The Big Crackdown
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Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier: the Great Qing and the Maritime World
Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier: The Great Qing and the Maritime World in the Long Eighteenth Century Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultüt der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Vorgelegt von Chung-yam PO Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Harald Fuess Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Joachim Kurtz Datum: 28 June 2013 Table of Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgments 3 Emperors of the Qing Dynasty 5 Map of China Coast 6 Introduction 7 Chapter 1 Setting the Scene 43 Chapter 2 Modeling the Sea Space 62 Chapter 3 The Dragon Navy 109 Chapter 4 Maritime Customs Office 160 Chapter 5 Writing the Waves 210 Conclusion 247 Glossary 255 Bibliography 257 1 Abstract Most previous scholarship has asserted that the Qing Empire neglected the sea and underestimated the worldwide rise of Western powers in the long eighteenth century. By the time the British crushed the Chinese navy in the so-called Opium Wars, the country and its government were in a state of shock and incapable of quickly catching-up with Western Europe. In contrast with such a narrative, this dissertation shows that the Great Qing was in fact far more aware of global trends than has been commonly assumed. Against the backdrop of the long eighteenth century, the author explores the fundamental historical notions of the Chinese maritime world as a conceptual divide between an inner and an outer sea, whereby administrators, merchants, and intellectuals paid close and intense attention to coastal seawaters. Drawing on archival sources from China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the West, the author argues that the connection between the Great Qing and the maritime world was complex and sophisticated. -
The Opium War, 1839–1842
Chapter 8 The Opium War, 1839–1842 At the end of the great opium debate, the Daoguang Emperor appointed the morally-upright Lin Zexu (1785–1850) as imperial commissioner to sup- press the opium trade. Lin arrived in Canton in March 1839. Within months, Commissioner Lin arrested thousands of opium smokers, destroyed tens of thousands of opium pipes, and confiscated large stockpiles of opium from Chinese smugglers. His foremost concern, however, was to force the British firms to surrender their supplies and sign a bond guaranteeing never to deal in opium again. When the British traders refused, Lin ordered soldiers to sur- round the Thirteen Factories, where the British and other foreigners lived, and demanded the opium. To the surprise of everyone, Superintendent of Trade Charles Elliott promised the traders that the British crown would indemnify them for their losses; within weeks they surrendered more than 20,000 chests, weighing approximately 2.6 million pounds, with a value of some £2 million. The British refused to sign the bond, however. Minor military clashes followed shortly thereafter, in September and November, that started what became known as the Opium War. There are many scholarly debates about the origins of the Opium War. Was it the culmination of a cultural clash between China and the West because of the incompatibility of their different systems of international relations? Was it a moral and economic crusade by the Qing government to end the “great scourge” of opium and relieve the financial pressure on the population from the “silver famine”? Was it a war to secure free trade for British merchants? A war to defend the honor and prestige of the British flag? The answer to this question depends in large part on the perspective being adopted. -
Climate-Change Journalism in China: Opportunities for International
Climate-change journalism in China: opportunities for international cooperation By Sam Geall Foreword by Hu Shuli 中国气候变化报道: 国际合作中的机遇 山姆·吉尔 序——胡舒立 Climate-change journalism in China: opportunities for international cooperation 中国气候变化报道:国际合作中的机遇 © International Media Support 2011. Any reproduction, modification, publication, transmission, transfer, sale distribution, display or exploitation of this information, in any form or by any means, or its storage in a retrieval system, whether in whole or in part, without the express written permission of the individual copyright holder is prohibited without prior approval by IMS. Cover image by Angel Hsu. © 国际媒体支持组织 版权所有 2011 任何媒体、网站或个人未经“国际媒体支持组织”的书面许可,不得引用、复 制、转载、摘编、发售、储存于检索系统,或以其他任何方式非法使用本报告全 部或部分内容。 封面照片由徐安琪摄。 International Media Support (IMS) Communications Unit, Nørregade 18, Copenhagen K 1165, Denmark Phone: +4588327000, Fax: +4533120099 Email: [email protected] www.i-m-s.dk Caixin Media Floor 15/16, Tower A, Winterless Center, No.1 Xidawanglu, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100026, P.R.China http://english.caing.com/ chinadialogue Suite 306 Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, United Kingdom Phone: +442073244767 Email: [email protected] www.chinadialogue.net Climate-change journalism in China: opportunities for international cooperation By Sam Geall1 Foreword by Hu Shuli2 p4 1. Sam Geall is deputy editor of chinadialogue. The author acknowledges generous contributions to the research and analysis in this report from Li Hujun, Wang Haotong, Eliot Gao and Lisa Lin. Essential input and support were also provided by Martin Breum, Martin Gottske, Isabel Hilton, Tan Copsey, Li Dawei, Ma Ling, Hu Shuli, Bruce Lewenstein and Jia Hepeng. 2. Hu Shuli is editor-in-chief of Caixin Media (the Beijing-based media group that publishes Century Weekly and China Reform), the former founding editor of Caijing magazine and a prominent investigative journalist and commentator. -
