Roads to Europe to Roads Heinrich Aigner and the Genesis of of Genesis the and Aigner Heinrich Auditors of Court European the Laura Christine Ulrich Christine Laura

Home , Alfons Maria Jakob, Alois Hundhammer, Bavarian Order of Merit, Bavaria Party, Beilngries, Cartellverband

ROADS TO EUROPE TO ROADS HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF OF GENESIS THE AND AIGNER HEINRICH AUDITORS OF COURT EUROPEAN THE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH CHRISTINE LAURA

ROADS TO EUROPE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH ROADS TO EUROPE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH

ROADS TO EUROPE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH

QJ-02-15-731-EN-C doi:10.2865/759383 ISBN 978-92-9241-998-1 ISBN 978-92-9241-998-1

Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union

Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016

print ISBN 978-92-9241-998-1 doi:10.2865/759383 QJ-02-15-731-EN-C PDF ISBN 978-92-9241-999-8 doi:10.2865/006480 QJ-02-15-731-EN-N

This publication was produced with the support of the European Court of Auditors.

Translation of: Wege nach Europa. Heinrich Aigner und die Anfänge des Europäischen Rechnungshofes.

Text: Laura Ulrich. Photos: reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged except photos on pages 37 and 55. For these photos permission must be sought directly from the copyright holder. Photos on front cover: © European Union; Photo on back cover: © Sami Sarkis/Getty Image

Printed in Italy PRINTED ON ELEMENTAL CHLORINE-FREE BLEACHED PAPER (ECF) LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH

ROADS TO EUROPE

HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 7

FOREWORD

VÍTOR CALDEIRA President of the European Court of Auditors

Heinrich Aigner (1924-1988), as a Member of the European Parliament, was deeply committed to setting up a comprehensive budgetary control framework at the European level and was the real driving force behind the establishment of the European Court of Auditors. Without any exaggeration, we can say that our Institution owes its creation to him.

This excellent book by Laura Christine Ulrich, which we have the great pleasure to present in its English edition, provides the first comprehensive and well-documented personal and political biography of our founding father. In particular, it gives a very illuminating and well researched account of the historical context, in the early nineteen seventies, which led to the genesis of the European Court of Auditors.

The ‘special relationship’ between Aigner and ‘his’ Institution continued even after the approval of the Treaty of Brussels (1975) and the establishment of the Court in October 1977. Heinrich Aigner went on to be the first chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control, a position he ROADS TO EUROPE 8

held until his premature death in 1988. In that capacity, he entered into close and regular dialogue with the Court and its Members, including its former President Marcel Mart, never hiding that his views sometimes diverged with those of the Court as he fought for the Parliament, the elected body, to have greater influence over the Commission.

In September 1973, when first arguing in favour of a new European Audit Institution, Heinrich Aigner recalled a guiding principle that is as relevant now as it was then, ‘The role of the European Community is to serve the nations which it unites and their citizens. The latter have a right to expect that the money flowing into “Europe” is put to good use and spent in accordance with the principle of sound financial management’.

It is important to note that Heinrich Aigner emphasised the right of ‘citizens’ to be informed about the use of their money. He could have simply referred to ‘taxpayers’. Instead, as a passionate representative of the people and a convinced democrat and European, Aigner deliberately chose to refer explicitly to European citizens.

The Court of Auditors went on to achieve the full status of a European Institution as Aigner had originally advocated. And during the more than 35 years since our founding, we have never lost sight of the fact that we were established to serve European citizens. For that reason, I am very pleased to introduce this book about a great European, who continues to inspire us in our mission to help improve democratic accountability for the use of EU funds.

Luxembourg, September 2015 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 9

FOREWORD

DR INGE GRÄSSLE MEP, Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control

Politics, Max Weber wrote, means ‘drilling slowly and forcefully through hard boards with passion and moderation in equal measure’. As the story of Heinrich Aigner MEP’s life and impact illustrates in this book, the politics of European budgetary control also demand perseverance and fortitude, firm convictions and pragmatism in forging alliances. I am delighted that, with this book, my predecessor as Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control is receiving the attention that he and his lifetime of great service to Europe deserve.

The significance of Heinrich Aigner’s role in creating the European Court of Auditors and introducing budgetary control at a political level by the European Parliament cannot be stressed enough. During his many years as an MEP, he saw his continually repeated calls for independent external audit first gain majority support in the Parliament, before becoming part of the European institutional set-up by virtue of a unanimous summit decision and subsequent treaty amendment. Only after Aigner’s death did the Court of Auditors attain the EU institution status for which he had always striven. ROADS TO EUROPE 10

Aigner also left his mark on the nature of budgetary control at a political level, including its central component: the decision on whether or not to grant discharge in respect of the management of the budget for a particular year. Having already been the driving force on the former ‘Control Subcommittee’ of the Parliament’s Committee on Budgets, he succeeded in establishing a permanent Committee on Budgetary Control following the first elections by direct suffrage in 1979 and, as its Chair, made history again in 1984 by refusing to grant discharge to the Commission in respect of its management of the budget for the 1982 financial year. At the same time, he laid the foundations for closer links between audit and the political side of budgetary control, which to this day remain the key to an effective partnership between the Court of Auditors and the Parliament.

He faced constant resistance, occasionally even from within the ranks of the Parliament hierarchy, who regarded trouble-free cooperation between institutions as more important than uncovering and punishing irregularities, waste and fraud at the expense of the European taxpayer. This made all the more important Aigner’s focus on creating a European network, beyond institutional, national and party boundaries, of like- minded individuals for whom the issue of budgetary control was just as much of a concern as it was for him; with their help, he ultimately achieved what initially seemed impossible.

I would like to thank the book’s author, Laura Christine Ulrich, and its publisher, the European Court of Auditors, for keeping alive the memory of a great European. Heinrich Aigner’s impact continues to motivate and inspire those of us involved in EU budgetary control today.

Brussels, September 2015 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 11

CONTENTS

PREFACE 15

1. INTRODUCTION 17

Subject matter and structure 20 Literature review 23 Sources 26

2. HEINRICH AIGNER – THE ROAD TO POLITICS 29

Origins and upbringing in Bavaria 30 War experiences inspire commitment to Europe 31 Studies in Erlangen, starting a family and early career in Munich 32 Rising through the ranks: from Junge Union to the Bundestag 34 Appointment to the European Parliament until first direct elections in 1979 42 ROADS TO EUROPE 12

3. ROAD TO EUROPE 47

Involvement in the Paneuropean Union 47 ‘The key to the fate of the 20th century’ — visions for Europe 50 Values and general aims in European politics 50 Promoting the concept of Europe to the public 51 Development aid as a political tool for Europe 54 Ideas for a supranational European order 56

4. THE CAMPAIGN FOR BUDGETARY POWERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 59

The initial situation in the 1960s 60 First achievements: the Luxembourg Treaty (1970) 63 The establishment of the European Court of Auditors: the Treaty of Brussels (1975) 66

5. A NEW INSTITUTION FOR THE COMMUNITIES: DESIGNING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 70

Conflicts of interest: differing ideas on how to organise the Court 70 From the final communiqué of the Copenhagen summit to the Brussels Treaty 70 The European Court of Auditors: from the founding Treaty to the start of work 75 Aigner’s motives and contribution 78 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 13

The beginnings of the European Court of Auditors: cooperation with the new body 81 Heinrich Aigner’s expectations 81 Making contact with the new body: first steps 82

6. HOPES AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: THE FIRST DIRECT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS IN 1979 AND THE BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS IN 1980 86

An election campaign for Europe — and for Franz Josef Strauß? 86 The Paneuropean Union’s Europe Day in Munich: cross-party rally or CSU election campaign? 87 Election campaign for Franz Josef Strauß 89 Acceptance back home: how Aigner’s work as an MEP was perceived in Bavaria 90 Electoral turnout and support in the Upper Palatinate 90 Heinrich Aigner and the CSU 92

7. FOCUS ON EUROPE: THE TAXPAYER’S ADVOCATE — AIGNER’S FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD IN THE COMMUNITIES 94

The creation of the Committee on Budgetary Control 94 Setting an example for internal control 97 Wrangling with the Commission: the 1976/77 Malt Affair 97 The refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year 98 The audit ‘flying squad’: external control 102 ROADS TO EUROPE 14

8. CONCLUSION 106

Heinrich Aigner in the eyes of his contemporaries 106 Tilting at windmills? Aigner’s career as an MEP 108

ANNEXES 116

Edited selection of publications and documents 116 Editorial principles 116 Edited publications and documents 117 Bibliography 156 Unpublished sources 156 Published sources 159 Secondary literature 164 Notes 178 List of abbreviations and acronyms 211 Index 213 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 15

PREFACE

LAURA ULRICH

This study was submitted in 2014 as a final Magister thesis to the Institute of Bavarian History at the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich. Minor revisions have been made for publication.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Ferdinand Kramer for supervising this thesis and making its publication possible. His suggestions and encouragement during the creative process also helped to make my own personal ‘road to Europe’ that little bit less rocky. I would also like to thank Dr Renate Höpfinger from the Archive for Christian Social Politics (Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik) for her ideas on this topic. My extensive research at the Historical Archives of the European Union was made possible by a bursary from the European Court of Auditors and the European University Institute. For this financial support, and for their expertise, I would particularly like to thank Gilberto Moggia of the ECA and Dieter Schlenker of the Historical Archives. ROADS TO EUROPE 16

Others I wish to thank are Dr Thomas Schlemmer, for agreeing to act as my second examiner, and the staff at the archives I visited, who kindly went out of their way to help me at all times. I would like to mention Andreas Bitterhof and Tobias Flümann of the Archive for Christian Social Politics, Jörg Fischer of the Amberg town archives (Stadtarchiv Amberg), and Alexandra Devantier of the Historical Archives of the European Parliament in Luxembourg, to name but a few. I would also like to thank everyone who provided me with first-hand accounts for agreeing to be interviewed, in some cases travelling long distances and going to great lengths, such as Jean Darras, whom I had the opportunity to meet in Luxembourg. Bernd Posselt and Heinrich Aigner’s family were also extremely helpful, providing me with photographic and other materials.

I would particularly like to thank the English Translation Unit of the Translation Directorate at the European Court of Auditors for translating my book into English. Hannah Critoph, Michael Pyper, and Thomas Everett deserve a special mention. Thanks to their accurate translation, I am able to publish my research in English, too. For a better understanding of the text, they have translated all German quotations. References to the original quotes can be found in the corresponding footnotes. In the German version of this book, all quotes are cited in their original language.

Last but not least, I would like to express thanks to Iveta Adovica and to the team of the Publications Office for all their work and effort to produce this book.

Munich, September 2015 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 17

1.INTRODUCTION

The creation of European organisations paved The creation and development of the European the way for Europe to Communities (EC) (1) and the European Union (EU) grow closer and for determined the course of much of Europe’s social and political history in the twentieth century. Yet the the development of a idea of European unity spans a far longer period than European identity, or for the history of the EC or the EU, the birth of which is citizens to feel as though generally associated with names like Konrad Adenauer, they belonged to a larger Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. Talk of a ‘politically entity beyond their native utopian vision for Europe’ (2) dates back to the early country or region. modern era and eventually began to take shape in the late 19th century with the making of political plans for Europe. The first steps were taken towards European integration in the wake of the Second World War, with the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 under the Marshall Plan and, finally, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. After the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) were founded by the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the European Communities — made up of the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom — established themselves as the institutions at the heart of the European unification movement. ROADS TO EUROPE 18

}

Aigner speaking at a plenary session of the European Parliament (October 1977).

Source: European Parliament

The creation of European organisations paved the way for Europe to grow closer and for the development of a European identity, or for citizens to feel as though they belonged to a larger entity beyond their native country or region. At the same time, the institutionalisation of European integration presented a sizeable challenge for an entire generation that was to engage in previously non-existent policy areas. Through the forging of the EC new institutions such as the European Parliament, came into being and set up operations in new locations such as Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg. European politicians found themselves faced with new issues and areas of responsibility to grapple with, one of these being the establishment of an EC financial system and the management of revenue and expenditure. Financing an organisation, particularly one as large as the European Communities, invariably goes hand in hand with budget controls and prevention of the misuse of financial resources.

The European Court of Auditors (ECA) has been auditing the finances of the European association of States since October 1977, acting as the European Union’s ‘financial conscience’ (3). It was founded on 22 July 1975 by the Treaty amending certain financial provisions, yet it was not until the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993 that the Court obtained the legal status of a fully-fledged EU institution. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 19

It is against this background that the following study asks its two central questions: what drove politicians in the What drove politicians in post-war decades along the road to Europe, and what the post-war decades along was its course? What prompted a politician like Heinrich the road to Europe, and Aigner — a member of the Christian Social Union (CSU) what was its course? What from Amberg, who had only faced voters in Bavaria — to prompted a politician like embark on a journey to help shape European politics and Heinrich Aigner to embark construct the European institutions? By what means did he reach his destination and where did he stop off along on a journey to help shape the way? How did a European financial control system European politics and develop and under what circumstances was the Court construct the European ultimately established, thereby further strengthening the institutions? European Parliament’s budgetary powers?

Heinrich Aigner (1924-1988) is said to have provided the ‘main impetus for setting up the European Court of Auditors’ (4). Hailing from the Upper Palatinate, an administrative district of Bavaria on the Czech border, and thus not far from the Iron Curtain, Aigner was a member of the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament) from 1957 to 1980 and, from 1961 until his death in 1988, of the European Parliament, where he was particularly involved in budgetary policy. From the very beginning of his national mandate, Aigner was a member of the Bundestag’s budgetary committee, going on in 1979 to chair the European Parliament’s newly established Committee on Budgetary Control. Aigner was also active in the Paneuropean Union (5), of which he set up and chaired a Bavarian branch.

Throughout the history of European parliamentarianism, budgetary power and budgetary control have played a crucial role in any parliament’s rise in status. Budgetary power ‘has been described as the cornerstone of public constitutional law, since the bodies invested with budgetary power have always managed to break away from the narrow competencies assigned to assemblies in accordance with the constitutionally dualistic approach to the State’ (6). In federal States too, budgetary power could be leveraged in the name of parliamentarianism (7). In addition, the legitimacy gained through elections and the representation in parliament of all constituent parts of a political space proved a considerable integrative force as modern States developed. The interaction between budgetary policy, parliamentarianism, and nation-building has also played a notable role in the case of European unification.

The history of the founding of the European Court of Auditors and the development of financial control are closely connected to the strengthening of the European Parliament. In his action to bring about an audit office, Aigner ROADS TO EUROPE 20

was ultimately spurred by his goal of making the European Communities more democratic by furthering parliamentary powers. Who, then, was this Bavarian politician who went on to become the founding father of the ECA, and what contribution did he make to the development of European budgetary control?

SUBJECT MATTER AND STRUCTURE

This book takes a biographical approach to its subject matter (8). Heinrich Aigner’s political career started in the early 1950s in the Junge Union (JU), the CSU’s youth organisation in Bavaria. Before long, he was seeking election to the Bavarian Landtag or the German Bundestag. In 1957, he was directly elected to the Bundestag, which appointed him to the European Parliament in 1961. In studying Aigner’s political biography, we will first consider what led a Bavarian politician who was originally focused on politics at the provincial and federal level to take to the European stage. To avoid interpreting Aigner’s road to Europe as a linear path towards an end goal (9), the first part of this book will consider his upbringing and political socialisation. It will also examine various stages of his life, along with the room for manoeuvre and decision-making scope he had at each stage (10).

This study is intended primarily as an ‘intellectual biography’ (11) to analyse the idea of Europe underpinning Aigner’s commitment to European affairs. Starting from his values and his fundamental ideological outlook, it will consider the extent to which his upbringing and the political environment in Bavaria and the CSU influenced his own visions for European politics — insofar as they were able to do so — and the extent to which regional forces shaping tradition and identity played a role in this regard (12). For example, in order to propagate his vision for Europe, Aigner became involved with the Paneuropean Union, which, in terms of both membership and ideology, was associated in Bavaria with conservative circles within the CSU.

Where it is concerned with the history of ideas, this study will employ discourse analysis methods (13), albeit with a consistent focus on the interplay between abstract visions for Europe and concrete action in the field of European policy. The conflict between abstract ideals and political pragmatism can be seen in the example of Aigner himself: during his career as an MEP in the multi-level European system, he increasingly found himself caught between HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 21

federal interests in Bavaria’s European policy and his day- to-day experience in the European Parliament in regard To avoid interpreting to the problems of the European Communities. This is Aigner’s road to Europe as particularly apparent in the area of budgets, which he a linear path towards an felt required further centralisation of powers and control end goal, the first part of rights in Europe. this book will consider his upbringing and political Political biographies are now an established strand of socialisation. It will also 14 contemporary historical research ( ). They can range examine various stages from biographical anthologies (15), to readers and 16 17 of his life, along with the encyclopaedias ( ) or the corresponding monographs ( ). room for manoeuvre and In Bavarian regional history, too, biographies have been decision-making scope he written on post-war politicians, most of them leading 18 had at each stage. political figures ( ). To date, there have been few studies on Bavarian members of the Landtag and Bundestag, or on politicians below the top tier (19). Moreover, there is a growing tendency in thematic biographies to centre biographical accounts around the protagonist’s impact on specific spheres of (political) activity (20). The present study shares that approach, focusing primarily on Aigner’s politics in the field of budgetary control at the European level.

Even during his lifetime, Heinrich Aigner was credited with being the ‘founding father’ (21) of the European Court of Auditors. This public acclaim is due mainly to his Case for a European Audit Office (22), published in 1973, in which he outlined his initial idea for such a body. This book will address the question of why and how the EC’s external audit function was reformed and institutionalised with the creation of the Court. To what extent did it actually succeed in strengthening the position of the European Parliament in the Communities’ institutional set-up and achieving further democratisation? In answering these questions, we will focus on Aigner’s role in establishing the European Court of Auditors and putting in place budgetary control by the Parliament. We will analyse the Bavarian MEP’s reasons for wanting to create a European audit office, his vision, and how he went about the task. We will consider the contexts of the time, his networks and his spheres of activity in order to determine how much room for manoeuvre an individual had at the European level and the extent to which his recognition as the founding father of the Court was due to more than a culture of remembrance that only emerged later.

This study will focus mainly on the 1970s and 1980s, a period which saw significant budgetary control reforms. However, we will also briefly look back at the 1960s to cast some light on the initial situation. The actual period ROADS TO EUROPE 22

under consideration starts in 1970, when the European The question here concerns Parliament’s budgetary powers were significantly the extent to which strengthened for the first time by the Treaty of principles shaped by Luxembourg, giving rise to considerations on developing budgetary control. The study deliberately does not end people’s biographies can with the Court starting its work in 1977, but continues influence the development right up until Aigner’s death in 1988. It does so not only of institutions, and for biographical reasons, but also in order to assess whether it is even possible the impact and consequences of the new body and the for one individual to have reformed budgetary control procedures. For the period such an influence. from 1977 to 1988, however, it will only be possible to highlight key events in budgetary control policy, such as the so-called Malt Affair in 1977, the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and the Parliament’s refusal in 1984 to grant discharge in respect of the 1982 financial year. The focus here will be on the development of the Parliament’s powers of budgetary control, along with external control by the Court of Auditors, and the interaction between the Court and the Parliament’s newly established Committee on Budgetary Control, chaired by Aigner.

In this respect, the book’s biographical approach is linked to a topic of institutional history. This has already been identified in our historiographical discussion as an opportunity for new insights (23). The question here concerns the extent to which principles shaped by people’s biographies can influence the development of institutions, and whether it is even possible for one individual to have such an influence. In response to the call for ‘a modern institutional history complete with cultural context’ (24), we will consider not only the normative requirements and formal conditions surrounding the creation of the Court of Auditors, but also the impact and perceptions of these requirements, i.e. the ‘institutional reality’ (25) of the newly- established body. For example, in a chapter on the beginnings of the Court of Auditors Aigner’s expectations are compared with the new institution’s own understanding of its role. Some observations are made about the processes of institutionalisation and the significance of institutional power 26 ( ), as demonstrated by the example of the development of budgetary control in the European Communities. This study of the development of budgetary control by the Parliament will also employ methods of historical political research, which are likewise becoming increasingly geared towards cultural history (27). Such methods seek to ‘[understand] politics as social action, as a network of meanings, symbols, and discourses in which — frequently contradictory — realities are analysed’ (28) in order to open up historical political research to ‘cultural political research’ or a ‘cultural history of politics’ (29). Looking at a political protagonist such as Aigner and the creation of an institution such as HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 23

the Court of Auditors, it is not only a question of why political action is taken and where it comes from, but also how (30). In specific terms, this means that we will not only show what measures were taken in developing European budgetary control and why, but also how they were taken and how they were perceived. Hence, this book aims to contribute to the study of European integration and, at the same time, offer a new perspective on the process of European integration by establishing a link back to state and regional history through the biographical approach (31).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Valentina Vardabasso has nicknamed the ECA ‘the Cinderella in the story of the construction of Europe’ (32) since, to date, historians have shown little interest in the ECA archives. Indeed, the institution has been overlooked by the literature: it is the subject of only a few comprehensive accounts and merely a handful of brief papers, which are, in any case, mostly written from a jurisprudential perspective and examine legal issues (33). One exception is Michael Freytag’s political science thesis on the Court, which also deals with the institution’s political impact (34). Yet the corpus lacks a comprehensive history of the Court’s founding, this being mainly glossed over by a couple of pages containing just the key dates. Studies are often linked to work regarding the financial system and financial control in the European Communities and/ or European Union (35). Although the first edition was published back in 1975, Daniel Strasser’s work is still one of the leading accounts of EC budgetary and financial law (36). Some of the papers were written by administrative officials working for the Communities, and we need to be wary of their loyalty to their employers when using this literature for academic purposes. Presumably, for example, events can hardly be assumed to have been recounted entirely objectively when Daniel Strasser claims that the Commission was ‘deviously condemned’ (37) in the refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year.

Aside from research into the Court of Auditors, studies on the formation and development of the European institutions, particularly the European Parliament, are especially pertinent for this work. Most such studies are older (38), although a few more recent essays deal with the development and power of the Parliament (39). Recently, the literature has been increasingly interested in cross-party groupings of MEPs and their powers (40). ROADS TO EUROPE 24

Ideological studies on the concept of Europe and the European unification movement are of relevance when examining Aigner’s vision for Europe and placing it in its wider temporal context. After a focus on ideology in the 1960s, which assumed a ‘European idea’ (41) to be the central motive in the minds of those pushing for European unification, more recent research has expanded on this approach and looked at the relationship between ideas and practical consequences (42).. Worthy of a mention at this juncture is Achim Trunk’s analysis of the significance that visions for Europe in the 1950s had on the process of European integration, since it successfully combines cultural and political history (43).

To set the evolution of financial control in the European The creation of European Communities, and Aigner’s views in this regard, in a institutions and wider historical context, it would have been helpful to supranational organisations draw comparisons with pre-1945 notions of a common European financial control system. However, research such as the EEC challenged on such concepts often fails to go into ideas for actual the autonomy of nation practical implementation. Even detailed studies, such as states, federal states, and an examination of the Briand Plan from a jurisprudential regions in Europe. perspective (44), shed little light on whether such plans contained proposals related to finance and financial control or what these might have been (45). In his book A History of the League of Nations, F. P. Walters devotes a short chapter to the League’s finances which reveals that financial control already played a key role in its organisation: ‘The budget of the League was thus subjected to a series of controls for which it would be hard to find a parallel’ (46). The Assembly of the League of Nations also ‘asserted and maintained, as against the Council, its right to control the finances of the League’ (47). Walters’ findings suggest that a more in-depth review and a comparison of the financial control system in place at supranational organisations could shed light on the evolution of parliamentary powers, particularly with regard to the relationship between supervisory powers and the understanding of a parliament’s role.

There is scant research on the Paneuropean Union in Germany. While its beginnings in the 1920s and its founder Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove- Kalergi have been explored in some depth (48), there is no study looking at the Paneuropean Union after his death in 1972. This makes it more difficult to contextualise and categorise Aigner’s commitment to European politics at the Bavarian level, though Vanessa Conze’s comprehensive analysis of the Abendland idea and movement (for the Christian western world) (49), HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 25

within which tradition the Paneuropean Union fell in the 1970s, goes some way towards remedying this predicament, as do the Paneuropean Union’s anniversary publications.

Having grown up in Bavaria, Aigner came from a Land that, over the course of history, had repeatedly had to assert its sovereignty. The creation of European institutions and supranational organisations such as the EEC challenged the autonomy of nation states, federal states, and regions in Europe. The Free State of Bavaria was interested from the outset in helping to shape and otherwise influence European unification, particularly as regards avoiding the structural pitfalls involved in setting up a common market or introducing the principle of federalism to the new European institutions (50).

Nevertheless, by and large, the body of historical research still lacks a study of Bavaria’s policy on Europe. Martin Hübler took a political science approach in his thesis discussing Bavaria’s European policy in the 1980s and 1990s (51). However, the time prior to this has not yet been examined in any depth (52), and efforts to engage with European politics can only be vaguely discerned from works on the CSU’s vision for Europe (53) or from literature generally concerned with the role of the German Länder in the process of European integration (54). Individual figures such as Bavarian politicians active on the

Official opening of the ‘Aigner room’ at the ECA (21 December 1993). Left to right: Egon Klepsch, President of the European Parliament; Elisabeth Aigner, Heinrich Aigner’s widow; Dr Heinz Aigner, Heinrich Aigner’s son; and André Middelhoek, ECA President.

Source: European Court of Auditors ROADS TO EUROPE 26

European stage have yet to attract much attention from historians or political scientists (55). It is therefore difficult to compare Aigner’s career with that of other politicians of his generation who did not reach the upper political echelons; we can only do so in a few instances here. By contrast, the history of the European idea and integration process has been well researched using various approaches, such as studying the political unification process from a national, supranational and multilateral perspective and cultural and socio- historical approaches to exploring a European consciousness (56). Recently, the role of transnational networks has been the primary focus (57).

SOURCES

The main sources for the present study are Aigner’s personal estate and the archives of the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors. Aigner’s estate is mostly housed in the Archive for Christian Social Politics (ACSP) and is mainly concerned with the topic of Europe (58). Another part of the estate is in the Amberg town archives. This collection largely relates to Aigner’s political activity at the federal level in his Amberg constituency. The estate in the ACSP contains a large collection of speeches and articles by Aigner, collections of press clippings from various years mentioning Aigner, and some items on budgetary control (59). In relation to Aigner’s political activities at the European level, in particular, the estate does not appear to be anywhere near complete or coherent. In particular, documents from before 1980 are scarce. Aigner’s campaign for a budgetary control system and a European audit office is covered mainly by documents from Parliament sittings. Personal notes or correspondence on this matter are generally lacking. Thus, for the most part, Aigner’s political activities at the European level need to be inferred from documents of the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors.

The relevant minutes of plenary sessions and committee meetings, along with the Parliament’s working documents, are kept in the Archives of the European Union in Florence, and some are also stored electronically in the archives in Luxembourg. However, the committee minutes are records of outcomes, meaning that they do not shed any light on the views of individual members or the background to decisions. This is remedied only by the comments of committee members in plenary meetings relating to the topics discussed by the committee. The working documents of the secretariats of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the Committee on HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 27

Budgets would have also been useful for analysing the networks involved in creating the ECA. However, these documents have not been committed to the Archives of the European Union (60).

Biographical sources for the first half of Aigner’s life in particular are scant. Files on his school and university days are no longer available, except for his doctoral certificate. Enquiries with the relevant archives concerning Aigner’s youth under the Nazis and his involvement in the war yielded nothing (61). Only a denazification questionnaire and biographical details contained in CVs and newspaper articles on Aigner shed any light on this period (62). Sources on his political career are more plentiful, although there are still sizeable gaps in relation to his early days in the JU and the CSU in particular, meaning some questions must remain unanswered. For this period, however, I was able to use the unsorted collections in KV Amberg-Stadt and BWK Oberpfalz, as well as Hans Raß’s estate in the ACSP, which mostly contains correspondence between Aigner and other JU and CSU politicians.

My sources on Aigner’s contacts and networks were letters contained in the estates of Bavarian and European politicians, such as his correspondence with Franz Josef Strauss and Richard Jaeger in the ACSP. The CSU collection in the Amberg town archives, which mainly contains Aigner’s working documents for his European activities and the Paneuropean Union, proved very informative. I also used the Bavarian State Chancellery’s collections on European politics in Bavaria’s central archive (Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv). The Paneuropean Union does not have an archive, so undertaking a comprehensive search there was not feasible. Consequently, it was not possible to find any documents on how Aigner organised the regional association, or even membership lists, so it is not even clear when Aigner joined the Paneuropean Union. I was, however, able to consult a number of unsorted files relating to the Paneuropean Union’s Christian pro-Europe rally, the Bekenntnistag für Europa, organised by Aigner on 12 May 1979 in Munich (63).

Where there were gaps in the sources, I had to rely on interviews with Aigner’s sons and some of his former colleagues. To this end, I was able to call on Bernd Posselt and Michael Möhnle, who were active fellow members of the Paneuropean Union, and Jean Darras, who worked with Aigner at the European Parliament. When dealing with the insights provided by such interviews, the methodological problems inherent in oral history need to be borne in mind (64). Nonetheless, these insights do help to gain a fuller understanding of Aigner’s career and of the motives behind his actions, which are often unclear or absent altogether from written documents. How Aigner’s political activity at the European level was perceived in the region has to be ROADS TO EUROPE 28

inferred primarily from media reports. It was not possible to undertake a systematic newspaper review for this study, so I mainly used a collection of newspaper articles from Aigner’s estate for this purpose. The online repositories of Der Spiegel magazine and Die Zeit weekly newspaper enabled me to analyse how Aigner’s activity was perceived at the national level. Finally, I have used Aigner’s speeches, draft speeches and publications (65) as a starting point in order to ascertain his ideas of and vision for Europe.

I consciously decided against analysing sources from the collections in the national archives in Koblenz and the Archive for Christian Democrat Politics (ACDP), even though the latter has its own Europe-related collection. Detailed information from these archives showed that these collections would have yielded little information for the purposes of this study, or on Heinrich Aigner as an individual. The same is true of the archives of the German Bundestag, as they only contain collections relating to Aigner’s political activity at the national level, which were not relevant here. A quantitative analysis of Aigner’s estate as a whole, of newspaper reports, and of parliamentary documents relating to his work cannot be undertaken as part of this book. Instead, I have made a selection based on their particular relevance, and will highlight individual aspects of Aigner’s political career at the European level. By focusing on particular events, though, such as the founding of the Court of Auditors or the Paneuropean Union rally in Munich, we run the risk of considering Aigner’s life as a mere highlights reel (66). Nevertheless, focusing on these events may help to show how a politician from the often marginalised European Parliament influenced the process of European integration and how these actions may have been driven by the protagonist’s regional background. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 29

HEINRICH2. AIGNER — THE ROAD TO POLITICS

Heinrich Aigner’s life could be examined from various viewpoints: we might look at his involvement in development policy or his work as a member of the Bundestag for the constituency of Amberg, or we could write a biography of a post-war politician who, like most of his contemporaries, never reached senior office. When considering Aigner’s biography, it becomes clear that although he did devote a significant portion of his life to European politics, he nevertheless remained active in other areas. I should therefore stress from the outset that my focus is on Aigner’s activities in European politics and that this biographical study does not purport to be complete. Nevertheless, I should outline his life at least in brief and point to the diversions and crossroads at which he might have turned aside along his road to Europe. For example, in 1954 Aigner might have become a member of the Bavarian Landtag (regional parliament) or, in 1980, had the ‘union’ parties claimed electoral victory, he could have been made German Minister of Development, perhaps then continuing to make a name for himself in this field. It would therefore be a mistake to seek to understand Aigner’s life by viewing it solely through the lens of European politics for, even if his life was closely intertwined with Europe (67), his political activities in that area were not confined to his time spent working as an MEP. ROADS TO EUROPE 30

ORIGINS AND UPBRINGING IN BAVARIA

Heinrich Aigner was born in 1924 in Weimar Germany. Following the crisis of the early Weimar years, a period of relative stability began in 1924 in Bavaria under the new regional Prime Minister Heinrich Held. Nevertheless, due to the Nazis’ rise to power in 1933 and the Gleichschaltung (forced alignment) of the German Länder, their rights having already been eroded under the Weimar Republic, even Bavaria lost its autonomy a few years later (68). Given how Bavaria had fought to assert its autonomy at various points in history, these experiences left a profound mark on Bavarian politics and were still a powerful influence on discussions about the post-war order in Germany and Bavaria after 1945 (69). Aigner himself would later confront this issue during the early days of his political activity in the CSU, which, in the light of these experiences during the first half of the 20th century, had a constant focus on federalism and preserving Bavarian rights. Upholding the principles of federalism would also subsequently be a major factor in Bavaria’s involvement in European policy (70).

Heinrich Erich Johann Aigner was born in the Upper Franconian town of Ebrach, on 25 May 1924, to Georg Aigner and his wife, Katharina. Shortly after his birth, the family moved to Amberg in the Upper Palatinate, where Georg Aigner had been transferred in order to take up the role of Chief Court Officer (Justizhauptwachtmeister) (71). There, Heinrich Aigner started primary school in 1931 and high school in 1936 (72). Thus, Amberg can be considered the place where he was actually brought up. Even later in life, Amberg and the Upper Palatinate would remain his most significant point of origin and reference, despite his working in many other places and residing in several places at once (73). Aigner was the second of four brothers, and he also had two sisters. While little is known about its circumstances, the family is unlikely to have been any more than typical of the middle class of the time. His parents were strict Catholics (74). For instance, Aigner’s mother Katharina is said to have organised, in Amberg, one of the protests against the Nazis’ removal of crucifixes from Bavarian schools (75). Aigner’s profound Christian faith and essentially conservative outlook, which would later be reflected in his political attitudes, probably stemmed from this Catholic upbringing.

Heinrich Aigner was still a schoolboy during the Nazi period. In his questionnaire pursuant to the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism of 5 March 1946, Aigner indicated that he had been a Kameradschaftsführer (roughly, an assistant squad leader) in the Hitler Youth for two months in 1941. Under ‘Comments’, he wrote: ‘Expelled from HY for religious and ideological reasons following disciplinary proceedings’ (76). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 31

Whether Aigner’s statement was actually true could not be ascertained. However, based on the information he gave, he was found to be ‘not involved’ by the civilian tribunal (77). In any event, in his youth Aigner surely found himself torn between the state’s Nazi ideology and his Catholic upbringing. His later political convictions were founded on Christian values and freedom to practise the Christian faith. In 1941, after five years at high school in Amberg, Aigner moved to the Luitpold-Oberrealschule in Munich for his last two years of school (78). In January 1943 he was called up for service by the Wehrmacht (79).

WAR EXPERIENCES INSPIRE COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

By his own account, Aigner saw active service in Russia, Italy and France. During his involvement in these His experiences of war operations, he was wounded twice and received the and captivity, along with Iron Cross (2nd Class). He was part of the cavalry and his Christian beliefs, held the highest rank as a lieutenant in the reserve army. compelled him to get Presumably, he also previously attended the military 80 involved with party school in Dresden ( ). At the end of the war, he was taken prisoner by the Americans and detained in Cherbourg, politics after the war. France (81). He was released on 10 December 1945 and returned to Amberg (82). No more is known about Aigner’s experiences during the war (83). Any other clues come from stories told by Aigner to acquaintances. These are all similar in terms of content. In one such, he described having been holed up with comrades in a trench at Monte Cassino, Italy. He left the trench to have a smoke, and just at that moment it was hit and all of his comrades were killed (84). On another occasion he spoke of a friend who was fatally wounded just a few centimetres away from him (85). These episodes may well have taken place more or less as reported. What mattered for Aigner though, as for so many of his generation, was the realisation that no war should ever again be allowed to break out on the European continent.

This is how, in the years to come, he would always justify his commitment to a unified Europe. His experiences of war and captivity, along with his Christian beliefs, compelled him to get involved with party politics after the war. The fact that his freedom to act and decide for himself had been constrained during a youth blighted by dictatorship and active military service, left Aigner with a ROADS TO EUROPE 32

desire to help shape post-war politics. The first time he actually engaged with political issues related to the post-war order in Germany and Europe was, most probably, as a prisoner of war when he contributed to a camp newspaper (86). His experiences during the war bound him to most post-war German politicians, who had similar motives for getting involved in politics (87).

STUDIES IN ERLANGEN, STARTING A FAMILY AND EARLY CAREER IN MUNICH

Because he was late returning home from wartime captivity, Aigner was unable to start his degree until the summer semester of 1946. In Erlangen — probably chosen due to its proximity to his home town of Amberg — he studied Law, a degree seemingly typical for conservative Bavarian post-war politicians (88). Unlike many of these, Aigner did not join a Catholic student fraternity (89). These associations were often an initial social network, and relationships formed there by many post-war politicians lasted well into their political careers (90). In 1949, Aigner passed the first State examination in Law with a grade of ‘Adequate’; he received a grade of ‘Satisfactory’ for the second in 1953. From 1949 to 1952 he worked as a trainee lawyer at Amberg Regional and District Court (91). He also devoted some of this time to writing his doctoral thesis ‘Study of the criminal offence of abortion based on the records of the Amberg District Court, 1925- 1950’ (92), obtaining his doctorate in Erlangen in 1954. Even Aigner’s choice of thesis topic underlines his conservative Christian values, and his discussion of the topic is accompanied by a political statement:

‘Finally, this thesis is also intended to help raise awareness that everything possible must be done to contain the terrible danger posed by the plague of abortion. This is essential to protect the legal system, to put a stop to the heresy of lawful abortion that brings destruction upon nations, to replace the distorted image of motherhood that has emerged by restoring the dignity of the mother which, while full of suffering and sacrifice, is all the greater and more sacred for being so and, last but not least, for the sake of the millions of unborn children with no voice who are being murdered.’ (93)

The thesis was not merely a rejection of abortion, but also presented Aigner’s political ideas on how to solve the problem. For example, he called for families to be supported financially, to prevent people deciding to have abortions out of economic necessity. Aigner was not only calling for the legal HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 33

prohibition of abortion: he also regarded it as an ‘economic task’ (94). This issue would accompany Aigner throughout his political career, during which he repeatedly campaigned against abortion and for the ‘protection of unborn life’ (95), as befitted his conservative Christian outlook.

Not long after starting university, on 22 June 1946, Aigner married the daughter of Josef Furtner, who worked for the local tax office. Aigner’s wife, Elisabeth, had gone to school with one of his brothers and had long been known to the family (96). The marriage produced five children between 1947 and 1963, two of whom did not live beyond their early childhood (97).

To pay his way through university, Aigner worked as a hatter and a tanner, among other jobs. In particular, he put his musical talent to use as an orchestral conductor. He also performed with his wife in the officers’ mess of the American forces stationed in the area (98).

In August 1954, Aigner started working full-time at the Obere Siedlungsbehörde (the main resettlement office for persons displaced by the war) on Maximilianstrasse in Munich. There, Alois Schlögl, then the Bavarian Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forestry, to whom the Obere Siedlungsbehörde reported, took Aigner under his wing (99). Schlögl was a member of the Board of the CSU, which is probably where Aigner made his acquaintance and thus sought his support. The job at the Obere Siedlungsbehörde seems only to have been Aigner’s second choice, as he was simultaneously attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to win a seat in the 1954 Bavarian Landtag elections (100). From then on, Aigner would be responsible at the Obere Siedlungsbehörde for legal issues arising from the Land Reform and Federal Expellees Act. In addition, he was Deputy Section Manager for the marketing of agricultural land and for the legal affairs of the fisheries and allotments sector. In November 1954, he was appointed to a post of assistant government lawyer and took up a supernumerary position in the civil service. In 1956, Aigner rose to the position of Deputy Head of the Obere Siedlungsbehörde and the body’s representative of the public interest on the arbitration committee of the Government of Upper Bavaria.

The experience of this work, which brought him into contact with the issue of displaced persons and refugees, would be a factor in his subsequent involvement in the Paneuropean Union. Driven by the vision of its founder, Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, the Paneuropean Union stood up for the interests of displaced people and maintained close contacts with their associations (101). ROADS TO EUROPE 34

Aigner does not appear to have found working at the Obere Siedlungsbehörde fulfilling. In June 1955, in a letter to Richard Jaeger, a fellow party member and then Chairman of the Bundestag’s Defence Committee, he wrote that he would like to change careers. The kind of job he was thinking of was a ‘position of responsibility from which he could help to build up our defence forces’ (102), and he asked for support from Jaeger, who agreed to help. However, Aigner does not appear to have followed through on these plans, proceeding to focus instead on winning a seat in the Bavarian Landtag or the Bundestag. He managed to do this in the 1957 Bundestag elections, prompting him to take temporary leave of absence from the Obere Siedlungsbehörde in July of the same year (103). As he continued to hold a seat for the rest of his life, Aigner would never return to the civil service.

RISING THROUGH THE RANKS: FROM JUNGE UNION TO THE BUNDESTAG

Any analysis of Aigner’s early years as a member of the Junge Union and the CSU draws on a very small number of sources and is therefore vague. It is unclear exactly when and how Aigner first came to associate with the CSU. In the CSU membership list for Amberg, he is listed as member number 285 of the local CSU association for Amberg town, having joined on 29 March 1951. Aigner’s father Georg is recorded as a member from 20 May 1946 (104), only shortly after the US military regime authorised the CSU to become politically active throughout Bavaria in January 1946 (105). Aigner may have been inspired to get involved in Amberg politics by his father’s joining the CSU, or else he may have come into contact with politically-engaged students while studying in Erlangen (106).

He first became politically active in the still nascent Junge Union, the youth organisation of the CSU and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). As early as 1946, the first CSU groups began to form among young people in many towns and districts (107). Initially, due to the rules set by the occupying forces, political organisations could only be formed at a municipal level (108), meaning that the JU’s activities varied greatly from one region to the next. In 1949, Aigner became the first chairman of just such a district JU group in Amberg (109). Yet the JU still lacked an operational regional structure, even though the first steps in this direction had been taken with the setting-up of a CSU youth committee by Franz Steber and Franz Thierfelder on 24 February 1946 in Munich. This committee was, though, soon replaced by a Parlament HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 35

der Jungen Union, which sat for the first time in Regensburg on 11 and 12 January 1947, the date now taken for the creation of the JU in Bavaria (110). At the same time, the first regional council was also formed, with Franz Steber, Otto Schedl, Rudolf Birkl and, until 1948, Richard Jaeger, Franz Heubl, and Franz Xaver Butterhof as members (111). A few days later, the German conference in Königstein on 17-21 January 1947 saw the foundation of the national JU, which was divided into regional associations.

While gains were made in the organisation of the JU at a national level, there were setbacks to its development in Bavaria. The CSU was split into two camps by internal ideological and power struggles. Certainly, during its early years, the CSU had to battle against conflicts on various fronts, stemming from slightly different causes 112 ( ), yet the wrangling within the party had the largest impact. Josef Müller, nicknamed Ochsensepp. (‘Joe the Ox’), and his supporters saw the youthful CSU as a ‘collective interfaith Christian movement and party for the masses, driven by the need to bring about social change’ (113). Countering this was the group rallying around Fritz Schäffer and Alois Hundhammer, which had more of a ‘Bavarian, Catholic and statist’ (114) mindset and aligned itself, in terms of both its programme and organisation, with the traditions of the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) (115). Schäffer’s wing put up resistance against the emerging JU and was opposed to its having a say in the party’s decision-making processes. Hundhammer in particular spoke out against greater participation by the youth organisation, which, he felt, should model itself on the BVP’s Jungbayernbund (Bavarian Youth League) and provide political schooling for young people without giving them a political say (116). Only with the CSU’s new charter did the JU manage, in 1968, to secure a JU representative sitting on each CSU Board at the local, district and Land levels (117). Until that point the Junge Union had only ever had to assert itself in internal party disputes, which threatened to tear the fledgling JU apart in 1949/1950 (118).

