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Evolutions10a.qxd 2005/09/28 12:08 PM Page 295 CHAPTER ELEVEN A changing conception of defence: A historical perspective of the military in Tanzania Nestor Luanda INTRODUCTION This chapter examines the historical development of the military in Tanzania, beginning with a background to the Tanganyika Rifles (TR). The legacies of Tanzania’s colonial history form an essential background, providing the basis from which major adjustments were made at independence. The chapter then reviews early attempts at formulating a defence policy in Tanganyika. The country was initially pre-occupied with developmentalism, and it was only after 1963 that glimpses of foreign and defence policies began to emerge; the TR mutiny of January 1964 was the turning point in the conception of a defence policy. Tanganyika’s commitment to the liberation war from very early on provides another pillar in the country’s conception of defence and foreign policies. The chapter then argues that from its inception the Tanzania Peoples’ Defence Force (TPDF), largely an infantry army, was ideologically oriented. With the advent of multiparty politics and political liberalisation, however, this ideological orientation has been de- emphasised. As a result the conception of defence has also changed and become liberalised. THE COLONIAL ROOT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY Since the King’s African Rifles (KAR) was the precursor to the TR, we begin by outlining the main characteristics of the former in order to underscore the colonial roots of the latter. The KAR was inextricably 295 Evolutions10a.qxd 2005/09/28 12:08 PM Page 296 296 Evolutions & Revolutions linked to the history of colonial conquest, pacification and occupation of East and Central Africa. Like many a colonial army, it was an adjunct of the colonial administration. The KAR dates back to the days of chartered companies which had to raise local forces in order “to pacify the countries and to bring law and order”.1 The forces were “scantily equipped levies armed with out-of- date rifles and employed on local expeditions against ill-armed tribes”.2 KAR troops were mostly drawn from satrapic members of African societies; they were armed with antiquated rifles and possessed little superior marksmanship to that of the men they fought. These soldiers of fortune developed into a mercenary force with no local affinity to an area where they might be called on to operate, and controlled thousands of their own kind. The KAR was essentially an active service force whose main tasks were colonial pioneering, pacification, policing and counter- insurgency commitments. However, the point stands that the KAR commanders held their African troops in contempt. The legendary loyalty and courage of the Askari was founded upon stereotyped inferior qualities of the African. When a new arrival asked a veteran KAR officer about the force, he commented: … the great thing about the KAR is that they only enlist the thick ones to be soldiers, … these are the ones that have plenty of espirit de corps, so long as there are European officers it can all be channelled in the right direction. The other trouble with all Africans, whether they’re educated or uneducated, is that they are totally unreliable, but I imagine military discipline caters for that in the KAR.3 PATTERN OF TRANSITION A permanent military barracks was established at Colito in Dar es Salaam in 1954, marking a watershed in the history of the military in Tanganyika. This 6th Battalion comprised rifle companies. Two years later the nucleus of a new battalion—the 26th Battalion, Kalewa Barracks—was formed at Urambo. Both battalions came under the control of East African Command and provided periodic garrison duty in Mauritius until 1957. The point is that during crisis periods—notably the First and Second World Wars, and Mau Mau uprising—the War Office took control of the colonial forces. From 1957 to 1960, however, the respective governors Evolutions10a.qxd 2005/09/28 12:08 PM Page 297 Tanzania 297 of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika took control of the KAR units under a loose federal body called the East African Land Forces’ Organisation; but the organisation was disbanded in 1960 and the KAR units were again taken over by the War Office. In short, the 6th and 26th KAR battalions were forerunners of local constabulary forces designed for internal security duties in Tanganyika. They were indeed skeleton battalions whose companies fused, fissured or simply disbanded as expediency required; this holds true throughout the history of the two battalions. Another interesting feature of the 6th and 26th battalions is that they were continuously moved from place to place, but especially to Mauritius for garrison duty. A cynic once remarked that Tanganyika was unable to support military units and that the best way to avoid incurring maintenance costs was to let others do it by providing them in return with garrison duty. There were other implications