Incentives in China's Reformation of the Sports Industry
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Keck Graduate Institute Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2017 Tapping the Potential of Sports: Incentives in China’s Reformation of the Sports Industry Yu Fu Claremont McKenna College Recommended Citation Fu, Yu, "Tapping the Potential of Sports: Incentives in China’s Reformation of the Sports Industry" (2017). CMC Senior Theses. 1609. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1609 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claremont McKenna College Tapping the Potential of Sports: Incentives in China’s Reformation of the Sports Industry Submitted to Professor Minxin Pei by Yu Fu for Senior Thesis Spring 2017 April 24, 2017 2 Abstract Since the 2010s, China’s sports industry has undergone comprehensive reforms. This paper attempts to understand this change of direction from the central state’s perspective. By examining the dynamics of the basketball and soccer markets, it discovers that while the deregulation of basketball is a result of persistent bottom-up effort from the private sector, the recentralization of soccer is a state-led policy change. Notwithstanding the different nature and routes between these reforms, in both sectors, the state’s aim is to restore and strengthen its legitimacy within the society. Amidst China’s economic stagnation, the regime hopes to identify sectors that can drive sustainable growth, and to make adjustments to its bureaucracy as a way to respond to the society’s mounting demand for political modernization. -
The Coronavirus Cover-Up: a Timeline
SITUATION BRIEF April 10, 2020 • China Studies Program The Coronavirus Cover-Up: A Timeline How the Chinese Communist Party Misled the World about COVID-19 and Is Using the World Health Organization As an Instrument of Propaganda Executive Summary The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its ruling Chi- assertions, the harm would have been significantly reduced. nese Communist Party (CCP) have deceived the world Instead, the PRC’s actions and WHO’s inaction precipitat- about the coronavirus since its appearance in late 2019. In ed a pandemic, leading to a global economic crisis and a this situation brief, the Victims of Communism Memorial growing loss of human life. Foundation compares the timeline and facts with China’s ongoing disinformation campaign about the coronavirus’ As a matter of justice, and to prevent future pandemics, the origins, nature, and spread. This brief also demonstrates PRC must be held accountable through demands for eco- how the World Health Organization (WHO) has promoted nomic reparations and other sanctions pertaining to human and helped legitimize China’s false claims. rights. China should also be suspended from full member- ship in the WHO and the WHO, which U.S. taxpayers fund The consequences of China’s deception and the WHO’s cre- annually, must be subject to immediate investigation and re- dulity are now playing out globally. It is normally difficult to form. Media organizations reporting on the claims of China assign culpability to governments and organizations charged and WHO regarding the pandemic without scrutiny or con- with ensuring public health in any pandemic, but the coro- text must be cautioned against misleading the public. -
The Changing Representation of the Late Qing History in Chinese Film Guo Wu Allegheny College
100 Media Resources The Changing Representation of the Late Qing History in Chinese Film Guo Wu Allegheny College Introduction From the 1950s to the 1990s, Chinese film never ceased to represent the turbulent late Qing history on the screen. The representations, all carrying the mark of their own time, not only tell a story about the late Qing Chinese predicament and dilemma of its modernization, but also reveal the trajectory of the changing ideologies behind their own production. In this sense, the films can be read as both historical and contemporary texts. This article attempts to trace the changing representation by comparing and analyzing major historical films of China from the 1950s to the 1990s, and focuses the discussion on several main themes. National Heroes, Martyrs, and Villains A motif in Chinese historical film is the portrayal of national heroes and the roles they play in China’s self-defense against Western and Japanese invasions. Two films, Lin Zexu, 1958) and The Naval Battle of 1894 (Jiawu fengyun, 1962) created the images of two well-known heroes: Commissioner Lin Zexu and Captain Deng Shichang. In Lin Zexu, Lin is portrayed as a dedicated and conscientious minister par excellence. Always grateful that the Emperor’s trusted him to put down opium smuggling in Guangdong Province, Lin announces in the film that he is willing to thoroughly sacrifice himself (gannao tudi) ASIANetwork Exchange Late Qing History in Chinese Film 101 to accomplish the task. He shows a strong concern with the security and moral integrity of the nation, and holds an explicitly hawkish position of suppressing opium smuggling by closing down opium dens, surrounding the Western firms involved in the smuggling, destroying the opium in public, and forcing the smugglers to sign bonds. -
COVID-19 and China: a Chronology of Events (December 2019-January 2020)