The Bavarian JU began to put the crisis behind it with the election of Franz Sackmann as Chairman at the JU Regional Convention in Munich on 8 and 9 November 1952. Fritz Pirkl and Wolfram Thiele became his deputies. At the same time, Heinrich Aigner was voted Secretary of the Bavarian JU (119). In addition to his district chairmanship, he was now also active in the JU at a Land level. On account of the crisis, the Bavarian JU was at this time virtually insignificant in organisational and political terms. First of all, an operational regional structure had to be recreated, and Aigner was very much involved in these efforts. To this end, Josef Müller put two cars at the JU’s disposal for the regional organisers to use when arranging events throughout Bavaria. Fritz Pirkl from Nuremberg assumed responsibility for Franconia, while ROADS TO EUROPE 36

Franz Sackmann handled Old Bavaria and Swabia alongside Aigner, Georg Brauchle, Hans Drachsler, Peter Schmidhuber and others.

As Secretary of the Bavarian JU, Aigner was responsible for organising founding events in places where regional JU groups did not yet exist. In so doing, he established contact with the local chairmen of Catholic and Evangelical youth associations, whose members often became the core of the JU’s newly-founded political associations. The chairmen of the youth associations, many of whom were successfully recruited to the JU, helped the JU to influence the decisions of the Bavarian Landesjugendring (federation of young people’s organisations) and so made an essential contribution to its increase in strength. In this manner, within a couple of years a network of district associations had been created, and this was particularly strong in Aigner’s native Upper Palatinate. Boasting 2 000 members, the Upper Palatinate association became the largest JU association at that time (120).

Unlike Schäffer’s and Hundhammer’s wing, Josef Müller supported the development of the regional structure. Besides the two vehicles, he provided the JU with an administrative office at the CSU’s regional headquarters from which it could organise its events (121). As the Secretary for the Bavarian JU and the CSU’s Legal Affairs Officer (122), Aigner was based at CSU headquarters, so he experienced the party’s procedures and problems first-hand. It was here that he was able to forge his first networks, helping him, for example, to gain employment at the Obere Siedlungsbehörde. At this time, Hans Ehard was CSU Chairman (1949-1955) and Bavarian Prime Minister (1946-1954). The disputes between the party’s factions calmed down and ended ‘in superficial consolidation and an unstable truce’ (123). The main concern was then the disagreement with the Bayernpartei (Bavaria Party) (124), which was proving to be an ever greater rival for the CSU at a Land level. There was discord within the CSU regarding the strategy for dealing with this rival party: while Alois Hundhammer and Fritz Schäffer were pro-rapprochement, Josef Müller and Hans Ehard wanted to set clear boundaries separating the CSU from the Bayernpartei, in the hope that the latter would fade into insignificance (125). The disagreement also made itself felt within the JU. For example, Franz Sackmann recalled that, in 1954, he had been due to address a Bayernpartei event in Nittenau, when he was thrown off stage following a dispute about the length of his speech (126). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 37

Poster for the 1957 Bundestag elections.

Source: Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik ROADS TO EUROPE 38

In March 1955, Aigner was replaced as Secretary of the Bavarian JU by Hans Stützle and Alois Engelhard, who became ad interim holders of the post. It is unclear whether Aigner no longer had sufficient support or whether he was replaced for other reasons (127), yet, by March 1957, he had already succeeded in becoming Deputy Chairman (together with Horst Erny). At the same time, at the JU regional assembly in Schwabach, Fritz Pirkl was made Chairman, thus succeeding Franz Sackmann (128).

Evidence of commitment to a European confederation can be found as early as in the CSU’s 1946 manifesto. The debate as to what a stable, peaceful European order might look like and the analysis of ideas for Europe were not limited to the CSU. The JU was also busy considering these matters and organising related events. In autumn 1955, for example, the annual congress of the International Union of Young Christian Democrats, held in Tutzing, was intended to testify to young people’s desire for unification among European States. In preparation for the 1957 Bundestag elections, the Bavarian JU also formed working groups on the topics ‘The European market’ and ‘Us and eastern Europe’ (129). Whether and to what extent Aigner participated in these events and their organisation cannot be ascertained from the sources, although it is probable that, when in the JU, he also came into contact with European issues. For the time being, he had his sights set not only on rising through the ranks of the party’s youth movement but also on obtaining a political mandate. To this end, he initially focused on Bavarian politics, though he was unsuccessful in gaining a foothold.

In simple terms, in the early stages of the CSU we can distinguish between three generations. The first group included the CSU’s co-founders, such as Josef Müller, Fritz Schäffer, and Alois Hundhammer. This generation of the CSU were born before or around the turn of the century, and so were around 45 to 50 years old at the end of the war. Some had been active in the BVP. It was mainly among these people that discussions took place regarding the direction of the party. The second group comprised early CSU members, such as Franz Josef Strauß, Richard Jaeger, and Otto Schedl. They were mostly born towards the end of the First World War, and were roughly 30 years old in 1945. Members of this group did not immediately rise to the most senior positions within the party or Land, but often already sat on the Board and began their political careers, like Otto Schedl and Franz Josef Strauß, as heads of district, though they often landed a constituency immediately thereafter for the first Bundestag or Bavarian Landtag (130). Aigner belonged to the third group. Like Fritz Pirkl and Friedrich Zimmermann, he was born around 1925 and had only just turned 20 by the time the war ended (131). Members of this group were still too young to make political headway in the first five years HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 39

after the war. Instead, they were involved in building up and expanding the ~ JU after the 1949/50 crisis. From this position, they began to further their Plenary session political careers, which was no longer as easy as it had been for the preceding of the European generation. Most constituencies were already taken, so it was difficult to Parliament (March 1977). secure one, as the case of Aigner exemplifies.

Source: European For the 1954 Landtag elections, Aigner campaigned for selection as the Parliament CSU’s direct candidate for the Laufen/Berchtesgaden constituency. Johann Thanbichler (132), a farmer from Niederheining, was the CSU’s incumbent in this seat. Aigner ran against him as a constituency candidate during the general assembly. Previously, in a first assembly, Alois Hundhammer had received only one more vote than Thanbichler and so decided to forgo the constituency (133). Aigner won by 16 votes to 14, yet even after his second defeat Thanbichler refused to give up and fought tirelessly to hold on to his constituency. He complained about the vote to the CSU Executive Board, which upheld the objection primarily out of concern that Aigner, who had only just turned 30, risked defeat at the hands of the Bayernpartei candidate (134). Aigner thus lost his first run-in with the party’s Executive Board, and the general assembly eventually selected Thanbichler as its candidate for the Landtag (135). ROADS TO EUROPE 40

~ Aigner would soon relive the story of the challenged vote. This time round, the The European bid was unsuccessful, though for Aigner it carried greater personal anguish. Parliament’s Robert Despite his defeat when running for the Laufen/Berchtesgaden constituency, he Schuman Building in kept up his efforts to secure a political mandate. He launched his next attempt Luxembourg (1977). with a view to the 1957 Bundestag elections. Anton Donhauser had been directly elected for the CSU in constituency 214 (Amberg) for the second term Source: European Parliament of the Bundestag (1953-1957). When Donhauser’s parliamentary immunity was waived on 12 October 1955 and criminal proceedings were launched against him, he was ruled out as a CSU candidate for the third Bundestag elections (136). However, aside from Aigner, a few others were interested in the constituency, including Deputy District Head Wittmann from Sulzbach-Rosenberg. Despite the competition, Aigner was nominated on 6 May 1957 by 16 votes out of 30 (137). As a candidate for the constituency, however, he himself got dragged into the internal power struggles which still dominated parts of the CSU. A few days after Aigner’s candidacy, the Amberg District Head Martin Winkler filed an objection to the election, in the name of several delegates, with the CSU Executive Board (138). After Hans Raß, the Chairman of the CSU District Association for the town of Amberg, was able to convince the Board that this was a conspiracy and that the accusation that Aigner had double-booked his travel expenses was without foundation, the Board decided, at its meeting of 15 June 1957, not to object to Aigner’s nomination (139). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 41

Deeply hurt by the accusations of double-booking (140), Aigner went on the counter-attack and asked the Amberg District Association to exclude Martin Winkler from the party for having circulated the letter of opposition to a large circle of people, including some outside the CSU (141). Throughout his life, Aigner never shied away from conflict when it came to asserting his interests and convictions. In so doing — as in this case — he often did himself no favours (142). Without justifying its actions, the CSU Executive Board decided, at its meeting of 13 July 1957, to file an objection nonetheless against Aigner’s nomination, and ordered a re-run of the vote (143). This also prompted a rift in Aigner’s long collaboration with Franz Sackmann (144). The Executive Board’s change of heart can only be down to the influence of Aigner’s opponents, since the facts surrounding the accusations had not altered a bit. Despite the unfavourable circumstances clouding his first nomination, which certainly impacted the election campaign, Aigner was nominated yet again and, with 65 % of the vote for a turnout of 92 %, was directly elected to the Bundestag ( 145).

Aigner’s two bids to secure a constituency show how tough it could be for a young politician from the ranks of the JU to join the party’s inner circle. Above all, though, these episodes illustrate Aigner’s unconditional desire to enter politics and to fight for a mandate despite the setbacks which he had to endure. His early political activity was marked by internal disagreements regarding the party’s practical, staffing and structural arrangements. This period influenced Aigner’s own convictions and the way he navigated between the party’s divisions and factions, which also extended down to the JU (146). Due to his strict Catholic upbringing, Aigner leant more towards the conservative wing of the CSU (147). His politics were also influenced by personal connections with other party members, such as Richard Jaeger (148), who was also close to the circles around Hundhammer and Schäffer (149). Although Aigner had not yet shown any particular interest in European politics, this chapter of his life is nevertheless significant in terms of his later commitment. During his time with the JU, he came into contact with the party leadership and, in the Bavarian JU and as a member of the JU National Council, he got to know comrades in arms, some of whom, such as Helmut Kohl and Franz Josef Strauß (150), would go on to become leading Bavarian and German politicians. It may have also been at around this time that he first came into contact with Alfons Goppel, who later offered Aigner support, in particular with the activities and financing of the Paneuropean Union (151). ROADS TO EUROPE 42

APPOINTMENT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT UNTIL FIRST DIRECT ELECTIONS IN 1979

Heinrich Aigner entered the Bundestag in its third legislative term in 1957, aged just 33 (152). The election saw Chancellor Konrad Adenauer retain power and, for the first time, the CDU/CSU electoral group won an absolute majority, with 50.2 % of the vote (153). Konrad Adenauer’s term in office had seen the Federal Republic of Germany integrated into the Western Bloc and accepted into NATO in 1955, just ten years after the end of the war. Aigner’s early years in the Bundestag were marked, on the one hand, by the ongoing economic recovery in West Germany, and, on the other, by the Cold War which culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In 1957, a four-party coalition consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Bayernpartei, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Expellees’ and Disenfranchised People’s Bloc (BHE) was governing Bavaria. In the 1957 Bundestag elections, the CSU had won 57.2 % of the Bavarian vote, while the SPD, its coalition partner, had suffered losses in Bavaria. This led to the collapse of the four-party coalition in October 1957. The CSU, which had been in opposition from 1954 to 1957, returned to government and Hanns Seidel was elected as the Bavarian Prime Minister (154).

Of course, the electoral success of the CSU in Bavaria also In his first term in the strengthened the position of the CSU grouping in the Bundestag, Aigner was a Bundestag, of which Aigner was now a member. The CSU full member of the Budget had won almost two thirds of the 82 Bavarian seats in the Committee and was 1957 Bundestag elections, and Aigner was one of 16 new faces among the 53 CSU Bundestag members (155). Andreas particularly active on its Zellhuber notes that ‘with the exception of Karl-Theodor audit subcommittee. Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, none of the Bundestag members from among the group of newcomers managed to reach the highest echelons of the CSU grouping or make a name for themselves at the federal level’ (156). It is remarkable that not one of the newly elected CSU Bundestag members managed to do this, presumably because it was difficult for their generation to climb the political ladder (157). It may have been this state of affairs that prompted Aigner to attempt to rise to political prominence at a European level.

In his first term in the Bundestag, Aigner was a full member of the Budget Committee (158) and was particularly active on its audit subcommittee (159). The Budget Committee is one of the most important for Bundestag members, as they hope, through their work on the committee, to use their influence to HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 43

Heinrich Aigner’s official portrait as a young Member of the European Parliament in the 1960s.

Source: European Parliament

obtain (co-)financing from the federal government for important projects in their home constituencies, thus enabling them to offer their voters proof of success. It is not surprising, then, that Aigner was hoping to be appointed to this committee even before the inaugural session of the Bundestag (160). So, even at the start of his parliamentary career, Aigner was already gathering experience in the area of budgetary implementation and control.

Aigner was a member of the Bundestag from its third right through to its eighth legislative term, only leaving in 1980 (161). During that time, he was a full member of the Budget Committee in the third legislative term, the International Trade Committee in the fourth legislative term, and the Development Aid Committee in the fourth and fifth terms. The experience he gained from these activities may have influenced his work in European ROADS TO EUROPE 44

politics, because in the European Parliament, too, The experience he gained Aigner was particularly active in the Committee on from these activities may Budgets and the Committee on Development and have influenced his work Cooperation. The focus of his work would soon shift to in European politics, the European Parliament. While Aigner frequently acted because in the European as rapporteur on budgets during the Bundestag’s third term (162), his speeches and initiatives became noticeably Parliament, too, Aigner more infrequent, at least in the Bundestag’s plenary was particularly active in sessions (163). Aigner ceased acting as rapporteur after the the Committee on Budgets third legislative period, focusing instead on a few minor and the Committee requests and oral questions during question time, mostly on Development and in relation to the interests of his constituency — such as Cooperation. structural assistance for the Upper Palatinate (164).

At first glance, Aigner would almost appear to have been a back-bencher. However, the fact that his work in the Bundestag was rarely reflected in speeches and reports was due to his appointment to the European Parliament. Bundestag committee meetings and plenary sessions often overlapped with those of the European Parliament, meaning that, as with other delegates to the Parliament, Aigner was officially granted absence from many Bundestag meetings. During the eighth legislative period, he was excused from around 192 of the total of 230 Bundestag meetings (165). German MEPs were excused from around 80 % of meetings. Their contribution to the Bundestag’s work therefore consisted mainly of their representative duties and work in the European Parliament. Due to the growing activity of the European Parliament, the workload from this dual role became excessive. The MEPs could no longer reasonably combine their work in both assemblies, as the figures above show. For this reason, after the first elections by direct suffrage in 1979, it was possible to hold a dual mandate as both an MEP and a national MP only in exceptional cases.

Aigner was always elected directly by his constituency with over 64 % of first preference votes (166). As a member of the Bundestag, he was successful in stimulating and supporting a number of structural projects in his region. He gave particular support to the building of an indoor swimming pool in Amberg, and to the St Sebastian flagship building project (167). Befitting his Christian faith and worldview, Aigner worked to reunite families separated by the Iron Curtain, and campaigned for the rights of politically persecuted persons in the East (168). Amberg’s geographical proximity to the Iron Curtain exposed Aigner time and again to the humanitarian and economic problems arising from the division of Germany, and must be regarded as a crucial factor in his commitment to Europe. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 45

Aigner during a session in the Strasbourg hemicycle (November 1979).

Source: European Parliament

In the same year as Aigner’s initial election to the Bundestag, the Treaties of Rome were signed by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This marked another major step towards European integration. The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 and, with it, of plans for a political union was followed by the stagnation of supranational integration at the European level (169). However, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had an interest in strengthening the Federal Republic’s integration with the West. This was why he supported plans to establish a European Economic Community, even though Ludwig Erhard, his Minister for Economic Affairs, felt that such a union ‘made no sense economically’ (170). France, by contrast, supported the project in order to escape from the international isolation caused by its colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, and to modernise its economy (171).

The Common Assembly of the ECSC, which had been in existence since 1952, was also to be responsible for the EEC and EAEC (172). The Assembly was expanded to 142 members. From then on, the name European Parliament ROADS TO EUROPE 46

became increasingly prevalent (173). Until 1979, MEPs Amberg’s geographical were appointed from national parliaments, despite the proximity to the Iron fact that the Treaties of Rome had already provided for 174 Curtain exposed Aigner their future election by direct suffrage ( ). Heinrich time and again to the Aigner, too, was appointed to the Parliament in 1961 during his second term in the Bundestag, along with humanitarian and 35 other Bundestag members (175). It remains unclear economic problems whether he actively sought appointment to the European arising from the division Parliament, or whether it was simply assigned to him (176). of Germany, and must be regarded as a crucial At the time, the European Parliament may have seemed factor in his commitment to be a potential springboard from which to launch a to Europe. career. It had negligible powers at this stage. However, after the optimism of the 1950s, the hope may have still existed in 1961 that it would play an increasingly important role in European integration. Even Richard Jaeger, Maria Probst, and Franz Josef Strauß had been MEPs for at least a short period in the 1950s. To date, there has been no detailed research on the public perception of the European Parliament in the 1960s (177). Research on this subject only covers the 1980s onwards, during which time the Parliament was mainly perceived as a ‘thinking and debating club’ (178). Even slogans like Hast du einen Opa, schick ihn nach Europa! (literally: Got a Grandad? Send him to Europe!) probably have their origins in the first direct European elections in 1979, when, in Germany, former top-level politicians such as Willy Brandt or Alfons Goppel stood as candidates. There are no written sources indicating that Aigner was particularly concerned with European affairs before he was appointed as an MEP (179). However, as early as 1962, i.e. one year after his appointment, he was giving his thoughts on European policy in letters to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (180). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 47

ROAD3. TO EUROPE

INVOLVEMENT IN THE PANEUROPEAN UNION

To put it simply, Heinrich Aigner’s political beliefs and activities were rooted in four interlinking principles. First of all, his upbringing, social background and origins certainly played a role. He grew up in a predominantly Catholic environment, and Christian values always guided his political activities, from his views on Europe to his views on development. He was also influenced by personal experiences, such as experiences with National Socialism both as a soldier and in captivity. The third basis for his beliefs was his perception of contemporary events. In this regard, the Cold War played a large role at the foreign policy level, with the radical changes and evolution in German society shaping his domestic politics. Lastly, his political beliefs were influenced by experiences gained through personal contacts and networks. At the same time, his standing within his own party and the CSU’s contemporary political programme were also significant, even though individual politicians could still deviate from the latter. These four factors were interconnected and also influenced Aigner’s ideas about Europe. For example, for Aigner, who came from the zonal border area, the Cold War had a rather special significance due to the geographical proximity of the border. We cannot give a complete overview here of his political profile at the Land, national and European levels, and so will concentrate on his concrete ideas for a unified Europe and on the most important debates which shaped this vision (181). ROADS TO EUROPE 48

Our examination of Aigner’s entry into politics has shown However, like many CSU the type of political environment in which he developed. politicians at that time, His political ideas for Europe were initially shaped he did view Europe as a primarily by the party line. Early CSU policies on Europe community of states bound were heavily influenced by Alois Hundhammer’s vision of 182 by western Christian a ‘Bavarian Christian stronghold’ ( ), which saw Bavaria as having a ‘Christian mission to fulfil, not only in German values and a common 183 culture. government but throughout Europe’ ( ). The idea of marking Bavaria out as a Land with its own population characteristics was not a major concern for Aigner since he was of a far younger generation than Hundhammer and a member of the German and European parliaments (184). However, like many CSU politicians at that time, he did view Europe as a community of states bound by western Christian values and a common culture.

Plans for a European federation were not new to the twentieth century, but can be traced back to the 14th and 15th centuries (185). The interwar years, therefore, were not the starting point for the Europeanisation process, but they can be seen as a key period for European integration efforts (186). Moreover, the Paneuropean Union, on whose principles Aigner’s ideas for Europe were based, was founded during this time. The German perception of Europe in the post-war years has been examined in more detail in recent studies (187). Vanessa Conze’s work shows that very disparate notions of Europe existed in Germany as late as the 1960s. She mainly compares the abendländisch ideal (the Christian west) with the western European ideal from 1920 through to 1970 (188). However, Aigner himself shows us how quickly these distinctions could subsequently return to insignificance, since he was a member of both the Paneuropean Union, which was deeply rooted in an abendländisch vision of Europe, and the Europa-Union, which, before the fall of the Iron Curtain, embodied the western European ideal (189). He was, though, more heavily involved in the Paneuropean Union, which was founded by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1922, making it now the oldest European unification movement (190). According to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s vision in the 1920s, a confederation of states, the ‘United States of Europe’ (191), ought to be formed to counter the USA, Russia, Great Britain and Asia as a fifth regional block (192). After the Second World War, Coudenhouve-Kalergi failed to build upon the success of the interwar years, during which time the Paneuropean Union had assumed a leading role. By the 1950s the Paneuropean Union was virtually non-existent, and it would remain so until the stand-off between the Atlanticists and the Gaullists (193) in the 1960s. Following this clash, the Paneuropean Union was able to re-establish itself since there was a growing need for a Europe-centric organisation rather than one which pursued links HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 49

with the United States as the protector across the Atlantic. Since the Europa- Union was a camp for Atlanticists, a series of Gaullists — such as Richard Jaeger, Franz Josef Strauß, Alfons Goppel and Alois Hundhammer — at least formally joined the Paneuropean Union (194). This example set by his party colleagues may also have prompted Aigner to get involved in the Paneuropean Union.

Precisely when Aigner joined the Paneuropean Union could not be ascertained; in any event, his active He was a member of both involvement in the organisation began after Coudenhove- the Paneuropean Union, Kalergi’s death in 1972 and the assumption of the body’s which was deeply rooted in chairmanship by Otto von Habsburg. With the latter on an abendländisch vision of board, the Paneuropean Union underwent a revival in Europe, and the Europa- Germany after the Abendland movement was rocked 195 Union, which, before the by crisis ( ). Unlike Coudenhove-Kalergi, who saw the Paneuropean Union as a project for the elite, Otto fall of the Iron Curtain, von Habsburg wanted to reach the masses. According embodied the western to Vanessa Conze’s study, the Paneuropean Union took European ideal. over ‘clientele and ideas from the former Abendland movement and, in so doing, managed to extend its reach far beyond the Abendland followers of the 1950s, appealing to young people in particular’ (196). In the mid-1970s, Aigner, too, made use of the fresh impetus that had been injected into the organisation in order to construct a Bavarian association for the Paneuropean Union, which he then chaired (197). By 1978, the Bavarian association had reached a total membership of approximately 2 000 people (198). In 1976, Aigner also became Vice-President of the Paneuropean Union in Germany.

Why, though, did Aigner get involved with the Paneuropean Union? Vanessa Conze found that for the older generations returning from exile, such as that of Otto von Habsburg, the Paneuropean Union held appeal for reasons of individual or particular interest. Within the framework of this organisation, they were able to transpose on to post-war Europe ‘their elitist, hierarchical, anti-liberal, anti-democratic and supranational ideas for order, which were rooted in basic Christian/Catholic principles. These ideals emerged more or less unscathed from the Second World War’ (199). Aigner, however, had not really experienced the pre-war order for long enough to want to return to it. Doubtless his personal connection to members of the Paneuropean Union, and to Otto von Habsburg in particular, played a role in his joining (200).

Nevertheless, it must have taken more than this to inspire active involvement in the organisation. Thanks to its new members, the Paneuropean Union managed to extricate itself from the standstill that affected planning in ROADS TO EUROPE 50

the interwar years and thus also to appeal to younger In 1976, Aigner also generations. The radical political and societal shifts that became Vice-President of came about during the era of détente and the events of the Paneuropean Union in 1968 worried those with a conservative notion of order, Germany. including Aigner. As an organisation, the Paneuropean Union promised to promote ‘conservative, elitist societal views, with a Christian basis serving as the sine qua non for a united Europe and, finally, a pronounced anti- communism’ (201). Paneuropa gradually began to replace the term Abendland and, by forging links between conservatism and Europe, came to widespread public attention (202). The Paneuropean Union’s distancing from communism and socialism may have been what finally prompted Aigner’s involvement, since he found the Europa-Union to be too neutral and cross-party for it to achieve anything (203).

‘THE KEY TO THE FATE OF THE 20TH CENTURY’ — VISIONS FOR EUROPE

Values and general aims in European politics

In discussing Aigner’s vision for Europe, various levels need to be distinguished: his motives and driving forces, his aims, and his vision for realising these. On the ideological level, the motives described above steered him towards various political goals for Europe. These included fightingEurocommunism (204) and dismantling the Iron Curtain. The Paneuropean idea of peace seemed to him the correct and, indeed, the only way of achieving these aims. This idea held that peace could not be maintained by military means alone, but also meant taking on communism at an intellectual level: ‘The Paneuropean idea — a free Europe, affirming its history and Christian mission and preserving its value system, which recognises every human being as having been created in the image of God — this is our intellectual armoury’ (205). This model, he believed, would carry the desire for reconciliation across the Iron Curtain. Aigner saw the EC as an open community which must, without fail, include the people of central and eastern Europe: ‘Nations must not be identified with the communist system’ (206). In order to achieve this, however, a change in thinking would also be required in the West: ‘We must realise that this earthly tent has been entrusted to us only temporarily; that there can never be an earthly paradise or, indeed, an atheist paradise on earth; that harmony, reconciliation HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 51

and forgiveness are possible only where people feel answerable to the Lord our God. Europeans must rediscover their awareness that man was born to serve God and his neighbour, not to rule over others.’ (207) In the tradition of the Abendland idea, the liberal ideal of an open Europe was strongly linked to a sense of mission. Accordingly, a peaceful and free Europe would require a re-Christianisation of society on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Promoting the concept of Europe to the public

At stakeholder level, the Paneuropean Union was intended to provide an organisational framework within which to In the run-up to the first convince the public of Aigner’s ideas. To this end, the European Parliament first thing he did was to form a Bavarian association for elections by direct suffrage, the Paneuropean Union and then, in 1980, to supplement he organised a ‘Europe the periodical Paneuropa Deutschland, he created his 208 Day’ in the Munich own information service named Paneuropa intern ( ). The fact that the Bavarian association had few members Olympic Hall, which and few staff did not dissuade Aigner from using large attracted approximately events to promote his ideas for Europe. For example, in 12 000 participants. the run-up to the first European Parliament elections by direct suffrage, he organised a ‘Europe Day’ in the Munich Olympic Hall, which attracted approximately 12 000 participants (209). Through his involvement in the Paneuropean Union, he hoped, first and foremost, to reach and win over his fellow Bavarians. The hubs for this activity were his Upper Palatinate constituency and Munich, where the Bavarian association’s headquarters was located. In addition, Aigner wanted to promote the pan- European ideal in other regions too. For example, in 1986 he organised, in collaboration with the ADAC (a German automobile club), a pro-Europe rally to mark the 100th anniversary of the automobile, for which around 500 participants from eight European countries drove by car to Strasbourg. The opening of the rally in Strasbourg, which was addressed by Aigner and Otto von Habsburg, was held under the banner of the Paneuropean Union (210). So, in trying to win over support, Aigner not only made use of Paneuropean Union publications and speeches but also sought to reach people through large community events promoting his European ideas and his belief in the need for European integration.

As a Christian, Aigner saw huge potential in the Church to promote the pan- European ideal. For example, he was in close contact with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI, whom he had presumably met ROADS TO EUROPE 52

when the Cardinal was a professor at the University of Regensburg (211). It was Ratzinger, by then Archbishop of Munich, who gave a special service in Munich’s Liebfrauenkirche on Aigner’s Europe Day in 1979 (212). Most of those who took part in Europe Day were recruited through Bavaria’s various Christian associations. For example, the Catholic Council of the Diocese of Regensburg alone received 2 604 tickets, and Munich’s Marian Society 1 000 (213). Through this event, Aigner forged contacts with the Catholic Church in order to promote the concept of Europe. He worked particularly closely with the Catholic Council of the Diocese of Regensburg on common Europe-related matters of concern, and arranged oratory training for the Diocese in Luxembourg so that it could incorporate the notion of ‘Europe’ into its diocesan work (214). Vanessa Conze explicitly excluded the Paneuropean Union from her study of the European idea in Germany up to 1970, as ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Paneuropean Union […] never had strong support in Germany’ (215). In this connection, however, a comprehensive study of the influence and networks of the Paneuropean Union after Coudenhove- Kalergi’s death in 1972 appears to be of interest, particularly its links to the (Catholic) Church in promoting the concept of Europe (216).

With no political or party political post in Bavaria, Aigner sought to achieve his European political goals by forming networks that went beyond the CSU party. Besides the Paneuropean Union and the Church, this also extended to other initiatives. In the run-up to the first direct European Parliament elections in 1979, Aigner was hoping to establish a Bavarian European Institute (217) with the support of former Bavarian Prime Minister Alfons Goppel and Otto von Habsburg, the President of the Paneuropean Union in Germany. The idea was that this would combine the traditions of the Abendländische Akademie, which was active in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Europäische Dokumentations- und Informationszentrum (European Documentation and Information Centre), both of which had lost their significance (218). The Bavarian European Institute was to be run by the Paneuropean Union to provide an ‘intellectual tool and political orientation’ (219) for cooperation among all conservative organisations and associations, such as student unions, displaced people’s associations and denominational church groups. Aigner viewed such cooperation among the associations operating outside the parliamentary realm as absolutely essential in order to counteract the communist and socialist forces, embodied, to his mind, by the trade union movement. The Bavarian European Institute was expressly intended to become a ‘conservative HQ’ (220) to influence Christian conservative MPs in Bavaria, Germany and Europe in the direction of the party’s traditional conservative ideas, and those of Aigner and Otto von Habsburg in particular. From the outside, the organisation was to be seen as independent from the HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 53

Aigner during a European Parliament session in Strasbourg (September 1979).

Source: European Parliament

CSU, although pursuing the party’s conservative aims (221). It would appear that Aigner was insufficiently convincing with this concept, as the Bavarian Council of Ministers refused to set up a Bavarian European Institute even though there would have been sufficient funds available. In particular, regional Minister Karl Hillermeier spoke out against the Institute, as he believed it would endanger the status of the Europäische Akademie Bayern (Bavarian European Academy), which he chaired (222). ROADS TO EUROPE 54

Development aid as a political tool for Europe

Beyond networking, Aigner dedicated himself to the area of development policy. At a supranational level, his interest in development policy was the nexus between his idea of a united Europe, his actual work towards this goal and his specific considerations regarding the necessary supranational organisational framework. In the European Parliament, Aigner was a member of the Committee on Development and Cooperation and the Joint Committee of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly (223). He also had an interest in development aid and policy beyond his parliamentary activity (224). For example, he was on the management board of the Catholic Church’s central agency for development aid (225), and was Curator of the German- Brazilian Society (226).

Aigner’s involvement in development aid was Aigner was convinced undoubtedly influenced by his Christian values, but was that there were two major equally a consequence of his budgetary and economic issues to be resolved: concerns. A not insignificant share of the Community budget was spent on development policy. In his budgetary overcoming the East-West control activities, too, Aigner was frequently concerned conflict and reaching a with the use of development aid funds and prepared a just and viable peace in number of reports for the European Parliament on the relation to the North- subject (227). Development aid and building the EC’s South divide. relations with countries outside Europe were important to Aigner for one other reason in particular: during the Cold War and the so-called proxy wars, as an avowed opponent of socialism, he wanted to limit the influence of the Soviet Union and prevent the spread of communism by any means (228). Great importance was attached to development aid and cooperation at this time of conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers (229). Based on his vision for Europe and against the backdrop of his experiences at the time, Aigner was convinced that there were two major issues to be resolved: overcoming the East-West conflict and reaching a just and viable peace in relation to the North-South divide. For him, these two issues were inextricably linked. As such, he regarded development policy as an important tool in realising his vision for Europe, particularly in the conflict with the Soviet Union (230). In practical terms, he wished to link development policy more closely to the foreign trade and policy interests of the European Communities. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 55

Poster for the 1984 European Parliament elections.

Source: Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik ROADS TO EUROPE 56

Ideas for a supranational European order

Turning the ideal of a free Christian Europe into reality would require a concrete supranational framework such as the European Communities had already begun constructing by the time of Aigner’s entry into European politics. When Aigner was appointed to the European Parliament in 1961, the European Communities were emerging as the centre of the supranational European unity movement, ahead of other organisations such as the Council of Europe. Academics often characterise the 1960s as the period of ‘go and stop’ (231). After the conclusion of the Rome Treaties in 1957, other major achievements in European integration After the conclusion of the then became possible, such as the setting-up of the Rome Treaties in 1957, Common Market and the introduction of the common other major achievements agricultural policy. By contrast, plans for a political union in European integration or to expand the Communities could not be put into effect, largely as a result of French President Charles de Gaulle’s then became possible, such unwillingness to cede further national sovereignty for the as the setting-up of the benefit of supranational European integration (232). When Common Market and the de Gaulle was succeeded by Georges Pompidou in 1969, introduction of the common this gave fresh impetus to the unification process, and the agricultural policy. 1970s were seen as a phase of consolidation and building upon earlier achievements (233).

Against this background, Aigner, as a Member of the European Parliament, believed that, in practical terms, fashioning a supranational Europe mainly meant strengthening the Parliament’s powers. To his mind, it was essential that the European Communities be rooted in a fully functioning parliamentary system (234). At the time of Aigner’s entry into the European Parliament, the institution had no notable powers; one could not yet talk of a parliamentary system. Therefore, Aigner’s most pressing and fundamental aim, as with many other MEPs, was first of all to extend the Parliament’s few existing powers and, in particular, to successfully introduce European Parliament elections by direct suffrage (235).

As a Bavarian politician whose background was in the CSU, he was first and foremost influenced by his party’s basic principles with regard to European affairs 236 ( ). According to Martina Schöfbeck, we can essentially assume that the CSU has, since its inception, supported the basics of European integration (237). Martin Hübler points to promoting federalism and subsidiarity as being the core principles of the CSU’s policy on Europe (238). It is with these fundamental notions of a European order that Aigner, too, entered HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 57

European politics. In line with the CSU manifesto, he spoke out in favour of the creation of a United States of To his mind, it was Europe (239). Over the course of the European integration essential that the European process, many CSU members became ever more critical Communities be rooted of the transfer of responsibilities to Europe from the in a fully functioning 1980s, which was interpreted as an erosion of federalism parliamentary system. and a loss of authority for Bavaria (240). Thus, Aigner was increasingly unable to align his ideas for enhancing the powers of the European institutions, and particularly the European Parliament, with his party’s European goals. This became especially apparent in the 1980s, once the goal of direct European Parliament elections had been achieved and Aigner continued to propose further developing the EC’s powers.

Aigner saw the legitimacy gained through direct suffrage as a clear mandate from voters to unify Europe politically as well as economically. Political union was, of course, envisaged as having a federal structure comprising a ‘Chamber of Nationalities’ (241) alongside, and on an equal footing with, the freely elected European Parliament. This supranational concept left little room to accommodate the demands from regions and Länder, such as Bavaria, to participate in decision-making, as Aigner made clear in one draft speech: ‘In addition to a freely elected European Parliament, there will of course be a Chamber of Nationalities, which must have equal decision- making powers. Whether or not, in addition to this, the regions should also be represented in some sort of advisory capacity, I do not know. They will however be represented in at least the Chamber of States.’ (242) This statement clearly deviates from the position of the CSU, which, even under Prime Minister Strauß, campaigned heavily for the regions to have institutional representation in the EC (243).

Although Aigner cut his teeth as a Bavarian politician, he moved increasingly further away from the Bavarian school of thought in the course of his work at the European level. Unlike many of his party colleagues, his home and place of work no longer lay primarily within the Bavarian or German borders. In the European Parliament, he worked with people from first six, and then twelve, European states and dealt primarily with cross-regional and cross-national problems. This inevitably altered his European and political goals and ideas. At the beginning of his political career, Aigner, inspired by the prevailing school of thought, would have viewed European integration as a necessary means to the ideological ends of preventing another war and providing a defence against communism. After he began to operate increasingly within the evolving European framework, in particular after withdrawing from ROADS TO EUROPE 58

national office in 1980, he had a heightened interest in He felt that the basis for enhancing the capacities of this supranational Europe, the transfer of national and of the European Parliament in particular, since it sovereignty to the EC was here that he had experienced the weaknesses and resided in a parliamentary democratic shortcomings of the Communities. As an MEP, he of course also had a personal interest in system. The European increasing the institution’s powers. Parliament should be empowered to appoint, monitor and (by a Aigner deemed the Commission’s increasing dependence vote of no confidence) on the Council to be one of the biggest problems facing the Communities. He felt that the basis for the transfer of dismiss members of the national sovereignty to the EC resided in a parliamentary Commission or of a future system. The European Parliament should be empowered government of a European to appoint, monitor and (by a vote of no confidence) political union. dismiss members of the Commission or of a future government of a European political union (244). The introduction and consolidation of these three powers became Aigner’s top priorities, especially once direct European Parliament elections had been secured for 1979. The battle to have them introduced was played out primarily in the area of the European Parliament’s budgetary powers. Most of Aigner’s demands went beyond what was deemed feasible, and so they could often not be brought to fruition. Nevertheless, he believed in his vision for a united Europe free from an Iron Curtain (245). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 59

THE4. CAMPAIGN FOR BUDGETARY POWERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

Heinrich Aigner’s career as an MEP can be divided into two phases. The first phase lasted from his initial These first direct elections appointment to the European Parliament in 1961 until marked a turning point, the Parliament’s first direct elections in 1979. These first as it was only from then direct elections marked a turning point, as it was only on that the Parliament from then on that the Parliament had true democratic had true democratic legitimacy. How MEPs saw their role, and the demands legitimacy. placed upon them, changed after European elections were introduced, as they were now directly accountable to the electorate and would have to win over voters again when they next went to the polls. The break with the past marked by the elections was also reflected in the substance of parliamentary debate. Where the first phase had been marked by constant calls for direct elections and greater legitimacy, the Parliament could now debate other matters and use its democratic legitimacy to call for a further expansion of its powers. MEPs had high hopes following the introduction of direct elections, which were seen as the first significant step towards increasing the Parliament’s authority. As for Aigner, his political activity in the European Parliament prior to 1979 had focused on striving to establish a European audit office (246), particularly during the 1970s. Though established in 1975, the Court of Auditors did not start operating until 1978, just before the first direct elections to the European Parliament. ROADS TO EUROPE 60

The second phase of Aigner’s activity in the European Parliament was marked entirely by the strengthening of budgetary control and the fight against fraud within the European Communities. Once the Court of Auditors had started its work, it first had to ensure effective cooperation with the Parliament and the other Community institutions and bodies. Aigner also campaigned for additional mechanisms to combat fraud. After 1979, the Control Subcommittee was upgraded to a full committee, and Aigner became its Chair, a post he was to hold for the rest of his life, using his position in efforts to strengthen the committee’s influence.

THE INITIAL SITUATION IN THE 1960S

The European Parliament, to which Aigner was appointed in 1961, is viewed by the political research relating to this period as a ‘relatively powerless representative body’ that saw itself more as a ‘parliamentary forum’ than a ‘decision-making parliament’ (247). The Parliament was established in 1952 as the parliamentary assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community and, under the 1957 Treaties of The development of the Rome, also assumed responsibility for the EEC and the EAEC. From then on, it referred to itself as the European European Parliament’s 248 budgetary powers was Parliament ( ), even though it was not yet able to perform the traditional functions of a parliament (249). In the 1960s, central to the evolution of its powers extended only to consultation and supervision, the institution’s authority, and only in three areas: supervision of each Commission/ because with expanded High Authority and the Councils (250), budgetary control, budgetary powers came and consultation in the legislative process. This book additional responsibility. focuses on budgetary powers, which are nevertheless closely related to the Parliament’s other powers.

The development of the European Parliament’s budgetary powers was central to the evolution of the institution’s authority, because with expanded budgetary powers came additional responsibility. It was not uncommon, in the history of democratic parliaments, for them to use their budgetary powers ‘deliberately as a political weapon’ (251) in order to strengthen their hand. Thus, the struggle for budgetary powers was closely tied to the evolution of the European Communities. Daniel Strasser has gone as far as to describe these struggles as ‘summing up the history of European integration’ (252), as they have always been played out at two levels: as a conflict between, on the one hand, Member States and the European Communities and, on the other, HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 61

among the separate Community institutions. In the spirit of supranationalism, the Treaty of 1951 establishing the The introduction of a European Coal and Steel Community gave the main common agricultural budgetary powers to the High Authority, as this body policy, which the European was particularly in favour of a supranational EC. This Agricultural Guidance changed with the Rome Treaties, which had less of a and Guarantee Fund supranational orientation and were aimed at preventing (EAGGF) was established the Commissions from being granted too many powers. The Rome Treaties made the Council of Ministers, to finance in 1962, which represented Member States’ interests, the most provided the occasion influential budgetary authority (253). Hence, the struggle for such an increase in for budgetary powers was mainly between the Council powers. of Ministers and the European Parliament. However, due to its exclusive right to initiate amendments to treaties and legislation, the European Commission was also constantly involved in this debate.

In the story of how the Court of Auditors came into being, there are four significant stages in the development of the European Parliament’s budgetary powers. These four stages are demarcated by changes in 1965, 1970 and 1975. The period before 1965 was characterised by various budgetary provisions in the treaties establishing the ECSC, EAEC, and EEC that did not give the Parliament any real say, either on the Communities’ revenue and expenditure or on the supervision of its finances. Although the Parliament was able to propose amendments to the draft budget, it could not influence the final budget. While it also examined the ECSC auditor’s report, there was no provision for it to grant discharge in respect of the Commission’s implementation of the budget, meaning that the Parliament’s work was not backed up by action (254). At the time, Community revenues consisted only of contributions from the Member States, and the Communities did not yet have their own resources (255). However, Article 201 of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community provided for the replacement of Member States’ financial contributions by the Communities’ own resources, including revenue accruing from the common customs tariff (256). In accordance with the wishes of some Member States’ national parliaments, this change was to be accompanied by an increase in the European Parliament’s budgetary powers in order to ensure parliamentary scrutiny of EC own resources since, unlike the Member States’ contributions, these would no longer be under the control of national legislative assemblies (257).

The introduction of a common agricultural policy (258), which the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was established ROADS TO EUROPE 62

to finance in 1962, provided the occasion for such an A European audit office increase in powers. However, detailed provisions for this would serve the purpose of funding scheme had only been laid down for the first three external financial control, financial years, meaning that further discussions were which is exercised by a subsequently required. In 1965, the Commission presented body that is independent far-reaching proposals covering EC own resources and further budgetary powers for the Parliament, which of those being audited. 259 was henceforth to be elected by direct suffrage ( ). The Parliament itself had also previously called on several occasions for its budgetary powers to be expanded (260), and in a debate Aigner had argued in favour of maximising those demands. He viewed cooperation with national parliaments as an opportunity to force concessions by the Council of Ministers to the European Parliament (261). A key facet of the demands throughout was increasing the Parliament’s powers in the area of budgetary control, in particular the right of discharge in respect of transactions. Even at this early stage, the demands were accompanied by the first calls for an audit office for the Communities (262). However, the Commission’s proposals prompted strong opposition from France, culminating in the empty chair crisis (263). Berthold Rittberger has described this, not without justification, as ‘an irony in the evolution of the European Community that the one Member State which pressed most strongly for the completion of a common market for agricultural products, France, was the most reluctant to accept the institutional consequences of creating such a common market.’ (264) France’s pursuit of this policy led to extraordinary delays in developing the Parliament’s budgetary control procedure.

At the time, the Communities already had a budgetary control system in place, consisting of internal and external control. Each institution had a financial controller who was responsible for ex-ante checks on income and expenditure, either issuing or withholding approval of financial transactions. This type of control is referred to as internal, as the financial controller is an official of the relevant institution. Although the financial controller’s powers and responsibilities have evolved over time, the procedure fundamentally remains to this day in the European Union (265). By contrast, establishing a European audit office would serve the purpose of external financial control, which is exercised by a body that is independent of those being audited. In the EEC and EAEC, external control was previously exercised by an Audit Board, which audited revenue and expenditure ex-post and prepared a report at the end of each financial year. The ECSC, meanwhile, was audited by an auditor with responsibility for the external control of that Community (266). Over time, however, this system proved to be inadequate, as would become particularly apparent following the amendment of certain budgetary provisions through the 1970 Treaty of Luxembourg. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 63

FIRST ACHIEVEMENTS: THE LUXEMBOURG TREATY (1970)

When Georges Pompidou replaced Charles de Gaulle as French President, this cleared the way for an agreement on the financing of the common agricultural policy and for amendments to certain budgetary provisions. The Luxembourg Resolutions of 21 and 22 April 1970 are held to be among the most significant milestones in the budgetary history of the European Communities (267). They facilitated the introduction of EC own resources to replace financial contributions from Member States. The Luxembourg Resolutions provided for the progressive introduction of a new system that would see the Communities ultimately fully financed by their own resources by 1 January 1975 (268). The EC budget would be drawn from agricultural levies, customs duties and VAT-based revenue.