too. The 6th and 26th KAR battalions were particularly small; they were more or less a superior police force organised for rapid deployment to quell tax revolts, labour disputes or nationalist demonstrations. Dar es Salaam (Colito Barracks) and Tabora (Kalewa Barracks) were really transit camps or rest stations for the battalions’ rotating units. The upshot is that technical and expert fields dealing with, among others, electrical, motor vehicle, weaponry, heavy machinery and engineering were concentrated in Kenya. A training wing (infantry) was not established at Colito Barracks until 1956. A number of interviewees for this study claim that despite their relatively good educational backgrounds, they were denied a chance to take specialised training. Up to 1963 Kenya remained the centre for specialised courses such as signals, stores, medicine, driving and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). For example, 12 out of the first 18 top appointments in 1957 were Kenyans. It is unclear how many came from Uganda, but only one was from Tanganyika.4 Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the promotion of African NCOs was arduously slow. All command positions from top to bottom were occupied by the British. In theory, it would take an African soldier two years to become lance corporal, six years to become corporal, and 10 years to reach sergeant—but in practice very few Africans were promoted. Most Africans did not join the army for a career. However, during the Second World War years, and especially in the early 1950s, Africans in general began to be promoted to NCO positions and were first appointed as warrant officer platoon commanders (WOPCs). Evolutions10a.qxd 2005/09/28 12:08 PM Page 298 298 Evolutions & Revolutions But the responsibilities given to African NCOs, including WOPCs, was a façade: the British never allowed African NCOs to assume full command of a unit, be it a platoon or a section—there was always a British counterpart who was the senior of the two. For example, a platoon would have a British national service subaltern and an African WOPC. The African platoon commander would, however, take charge when it came to such arduous tasks as foot slogging. However, the African WOPC would have to report to the British subaltern for orders regarding every administrative, tactical or logistical decision. The same was true for platoon sergeants; they took orders from the British sergeants. The British in East Africa gave no serious thought to commissioning Africans until the late 1950s. As mentioned, the highest rank an African in the KAR could aspire to was WOPC. The rank gave the African a semblance of responsibility but it was an NCO rank nevertheless. In addition, the standard of education particularly among the WOPCs was appallingly low. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AT INDEPENDENCE Both the 6th and 26th battalions were part of KAR’s 11th Division. The 6th Battalion had distinguished itself in battle at Colito, Ethiopia during the First World War, with the Colito Barracks (1954) in Dar es Salaam named after that battle. The 26th Battalion had fought gallantly at Kalewa, Burma during the Second World War and the Kalewa Barracks (1956) in Tabora was named after that battle. Minus the two world wars and the nationalist uprisings in the 1950s, colonial units were maintained through colonial revenues. Of Britain’s East and Central African colonies, Tanganyika was the runt of the litter, so to speak, and the KAR units in colonial Tanganyika operated on a threadbare budget. The KAR in Tanganyika was a poorly equipped infantry army: the Mark IV, with pounder mortar and rocket launcher thrown in, was the KAR’s most important weapon. THE SEARCH FOR A DEFENCE POLICY At independence on 9 December 1961 the KAR units in Tanganyika— namely the 6th and 26th battalions—became the First Battalion (at Colito Barracks in Dar es Salaam) and Second Battalion (at Kalewa Barracks in Tabora) Tanganyika Rifles respectively. It is important to emphasise that the change was in name only: the British continued to Evolutions10a.qxd 2005/09/28 12:08 PM Page 299 Tanzania 299 hold sway. All commanding positions were held by British officers—35 British officers and 25 British NCOs (from the KAR) were inherited intact to command the TR. During the first two years of independence Tanganyika did not formulate any articulate defence or foreign policy. It was only after 1963 when there were clear perceptions of an external threat that moves were made to establish a defence system to confront this threat. Parliamentary debates are key to understanding the search for a national defence policy.5 The substance of parliamentary debates during the pre-mutiny period was heavily oriented towards development policies as well as the strategies and tactics necessary to bring about this development. The dominant view was that British colonialism had been overthrown and the only task ahead worthy of attention was economic reconstruction.

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