that the media or press in Sweden is subsidized by government press support while still being owned by several different actors. The largest actor is Bonnier AB, a liberal non-party affiliated Swedish media organization ( and is considered to be a democratic corporatist media model. However, most alternative media2 outlets are funded or owned by the Sweden Democrats (Wadbring and

Ohlsson, 2021).

In 2016, a large influx of asylum seekers risked their lives by crossing the Mediterranean into the European Union in search of a better life (Evans, 2020). By 2016, Sweden had accepted its highest percentage of asylum seekers, including a large percentage of Syrian, who fled from open warfare3. Figure 1 below, shows percentages of overall rejection rates per year since 2013, illustrating the large shift in rejection rates in 2016 once the Migration Crisis occurred. This figure includes every applicant, it is not specific to applicants from a single country of origin.

2 Swedish “alternative media” means right-wing media. 3 Who is granted asylum is political, if NATO or the United States declares the asylum seeker’s country of origin as a warzone or not.

6 Figure 1. Graph of the rejection rates by year in Sweden

Both Figure 1 and Figure 2 display the same evidence of an increase in rejection rates per year since 2016, which will be explored in the discussion section. However, Syrian asylum seekers experienced the highest rise in rejection rates, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below. From

2015-2017, rejection rates for Syrian applicants were low. However, as the largest group to receive asylum during 2015-2017, Syrian asylum seekers’ acceptance rates also experienced the greatest percentage decrease during 2018-2020. This decrease also coincides with marked growth in the Sweden Democrats supporters (Rydgren and Van der Meiden, 2018). The differing graphs were done to exhibit the drastic decrease in acceptance of asylum seekers from a state in which seekers were previously widely granted asylum. The graphics help demonstrate the severity of the decrease in asylum applicants’ acceptance.

Figure 2. Syrian Origin Asylum Seeker Rejection Rates

7 As Syrians previously experienced one of the highest rates of acceptance for asylum in

Sweden, this increase in rejection reflects the power and influence of the Sweden Democrats’ narrative and ability to harness the media to spread and promote their anti-immigrant campaign.

After Sweden’s record high of 162,877 asylum applicants were accepted in 2015, the Sweden

Democrats publicly promoted the narrative that the majority of these asylum seekers were

Muslim and purported that they were the cause of violent crime in Sweden and capitalizing on

Sweden’s generous welfare system (Tomson, 2020). The Swedish media reported the party’s xenophobic declarations, in essence, publicizing and promoting the rhetoric to a previously self-declared “welcoming society.” For instance, Aftonbladet, one of Sweden’s most widely read news outlets with a circulation of 154,000 papers printed in 2015 (Watson, 2016), published articles discussing issues surrounding the polarization of Swedes’ opinions on refugee acceptance. For example, in the Aftonbladet article “Åkesson: Muslims are our biggest foreign threat,” the Sweden Democrats’ party leader, Jimmie Åkesson states, “As a Sweden Democrat, I see this [Muslims in Sweden] as our biggest foreign threat since the Second World War and I promise to do everything in my power to reverse the trend when we go to the polls next year”

(Åkesson, 2016). Following Åkesson’s article, the popular outlet also released articles surrounding the possible segregation in Swedish schools between refugees and Swedes. The image below depicts a 2016 Aftonbladet article titled “Refugee issues at the top of the agenda” that discusses a large amount of political polarization between those that welcome asylum seekers and those that believe they are a detriment to the state (Aftonbladet, 2016). As discussed in Åkesson’s Aftonbladet article, the Sweden Democrats perceive Muslims to be a threat to

Swedish society and posits that in the past, Swedes would be exaspirated at the Muslim religious following in Sweden. Åkesson goes on to postulate that if Islam continues to spread in Sweden,

8 Swedish artists who criticize or joke with Islam would live under constant death threats, that a dozen Muslim terrorist organizations would come to establish itself in Sweden, that leading Muslim representatives would make demands for the introduction of sharia law in Sweden, that Swedish county councils would use taxpayers' money to cut off the foreskin of perfectly healthy little boys, that Sweden would have the most rapes in Europe and that Muslim men would be very strongly overrepresented among the perpetrators…(Åkesson, 2016).