This led to a fundamental change in the way the Communities were financed. Previously, the European Communities had been financially dependent on the Member States; now national governments’ sovereign powers were transferred, through financial instruments, to the Communities, which thereby acquired a degree of financial autonomy. Since control of financial resources had now been taken away from national parliaments, which had previously exercised control over the contributions from their respective national budgets, the European Parliament needed to be vested with additional powers of scrutiny. This was achieved by way of the Treaty amending certain budgetary provisions (269) of 1970, which provided for a gradual adjustment of budgetary powers. The European Parliament was granted the right to be consulted on the compilation of the budget, The Luxembourg so that it could have a degree of influence over the EC’s Resolutions of 21 and 22 270 non-compulsory expenditures ( ). Crucially, for the later April 1970 are held to be role of the Court of Auditors, the Parliament has since among the most significant been involved in the discharge procedure; the European milestones in the Commission could only be granted discharge subject budgetary history of the to the agreement of the Council and the Parliament following an examination of the Audit Board’s report (271). European Communities. This power, and the associated procedures, developed They facilitated the over time to become an essential means by which the introduction of EC own Parliament could exert pressure to expand its influence. resources to replace Aigner, in particular, recognised the potential of this tool financial contributions and sought, with varying degrees of success, to harness it from Member States. to achieve his aims. ROADS TO EUROPE 64

The Luxembourg Resolutions of 1970 allowed the The 1970 Luxembourg European Commission two years to come up with new Treaty granted the proposals for strengthening the Parliament’s budgetary 272 European Parliament new powers ( ). In the meantime, a debate unfolded in the budgetary powers, which European Parliament, and in the Committee on Budgets gave it an active role in the in particular, on the shortcomings of the Communities’ budgetary control system. This debate was increasingly discharge procedure. 273 coupled with calls for a European audit office ( ). As Horst Gräfe pointed out in the paper he wrote at the time on the creation of the Court of Auditors, these calls emanated mainly from the German MEPs (274). Aigner, who became Vice- Chair of the Committee on Budgets in March 1973, made the establishment of a European audit office his absolute priority.

The motives for calling for an audit office were probably both technical and political. The Audit Board, which was responsible for external audits, was increasingly incapable of satisfactorily performing its tasks. This was due, first of all, to the expanding EC budget following the introduction of the common agricultural policy and to the changeover to own resources. These changes did not provide for the Audit Board, which had only a few staff, to be reformed or expanded. The nine auditors carried out their tasks as a mere sideline occupation and were only obliged to meet every other month (275). Secondly, at the beginning of the 1970s a number of fraud cases came to light in the European Communities’ budget. These cases ran into the millions (276) and made the inadequacy of the EC’s financial control system all too clear. It was mostly Aigner and his colleagues in the Committee on Budgets who took up the issue. Although hopes for a European audit office had been around since 1964, the MEPs’ demands focused first and foremost on reforming the Audit Board. Aigner stressed that what was really needed was a truly independent budgetary control body (277), although he presumably realised that this would never find acceptance so soon after the empty chair crisis, since the creation of an audit office would have required fresh treaty amendments.

The 1970 Luxembourg Treaty granted the European Parliament new budgetary powers, which gave it an active role in the discharge procedure. This had particular implications for the work of the Committee on Budgets, which had concerns that its newly established power would be disregarded in practice, since the Council already had a history of simply leapfrogging the Parliament’s technically mandatory opinion (278). In the long term, the Committee on Budgets intended to construct a functioning budgetary control system of the kind the European Communities had been lacking to date. At the same time, this would naturally also bolster the Parliament’s influence over the Commission and the Council. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 65

The first step, though, was to lay the foundations for political budgetary control. To this end, the Committee on Budgets forged a close relationship with the Communities’ Audit Board, the members of which took part in the meetings of the Committee on Budgets when relevant items were on the agenda. Such contacts were intended to further the interests of both parties. The Audit Board was embroiled in a conflict with the Commission on the reach of its audit powers and wanted the Parliament on its side (279). Meanwhile, the aim of the Committee on Budgets was, first of all, to improve the quality of audit reports, which the Parliament wanted to take as a basis for exerting political control. If improvements were to be made, the Audit Board would need to be endowed with greater powers, more staff and additional resources. The Committee on Budgets was also seeking, by expanding the Audit Board, to secure greater influence over it. Hitherto, owing to its location at the Commission, the Audit Board had been organisationally dependent on the latter, as its organisation chart could testify. For this reason, Aigner proposed, in his report on the European Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for 1972, ‘to include half of the revenue and expenditure of the Communities’ Audit Board and the ECSC auditor in the Parliament’s own budgetary estimates’ (280). In this way, the Parliament, since it compiled the estimates for its own budget, could have much more easily exerted influence over the financing of the Audit Board. In addition, the Committee on Budgets called for the Audit Board’s powers to be precisely defined so as to avoid any conflict between the Community bodies regarding their areas of responsibility (281).

The first nine ECA Members (1977). From the top and left to right: A. Middelhoek, M. Mart, A. Angioi, P. Lelong, A. Leicht, N. Price, M. Murphy, P. Gaudy, A.K. Johansen.

Source: European Court of Auditors ROADS TO EUROPE 66

Yet the Audit Board’s working conditions seemed to get worse rather than better, with the Commission refusing to supply the Board with internal documents, thus complicating budgetary control within the institutions of the European Communities. The Council, by contrast, blocked the Audit Board’s attempts to carry out on-the-spot audits in the Member States on the use of Community funds (282). National governments were not keen to have the supranational Community performing audits on their territory, preferring to tolerate cases of fraud affecting Community funds.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS: THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS (1975)

Because these problems could not be resolved via In order to persuade the the Audit Board, the idea of a European audit office Commission to include assumed renewed importance. The Commission this call in its reform planned to submit new proposals by 1972 to strengthen the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, as proposals to the Council, per the commitment it had made at a meeting of the the Parliament launched Council in 1970 following the Luxembourg Resolutions an impassioned campaign, and the gradual introduction of EC own resources (283). led by the Committee on This provided an opportunity to also reform budgetary Budgets and particularly control and install a European audit office. In order to by Aigner himself, for a persuade the Commission to include this call in its reform European audit office. proposals to the Council, the Parliament launched an impassioned campaign, led by the Committee on Budgets and particularly by Aigner himself, for a European audit office. It started by calling for an audit office in every Parliament resolution and debate concerning budgetary control (284). Whereas the Parliament had hitherto not been particularly emphatic in its calls, Aigner was now leading an active struggle for a European audit office. He did this, firstly, through campaigns at both the Community and Member State level and, secondly, by getting the public involved.

Throughout the process that culminated in the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, Aigner built up a shared-interest network to help him ensure that the idea would prevail. The starting point for this was his proposal to organise a hearing with the heads of the national audit institutions (285), in order to discuss with them the desirability of a European audit office (286). The hearing was to be held in the run-up to the next Summit of Heads of State HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 67

The Court’s first premises at 29, rue Aldringen, in the Luxembourg old town. It was here, in October 1977, that the institution began operations. In 1988, the Court moved to its new premises in the Kirchberg district, alongside the buildings of the other European institutions.

Source: European Court of Auditors

or Government in Paris in October 1972, in order to have the audit office included in the resolutions to be passed there. The hearing, on 14 and 15 September 1972 in Brussels, revealed support for the prompt establishment of a European audit office from the heads of the German and Italian national audit offices in particular. At the same time, the audit offices of other Member States were more reserved, viewing such an institution more as an aspiration for the future. Horst Gräfe interprets this caution as the heads of these audit institutions toeing the line of their national governments (287). At Aigner’s suggestion, however, a working group was formed, consisting of members of the Committee on Budgets and representatives from all the national audit offices (288), and this would meet on several occasions in the years that followed until the Court of Auditors was established. ROADS TO EUROPE 68

The summit in Paris brought no further progress, either Since the autumn of in relation to a European audit office or to expanding 1972, reports had been the Parliament’s budgetary powers. On account of the starting to appear in negotiations with the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark Member States’ national and Norway, all of which, except Norway, joined the newspapers concerning European Communities on 1 January 1973 during the first enlargement, the Commission had not yet submitted the call for a European any new reform proposals following the resolutions audit office and increased of 1970 (289). While Georges Spénale in particular, as budgetary powers for the Chair of the Committee on Budgets, campaigned for Parliament. an increase in the Parliament’s budgetary powers (290), Aigner continued to focus on promoting the idea of an audit office. The goals of the Committee on Budgets would now be pursued more vigorously. In December 1972, the committee considered a motion of no confidence against the Commission, as it had still not submitted any new reform proposals. Aigner even tried to change this to a constructive motion of no confidence, under which the Parliament would also be given the right to appoint the Commission (291). Although such a right was of course still inconceivable at that time, Aigner and the Committee on Budgets were now starting to work on a strategy for involving the public.

Since the autumn of 1972, reports had been starting to appear in Member States’ national newspapers concerning the call for a European audit office and increased budgetary powers for the Parliament (292). Aigner’s Case for a European Audit Office (293), referred to in the press as the ‘white paper’ (294) for an audit office, attracted particular attention. With this essay presenting his ideas for the future of budgetary control, he now finally started to ‘go public’ (295) in order to put pressure on the Council and Commission. In addition, Aigner attempted to informally raise awareness of the need for an audit office via Member States’ national parliaments. At another meeting with representatives of the national audit institutions in June 1973, he asked them to ‘approach the national parliaments with a view to furthering the initiative by the Committee on Budgets aimed at the creation of an effective audit at the Community level’ (296). Through regular contact with representatives of the national audit institutions, Aigner had created links that he also hoped to use to influence decisions in the Member States. The Contact Committee of supreme audit institutions, in existence since 1960, already provided a forum for interaction among the Member States’ national audit institutions (297). Aigner used the Committee on Budgets to network with the Contact Committee, attempting to exploit it as a means to his end of establishing a European audit office (298). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 69

The political pressure on the Commission paid off: on 8 June 1973 the Commission finally submitted a new draft treaty to strengthen the European Parliament’s budgetary powers (299). This provided for the creation of a European audit office by amending the Treaties of the Communities. In his Case for a European Audit Office, Aigner had considered a treaty amendment desirable but difficult to achieve. He had therefore initially favoured a model whereby the Audit Board would be expanded to an audit office based on Article 206 of the EEC Treaty (300).

Why did the Commission go even further than the Parliament’s demands, despite the fact that the Audit Board On 14 and 15 December had recently been granted greater powers by the amendment 1973, at the third of 25 April 1973 to the Financial Regulation? Claus-Dieter Summit of Heads of Ehlermann, writing close to the time, saw this as an attempt State or Government in by the Commission to accommodate the Parliament in Copenhagen, it was finally strengthening budgetary control in order to gloss over decided, in principle, to ‘the Commission’s rather paltry proposals to increase the European Parliament’s powers in the preparation of the establish a Community budget’ (301). Following the Vedel Report (302), it had become Audit Board. clear that (hitherto non-existent) legislative powers needed to be created for the Parliament before its budgetary powers could be increased any further. A proposal for such legislative powers would not have made it past the Council in 1973. Therefore, the European Parliament was to be given at least sole right of discharge, while the Council would merely make a recommendation to the Commission on whether to grant discharge (303). A European audit office, on whose annual report the discharge decision was to be based (304), was planned for this purpose.

The Parliament welcomed these proposed changes and, in relation to budgetary control, initially called for only minor amendments to the Commission proposal (305). In particular, the Parliament insisted that members of the future audit office should be appointed by agreement with the Parliament and not by the Member States’ governments, as had been proposed by the Commission (306). For its part, the Commission incorporated the desired changes into a revised proposal (307) and then consulted the Council. On 14 and 15 December 1973, at the third Summit of Heads of State or Government in Copenhagen, it was finally decided, in principle, to establish a Community Audit Board (308). Thus, the foundations for a Community audit office were laid. However, a good deal of discussion lay ahead on the audit office’s structure and powers before it was finally established under the Treaty of Brussels on 22 July 1975 and could actually start operating in October 1977. ROADS TO EUROPE 70

A5. NEW INSTITUTION FOR THE COMMUNITIES: DESIGNING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: DIFFERING IDEAS ON HOW TO ORGANISE THE COURT

From the final communiqué of the Copenhagen summit to the Brussels Treaty

In its final communiqué, the Copenhagen summit resolved to establish a Community Audit Board, yet the new body’s organisational structure remained entirely up in the air. This sparked a fresh debate in which the various stakeholders — namely the Council, the Commission, the Contact Committee of the Heads of the SAIs and the European Parliament (represented by Aigner) — sought to impose their equally varied interests. Aside from the numerous interest groups, we can also identify two distinct phases in the consultations concerning the arrangements for the new audit office. The first of these phases began with the run-up to the 1973 Copenhagen summit and culminated in the signature of the Brussels Treaty in July 1975. In this phase, consultations covered the provisions on the Court’s powers, set-up and structure, which were to be laid down in the Treaty. The second phase, which ran from signature of the Treaty in 1975 to Treaty ratification by the Member States and the Court’s entry into operation in October 1977, focused on specific organisational matters regarding the establishment of the Court, HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 71

such as its seat and how to finance the organisation. The two phases reflected the key interests of those involved. The first phase set the Parliament’s assertion of its right to be consulted against the other stakeholders’ fear of a loss of competence. The second phase involved tussles over the concrete arrangements for the Court, with the Parliament particularly keen to leverage consultations on headquarters and staffing matters to gain influence over the new organisation.

Once Aigner had seen to the founding of a European audit office through the 1973 communiqué, he in no way stepped back from the consultations concerning the creation of the new organisation. In his Case for a European Audit Office, he had clearly set out his vision for the Court’s role and structure and, in doing so, devised an initial blueprint for a European audit office (309). Unlike Aigner, the Commission did not specify any particular rules in its blueprint, deciding that these should be laid down in a final ~ statute which the Court would produce itself at a later date. In this way Cover page of the Commission hoped to avoid a situation in which a few Member States Aigner’s ‘Case for might take issue with certain proposals and then reject the whole project. a European Audit Office of 1973. Certainly, vastly different financial control models, conferring varying ’ degrees of authority on audit bodies, were in place in the Member States. Source: European The Council, though, was unwilling to relinquish having a say by postponing Court of Auditors decision-making, and demanded that the audit office’s powers be enshrined in a treaty (310). It was at this point that the Contact Committee of the Heads of the SAIs acquired an active role (311). The committee was first brought on board for the consultations concerning a European audit office, at Aigner’s initiative, for hearings with the Committee on Budgets, which were first held in September 1972 (312).

At its meeting on 30 November 1973, the Contact Committee drafted a resolution which supplemented the Commission’s blueprint with more precise rules for a Court of Auditors. This resolution brought the Commission into line with the Council’s deliberations by accommodating the Council’s calls for more precise provisions without formally amending the Commission’s own proposal. In this manner, the national audit offices’ proposals ‘significantly influenced the formation of the Community’s audit office’ (313). This remained the case as consultations continued, and Aigner maintained close links with the Contact Committee. Four days after its adoption, the resolution of 30 November was considered on 4 December at a meeting held by the Control ROADS TO EUROPE 72

Subcommittee of the Committee on Budgets with SAI representatives in the presence of the Commission, the Audit Board of the European Communities, and the ECSC Auditor (314). The resolution was not further amended, though suggestions were put forward for the Contact Committee’s forthcoming deliberations. As soon as the Contact Committee had drafted a statute for the Court, this was to be considered with the Committee on Budgets (315).

With these meetings, Aigner created a platform for the exchange of ideas and alliance-building at which all stakeholders, with the exception of the Council, regularly convened. The talks were mostly successful in bringing about a consensus among the interest groups, meaning that the proposals put to the Council for a decision by and large had the backing of all stakeholders. In its decision-making, the Council was exposed to the differing interests and reservations of all the Member States, and so external pressure was necessary to bring about agreement on the Court. It is doubtful whether the Council would have accepted the Court in its present-day form if the Parliament, the national audit offices and the Commission had not toed the same line but each tabled very different ideas.

Despite these divergent interests and occasional Despite these divergent differences of opinion among the national audit offices, interests and occasional the Commission, the Parliament and the Audit Board, differences of opinion a consensus could always be forged on the most crucial points; therefore, we might reasonably speak of a concerted among the national audit push for the Court of Auditors to counter the Council. offices, the Commission, The Contact Committee’s discussions were based on the the Parliament and the blueprint published in Aigner’s Case for a European Audit Audit Board, a consensus Office (316). This closely reflected the German audit system, could always be forged which, particularly due to its federal nature, was able to on the most crucial serve as a model for a European audit office. He saw the points; therefore, we Bundesrechnungshof as a good example to follow since its might reasonably speak audits had to be synchronised and coordinated with those of a concerted push for of the regional German audit offices, as would be the case the Court of Auditors to between the European Court of Auditors and the national counter the Council. audit offices in the Member States. The German delegation to the Contact Committee backed Aigner’s blueprint, yet was unable to get the Contact Committee to accept some aspects of his proposals (317).

The main challenge lay in combining the Member States’ different financial control systems at the European level. The national audit offices had contrasting constitutional power and status (318), conducted either ex-ante or HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 73

ex-post audits, and differed in other areas, too. Valentina Vardabasso simplifies matters by distinguishing between Owing to the differences of two types: ‘the Latin-style supreme audit institution […] opinion, compromises had organised in the form of colleges of judges, and the Anglo- to be found, which watered Saxon-style audit institution, which is a monocratic down Aigner’s plans for body, like the UK National Audit Office, attached to the 319 the status of the audit national parliament’ ( ). However, with this distinction, office. For example, it was she overlooks the German model, which does not fit not possible to achieve neatly into either category. for the Court of Auditors the same legal status as, The readiness of the Contact Committee members to say, the Parliament or accept far-reaching competences and a strong role, the Commission, i.e. that anchored in the Treaties, for a European audit office of an institution of the depended on the position of the audit institutions in their Communities own countries. For example, Italy in particular adopted a more reserved stance, whereas Germany and the UK were advocates for a strong European audit office (320). Having acceded to the European Communities only in 1973, the UK then supported German interests in improved budgetary control for the EC, which had previously proven impossible to impose. Owing to the differences of opinion, compromises had to be found, which watered down Aigner’s plans for the status of the audit office. For example, it was not possible to achieve for the Court of Auditors the same legal status as, say, the Parliament or the Commission, i.e. that of an institution of the Communities (321). Nevertheless, a declaration that was included in a set of Council minutes stated that the Court of Auditors should be on an equal footing with the Community institutions in many areas (322).

During the ongoing consultations about a statute for a European audit office, Aigner maintained close contact with representatives from the national offices via the Control Subcommittee of the Committee on Budgets. The Contact Committee members regularly updated the subcommittee on the state of their negotiations, and together the two bodies discussed any outstanding issues to get ideas for the next session (323). In addition, Aigner saw to it that the subcommittee was kept regularly informed about the state of play in the consultations between the Council and the Commission on the treaty amendments. Information was received from Commission officials and a secretary of state from the German Ministry of Finance, who sat on the subcommittee as the representative of the German Presidency of the Council (324). Moreover, Aigner personally reported to the European Parliament on the consultations and, when doing so, he always allowed his personal opinion to shine through (325). On 25 June and 14 October 1974, the ROADS TO EUROPE 74

Council’s joint guidelines on strengthening the European Parliament’s budgetary powers (326), which also contained the text on the treaty amendments for the Court of Auditors, were discussed with a Parliament delegation including Aigner (327). As regards the Court of Auditors, the Parliament delegation only objected to the procedure for appointing Court members. The Commission’s 1973 blueprint had envisaged that the members would be appointed subject to parliamentary assent, yet the latest draft stated merely that the Parliament had to be consulted (328).

However, Aigner did not want to derogate from the parliamentary assent to appointments; by way of compromise, in his working document reporting on consultations regarding the Court of Auditors, he simply proposed an alternative wording which replaced ‘assent of’ with ‘in agreement with’ (329). The Parliament approved of 330 ~ this approach and adopted it in a resolution ( ). However, the demands it made were ignored by the Council, which, on 22 July 1975, at an Marcel Mart intergovernmental conference of the Member States’ foreign ministers, adopted (born 10 May 1927 in Esch-sur-Alzette) the Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the was the first European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a Luxembourgish single Commission of the European Communities (331). Member of the Court and President of the Court Thus, 18 months after the Copenhagen communiqué, the Court of Auditors (18 October 1984-20 was established in a treaty. Drafting of the treaties proved such a protracted December 1989). process less on account of the rules governing the Court of Auditors than because of the decisions to further strengthen the European Parliament’s Source: European Court of Auditors budgetary powers and of the introduction of a conciliation procedure between the Council and the Parliament. These changes were also part of the treaty amendments and had sparked much debate between the Council and the Parliament (332). The Treaty now had to be ratified by the Member States, and this, another lengthy process, took until 1977. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 75

The European Court of Auditors: from the founding Treaty to the start of work

The consultations on the Treaty establishing the European Court of Auditors generally passed off without major complications. The long period of time between the final communiqué in 1973 and the signing of the Treaty in 1975 can be explained by the disagreements and disputes between the Parliament and the Council regarding the scope of the additional budgetary powers to be assigned by the Treaty. As some Member States continued to harbour reservations about the Treaty, the ratification process was greatly delayed, and the Treaty did not enter into force until 1 June 1977 (333).

Only now could preparations commence for the Court to start work. Before it could do so, however, there remained some outstanding issues to settle, concerning both practical decisions, such as the new body’s seat, and interinstitutional matters, such as arrangements for transferring to it the Audit Board’s affairs. Aigner wished to resolve these issues as promptly as possible, so that the Court could start operating as soon as possible once the ratification process was complete. He therefore clearly set out his own ideas in working documents and maintained contact with the networks he had built, with the Audit Board of the Communities and with the Contact Committee of supreme audit institutions. Representatives of the Audit Board regularly attended meetings of the Control Subcommittee, and were commissioned by the latter to prepare a general report on the transfer of audit activities to the Court of Auditors (334). At the same time, the member of the Audit Board entrusted with this task, Hilmar Hartig, personally corresponded with Aigner in writing (335). Of course, the Audit Board had a special interest in the transitional arrangements, particularly as far as the transfer of its members to the Court of Auditors was concerned, as the Board would be disbanded once the Court started operating (336). The Audit Board thus hoped for the Parliament’s support on these issues, which arose in particular as a result of Aigner’s taking up the cause of the Audit Board’s staff (337).

In January 1977, the Commission had prepared a communication to the Council on the establishment of the Court of Auditors, commenting on the outstanding issues (338). In the plenary, Aigner proceeded to argue for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to ready the Court. This group was to include representatives of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament because, in his opinion, such decisions should not be reserved for the Commission and the Council alone (339). In addition, Aigner was entrusted by the Committee on Budgets with preparing its own working ROADS TO EUROPE 76

paper on the establishment of the Court (340). In As regards the question of that document, he set out detailed proposals on the its seat, the Commission outstanding issues (341). For Aigner, this was a circuitous had been in favour route towards finally achieving the Parliament’s demands of Luxembourg, and that had not been successfully asserted at the time of the Audit Board of the treaty negotiations. Aigner had argued in favour of giving the Court full institutional status, but this had not the Communities had happened. Now he called for the Court to be placed on favoured Brussels, but a largely equal footing, in terms of staff remuneration Aigner insisted that it be and financial resources, with the European Court of located in the same place Justice, which did have institutional status. He also as the definitive seat of the wanted the Court of Auditors to become an independent European Parliament. appointing authority. As regards the question of its seat, the Commission had been in favour of Luxembourg (342), and the Audit Board of the Communities had favoured Brussels (343), but Aigner insisted that it be located in the same place as the definitive seat of the European Parliament (344). This was in order to reflect geographically the close ties which the Parliament sought with the Court of Auditors. As the Parliament’s definitive seat had still not been established, this demand was difficult to assert, and the Council ultimately decided on Luxembourg as the location of the Court (345).

Aigner pulled out all the stops to obtain the powers he had been striving for but had not yet achieved in practice. Under the Treaty, members were to be appointed only following consultation with, but not approval by, the Parliament. Aigner now demanded that not only one candidate per Member State — i.e. only nine candidates in total — be nominated, but three each, from which the Parliament would then select one per Member State (346). This would of course have given the Parliament an extensive consultative role, going beyond even the right of approval it had originally demanded. Even other members of the Audit Board, for whom the Parliament’s interests were likewise paramount, considered this demand to be contrary to the Treaty and stressed that it should merely have the right to veto appointments (347). Aigner was already being frequently described as a ‘rogue’ (348) who used his ‘box of parliamentary tricks’ (349) to advance his interests. His approach to the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Auditors seems to bear out this assessment, even if it meant that he did not always attract support.

Aigner occasionally overshot the mark. Not everyone backed his efforts to lay down such detailed arrangements before the Court of Auditors had even been established. For example, the Contact Committee reacted very cautiously to Aigner’s attempts to have the scope of audits and cooperation HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 77

between national audit offices and the European Court of Auditors discussed ~ at another hearing as early as May 1977. The SAI representatives made it Image of the clear that these questions were a matter for the Court once it had been Kirchberg district established (350). Even Aigner’s fellow members of the Committee on Budgets in 1978. It was on this empty plot, wanted to ensure that ‘members of the future Court of Auditors retained 351 not far from the appropriate discretionary powers in the setting-up of their institution’ ( ). city’s dome-shaped fitness centre, that the Court of Aigner did not ultimately succeed in having his far-reaching demands met, Auditors would despite using every trick in the book to achieve all or at least some of them erect its new by the back door. He did, however, manage to build an information network buildings. with everyone involved; in this way, he could be kept in the picture regarding all matters raised and would be able to contribute his own ideas to the Source: European Parliament discussion. He thus succeeded in being accepted as a negotiating partner and included in the process by the parties involved. Although he had to shelve his most weighty demand — for the Parliament to have a role in deciding on the appointment of members of the Court of Auditors — his actions ensured that the Parliament’s right to be consulted on such appointments would be taken seriously. This was a significant advance compared with previous practice, when the Council had often simply ignored the Parliament. Above all, Aigner was invited to attend the meeting held by the enlarged Bureau of the Parliament to examine the nominees (352). With the support of his fellow members of the Committee on Budgets, he succeeded in having the committee itself granted a special consultative role in the examination of ROADS TO EUROPE 78

candidates for the Court of Auditors, and in ensuring that the examination was discussed not only by the Bureau, but publicly in plenary session (353). To this end, a report and a motion for a resolution were produced in advance; Aigner, who until his death would chair the future Committee on Budgetary Control, even took it upon himself to draft the report (354).

Aigner’s motives and contribution

In his campaign for a Court of Auditors, Aigner pursued What prompted the very specific aims, adapting the scale of his demands to European Parliament’s suit the circumstances. What prompted the European Parliament’s calls, back in 1964, for a Communities audit calls, back in 1964, for office was the inadequate financial control system and a Communities audit the large number of cases of fraud, which had become office was the inadequate particularly rife with the introduction of the common financial control system agricultural policy. Against this background, Aigner and the large number of concentrated on furthering the Parliament’s budgetary cases of fraud, which had control powers and militating for an audit office. His Case become particularly rife for a European Audit Office revealed his great expertise on with the introduction of the the various problems and put forward detailed solutions common agricultural policy. for practical and efficient improvements to the control system (355). While the content of the Case was purely factual, the very act of publishing such a document was a tactical political move intended to publicly strengthen the call for an audit body.

Through its involvement in the budgetary discharge procedure after the treaty amendments in 1970, the European Parliament acquired one of the first powers with which it could exert political pressure. Recognising this, Aigner sought to extend this power further in the subsequent period by way of the Malt Affair and the refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 budget (356). The Court of Auditors played an important role in the latter, as Aigner repeatedly stressed: ‘The European Parliament is primarily interested in obtaining an instrument which will allow it to exercise its own control as an authority called upon to give the discharge for the Community budget. The Parliament must have an instrument enabling it to assume its own responsibilities’ (357).

Pending the decision of principle establishing a Court of Auditors, purely technical proposals for improving financial control were required in order to raise awareness of the need for such a body. Once the decision had been HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 79

taken, Aigner directed his efforts towards obtaining a Court of Auditors that, in particular, suited the It was mainly his Case for Parliament’s interests. This would mean the Parliament a European Audit Office exerting maximum influence over the selection of Court that set Aigner apart as members and basing the Court’s mode of operation on the Court’s father, since the German or UK audit system. In those systems, the this attracted much audit offices have no executive powers but report the shortcomings they find to the national parliament, which attention in the relevant then, as the discharge body, can exert influence over the circles and contained the executive (358). The Court should, therefore, ultimately first detailed ideas for an help to enhance the Parliament’s power by providing it audit office. with comprehensive and reliable audit reports which it could use as a basis for launching investigations and conducting the discharge procedure.

In order to turn the close relationship Aigner sought between the Court and the Parliament into reality, he continued seeking to influence the formation of the Court even after it had been established in the Treaties. For example, his efforts to have the members of the Audit Board transferred to the new body were certainly not prompted by sympathy alone; although this naturally also played a role, Aigner was pursuing an altogether different goal. Aigner and the Committee on Budgets already had a good relationship with the Audit Board and hoped, with the help of its members, to maintain close contact with the Court, too. However, most of these strategies did not bear fruit (359).

Despite the setbacks, Aigner knew how to convince the public that the arrangements made for the Court of Auditors spelt triumph for the European Parliament. For example, he described the treaty provisions as marking ‘the beginning of the Parliament’s right of investiture’ (360), which was now recognised by the Council and the Commission. This, he claimed, was a crucial step for the Parliament towards eventually being able to appoint and dismiss Commissioners (361). Even scholars were misled; for instance, Pascal Fontaine, in his comprehensive work on the history of the European People’s Party, wrote ‘Heinrich Aigner managed to ensure that the Parliament had unlimited powers to participate in the appointment of members at the Court of Auditors’ (362), although this was not actually the case.

Even while he was still alive, Aigner was revered as the ‘founding father of the European Court of Auditors (363)’, and the Court itself now describes him on its website as having provided the ‘main impetus for setting up the European Court of Auditors’ (364). From a modern historical science perspective, now that the discipline has broken with its focus on great men, the term ‘founding ROADS TO EUROPE 80

father’ is of course problematic. This aside, other factors contradict the assertion, since several parties had a role in establishing the Court, such as the Contact Committee of SAIs, whose input proved invaluable. Furthermore, other MEPs also lent their support to the Parliament’s campaign for an audit office, which it had launched back in 1964. It was mainly his Case for a European Audit Office that set Aigner apart as the Court’s father (365), since this attracted much attention in the relevant circles and contained the first detailed ideas for an audit office.

However, Aigner was unable to bring many of his The nerve centre and concrete ideas to fruition, since the Court departed in meeting point of the many respects from his 1973 concept, and his insistence networks was undoubtedly on the Parliament’s powers of appointment and the the Parliament’s Control Court’s institutional status was not heeded. Yet we should not measure his performance on this basis; his true Subcommittee, which, contribution to the founding of the Court of Auditors lay at Aigner’s initiative, elsewhere, for it was by including the public in the call for organised hearings with an audit office and by consolidating networks of interest the interest groups. groups — such as the Contact Committee of SAIs, the Audit Board of the Communities and the Commission — that sufficient political pressure could ever be brought to bear on the Council for the establishment of the Court to become a possibility. The nerve centre and meeting point of the networks was undoubtedly the Parliament’s Control Subcommittee, which, at Aigner’s initiative, organised hearings with the interest groups. The significance of these networks should not be underestimated, since, for example, the heads of the national audit offices were also able to exert political influence in the Member States and on their respective national governments, which then took decisions regarding the Court in the Council. In this respect, therefore, Aigner made an essential contribution to the creation of the Court of Auditors, and any focus on his impact should not — as has often been the case in the literature to date — confine itself to his Case for a European Audit Office. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 81

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS: COOPERATION WITH THE NEW BODY

Heinrich Aigner’s expectations

Aigner had clear ideas regarding the relationship between the Court of Auditors and the Parliament. While he argued The Court of Auditors’ from the outset that the Court should have sufficient work would be in vain if its independence to properly undertake its audit activities, reports could not then be he also viewed it as a sort of budgetary control arm of acted upon by a politically the Parliament. During the negotiations on the text of the active institution. Treaty establishing the Court of Auditors, Aigner wished Conversely, the EP would to include a clause on its relationship with the Parliament’s not be able to carry out any audit committee, thereby enshrining this relationship in external audits without the the Treaty and hence expressing the Court’s close ties with the Parliament (366). Ultimately, however, the Treaty Court of Auditors’ in-depth contained only the general formulation: ‘It [the Court of expertise. Auditors] shall assist the Assembly and the Council in exercising their powers of control over the implementation of the budget.’ (367) This did not, by any means, secure the desired relationship between the Court of Auditors and the Parliament, and Aigner feared that the newly created body would not develop as hoped. Therefore, in every speech or publication on the matter, he stressed the need for close cooperation between the Court and the Parliament: ‘And there is one more thing to consider, namely the operational relationship between the Parliament and the Court. The two bodies are mutually dependent. The Court of Auditors’ work would be in vain if its reports could not then be acted upon by a politically active institution. Conversely, the EP would not be able to carry out any external audits without the Court of Auditors’ in-depth expertise.’ (368)

In practice, discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget was to be granted on the basis of the Court’s annual reports. The Treaty provided for the annual reports to be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, which represented progress compared to the Audit Board’s reports. Being published lent the reports a greater potential impact, which also benefited the Parliament’s control activities at a political level (369). The Court was also mandated to present special reports on specific issues at its own initiative or on behalf of one of the Community institutions. Aigner saw the possibility of requesting such reports as a way for the Parliament to acquire the legislative powers which it had previously been denied: ROADS TO EUROPE 82

‘These provisions should usher in one of the most interesting relationships between the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors. […] Not only should these ad hoc reports contribute to timely and effective parliamentary control: by offering the expert opinions requested they could also simultaneously act as a stepping stone towards legislative action. This procedure should be applied in particular where poor harmonisation of Community law in the various Member States has resulted in enormous financial errors.’ (370)

Making contact with the new body: first steps

Before this, however, the main thing was to establish contact with the new body, and relationships needed to be built between the Court of Auditors and the other institutions. In line with its aim of securing close links, the Parliament made the first move — before the Court had even started operating, in fact. The President of the Parliament invited the Council’s nominees to the Court for an exchange of views, which was also attended by the Chair of the Committee on Budgets and by Aigner as his deputy. The aim of the meeting was to establish initial personal contacts (371). While there, presumably, the members of the Court pledged to contact the Control Subcommittee of the Committee on Budgets following their official appointment.

These positive signals from the Court prompted Aigner The Court had to seek to argue that the members should not be discussed in the plenary, but that the Council’s nominees should be out a place for itself 372 among the Community approved by resolution of the EP President ( ). Whereas, a few months previously, Aigner had called for the institutions, without Parliament to be granted an extensive consultative role, becoming dependent upon with a choice of three candidates from each Member State, or entering into conflict his desire to dispense with the discussion of candidates with them. in the Parliament now represented a volte-face. Such a discussion would have jeopardised the willingness that the nominees had expressed at the meeting for a positive working relationship with the Parliament. At the time, Aigner placed greater value on the prospect of positive relations than on symbolically making intensive use of the Parliament’s right to be consulted via a discussion of candidates that would probably do nothing to alter the final composition of the Court. Ultimately, the power of appointment belonged to the Council, even if it had promised the Parliament a ‘power of veto’ (373) in a gentlemen’s agreement. Following the protest by Lord Bruce of Donington at the failure HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 83

to involve the Committee on Budgets, a compromise was reached and the Parliament ended up voting on a motion The Court was necessarily for a resolution tabled by the Committee on Budgets, aware that it was reliant not by the President. Furthermore, Aigner stressed in upon cooperation with the his speech on that occasion that the Parliament’s say Parliament. This was due in the appointment of members should clearly not be to the audit system, which limited to the consultation process (374), in order to avoid setting a precedent for future appointments. He stressed did not give the Court any in the strongest possible terms that the Parliament power to impose sanctions nonetheless wanted immediate dialogue with the Court when irregularities were on the external control of the Communities (375). After detected. all, one of the first acts of the newly established Court would be to take stock with the Parliament and the Audit Board, whose role the Court was now to assume (376). When dialogue began, however, the Court was anxious at all times to assert its independence (377).

Following its establishment, the Court found itself in a difficult position. Firstly, it was necessary at once to devise an organisational structure and kick-start some sort of bureaucratic procedure. There were also the matters of the Court’s work programme, the number of staff and the staff selection process, the role of the President of the Court and a few other organisational issues to resolve (378). Secondly, the Court had to seek out a place for itself among the Community institutions, without becoming dependent upon or entering into conflict with them. The fact that the Court had not been granted the status of a full, independent institution in the Treaties, but merely some of the associated prerogatives, did not make this task any easier. The Court was quick to establish contact with the Parliament, firstly because this was expected by the Parliament and, secondly, because the Court’s draft budget, in which the Parliament had a consultative role, needed to be discussed (379).

The Court was necessarily aware that it was reliant upon cooperation with the Parliament. This was due to the audit system, which did not give the Court any power to impose sanctions when irregularities were detected. Hence, the Court needed the Parliament if it wanted its reports to carry any political weight. At the same time, the Parliament was supposed to help the Court, in its early stages, to attain a strong standing among the Community institutions, as there was justifiable concern that the Commission or the Council would not show the Court the desired degree of respect (380). This had been the fate suffered by the Audit Board, so the Court was careful from the outset to symbolically convey the importance of its role. Among other things, the Parliament was to provide the forum for this cooperation. Hence, the Court asked the Parliament for seats to be set aside for it in the plenary ROADS TO EUROPE 84

chamber to reflect its special status (381). However, this was not the norm for the national audit offices in any of the Member States’ national parliaments, and the EP Bureau was cautious in its response (382).

Meanwhile, as well as the Bureau of the Parliament, Aigner himself had made contact with the Court via the Control Subcommittee. As already mentioned, Aigner placed great importance on the Court’s mandate to prepare special reports; indeed, he stressed this in his letter to the President of the Court. For even greater emphasis, he immediately called on behalf of the Control Subcommittee for a special report on the Communities’ Stabex system (383) — just three months after the Court had started operating (384). While the Court agreed to this request (385), it insisted on rapidly formalising its relations with the Parliament (386) in order to underline its independence and special status, given that it by no means wished to be viewed as a ‘branch of the Parliament’ (387). The Court therefore prepared a memorandum defining its relations with the Parliament. In the memorandum, it sought assurance that requests to the Court and invitations to attend Parliament meetings would be sent in advance, and in writing, via the Parliament’s Bureau. It wished to ensure that MEPs would not be able to randomly request reports and opinions from the Court on their own initiative, and to prevent the Court from being called to meetings at short notice and without a proper invitation, as had previously happened to the Audit Board of the Communities. At the same time, it was left to the Parliament to decide which committees would cooperate with the Court (388).

An official of the Court was seconded to the Control Although, as a new body, Subcommittee as a permanent observer. However, the Court found itself in a members of the Court only attended meetings if relevant items were being discussed, such as those relating to difficult situation, as it was 389 faced with expectations ECA reports ( ). This arrangement satisfied the Court’s requirements, and introducing a permanent observer from all sides and initially also took account of Aigner’s and the Parliament’s desire had to assert itself, for close relations, without giving too much importance formal relationships that to that relationship. This was because the observer was were satisfactory to all merely an official of the Court and not a member, and parties were successfully therefore had a lower status and no authority to express established within the first his or her personal opinion in discussions (390). Aigner few months. and the Control Subcommittee fully agreed to the arrangements proposed by the Court (391). In turn, the Committee on Budgets supported the Court’s demands to be allocated more resources in the budget for its operational needs (392). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 85

On the whole, initial contacts between the Parliament, the Committee ~ on Budgets, the Control Subcommittee and the Court of Auditors were The ECA’s buildings very positive. Although, as a new body, the Court found itself in a difficult (April 2013). situation, as it was faced with expectations from all sides and initially had to assert itself, formal relationships that were satisfactory to all parties were Source: European successfully established within the first few months. Of course, it remained Court of Auditors to be seen whether these arrangements would continue to work in practice once the Court had developed a working routine and was less concerned with organisational issues. Minor conflicts did, in fact, later arise between the Parliament and the Court, such as during the Court’s audit of the EP Secretariat (393). The development of relations between the Parliament and the Court in later years cannot be studied any further within the scope of this book, and this requires more detailed, source-based research (394). However, when we come to consider the further course of Aigner’s political career, the Court will continue to play a role, particularly as regards his involvement in combating fraud within the European Communities (395). ROADS TO EUROPE 86

HOPES6. AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: THE FIRST DIRECT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS IN 1979 AND THE BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS IN 1980

AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR EUROPE — AND FOR FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS?

We have already divided Aigner’s time as an MEP into two phases. Aside from the establishment of a European audit office, his main aim in the first phase was to bring about direct elections to the Parliament (396). Even the Rome Treaties in 1957 had provided for the It was not until June direct election of the Assembly, for which procedures 1979 that the first direct were supposed to be drawn up (397). The Parliament had European elections took submitted a blueprint as far back as 1960, yet approval place. In the run-up to from the Council of Ministers could not be obtained for a long time, and it was not until June 1979 that the first the elections, they were 398 ascribed great importance, direct European elections took place ( ). In the run-up particularly in West to the elections, they were ascribed great importance, particularly in West Germany, where the then Foreign Germany, where the then Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, even heralded a Foreign Minister, Hans- ‘new chapter in the history of European unification’ (399). Dietrich Genscher, even The CDU and CSU also advocated the introduction of heralded a ‘new chapter direct suffrage, although the elections, and above all their in the history of European timing, posed a challenge for the parties. For one thing, unification’. the direct elections were being held for the first time, and so voter interest and involvement first had to be engaged. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 87

Secondly, there was little understanding of European politics, and the direct implications for the electorate were low, since neither a future government nor direct candidates were being elected but only an electoral list (400). Thirdly, the next elections to the Bundestag were due to be held in 1980, just one year after the European elections. Therefore, there were fears that the election campaign and results would have repercussions on the Bundestag elections, in which the ‘union’ parties were hoping to topple the SPD after 11 years in power.

The Paneuropean Union’s Europe Day in Munich: cross-party rally or CSU election campaign?

For Aigner, the European elections were a particularly important event. Now that the Court of Auditors had Aigner’s aim — in which he been successfully set up and the European Parliament’s was ultimately successful budgetary powers extended, the Parliament was finally — was to organise the set to obtain democratic legitimacy through direct continent’s largest-ever elections. Aigner saw these as a springboard for a further congress on Europe. extension of the Parliament’s power, which he deemed necessary for Europe’s future. Moreover, the election campaign presented an opportunity to bring the topic of Europe closer to its citizens and to impress upon them the need for the European Communities, which Aigner held to be so important. While Aigner was convinced of his vision for Europe, at the same time he was not a pure idealist. His election campaign and actions always had underlying partisan and electoral motives.

It was the CSU that originally mooted the idea of holding a large European election congress in Munich’s Olympic Hall (401). Yet after the party decided that there was too great a risk of being unable to fill the hall with 10 000 to 12 000 people, Aigner, as chairman of the Bavarian Paneuropean Union association, quickly took over organisation of the event (402). The format was changed to a Paneuropean Union Europe Day, and Aigner’s aim — in which he was ultimately successful — was to organise the continent’s largest-ever congress on Europe (403). Around 12 000 people took part in a mass rally at Munich’s Olympic Hall on 12 May 1979. Among the speakers he managed to line up for the Paneuropean Union were: Otto von Habsburg; the Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauß; his predecessor Alfons Goppel; and the Russian writer and dissident Vladimir Maximov. Even Margaret Thatcher had accepted her invitation as guest of honour, although she was forced to pull out ROADS TO EUROPE 88

at short notice following her election as UK Prime Minister. The programme of fringe events got underway during the day in Munich’s pedestrian area, where folk dance troupes performed. Religious services were led by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in the Frauenkirche and by Bavaria’s Evangelical bishop Johannes Hanselmann in the Matthäuskirche. In addition to the ordinary congress- goers, there were approximately 2 000 Bavarian singers and musicians, as well as groups in local dress and delegations from 10 European countries (404).

