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The Opium War, 1839–1842

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The Opium War, 1839–1842 Chapter 8 The Opium War, 1839–1842 At the end of the great opium debate, the Daoguang Emperor appointed the morally-upright Lin Zexu (1785–1850) as imperial commissioner to sup- press the opium trade. Lin arrived in Canton in March 1839. Within months, Commissioner Lin arrested thousands of opium smokers, destroyed tens of thousands of opium pipes, and confiscated large stockpiles of opium from Chinese smugglers. His foremost concern, however, was to force the British firms to surrender their supplies and sign a bond guaranteeing never to deal in opium again. When the British traders refused, Lin ordered soldiers to sur- round the Thirteen Factories, where the British and other foreigners lived, and demanded the opium. To the surprise of everyone, Superintendent of Trade Charles Elliott promised the traders that the British crown would indemnify them for their losses; within weeks they surrendered more than 20,000 chests, weighing approximately 2.6 million pounds, with a value of some £2 million. The British refused to sign the bond, however. Minor military clashes followed shortly thereafter, in September and November, that started what became known as the Opium War. There are many scholarly debates about the origins of the Opium War. Was it the culmination of a cultural clash between China and the West because of the incompatibility of their different systems of international relations? Was it a moral and economic crusade by the Qing government to end the “great scourge” of opium and relieve the financial pressure on the population from the “silver famine”? Was it a war to secure free trade for British merchants? A war to defend the honor and prestige of the British flag? The answer to this question depends in large part on the perspective being adopted. What every- one agrees on is that the sea power of the British empire utterly dominated the military forces of the Qing imperium. After the two minor skirmishes in the fall of 1839, Commissioner Lin so- lidified the defenses around Canton in preparation for a major British assault, but when the British fleet finally arrived in the summer of 1840, much to Lin’s consternation, Elliott ordered it to sail north and seize the city of Dinghai, in the Zhoushan (Chusan) archipelago, in the Yangzi delta region. A month later the British fleet appeared off the Dagu forts, less than one hundred miles from Beijing. An utterly shocked Daoguang Emperor ordered Qishan, the Governor- General of Zhili, to convince Elliott to return to Canton for negotiations; Lin Zexu was sacked a short time later. Elliott and Qishan negotiated for several © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004361003_010 The Opium War, 1839–1842 75 months and finally signed the Convention of Chuanbi in January 1841, but both men would be cashiered for their trouble—Qishan for ceding Hong Kong to the British, Elliott for not getting better terms. In August 1841, Sir Henry Pottinger arrived with a renewed fleet to force the Qing government to come to those better terms. That fall he captured Xiamen, Zhenhai, and Ningbo. The final battles of the war took place in the Yangzi Valley in the spring of 1842. After capturing Wusong, Shanghai, and Zhenjiang in rapid succession, British warships threatened to bombard the city of Nanjing. The emperor sued for peace and the famous Treaty of Nanjing was signed on August 29, 1842. The sources below confirm many of the well-known facts about the war, but they also tell us much about the beliefs of early nineteenth century Qing of- ficials, the troubling issues they discovered about their military preparedness, and the problem of systemic falsehoods about the progress of the war reported to the emperor. January 18391 Lin Zexu, a native of Fujian, high in office and reputation, has been commis- sioned by the emperor to visit Canton, to make inquires and to propose new measures respecting the opium trade. He is expected in a few days. He intends to “cut off the fountain of evil,” and is prepared, if necessary, “to sink his ships and break his cauldrons;” for it now appears that, “the indignation of the great emperor has been fairly aroused at these wicked practices—of buying and sell- ing, and using opium,—and that the hourly thought of his heart is to do away with them forever.” October 9, 18392 Lin [Zexu], high imperial commissioner, viceroy of the two Jiang provinces, &c., &c., and Deng [Tingzhen] governor of the two Guang provinces, &c., &c., hereby conjointly issue this proclamation, that all men may know and understand. Whereas the merchant ships belonging to the English nation which have arrived at Guangdong in the course of the present year, have not for a long 1 Translated in The Chinese Repository 7: 9 (January 1839), 504. 2 Translated in The Chinese Repository 8: 7 (November 1839), 379–80..
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