This quote illustrates blatant islamophobia and xenophobia as Åkesson assumes that as a result of Muslim migrants and the spread of Islam in Sweden, terrorist organizations would form, taxpayers’ money would be put towards circumcision surgery, and Muslim men would cause

Sweden to have the highest rape percentage in all of Europe. Prior to publishing this article,

Aftonbladet editor-in-chief Jan Helin spoke with lawyers about expressing incitement against ethnic groups, and decided to publish the article to show the public where the Sweden Democrats lie on the issue of migration (Åkesson, 2016).

Another narrative commonly employed against migrants within a society includes the fear-driven belief that non-citizens will “steal jobs” from nationals. During the 2008 economic collapse, Sweden accepted fewer asylum applicants. However, by 2012, 16,543 work permits were granted to migrants that allowed them to apply for jobs available to Swedish nationals

(Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2013). But a popular Swedish news outlet, Dagens Nyheter (circulation of 282,800 as of 2013), published an article stating, “Phillipe Legrain: Migration has more power than an iron pipe” posits that due to 2008 reforms, companies are choosing to hire employees from outside Sweden instead of solely hiring Swedish natives (Dagens Nyheter, 2013). This narrative of “stealing jobs” worsened once the Migration Crisis hit in 2016 because there was a high influx of refugees and too few job opportunities for both the migrants and the natives (The

Economist, 2016).

9 Image 1. “Refugee issues at the top of the agenda” (Translated by google-translate web extension)

In December 2020, Aftonbladet published another article that framed immigration by highlighting the financial burden supporting immigrants. It also discusses the increasing segregation in Swedish schools and places blame on “the uninhibited immigration that the

Sweden Democrats have warned for too long over and over again” (Aftonbladet, 2020). The utilization of terms such as “warned” and “risk” is significant, as it can promote a sense of fear

(Peters et al, 2013) related to asylum seekers and potentially frames the anti-immigration narrative of the Sweden Democrats as prophetic. As this media outlet is one of the state’s widely read and well-trusted news sources, it has a significant influence on the perception of Swedish citizens, but also foment pressure to alter the national asylum policy as well. This is shown in the article by Åkesson when he states that he will do all that he can to change the increase in

10 Muslims in Sweden, “when we go to the polls next year” (Åkesson, 2016). Statements such as this, impact not only the opinion of the general public, but influences legislation through increased internet exposure. News and media coverage have gained a larger following due to a

92.9% internet penetration rate and a net trust ranking of 74 (Wadbring and Ohlsson, 2021).

Consequently, since the majority of Swedes reported trusting news sources, it is noteworthy that there has been a rise in Swedish Democrat support that coincides with a rise in media coverage of their propaganda. Like United States counterparts, Sweden Democrats also utilize tropes, commonly wielded by former US President Trump and supporters, claiming that their

“alternative media,” meaning Swedish right-wing media, provides evidence of their statements.

When accused of promoting racist ideals, the Sweden Democrats claim to be working-class individuals that solely want what is best for the wellbeing of their state (Tomson, 2020).

Swedish Democrats also highlighted additional supra-state factors as further

“justification” for their mistrust of migrants. For example, the 2015 Paris attacks were several coordinated bombings and gun attacks organized by the Islamic State militant group throughout the city. The terrorists killed 130 civilians and severely injured 100 more. The assaults on the public fomented widespread Islamophobia in France, Europe, and much of the “western world.”

Although many who incited the violence of these attacks were French and Belgian citizens

(Dempsey and McDowell, 2018), the Sweden Democrats publicly reminded Swedes that they

“tried to warn” others of the dangers inherent among asylum seekers or migrants (Aftonbladet,

2020). This shows that the Sweden Democrats publicly display their disdain for asylum seekers and migrants and portray them as being a danger to Swedish society.