The change in format from an election congress to a ‘Europe Day’ offered many advantages since, as it was no longer party-affiliated, the event could be marketed as a cross-party rally for Europe, thus opening it up to a larger circle of potential participants and also making it easier than it would have been for a party-affiliated event to attract project partners and supporters to help with organisation. For example, the Technische Hilfswerk (government relief and intervention service) and the Federal army took over participant welfare. However, the main supporter was the Bavarian Catholic Church. Most participants were brought on board via Bavaria’s various Christian associations; Cardinal Ratzinger’s celebratory mass with Regensburg’s Cathedral Choir drew in 6 000 visitors alone (405). Nevertheless, Aigner’s ‘Europe Day’ came under heavy fire from the Bavarian SPD and the press (406), which likened the event to the Nazis’ Nuremberg Rally (407). Otto von Habsburg’s presence on the CSU’s list of candidates for the European Parliament and his earlier German naturalisation were controversial (408). The SPD clearly saw the event as a partisan act, which was to be financed using tax revenue since Aigner had sought support for the event from the district councils in Bavaria (409). This sparked a public dispute as letters were exchanged between Cardinal Ratzinger and the SPD Regional Chairman Helmut Rothemund, who accused the Catholic Church of political bias (410).

Ultimately, the altercations in the run-up to the event probably contributed to its success. Many large cross-regional newspapers reported on it, and even critical articles nevertheless revealed a certain admiration for the scale and pomp of ‘Europe Day’ (411). In taking charge of the event, Aigner achieved several goals, since ‘Europe Day’ generated huge publicity for the small Paneuropean Union and packaging the event as a cross-party rally secured the participation of prominent guests and supporters, while keeping up the campaign for the European elections through speeches by Franz Josef Strauß, Otto von Habsburg, and Aigner himself. In addition, Aigner performed a great service to his party in organising the event. That said, taking charge of the organisation also carried risks. The work had to be shouldered by the small administrative office of the Paneuropean Union in HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 89

Bavaria and the Paneuropean youth movement. The Union lacked sufficient resources and had to rely on entrance fees and support from the Free State of Bavaria for financing (412).

Election campaign for Franz Josef Strauß

At first, the risk Aigner took in organising the event and his commitment appeared to bear fruit. At the time, he was cultivating a close relationship with Franz Josef Strauß and was able to successfully plant his own ideas within the CSU. For example, it was originally Aigner’s suggestion to include Otto von Habsburg on the list of CSU candidates for the European Parliament, and to this end he obtained the support both of Habsburg and of Strauß against the opposition of some party colleagues, such as Edmund Stoiber (413). Although Aigner did not belong to any leading party committees, he was increasingly involved with party strategy. On the question of the party’s candidate for Chancellor for the 1980 Bundestag elections, he actively backed Strauß. During the head-to-head between Strauß and Helmut Kohl for the candidacy, it was mooted that the CSU should put forward a nationwide list for the 1980 elections (414). Aigner was in favour of this idea and proposed trialling a nationwide list during the European elections (415). Once Strauß had got the nod as candidate for Chancellor, he was refused electoral support by the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein. With this, Aigner (assisted by the Paneuropean youth movement) took charge of the election campaign in Schleswig-Holstein, where, thanks to his action plan, 100 events took place (416). In exchange, Strauß probably intended to appoint Aigner to his cabinet as development minister should he be elected Chancellor (417). At this time, Aigner was at the pinnacle of his political career with the CSU. After the defeat in the Bundestag elections, he dramatically fell out of favour with Strauß and was forced to swallow a series of setbacks (418). ROADS TO EUROPE 90

ACCEPTANCE BACK HOME: HOW AIGNER’S WORK AS AN MEP WAS PERCEIVED IN BAVARIA

Electoral turnout and support in the Upper Palatinate

Aigner was directly elected to the European Parliament on 10 June 1979. The CSU had lined up in Bavaria with a list of candidates headed by former Bavarian Prime Minister Alfons Goppel. Otto von Habsburg was third on the list, with Aigner fifth. In terms of results, the first European elections were a success for the ‘union’ parties: of West Germany’s 81 seats in the Parliament, the CDU won 34 and the CSU won eight. The CSU won 62.5 % of the vote in Bavaria (419). In the other EC countries, too, the parties that had joined forces as the European People’s Party (EPP) (420) in the run-up to the election were successful, although the EPP Group remained just behind the Socialist Group due to differences in electoral systems among the Member States (421). Between them, however, the various conservative parties had a majority of votes, thereby allaying Aigner’s fears of a socialist ‘Popular Front Coalition’ (422) in the Parliament. Given its electoral success in Bavaria, the CSU’s prospects for the 1980 Bundestag elections were good. However, the first European elections were a disappointment for Aigner and the pro-European faithful: while the turnout at Federal level was 65.9 %, Bavaria’s was 423 Although Aigner based his the lowest among the German Länder at 59.1 % ( ). By campaign on having ‘secured European standards, West Germany still managed to lead millions in European the way in terms of voter turnout, which had only been higher in countries with compulsory voting (424). Thus, funding for Bavaria’, there could be no question of a ‘new chapter in the history including the financing of of European unification’ (425) with a high level of interest 35 projects in the Upper and involvement from the European public. According to Palatinate, the population a study by the electoral research group Forschungsgruppe was not seeing the fruits of Wahlen, voters accorded next to no importance to the his European labour. European Parliament, had little interest in it and did not want it to have greater influence (426).

Aigner also felt the effects of the lack of interest in European politics in his Bundestag constituency in the Upper Palatinate. Even in the run-up to the elections, he was publicly criticised by CSU party colleagues in the Upper Palatinate for allegedly not doing enough for his constituency, thus driving them into the arms of the party’s rivals (427). Although Aigner based his campaign on having ‘secured millions in European funding for Bavaria’ (428), including the financing of 35 projects in the Upper Palatinate, the population was not seeing the fruits of his European labour (429). It was being asked HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 91

whether Aigner should run again as a direct candidate in the 1980 Bundestag elections. The CSU had decided The 1979 European at its party conference that, following the introduction elections had shown of direct elections, MEPs should no longer also be able that the public was only 430 to hold seats in the Bundestag or the Landtag ( ). marginally interested in Aigner, too, had supported this decision before the direct such matters, and that elections (431). With the Bundestag elections looming in election campaigns could 1980, however, he experienced a conflict of interests in considering whether to actually give up his Bundestag not be fought on European seat. On the one hand, he himself had opposed dual issues alone. The wider mandates and the CSU leadership was expecting him to connections between stand down. On the other hand, he wanted to bring about European integration greater influence for MEPs. For this reason, he had called and economic and foreign for MEPs to be given a role as advisory members of the policy, and their impact on Bundestag, with full right of intervention in committees, people’s lives, were lost on groups and the plenary, but without the right to vote (432). all but a few. As this call had been rejected, Aigner decided to stand again at the Assembly of Delegates as a candidate for the constituency of Amberg. Or at least, that was his official reason (433). There may have been others: had Strauß been elected Chancellor and Aigner been appointed to the cabinet, a seat in the Bundestag would have been his insurance policy, as he would have been required to give up his seat in the European Parliament. A subsequent change of government, a resignation, or any other threat to his position as a minister would have then left Aigner without any seat or any political future whatsoever. Whatever his reasons may have been, the Assembly of Delegates refused to support him. In the first round of the elections, Aigner was already clearly lagging behind his challenger Hermann Fellner, and the CSU withdrew him as a direct candidate for constituency 218 (434).

Aigner had been a member of the Bundestag for the constituency of Amberg for 23 years, and had always obtained a direct mandate with over 64 % of first preference votes. The CSU’s refusal to field him as Bundestaga candidate in 1980 was first and foremost a rejection of his motives — standing as a candidate purely to ensure a link between the European Parliament and the Bundestag. Moreover, there were younger CSU politicians striving for the opportunity of a vacated seat, and the party’s Board had stated its opposition to dual mandates. Also, in the preceding years, criticism had been levelled within the CSU at Aigner’s European involvement, because of which his work on behalf of his constituency had allegedly suffered. The workload from his dual mandate had increased, and his activities in the European Parliament had been an increasing drain on his time ever since it had been granted greater budgetary powers in the 1970s. While Aigner’s role in bringing about ROADS TO EUROPE 92

a European Court of Auditors and his budgetary policy work had brought him success and recognition at the European level, it had gone virtually unnoticed in the Upper Palatinate. The 1979 European elections had shown that the public was only marginally interested in such matters, and that election campaigns could not be fought on European issues alone (435). The wider connections between European integration and economic and foreign policy, and their impact on people’s lives, were lost on all but a few.

Heinrich Aigner and the CSU

In the end, Aigner’s commitment to Europe failed to pay off in his constituency. At the Land level, at the end of the 1970s it initially looked as though his European political activity might actually boost his career within the CSU. During the European election campaign, the weekly newspaper Die Zeit had described him as the ‘European mastermind in Strauß’s party’ (436). Due to his expertise in development policy — an area in which he had worked at the European level — Aigner was tipped to become the future minister for development. In addition, Strauß intended to appoint him as the ‘key European policymaker’ (437) on the CSU Board. The signs, therefore, augured well both for Aigner’s career and for a boost to the MEPs in the party as a whole.

However, circumstances took a dramatic turn in 1980: Strauß was defeated in the Bundestag elections and the socialist-liberal coalition under Helmut Schmidt clung to power, meaning that a ministerial post for Aigner was no longer even up for debate. Moreover, the region’s MEPs lost their significance for Strauß. As a result, Aigner was not co-opted to the CSU Board and the Bavarian Prime Minister did not receive the Bavarian MEPs until the end of 1981, when over half of their term had already elapsed. Such meetings had already taken place in all the other West German Länder, and even Federal President Carl Carstens had received the MEPs (438). Since Strauß had promised them his full support in a letter written in the early 1980s, his sudden lack of interest in the MEPs was striking (439). His disregard caused resentment among them, but even a letter to Strauß from Alfons Goppel requesting that the MEPs be shown the consideration due to them by protocol was of no avail (440).

Various factors may have caused Strauß’s about-turn. First of all, the European elections had not provided the desired, and anticipated, impetus for European integration. After his failed Chancellery bid, Strauß switched his focus to Bavarian politics, in which area he presumably saw the MEPs as less important. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 93

He needed all the support he could get for the Bundestag elections; but, as Bavarian Prime Minister, the European Once a career outside the Parliament was of no interest to him. Aigner’s fall from European Parliament had favour perhaps had an additional personal element. For become unlikely, Aigner this Aigner was partially responsible since, in seeking to focused on his duties as hold on to his Bundestag constituency, he had flouted an MEP, where, even after a party conference resolution. CSU Secretary-General the founding of the Court Edmund Stoiber had made it clear to him that a dual mandate was undesirable and that his appointment to the of Auditors, he mostly party’s Board depended on his conduct in this regard (441). campaigned to improve Moreover, during the campaign for the 1980 Bundestag the financial control elections there was some ill-feeling between Strauß and system and the fight Aigner, with the latter suspecting a conspiracy within the against fraud. party (442). Even later on, Strauß still appeared to have lost interest in Aigner’s European ideas. He made this apparent when Aigner publicly called for all EC Member States to appoint ministers for Europe and put Strauß’s name into the ring as the West German candidate (443). He also stopped supporting Aigner’s political career. In 1980 Aigner was up for discussion as a candidate to succeed the West German EC Commissioner Guido Brunner (444). Yet he was unsuccessful, despite a few candidates having already turned down the post, and apparently did not obtain the necessary backing from Strauß (445). Instead, Karl-Heinz Narjes of the CDU became the new Commissioner.

In any case, from the mid-1970s, it appears that the lynchpin determining Aigner’s standing in the CSU, his personal success and the level of Bavarian support for his European activities was his relationship with Strauß. This was not surprising inasmuch as Strauß, in this period, was both party Chairman and the Bavarian Prime Minister, meaning that his views carried the most weight in the CSU. Nevertheless, his support for Aigner appears to have been dependent not only on the importance that Strauß attached to European politics at that time, but also on the personal relationship between the two men. Once a career outside the European Parliament had become unlikely, Aigner focused on his duties as an MEP, where, even after the founding of the Court of Auditors, he mostly campaigned to improve the financial control system and the fight against fraud. ROADS TO EUROPE 94

FOCUS7. ON EUROPE: THE TAXPAYER’S ADVOCATE — AIGNER’S FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD IN THE COMMUNITIES

THE CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL

Following the first direct European elections in 1979, the Control Subcommittee of the Committee on Budgets emerged as a fully-fledged committee in its own right. The idea of creating a separate audit committee had been considered as early as 1976. A ‘control’ subcommittee had been established in May 1973 but had only ever met irregularly, and then for a limited time (446). With the strengthening of its budgetary control powers by the Treaty of Brussels in 1975, the Parliament needed to put procedures and organisational structures in place in The Parliament adopted a order to take on its new responsibilities. In this context, resolution on 15 June 1976 the creation of an audit committee was proposed in the 447 approving the creation Committee on Budgets ( ). Despite recognition of the of a permanent Control need for the Parliament to have an audit body, a majority Subcommittee with of the members of the Committee on Budgets were in favour of maintaining the Control Subcommittee, but responsibility for auditing wanted to make it a permanent body and clearly define expenditure, and Aigner its powers. The Committee on Budgets wanted to retain became its Chair. responsibility for all areas of budgetary policy and did not wish to yield control to a separate committee. Aigner’s HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 95

main concern in this debate was to formalise the subcommittee’s relations with the future Court of Auditors in advance on behalf of the Parliament (448), and to increase the number of secretarial staff at the subcommittee’s disposal (449). The Parliament adopted a resolution on 15 June 1976 approving the creation of a permanent Control Subcommittee with responsibility for auditing expenditure (450), and Aigner became its Chair.

Aigner had been a member of the Committee on Budgets ever since 1961, where he had been able to contribute and build upon the experience he had gained from his work in the Bundestag. In 1973, he had become the Vice-Chair of the committee; now, most recently, he was the Chair of the Control Subcommittee. Following the first European elections in 1979, the subcommittee would successfully emerge as a committee in its own right (451) — the Committee on Budgetary Control — and Aigner would remain its Chair for the rest of his life. The new subcommittee, yet to become the Committee on Budgetary Control, faced three challenges. Firstly, it had a considerable backlog of work to catch up on. Discharge was yet to be granted in respect of the 1972-1976 financial years, and the accompanying reports and recommendations also had to be prepared. This was, for the most part, accomplished by the Control Subcommittee before the direct elections (452). Secondly, in view of the Parliament’s new power to grant discharge to the Commission, all the elements of a discharge procedure had to be put in place, along with the necessary structures and groundwork (453). Finally, the roles of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control also needed to be defined and mutually delineated. Stephen Clark and Julian Priestley consider it a major achievement on the part of Aigner and Erwin Lange, then Chair of the Committee on Budgets, ‘that this organisational divorce did not degenerate into unmanageable turf wars’ (454).

In this context, we should mention the major role played by German MEPs in budgetary policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Aigner and Lange presided over the budgetary policy committees, and there were a number of other German MEPs on the committees, such as Martin Bangemann and Horst Gerlach, who acted as rapporteurs. This involvement can be explained by the perception, widely held to this day, of the Federal Republic as Europe’s paymaster, which made budgetary policy — and budgetary control in particular — an important issue for MEPs vis-à-vis their electorates and in overcoming prejudices against European integration (455). In the European Parliament, German MEPs were careful, in asserting their budgetary powers, to avoid any conflict with the Commission or the Council, and this had led the press to dub them ‘the German Mafia in the European Parliament’ (456). ROADS TO EUROPE 96

Aigner had already established relations with the Court of Auditors in 1978 via the Control Subcommittee. In his view, however, the role of the Committee on Budgetary Control was not merely to work with the Court, but also continuously to improve the control bodies of the Communities. For him, this also included forging links to national and regional audit offices in the Member States (457). For example, the Committee on Budgetary Control held its November 1981 meeting in Munich in order to exchange views with the Bavarian Landtag’s budgetary committee and the Bavarian Supreme Audit Office (458). Aigner was particularly interested in cooperation between the Bundesrechnungshof and its Bavarian counterpart, as this was an issue of some importance for the European Court of Auditors (459). The choice of Bavaria as the meeting venue had of course been made with Aigner’s interests in mind. Firstly, it was a way for him to try to focus the attention of Bavarian politicians and the CSU leadership once more on European issues (460). Secondly, he was seeking to further expand his networks and to gain even greater influence in shaping budgetary control and the fight against fraud in the European Communities through cooperation with the national audit authorities (461). Aigner’s decision to expand his network in the direction of Bavaria was down to his background, and he also used his position as Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control to establish relations with other Member States, one example being a visit by the committee to the Dutch national audit office in 1984 (462).

The creation of the Committee on Budgetary Control The creation of the was one of the most obvious consequences of the direct 463 Committee on Budgetary elections ( ). In his role as Chair, Aigner was anxious Control was one of the to ensure from the outset that the committee had its most obvious consequences own profile and could assert itself effectively vis-à-vis the other institutions. He viewed the committee as a of the direct elections. ‘citizens’ advocate of more efficient use of taxpayers’ money by the Commission’ (464). ‘Aigner […] made the new committee a force to be reckoned with by adopting a relentless inquisitorial style’ (465). His influence can also be seen in how the committee was referred to: it was often the ‘Aigner Committee’ (466) in internal documents, and in Brussels it was dubbed the ‘Schreckenskabinett des Dr Aigner’ (literally: ‘Dr Aigner’s cabinet of horrors’) (467). The Committee on Budgetary Control gained this reputation in particular through two events relating to internal control in which Aigner played a crucial role. We will therefore briefly discuss those events below. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 97

SETTING AN EXAMPLE FOR INTERNAL CONTROL

Wrangling with the Commission: the 1976/77 Malt Affair

The first episode that made a talking point of the new permanent Control Subcommittee chaired by Aigner The first episode that was the Malt Affair. In 1975 and 1976, the Commission made a talking point of the had paid out excessive refunds on malt exports, and this new permanent Control was criticised by the Commission’s financial controller 468 Subcommittee chaired by in an internal report ( ). In July 1976, the Control Subcommittee asked for a copy of this report, but the Aigner was the Malt Affair. Commission refused, insisting on the need to uphold the independence of its financial controller and claiming that it could not hand over an internal document (469). Although the Commission supplied it with other reports and information, the subcommittee made the release of this specific report a matter of principle. The Commission was given until 1 December 1976 to forward the report (470). When the Commission let the deadline pass unheeded, Aigner tabled a motion of censure against the Commission in a plenary session. He believed that the Parliament should not stand for this refusal and ought to assert its right of scrutiny, failing which it would lose all credibility and a precedent would be set for the Commission (471). Although many MEPs supported this view, they opposed the timing of the motion of censure. The Commission’s mandate was set to end three weeks later, so the motion would have to be adopted under time pressure, and the MEPs wanted to wait and see what the new Commission had to say on the matter. Aigner was therefore obliged to withdraw his motion of censure (472).

In spite of this, the Malt Affair turned out to be good news for Aigner and the Control Subcommittee. The new Commission under President Roy Jenkins declared its willingness to provide the Parliament with the report — and with internal documents in general, which were also handed over to the subcommittee — for budgetary control purposes, provided that the confidentiality of the documents could be assured. In return, a procedure for safeguarding confidentiality was to be developed jointly (473). The Control Subcommittee thus succeeded right at the beginning of its permanent tenure in asserting its claims and the Parliament’s new powers of scrutiny. The Malt Affair is therefore hugely significant, since the Parliament had only just been granted greater budgetary control powers and was requesting Commission documents for the first time. Aigner’s motion of censure ‘led to a debate of principle on the extent and practical application of Parliament’s right of control in the Community’ (474). By securing the hand-over of internal documents to ROADS TO EUROPE 98

the subcommittee, Aigner created a precedent which would continue to play a role in subsequent disputes with the Commission, in particular during the refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year (475).

The refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year

There were three main steps to the Communities’ The discharge decision annual budgetary procedure: establishing the budget, gradually evolved from implementing the budget and, finally, granting discharge a functional part of the for the implementation of the budget. As its budgetary budgetary procedure to a powers were strengthened by the Treaties of 1970 and 1975, the Parliament became increasingly involved in political tool wielded by these procedures. Following the entry into force of the the Parliament. Brussels Treaty in 1977, the power to grant discharge lay exclusively with the Parliament (476). The Committee on Budgetary Control prepared the discharge resolution in a report based primarily on the Court of Auditors’ annual report. It was in the discharge procedure that the cooperative relationship between the Court and the Parliament was most visible: in order to enforce its recommendations, the Court of Auditors needed the Parliament, whereas the latter obtained instruction from the Court’s annual report (477). After the first direct elections in 1979, the Committee on Budgetary Control ascribed increasing importance to the discharge decision, as attested to by the sheer rise in the number of pages dedicated to discharge resolutions in the Official Journal of the European Communities (478). An awareness of the significance of the power of discharge was slow to take hold in the debating chamber. Aigner therefore called for greater recognition in the Parliament of its exclusive prerogative in this area (479). Scholars have labelled the Parliament’s securing of the power of discharge as a huge gain in political influence, since it gave it the opportunity to make a political stand (480). In its resolution, the Parliament could pass judgement on the Commission’s actions in any given financial year and, in so doing, hope to influence future Commission policies (481). The discharge decision gradually evolved from a functional part of the budgetary procedure to a political tool wielded by the Parliament. An important step in this direction was taken with the refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year.

Since the introduction of direct elections, the Parliament had used the discharge procedure to demonstrate its augmented status. Discharge of the Commission’s budget for 1980 and 1982 was postponed, and the resolutions were increasingly coupled with conditions and demands (482). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 99

In March 1984, in the Committee on Budgetary Control, Aigner and Bodil Boserup, the rapporteurs for discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the 1982 budget, spoke in favour of refusing discharge. However, the committee, and later the plenary session, too, initially voted by majority to postpone discharge, as the Parliament would shortly face its second direct elections and, in any case, the European Communities were navigating a difficult financial crisis in 1984 (483). A refusal to grant discharge was deemed unconstructive at this point in time, and there was a desire to leave the decision to the newly elected Parliament and to give the Commission an opportunity to explain itself. In the new Parliament, the Committee on Budgetary Control, again chaired by Aigner, deemed the Commission’s comments to be unsatisfactory and submitted a motion for a resolution to the plenary session on the refusal of discharge. In the session on 14 November 1984, the Commission was for the first time refused discharge for a financial year (484).

The reasons given for the refusal covered various areas. The Parliament bemoaned the Commission’s failings Its members believed: and its disregard for the Parliament’s amendments and ‘Parliamentary control, criticism when implementing the budget in the areas of 485 whatever the form in agriculture, food aid and financial management ( ). The which it is exercised, is refusal to grant discharge was controversial from various political control, and perspectives. Firstly, the Commission was of the opinion that a refusal was actually technically impossible, since political control must discharge was based on a judgement of the Commission’s perforce lead to political accounting rather than its political conduct. Therefore, judgements!’ discharge could not be refused but merely postponed pending correction of the accounts (486). The Parliament, by contrast, held an altogether different view and, in 1981, amended its rules of procedure so as to allow a refusal as opposed to just a postponement (487). Its members believed: ‘Parliamentary control, whatever the form in which it is exercised, is political control, and political control must perforce lead to political judgements!’ (488) The Commission also had substantive criticisms of the refusal, since not all the reasons given related to the 1982 financial year; some were general reproaches regarding the Commission’s policies. In the Commission’s view, ‘to use a discharge resolution as a vehicle for general criticism of the Commission’s record [was] an abuse of the Communities procedure’ (489).

It is irrelevant for our purposes whether the procedure is viewed as one of the Parliament’s duties or as an abuse of its powers. The crucial point is that, for Aigner, the discharge procedure was becoming more political (490). This is ROADS TO EUROPE 100

particularly apparent from his comments in the Parliament, in which general political motives were clearly more important than budgetary grounds. He believed that the Commission was not making sufficient use of its right of initiative, was no longer fulfilling its role as ‘the Community’s driving force […] of its further development’ (491) and had become a ‘general secretariat of the Council’ (492). In this regard, he saw the refusal of discharge and the criticism it expressed as an opportunity to advance the EC and to strengthen the Commission in relation to the Council (493). Discharge should become a vehicle for the Parliament to exercise influence over Commission policies and bring about changes, despite not having any legislative powers. In addition, in militating for the refusal to grant discharge, Aigner was defending hard- won parliamentary powers. In the run-up to the discharge, the Commission had — as with the Malt Affair — refused to release internal documents on the Milk Marketing Board Affair (494). Since the Commission had promised to share internal documents with the Parliament in the wake of the Malt Affair, Aigner was unable to accept the documents being kept under wraps and sought to force their disclosure by refusing discharge (495).

In considering the discharge debate, we should examine not only internal Community motivations but also the historical context. In the first half of the 1980s, the Communities were embroiled in crisis. The integration process had stalled due to a weak global economy and the pursuit of national interests. In addition, the Communities were suffering from financial problems inflicted by the mounting costs of the common agricultural policy (496), and the UK was demanding a rebate because it paid more money into the EC than it received from the budget (497). Under such circumstances, the European Parliament disagreed with the Council’s policies, which were further hobbled by the unanimity procedure then in place. The refusal of discharge to the Commission was intended as a criticism of the Council, which represented the national governments. The Commission became a ‘scapegoat’ 498 ( ) for not having done enough to build alliances with the Parliament against the Council. Essentially, the cause of the grievances lay with the Council, yet the Parliament was unable to bring any direct influence to bear over that institution. The Parliament’s aim was to encourage the Commission to cooperate more closely with it, since ‘the Council is the enemy’ (499), as former Parliament President Simone Veil avowed.

The refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year was the first milestone in a process which saw the Parliament increasingly assert and wield its new budgetary powers. As the Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control, Aigner played an important role in this process and sought to make full use of the Parliament’s powers. But just how successful was he in his quest? If we consider HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 101

only the obvious consequences of the refusal, the answer is rather sobering. It did not lead to the Commission’s resignation, despite one Commissioner declaring before the Parliament in 1979 that refusing to grant discharge would equate to a vote of no confidence and should result in the Commission’s dismissal (500). Nor did the Parliament table its own vote of no confidence, since the Commission’s mandate was to end a few weeks later anyway. Henry Marty-Gauquié deems discharge to be nothing more than an administrative act; only when combined with a motion of censure can it become a political weapon (501). Yet this first refusal of discharge in the history of the European Communities lacked just such a combination. Although, during debates on the discharge, the Parliament reminded the Commission repeatedly how one of its own members had interpreted refusal, it left the decision as to the consequences of refusal to the Commission (502). The upshot was that the refusal had no direct political consequences. In the wrangling over the disclosure of internal Commission documents, it again failed to achieve the desired effect. Even the new Commission led by President Jacques Delors initially refused to release the internal documents involved in the Milk Marketing Board Affair, and the conflict was not finally resolved until 1987 (503).

From a long-term perspective, the refusal to grant discharge for the 1982 financial year, as ushered through In the period that followed, by Aigner, was, nevertheless, a small but important step the discharge procedure in developing the European Parliament’s budgetary gained in significance and powers and political authority. Through its decision came to be seen as the most to refuse discharge, the Parliament gained in self- effective vehicle for change confidence, as became apparent from its resolution on discharge to the Commission for the 1983 financial year: in administrative practice ‘Through this decision […] the Parliament acknowledged, and in the implementation for the first time, that it had the power not only to make of European Community observations on the Executive’s management, but also policies. to enjoin and compel the addressee of the resolution to act in a certain way.’ (504) Upon the initiative of the Committee on Budgetary Control, under Aigner’s leadership, the Parliament thus developed an understanding of how to use its budgetary powers to exact certain measures from the Commission, thereby expanding its influence. In the period that followed, the discharge procedure gained in significance and came to be seen as the most effective vehicle for change in administrative practice and in the implementation of European Community policies (505). At the very latest this came to the fore with the wholesale resignation of the Santer Commission in March 1999, after discharge had been refused for the 1996 financial year (506). True, the political impact of the Parliament’s power of discharge remained limited until the 1990s, but the refusal of 1984 did give a first hint of the potential within that power. ROADS TO EUROPE 102

Aside from their political effect, the events surrounding the refusal of discharge also had institutional repercussions, since this extreme situation helped to increase the intensity of contacts between the Committee on Budgetary Control and the Court of Auditors, and to demarcate the respective roles of the two institutions. Preparation of the discharge decision is a collaborative process involving the Parliament (particularly the Committee on Budgetary Control) and the Court. On the one hand, the Court’s annual report forms the basis for the committee’s work; on the other, the Parliament offers a channel through which the Court’s activities can take effect (507). The Court conducted itself accordingly during the debates leading to the refusal of discharge. When presenting the 1982 annual report to the Committee on Budgetary Control, André Middelhoek, a member of the Court, urged the committee to make discharge a veritable vehicle for parliamentary control (508). In so doing, the Court sided with the Parliament, against the Commission, in viewing discharge as having a political as well as an administrative dimension. At the same time, however, the Court made clear that, although advising and assisting the Parliament, it would remain entirely in the background during the discharge procedure, simply providing evidence on the basis of which the committee could reach its political decision (509). Thus, the Court wanted to remain neutral on these political matters and limited its role, from then on, to providing information on purely substantive and technical issues. Even when assessing the consequences of the discharge refusal, the Court exercised restraint (510) in advising the committee on how, post-refusal, the 1982 financial year could be closed from an accounting perspective 511 ( ). Thanks to its politically neutral yet supportive attitude, the Court was able to strengthen its relations with Aigner’s Committee on Budgetary Control, and it spoke out in favour of closer contact between the committee’s rapporteurs and the Court’s staff (512).

THE AUDIT ‘FLYING SQUAD’: EXTERNAL CONTROL

At Aigner’s instigation, the Committee on Budgetary Control involved itself not only in auditing institutions within the Communities, but also in financial control and combating fraud in the EC’s multi-level system. From the outset, the European Communities had been struggling with fraud and irregularities, which had often tarnished their public image. The EC’s supranational system was susceptible to fraud for three reasons. Firstly, Community expenditures largely consisted of aid payments, which carried a temptation for potential beneficiaries to make false declarations regarding their eligibility. Secondly, HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 103

the interweaving of supranational and national powers in the implementation and control of the European Communities’ budget carried inherent risks. The Commission was reliant on Member States to administer the resources made available in the budget for EC policy programmes, and itself had no control over how the resources were used. Thirdly, the risk of fraud was made greater by the unlikelihood of prosecution and conviction, due to a lack of supervision and differing criminal laws in the Member States (513). In addition to the irregular use of its funds, the EC’s legitimacy was also jeopardised by fraud. Cases of fraud always received wide press coverage, thus undermining the credibility of European integration in the public eye (514).

Aigner had identified this risk at an early stage and, as far back as 1970, had proposed setting up an information In the course of discussions 515 system to tackle fraud ( ). In his capacity as Chair of on the new audit body, the new Committee on Budgetary Control, in particular, Aigner suggested creating he dealt with cases of fraud and financial irregularities an audit ‘flying squad’ to within the Communities and developed plans to combat conduct ad hoc on-the-spot them. In his 1973 Case for a European Audit Office, he was already engaging with these issues and with the checks in Member States. problem of supervision between the Commission and Member States’ administrations (516). In the course of discussions on the new audit body, Aigner suggested creating an audit ‘flying squad’ (517) to conduct ad hoc on-the-spot checks in Member States. The Council, however, responded hesitantly to proposals on combating fraud and, for a long time, there was no improvement. This led to asymmetry in European integration because, while Member States had increasingly transferred budgetary resources and powers to the Communities over time, they were against any harmonisation in the field of criminal law (518), making the fight against fraud more difficult.

Once the European Parliament’s legitimacy had been increased by the introduction of direct elections and the successful establishment of the Court of Auditors, Aigner saw a new opportunity to make progress in the fight against fraud. In 1985, a then record number of fraud cases came to light in the European Communities (519). At the same time, the Communities were in the midst of an as yet unresolved budgetary crisis, as they needed to expand the share of their own financial resources. The UK in particular was opposed to any increase in Community resources, from which it seemed to benefit less than other Member States. UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that there was no legally binding, effective control of Community expenditure in Member States (520). Against this backdrop, Aigner revived his idea for an audit flying squad and put it forward once again in the discussion on ROADS TO EUROPE 104

improving financial control. He used a similar approach to Once the European gain acceptance for his proposal as he did for the creation Parliament’s legitimacy of the Court of Auditors. He started by obtaining greater had been increased by press coverage, in Germany at least, for his idea of a corps the introduction of direct of Community auditors. Newspaper articles and television reports on cases of fraud, along with Aigner’s ideas elections and the successful on how to solve the problem, were aimed at increasing establishment of the Court public pressure on the Council to adopt measures to of Auditors, Aigner saw combat fraud (521). The Committee on Budgetary Control a new opportunity to and the Court of Auditors also organised a public hearing make progress in the fight on ways of improving financial control 522 ( ), to which against fraud. experts from national and European authorities were invited. The committee held government-level talks in several Member States in order to lend greater urgency to Aigner’s demands (523). Here, too, Aigner attempted to develop contacts in order to serve his interests. In this instance, he found a particular ally in the UK government, which had a vested interest in a more effective control system. Following these discussions, in 1987, the Commission established an Anti-Fraud Coordination Unit (UCLAF) (524) in its Secretariat-General (525). This was a first step towards effective action against fraud. In 1999, the UCLAF was superseded by an independent Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) following the emergence of cases of maladministration, which had led to the resignation of the Santer Commission earlier the same year (526).

To summarise, we have seen that, after losing his seat in the Bundestag, Aigner focused on politics at the European level. Although the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 did not deliver the desired impetus for European integration, Aigner nevertheless viewed direct suffrage as a basis for giving the Parliament legitimacy and an opportunity to increase its powers. In his view, MEPs now had ‘a clear electoral mandate to achieve not only the economic but also the political unification of Europe’ (527). He regarded himself as a ‘citizens’ advocate of more efficient use of taxpayers’ money by the Commission (528) and, to this end, extended the role of the newly formed Committee on Budgetary Control. Under Aigner’s chairmanship, the committee developed into a ‘watchdog’ (529) for Community finances. The Commission in particular saw the effects of this, as demonstrated by the events surrounding the Malt Affair and the refusal to grant discharge in respect of the 1982 financial year. With its sometimes uncompromising approach, being afraid neither to involve the press nor to threaten motions of no confidence, the ‘Aigner Committee’ 530 ( ) acquired a certain standing compared to the otherwise very weak Parliament. The support of the Court of Auditors, which lent its well-established expertise, was crucial in this regard. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 105

Notwithstanding, the committee always had to fight to assert its rights, such as the right of access to internal In his view, MEPs now documents in the Milk Marketing Board Affair. Although had ‘a clear electoral the committee made progress in the fight against fraud, mandate to achieve Rainer Graf criticises the fact that ‘its entire work not only the economic focused only on curing symptoms, without ever really but also the political penetrating to the core of the problem (which lay in the objectives of Community policy and in the relationship unification of Europe’. between the EC and the Member States)’ (531). In this regard, the committee did not actually have the necessary powers. Nevertheless, it succeeded in driving forward the establishment of an independent unit to combat fraud, which subsequently developed into an independent fraud office. In dealing with fraud, Aigner also discovered how Member States’ differing cultural practices affected their recognition of EC legislation. West Germany regularly had the highest number of reported cases of attempted fraud. This did not necessarily mean, however, that the country saw the highest incidence of fraud, but rather, first and foremost, that the monitoring and reporting of cases was tackled very differently between countries and regions (532). In its fight against fraud, the committee sought to develop initial procedures along the road towards a common European understanding of the law in this field.

The 1 000th meeting of the ECA Members (27 October 2014).

Source: European Court of Auditors ROADS TO EUROPE 106

CONCLUSION8.

HEINRICH AIGNER IN THE EYES OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES

Our investigation of Aigner’s work as an MEP has illuminated his role in developing the European Communities’ fiscal and budgetary policy. This biographical study has also shown that, while European politics were indeed an important part of Aigner’s life, he also considered other career options at the state or federal level. His focus on the European Parliament after its first direct elections in 1979 was not so much a conscious decision as dictated by circumstance, as shown by the conflict about whether he should keep his seat in the Bundestag. By no means, however, did Aigner view European politics and his activities in the European Parliament as a mere stepping stone. Although he always maintained his primary address in Amberg, he bought a house in Alsace, close to the plenary of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and took a language course in an effort to improve his French (533). Thus, he sought to live out his own vision for Europe.

Any impact his Bavarian background may have had on his political activity in the European Parliament is difficult to discern. His fundamental positions and involvement in budgetary policy and control can mainly be attributed to national interests and circumstances. For example, German and UK MEPs in HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 107

particular were involved in budgetary policy, and support for Community projects, such as the Court of Auditors, Aigner believed firmly in also came from national bodies — in this case the national the need for European audit offices. As a person, meanwhile, MEPs and EC integration and was not officials remembered Aigner as a ‘genial, large Bavarian afraid to present his ideas right-winger’ and a ‘bon viveur who delighted in playing with a certain degree of cards late into the Strasbourg night’ (534), as well as for his peculiar pronunciation of the word ‘Europa’ as Europpa, force. with a short vowel in the second syllable (535). Aigner believed firmly in the need for European integration and was not afraid to present his ideas with a certain degree of force. However, he was also prepared, in the course of debate, to adapt his demands depending on what he felt could still be achieved, and to bide his time using measures from his ‘box of parliamentary tricks’ (536), as he did during the debate on the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Auditors and during the Malt Affair. This led to him being described as a ‘likeable rogue’ (537) by his sympathisers. His at times very direct, short-tempered and spontaneous way of speaking and acting may not always have worked in his favour. Although the publicity from charges brought against him by SPD politicians (malicious gossip being one example) (538) probably did him more good than harm, Aigner’s stubborn approach made him enemies as well as friends, particularly within the CSU. His insistence on maintaining his dual mandate in 1980 may have been part of the reason why he was not ultimately co-opted on to the party’s Board.

Aigner undoubtedly reached his peak political standing within the CSU in the run-up to the first direct elections in 1979. At that time, he was also viewed nationwide as the ‘European mastermind in Strauß’s party’ (539) and described as Strauß’s ‘right-hand man’ (540). Hard as Aigner always fought for a particular cause, he scarcely ever received public credit for his achievements (541). Thus, for all his commitment, he always remained in the second tier within the CSU and never achieved any higher political office. Nevertheless, Aigner was honoured with numerous awards for his services to European unification: the Bavarian Order of Merit in 1968, the First Class Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976 and the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1986 (542). In the same year, he was appointed Commander in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg’s Order of the Oak Crown (543). In 1986, Aigner became the longest-serving MEP in the European Parliament, at 25 years (544). If only in terms of time devoted to it, European politics were the main focus of his life. ROADS TO EUROPE 108

TILTING AT WINDMILLS? AIGNER’S CAREER AS AN MEP

Aigner belonged to a generation that had experienced the full effects of the Second World War. After the war, he started to become involved in politics and was a witness to the debate about possible post-war orders in Germany. Various ideas of Europe and their realisation played a major role in these debates (545). In West Germany in particular, following the devastation wreaked by Nazism, people were seeking a new identity, with the formation of a European consciousness serving as a shared point of reference (546).

For those in the CDU and CSU, such as Aigner, the Abendland idea served as a driving force for integrating Christian values with the idea of European unification. The motivation for this identity formation was largely negative: seeking differentiation from other identities, particularly the communist threat from the East (547).

It was in this ideological environment, which in Bavaria, and especially in the CSU, was marked by strong federalist and regionalist tendencies, that Aigner cut his political teeth. He took up these ideas and formed his own vision for Europe in support of the Paneuropean idea within the eponymous Union. Although the Paneuropean Union did not receive any great support in Bavaria in numerical terms, its ideological basis was compatible with the CSU’s own vision for Europe. This gave Aigner a basis for communicating his policy on Europe in Bavaria and within his party.

Over the course of his career as an MEP, however, his ideas as to the form a supranational European Community should take departed from the CSU’s interests. Although (contrary to what is often assumed) the CSU did have an active policy on Europe, its main focus was on greater participation for the Länder and regions and on preserving Bavaria’s autonomy (548). On the issue of increasing the EC’s powers, Aigner increasingly shed his background in regional politics and became less provincial in his thinking. The day-to-day problems On the issue of increasing of the European institutions made it only too clear that the EC’s powers, Aigner the Communities were suffering due to the Member increasingly shed his States’ excessive pursuit of national interests. Although background in regional Aigner was still in favour of the EC having a federal politics and became less and subsidiary structure, including, for example, a provincial in his thinking. chamber of nationalities, he considered it essential to hand over certain powers held at the national level and, HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 109

in particular, to end dependency on the Member States. This necessity was particularly apparent in budgetary policy and in the fight against fraud, where a lack of Community powers and stonewalling by Member States often led to shortcomings (549). Aigner’s call for greater powers for the European Parliament also resulted in a loss of influence for national governments and, thereby, for the Länder and regions.

Although MEPs in particular would have been in a position to represent the interests of their respective As Chair of the Committee regions of origin, the European Parliament seemed to on Budgetary Control, he the Bavarian government to be too weak for that. In the gained for it the respect of run-up to the first direct elections to the Parliament, the other institutions and the CSU’s leadership was still pinning its hopes on its sought to ensure that the own MEPs. However, interest declined significantly after the elections failed to deliver the desired impetus committee’s demands were towards integration. This was also decisive for Aigner’s accepted. political career in the CSU. For example, whereas in 1978 consideration was still being given to co-opting him onto the party Board, from 1979 until the end of 1981 he did not even manage to have Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauß organise a reception for the Bavarian MEPs (550).

The focus of this study has been Aigner’s budgetary control policy. His campaign to create a European audit office marked an important first step towards establishing effective budgetary control. Furthermore, Aigner was involved in creating new structures in the fight against fraud. As Chair of the Committee on Budgetary Control, he gained for it the respect of the other institutions and sought to ensure that the committee’s demands were accepted. Cooperating and developing relations with the Court of Auditors were crucial for the committee, for without the Court’s support it would have lacked the necessary material for debate.

Aigner viewed budgetary policy as a key element of the European Communities. One motivation behind his commitment to fiscal matters was that fraud cases were playing a part in discrediting the Communities in the public eye and were jeopardising the European project. As an MEP, Aigner also had to counter the accusation at home that West Germany was Europe’s paymaster (551).

He hoped to use his involvement in budgetary control to address these weaknesses and prove to his electorate that he was taking action against ROADS TO EUROPE 110

these allegations. However, the founding of the European Aigner recognised the need Court of Auditors made little impression on the public, to involve citizens more particularly in Aigner’s constituency. Nor did the first closely in the European direct elections to the European Parliament arouse the project and come up with public’s interest in European integration as hoped. Aigner ways of getting them to recognised the need to involve citizens more closely in the European project and come up with ways of getting identify with it. them to identify with it.

With this in mind, he organised the Paneuropean Union’s ‘Europe Day’ in the run-up to the 1979 elections. This and other events were aimed at stirring a sense of European community through mass rallies, e.g. by having everyone in attendance sing together, accompanied by a choir and orchestra of 2 000. Not least for this reason, opponents accused the organisers of propaganda, comparing Europe Day with the Nazis’ Nuremberg Rally (552). However, even measures such as these failed to convince the majority of the population of the importance of the European idea. Although some 12 000 people turned out at the Olympiahalle, the places were mainly occupied by the musicians involved and by mobilising church organisations. Before the second European elections in 1984, Aigner organised another Europe Day in the Olympiahalle, but this time attracted only around 8 000 participants (553). Nor did he manage to gain much attention by portraying himself to the public as a citizens’ advocate at the European level. In his Amberg constituency, his work as an MEP and his frequent absence as a result were even held against him in some quarters, and were a factor in his deselection for the 1980 Bundestag elections.