COVID-19 and China: A Chronology of Events (December 2019-January 2020) Updated May 13, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46354 SUMMARY R46354 COVID-19 and China: A Chronology of Events May 13, 2020 (December 2019-January 2020) Susan V. Lawrence In Congress, multiple bills and resolutions have been introduced related to China’s Specialist in Asian Affairs handling of a novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China, that expanded to become the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) global pandemic. This report provides a timeline of key developments in the early weeks of the pandemic, based on available public reporting. It also considers issues raised by the timeline, including the timeliness of China’s information sharing with the World Health Organization (WHO), gaps in early information China shared with the world, and episodes in which Chinese authorities sought to discipline those who publicly shared information about aspects of the epidemic. Prior to January 20, 2020—the day Chinese authorities acknowledged person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirus—the public record provides little indication that China’s top leaders saw containment of the epidemic as a high priority. Thereafter, however, Chinese authorities appear to have taken aggressive measures to contain the virus. The Appendix includes a concise version of the timeline. A condensed version is below: Late December: Hospitals in Wuhan, China, identify cases of pneumonia of unknown origin. December 30: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issues “urgent notices” to city hospitals about cases of atypical pneumonia linked to the city’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. The notices leak online. -
Tibet Was Never Part of China Before 1950: Examples of Authoritative Pre-1949 Chinese Documents That Prove It
Article Tibet was Never Part of China Before 1950: Examples of Authoritative pre-1949 Chinese Documents that Prove It Hon-Shiang LAU Abstract The claim ‘Tibet has been part of China since antiquity’ is crucial for the PRC to legitimize her annexation of Tibet in 1950. However, the vast amount of China’s pre-1949 primary-source records consistently indicate that this claim is false. This paper presents a very small sample of these records from the Ming and the Qing dynasties to illustrate how they unequivocally contradict PRC’s claim. he People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims that ‘Tibet has been part of China T since antiquity西藏自古以来就是中国的一部分.’ The Central Tibet Administration (CTA), based in Dharamshala in India, refuses to accede to this claim, and this refusal by the CTA is used by the PRC as: 1. A prima facie proof of CTA’s betrayal to her motherland (i.e., China), and 2. Justification for not negotiating with the CTA or the Dalai Lama. Why must the PRC’s insist that ‘Tibet has been part of China since antiquity’? China is a signatory to the 1918 League-of-Nations Covenants and the 1945 United- Nations Charter; both documents prohibit future (i.e., post-1918) territorial acquisitions via conquest. Moreover, the PRC incessantly paints a sorry picture of Prof. Hon-Shiang LAU is an eminent Chinese scholar and was Chair Professor at the City University of Hong Kong. He retired in 2011 and has since then pursued research on Chinese government records and practices. His study of Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Manchu period official records show that Tibet was never treated as part of China. -
The Incompetence of Qing Dynasty Officials in the Opium Wars, and the Consequences of Defeat
An Indefensible Defense: The Incompetence of Qing Dynasty Officials in the Opium Wars, and the Consequences of Defeat DANIEL CONE The Opium Wars were small scale wars fought with global implications. With fewer than five thousand troops and twenty naval vessels the British were able to win the First Opium War, allowing them to rewrite trade laws that were demonstrably unfair to the Chinese. After losing the First Opium War, the Qing Dynasty then had to deal with the Taiping Rebellion (caused in part by anti- foreign sentiment sprung from the Opium War) and a subsequent Second Opium War, which created more unequal trade stipulations. The Manchus and the British had very different militaries, as “Britain experienced an industrial revolution that produced military technology far beyond that of the Qing forces,” writes Peter Worthing.1 While the Manchus would almost certainly be defeated by the British in an open, “fair fight,” there are many other ways of engaging an enemy while maintaining a tactical advantage. This is especially true when fighting an invading force, as the Manchus could utilize defensive structures to their advantage. According to the traditionalist view, the Manchus could not have competed with such a superior force,2 but I contend it was the incompetency of Qing officials, not the superiority of European warfare, that caused the Qing Dynasty to capitulate. Qing officials anticipated an armed conflict would be necessary to halt the importation of British opium, but the Manchus vastly underestimated the foe they were to face. The preparations made before the invasion were underfunded, underutilized, and most importantly undermanned; often leaving local provinces to fight without any assistance. -
Mapping the EU-China Cultural and Creative Landscape