11 COVID-19 and Changes in Swedish Immigration Policy

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the state passed a plethora of new and more restrictive migration policies. Their justification centers on the argument that with fewer asylum seekers entering the Swedish state, and potentially transmitting or protracting the virus, the spread of

COVID-19 could be curtailed in comparison to an open-border policy. According to the

UNHCR, the outbreak of COVID-19 has resulted in “extraordinary” and “unprecedented” worldwide health emergency, and “in response, States, including Sweden, have been taking necessary and legitimate measures to prevent the spread of the virus and to protect their populations, including asylum-seekers and refugees” (UNHCR 2020).

While this justification is warranted to keep the spread of COVID-19 to a minimum, the potential risks of granting asylum do not outweigh the risks that asylum seekers face if rejected and forced to return to their home state. The report also posits that due to the increase in asylum seekers since the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020, restrictive measures have been implemented to minimize the sheer number of arrivals into the state (UNHCR 2020). For example, one measure includes a temporary ban of migration into the EU through Sweden that was extended through 22 December 2020 to further mitigate the spread of the virus (Ministry of

Justice 2020). The Swedish state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell stated “immigrant groups that have played an important role in spreading the infection” during a television interview when asked about the Swedish death toll of the COVID-19 pandemic (Iammarrone, 2021). Thus, throughout 2020, restrictive measures were put in place to limit the number of asylum seekers entering the state, and state officials placing blame on immigrants for the spread of the virus contributed to an increasing anti-immigrant agenda in Sweden.

12 The Swedish Government’s Justification

The Swedish government publicly declaring its reduction in acceptance of asylum seekers does not reflect xenophobic rationale or support for the Sweden Democrats’ anti-immigration agenda. However, the state has implemented certain explicit modifications of its asylum legislation to make Sweden appear less desirable for asylum seekers (Green‐Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008). The government justifies this by stating:

Sweden has shouldered a great deal of responsibility in the ongoing global refugee situation. The Government took a series of temporary measures to significantly reduce the number of people seeking asylum in Sweden when EU Member States, in the second half of 2015, could not share the responsibility involved in managing the large number of asylum seekers (Ministry of Justice, 2019).

This statement exhibits how the Swedish state places blame on the other EU member-states for neglecting to share the responsibility of supporting an unprecedented rise of asylum seekers entering Europe from 2014-2018. Similarly, Morgan Johannson, the Swedish Minister for Justice argued:

Today's large migration and refugee flows show the need for improved cooperation and coordination between countries. This is a global issue, and we need to act in partnership – between countries, regions and organisations, with civil society and with the people affected. There is an urgent need to find common and long-term solutions (Johannson, 2016).

Johannson’s statement underpins the state’s effort to justify its actions through an accusatory undertone against other EU member states’ failure to perform their civic and supra-state duties.

However, such statements also subtly deflect the Swedish state’s own actions by drawing attention to its neighboring states. The dates of such declarations are consistent with the rise of popularity of the Sweden Democrats and their anti-immigrant narratives and amplified by the media and eventual justification for reduced rates during the COVID-19 global pandemic.

13 Conclusion While there are several contributing factors that influenced the reduction in asylum seeker acceptance rates in Sweden, I argue that the unparalleled rise of popularity of the Sweden

Democrats’ rhetoric that was spread through Swedish alternative media not only influenced public attitudes but also provided pressure for the state to modify its asylum policy as well. The government’s justifications for asylum policy change reported in the media demonstrate that the media’s influence over both the public and the government is far-reaching. The Swedish government’s strategic decision to blame its fellow EU member states for their failure to host asylum seekers as rationale for their drastic modifications of its national migration policy masks its decision to ignore asylum seekers’ needs.

While this paper discusses the role of the media, the rise of xenophobic nationalist parties, and the Swedish government’s official statements to justify its actions, further research on the multilayered connection among these actors will prove to be a fruitful line of investigation. Case studies of similar examples in other states, such as the United States, France, or Germany, could also provide informative comparisons for further analysis. Indeed, the connections among powerful media tropes, fear-driven narratives prompted by exclusionary nationalist parties, and subsequent changes in state immigration policy deserve more investigation attention.

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