With this in mind, a critical eye needs to be cast on the theory that European integration is a ‘project of the elites’ (554). Referring to the rejection of the Constitution for Europe in the 2005 French and Dutch referendums, Max Haller suggests that ‘a considerable gulf has opened up between the elites and the public when it comes to European integration’ (555). The example of Aigner shows that this risk had already been identified back in the 1970s. However, attempts to involve the public more closely through regional campaigns or associations such as the Paneuropean Union proved unsuccessful in the long term. It seems paradoxical that Aigner, despite recognising the need to involve a broad segment of the European population, mainly confined his activities at the regional level to the Paneuropean Union — a body which was somewhat elitist in nature and, on account of its conservative ideological orientation based on the Abendland idea, was ill-suited to attracting a broader cross-section of the population. In this regard, Aigner was torn between his own ideological orientation and attracting popular support for his vision for Europe. Although he attempted, through events such as Europe Day, to HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 111

Heinrich Aigner at the end of his career.

Source: European Parliament

combine the two, at a regional level — where he might have been able to connect with the public — he ultimately gave higher priority to propagating an ideology: the Paneuropean idea. By definition, however, this meant that he was only able to gain acceptance for and arouse interest in the supranational EC structure among a smaller number of people. In this context, it is interesting to consider whether rivalry between various European movements at the national and regional levels had any impact on attracting popular support for the supranational European Communities, which operated independently of these levels, and what that impact was. Further research is required at this level in order to get to the bottom of the ‘project of the elites’ theory.

The times and political traditions in which Aigner was raised should not be overlooked as a second motivation behind his budgetary policy work. The issue of effective budgetary control initially assumed importance for the EC with the introduction of its own resources. In the 1960s, the introduction of a common agricultural policy provided new impetus to the growth of the EC, resulting in new budgetary powers being assigned to the European Parliament. During this period of growth, there was greater willingness among Member States to hand over budgetary powers than to put in place effective control structures. Budgetary control only assumed greater priority in connection ROADS TO EUROPE 112

with the first oil crisis in 1973 and the ensuing impact on the global economy, and the decision was made to establish a European audit office. As has already been noted, German and UK MEPs in particular were involved in budgetary policy, due to the interest the two countries had in ensuring the soundness of the EC’s fiscal policy. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were net contributors to the Communities (556). This also ultimately became apparent in the EC’s external control arrangements, which followed the UK and German audit tradition, while internal control was based more on the French model (557).

Aigner’s Bavarian background may have also been a factor, particularly in his involvement in fiscal policy. In the history of Bavaria’s statehood, financial soundness had often been important, particularly in relation to top-level state structures. Bavaria’s experience of financial dependence on the Reich during the Weimar Republic, which had greatly undermined its autonomy, continued to be apparent in its discussions of the post-war order (558). However, apart from Aigner, no specifically Bavarian contribution to the EC’s fiscal policy can be discerned in the period under consideration. For example, Erwin Lange, the Chair of the Committee on Budgets following the direct elections in 1979, was from North Rhine-Westphalia. MEPs were not grouped by national origin, but rather in political groups based on ideology (559). Political and ideological differences did of course exist between MEPs and their political groups. However, in the struggle to assert the Parliament’s rights and achieve its objectives, these differences took more of a back seat than in national parliaments, because the largest political group did not constitute the government of the Communities, nor could any group assume the role of the opposition.

Even with this experience, Aigner branched out beyond the practices of his regional party — and found himself in direct conflict with it as a result. He was forced to explain to the CSU party executive in writing why he had jointly signed a motion with a communist in the European Parliament, a move which reportedly met with general incomprehension within the party (560). For all that Aigner warned in his public statements at regional and national level against the supposed socialist and communist threat, he often cooperated with such people in the European Parliament, for example when refusing discharge in respect of the 1982 financial year. Bodil Boserup, the rapporteur, who helped Aigner to push through the refusal of discharge in the Parliament, was a member of the communist group. Aigner was able to overlook such differences at the European level in order to achieve his objectives. This was not an option at the regional and national levels, where he held unswervingly to his ideological line of communism as the arch-enemy (561). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 113

For Aigner, establishing a European audit office and improving budgetary control were ultimately not For Aigner, establishing only a question of national interest but, above all, of a European audit office strengthening the European Parliament. It is particularly and improving budgetary difficult and controversial in this regard to assess the control were ultimately not importance of his work and its impact on the Parliament’s only a question of national standing. The first question to ask is what contribution interest but, above all, Aigner, as an individual, could possibly have made, and of strengthening the to what extent a culture of remembrance has been built up around him as the ‘founding father’ of the Court European Parliament. of Auditors. As we have seen, the idea of a European audit office already existed before being taken up by Aigner. However, with his Case for a European Audit Office, he attracted the necessary attention for the proposal in the relevant circles and developed an initial concept. Publications on the Court of Auditors usually reduce Aigner’s contribution to the Case; yet he was unable to bring most of the ideas therein to fruition as the Court took shape. His true impact lay in creating a network and forum for exchanging views in the context of the Parliament’s Control Subcommittee. Involving and mobilising the Contact Committee of SAIs in support of the idea of the Court paved the way for meaningful discussion in the first instance, including among decision-makers in the Member States. As such, Aigner can be considered to be the driving force behind the debate, yet with little power to influence specific decisions. He was also reliant, of course, on the support of his fellow committee members and other MEPs, who were needed to back resolutions, for example. In the process of decisions leading to the Court of Auditors, however, Aigner was entirely dependent on the will of the Member States.

As well as looking at Aigner’s role in the establishment of the Court, we also need to ask how much sense creating a new institution made, what impact it had and, hence, to what extent Aigner’s efforts to further the growth of the EC were actually warranted. The Treaty of Brussels of 1975 establishing the European Court of Auditors gave it scarcely greater responsibilities than its predecessor, the Audit Board of the Communities. The Treaty did, however, significantly raise the audit body’s status, for example by giving members a full-time mandate, establishing the Court as an independent body and providing for the publication of its reports in the Official Journal of the European Communities (562). In the further course of European integration, the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice granted the Court new powers and increased the scope of its mission (563). The political importance of the establishment and work of the Court in furthering political integration in Europe has been highlighted time and again in the relevant literature. ROADS TO EUROPE 114

Valentina Vardabasso highlights not only the contribution made by the Court towards developing financial control, but also its indirect impact on improving Community instruments and policy programmes (564). At the same time, the Court provided the basis for expanding the Parliament’s political power of budgetary control, as exercised by Aigner after the first direct elections in particular. The Committee on Budgetary Control developed basic procedures for budgetary control at a political level in the EC, for example in the context of reporting and the resolution on granting discharge to the Commission. As its Chair, Aigner acquired for the committee a formidable reputation, if the accounts of some European officials are to be believed (565). However, talk of the committee’s ‘relentless inquisitorial style’ (566) does suggest an undertone of criticism of its approach.

Although the Parliament managed to consolidate its The establishment of a position in the area of budgets from 1979 onwards, it European audit office did not succeed in gaining any new powers (567). Even and an anti-fraud agreements already obtained on the handing-over of office met the first key documents had to be defended time and again, as the Milk institutional conditions for Marketing Board Affair showed. In this respect, Aigner does indeed appear to have been tilting at windmills. This improvement, even if the also became clear in Aigner’s attempts to combat fraud, results of this improvement a cause in which he had been engaged since early 1970, only became apparent in while fraud cases continued to occur in ever increasing the long term. Through its numbers until 1985. However, the establishment of a budgetary and supervision European audit office and an anti-fraud office met the first policy, the Parliament key institutional conditions for improvement, even if the found new ways to results of this improvement only became apparent in the influence EC policy. long term. Through its budgetary and supervision policy, the Parliament found new ways to influence EC policy.

The increase in the European Parliament’s budgetary powers in the 1970s, and the introduction of direct elections, undoubtedly helped to strengthen the Parliament within the Community system. Even after this, however, the Parliament’s political impact is often considered to have been very minor (568). David Judge and others argue, by contrast, that the Parliament’s influence cannot be assessed in absolute terms, introducing instead the analogy of ‘ripples and waves’ emanating from the institution. The Parliament, as a diverse entity, ‘can display divergent patterns of influence across policy sectors, and often within the same policy area, as well as across time, or even in the same time period’ (569). The achievements in the area of budgetary control, in which Aigner had a major hand, can also be viewed in such terms. They may not have made any great waves of the sort leading to real legislative HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 115

powers for the Parliament, but they were first steps — ripples — on the way to further democratising the Communities.

In the run-up to the 2014 European elections, 35 years after direct suffrage was introduced, we need to ask why the European public is increasingly losing interest in the European Parliament. Both the German and the average European turnout have been in steady decline since 1979. Commenting in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Heribert Prantl describes this as a European paradox: ‘The more important the European Parliament has become, […] the less notice Europeans have taken of it. The Parliament has lost its basis in the same proportion as it has gained influence.’ (570) There is scope for further cultural history research at this level to help solve the current problems facing European integration.

However Aigner’s impact is assessed and whatever the motives behind his actions, there is no doubt that he devoted a significant portion of his life to European politics. Aigner continued his struggle for a united Europe and sound EC fiscal policy right up until his dying moment: during a speech on a European Economic Constitution at the Bavarian State Bank, Heinrich Aigner collapsed. He died shortly afterwards of heart failure, on 24 March 1988, aged 63 (571). ROADS TO EUROPE 116

ANNEXES

EDITED SELECTION OF PUBLICATIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Editorial principles

For the edited selection, I have compiled documents shedding light on Heinrich Aigner’s position on various issues that arose throughout the process of establishing the Court of Auditors. I have only included extracts of his Case for a European Audit Office, as this source is very long and a published version already exists. The documents are presented in chronological order of production. I have added a document at the end illustrating Aigner’s commitment to European affairs.

The examples selected have been reproduced from the copies in Aigner’s estate. The editorial principles follow those applied to the minutes of the Bavarian Council of Ministers (572). All omissions and additions by the editor have been indicated using square brackets […]. Common abbreviations have either been assumed to be understood or included in the list of abbreviations. Spelling errors and obvious typographical errors have been corrected without any indication. Typewritten underlining in the text has been replicated, while handwritten underlining has been marked using dashed lines. Handwritten comments and corrections by Aigner have been reproduced in italics. Where these were written in the margin of a paragraph in the original, they have here been placed before the paragraph to which they relate. Struck-out passages are documented in the footnotes. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 117

Edited publications and documents

The Case for a European Audit Office (573)

Introduction by Heinrich Aigner to The Case for a European Audit Office, published in Luxembourg in 1973. In this publication, Aigner outlines a plan for budgetary control arrangements, a future audit office and a corps of Community auditors.

INTRODUCTION

1. The role of the European Community is to serve the nations which it unites and their citizens. The latter have a right to expect that the money flowing into ‘Europe’ is put to good use and spent in accordance with the principles of sound financial management. It is the duty of the representatives of the peoples of Europe — and the Members of the European Parliament see themselves as such — to ensure that the European Community’s financial governance is transparent, responsible, and can bear comparison with that of the Member States.

2. However, the European Community’s current audit arrangements do not fulfil this obligation. To put it succinctly, the auditing of Europe’s finances is done as a ‘sideline’; such is the current desperate state of budgetary and financial control in the European Community.

As matters stand at present: a) The European Communities’ budget has reached a figure of 4 200 m (1) UA (574); b) Payments from the European Development Fund amount to 1 000 m UA; c) The enlargement of the European Community to include Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark has become reality (575); d) With the creation of a monetary union (European Monetary Fund), a further steep rise must be expected in the budget growth rate.

(1) Budget estimates for 1973 run to 4 300 m UA, i.e. DM 15 300 m, FF 23 300 m, Fl 15 200 m, Lire 2 625 000 m, BF 210 000 m, £ 1 747 m, Kr. 26 000 m. ROADS TO EUROPE 118

In this situation, administrative control, whether external or by Parliament, is still in its infancy.

While parliamentary control over public finance in the Member States is ensured by national audit offices served by a professional staff whose activities cover an extremely wide field, the European Parliament is served by a body — the Audit Board — whose present statutes can hardly make it a satisfactory instrument for effective external, let alone parliamentary, control.

3. The communications gap both between the Member States and between them and the European Community, the complexity of European legislation, particularly in the agricultural sector, poor coordination of the Member States’ auditing activities: these are all factors which make it imperative to introduce a European system of financial control at an early date. The European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets and I personally have been calling for this for a good many years and our efforts have found a keen response in the national parliaments and auditing authorities. The need for a European Audit Office also won broad acceptance during talks between the European Parliament’s Committee for Finance and the Presidents of the national audit offices.

4. When it is recalled that cases of fraud involving the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund are common knowledge and that the Community or the Member States make inconsistent and sometimes improper payments in this sector running into hundreds of millions of dollars annually which have done and still do so much to impair the Community’s standing, it will be realised that action can no longer be postponed.

5. So far, the Council of the Communities has not gone beyond the stage of rhetoric; it has failed to take any initiative or action or, when it has, the required effect has not been achieved. Following three years of discussion, the new — and long overdue — financial regulation has only now been introduced. As from 1975, the Community will enjoy full financial autonomy. Under the Council’s decision of 21 April 1970, the Community will be self-financed from the following resources: 1) Customs revenue in its entirety (the figure for 1975 is estimated at approximately 2 200 m UA); HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 119

2) All revenue from agricultural levies (the estimated figure for 1975 is approximately 900 m UA) (2); 3) If necessary, up to 1 % of VAT from all Member States as from 1975 (estimated at 1 000 m UA) (3). This revenue will provide the basis on which the Community will operate. This in itself makes it necessary to ensure that it is brought under a satisfactory system of European financial control.

6. In as far as control over the use of these funds will not be exercised by the national parliaments, this responsibility must be assumed by a European Parliament with wider powers. Since financial control requires smoothly functioning machinery, the driving force behind the idea of a European Audit Office was, understandably enough, the Members of the European Parliament. It will be a grave threat to European integration if the financial management and expenditure of a European bureaucracy more or less responsible only to itself is not brought under an adequate and independently controlled authority.

7. The auditors and the chairman of the Audit Board provided for in Article 206 of the EEC Treaty, Article 78 of the ECSC Treaty, and Article 180 of the EAEC Treaty do not exercise their duties on a full-time basis, hence the observation made at the beginning of this introduction. Although the auditors are assisted by officials (at present 26 approved posts), there are not enough of them to ensure continuity and independence as in the case of the audit offices in the Member States, which have often been described as the fourth power in the State.

8. Such are the reasons which have prompted me, on behalf of the Bureau of the European Parliament and the Committee on Budgets, to give wide publication to this collection of documents. Our aim must be to set up a European Audit Office. The European Parliament in general and the members of its Committee for Finance and Budgets in particular have taken numerous initiatives in this field

(2) Including the ‘sugar’ contributions and the financial countervailing charges. (3) Source: forecasts covering several years submitted by the Commission, 15 November 1972, Doc. 257/72: The figures are for the six original Member States. The share of the new Member States should amount to approximately 750 million UA in 1975. ROADS TO EUROPE 120

in response to the recognised needs of a Community guided by the principles of parliamentary democracy. The avenues of approach to a European system of financial control which I have outlined in these introductory remarks are based on an analysis of the present situation; at the same time, they are designed to serve as a basis of discussion for the ad hoc Working Party set up by the European Parliament with representatives from the national audit offices and the other Community institutions.

A — Financial control under Community law

External and internal financial control

9. The three Treaties (4) provide for two forms of financial control. The first is external control. This is carried out by an outside body, the Audit Board, set up especially for the purpose and acting independently of the authorities subject to its control. It is further a retrospective form of control, consisting, in accordance with the three Treaties (5), first of examining the accounts of all revenue and expenditure on the basis of records, and, if necessary, on the spot, establishing that they have been received or incurred in a lawful and regular manner and in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and, secondly, in drawing up a report after the close of each financial year.

10. The three Treaties make provision for but do not further specify the other form of financial control. Article 78(f) of the ECSC Treaty, Article 209 of the EEC Treaty, and Article 183 of the EAEC Treaty simply instruct the Council and Commission to lay down arrangements for this form of financial control: the instruction is contained in the provision that the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, lay down rules concerning the responsibility of authorising officers and accounting officers and concerning appropriate arrangements for inspection.

11. In pursuance of this instruction, the various financial regulations provide for preliminary internal control on the model of the ‘advance control

(4) Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Treaty establishing the Euro- pean Economic Community (EEC), Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). (5) Article 78(e) ECSC Treaty; Article 206 EEC Treaty; Article 180 EAEC Treaty. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 121

procedure’ that is applied to a greater or lesser degree in the Member State and has been developed in a number of international organisations. In each of the four Community institutions, this form of control is the responsibility of a financial controller appointed by the institution to perform his duties independently. His advance endorsement is required not only for individual payment orders but also for any measure which may result in a charge on the budget. The financial regulations thus ensure that he can query any irregular expenditure far enough in advance. The financial controller queries expenditure by withholding his endorsement and stating his reasons. In such cases the expenditure is not effected unless, by a reasoned decision, the Commission overrides the financial controller’s refusal to endorse it.

Disadvantages of external financial control

12. Both preliminary internal control and retrospective external control have their weaknesses. The disadvantage of any form of retrospective control is that expenditure is queried after the event. The query is thus pointless save in cases where the item of expenditure is likely to recur in the same circumstances, which does not always happen. This disadvantage increases with the time lapse between the date on which expenditure is made and that on which it is queried. Experience has shown that it frequently takes a long time for the Audit Board’s report to reach or be discussed by the Parliament and the Council. For example, the discharge in respect of the 1970 financial year will not be given by Parliament until 1973.

13. A further disadvantage of retrospective external control is that a separate control body cannot be as familiar as would be desirable with the procedures applied by the departments subject to its control. While the Audit Board has access to all Commission documents, there are so many items of expenditure that each transaction cannot possibly be fully scrutinised on the basis of records. The auditor must therefore possess an intuitive sense if he is to begin his inspection at the point where it is likely to be most useful. Intuition of this sort, however, is not a matter of sixth sense, meaning that it is more likely to be found in greater measure in an auditor familiar with the internal workings of the department to be inspected than in an outsider. ROADS TO EUROPE 122

Disadvantages of internal control

14. The disadvantages of internal control lie in the position of dependence in which the financial controller finds himself to some extent although, following the merger of the executives of the three Communities, the post was graded at the highest level.

15. A further weakness of internal financial control is that the Commission can easily override the financial controller’s refusal to endorse expenditure. The requirement on the Commission to state its reasons is unlikely to have much of an inhibiting effect. The Court of Justice has repeatedly noted that the reasons given by the Commission for its decisions are generally somewhat slender and it would be unreasonable to expect the Commission, which is faced with so many more important decisions, to take special pains to justify decisions overriding those of the internal financial controller.

The advantages of a system of internal and external control

16. These weaknesses in external retrospective control and preliminary internal control explain why both forms are provided for in Community law. There is no justification in the argument that this is making too much of financial control, for it is only by combining both forms that the weaknesses of each when carried out alone can be remedied to any substantial extent. The official responsible for internal preliminary control is stronger in the knowledge that expenditure open to doubt will be scrutinized by a further authority, for the Audit Board’s censure is essentially directed against him in cases where he has given his endorsement. Furthermore, the Commission would be less tempted to override the financial controller’s decision to withhold his endorsement knowing that a report by the authority responsible for retrospective control would be submitted to Parliament and the Council stating that, despite warning from the financial controller, it (the Commission) had effected expenditure that was not in order. The external auditing body, too, would find it easier to concentrate on critical areas if it could work from the opinions and reports drawn up by the internal, preliminary, financial control authority.

17. To be more effective, the Audit Board must be given more extensive and clearly-defined rights and powers over the departments subject to its inspection. The Council and the Parliament’s Committee for Budgets have already developed clear conceptions in this matter and these have been incorporated in the new Financial Regulations. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 123

Under Community law, the Audit Board is primarily responsible for conducting retrospective control. If the administration provides the Board with too much information, this might blur the lines of demarcation of responsibilities (6); although this danger should not be overlooked, information of this nature cannot be disregarded if rational cooperation between the Audit Board and internal financial control is to produce optimum results.

18. Finally, in connection with the membership of the Audit Board, a development has occurred which would seem to give cause for concern. Formerly, the Board’s members were professors and members of the Audit Offices or similar bodies in the Member States carrying out independent financial control; since 1969, a few Member States have been nominating officials from their Ministries of Finance. With all due respect for the personal integrity and independence of Ministry of Finance officials, the danger is that the Communities’ Audit Board will gradually come to resemble the committees of the Council of Ministers. This would hardly be in keeping with the role assigned to the Audit Board in the Treaties, especially with the requirement for independence.

19. One of the provisions in the Financial Regulation which guarantees independent internal financial control is that all measures relating to the appointment and promotion of the financial controller, to disciplinary action, transfer, interruption of service or termination of appointment, must be laid down in reasoned decisions forwarded to the Council for information. The financial controller may appeal against such decisions to the Court of Justice. In other words, the financial controller can only be removed from office by a reasoned decision of the Commission which must be notified to the Council and is subject to full judicial investigation. Since Parliament and Council together now constitute the budgetary authority, provisions must be made to notify both of decisions concerning the financial controller. The provisions contained in the Financial Regulation on internal financial control are open to improvement in this respect. The budget authority should have a say in the selection of the financial controllers. Furthermore, the budget authority or even the Audit Board should be empowered to render the financial controller liable to disciplinary action, as provided for in the Financial Regulation, when he improperly endorses expenditures. This would certainly strengthen the financial controller’s hand, for under current staff regulations, only the Commission can take disciplinary action against him. This is hardly likely to happen if the endorsement improperly given is for an item of expenditure which the Commission itself wished to incur.

(6) In accordance with Article 205 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission implements the budget on its own responsibility. ROADS TO EUROPE 124

Finally, it is essential to extend internal preliminary financial control to all Commission expenditure and revenue. As matters stand, there are still a few important areas left uncovered. This is especially surprising in the case of the European Development Fund.

20. The reason advanced for excluding Development Fund payments made by the relevant Directorate-General from financial control is that the Directorate-General for Development Aid has built up a satisfactory financial control system of its own. This is self-contradictory since the whole spirit of financial control is impugned if it is carried out by the same department whose expenditure is to be scrutinised. The Directorate-General for Development Aid has not only assumed sole responsibility for financial control, but also for accounting. Furthermore, financial control is performed on the spot by so- called ‘commissioned controllers’ who, acting as a sort of ‘Jack-of-all-trades’, represent the Commission’s interests in the implementation of projects financed by the Development Fund in overseas countries. It would thus appear that, where the expenditure of the European Development Fund is concerned, the principle of independent financial control is not observed, nor is the principle likewise written into the Financial Regulation, whereby the duties of authorising officer, financial controller, and accounting officer should be kept separate.

21. The biggest improvement which can be made to financial control in the future lies in a better exchange of information between internal preliminary control and external retrospective control by the Audit Office. The two forms of control should not be partitioned off from each other. Preliminary internal control should be required to take account of the observations made by the Audit Board and approved by the budget authorities.

B — Control of Community revenue and expenditure handled by the States’ authorities

Rules for a procedure to control this revenue and expenditure

22. It is essential that all such revenue and expenditure should be controlled by the Communities since they are the Communities’ own resources and are simply handled by the Member States under administrative delegation — just as in federal states, the provincial authorities discharge certain responsibilities on behalf of the central government. This is by far the most important task for the Community’s future financial control department. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 125

As long as the Member States collect revenue and effect expenditure for the account of the Communities, there can obviously be no question of applying a system of preliminary control in which the financial controller of the Commission endorses the acts of the Member States’ authorities recording and collecting Community claims for payment of customs duties and agricultural levies or concerning, say, the substantiation and implementation of commitments under the Agricultural Fund.

23. Member States’ officials responsible for actually receiving and disbursing Community funds do not apply directly the Community’s agricultural and customs regulations, but follow implementing rules which are detailed in the extreme. In these rules, which are drafted by higher authorities in the Member States, and by the central authorities in particular, Community law, although directly applicable in the Member States, is interpreted for the use of the officials concerned in the form of readily understandable service instructions. This means that, for effective control of Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States, these implementing rules should be scrutinised; in other words, it is not enough for the Community’s control service or joint committees consisting of officials from various Member States to proceed to the frontier and observe how, in specific cases, the local customs authorities collect duties or agricultural levies on imports and pay refunds on exports. This would also be more closely in line with the allocation of responsibilities under Community law between the Member States and the Community for the handling of their own revenue and expenditure.

24. The implementing rules issued by the Member States can be scrutinised from two angles. First, it can be ascertained whether they conform to applicable Community law; in other words, whether they represent a correct and consistent interpretation of this law. Second, they must be checked for adequacy in the prevention of the fraud which has done so much to harm, and continues to harm, the Community’s reputation. Rules of implementation which resulted in higher export refunds or lower import levies than under a proper interpretation of Community law would apply to an unlimited number of import or export transactions, whereas fraud by importers or exporters occurs only in individual cases or in a limited number of cases.

25. The control of Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States should therefore include comprehensive and systematic supervision by Community bodies of Member States’ rules of implementation; however, it is essential that this be supplemented by on-the-spot controls. In ROADS TO EUROPE 126

the performance of their duties, officials of Member States that are responsible for collecting duties or making payments for the account of the Communities are not always guided by detailed implementing rules. Administrations have also adopted certain practices which, though not set down in writing, have through constant repetition the same effect as rules of implementation. These can only be brought to light through on-the-spot controls carried out for this specific purpose and not primarily to check a specified import or export transaction. Controls of this kind should be carried out not only by Community officials but also by joint committees of experts from the various Member States.

26. A solution to this problem of control is foreshadowed in those provisions of Community law which require Member States to notify the Commission of their implementing rules. Unfortunately, the only one which is entirely satisfactory is that applicable to Community expenditure effected by the Member States. This is Article 9, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 of Council Regulation No 729/70 of 21 Apri1 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy, under which Member States are required to notify the Commission of legal and administrative provisions relating to the common agricultural policy in as far as these have financial implications for the Agricultural Fund. Oddly enough, there is no similar provision governing Community revenue collected by the Member States. Under Article 4, paragraph l(b) of Council Regulation No 2/71 of 2 January 1971 on the replacement of the financial contributions of Member States by the Community’s own resources, the Member States are required to notify the Commission of general legal and administrative accounting regulations which relate to the establishment and making available of own resources.

27. The receiver of a payment in settlement of a claim by a third party and on the latter’s behalf is always required to render account. By virtue of this generally recognised legal principle, no Member State can refuse to notify the Commission of administrative regulations which affect the amount of the duties collected for the account of the Communities. There is probably little likelihood of such a refusal being given, but if it should be, the Commission could confidently refer the matter to the Court of Justice. Appropriate regulations should be issued allowing the Community’s external control authority to assess the effectiveness of the control procedures described above. Steps should therefore be taken to institutionalise close cooperation, the sharing of responsibilities, and coordination between the Audit Board, developed into a European Audit Office, and the audit offices in the Member States. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 127

Responsibility for the control of Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States’ authorities

28. The following question has still yet to be answered: which body and which department should exercise control over Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States by what is virtually administrative delegation? Should this fall within the competence of the Audit Board (European Audit Office) or the Commission? If the latter, which department should be responsible, internal financial control or another? It is clearly beyond doubt that the role of the Audit Board in this control process cannot be conceived in complete separation from that of the Commission’s internal financial control department. Initial attempts to answer the question of which body and which department in the Community should be authorised to control Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States and to check, for this purpose, the latter’s implementing rules and administrative practices are bedevilled by the large number of Commission departments which would appear suitable. In order to obtain any sort of general picture, a subdivision into three categories is essential. 1) The first category includes those departments whose task it is to draft and further develop Community customs and agricultural legislation and to institute proceedings when infringements of this legislation occur. These are: a) The ‘Administration of the Customs Union’ directly responsible to the Commission; and b) The three Directorates in the General Directorate for Agriculture which are responsible for the organisation of markets in crop products, livestock products and specialised crops, fishing and forestry. 2) The second category includes the departments which authorise Community revenue and expenditure handled by the Member States. a) For revenue, i.e. customs duties and agricultural levies, this is the Directorate-General for the Budget and Administration. b) For expenditure, i.e. under the guarantee section of the Agricultural Fund, this is the ‘European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund’ Directorate in the General-Directorate for Agriculture. 3) The third category consists of the General-Directorate for Financial Control. ROADS TO EUROPE 128

29. What is particularly striking in this inventory is that the Commission has assigned to different departments the task of drafting, further developing, and ensuring implementation of Community customs and agricultural legislation and that of authorising Community receipts from duties and agricultural levies as well as expenditure under the Agricultural Fund. Both tasks have thus been kept strictly separate up to the highest level. This situation attracts attention because, at first glance it would seem more natural and expedient to leave both tasks in the hands of a single authority; after all the task of authorising receipts and expenditure is concerned with the proper application of Community law. But while it may seem strange at first sight, this separation becomes clearer with reference to actual practice. The departments responsible for drafting and further developing Community customs and agricultural legislation work in extremely close cooperation with the Member States’ customs and agricultural administrations in framing Commission proposals for regulations and consult with the Council’s committees once these proposals are forwarded to the Council.

30. This is difficult to reconcile with the role of financial administration, which is responsible for Community revenue and expenditure and the balancing of the European budget. The Community’s customs and agricultural policy is at once economic policy, social policy, structural policy, regional policy, conjunctural policy, as well as commercial and external policy. It is also financial policy, but this aspect must not be allowed to occupy the centre of the stage. There is also a further consideration involved; free from the taint attached to the tax-collector and secure in the knowledge that differences of opinion on future Community legislation cannot be exacerbated by differences of opinion on what the Member States owe the Communities or the Communities the Member States under existing Community legislation, the Commission’s departments responsible for drafting and further developing Community customs and agricultural legislation will find it easier to negotiate with the Member States’ administrations and the Council’s committees. Furthermore, proceedings for infringement of Community law are governed by other principles and criteria than measures taken to ensure that revenue is received in full and that all Community expenditure is properly effected. The procedure provided for in the treaties in the case of breaches of those treaties is a formal procedure in which a Member State is put in the dock, so to speak, and is liable to censure by the Court of Justice of the Communities. For this reason, the treaty provisions governing the referral of breaches thereof to the Court of Justice are not binding and the Commission invokes them only in cases of such importance for the operation of the Community as warrants recourse to HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 129

the procedure involved. In most cases, moreover, the Commission is content to ensure that there will be no recurrence of the infringement in question. If a Member State has misapplied Community law and paid out too much in the way of export refunds or collected too little in the way of agricultural levies, and then takes steps to ensure that this does not recur, the error cannot be quietly overlooked when its accounts of receipts and expenditure are settled; this would be tantamount to the Commission paying unauthorised export subsidies out of the Agricultural Fund or foregoing the full amount of duties owing to the Community. This explains why the Commission departments whose task it is to draft and further develop Community customs and agricultural legislation and to ensure the enforcement thereof have quite rightly not been made responsible for collecting Community revenue and making Community expenditure under this legislation. It also explains why those departments are even less suited to undertake financial control of this revenue and expenditure.

31. The question remains of whether the Commission’s ‘authorising’ departments which collect Community revenue from customs duties and agricultural levies and effect expenditure from the Agricultural Fund should not have the additional responsibility of controlling said revenue and expenditure and, as part of this control, of scrutinising the Member States’ implementing rules and administrative practices. It is a generally recognised financial principle — which has been written into the Community’s financial regulations — that the duties of an authorising officer are incompatible with those of a financial controller. This principle is based on the consideration that departments whose task it is to secure adequate revenue or to prepare and implement projects generating expenditure do not possess the detachment required for impartial financial control. This principle can be applied with equal justification to relations between the authorising officers in the Commission and those in the Member States since the Commission departments concerned are responsible for a balanced Community budget and for the market support and other measures financed out of the Agricultural Fund.

32. The role of financial control should be to refuse endorsement of a statement of levies collected by a Member State for the account of the Communities if it is found, from examination of the implementing rules and administrative practices of the Member State concerned or from another source, that the levies due to the Communities have not been collected or not collected in full. Financial control should also refuse to endorse a payment order for the reimbursement of a Member State’s expenditure, e.g. for the ROADS TO EUROPE 130

account of the Agricultural Fund, if it is known that part of the expenditure involved covers export refunds which are not in accordance with Community law. The Audit Board, too, must enter an objection if the Commission, with or without the financial controller’s endorsement, effects such expenditure from the Agricultural Fund or if the Commission’s financial controller does not sufficiently check the Member States’ implementing rules and administrative practices to ascertain that such expenditure has occurred. If the financial controller of the Commission exercises this form of control and if there is close cooperation between preliminary internal financial control and retrospective control by the Audit Board, this will be the surest guarantee that Parliament will be able to fulfil its control responsibilities and its financial role as budget authority.

33. As Community financial control is developed, care should be taken to ensure that there is no self-monitoring, either within the agricultural sector or in connection with the European Development Fund or the Social Fund. This would be in contradiction with basic financial principles. Financial control implies that the controller and the controlled should not be identical, and this applies at all levels. No matter who is made responsible for the control of revenue and expenditure, it is vital that a clear decision should be taken at an early date. Control must be centralised in a single department, for if responsibility were shared among several departments, its effectiveness would be inhibited and this would be unreasonable from the point of view of the Member States. Inasmuch as responsibility for the revenue and expenditure in question lies with a single administration in the Member States, it should have, as its counterpart, a single control department at Commission level. Besides this, sharing responsibility among several departments means doubling staff requirements. This applies to the agricultural sector in particular, which still accounts for 80 % of the total expenditure of the European Communities. Permanent cross-fertilisation of ideas suggested by experience must therefore be a prime consideration in the implementation and further development of agricultural market regulations and the legislative authorities must also be quick to react to malpractices. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 131

C — The setting up of a European Audit Office

34. It should be perfectly clear from what has been said that even assuming a liberal interpretation of Article 206 of the EEC Treaty (576), the Audit Board is not a way to ensure adequate external control of Community finances. Many arguments can be advanced for transforming the Audit Board into a European Audit Office. One general observation of relevance here is that the Community budget has now reached a size that requires external control on a different scale. Furthermore, the problems caused not only by the division of the Community into Member States, but also by the different historical development of financial, budget, and control procedures make harmonisation essential. For this reason, the basic statutes of a future European Audit Office should be developed from Article 206 of the EEC Treaty.

35. The ultimate aim should be to set up the European Audit Office as a genuine independent Community body separate from the Assembly, the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Justice since this is the only way to guarantee its full independence, including organisational independence. In the initial stages of development, it will not be possible to take such a broad view for it would require changes to the treaties. Such changes could not be made easily and would, in any case, be subject to a time-consuming ratification procedure.

36. However, a European Audit Office based on the following outline model could be set up on the basis of Article 206 of the EEC Treaty. a) Responsibilities and authority The European Audit Office would be authorised in regard to the right to verify that the budgetary and financial management of the Communities is conducted properly and with due regard for economy; this includes all decisions taken in organisational and staffing matters and other measures with possible financial implications. It would also be authorised to conduct local investigations with the Member States’ administrations and would be free to circumscribe its audits as it saw fit or leave entire areas unaudited. By joint decision of the European Parliament and the Council it could be requested to conduct special inquiries into specific problems. The European Audit Office would have the right to be represented by a member at all meetings of the Parliament’s and Council’s budget committees. ROADS TO EUROPE 132

It would be able to take the initiative in submitting proposals to the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission on all matters of financial management. In the performance of its duties it would be able to call on the services of experts and commission expert reports.

b) Members The European Audit Office would consist of nine full-time members consisting of one from each country of the Community possessing judicial independence who would be free to conduct audit operations as they saw fit. The members of the European Audit Office would be required to have many years’ experience in the control of public accounts and would be nominated by Parliament and appointed for six years by the Council. The Parliament would make nominations on the basis of a triple list drawn up by the national audit offices. Members would be eligible for re-appointment for one further term of office. In order to ensure work continuity, the first members would be appointed in groups of three for three, five or seven years, with those various periods of office to be drawn by lot among the nine Member States.

c) President The nine members would elect from among their own numbers a ‘primus inter pares’ (577) to be President of the European Audit Office for a period of two years. He would represent the European Audit Office in its relations with outside bodies and would supervise the work of its staff.

d) Administrative director The Director of the European Audit Office would be responsible for organisation and administration. He would take decisions, under the authority of and, in personnel matters, where necessary, on the instructions of the President.

e) Structure, allocation of responsibilities The European Audit Office would be divided into audit areas each directed by one member assisted by the necessary staff. The nine members acting collectively would decide autonomously for six-year periods on the allocation of the Audit Office’s responsibilities in the various audit areas. As far as possible, account should be taken here of the organisation of the Commission and the focal points of Community expenditure. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 133

f) Decision-making bodies of the European Audit Office 1) Divisions would be formed, each covering three audit areas. Each division would take decisions in auditing matters by a majority vote on the basis of a report by whichever member is responsible. Decisions by individual members would not be permissible since they would offend the principle of collective responsibility for the decisions of the European Audit Office and stand in conflict with the efforts being made to achieve integration. 2) The three divisions with all their members would together form the Senate of the European Audit Office. The Senate would be responsible for the report on the accounts for a given financial year and for coordinating decision-making and auditing practices in the European Audit Office. g) Disciplinary authority of the European Audit Office The European Audit Office would be able to take disciplinary action in respect of infringements of financial regulations by accountants and officials in the Commission’s internal financial control department. It would have full rights to information on all procedures applied within the internal financial control department. The opinions of the European Audit Office in budget matters would be binding on the Commission’s internal financial control department but should not be allowed to interfere with the responsibilities of the Commission. h) Requests for audit made to national auditing authorities The Senate of the European Audit Office would be able to request any or all of the auditing authorities in the nine Member States to conduct inspections on specific matters. Where national auditing authorities are not requested to make inspections or where such requests cannot be met within a reasonable time or in a reasonable manner, the European Audit Office must itself assume the task. Common criteria applicable to all countries should be laid down in advance for auditing projects and should also specify how stringent the audits should be. Acting in conformity with these criteria, the national auditing authorities would carry out the requested audits on their own responsibility. They would submit their findings directly to the European Audit Office but would be free to inform their own governments or other departments concerned. ROADS TO EUROPE 134

i) Joint Senate A joint Senate with an advisory function would be set up within the European Audit Office. In addition to the nine members of the European Audit Office it would include a member from each of the auditing authorities in the Member States. The joint Senate would be consulted prior to decisions by the European Audit Office to submit audit requests to the national auditing authorities. Being represented in the joint Senate, the national auditing authorities would be able to coordinate their national auditing tasks with those of the European Audit Office. In addition to the rules outlined above, there are undoubtedly many other details to be clarified and incorporated partly in the statutes of the European Audit Office and partly in its internal rules of procedure.

D — The creation of a corps of Community auditors

37. In order to campaign effectively against fraud in the agricultural sector and to ensure that the Community’s own resources, particularly agricultural levies and common customs tariff duties, are collected in accordance with uniform procedures in all Member States, it might be useful to set up a Community inspection department as a sort of ‘flying squad’ with the task of carrying out random controls unannounced and on the spot, particularly at the Community’s external frontiers. The creation of a ‘flying squad’ on those lines presupposes a special Community training centre for officials — particularly customs officials from the individual customs authorities — for this particular purpose. The psychological effect of an auditors’ corps capable of working at any time and in any place would assuredly make itself felt in the Member States’ administrations which collect revenue or effect expenditure for the Community by administrative delegation and would certainly act as a deterrent to potential ‘agricultural defrauders’. This corps should come under the Commission and enjoy a fairly wide measure of independence. The Community Audit Board/European Audit Office would have to be kept constantly informed of the results of its activities.

Dr Heinrich Aigner Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Budgets HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 135

Heinrich Aigner’s address to the European Parliament on 11 July 1975 (578)

Heinrich Aigner’s address to the European Parliament, presenting his report on the draft treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties (579) and examining the Committee on Budgets’ desired amendments.

Aigner, Rapporteur. — […]

Let me express our view of the main aim of the Court of Auditors as follows. The main aim of this control should not be punitive but constructive. It should help the budgetary authority and the control authority to correct the lacunae which are sometimes also found in budgetary decisions. May I state a second principle, where we agree entirely with the Committee on Budgets. Control by a European Court of Auditors does not mean partially shifting responsibility from one Community Institution to the auditor. Political responsibility has its own laws and requirements. Even if auditing is seen purely as a means of information and as a means of making procedures transparent, it cannot take the place of political decisions. Faith, consultation and a mutual willingness to provide information are the preconditions for harmony between the auditor and the Institution. After the discussions we have held, the Committee on Budgets and this Parliament take the view that, under pressure of public opinion the political will of the Council coincides with that of the European Parliament on the establishment of a fully independent auditing body. That is why, Mr President (580), we are happy to note that the draft treaty (581) tries, firstly, to guarantee the proposed European Court of Auditors full independence. So that there are no doubts, we have formulated this very clearly in the text. Secondly, the proposed Court of Auditors must be able to perform on- the-spot checks at the Community Institutions and in the Member States. Thirdly, the proposed Court of Auditors must have the right to demand all documents or information from the Community Institutions and the national audit offices that are necessary for it to perform its duties. Our detailed proposals aim only at incorporating our ideas more clearly in the Treaty than we think they were before. Let me mention a few more points. I think I have a few minutes left. It is well-known, Mr President, that the present version of the draft treaty, under which members of the Court of Auditors are appointed by the Council after consultation of the Assembly, represents, in the eyes of the Council, a wide- reaching concession to Parliament. ROADS TO EUROPE 136

Mr President, may I make a personal remark to the Council. The Council should finally accustom itself to describing Parliament as the Parliament and drop the term ‘Assembly’ (582). I think we have gone beyond the founding period of the European Parliament. If it takes its duties seriously, a Parliament, Mr President, must insist that it is not only non-bindingly consulted but also has the power of co-decision in the appointment of members of the Court of Auditors. This demand can also be justified in that the main task of the Court of Auditors is to prepare by its controls and activities the annual discharge for which Parliament alone should be responsible after the present Treaty revision has entered into force. With respect to the appointment of members, the election of the president and the activities of the members of the Court of Auditors, may I, Mr President, refer to the written report. For inexplicable reasons — and this is my final comment — the draft treaty does not allow the Court of Auditors an equal status with the other institutions. Your rapporteur, Mr President, considers it essential to support the work of the Court of Auditors by guaranteeing its full independence vis- à-vis the institutions it is to supervise. That also means granting it the status of a fully independent body. Mr President, we have a very clear conception of this body which does not greatly differ from that of the Council. Yet I would like to say to the Council that it must fulfil the few demands we have so that we do not enter into conflict. I am convinced — as I have noted not only in very many articles in the press in all Member States but also in discussions, and in hearings with the presidents of the national audit offices — that we have full support of public opinion. I would be grateful to the House if it adopted this report, or part of this report, by a majority; it was unanimously approved by the committee. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 137

Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities (583)

Extract from the Treaty of 22 July 1975 establishing the European Court of Auditors, which entered into force on 1 June 1977.

Chapter II

Provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (584)

[…]

Article 15

Article 206 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community shall be replaced by the following:

‘Article 206 (1) A Court of Auditors is hereby established. (2) The Court of Auditors shall consist of nine members. (3) The members of the Court of Auditors shall be chosen from among persons who belong or have belonged in their respective countries to external audit bodies or who are especially qualified for this office. Their independence must be beyond doubt. (4) The members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed for a term of six years by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the Assembly. However, when the first appointments are made, four members of the Court of Auditors, chosen by lot, shall be appointed for a term of office of four years only. The members of the Court of Auditors shall be eligible for reappointment. They shall elect the President of the Court of Auditors from among their number for a term of three years. The President may be re-elected. ROADS TO EUROPE 138

(5) The members of the Court of Auditors shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. (6) The members of the Court of Auditors may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. (7) Apart from normal replacement, or death, the duties of a member of the Court of Auditors shall end when he resigns, or is compulsorily retired by a ruling of the Court of Justice pursuant to paragraph 8. The vacancy thus caused shall be filled for the remainder of the member’s term of office. Save in the case of compulsory retirement, members of the Court of Auditors shall remain in office until they have been replaced. (8) A member of the Court of Auditors may be deprived of his office or of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead only if the Court of Justice, at the request of the Court of Auditors, finds that he no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office. (9) The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall determine the conditions of employment of the President and the members of the Court of Auditors and in particular their salaries, allowances and pensions. It shall also, by the same majority, determine any payment to be made instead of remuneration. (10) The provisions of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities applicable to the Judges of the Court of Justice shall also apply to the members of the Court of Auditors.’