MAPPING THE EU‐CHINA CULTURAL AND CREATIVE LANDSCAPE A joint mapping study prepared for the Ministry of Culture (MoC) of the People's Republic of China and DG Education and Culture (EAC) of the European Commission September 2015 1 CO-AUTHORS: Chapters I to III: Cui Qiao - Senior Expert, BMW Foundation China Representative, Founder China Contemporary Art Foundation Huang Shan - Junior Expert, Founder Artspy.cn Chapter IV: Katja Hellkötter - Senior Expert, Founder & Director, CONSTELLATIONS International Léa Ayoub - Junior Expert, Project Manager, CONSTELLATIONS International http://www.constellations-international.com Disclaimer This mapping study has been produced in the context and with the support of the EU-China Policy Dialogues Support Facility (PDSF II), a project financed jointly by the European Union and the Government of the People's Republic of China, implemented by a consortium led by Grontmij A/S. This consolidated version is based on the contributions of the two expert teams mentioned above and has been finalised by the European Commission (DG EAC). The content does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Directorate General Education and Culture (DG EAC) or the Ministry of Culture (MoC) of the People’s Republic of China. DG EAC and MoC are not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein. The authors have produced this study to the best of their ability and knowledge; nevertheless they assume no liability for any damages, material or immaterial, that may arise from the use of this study or its content. 2 Contents I. General Introduction ....................................................................................................... 5 1. Background .............................................................................................................................. 5 2. Project Description ................................................................................................................. -
Myth-Busting Chinese Corporations in Australia
澳大利亚-中国关系研究院 MYTH-BUSTING CHINESE CORPORATIONS IN AUSTRALIA Colin Hawes Faculty of Law University of Technology Sydney FRONT COVER Thinkstock.com Published by the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) PO Box 123 Broadway NSW 2007 Australia e: [email protected] w: www.australiachinarelations.org © The Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) 2017 ISBN 978-0-9942825-8-3 The publication is copyright. Other than for uses permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without attribution. CONTENTS Executive Summary 4 Myth-busting Chinese Corporations in Australia 5 Myth One: All Chinese corporations are controlled by the Chinese government 8 Myth Two: China has private corporations, but they are actually controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, either directly or indirectly 15 Myth Three: The Chinese Communist Party and government know what they are doing and act in a unified way 22 Myth Four: China and its corporations are taking over the world (and taking our jobs) 27 Myth Five: Chinese corporate investment in Australia is a threat to our national security 31 Appendix One: Profile of Guo Guangchang 郭广昌 39 Appendix Two: Profile of Wang Jianlin 王健林 42 References 43 About ACRI 58 About the Author 59 MYTH-BUSTING CHINESE CORPORATIONS IN AUSTRALIA 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Among policymakers, media and the broader public, confusion reigns supreme when it comes to Chinese corporations. State- owned enterprises (SOEs) are assumed to be blindly following Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or security service orders with little concern for their own commercial interests. And private Chinese firms are conflated with SOEs and viewed as pawns in the CCP’s regional expansion strategy, despite the enormous growth of the Chinese private sector over the past two decades. -
Communication, Empire, and Authority in the Qing Gazette
COMMUNICATION, EMPIRE, AND AUTHORITY IN THE QING GAZETTE by Emily Carr Mokros A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland June, 2016 © 2016 Emily Carr Mokros All rights Reserved Abstract This dissertation studies the political and cultural roles of official information and political news in late imperial China. Using a wide-ranging selection of archival, library, and digitized sources from libraries and archives in East Asia, Europe, and the United States, this project investigates the production, regulation, and reading of the Peking Gazette (dibao, jingbao), a distinctive communications channel and news publication of the Qing Empire (1644-1912). Although court gazettes were composed of official documents and communications, the Qing state frequently contracted with commercial copyists and printers in publishing and distributing them. As this dissertation shows, even as the Qing state viewed information control and dissemination as a strategic concern, it also permitted the free circulation of a huge variety of timely political news. Readers including both officials and non-officials used the gazette in order to compare judicial rulings, assess military campaigns, and follow court politics and scandals. As the first full-length study of the Qing gazette, this project shows concretely that the gazette was a powerful factor in late imperial Chinese politics and culture, and analyzes the close relationship between information and imperial practice in the Qing Empire. By arguing that the ubiquitous gazette was the most important link between the Qing state and the densely connected information society of late imperial China, this project overturns assumptions that underestimate the importance of court gazettes and the extent of popular interest in political news in Chinese history.