Article 16

The following provisions shall be added to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community: HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 139

‘Article 206a

(1) The Court of Auditors shall examine the accounts of all revenue and expenditure of the Community. It shall also examine the accounts of all revenue and expenditure of all bodies set up by the Community in so far as the relevant constituent instrument does not preclude such examination. (2) The Court of Auditors shall examine whether all revenue has been received and all expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner and whether the financial management has been sound. The audit of revenue shall be carried out on the basis both of the amounts established as due and the amounts actually paid to the Community. The audit of expenditure shall be carried out on the basis both of commitments undertaken and payments made. These audits may be carried out before the closure of accounts for the financial year in question. (3) The audit shall be based on records and, if necessary, performed on the spot in the institutions of the Community and in the Member States. In the Member States the audit shall be carried out in liaison with national audit bodies or, if these do not have the necessary powers, with the competent national departments. These bodies or departments shall inform the Court of Auditors whether they intend to take part in the audit. The institutions of the Community and the national audit bodies or, if these do not have the necessary powers, the competent national departments, shall forward to the Court of Auditors, at its request, any document or information necessary to carry out its task. (4) The Court of Auditors shall draw up an annual report after the close of each financial year. It shall be forwarded to the institutions of the Community and shall be published, together with the replies of these institutions to the observations of the Court of Auditors, in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The Court of Auditors may also, at any time, submit observations on specific questions and deliver opinions at the request of one of the institutions of the Community. It shall adopt its annual reports or opinions by a majority of its members. It shall assist the Assembly and the Council in exercising their powers of control over the implementation of the budget.’ ROADS TO EUROPE 140

Article 17

The following provisions shall be added to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community:

‘Article 206b The Assembly, acting on a recommendation from the Council which shall act by a qualified majority, shall give a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget. To this end, the Council and the Assembly in turn shall examine the accounts and the financial statement referred to in Article 205 and the annual report by the Court of Auditors together with the replies of the institutions under audit to the observations of the Court of Auditors.’

Article 18

Article 209 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community shall be replaced by the following:

‘Article 209 The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly and obtaining the opinion of the Court of Auditors, shall: (a) make Financial Regulations specifying in particular the procedure to be adopted for establishing and implementing the budget and for presenting and auditing accounts; (b) determine the methods and procedure whereby the budget revenue provided under the arrangements relating to the Communities’ own resources shall be made available to the Commission, and determine the measures to be applied, if need be, to meet cash requirements; (c) lay down rules concerning the responsibility of authorising officers and accounting officers and concerning appropriate arrangements for inspection.’ HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 141

Chapter III

[…]

Chapter IV

Provisions amending the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities

Article 27

Article 22 of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities shall be replaced by the following:

‘Article 22 (1) The powers and jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Auditors established by Article 78e of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, by Article 206 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and by Article 180 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community shall be exercised in accordance with those Treaties by a single Court of Auditors of the European Communities constituted as provided in these Articles. (2) Without prejudice to the powers and jurisdiction referred to in paragraph 1, the Court of Auditors of the European Communities shall exercise the powers and jurisdiction conferred, before the entry into force of this Treaty, upon the Audit Board of the European Communities and upon the Auditor of the European Coal and Steel Community under the conditions laid down in the various instruments referring to the Audit Board and to the Auditor. In all these instruments the words ‘Audit Board’ and ‘Auditor’ shall be replaced by the words ‘Court of Auditors’. ROADS TO EUROPE 142

Chapter V

Final provisions

Article 28

(1) The members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed upon the entry into force of this Treaty. (2) The terms of office of the members of the Audit Board and that of the auditor shall expire on the day they submit their report on the financial year preceding that in which the members of the Court of Auditors are appointed; their powers of audit shall be confined to operations relating to that financial year.

Article 29

This Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic.

Article 30

This Treaty shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the last signatory State to take this step. If this Treaty enters into force during the budgetary procedure, the Council shall, after consulting the Assembly and the Commission, adopt the measures required in order to facilitate the application of this Treaty to the remainder of the budgetary procedure.

Article 31

This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Irish and Italian languages, all seven texts being authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which shall transmit a certified copy to each of the Governments of the other signatory States. […] HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 143

Account of the challenges facing the European Court of Auditors (585)

Heinrich Aigner’s account of the enduring problems in setting up the Court of Auditors, which, at this stage, had already been established by the Treaties but had not yet assumed its functions.

Dr Heinrich Aigner 8450 AMBERG (Upper Palatinate) Kaiser-Wilhelm Ring 14 Amberg, 14 September 1977

Right of investiture (586) 1. The European Parliament’s participation in the investiture of the European Court of Auditors is testimony to the considerable success of (587) efforts to align the European Parliament with its actual constitutional role. After all, a parliament is only operational if it is capable of temporarily appointing, monitoring and, where necessary, dismissing decision-makers — including at the European level (This is the only means by which to install, via elections, the same replacement mechanism as exists at the Member State level.). Since this is the only way of ensuring true accountability at the European level, this question is therefore one of the most important for the process of European integration. The European Parliament’s right of investiture, as manifested in its co- decisional role in appointing the members of the European Court of Auditors, signals the start of this necessary process.

More than a formal consultation The European Parliament therefore needs to play a visible and credible part in this process, which must not turn into a mere formal consultation.

Commission (despite being the very institution that is to be audited) 2. Yet, from a purely material perspective, too, the European Parliament needs to play a major role. Naturally, the main institution that is to be audited, namely the Commission, has been trying for months to mould the European Court of Auditors and its members according to its own vision. Let there be no mistaking the dangers this poses as the European Court of Auditors takes up its work; in particular, there is a danger of the Commission charting the Court’s future course. ROADS TO EUROPE 144

Timeline 3. As regards the actual setting-up of the European Court of Auditors and the corresponding timeline, arrangements are now more specific. The appointment of the members of the European Court of Auditors is scheduled to take place on 1 December 1977 at the earliest, thus avoiding any interruption to the ongoing audit of financial management in the 1977 financial year, which, under current practice, has to be brought to a conclusion. The Audit Board could then continue working under the responsibility of the European Court of Auditors until the latter has everything in place and is operational. However, the working conditions are as follows:

Overlap with the 1976 audit report In October this year, the Audit Board will send its audit report for the 1976 financial year, in all the official languages of the Community, to the Commission for forwarding to the Community’s budgetary authorities (Council and Parliament). Were the European Court of Auditors, following the appointment of its members, to already exist by October, there would no longer be a legal basis for the Audit Board to continue its work. Pursuant to Article 28(2) of the Treaty of 22 July 1975 (588), the term of office of the members of the Audit Board will expire upon the appointment of the members of the Court of Auditors and with the submission of the audit report for the current year. 4. While it is true that the Audit Board began its ongoing audit of the 1977 financial year on 16 July 1977, it needs to be able to complete its work, which would not be possible thus. This remarkable treaty provision would mean that, upon their appointment, the members of the European Court of Auditors would at once find themselves confronted with two significant responsibilities: a) They would immediately have to take over responsibility for continuing with, and thus for the continuity of, the ongoing external financial audit; and b) would at the same time be responsible for conceiving a European Court of Auditors, developing a suitable design for the structure of this new body and, accordingly, furthering the practicalities of its set-up in terms of staffing and material resources. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 145

Excessive demands Regardless of how qualified the future members of the European Court of Auditors may be, expecting them to simultaneously assume the two responsibilities that will become incumbent upon them is nevertheless clearly asking too much. However, if the effective appointment of the members is postponed until 1 January 1978, this would have virtually no impact on the application of Article 28(2) of the Treaty of 22 July 1975. The members could still, from October or November, start preparing for their mandate and also be remunerated for their preparatory work (costs for future staff).

1977 financial year The upshot of this would be: the Audit Board would be able to conclude its ongoing audit of financial transactions for the 1977 financial year, thus relieving the European Court of Auditors of this task. The members could devote themselves entirely to setting up the new audit body. Its temporary co-existence alongside the Audit Board in the first half of 1978 could, in itself, only be helpful.

Treaty of 22.7.1975 (‘formative support’) 5. I should point out that the Treaty of 22 July 1975 came about, first and foremost, thanks to the European Parliament having spent years calling and fighting for its existence. In my opinion, the Parliament has a particular responsibility to help bring the European Court of Auditors into this world. The appointed members need to convene a constitutive meeting and, for this, organisational and technical preparations have to be made.

Establishing independence 6. In order to establish the independence of the European Court of Auditors from its inception, the oldest Court member should, in agreement with his/ her colleagues, perform the preparatory work himself/herself. The Council, the Parliament, or the Audit Board may readily be consulted in relation to the preparatory work. ROADS TO EUROPE 146

7. The preliminary work includes:

Constitutive meeting

Meeting place

Where held? a) fixing a time and period, to suit all members for the constitutive meeting. Luxembourg, as the seat of the European Court of Auditors, should be the designated meeting place; setting up a meeting room in Luxembourg equipped with interpreting facilities for all the Community’s official languages, as well as offices and a meeting secretariat; b) drawing up an agenda for the meeting. The agenda must be drawn up on a priority basis, more specifically according to the European Court of Auditors’ most pressing needs at this fledgling stage. In order to become operational as such, the European Court of Auditors needs to be clear about its intended operational procedures. Becoming so will involve: — the passing of a resolution on the first principles to underlie a set of provisional rules of procedure setting out, for example, voting procedures — particularly for the election of a President — the President’s powers, principles for how the collegiality principle will work in practice, and so on; — where appropriate, the President could be elected at once; at the very latest, the election of the President should be scheduled for the next meeting; — until such time as a President has been elected, meetings should be led by the oldest member; — resolutions regarding the most pressing organisational arrangements, such as the provisional appointment of a budgetary specialist, an authorising officer, and a treasurer responsible for obtaining the funds required in this initial phase; — initial resolutions concerning urgent staffing matters, in particular the first intake of personal staff, secretaries, interpreters, and translators; — a resolution concerning a provisional procurement officer responsible for seeing to the obtaining of meeting rooms, offices, office furniture and equipment, and other material needs in Luxembourg; External financial control previously performed in Brussels HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 147

— at the same time, a provisional decision should be taken regarding the retention and continuation of the external audit service and its facilities in Brussels, located on the sixth and seventh floors of rue de la Loi 120 (589). For the European Court of Auditors, it is first and foremost necessary for the members to agree on a plan as to the form external financial control will take in the future. As a starting point for this, the members should take the requirements which, as things stand, are to be placed on the new body. — The first of these requirements is to ensure the continuity of existing external audit operations. Qualitative improvement must be expected (costs!) — In addition, the European Court of Auditors is expected to bring about a considerable qualitative improvement in audit, since otherwise the considerable additional costs forecast for its establishment would hardly be justified. The above gives rise to two main problems: — continuing the audit of resource management at the Brussels-based Community bodies; — improving the information available on the management of Community funds by the entrusted Member State authorities and their administration of Community own resources.

(1) Brussels office The functional problem with Brussels stems from the Council’s politically motivated decision to transfer the seat to Luxembourg. Actually, it seems somewhat impractical to want to settle on the Kirchberg (590) when the necessary information and documents can only be obtained at the Schuman roundabout (591). Of course the situation is ‘workable’, but it comes at the price of a considerable loss in efficiency and of twice the outlay in terms of time, staff, and money (constant business travel/commuting of Court officials between Luxembourg and Brussels for daily auditing activities).

Brussels office The solution to this problem is for the European Court of Auditors to have a branch office in Brussels. A simple ‘satellite’ or glorified letterbox in Brussels is not enough. Rather, the office would have to be staffed more or less like the present service so as to be able to cope with the requirements placed on it in terms of information and verification. ROADS TO EUROPE 148

Unsatisfactory

Brussels-Luxembourg As regards auditing in Brussels, the seat transfer has inevitably given rise to a new organisational problem, namely that of distinguishing between the control functions of the Luxembourg headquarters and the Brussels office. Control activities in Brussels cover a cross-section of virtually all of the Community’s areas of responsibility, which ultimately arise in Luxembourg, too, and have to be decided on centrally there. No solution to this organisational issue will ever be entirely satisfactory. We might imagine a temporal distinction separating the preliminary phase from the conclusion, with Brussels (592) responsible for information and for auditing the entry into payment commitments and Luxembourg (593) responsible for auditing the payments themselves and for issuing a final assessment on the audited subject matter. This idea aside, the problem of organisation should nevertheless be considered further.

(2) Court liaison offices in the other Member States

Irregularities (special reports) The European Court of Auditors is also expected to bring about improvements in external audit. In the future, the European Court of Auditors should be able not only to produce an improved annual report, but also to look into individual cases, e.g. cases of irregularity, and to produce a related special report, particularly at the European Parliament’s request. Since the remit of the European Court of Auditors is only slightly larger than that of the Audit Board, these requirements can only be met if the European Court of Auditors enjoys substantially improved access to information in the Member States.

Observers at national audit offices

Management One solution to this problem could be to set up a small-scale observation post at each of the national audit offices, subject to their agreement. The observers’ task would be to familiarise themselves with the customs, duties, and administrative practices of the Member State authorities entrusted with managing own resources — above all with collecting own resources on behalf of the Community — and with settling accounts. In particular, the observers would have to report to the European Court of Auditors on individual cases of observed departures from and irregularities with respect to the laws, HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 149

regulations, and administrative provisions governing the Community. Any audits conducted by the European Court of Auditors, at its own initiative, in the relevant Member States would then rely on the pre-existing information infrastructure and so acquire a specific audit status. To date, such audit visits have been of a type which, unfortunately, could be easily steered according to Member States’ wishes. 8. Only after the members have finalised the design for the European Court of Auditors can it be set up in practice. Aside from the need to obtain additional resources for the Luxembourg headquarters and the liaison offices in the seven other capital cities, the staffing issue is of paramount importance. The issue resides not so much with the continued employment of the existing audit staff, since this is in any case necessary and a decision regarding their absorption into the European Court of Auditors is expected straightaway. Rather, the problem lies with the European Court of Auditors’ need for an additional permanent workforce. (1) First of all, a sensible organisation chart needs to be drawn up, with the proposed posts assessed according to their functions. The risk that the general recruitment drive could lead to an over-inflated workforce, employed at an inflated grade, at the European Court of Auditors is already apparent. People wanting to be parachuted into the European Court of Auditors are jostling their way forward from all the institutions; the new members’ inexperience could easily lead to disaster if they are overly hasty in their actions. Then, if standard promotion opportunities were also to be capped for decades, the principle of rewarding merit could no longer be assured. (2) The procedures used to select new members of staff must be just as rigorous as for staff already in post. Recruitment must be on merit, on the basis of competitions. The recruitment conditions set by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Community must be respected absolutely. In no circumstances should current staff be threatened in their positions by people brought in from outside through the back door.

Risks (highly paid personal staff = 9 private offices) (3) We need to be wary of recruiting senior officials (to grade A3, for example) as the personal staff of Court members, since this would lead to an organisation with nine private offices, each run by a head of a private office. This structure is entirely unnecessary for the European Court of Auditors, since it would separate the Court members from one another, and this, in practical terms, would be difficult to reconcile with the collegiality principle. Moreover, it would hamper the necessary direct contact between the members and the staff engaged in practical audit work. ROADS TO EUROPE 150

(4) The Member States have declared themselves willing to provide the European Court of Auditors with temporary executive staff at the President’s request. The European Court of Auditors should decline this offer or make only limited use thereof through temporary contracts. Experience suggests that it later becomes difficult to get rid of such staff, whereas far better qualified staff could be recruited for the same tasks using the standard selection procedure for officials (see paragraph (2) above). 9. In brief, then, I would propose the following steps: a) The President of the European Parliament should invite the proposed members of the European Court of Auditors to an informal exchange of views as soon as possible. Since the European Parliament is called upon to co-decide on the members, it is logical that it contact the nominees. b) Prior to parliamentary approval, a meeting should be held to discuss the above issues with the members of the European Parliament’s committee on control. This could certainly be set up at the initiative of the proposed members of the European Court of Auditors; in fact, one nominee has already put such a request to me. c) Of course, prior to parliamentary approval, the members will naturally be more receptive to the considerations of the committee on control than they would be thereafter.

No staffing debate d) Following an internal exchange of opinion among the European Parliament’s political groups, and provided that no objections are raised against granting approval, the President of the European Parliament would then be in a position to accept an official submission of the list of candidates and to submit this for approval — without a staffing debate — to the plenary session.

Dr Heinrich Aigner HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 151

Press release from Heinrich Aigner, Bonn, 12 January 1978 (594)

Aigner’s press release on the Court of Auditors’ entry into operation in October 1977, explaining the significance of the new body for the European Parliament and reiterating the special relationship between the two entities.

New powers for the European Parliament — Why the establishment of the European Court of Auditors is fundamentally important – Dr Heinrich Aigner, Member of the Bundestag and MEP

(DUD) Bonn, 12 January 1978

Although it made few waves among the public and in the press, a new European body came into being at the end of last year: the European Court of Auditors. Yet the establishment of the European Court of Auditors deserves more attention than it has garnered so far. I should point out that this is the first time that the European Parliament has itself brought about a change in the Community’s institutional landscape. Without the European Parliament’s years of persistence, its repeated insistence that public bodies be held accountable in the event of economic and financial failings, and its clear conceptual contribution, this body would certainly not exist today. The establishment of the Court can be traced back to the Treaty of 22 April 1970 (595), under which, as a first step, budgetary powers were transferred from the Council of the European Communities to the European Parliament. Yet, at the time, the EP recognised that these powers would only be of any significance if simultaneously accompanied by powers to audit budget implementation. This functional consideration then led to calls for the establishment of the European Court of Auditors. There was also a political consideration, namely the issue of the Parliament’s actual influence on Community revenue and expenditure, since these were necessary priorities of the Parliament for as long as the institutional balance within the Community lacked an acceptable degree of parliamentary democracy. The Community’s activities are supposed to serve the nations, and their citizens, of which it is composed. This is their right; it is also the background to our longstanding calls for money flowing into Europe to be used appropriately and spent in accordance with the principles of sound financial management. The role of elected European representatives should be, and indeed is, to ROADS TO EUROPE 152

act as the guarantors of transparent and responsible financial management on the part of the Community. Undoubtedly, the Community has come a step closer to this goal in setting up the European Court of Auditors. Yet it is constitutionally significant that the EP also played a decisive role in establishing the European Court of Auditors. This first instance of the EP exercising its right of investiture is testimony to the considerable success of efforts to align the European Parliament with its constitutional position. The EP is only operational if it is capable of temporarily appointing, monitoring and, where necessary, dismissing decision-makers at the European level (such as Commissioners or, one day, members of a Europe-wide government). Viewed thus, the recognition of the EP’s right of investiture, as manifested in its co-decisional role in appointing the members of the Court of Auditors, marks a small but decisive step forwards. The European Court of Auditors is intended to be an autonomous body, independent of the Parliament, Council, and Commission. This independence is the prerequisite for responsible decision-making. And there is one more thing to consider, namely the operational relationship between the Parliament and the Court. The two bodies are mutually dependent. The Court of Auditors’ work would be in vain if its reports could not then be acted upon by a politically active institution. Conversely, the EP would not be able to carry out any external audits without the Court of Auditors’ in-depth expertise. In the 1975 Treaty (596), the EP secured sole and exclusive authority for Community discharge. The Treaty thus states that the Parliament, as the parliamentary control authority, should assume responsibility for the political and economic consequences of the Court of Auditors’ technical and economic audits. In this sense, the Court of Auditors is to support the European Parliament (see Article 206a(4) of the Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties) (597). Therefore, over the next few weeks we should focus mainly on the dangers that may arise should the Court of Auditors chart the wrong course in organising its work. The Court should make use of the experience of the parliamentary control authority (the EP Control Committee) (598) through close consultation. Here we can only summarise the potential benefits, as well as the pitfalls of the first steps. The Court’s authority (at the institutional level and in terms of the expertise of its staff) means that it is able to take action in a way that its predecessors (the Audit Board and the auditors of the ECSC) (599) never could, as their auditing work was a ‘sideline occupation’. The scope of its activities has also been extended markedly thanks to the Treaty of 22 July 1975 and the EP’s discharge powers. Audits of own resources and Community expenditure can now also be carried out fully in the Member States. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 153

The European Court of Auditors now faces the all-important question. Will it be organised in such a way as to: a) gain an understanding of the decision-making procedures underlying both revenue and expenditure; b) achieve close cooperation with the ‘Community’s internal auditors’ (600) (possibly through further Treaty amendments); c) enforce, together with the EP, full transparency in financial and budgetary conduct across specific areas of examination? Close cooperation with the national audit offices is necessary, particularly in order to ensure uniform interpretation of Community law or at least to initiate this via the Commission and the Parliament. The EP will be monitoring with some concern, yet also with high hopes, the next steps taken by the members of the European Court of Auditors. If the compulsory budgetary discussions between the Court and the EP fully respect the independence of each entity, it will be possible to achieve a satisfactory outcome that benefits the European Community. ROADS TO EUROPE 154

Press release from Heinrich Aigner on 1 June 1979 (601)

Press release in which Aigner gave his theories on European policy ahead of the first direct European elections on 10 June 1979.

CDU/CSU Bundestag group 13 October 1979 Page 8 This week’s keywords 1 June 1979

A policy for Europe is a policy for peace — theories on Europe

1. European unification holds the key to the fate of the 20th century. World peace can only be preserved and guaranteed if the liberal European idea overcomes the power politics of nationalism. 2. Only responsible, value-based politics now have the power to shield our world from disaster. 3. Europe needs to be redefined and to offer an intellectual alternative to communism. 4. Europe needs to revert to the intellectual roots of its Christian forefathers Adenauer, Schuman, and de Gasperi (602). The true idea of Europe needs to re-emerge from under the shroud of excessive pragmatism and the over-weighty influence of bureaucrats and lobbyists. Europe needs to protect individual citizens from powerful organisations. 5. Europe was shaped by Christianity. We are in favour of a pluralistic Europe with Christian values and a Christian understanding of mankind at its core. 6. A policy for Europe is a policy for peace built on reconciliation. Erstwhile sworn enemies are now thinking in terms of peace. The idea of Europe has changed attitudes among Europeans. 7. Europe is more than just a geographical concept. It is a vision for an order in which the rule of law, and not power, determines inter-state relations. 8. Taking the rule of law as the basis for resolving conflict always makes war less likely. It also protects minorities. 9. This model for a Europe founded on the rule of law has the potential to influence the third world and offers great hope to civil rights campaigners in Eastern Europe. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 155

10. Through forging a Europe founded on the rule of law, we are contributing to world peace and setting an example in non-coercive, and therefore lasting, conflict resolution. This is the only way to safeguard human rights across the globe.

Heinrich Aigner ROADS TO EUROPE 156

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished sources

Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (ACSP), Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Munich BWK Amberg Abg: 1, Nr. 6: Bundestagswahl 1957 (closed archives) DS 1/7 KV Amberg-Stadt Abg: 1, Nr. 5 (closed archives) KV Amberg-Stadt Abg: 1, Nr. 30: JU-KV Amberg-Stadt (closed archives) LG-8. WP 117 NL Aigner Heinrich 2/1, 6, 8, 10-13, 16-72, 85-130 NL Goppel Alfons 661 NL Jaeger Richard B 45/1, C 146 NL Klein Hans 537 NL Raß Hans 14 NL Strauß Franz Josef PV 121, 15757 BV Oberpfalz Fl. 1979: 1

Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (BayHStA), Munich Staatskanzlei 16576, 16577, 16581, 16616, 16617

Bundesgeschäftsstelle der Paneuropa-Union Deutschland e.V. (PEU), Munich Sternfahrt für Europa I, 11.-13.7.1986 Straßburg (closed archives)

European Parliament’s Archive and Documentation Centre (CARDOC), Luxembourg PE0 AP PR B0-0329/77 0030 PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG 19760128 0020, 19770118 0020 PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 SCCB 19770926 0017 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 157

PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 A0-0321/72 0030 PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0-0166/75 0120, A0-0166/75 0170, A0-0166/75 0210, A0-0167/75 0040, A0-0167/75 0060, A0-0167/75 0075, A0-0167/75 0095 PE0 OD PV/BUBE-19770915 0010 PE1 AP PV/CONT.1979 CONT 19831201 0020, 19840319 0010, 19840328 0010, 19840416 0030, 19850228 0010 PE1 P1 224/RIAU RIAU 19770325 0055 DOC1, 19770428 0080 DOC1, 19770920 0010 DOC1 PE1 P1 272/COMP CONT.1979-040 0010 DOC1

Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence C.CO Courrier Entrée 1975-1977, Sortie 29-7-1975 à 31-5-1977 (closed archives) CCE 271, 277, 319, 337, 351, 361, 371, 400, 632, 1572, 1690, 1709, 1826, 1976, 2989, 3000, 3089, 4126 CM2 73 – 127 CPPE 94 EN 211 PE0 422, 465, 468, 978, 1107, 1111, 1233, 1235, 1399, 1421, 1578, 2014, 2502 PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1967 BUDG 19701110, 19710202, 19710514, 19720324, 19720914, 19721201 PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG 19730618, 19731024, 19740304, 19760120, 19760512, 19770215, 19771003, 19780508, 19790124 PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 SCCB 19731204, 19740108, 19740218, 19760621, 19760712, 19761018, 19770314, 19770503, 19780227, 19780609 PE0 PV Commissions 1965-79 PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 A1-0469/81, A1-1125/82, A1-0790/83 PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 A2-0888/84, A2-0200/85, A2-0030/86, A2-0147/87

Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC), Brussels COM(73) 1000, COM(73) 1000 final, COM(76) 635 final ROADS TO EUROPE 158

Informations- und Dokumentationsstelle (IuD-Stelle), Hanns-Seidel- Stiftung, Munich Folder on Aigner Heinrich

Staatsarchiv Amberg (StA Am), Amberg Spruchkammer Amberg Stadt Meldebögen A 46

Staatsarchiv München (StA M), Munich RA 100204

Stadtarchiv Amberg (StadtAAm), Amberg CSU 11, 28, 30, 38, 51, 69 83 NL Heinrich Aigner 36, 84, 107, 123, 178-205, 337, 375, 381, 405, 460, 581, 590, 609

Interviewees

Prof. Konrad Ackermann on 7.3.2014 (by telephone) Dr Heinz Aigner on 10.1.2013 (Munich) Dr Ulrich Aigner on 9.11.2013 (Munich) Jean Darras on 21.10.2013 (Luxembourg) Heinz Donhauser on 21.8.2013 (Munich) Michael Möhnle on 16.1.2013 (Munich) Bernd Posselt on 17.9.2012 and 15.10.2013 (Munich) Maria Reindl on 10.2.2014 (by telephone) HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 159

Published sources

Adenauer, Konrad: government statement to the Bundestag on 15 December 1954. Aigner, Heinrich: ‘Europa als unsere politische und wirtschaftliche Aufgabe. Beiträge der Sachverständigen’, in CSU-Landesleitung (ed.): CSU 81 Herausforderung und Antwort. Dokumentation CSU-Parteitag 9-11 Juli 1981, Munich 1981, pp. 129-133. Aigner, Heinrich: Europa. Schicksalsfrage unseres Jahrhunderts, Würzburg 1978. Aigner, Heinrich: ‘Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Entwicklung und Perspektive’, in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 2 (1978), pp. 10-12. Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office, Luxembourg 1973. Aigner, Heinrich: Untersuchungen über das Delikt der Abtreibung an Hand der gerichtlichen Akten des Landgerichtsbezirkes Amberg der Jahre 1925-1950 (doctoral thesis), Erlangen 1954. Balcar, Jaromír/Schlemmer, Thomas (eds):An der Spitze der CSU. Die Führungsgremien der Christlich-Sozialen Union 1946 bis 1955, Munich 2007 (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 68). Bavarian Landtag, plenary minutes, tenth legislative period, 34th sitting on 23.11.1983 (Drs 10/1279). CSU manifestos, online: http://www.hss.de/mediathek/archiv-fuer- christlich-soziale-politik/parteiprogramme/grundsatzprogramme.html (accessed on 17.9.2015). Debates of the European Parliament, 1963-1964 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 12.5.1964. Debates of the European Parliament, 1969-1970 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 6.10.1969. Debates of the European Parliament, 1969-1970 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 26.11.1969. Debates of the European Parliament, 1972-1973 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 9.5.1973. Debates of the European Parliament, 1974-1975 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 11.7.1975. ROADS TO EUROPE 160

Debates of the European Parliament, 1975-1976 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 15.6.1976. Debates of the European Parliament, 1976-1977 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 14.12.1976. Debates of the European Parliament, 1976-1977 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 16.12.1976. Debates of the European Parliament, 1977-1978 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 10.2.1977. Debates of the European Parliament, 1977-1978 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 12.10.1977. Debates of the European Parliament, 1980-1981 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 5.5.1981. Debates of the European Parliament, 1984-1985 session, verbatim reports of the sitting of 14.11.1984. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/457. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/467. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/1342. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/1473. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/1721. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/2521. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/2650. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 04/1614. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 05/720. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 06/2938. German Bundestag, BT-Drs 07/5886. German Bundestag, stenographic reports, fourth legislative period, fifth sitting of 29.11.1961. European Parliament, reports of proceedings, 1974-1975 session. Foerster, Rolf H. (ed.): Die Idee Europa 1300-1946. Quellen zur Geschichte der politischen Einigung, Munich 1963. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 161

Franz, Corinna/Gnad, Oliver (eds): Handbuch zur Statistik der Parlamente und Parteien in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. CDU und CSU. Mitgliedschaft und Sozialstruktur 1945-1990, Düsseldorf 2005 (Handbücher zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 12). Franz, Corinna (ed.): Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1961–1966, Düsseldorf 2004 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945, Teilband 1). Official Journal of the European Communities, 152 of 13.7.1967. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 139 of 28.10.1969. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 66 of 1.7.1971. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 37 of 4.6.1973. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 62 of 31.7.1973. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 87 of 17.10.1973. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 179 of 6.8.1975. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 159 of 12.7.1976. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 266 of 7.11.1977. Official Journal of the European Communities, L 359 of 31.12.1977. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 203 of 13.8.1979. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 125 of 17.5.1982. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 127 of 14.5.1984. Official Journal of the European Communities, C 337 of 17.12.1984. Ratzinger, Joseph: Christlicher Glaube und Europa. 12 Predigten, Munich 1981. ‘Report of the Working Party examining the problem of the enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament’ of 25.3.1972, in Bulletin of the European Economic Community, April 1972, No 4, pp. 7-87, online: http:// www.cvce.eu/obj/bericht_vedel_25_marz_1972-de-a4f5b134-99b9-41b3- 9715-41769dfea12a.html (accessed on 17.9.2015). Schindler, Peter (ed.): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-1999, Vol. 1, Baden-Baden 1999. Schwarz, Jürgen (ed.): Katholische Kirche und Europa. Dokumente 1945- 1979, Munich 1980. ROADS TO EUROPE 162

Schwarz, Jürgen: Die Katholische Kirche und das neue Europa. Dokumente 1980-1995, 2 vols, Mainz 1996. Spénale, Georges: Die Eigenmittel. der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und die Haushaltsbefugnisse des Europäischen Parlaments. Dokumentensammlung, Luxembourg 1972. Zellhuber, Andreas/Peters, Tim B. (eds): Die CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1972, Düsseldorf 2011 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945, Vol. 15/I).

Newspaper articles and websites

‘Aigner als EG-Kommissar nach Brüssel?’, in Paneuropa Intern 15, 30.10.1980, p. 2. ‘Bauern im strengen Sinne’, in Der Spiegel 35, 25.8.1954, p. 17. ‘Bayerisches Bekenntnis’, in Die Zeit, 6.4.1979, online: http://www.zeit. de/1979/15/bayerisches-bekenntnis (accessed on 17.9.2015). ‘Brüssel — nein danke’, in Die Zeit, 5.12.1980, online: http://www.zeit. de/1980/50/bruessel-nein-danke/komplettansicht (accessed on 17.9.2015). ‘Brüssels dunkle Kanäle’, in Münchner Merkur, 11.5.1973, p. 4. ‘BT-Kandidat 1957: Reg.-Rat Dr Heinrich Aigner’, in Amberger Zeitung, 7.5.1957, p. 7. ‘Bundestagswahl 1957’, in Amberger Volksblatt, 16.9.1957, p. 5. ‘Die EG muß weiterentwickelt werden. Die Deutsche Tagespost sprach in Straßburg mit Dr Heinrich Aigner, MdB und MdEP’, in Deutsche Tagespost, 30.10.1979, p. 5. ‘Ein,leuchtendes Vorbild’. Dr Heinrich Aigner’, in Paneuropa Intern 5, 2.4.1988, p. 1. ‘Ein Mandat ist kein Erbhof’, in Der Spiegel 27, 3.7.1957, p. 26 et seq. ‘Europa — Aufgabe unserer Generation’, in Paneuropa Intern 5, 2.4.1988, p. 4. ‘EWG-Ausgabenkontrolle soll verbessert werden’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18.9.1972, p. 15. ‘Große Zeiten brechen am rechten Rand Europas aus’, in Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.5.1979, p. 3. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 163

‘Herz auf der Zunge’, in Der Spiegel 24, 9.6.1954, p. 6 et seq. ‘Ich verstehe schlecht’, in Der Spiegel 48, 23.11.1955, p. 21-26. ‘Klares Bekenntnis zu Europa’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27.1.2014, online: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wahl-des-eu-parlaments-klares- bekenntnis-zu-europa-1.1872598 (accessed on 17.9.2015). ‘Kontroverse Rothemund-Ratzinger’, in Deutsche Tagespost, 8.5.1979, p. 8. ‘MdB Aigner wurde abgewählt’, in Donaukurier, 8./9.3.1980, p. 5. ‘Mehr Integration durch Kontrolle’, in Handelsblatt, 8.11.1973, p. 9. ‘Neue Kompetenzen für das Europäische Parlament — Errichtung des Europäischen Rechnungshofes hat grundsätzliche Bedeutung’, in Deutschland-Union-Dienst 9, 12.1.1978, pp. 6-8. ‘Reg.-Rat Dr Heinrich Aigner, Bundestagskandidat der CSU’, in Amberger Volksblatt, 8.5.1957, p. 9. ‘“Schlamassel” bei Neumarkts Christlich Sozialen’, in Mittelbayerische Zeitung, 8./9.3.1980, p. 9. ‘Straßburg kritisiert die EG-Kommission’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11.5.1973, p. 10. ‘Vereinigung Europas vorangetrieben’, in Oberpfalznet.de, 26.3.2013, online: https://www.oberpfalznetz.de/zeitung/3626918-125,1,0.html#top (accessed on 17.9.2015). ‘Verfassungsgericht kippt Drei-Prozent-Hürde bei Europawahl’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26.2.2014, online: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ entscheidung-in-karlsruhe-verfassungsgericht-kippt-drei-prozent-huerde- bei-europawahl-1.1898660 (accessed on 17.9.2015). http://www.contactcommittee.eu (accessed on 17.9.2015). http://www.eca.europa.eu/de/Pages/History.aspx (accessed on 17.9.2015). http://www.europaeische-akademie.de (accessed on 17.9.2015). ROADS TO EUROPE 164

Secondary literature

Altmaier, Peter et al.: Finanzkontrolle und Betrugsbekämpfung in der Europäischen Union, Sankt Augustin 1996 (Interne Studien 127). Andrew, Christopher/Mitrokhin, Vasili: The World Was Going Our Way. The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, New York 2005. Arndt, Agnes et al. (eds): Vergleichen, verflechten, verwirren? Europäische Geschichtsschreibung zwischen Theorie und Praxis, Göttingen 2011. Arts, Karin: Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: the Case of the Lomé Convention, The Hague 2000. Baier, Stephan/Demmerle, Eva: Otto von Habsburg. Die Biografie, Vienna 2012. Bangemann, Martin et al.: Die Abgeordneten Europas. Möglichkeiten und Leistungen, Baden-Baden 1984. Barry, Desmond: Managing the finances of the European Union. The role of the European Court of Auditors, Dublin 1996. Bauer, Theresia et al. (eds): Gesichter der Zeitgeschichte. Deutsche Lebensläufe im 20. Jahrhundert, Munich 2009. Baziadoly, Sophie: ‘Le refus de la décharge par le Parlement Européen’, in Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 354 (1992), pp. 58-73. Becker, Winfried: ‘Gründung und Wurzeln der Christlich-Sozialen Union’, in Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (ed.): Geschichte einer Volkspartei. 50 Jahre CSU 1945- 1995, Munich 1995, pp. 69-107. Bergel, Philipp: Rechnungshöfe als vierte Staatsgewalt? Verfassungsvergleich der Rechnungshöfe Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Österreichs, Spaniens, des Vereinigten Königreichs und des Europäischen Rechnungshofes im Gefüge der Gewaltenteilung, Göttingen 2010. Beyme, Klaus von: Die parlamentarische Demokratie. Entstehung und Funktionsweise 1799-1999, 4th ed. Wiesbaden 2014. Bieber, Roland: Organe der erweiterten Gemeinschaften: Das Parlament, Baden-Baden 1974. Birkl, Rudolf: Geschichte der Jungen Union Bayern, in 30 Jahre Junge Union Bayern 1947-1977, Festschrift (ed. Landessekretariat der Jungen Union), Munich 1977, pp. 6-12. Birkl, Rudolf: ‘Im Dunkeln saß der,Ochsensepp’, in Junge Union Bayern (ed.): 50 Jahre Junge Union Bayern. Zukunft einer Volkspartei, Munich 1997, p. 140. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 165

Blind, Jochen: Das Heimspiel der ,Europa-Parteien,? Die Europawahlkämpfe der Union von 1979 bis 2009, Wiesbaden 2012. Bödecker, Hans Erich: ‘Biographie. Annäherungen an den gegenwärtigen Forschungs- und Diskussionsstand’, in Ibid. (ed.): Biographie schreiben, Göttingen 2003 (Göttinger Gespräche zur Geschichtswissenschaft 18), pp. 9-63. Bourdieu, Pierre: ‘Die biographische Illusion’, in BIOS. Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung und Oral History 3 (1990), pp. 75-81. Braun, Oliver: Konservative Existenz in der Moderne. Das politische Weltbild Alois Hundhammers (1900-1974), Munich 2005 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 7). Breuer, Thomas: Verordneter Wandel? Der Widerstreit zwischen nationalsozialistischem Herrschaftsanspruch und traditionaler Lebenswelt im Erzbistum Bamberg, Mainz 1990 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B: Forschungen 60). Brook-Shepherd, Gordon: Otto von Habsburg. Biographie, Graz, etc. 2002. Brueck, Werner: ‘Die Neuregelung der Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in Die öffentliche Verwaltung 30 (1977), pp. 23-27. Bugnot, Patricia: ‘La Cour des comptes des Communautés européennes: premier bilan’, in Revue du Marché commun 262 (1982), pp. 609-623. Carotti, Rosmarie: ‘Wer war Dr H. Aigner?’, in Life and Work in the European Court of Auditors 10/2006, pp. 16-17. Clark, Stephen/Priestley, Julian: Europe’s Parliament. People, Places, Politics, London 2012. Clemens, Gabriele et al: Geschichte der europäischen Integration. Ein Lehrbuch, Cologne, etc. 2008. Conze, Vanessa: Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920-1970), Munich 2005 (Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 69). Conze, Vanessa: ‘Leitbild Paneuropa? Zum Europagedanken und seiner Wirkung in der Zwischenkriegszeit am Beispiel der Konzepte Richard Coudenhove-Kalergis’, in Elvert, Jürgen/Nielsen-Sikora, Jürgen (eds): Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit, Munich 2009 (Historische Mitteilungen im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft 74), pp. 119-125. Conze, Vanessa: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Umstrittener Visionär Europas, Gleichen/Zürich 2003. ROADS TO EUROPE 166

Conze, Vanessa: ‘’Zum Europäer bin ich in Amerika geworden.‘’ Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Europabewusstsein und biographischen Erfahrungen in der Bundesrepublik der Nachkriegszeit’, in Depkat, Volker/ Graglia, Piero S.: Entscheidung für Europa. Erfahrung, Zeitgeist und politische Herausforderungen am Beginn der europäischen Integration, Berlin/New York 2010, pp. 43-60. Depkat, Volker: Lebenswenden und Zeitenwenden. Deutsche Politiker und die Erfahrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, Munich 2007 (Ordnungssysteme, Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit 18). Deutinger, Stephan: Bayerns Weg zur Eisenbahn. Joseph von Baader und die Frühzeit der Eisenbahn in Bayern 1800 bis 1835, St. Ottilien 1997 (Forschungen zur Landes- und Regionalgeschichte 1). Dreischer, Stephan: ‘Der Machtaufstieg des Europäischen Parlaments und der Einfluss institutioneller Mechanismen’, in Patzelt, Werner J. (ed.) Parlamente und ihre Macht. Kategorien und Fallbeispiele institutioneller Analyse, Baden- Baden 2005 (Studien zum Parlamentarismus 2), pp. 145-170. Dröge, Martin: ‘Einleitung: Die biographische Methode in der Regionalgeschichte’, in Ibid. (ed.): Die biographische Methode in der Regionalgeschichte, Münster 2011 (Forum Regionalgeschichte 17), pp. 1-13. Dröge, Martin (ed.): Die biographische Methode in der Regionalgeschichte, Münster 2011 (Forum Regionalgeschichte 17). Duchhardt, Heinz/Kunz, Andreas (eds): ‘Europäische Geschichte’ als historiographisches Problem, Mainz 1997. Eder, Franz X./Sieder, Reinhard: Historische Diskursanalysen. Genealogie, Theorie, Anwendungen, Wiesbaden 2006. Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Der Europäische Rechnungshof. Haushaltskontrolle in der Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1976. Eichmüller, Andreas: Der Jagerwiggerl. Ludwig Volkholz. Förster, Politiker, Volksheld, Regensburg 1997. Elvert, Jürgen: Die europäische Integration, Darmstadt 2013. Elvert, Jürgen/Nielsen-Sikora, Jürgen (eds): Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit, Stuttgart 2009 (Historische Mitteilungen im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft 74). Fait, Barbara: Die Anfänge der CSU 1945-1948. Der holprige Weg zur Erfolgspartei, Munich, etc. 1995. Fechtner, Detlef: Die deutschen Länder in der Europäischen Union. Perspektiven im transatlantischen Vergleich, Frankfurt am Main 1996. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 167

Finger, Stefan: Franz Josef Strauß. Ein politisches Leben, Munich 2005. Fleuter, Robert: Mandat und Status des Abgeordneten im Europäischen Parlament, Pfaffenweiler 1991. Foerster, Rolf H.: Europa. Geschichte einer politischen Idee, Munich 1967. Fontaine, Pascal: Herzenssache Europa. Eine Zeitreise 1953-2009. Geschichte der Fraktion der Christdemokraten und der Europäischen Volkspartei im Europäischen Parlament, Brussels 2009. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.: Europawahl in Deutschland. Eine Analyse der 1. Direktwahl zum Europaparlament am 10. Juni 1979, Mannheim 1979. Forsyth, Murray: Das Parlament der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Cologne 1964. Frevert, Ute: ‘Politikgeschichte: Konzepte und Herausforderungen’, in Frevert, Ute/Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard: Neue Politikgeschichte. Perspektiven einer historischen Politikforschung, Frankfurt am Main/New York 2005 (Historische Politikforschung 1), pp. 7-26. Freytag, Michael: Der Europäische Rechnungshof, Baden-Baden 2005. Friemberger, Claudia: Alfons Goppel. Vom Kommunalpolitiker zum Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten, Munich 2001 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 5). Friemberger, Claudia: Sebastian Schlittenbauer und die Anfänge der Bayerischen Volkspartei, St. Ottilien 1998 (Forschungen zur Landes- und Regionalgeschichte 5). Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier, Doris: Die deutschen Länder im Prozess der europäischen Einigung. Eine Analyse der Europapolitik unter integrationspolitischen Gesichtspunkten, Berlin 1991. Gall, Lothar (ed.): Die großen Deutschen unserer Epoche, Berlin 1995. Geiger, Tim: Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten. Außenpolitischer Konflikt und innerparteilicher Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958-1969, Munich 2008. Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Die Protokolle des Bayerischen Ministerrats 1945-1954, Munich 1995-2005. Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Hans Ehard. Die föderalistische Politik des bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten 1946-54, Düsseldorf 1992. Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: ‘Vom Kriegsende bis zum Ausgang der Ära Goppel (1945-1978)’, in Schmid, Alois (ed.): Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte. Band 4: Das neue Bayern von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Teilband 1: Staat und Politik, begr. von Max Spindler, Munich 2003, pp. 635-956. ROADS TO EUROPE 168

Geppert, Alexander C.T.: ‘Forschungstechnik oder historische Disziplin? Methodische Probleme der Oral History’, in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 45 (1994), pp. 303-323. Geppert, Dominik: Die Ära Adenauer, Darmstadt 2007. Glaesner, Hans-Joachim: ‘Das Konzertierungsverfahren zwischen Rat und Europäischem Parlament’, in Integration 4 (1981), pp. 22-27. Göhler, Gerhard (ed.): Die Eigenart der Institutionen. Zum Profil politischer Institutionentheorie, Baden-Baden 1994. Göhler, Gerhard et al (eds): Institution — Macht — Repräsentation. Wofür politische Institutionen stehen und wie sie wirken, Baden-Baden 1997. Gollwitzer, Heinz: Europabild und Europagedanke, Munich 1951. Graf, Rainer: Die Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden- Baden 1999 (Schriftenreihe Europäisches Recht. Politik und Wirtschaft 213). Gräfe, Horst: ‘Auf dem Wege zu einem Rechnungshof für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in Schiffer, Eckart/Karehnke, Helmut (eds): Verfassung, Verwaltung, Finanzkontrolle. Festschrift für Hans Schäfer, Cologne, etc. 1975, pp. 349-371. Gruner, Wolf D.: ‘Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Römischen Verträge in historischer Perspektive’, in Gehler, Michael (ed.): Vom Gemeinsamen Markt zur Europäischen Unionsbildung. 50 Jahre Römische Verträge 1957-2007, Vienna, etc. 2009, pp. 485-520. Gruner, Wolf D.: ‘The German Perception of Europe: Expectations — Perceptions — Positions — Ideas’, in Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse et al (eds): Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration Européenne, Brussels 2007, pp. 61-86. Haller, Max: ‘Die europäische Integration als Elitenprojekt’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 23-24 (2009), pp. 18-23. Harms, Thomas: Die Rechtstellung der Abgeordneten in der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates und im Europäischen Parlament, Hamburg 1968. Hartmann, Peter Claus: Bayerns Weg in die Gegenwart. Vom Stammesherzogtum zum Freistaat heute, Regensburg 2004. Hartmann, Peter Josef: Die Entwicklungspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft am Beispiel der Lomé-Abkommen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung bundesdeutscher Interessen, Munich 1986. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 169

Henrich-Franke, Christian (ed.): Die „Schaffung’ Europas in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Konstruktionen eines vereinten Europas, Berlin 2014. Henßler, Patrick: ‘Reservatrechte’, in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, http://www. historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_44589 (accessed on 17.9.2015). Henzler, Christoph: ‘Die Christlich-Soziale Union in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren’, in Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (ed.): Geschichte einer Volkspartei. 50 Jahre CSU 1945-1995, Munich 1995, pp. 109-161. Henzler, Christoph: Fritz Schäffer. Der erste bayerische Nachkriegs- Ministerpräsident und erste Finanzminister der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1967. Eine biographische Studie, Munich 1994 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 3). Herman, Valentine/Lodge, Juliet: The European Parliament and the European Community, London 1978. Hettler, Friedrich Hermann: Josef Müller („Ochsensepp’). Mann des Widerstandes und erster CSU-Vorsitzender, Munich 1991 (Miscellanea Bavarica Monacensia 155). Hoerning, Erika M./Corsten, Michael (eds): Institution und Biographie. Die Ordnung des Lebens, Pfaffenweiler 1995. Hofmann, Ulrike Claudia: ‘Bayerischer Oberster Rechnungshof (ORH)’, in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/ artikel/artikel_45919 (accessed on 17.9.2015). Hölscheidt, Sven: Der Haushaltsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestags, Rheinbreitbach 1988. Höpfinger, Renate: ‘Ein Zeitzeuge erinnert sich. Interview mit dem ehemaligen JU-Vorsitzenden Franz Sackmann’, in Junge Union Bayern (ed.): 50 Jahre Junge Union Bayern. Zukunft einer Volkspartei, Munich 1997, pp. 45-64. Höpfinger, Renate: ‘Richard Jaeger (1913-1998)’, in Zeitgeschichte in Lebensbildern 12 (2007), pp. 115-127. Hübler, Martin: Bayern in Europa. Determinanten der bayerischen Europapolitik bis zur EU-Osterweiterung, Munich 2003. Hübler, Martin: Die Europapolitik des Freistaates Bayern. Von der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte bis zum Amsterdamer Vertrag, Munich 2002 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 6). Hummer, Waldemar/Obwexer, Walter: ‘Der,geschlossene' Rücktritt der Europäischen Kommission. Von der Nichtentlastung für die Haushaltsführung zur Neuernennung der Kommission’, in Integration 2 (1999), pp. 77-94. ROADS TO EUROPE 170

Hürten, Heinz: ‘Revolution und Zeit der Weimarer Republik’, in Schmid, Alois (ed.): Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte. Band 4: Das neue Bayern von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Teilband 1: Staat und Politik, begr. von Max Spindler, Munich 2003, pp. 439-498. Inghelram, Jan F.H.: Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti- Fraud Office (OLAF). An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, Groningen 2011. Jansen, Thomas: Die Entstehung einer Europäischen Volkspartei. Vorgeschichte, Gründung und Entwicklung der EVP, Bonn 1996. John, Anke: ‘Konzeptionen für eine EG-Reform: Der europäische Verfassungsdiskurs in der Bundesrepublik 1981-1986’, in König, Mareike et al (eds): Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung 1949-2000. Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen. Festschrift für Wolf D. Gruner zum 60. Geburtstag, Stuttgart 2004, pp. 559-578. Jost, Jonas: Der Abendlandgedanke in Westdeutschland nach 1945. Versuch und Scheitern eines Paradigmenwechsels in der deutschen Geschichte nach 1945, Hannover 1994. Judge, David et al: ‘Ripples or waves: The European Parliament in the European Community Policy Process’, in Journal of European Public Policy 1 (1994), pp. 27-52. Kaiser, Wolfram: Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge 2007. Kaiser, Wolfram et al (eds): Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe 1945-83, Basingstoke 2010. Kershaw, Ian: Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria 1933-1945, Oxford 1983. Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: ‘The European Parliament and Political Careers at the Nexus of European Integration and Transnational History’, in Laursen, Johnny (ed.): The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973-83, Baden-Baden 2014, pp. 76-96. Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: ‘The 1970 and 1975 Budget Treaties: Enhancing the Democratic Architecture of the Community’, in Laursen, Finn (ed.): Designing the European Union. From Paris to Lisbon, Houndmills et al. 2012, pp. 98-123. Kock, Peter Jakob: Bayerns Weg in die Bundesrepublik, Munich 1988 (Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 22). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 171

König, Mareike et al (eds): Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung 1949-2000. Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen. Festschrift für Wolf D. Gruner zum 60. Geburtstag, Stuttgart 2004. Koß, Siegfried/Löhr, Wolfgang (eds): Biographisches Lexikon des KV, Vol. 1-7, Schernfeld/Cologne 1991-2010. Kramer, Esther: Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wandel in den Verhandlungen über eine politische Union 1958-1970, Baden- Baden 2003. Kramer, Ferdinand: ‘Zur regionalen Dimension der europäischen Geschichte’, in Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte 147 (2011), pp. 1-6. Kraus, Andreas: Geschichte Bayerns, Munich 2004. Kraus, Hans-Christof: ‘Geschichte als Lebensgeschichte. Gegenwart und Zukunft der politischen Biographie’, in Kraus, Hans-Christof/Nicklas, Thomas (eds): Geschichte der Politik. Alte und neue Wege, Munich 2007 (Historische Zeitschrift, Supplement 44), pp. 311-332. Kunz, Reinhard: Die Delegation von Ausgabeermächtigungen durch das Bundestagsplenum auf den Haushaltsausschuss, Hattersheim am Main 1976. Laffan, Brigid: ‘Becoming a ‘Living Institution’. The evolution of the European Court of Auditors’, in Common Market Studies 37 (1999), pp. 251-268. Lambrecht, Lars: Intellektuelle Subjektivität und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Grundzüge eines Forschungsprojekts zur Biographik und Fallstudie zu F. Nietzsche und F. Mehring, Frankfurt am Main, etc. 1985 (Philosophie und Geschichte der Wissenschaften 7). Landwehr, Achim: Historische Diskursanalyse, Frankfurt am Main 2008 (Historische Einführungen 4). Lill, Rudolf: ‘Die Europapolitik der CDU/CSU und die ersten großen Schritte zu deren Verwirklichung’, in Zehetmair, Hans (ed.) Politik aus christlicher Verantwortung, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 125-137. Löffler, Bernhard: ‘Moderne Institutionengeschichte in kulturhistorischer Erweiterung. Thesen und Beispiele aus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Kraus, Hans-Christof/Nicklas, Thomas (eds): Geschichte der Politik. Alte und neue Wege, Munich 2007 (Historische Zeitschrift, Supplement 44), pp. 155-180. Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises. The European Project 1963- 1969, Baden-Baden 2001. Malettke, Klaus (ed.): Imaginer l’Europe, Berlin 1998. ROADS TO EUROPE 172

Margedant, Udo: ‘Europäische Gemeinschaft(en)’, in Bergmann, Jan (ed.): Handlexikon der Europäischen Union, 4th ed. Baden-Baden 2012, pp. 311-314. Mart, Marcel: ‘Die Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Studie aus historischer und wirtschaftlicher Sicht’, in Zavelberg, Heinz Günter (ed.): Die Kontrolle der Staatsfinanzen; Geschichte und Gegenwart, 1714 — 1989. Festschrift zur 275. Wiederkehr der Errichtung der Preußischen General- Rechen-Kammer, Berlin 1989, pp. 469-492. Marty-Gauquié, Henry: Le côntrole externe des finances publiques européennes, Brussels 1988. Mauerer, Josef Hermann: Otto Schedl. Ein Oberpfälzer strukturiert Bayerns Wirtschaft um, Munich 1972. May, Alex (ed.): Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The Commonwealth and Britain’s Applications to Join the European Communities, London 2001. Melville, Gert (ed.): Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare der Macht. Institutionelle Prozesse in Antike, Mittelalter und Neuzeit, Cologne, etc. 2005. Melville, Gert (ed.): Institutionen und Geschichte. Theoretische Aspekte und mittelalterliche Befunde, Cologne, etc. 1992 (Norm und Struktur 1). Melville, Gert/Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert (eds): Dimensionen institutioneller Macht. Fallstudien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Cologne, etc. 2012. Mergel, Thomas: ‘Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik’, in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002), pp. 574-606. Mintzel, Alf: ‘Die Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V’., in Stöss, Richard: Parteien-Handbuch. Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945- 1980. Sonderausgabe Band 2: Die CSU bis DSU, Opladen 1986 (Schriften des Zentralinstituts für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung der Freien Universität Berlin 38), pp. 661-718. Mintzel, Alf: Die CSU. Anatomie einer konservativen Partei 1945-1972, Opladen 1975. Mittag, Jürgen (ed.): 30 Jahre Direktwahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (1979-2009). Europawahlen und EP in der Analyse, Baden-Baden 2011 (Denkart Europa 12). Mohr, Arno: ‘Die Rolle der Persönlichkeit in politischen Institutionen: Biographische Ansätze in der Politikwissenschaft’, in BIOS. Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung und Oral History 3 (1990), pp. 225-236. Müller, Gerhard: Die Junge Union Bayern und ihr Beitrag zur politischen Jugend- und Erwachsenenbildung, Munich 1987. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 173

Müller-Botsch, Christine: ‘Biographie und Institution. Zur Interdependenz biographischer und institutioneller Entwicklungen’, in Dröge, Martin (ed.): Die biographische Methode in der Regionalgeschichte, Münster 2011 (Forum Regionalgeschichte 17), pp. 59-74. Neuhann, Florian: Im Schatten der Integration. OLAF und die Bekämpfung von Korruption in der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden 2005 (Münchner Beiträge zur Europäischen Einigung 12). Neumann, Thomas: Die Europäischen Integrationsbestrebungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Vienna 1999. Niethammer, Lutz: Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedächtnis. Die Praxis der ‘Oral History’, Frankfurt am Main 1985. Patel, Kiran Klaus: Europäisierung wider Willen: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG, 1955-1973, Munich 2009. Patel, Kiran Klaus: ‘Transnationale Geschichte’, in Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO), ed. Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG), Mainz 3.12.2010, http://www.ieg-ego.eu/patelk-2010-de (accessed on 17.9.2015). Pietsch, Isolde: ‘Es begann im Hungerwinter’, in Landessekretariat der Jungen Union Bayern (ed.): Gestern, Heute, Morgen. Zwanzig Jahre Junge Union Bayern, Munich 1967, pp. 39-51. Piodi, Franco: Der Weg zu den Direktwahlen des Europäischen Parlaments, Luxembourg 2009 (Schriften Reihe CARDOC, special issue). Pohlig, Matthias: ‘Vom Besonderen zum Allgemeinen? Die Fallstudie als geschichtstheoretisches Problem’, in Historische Zeitschrift 297 (2013), pp. 297-319. Pöhlmann, Barbara: Heinrich Held als Bayerischer Ministerpräsident (1924- 1933). Eine Studie zu 9 Jahren bayerischer Staatspolitik, Munich 1996. Posselt, Martin/Voss, Dirk: Paneuropa Jugend. 10 Jahre Kampf um Europa, Munich 1982. Pyta, Wolfram: ‘Biographisches Arbeiten als Methode. Geschichtswissenschaft’, in Klein, Christian (ed.): Handbuch Biographie. Methoden, Traditionen, Theorien, Stuttgart 2009, pp. 331-338. Raden, Friedhelm: Christliche Hilfswerke im Kalten Krieg, Herbolzheim 2000. Rauh-Kühne, Cornelia: ‘Katholikinnen unter dem Nationalsozialismus: Voraussetzungen und Grenzen von Vereinnahmung und Resistenz’, in Wickert, Christl (ed.), Frauen gegen die braune Diktatur. Widerstand und Verfolgung im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, Berlin 1995, pp. 34-51. ROADS TO EUROPE 174

Rauh-Kühne, Cornelia: ‘Katholisches Sozialmilieu, Region und Nationalsozialismus’, in Möller, Horst et al (eds): Nationalsozialismus in der Region. Beiträge zur regionalen und lokalen Forschung und zum internationalen Vergleich, Munich 1996 (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer), pp. 213-235. Richter, Saskia: ‘Kanzlerkandidatur von Franz Josef Strauß, 1980’, in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/ artikel/artikel_46134 (accessed on 17.9.2015). Rittberger, Berthold: Building Europe’s Parliament. Democratic Representation beyond the Nation-State, New York/Oxford 2005. Rohe, Karl: ‘Politische Kultur und ihre Analyse. Probleme und Perspektiven der politischen Kulturforschung’, in Historische Zeitschrift 250 (1990), pp. 321-346. Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament und Haushaltsverfassungsrecht. Eine kritische Betrachtung der parlamentarischen Haushaltsbefugnisse, Berlin 1997 (Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften, Öffentliches Recht 9). Sarasin, Philipp: Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse, Frankfurt am Main 2003. Schildt, Axel: Zwischen Abendland und Amerika. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre, Munich 1999 (Ordnungssysteme, Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit 4). Schlemmer, Thomas, ‘Pirkl, Fritz’, in Neue Deutsche Biographie 20 (2001), p. 476 et seq. [online version], URL: http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/ pnd119502275.html, (accessed on 17.9.2015). Schlemmer, Thomas: Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung. Die Christlich-Soziale Union 1945-1955, Munich 1998. Schmale, Wolfgang: Geschichte Europas, Vienna, etc. 2001. Schmöger, Helga (ed.): Der Bayerische Senat. Biographisch-statistisches Handbuch 1947-1999, Bonn 1998 (Handbücher zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 10). Schöberl, Verena: ‘Es gibt ein großes und herrliches Land, das sich selbst nicht kennt… Es heißt Europa’. Die Diskussion um die Paneuropaidee in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien 1922-1933, Berlin 2008 (Gesellschaftspolitische Schriftenreihe der Begabtenförderung der Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 2). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 175

Schöfbeck, Martina: ‘Eine Bastion konservativer Grundideen? Die programmatischen Entwicklungslinien der CSU-Europapolitik’, in Hopp, Gerhard (ed.): Die CSU. Strukturwandel, Modernisierung und Herausforderungen einer Volkspartei, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 219-237. Schönhoven, Klaus: Die Bayerische Volkspartei 1924-1932, Düsseldorf 1972 (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 46). Schorn-Schütte, Luise: Historische Politikforschung. Eine Einführung, Munich 2006, pp. 77-85. Schramek, Christian: ‘Als Regionalpartei in Brüssel und Straßburg. Die europapolitischen Akteure der CSU’, in Hopp, Gerhard (ed.): Die CSU. Strukturwandel, Modernisierung und Herausforderungen einer Volkspartei, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 309-334. Schröder, Adolf (ed.): ‘Völker Europas, findet euch selbst!’ Beiträge zur Ideengeschichte der Europabewegung in Deutschland, Oldenburg 2007. Schubert, Klaus/Martina Klein: Das Politiklexikon, Bonn 2011, http://www. bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17428/eurokommunismus (accessed on 17.9.2015). Schwarz, Hans-Peter: Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012. Schwend, Karl: Bayern zwischen Monarchie und Diktatur. Beiträge zur bayerischen Frage in der Zeit von 1918 bis 1933, Munich 1954. Skiadas, Dimitrios: The European Court of Auditors, London 2000. Solle, Stefan: Kampf um Europa. Die Paneuropa-Konzeption des Grafen Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und ihre ideengeschichtlichen Wurzeln, Saarbrücken 2008. Soutou, Georges-Henri: L’alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico- stratégiques franco-allemands 1954-1996, Paris 1996. Sternberger, Dolf et al (eds): Die Wahl der Parlamente und anderer Staatsorgane. Band 1.1.: Europa, Berlin 1969. Stoll, Ulrike: Kulturpolitiker als Beruf. Dieter Sattler (1906-1968) in München, Bonn und Rom, Paderborn, etc. 2005 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B: Forschungen 98). Stollberg-Rilinger, Barbara: ‘Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?’, in Ibid. (ed.): Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?, Berlin 2005 (Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Beiheft 35), pp. 9-24. Strasser, Daniel: Die Finanzen Europas. Das Haushalts- und Finanzrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Luxembourg 1991. ROADS TO EUROPE 176

Ternes, Stefan Johannes: Die Finanzkontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1996. Thäsler, Christoph: Finanzkontrolle im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Die Zusammenarbeit der europäischen Rechnungskontrollbehörden und die Perspektiven für einen externen Finanzkontrollverbund, Göttingen 2012 (Schriften zum Europäischen und Internationalen Recht 20). Theato, Diemut/Graf, Rainer: Das Europäische Parlament und der Haushalt der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1994. Thiem, Janina: Nationale Parteien im Europäischen Parlament. Delegation, Kontrolle und politischer Einfluss, Wiesbaden 2009. Timmann, Hans-Jörg: ‘Der Rechnungshof’, in Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1993/94, Baden- Baden 1994, pp. 93-98. Treffke, Jörg: Gustav Heinemann. Wanderer zwischen den Parteien. Eine politische Biographie, Paderborn, etc. 2009. Trunk, Achim: Europa, ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und europäische Identität in den 1950er Jahren, Munich 2007 (Studien zur Internationalen Geschichte 18). Vardabasso, Valentina: ‘La cendrillon de l’histoire: la Cour des comptes européenne et la démocratisation des institutions européennes (1970-1976)’, in Journal of European Integration History 17 (2011), pp. 285-302. Vierhaus, Rudolf/Herbst, Ludolf (eds): Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-2002, Vol. 1, Munich 2002. Vollhardt, Britta-Ulla: Staatliche Heimatpolitik und Heimatdiskurse in Bayern 1945-1970. Identitätsstiftung zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung, Munich 2008 (Münchner Beiträge zur Geschichtswissenschaft 3). Vorländer, Herbert (ed.): Oral History. Mündlich erfragte Geschichte, Göttingen 1990. Walters, F. P.: A History of the League of Nations, Oxford 1952. Walther, Christoph: Jakob Fischbacher und die Bayernpartei. Biografische Studien 1886 bis 1972, Munich 2006. Weichers, Britta: ‘Mitteleuropa oder Paneuropa?’, in Schröder, Adolf (ed.): „Völker Europas, findet euch selbst!’ Beiträge zur Ideengeschichte der Europabewegung in Deutschland, Oldenburg 2007, pp. 63-114. Westad, Odd Arne: The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge 2006. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 177

Westerhoff, Horst-Dieter: ‘Die parlamentarische Zusammenarbeit von Bundestagsfraktion und Europaabgeordneten. Das Beispiel CDU/CSU’, in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 3 (1985), pp. 372-382. White, Simone: Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communities: The Fight against Fraud and Corruption, The Hague 1998. Wirz, Ulrich: Karl Theodor von und zu Guttenberg und das Zustandekommen der Großen Koalition, Grub am Forst 1997 (Oberfränkische Köpfe 4). Wolf, Constanze: CSU und Bayernpartei. Ein besonderes Konkurrenzverhältnis 1948-1960, Cologne 1984. Zellhuber, Andreas: Introduction in Zellhuber, Andreas/Peters, Tim B. (eds): Die CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1972, Düsseldorf 2011 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945, Vol. 15/I), pp. XI-XC. Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Anita: Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergie und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren, Vienna 2004. Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Anita: ‘Europäische Christdemokraten und die Paneuropa-Bewegung von Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’, in Gehler, Michael et al (eds): Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna, etc. 2001 (Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 4), pp. 574-603. Ziegler, Walter: ‘Bayern im NS-Staat 1933 bis 1945’, in Schmid, Alois (ed.): Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte. Band 4: Das neue Bayern von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Teilband 1: Staat und Politik, begr. von Max Spindler, Munich 2003, pp. 499-634. ROADS TO EUROPE 178

NOTES

(1) The terms European Community and European Communities are used inconsistently in my sources and reference works. European Communities is the official collective designation for the EEC, EAEC, and ECSC. In common parlance, European Community is also often used to refer to all three communities, although the term has been used solely to denote the EEC since the latter was rebaptised by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, this study uses the term European Communities only when referring to the whole body of communities. For variety, the terms the Communities and EC are also used. See, for example, Margedant, Udo: ‘Europäische Gemeinschaft(en)’, in Berg- mann, Jan (ed.): Handlexikon der Europäischen Union, 4th ed. Baden-Baden 2012, pp. 311-314. (2) Schmale, Wolfgang: Geschichte Europas, Vienna, etc. 2001, p. 84. (3) This description was first used by Hans Kutscher, President of the European Court of Justice, as he swore in the ECA’s members in October 1977. (4) From the Court’s own words on its history: http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/History.aspx (accessed on 26.8.2015). (5) The Paneuropean Union, the oldest European unification movement, was founded by Richard Nikolaus Graf von Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1922. See chapter 3. (6) Beyme, Klaus von: Die parlamentarische Demokratie. Entstehung und Funktionsweise 1799-1999, 4th ed. Wiesbaden 2014, p. 57. (7) Ibid., p. 59. (8) This book is based on the standards for a political biography as set out by Hans-Christof Kraus. See Kraus, Hans-Christof: ‘Geschichte als Lebensgeschichte. Gegenwart und Zukunft der politischen Biographie’, in Kraus, Hans-Christof/Nicklas, Thomas (eds) Geschichte der Politik. Alte und neue Wege (Historische Zeitschrift, Supplement 44), Munich 2007, pp. 311-332. (9) Cf. social scientific criticism of historical biography, Pierre Bourdieu ‘Die biographische Illusion’, in BIOS. Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung und Oral History 3, 1990, pp. 75-81. (10) See Kraus, Hans-Christof: Geschichte, p. 331. (11) Oliver Braun defines this as ‘an approach based on the history of ideas […], locating an individual’s intellectual development and political action within a comprehensive framework of certain basic ideological tendencies and party political developments’. (Braun, Oliver Konservative Existenz in der Moderne. Das politische Weltbild Alois Hundhammers (1900-1974), Munich 2005 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 7), p. 30); see also Lambrecht, Lars Intellektuelle Subjektivität und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Grundzüge eines Forschungsprojekts zur Biographik und Fallstudie zu F. Nietzsche und F. Mehring, Frankfurt am Main, etc. 1985 (Philosophie und Geschichte der Wissenschaften 7). (12) See Kramer, Ferdinand: ‘Zur regionalen Dimension der europäischen Geschichte’, in Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte 147, 2011, pp. 1-6. Considerations on biography in regional history are useful for this subject matter. See Dröge, Martin (ed.): Die biographische Methode in der Regional- geschichte, Münster 2011 (Forum Regionalgeschichte 17) — in particular the editor’s introduction on pp. 1-13. (13) See Eder, Franz X./Sieder, Reinhard: Historische Diskursanalysen. Genealogie, Theorie, Anwen- dungen, Wiesbaden 2006; Landwehr, Achim: Historische Diskursanalyse, Frankfurt am Main 2008 (Historische Einführungen 4); Sarasin, Philipp: Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse, Frankfurt am Main 2003. (14) Bödecker, Hans Erich: Biographie. Annäherungen an den gegenwärtigen Forschungs- und Diskussi- onsstand, in Ibid. (ed.): Biographie schreiben, Göttingen 2003 (Göttinger Gespräche zur Geschichts- wissenschaft 18), pp. 9-63. (15) Gall, Lothar (ed.): Die großen Deutschen unserer Epoche, Berlin 1995. (16) For example: Vierhaus, Rudolf: Handbuch; for Bavaria: Schmöger, Helga (ed.): Der Bayerische Senat. Biographisch-statistisches Handbuch 1947-1999, Bonn 1998 (Handbücher zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 10). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 179

(17) E.g. Treffke, Jörg: Gustav Heinemann. Wanderer zwischen den Parteien. Eine politische Biographie, Paderborn, etc. 2009. (18) E.g. Friemberger, Claudia: Alfons Goppel. Vom Kommunalpolitiker zum Bayerischen Minister- präsidenten, Munich 2001 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 5); Braun, Oliver: Existenz; Henzler, Christoph: Fritz Schäffer. Der erste bayerische Nachkriegs-Ministerpräsident und erste Finanzminister der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1967. Eine biographische Studie, Munich 1994 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 3). (19) See Wirz, Ulrich: Karl Theodor von und zu Guttenberg und das Zustandekommen der Großen Koalition, Grub am Forst 1997 (Oberfränkische Köpfe 4); Stoll, Ulrike: Kulturpolitiker als Beruf. Dieter Sattler (1906-1968) in München, Bonn und Rom, Paderborn, etc. 2005 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B: Forschungen 98). (20) E.g. Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Hans Ehard. Die föderalistische Politik des bayerischen Ministerprä- sidenten 1946-54, Düsseldorf 1992; Deutinger, Stephan: Bayerns Weg zur Eisenbahn. Joseph von Baader und die Frühzeit der Eisenbahn in Bayern 1800 bis 1835, St. Ottilien 1997 (Forschungen zur Landes- und Regionalgeschichte 1). (21) E.g. ‘Der Europäische Rechnungshof’, in Die Europäische Sicht. Der Sonderkommentar. Analysen zum Zeitgeschehen 45/1977 (ed. Hahn-Butry, Bonn), in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 1.2; Michael Möhnle: ‘Ein ‘europäischer Wirbelwind‘. Dr Heinrich Aigner: 25 Jahre im Europäischen Parlament’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 13. (22) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office, Luxembourg 1973. See extract in the annexes. (23) See Müller-Botsch, Christine: ‘Biographie und Institution. Zur Interdependenz biographischer und institutioneller Entwicklungen’, in Dröge, Martin (ed.): Die biographische Methode in der Regionalgeschichte, Münster 2011 (Forum Regionalgeschichte 17), pp. 59-74; Hoerning, Erika M./ Corsten, Michael (eds): Institution und Biographie. Die Ordnung des Lebens, Pfaffenweiler 1995; Mohr, Arno: ‘Die Rolle der Persönlichkeit in politischen Institutionen: Biographische Ansätze in der Politikwissenschaft’, in BIOS. Zeitschrift für Biographieforschung und Oral History 3, 1990, pp. 225-236. (24) Löffler, Bernhard: ‘Moderne Institutionengeschichte in kulturhistorischer Erweiterung. Thesen und Beispiele aus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Kraus, Hans-Christof/ Nicklas, Thomas (eds): Geschichte der Politik. Alte und neue Wege (Historische Zeitschrift, Supple- ment 44), Munich 2007, pp. 155-180. (25) Ibid., p. 157. (26) See Melville, Gert (ed.): Institutionen und Geschichte. Theoretische Aspekte und mittelalterliche Befunde, Cologne, etc. 1992 (Norm und Struktur 1); Melville, Gert (ed.): Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare der Macht. Institutionelle Prozesse in Antike, Mittelalter und Neuzeit, Cologne, etc. 2005; Melville, Gert/Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert (eds): Dimensionen institutioneller Macht. Fallstudien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Cologne, etc. 2012. (27) Schorn-Schütte, Luise: Historische Politikforschung. Eine Einführung, Munich 2006, pp. 77-85. (28) Mergel, Thomas: Überlegungen, p. 605. (29) For example, the terms ‘Historische Analyse der politischen Kultur’ (historical analysis of political culture), ‘Kulturgeschichte des Politischen’ (history of political culture), ‘Kulturgeschichte der Politik’ (cultural history of politics) and ‘historische Politikforschung’ (historical political research) are used, respectively, in Rohe, Karl: ‘Politische Kultur und ihre Analyse. Probleme und Pers- pektiven der politischen Kulturforschung’, in Historische Zeitschrift 250 (1990), pp. 321-346; Stollberg-Rilinger, Barbara: ‘Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?’, in Ibid. (ed.): Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen? (Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Supplement 35), Berlin 2005, pp. 9-24; Mergel, Thomas: ‘Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik’, in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002), pp. 574-606; Frevert, Ute: ‘Politikgeschichte: Konzepte und Herausforderungen’, in Frevert, Ute/Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard: Neue Politikgeschichte. Perspektiven einer historischen Politikforschung (Historische Politikforschung 1), Frankfurt am Main/New York 2005, pp. 7-26. (30) Ibid. ROADS TO EUROPE 180

(31) See Kramer, Ferdinand: Dimension, pp. 1-6. As regards the extent to which more general insights can be obtained from a single historical study, see: Pohlig, Matthias: ‘Vom Besonderen zum Allge- meinen? Die Fallstudie als geschichtstheoretisches Problem’, in Historische Zeitschrift 297 (2013), pp. 297-319. (32) Vardabasso, Valentina: ‘La cendrillon de l’histoire: la Cour des comptes européenne et la démo- cratisation des institutions européennes (1970-1976)’, in Journal of European Integration History 17, pp. 285-302, specifically p. 285. (33) See Barry, Desmond: Managing the finances of the European Union: The role of the European Court of Auditors, Dublin 1996; Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Der Europäische Rechnungshof: Haushaltskontrolle in der Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1976; Laffan, Brigid: ‘Becoming a ‘Living Institution’: The evolution of the European Court of Auditors’, Common Market Studies 37, 1999, pp. 251-268; Skiadas, Dimitrios: The European Court of Auditors, London 2000; Timmann, Hans-Jörg: ‘Der Rechnungshof’, in Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds) Jahrbuch der Eu- ropäischen Integration 1993/94, Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 93-98; Vardabasso, Valentina Cendrillon; Bugnot, Patricia: ‘La Cour des comptes des Communautés européenes: premier bilan’, in Revue du Marché commun 262, 1982, pp. 609-623. (34) See Freytag, Michael: Der Europäische Rechnungshof, Baden-Baden, 2005. (35) See Altmaier, Peter et al: Finanzkontrolle und Betrugsbekämpfung in der Europäischen Union, Sankt Augustin 1996 (Interne Studien 127 [Konrad Adenauer Stiftung]); Brueck, Werner: ‘Die Neuregelung der Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in Die öffentliche Verwal- tung 30, 1977, pp. 23-27; Mart, Marcel: ‘Die Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Studie aus historischer und wirtschaftlicher Sicht’, in Zavelberg, Heinz Günter (ed.): Die Kontrolle der Staatsfinanzen; Geschichte und Gegenwart, 1714-1989. Festschrift zur 275. Wiederkehr der Errichtung der Preußischen General-Rechen-Kammer, Berlin 1989, pp. 469-492; Ternes, Stefan Johannes: Die Finanzkontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1996. (36) See Strasser, Daniel: Die Finanzen Europas. Das Haushalts- und Finanzrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Luxembourg 1991. (37) Ibid., p. 307. (38) See Herman, Valentine/Lodge, Juliet: The European Parliament and the European Community, London 1978; Bieber, Roland: Organe der erweiterten Gemeinschaften: Das Parlament, Baden- Baden 1974. (39) Dreischer, Stephan: ‘Der Machtaufstieg des Europäischen Parlaments und der Einfluss institutioneller Mechanismen’, in Patzelt, Werner J. (ed.): Parlamente und ihre Macht. Kategorien und Fallbeispiele institutioneller Analyse, Baden-Baden 2005 (Studien zum Parlamentarismus 2) pp. 145-170; Judge, David et al: ‘Ripples or waves: The European Parliament in the European Commu- nity Policy Process’, in Journal of European Public Policy 1, 1994, pp. 27-52. (40) See Fleuter, Robert: Mandat und Status des Abgeordneten im Europäischen Parlament, Pfaffen- weiler 1991; Fontaine, Pascal: Herzenssache Europa. Eine Zeitreise 1953-2009. Geschichte der Fraktion der Christdemokraten und der Europäischen Volkspartei im Europäischen Parlament, Brussels 2009; Thiem, Janina: Nationale Parteien im Europäischen Parlament. Delegation, Kontrolle und politischer Einfluss, Wiesbaden 2009; Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: ‘The European Parliament and Political Careers at the Nexus of European Integration and Transnational History’, in Laursen, Johnny (ed.): The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973-83, Baden-Baden 2014, pp. 76-96. (41) Foerster, Rolf H (ed.): Die Idee Europa 1300-1946. Quellen zur Geschichte der politischen Einigung, Munich 1963. (42) See Elvert, Jürgen/Nielsen-Sikora, Jürgen (eds): Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkun- gen in der Neuzeit, Stuttgart 2009 (Historische Mitteilungen im Auftrage der Ranke-Gesellschaft 74); Schröder, Adolf (ed.): ‘Völker Europas, findet euch selbst!’ Beiträge zur Ideengeschichte der Europabewegung in Deutschland, Oldenburg 2007; Jost, Jonas: Der Abendlandgedanke in Westdeutschland nach 1945. Versuch und Scheitern eines Paradigmenwechsels in der deutschen Geschichte nach 1945, Hannover 1994; Schildt, Axel: Zwischen Abendland und Amerika. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre, Munich 1999 (Ordnungssysteme, Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit 4). HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 181

(43) See Trunk, Achim: Europa, ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und europäische Identität in den 1950er Jahren, Munich 2007 (Studien zur Internationalen Geschichte 18). (44) Neumann, Thomas: Die Europäischen Integrationsbestrebungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Vienna 1999. (45) A focused source analysis and a study of the genesis of ideas for financial control would be required in order to comprehend the evolution of European and national financial control systems. (46) Walters, F. P.: A History of the League of Nations, Oxford 1952, p. 133. (47) Ibid., p. 132. (48) Solle, Stefan: Kampf um Europa. Die Paneuropa-Konzeption des Grafen Richard Nikolaus Couden- hove-Kalergi und ihre ideengeschichtlichen Wurzeln, Saarbrücken 2008; Schöberl, Verena: ‘Es gibt ein großes und herrliches Land, das sich selbst nicht kennt… Es heißt Europa’. Die Diskussion um die Paneuropaidee in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien 1922-1933, Berlin 2008 (Gesell- schaftspolitische Schriftenreihe der Begabtenförderung der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 2). (49) Conze, Vanessa: Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstra- dition und Westorientierung (1920-1970), Munich 2005 (Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 69). (50) See Hübler, Martin: Die Europapolitik des Freistaates Bayern. Von der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte bis zum Amsterdamer Vertrag, Munich 2002 (Untersuchungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschich- te 6). (51) Ibid. (52) At the Munich-based Institut für Bayerische Geschichte (Institute for Bavarian History), Alexan- der Wegmaier is working on a thesis entitled Die Idee Europa und die Anfänge der bayerischen Europapolitik 1945-1978 (The European idea and the beginnings of European politics in Bavaria 1945-1978). (53) See, for example, Schramek, Christian: ‘Als Regionalpartei in Brüssel und Straßburg: Die europapolitischen Akteure der CSU’, in Hopp, Gerhard (ed.): Die CSU. Strukturwandel, Moder- nisierung und Herausforderungen einer Volkspartei, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 309-334; Schöfbeck, Martina: ‘Eine Bastion konservativer Grundideen? Die programmatischen Entwicklungslinien der CSU-Europapolitik’, in Hopp, Gerhard (ed.): Die CSU. Strukturwandel, Modernisierung und Herausforderungen einer Volkspartei, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 219-237. (54) Fechtner, Detlef: Die deutschen Länder in der Europäischen Union. Perspektiven im transatlantischen Vergleich, Frankfurt am Main 1996; Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier, Doris: Die deutschen Länder im Prozess der europäischen Einigung. Eine Analyse der Europapolitik unter integrationspolitischen Gesichtspunkten, Berlin 1991; Gruner, Wolf D.: ‘The German Perception of Europe: Expectations — Perceptions — Positions — Ideas’, in: Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse et al (ed.): Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration Européenne, Brussels 2007, pp. 61-86. (55) See, for example, works on Otto von Habsburg, which are nonetheless mostly set within a wider context and do not deal specifically with Habsburg as a European politician from Bavaria. E.g. Baier, Stephan/Demmerle, Eva: Otto von Habsburg. Die Biografie, Vienna 2012; Brook-Shepherd, Gordon: Otto von Habsburg. Biographie, Graz, etc. 2002. (56) See the overview of this new trend and the related literature, including a short bibliography, in Clemens, Gabriele et al: Geschichte der europäischen Integration. Ein Lehrbuch, Cologne, etc. 2008, pp. 25-45. (57) See, for example, Kaiser, Wolfram et al (eds): Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe 1945-83, Basingstoke 2010; Kaiser, Wolfram: Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge: 2007. As regards the approaches and potential of transnational history, see Patel, Kiran Klaus: „Transnationale Geschichte’, in Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO), published by the Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG), Mainz: 2010-12-3. URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/patelk-2010-de (accessed on 26.8.2015). Here, partly due to the sources available, we can only touch on the role that transnational networks played in Aigner’s politics, although such an approach would be helpful in relation to his work on development policy, yet this is not our focus here. ROADS TO EUROPE 182

(58) ACSP, NL Aigner 16-72 and 107-130. This collection includes working materials relating to various areas of Community politics, the 1979 European election campaign and the Paneuropean Union. (59) ACSP, NL Aigner 21-35 and 109-116. This collection mostly contains working materials of the Committee on Budgetary Control and other documents relating to the EC budget. (60) Nor do they appear to have been stored elsewhere, or at least the responsible authorities know nothing about them. Information obtained from searches in the Archives of the European Union in Florence. (61) Enquiries at the Amberg town archives, the Gregor-Mendel-Gymnasium in Amberg, the Erlan- gen-Nürnberg university archives, the national archives (Bundesarchiv) in Berlin and the national archives in Freiburg (military archive department), all on 1 July 2013; at the Deutsche Dienststelle (military records office) in Berlin on 18 July 2013. (62) S, ‘Spruchkammer Amberg Stadt Meldebögen A 46’ (Amberg Civilian Tribunal, survey A 46). (63) The scarcity of sources here also makes it very difficult to investigate Aigner’s transnational -net works, given that Paneuropean Union archives would have been particularly useful in this regard. The estate also contains hardly any correspondence or documents referring to transnational contacts, such as fellow EPP members. (64) Geppert, Alexander C.T.: ‘Forschungstechnik oder historische Disziplin? Methodische Probleme der Oral History’, in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 45 (May 1994), pp. 303-323; Niethammer, Lutz: Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedächtnis. Die Praxis der ‘Oral History’, Frankfurt am Main 1985; Vorländer, Herbert (ed.): Oral History. Mündlich erfragte Geschichte, Göttingen 1990. (65) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office; Aigner, Heinrich: Europa, Schicksalsfrage unseres Jahrhunderts, Würzburg, 1978; Aigner, Heinrich: ‘Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Entwicklung und Perspektive’, in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 2 (1978), pp. 10-12; Aigner, Heinrich: ‘Europa als unsere politische und wirtschaftliche Aufgabe. Beiträge der Sachverständigen’, in CSU Leadership (ed.): CSU 81 Herausforderung und Antwort. Dokumen- tation CSU-Parteitag 9-11 July 1981, Munich 1981, pp. 129-133. (66) See Pierre Bourdieu: Illusion, pp. 75-81. (67) The term Europe has many meanings, but in this study it is used in the sense of a supranational Europe and of the twentieth-century European integration process. (68) Hürten, Heinz: ‘Revolution und Zeit der Weimarer Republik’, in Schmid, Alois (ed.): Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte. Band 4: Das neue Bayern von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Teilband 1: Staat und Politik, begr. von Max Spindler, Munich 2003, pp. 439-498; Ziegler, Walter: ‘Bayern im NS-Staat 1933 bis 1945’, in Schmid, Alois (ed.): Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte. Band 4: Das neue Bayern von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Teilband 1: Staat und Politik, begr. von Max Spindler, Munich 2003, pp. 499-634; Hartmann, Peter Claus: Bayerns Weg in die Gegenwart, Regensburg 2004, pp. 488-509; Kraus, Andreas: Geschichte Bayerns, Munich 2004, pp. 700-745; Pöhlmann, Barbara: Heinrich Held als Bayerischer Ministerpräsident (1924-1933). Eine Studie zu 9 Jahren bayerischer Staatspolitik, Munich 1996. (69) See Schwend, Karl: Bayern zwischen Monarchie und Diktatur. Beiträge zur bayerischen Frage in der Zeit von 1918 bis 1933, Munich 1954. (70) Hübler, Martin: Europapolitik, pp. 26-44. On the federalism debate in Bavaria, see Kock, Peter Jakob: Bayerns Weg in die Bundesrepublik, Munich 1988 (Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 22). (71) ‘BT-Kandidat 1957: Reg.-rat Dr Heinrich Aigner’, in Amberger Zeitung, 7 May 1957, p. 7. (72) Biographical details in Aigner, Heinrich: Untersuchungen über das Delikt der Abtreibung an Hand der gerichtlichen Akten des Landgerichtsbezirkes Amberg der Jahre 1925-1950 (doctoral thesis), Erlangen 1954; Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at the Bavarian resettlement office (Obere Siedlungsbehörde), in StA M, RA 100204. (73) See next chapter. (74) Interview with Ulrich Aigner, 9.11.2013. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 183

(75) Interview with Ulrich Aigner, 9.11.2013; interview with Bernd Posselt, 17 September 2012. Many places in Bavaria saw protests against the removal of crucifixes. On the debate surrounding the crucifix under the Nazis, see Rauh-Kühne, Cornelia: ‘Katholisches Sozialmilieu, Region und Nationalsozialismus’ in Möller, Horst et al (eds): Nationalsozialismus in der Region. Beiträge zur regionalen und lokalen Forschung und zum internationalen Vergleich, Munich 1996 (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer), pp. 213-235; Ibid.: ‘Katholikinnen unter dem Nationalsozialismus: Voraussetzungen und Grenzen von Vereinnahmung und Resistenz’, in Wickert, Christl (ed.), Frauen gegen die braune Diktatur. Widerstand und Verfolgung im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, Berlin 1995, pp. 34-51; Breuer, Thomas: Verordneter Wandel? Der Widerstreit zwischen nationalsozialistischem Herrschaftsanspruch und traditionaler Lebenswelt im Erzbistum Bamberg, Mainz 1990 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B: Forschungen 60), pp. 281-291; Kershaw, Ian: Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria 1933-1945, Oxford 1983, pp. 331-357. (76) StA Am, Spruchkammer Amberg Stadt Meldebögen A 46. (77) Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at Bavaria’s Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204. (78) CV in Aigner, Heinrich: Untersuchungen. The reasons for the move and change of schools are not entirely clear. The family stayed in Amberg, while Aigner presumably went to Munich because his older brother was studying theology there (interview with Ulrich Aigner, 9.11.2013). Another reason may have been his expulsion from the Hitler Youth, after which Aigner may not have wanted to stay at the school in Amberg. The schools in Amberg and Munich no longer have any records on Heinrich Aigner. (79) Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at Bavaria’s Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204. (80) Biographical details in Aigner, Heinrich: Untersuchungen. (81) Profile in ACSP, BWK Amberg, Abg. 1, No 6: Bundestag elections 1957. The archives do not state the precise dates of Aigner’s military deployment and captivity. (82) Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at the Bavarian Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204. (83) Enquiries made to the military archives department at the German national archives and to the Deutsche Dienststelle (military records office) produced either no results or little new information. (84) Carotti, Rosmarie: ‘Wer war Dr H. Aigner?’, in Life and Work in the European Court of Auditors 10/2006, pp. 16-17, specifically p. 16. (85) Interview with Jean Darras, 21.10.2013. (86) Profile, in ACSP, BWK Amberg, Abg. 1, No 6: Bundestag elections 1957. (87) See Depkat, Volker: Lebenswenden und Zeitenwenden. Deutsche Politiker und die Erfahrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, Munich 2007 (Ordnungssysteme, Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit 18); Bauer, Theresia et al (eds): Gesichter der Zeitgeschichte. Deutsche Lebensläufe im 20. Jahrhundert, Munich 2009. (88) Friemberger, Claudia: Alfons Goppel, p. 31. Claudia Friemberger draws attention here to the simi- larity between a number of conservative Bavarian politicians’ early years; Aigner’s early life, from his origins to his war-time experiences and degree choice, falls into this category, even though he did not come from a farming or artisanal background. (89) Or at least neither Heinrich Aigner’s CV nor his estate contains any indication that he was a member. There is no reference to Aigner in the biographical encyclopaedia of the umbrella organisation of German Catholic student fraternities, the Kartellverband katholischer deutscher Studentenvereine (KV). See Koß, Siegfried/Löhr, Wolfgang (eds): Biographisches Lexikon des KV, Parts 1-7, Schernfeld/Köln 1991-2010. Nor, according to information provided by the Regensburg Episcopal Central Archive on 24 February 2014, was Aigner a member of a fraternity belonging to another, separate umbrella organisation, the Cartellverband der deutschen katholischen Studen- tenverbindungen. (90) Friemberger, Claudia: Alfons Goppel, pp. 31-40. For example, Konrad Adenauer, Alfons Goppel, Max Streibl, Otto Schedl and Richard Jaeger all belonged to the KV (Koß, Siegfried (ed.): Biogra- phisches Lexikon, Part 6, pp. 106-109). ROADS TO EUROPE 184

(91) Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at Bavaria’s Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204. No other sources are available on Heinrich Aigner’s studies to provide any indication of his choice of courses or lecturers (information from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg archives and from the Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg). (92) Aigner, Heinrich: Untersuchungen. (93) Ibid., p. 6. (94) Ibid., p. 267. (95) StadtAAm, NL Aigner 84, 107, 123, 337, 609. (96) Ibid.; Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at Bavaria’s Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204. (97) Interview with Ulrich Aigner, 9.11.2013. (98) ‘Reg.-Rat Dr Heinrich Aigner, Bundestagskandidat der CSU’, in Amberger Volksblatt, 8.5.1957, p. 9; Interview with Heinz Aigner, 10.1.2013; Interview with Ulrich Aigner, 9.11.2013. (99) Meeting of the CSU Executive Board on 6 August 1954 in Munich, in Balcar, Jaromír/Schlemmer, Thomas (eds): An der Spitze der CSU. Die Führungsgremien der Christlich-Sozialen Union 1946 bis 1955, Munich 2007 (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 68), pp. 428-431, specifically p. 430. (100) ‘Bauern im strengen Sinne’, in Der Spiegel 35, 25.8.1954, p. 17. See chapter 2. Heinrich Aigner’s dual role did not go down well with everyone in the CSU. Otto Freiherr von Feury, a member of the Executive Board of the CSU, complained in a meeting of the Board about Aigner’s actions: ‘I still don’t quite understand what’s going on with this Schlögl-Aigner business. As far as I’m concerned, you’re either an employee of the Ministry of Agriculture or a candidate.’ (Meeting of the Executive Board of the CSU, 6 August 1954 in Munich, in Balcar, Jaromír (ed.): An der Spitze, p. 430). See chapter 2. (101) Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi’s family itself originated from West Bohemia. These links remain today. The President of the German Paneuropean Union, Bernd Posselt, is also spokesman for the Sudeten Germans. (102) Letter from Heinrich Aigner to Richard Jaeger on 15 June 1955, in ACSP, NL Jaeger B 45/1. Aign- er must have already known Jaeger for some time and been on friendly terms with him. This was probably from their time together in the Junge Union in Bavaria. See chapter 2. (103) Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at Bavaria’s Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204. (104) CSU membership list for Amberg town, undated, in ASCP, KV Amberg-Stadt Abg. 1, No 5. This list must have been drawn up retroactively, since Aigner is shown as ‘Dr Heinrich Aigner’ although he was not awarded his doctorate until 1954. It is possible that Aigner did not join the party until 1951 despite getting involved with the JU at an earlier date, since JU members were not automatically members of the CSU (Höpfinger, Renate: ‘Ein Zeitzeuge erinnert sich. Interview mit dem ehemaligen JU-Vorsitzenden Franz Sackmann’, in Junge Union Bayern (ed.): 50 Jahre Junge Union Bayern. Zukunft einer Volkspartei, Munich 1997, pp. 45-64, specifically p. 49). (105) Schlemmer, Thomas: Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung. Die Christlich-Soziale Union 1945-1955, Munich 1998, p. 63. (106) For example, Fritz Pirkl (1925-1993), from Sulzbach-Rosenberg, also studied in Erlangen. He became a member of the CSU in 1949 and was later involved, together with Aigner, in the Bavarian JU (Schlemmer, Thomas: ‘Pirkl, Fritz’, in Neue Deutsche Biographie 20, 2001, p. 476 et seq [online version]; URL: http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd119502275.html, accessed on 27.8.2015). Yet whether or not the two knew each other prior to their time in the JU could not be established. (107) Mintzel, Alf: Die CSU. Anatomie einer konservativen Partei 1945-1972, Opladen 1975, pp. 204-206. There is no comprehensive account of the beginnings of the JU in Bavaria. Mintzel limits his presentation to a brief, two-page overview. Müller, Gerhard: Die Junge Union Bayern und ihr Beitrag zur politischen Jugend- und Erwachsenenbildung, Munich 1987, also teaches us nothing new about the history of the Bavarian JU. Similarly, resources on the beginnings of the JU are scarce (information and research in the ACSP). We can therefore only consult the Bavarian JU’s commemorative anniversary publications. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 185

(108) Birkl, Rudolf: ‘Geschichte der Jungen Union Bayern’, in 30 Jahre Junge Union Bayern 1947-1977, commemorative publication by the Landessekretariat der Jungen Union Bayern, Munich 1977, pp. 6-12, specifically p. 8. (109) ‘BT-Kandidat 1957: Reg.-Rat Dr Heinrich Aigner’, in Amberger Zeitung, 7.5.1957, p. 7. (110) Mintzel, Alf: CSU, p. 205. (111) At only the second session of the Parlament der Jungen Union, the regional council was superseded by a regional chairman, to which post Fritz Höhenberger (1911-2001) was elected in July 1947. The collegial system comprising three heads of district proved unsuccessful (Mintzel, Alf: CSU, p. 205; Birkl, Rudolf: ‘Im Dunkeln saß der ‘Ochsensepp’’, in Junge Union Bayern (ed.): 50 Jahre Junge Union Bayern. Zukunft einer Volkspartei, Munich 1997, p. 140). (112) See Schlemmer, Thomas: Aufbruch; Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Ehard; Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: ‘Vom Kriegsende bis zum Ausgang der Ära Goppel (1945-1978)’, in Schmid, Alois (ed.): Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte. Band 4: Das neue Bayern von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Teilband 1: Staat und Politik (founded by Max Spindler), Munich 2003, pp. 635-956; Becker, Winfried: ‘Gründung und Wurzeln der Christlich-Sozialen Union’, in Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (ed.): Geschichte einer Volkspartei. 50 Jahre CSU 1945-1995, Munich 1995, pp. 69-107; Fait, Barbara: Die Anfänge der CSU 1945-1948. Der holprige Weg zur Erfolgspartei, Munich, etc. 1995. (113) Henzler, Christoph: ‘Die Christlich-Soziale Union in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren’, in Hanns-Sei- del-Stiftung (ed.): Geschichte einer Volkspartei. 50 Jahre CSU 1945-1995, Munich 1995, pp. 109- 161, specifically p. 119. (114) Henzler, Christoph: Die Christlich-Soziale Union, p. 119. Henzler rightly points out that the opposition between the interfaith liberals and the Catholic conservative wing in no way led to clear demarcations. For example, while Fritz Schäffer sought to re-establish a lead role for the party’s senior officials, Alois Hundhammer and Josef Müller vehemently disapproved. Yet, when it came to the big issues regarding the party line, the two camps (Müller vs Schäffer and Hundhammer) became apparent. (115) The BVP was founded in 1918 by occupants of the Bavarian middle-ground and existed until 1933. It was guided by conservatism and federalism. See Friemberger, Claudia: Sebastian Schlit- tenbauer und die Anfänge der Bayerischen Volkspartei, St. Ottilien 1998 (Forschungen zur Landes- und Regionalgeschichte 5); Schönhoven, Klaus: Die Bayerische Volkspartei 1924-1932, Düsseldorf 1972 (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 46). (116) Mintzel, Alf: CSU, p. 205 et seq; Höpfinger, Renate: Zeitzeuge, p. 49. (117) CSU Charter of 1 August 1968, in ACSP, DS 1/7. (118) Mintzel, Alf: CSU, p. 206; Pietsch, Isolde: ‘Es begann im Hungerwinter’, in Landessekretariat der Jungen Union Bayern (ed.): Gestern, Heute, Morgen. Zwanzig Jahre Junge Union Bayern, Munich 1967, pp. 39-51, specifically p. 40. The literature and sources do not contain more precise details on the nature and cause of the disputes, although they are mentioned as an aside in the Bavarian JU’s commemorative publications. For example, Mintzel speaks of membership figures being ‘embellished and historically retouched on account of ‘anniversaries’ (Mintzel, Alf: CSU, p. 583, FN 73). As in the CSU, the disputes may have been personal and ideological squabbles between the two factions. (119) Junge Union Bayern (ed.): 50 Jahre, p. 149. (120) Höpfinger, Renate: Zeitzeuge, p. 54-56. JU membership figures are only available for Bavaria as a whole from 1964 (when there were 13 864 members), and for the individual administrative divisions from 1976/1982. In 1976 there were 4 260 members in the Upper Palatinate and 4 599 in Lower Bavaria. The relative size of the Upper Palatinate association with respect to the other associations therefore appears to have evened out in the 1970s. See Franz, Corinna/Gnad, Oliver (eds) Handbuch zur Statistik der Parlamente und Parteien in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. CDU und CSU. Mitgliedschaft und Sozialstruktur 1945-1990, Düsseldorf 2005 (Handbücher zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 12), pp. 789-799. (121) Höpfinger, Renate: Zeitzeuge, pp. 54-56. ROADS TO EUROPE 186

(122) It is stated in the assessment of Aigner’s parliamentary allowances, salary and seniority that he was employed by CSU Bavaria as a Legal Affairs Officer from 1.10.1952 to 15.8.1954. This presumably made up the second part of his legal training after his time at Amberg Regional and District Court. (Assessment of allowances, salary and seniority for assistant government lawyer Dr Heinrich Aigner, Munich, 20 November 1954, in Heinrich Aigner’s personal file at the Bavari- an Obere Siedlungsbehörde, in StA M, RA 100204). (123) Schlemmer, Thomas: Aufbruch, p. 478. See also Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Ehard; Gelberg, Karl-Ul- rich: Kriegsende. While Thomas Schlemmer sees Hans Ehard as a weak leader, Karl-Ulrich Gelberg interprets Ehard’s party chairmanship differently, judging that Ehard succeeded in using the chairmanship to push through his federalist policies (Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Ehard, p. 532). Whatever the case, Heinrich Aigner reported that, as Chairman, Hans Ehard never set foot in the party headquarters (Egon Klohn to Hans Ehard on 28.6.1957, in BayHStA, NL Ehard 407, cited in Schlemmer, Thomas: Aufbruch, p. 333). Hans Ehard therefore did not seek close ties with the party organisation. (124) The Bayernpartei was founded on 28.10.1946 in Munich. In the immediate post-war years, it became an ever greater rival for the CSU, which was mired in crisis due to internal disputes. See Wolf, Constanze: CSU und Bayernpartei. Ein besonderes Konkurrenzverhältnis 1948-1960, Colo- gne 1984; Walther, Christoph: Jakob Fischbacher und die Bayernpartei. Biografische Studien 1886 bis 1972, Munich 2006; Eichmüller, Andreas: Der Jagerwiggerl. Ludwig Volkholz. Förster, Politiker, Volksheld, Regensburg 1997. (125) Schlemmer, Thomas: Aufbruch, pp. 367-369. (126) Höpfinger, Renate: Zeitzeuge, p. 57. (127) Junge Union Bayern (ed.): Zeitzeuge, p. 151. It is not known whether Aigner did not stand again for election or was voted down. It is also unclear why the post was subsequently filled on a temporary basis. It could be that there was yet again no agreement on one particular candidate, just as Fritz Prikl was initially made acting Chairman in 1952 after no majority was secured for a successor to Fritz Höhenberger. (128) Ibid., p. 153. Contrary to what is reported by Vierhaus and Balcar, Heinrich Aigner was not Chair- man of the Bavarian JU from 1955-1959. See Vierhaus, Rudolf: Handbuch, p. 8; Balcar, Jaromír/ Schlemmer, Thomas (eds): An der Spitze der CSU. Die Führungsgremien der Christlich-Sozialen Union 1946 bis 1955, Munich 2007 (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 68), p. 429, FN 8. (129) Pietsch, Isolde: Hungerwinter, p. 42 et seq. (130) Franz Josef Strauß and Richard Jaeger were elected to the Bundestag for the constituencies of Weilheim in Upper Bavaria and Fürstenfeldbruck. Otto Schedl was elected in 1950 to the Bavari- an Landtag for the constituency of Neumarkt and Beilngries. See Vierhaus, Rudolf: Handbuch. (131) While academics have already studied the first two groups, very little research has been done on the members of the third group. There are even some missing entries in the relevant biographical encyclopaedias. The article by Thomas Schlemmer on Fritz Pirkl is very much an exception here (Schlemmer, Thomas: ‘Pirkl, Fritz’); see Hettler, Friedrich Hermann: Josef Müller (‘Ochsensepp’). Mann des Widerstandes und erster CSU-Vorsitzender, Munich 1991 (Miscellanea Bavarica Monacensia 155); Henzler, Christoph: Schäffer; Braun, Oliver: Existenz; Finger, Stefan: Franz Josef Strauß. Ein politisches Leben, Munich 2005; Mauerer, Josef Hermann: Otto Schedl. Ein Oberpfälzer strukturiert Bayerns Wirtschaft um, Munich 1972; Höpfinger, Renate: ‘Richard Jaeger (1913-1998)’, in Zeitgeschichte in Lebensbildern 12 (2007), pp. 115-127. (132) Johann Thanbichler (1892-1962) took part in the First World War between 1914 and 1918, was a member of the BVP from 1918, a member of the CSU from 1945, sat for the CSU from 1948 on Bad Reichenhall District Council, and was a member of the Landtag from 1950 to 1958 (Balcar, Jaromír (ed.): An der Spitze, p. 429, FN 6). (133) ‘Herz auf der Zunge’, in Der Spiegel 24, 9.6.1954, p. 6 et seq. In the Landtag elections on 26 No- vember 1950, Hundhammer was defeated by the Bayernpartei candidate Georg Knott and only made it into the Landtag via the CSU list. It is therefore possible that Hundhammer preferred to run in the 1954 elections for his former constituency of Laufen/Berchtesgaden/Reichenhall, where he had already stood as a candidate in 1933. (Ibid.; Braun, Oliver: Existenz, p. 66.) HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 187

(134) ‘Bauern im strengen Sinne’, in Der Spiegel 35, 25.8.1954, p. 17. Before the vote on 17 July 1954 in Freilassing, Thanbichler was told not to be present at the assembly. By contrast, Aigner had travelled from Munich to Freilassing with CSU Executive Secretary Alois Engelhard, and had introduced himself to the delegates. When the objection was discussed by the Executive Board, Hundhammer spoke out against a repeat of the vote, but Strauß, who was represented at the meeting by Josef Brunner, was in favour of a re-run. Above all, the Executive Board criticised the fact that Alois Engelhard, as a member of the Board, had travelled with Aigner, thus making it look as though the Board had influenced the election outcome. It did not help that Aigner explained his actions in a letter to the Bavarian Prime Minister Hans Ehard, and complained that he had not once been told that the election had been challenged and, what is more, had not been heard on the matter. See a report on the meeting of the CSU Executive Board on 6 August 1954 in Munich, in Balcar, Jaromír (ed.): An der Spitze, pp. 428-431; Heinrich Aigner to Hans Ehard on 2.9.1954, in ACSP, KV Amberg-Stadt Abg. 1, No 30: JU-KV Amberg-Stadt. (135) Balcar, Jaromír (ed.): An der Spitze, p. 431, FN 10. (136) ‘Ich verstehe schlecht’, in Der Spiegel 48, 23.11.1955, pp. 21-26. (137) Record of the general assembly on 6.5.1957 in Amberg, in ACSP, NL Raß 14. (138) At the time of the power struggles, opposing nominations appears to have been a favoured means of imposing vested interests and did not only affect Aigner. See ‘Ein Mandat ist kein Erbhof’, in Der Spiegel 27, 3.7.1957, p. 26 et seq. There were two reproaches against Aigner. First, that his nomination was the result of coercion, since several delegates had been pressurised into supporting his candidacy by District Head Otto Schedl and the JU, to the extent that one delegate didn’t turn up to vote as he felt morally con- flicted. Secondly, concerns were expressed about Aigner as a person, and he was accused of ‘not entirely above-board wheelings and dealings’ (District Head Winkler to the CSU Executive Board on 23.5.1957, in ACSP, NL Raß 14). (139) Hans Raß to the CSU Executive Board and Secretary-General Zimmermann on 12.6.1957, and Hans Raß to Hanns Seidel on 14.6.1957, both in ACSP, NL Raß 14; Friedrich Zimmermann to Hans Raß on 19.6.1957, in ACSP, NL Raß 14. (140) ‘For years I have been paying out of my own pocket to sacrifice my free-time for the good of the CSU. When I am then accused of having made money out of this, you can surely understand why I cannot just stand back and watch this game unfold. “Lord, protect me from my friends; I can take care of my enemies.’’ ’ (Heinrich Aigner to Hans Raß on 13.6.1957, in ACSP, NL Raß 14). (141) Heinrich Aigner to the CSU District Association for the town of Amberg, F.A.O. Dr Hans Raß, on 22.6.1957, in ACSP, NL Raß 14. (142) Later disputes with Franz Josef Strauß also had an adverse effect on Aigner’s career within the CSU. See chapter 6. (143) Friedrich Zimmermann to Hans Raß on 15.7.1957, in ACSP, NL Raß 14. The reasons why the Executive Board ordered a repeat vote could not be ascertained. The minutes of the Executive Board’s meeting of 13.7.1957 are only available in the archives in the form of a shorthand list of outcomes, which does not state the precise reasons for the re-run. (144) ‘When, just because he has an iota of right on his side, a person behaves like Michael Kohlhaas and wages war against everyone, including those whom he has much to thank for, then, sooner or later, events will take a turn which the instigator had probably not envisaged.’ (Franz Sackmann to Hans Raß on 3.7.1957, in ACSP, NL Raß 14). Sackmann’s comments suggest that his relations with Aigner had not been good for a long time. (145) ‘Bundestagswahl 1957’, in Amberger Volksblatt, 16.9.1957, p. 5. (146) Höpfinger, Renate: Zeitzeuge, p. 54. (147) Whether and to what extent he lent his support to a particular wing of the party at this time cannot, however, be discerned from the files. (148) Richard Jaeger himself referred to the beliefs he shared with Aigner, even during inner-party disagreements. See Richard Jaeger to Elisabeth Aigner on 15.4.1988, in ACSP, NL Jaeger C 146. ROADS TO EUROPE 188

(149) Höpfinger, Renate: Richard Jaeger, p. 118 et seq.; Braun, Oliver: Existenz; Henzler, Christoph: Schäffer. Even Aigner’s western Christian beliefs may have been influenced by his contact with Richard Jaeger, since he was very much involved in the Abendland movement. For more on Aign- er’s beliefs and his vision for Europe, see chapter 3. (150) Helmut Kohl was among the co-founders of the JU in Ludwigshafen. See Schwarz, Hans-Peter: Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012, pp. 49-82. Aigner met him at the JU National Council. See Aigner’s campaign flyer for the 1984 European elections in StadtAAm, CSU 28. It is not clear from the sources precisely when Heinrich Aigner was a member of the JU National Council. (151) See BayHStA, StK 16576. (152) Fewer than 10 % of the members of the Bundestag were born after 1919. Aigner was one of eighteen 30-35 year-olds among the 519 members. Only four were aged between 25 and 30. From the first to the fourth legislative terms, the proportion of older members increased. It was not until the fifth legislative term in 1965 that the members’ average age began to fall (Schindler, Peter (ed.): Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-1999, Vol. 1, Baden-Baden 1999, pp. 556-560). (153) Schindler, Peter (ed.): Datenhandbuch, p. 156. (154) This episode is also regarded in the literature as ‘a turning point in the CSU’s history’. (Hartmann, Peter Claus: Bayerns Weg, p. 568). Under the leadership of Hanns Seidel, reforms were introduced in the CSU’s organisation and structure, and the party developed into a modern party of the masses. Between 1955 and 1977, the number of CSU members increased from 35 000 to 150 000. (155) If Hermann Matthias Görgen and Franz Ruland, who made it to the Bundestag via the ‘CSU- Saar’ regional list, are included as members for the CSU, the Bavarian grouping consisted of 55 members (Zellhuber, Andreas: Introduction in Zellhuber, Andreas/Peters, Tim B. (eds): Die CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1972, Düsseldorf 2011 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945 Vol. 15/I), pp. xi-xc, specifically p. xxv). (156) Zellhuber, Andreas: Introduction, p. xxv. (157) The reasons for this need to be examined in more detail. Presumably, however, the second generation had already occupied all the available positions. (158) The Budget Committee is concerned with the federal government’s budget planning. It is thus responsible for managing and controlling expenditure. The Finance Committee, on the other hand, is concerned with federal revenue, such as taxes. The Budget Committee is also known as the king of committees, because it has ultimate decision-making authority for all expenditures. See Hölscheidt, Sven: Der Haushaltsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestags, Rheinbreitbach 1988; Kunz, Reinhard: Die Delegation von Ausgabeermächtigungen durch das Bundestagsplenum auf den Haushaltsausschuss, Hattersheim am Main 1976. (159) Vierhaus, Rudolf: Handbuch, p. 8. (160) ‘Bundestagswahl 1957’, in Amberger Volksblatt, 16 September 1957, p. 5. (161) The CSU stopped fielding him as a constituency candidate in 1980. See chapter 6. (162) See, for example Bundestag, BT-Drs 03/457; BT-Drs 03/467; BT-Drs 03/1342; BT-Drs 03/1473; BT-Drs 03/1721; BT-Drs 03/2521; BT-Drs 03/2650. (163) It is not clear whether this applies to his participation in committee meetings, as no verbatim record of those meetings was drawn up. However, Aigner appears no longer to have been a full member of any committee in the sixth to eighth legislative periods. During this time, he was merely an alternate member of the Committee for Economic Cooperation (see Vierhaus, Rudolf: Handbuch, p. 8). (164) See for example Bundestag, BT-Drs 04/1614; BT-Drs 05/720; BT-Drs 06/2938; BT-Drs 07/5886. (165) The names of excused Bundestag members are recorded in the plenary minutes, along with the reason for their apologies. See the Bundestag’s plenary minutes for the relevant years. However, despite being officially excused, a member may still be present in the Bundestag, e.g. to take part in a vote. So, Aigner was not necessarily absent on all 192 days. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 189

(166) 65.0 % in 1957, 64.1 % in 1961, 67.8 % in 1965, 66.7 % in 1969, 65.2 % in 1972 and 66.9 % in 1976 (Schindler, Peter (ed.): Datenhandbuch, pp. 243-254). (167) See StadtAAm, NL Aigner 178-205 and 460; ACSP, NL Aigner 85-100. (168) See StadtAAm, NL Aigner 197, 198, 288-293, 302. (169) Geppert, Dominik: Die Ära Adenauer, Darmstadt 2007, pp. 100-104; Elvert, Jürgen: Die europäi- sche Integration, Darmstadt 2013, pp. 63-72. (170) Cited in Geiger, Tim: Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten. Außenpolitischer Konflikt und innerparteilicher Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958-1969, Munich 2008, pp. 83-87, cited p. 84). (171) Geppert, Dominik: Ära, p. 101. (172) Similar provisions applied to the ECSC Court of Justice. However, for the EEC and the EAEC, as for the ECSC, a separate Council of National Ministers was created, along with a separate Com- mission. (Clemens, Gabriele: Geschichte, pp. 130-137). (173) This name only entered the Treaties with the Single European Act of 1 July 1987. However, the Assembly had already been referring to itself as the European Parliament since 1957, even in its official documents. This term will therefore also be used hereinafter (ibid., p. 134). (174) Ibid. (175) The Bundestag unanimously approved all the MEPs proposed on a list previously agreed upon between all parties (Bundestag, fourth legislative term, stenographic report of 5th session, 29 November 1961, p. 44). The Bundesrat (Federal Council) also initially wanted to be involved in appointing Bundestag members as MEPs, in order to give the Länder a say in their selection. Ho- wever, it did not succeed in its demands. See Gruner, Wolf D.: ‘Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Römischen Verträge in historischer Perspektive’, in Gehler, Michael (ed.): Vom Gemeinsa- men Markt zur Europäischen Unionsbildung. 50 Jahre Römische Verträge 1957-2007, Vienna, etc. 2009, p. 485-520, specifically p. 506 et seq. (176) Why Heinrich Aigner was targeted for appointment is unclear. Neither the minutes of the CSU grouping nor those of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag contain any record that the appointment of MEPs was discussed. See Zellhuber, Andreas/Peters, Tim B. (ed.): Die CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1972, Düsseldorf 2011 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945 Vol. 15/I); Franz, Corinna (ed.): Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1961-1966, Düsseldorf 2004 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945, Teilband 1). CSU candidates may have been decided upon in the executive council of the CSU grouping. However, according to the ACSP, no minutes of these meetings have survived. On the legal status of MEPs and the European Parliament in general, see Harms, Thomas: Die Rechtstellung der Abgeordneten in der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates und im Europäischen Parlament, Hamburg 1968; Forsyth, Murray: Das Parla- ment der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Cologne 1964; Bangemann, Martin et al: Die Abgeordneten Europas. Möglichkeiten und Leistungen, Baden-Baden 1984; Bieber, Roland: Organe; Fleuter, Robert: Mandat. (177) To a certain degree, Achim Trunk has studied perceptions of the Common Assembly (later the European Parliament), the Council of Europe and the Ad Hoc Assembly from 1949 to 1957. At the very outset, the ‘political elites of Western Europe’ were represented there. ‘Over time (and with a perception that its importance was declining), the proportion of leading politicians in these assemblies decreased’ (Trunk, Achim: Europa, pp. 19-32, cited p. 23). (178) John, Anke: ‘Konzeptionen für eine EG-Reform: Der europäische Verfassungsdiskurs in der Bundesrepublik 1981-1986’, in König, Mareike et al (eds): Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung 1949-2000. Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen. Festschrift für Wolf D. Gruner zum 60. Geburtstag, Stuttgart 2004, pp. 559-578, specifically p. 569. (179) According to Maria Reindl, Aigner’s assistant in his Amberg constituency office, he was already interested in European affairs as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Interview with Maria Reindl, 10.2.2014. (180) Correspondence between Heinrich Aigner and Konrad Adenauer, 16.2.1962 to 11.7.1962, in StadtAAm, CSU 30. ROADS TO EUROPE 190

(181) It would also be interesting to track how Aigner’s ideas evolved and, as the case may be, mutated over the years. However, as a basis for an analysis of his image of Europe, it is mainly his speeches and papers that are helpful. Unfortunately, these documents from Aigner’s estate are largely undated, thus making it difficult to establish a chronology. (182) Mintzel, Alf: ‘Die Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.’, in Stöss, Richard: Parteien-Handbuch. Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980. Special edition, Vol. 2: Die CSU bis DSU, Opladen 1986 (Schriften des Zentralinstituts für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung der Freien Universität Berlin 38), pp. 661-718, specifically p. 680. (183) Ibid., p. 681. (184) For more information on internal Bavarian politics, see Vollhardt, Britta-Ulla: Staatliche Hei- matpolitik und Heimatdiskurse in Bayern 1945-1970. Identitätsstiftung zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung, Munich 2008 (Münchner Beiträge zur Geschichtswissenschaft 3). (185) See Malettke, Klaus (ed.): Imaginer l’Europe, Berlin 1998; Foerster, Rolf H.: Europa. Geschichte einer politischen Idee, Munich 1967. (186) See, for example, Neumann, Thomas: Integrationsbestrebungen; Henrich-Franke, Christian (ed.): Die ‘Schaffung’ Europas in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Konstruktionen eines vereinten Europas, Berlin 2014; Foerster, Rolf H.: Europa. (187) The work of Vanessa Conze and Achim Trunk deserves particular mention in this context (Conze, Vanessa: Europa; Trunk, Achim: Europa). (188) Conze, Vanessa: Europa. (189) Of course, Aigner’s membership of the Europa-Union could also be due to the fact that it was politically necessary for him to also belong to this organisation. After all, Karl Hillermeier was both Chairman of the Europa-Union in Bavaria and the Bavarian Government’s Europe representative, making him an important interface between Aigner and the Bavarian Government. (190) For the history of the Paneuropean Union, see Conze, Vanessa: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Umstrittener Visionär Europas, Gleichen/Zurich 2003; Conze, Vanessa: ‘Leitbild Paneuropa? Zum Europagedanken und seiner Wirkung in der Zwischenkriegszeit am Beispiel der Konzepte Richard Coudenhove-Kalergis’, in Elvert, Jürgen/Nielsen-Sikora, Jürgen (eds): Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit, Munich 2009 (Historische Mitteilungen im Auf- trage der Ranke-Gesellschaft 74), pp. 119-125; Conze, Vanessa: ‘Zum Europäer bin ich in Amerika geworden.’ Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Europabewusstsein und biographischen Erfahrungen in der Bundesrepublik der Nachkriegszeit’, in Depkat, Volker/Graglia, Piero S.: Entscheidung für Europa. Erfahrung, Zeitgeist und politische Herausforderungen am Beginn der europäischen Integration, Berlin/New York 2010, pp. 43-60; Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Anita: Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren, Vienna 2004; Weichers, Britta: ‘Mitteleuropa oder Paneuropa?’, in Schröder, Adolf (ed.): ‘Völker Europas, findet euch selbst!’ Beiträge zur Ideengeschichte der Europabewegung in Deutschland, Oldenburg 2007, pp. 63-114; Solle, Stefan: Kampf. For more information on the relationship between the Christian Democrats and the Paneuropean Union, see Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Anita: ‘Europäische Christdemokraten und die Paneuro- pa-Bewegung von Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’, in Gehler, Michael et al (ed.): Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert, Vienna, etc. 2001 (Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen 4), pp. 574-603. (191) For the history of the idea of a United States of Europe, see Schmale, Wolfgang: Geschichte, pp. 100-114, 129-136; Gollwitzer, Heinz: Europabild und Europagedanke, Munich 1951. (192) Conze, Vanessa: Leitbild, pp. 119-122. (193) This was a dispute over contentious matters of foreign affairs which were played out in the 1960s, particularly within the CDU and CSU. The Atlanticists, made up of the majority of the CDU plus the SPD and the FDP, were in favour of close international ties with the USA. By contrast, the Gaullists, who were the majority of the CSU and some CDU members, were aligned with French President Charles de Gaulle in preferring an independent Europe. See Geiger, Tim: Atlantiker. (194) Conze, Vanessa: Europa, pp. 197-206. (195) For more information on the Abendland movement, see Conze, Vanessa: Europa, pp. 109-206. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 191

(196) Conze, Vanessa: Europa, p. 171. (197) As suggested by Michael Möhnle’s obituary for Aigner, he probably became chairman of the Bavarian association in 1976. See ‘Ein “leuchtendes Vorbild”. Dr Heinrich Aigner’, in Paneuropa Intern 5, 2.4.1988, p. 1. (198) Letter of 25.11.1978 from Heinrich Aigner to Under-Secretary Keck of the Bavarian State Chan- cellery, in BayHStA, StK 16616. Unfortunately, comparative figures for Germany or other regional associations are not available. (199) Conze, Vanessa: Europa, p. 109. (200) Compared with other CSU politicians, Otto von Habsburg appears to have played a particularly large role. Aigner’s ideal for Europe was very closely related to Otto von Habsburg’s ideas, as found, for example, in Habsburg’s four-point programme for the Paneuropean Union of 1976. It was not possible to ascertain, even by interviewing their contemporaries, when and on what occasion Aigner first met Otto von Habsburg. See Baier, Stephan: Otto von Habsburg, pp. 381-399. (201) Conze, Vanessa, Europa, p. 205. (202) Ibid. (203) ‘The Paneuropean Union believes that Europe can no longer be constructed upon the smallest common denominator between Marxists, conservatives and the Christian democrats. Instead, it is calling for the establishment of a clear front line against communism and Marxism. This seems to me to be the main difference between the Paneuropean Union and the Europa-Union.’ (Heinrich Aigner to Dr Günther Rühe on 13.4.1979, in StadtAAm, NL Aigner 590). (204) Eurocommunism is the ‘collective term for the efforts by communist parties in Western Europe (particularly in Spain, France and Italy) to distance themselves, on the one hand, from the state socialism of the former Soviet Union and, on the other hand, to find their own separate communist path in Western democracies.’ (‘Eurocommunism’, in Schubert, Klaus/Martina Klein: Das Politiklexikon, Bonn 2011, online at http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17428/eurokommunismus (accessed on 27.8.2015)). (205) Draft of speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Sicherheit für Europa. Paneuropa — eine Friedensidee’, undated, in ACSP, NL Aigner 6. (206) Ibid. (207) Ibid. (208) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 15.10.2013. (209) See chapter 6. (210) Documents on the first pro-Europe rally, in PEU, Sternfahrt für Europa I, 11-13.7.1986, Stras- bourg (closed archives). (211) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 17.9.2012. (212) At this time, Joseph Ratzinger was very engaged with European issues. See his collected sermons on Europe in Ratzinger, Joseph: Christlicher Glaube und Europa. 12 Predigten, Munich 1981. (213) Letter of receipt, in StadtAAm, CSU 83. (214) Correspondence between Heinrich Aigner and Valentin Graf Ballestrem of 28.3.1977 and 6.4.1977, in StadtAAm, NL Aigner 381. In addition, Aigner was in contact with, for example, Bishop Rudolf Graber from Regensburg and the staff of the Regensburg Diocese journal regarding the publication of Aigner’s articles and other matters. See StadtAAm, NL Aigner 36 and 405. No contact between Aigner and the Evangelical Church can be determined from the sources. (215) Conze, Vanessa: Europa, p. 15. (216) There have not yet been any in-depth studies into the role of the churches in promoting the concept of Europe and European integration. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to look into what ideas the churches were conveying about Europe and to what extent they were thus able to exert influence. As regards Bavaria, Alexander Wegmaier considers this issue in his thesis on the beginnings of European politics in Bavaria. See also Schwarz, Jürgen (ed.): Katholische Kirche und Europa. Dokumente 1945-1979, Munich 1980; Schwarz, Jürgen: Die Katholische Kirche und das neue Europa. Dokumente 1980-1995, Vol. 2, Mainz 1996. ROADS TO EUROPE 192

(217) Letter of 30.5.1979 from Heinrich Aigner, Alfons Goppel and Otto von Habsburg, written on behalf of PEU Deutschland e.V. to Franz Josef Strauß MP, in BayHStA, StK 16616. (218) The two organisations had the same conservative target audience steeped in an abendländische vision of Europe. They were intended to encourage intellectual and academic exchange and the formation of networks. There was significant overlap between those organising and running the two bodies. In particular, Otto von Habsburg was fully involved in both. For more information on the Abendländische Akademie and the Europäische Dokumentations- und Informationszentrum, see Conze, Vanessa: Europa, pp. 127-206. The attempt to establish a Bavarian European Institute has not yet been studied. (219) Letter of 30.5.1979 from Heinrich Aigner, Alfons Goppel and Otto von Habsburg, written on behalf of PEU Deutschland e.V. to MP Franz Josef Strauß, in BayHStA, StK 16616. (220) Annex 2: Comments on the letter of 30.5.1979 from Heinrich Aigner, Alfons Goppel and Otto von Habsburg, written on behalf of PEU Deutschland e.V. to MP Franz Josef Strauß, in BayHStA, StK 16616. (221) ‘Like the Paneuropean Union, the activities of the Bavarian European Institute will prove indispensable for our party. Among other things, the possibility of maintaining an outwardly independent appearance is particularly advantageous.’ (Letter of 30.5.1979 from Heinrich Aigner, Alfons Goppel and Otto von Habsburg, written on behalf of PEU Deutschland e.V. to MP Franz Josef Strauß, in BayHStA, StK 16616). (222) Extract from the minutes of the Bavarian Council of Ministers meeting of 1.4.1980, in BayHStA, StK 16617; Memo: ‘Errichtung eines Bayerischen Europa-Instituts e.V.’, B I 3 — 2020751-2-14, in BayHStA, StK 16617. The Europäische Akademie Bayern was close to the Europa-Union and had been founded in 1976 as a cross-party body to promote European unification by offering political training to young people and adults. Karl Hillermeier chaired both the Europa-Union in Bavaria and the Europäische Akademie Bayern. Not much literature is currently available on the Eu- ropäische Akademie Bayern. See http://www.europaeische-akademie.de (accessed on 27.8.2015). (223) The ACP-EEC Convention, also referred to as the Lomé Convention, governs relations between the EEA States and developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The agreement was signed on 28 February 1975. See Hartmann, Peter Josef: Die Entwicklungspolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft am Beispiel der Lomé-Abkommen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung bundesdeutscher Interessen, Munich 1986; Arts, Karin: Integrating Human Rights into Develop- ment Cooperation: the Case of the Lomé Convention, Den Haag 2000. (224) The extent to which Heinrich Aigner distinguished himself in the area of development policy is also illustrated by the fact that, in the run-up to the 1980 Bundestag elections, serious consideration was given to appointing him to the Cabinet as Minister for Development should Franz Josef Strauß be elected Chancellor (interview with Bernd Posselt, 15.10.2013). Of course, the defeat of the CDU/CSU put an end to this. Nonetheless, it shows that Heinrich Aigner did have alternatives to his ‘life for Europe’. He would have certainly had to give up his activities as an MEP for the ministerial post, which is not to say, of course, that there would have been an end to his commitment to European integration. (225) The Catholic Church’s central agency for development aid, now known as Misereor, was founded in 1958 by the assembly of German bishops. Heinrich Aigner was a member from 1962 until his death in 1988. According to information provided by Misereor on 2 July 2013, other than meeting documents, the body’s collected archives do not have anything significant on Heinrich Aigner’s activities. (226) Unfortunately, I did not receive any reply to my enquiry to the German-Brazilian Society regarding Heinrich Aigner. According to information provided by Konrad Ackermann on 7 March 2014, Aigner probably became curator through his acquaintance with Hermann Mathias Görgen, the society’s founder and a member of the CSU in the Saarland. (227) See for example the ‘Financement de l’aide alimentaire’ report by Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE0 2748; ‘Programme 1978 d’aide alimentaire en céréales, lait écrémé en poudre et butteroil en faveur du tiers monde’, report by Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE0 2502. (228) Text of speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Wie werden die christlichen Parteien Europas ihrem entwicklungspolitischen Auftrag in einem neuen Europa-Parlament gerecht?’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 6. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 193

(229) See Andrew, Christopher/Mitrokhin, Vasili: The World Was Going Our Way. The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, New York 2005; Raden, Friedhelm: Christliche Hilfswerke im Kalten Krieg, Herbolzheim 2000; Westad, Odd Arne: The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge 2006. (230) ‘Europe will only survive if it increases its efforts and readiness to make sacrifices in order also to prevail in this area of conflict.’ (Undated draft speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Wie werden die christlichen Parteien Europas ihrem entwicklungspolitischen Auftrag in einem neuen Europa-Parla- ment gerecht?’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 6). (231) Clemens, Gabriele: Geschichte, pp. 138-181; Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises. The European Project 1963-1969, Baden-Baden 2001. (232) See, for example, Kramer, Esther: Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wandel in den Verhandlungen über eine politische Union 1958-1970, Baden-Baden 2003; Soutou, Georges-Henri: L’alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954- 1996, Paris 1996; May, Alex (ed.): Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe. The Commonwealth and Britain’s Applications to Join the European Communities, London 2001. (233) Clemens, Gabriele: Geschichte, pp. 182-220. (234) Undated draft speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Politische Haushaltskontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in StadtAAm, CSU 69. (235) See chapter 4. (236) There is at present no comprehensive analysis of the CSU’s policy on Europe. Alexander Weg- maier is currently working on a thesis on the beginnings of European politics in Bavaria. For 1987 onwards, see Hübler, Martin: Bayern in Europa. Determinanten der bayerischen Europapolitik bis zur EU-Osterweiterung, Munich 2003; Hübler, Martin: Europapolitik. Briefer studies are nevertheless available. See Schöfbeck, Martina: Bastion; Schramek, Christian: Regionalpartei; Lill, Rudolf: ‘Die Europapolitik der CDU/CSU und die ersten großen Schritte zu deren Verwirklichung’, in Zehetmair, Hans (ed.): Politik aus christlicher Verantwortung, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 125-137. (237) Schöfbeck, Martina: Bastion, p. 221 et seq. (238) Hübler, Martin: Europapolitik, pp. 26-44; Hübler, Martin: Bayern, pp. 16-24. (239) See the CSU’s manifestos from 1968 and 1976 at http://www.hss.de/mediathek/archiv-fuer- christlich-soziale-politik/parteiprogramme/grundsatzprogramme.html (accessed on 27.8.2015). (240) Schramek, Christian: Regionalpartei, p. 311 et seq. Precise findings in this regard are not yet available. (241) Undated draft speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Kontrolle und Durchsetzbarkeit des parlamentarischen Mehrheitswillens in der Frage der Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Solidarität auf dem Gebiet der Regional- und Sozialpolitik’, in StadtAAm, CSU 11. (242) Ibid. (243) Strauß, for example, was in favour of Länder and regions having their own representative Europe- an body. See Schöfbeck, Martina: Bastion, p. 223 et seq; Response from the Bavarian Government to the question tabled by Tandler MP, Wünsche MP and the CSU group on Bavaria and the European Community, Bavarian Landtag, full minutes, 10th electoral term, sitting of 23.11.1983 (document 10/1279), p. 1834. (244) Undated draft speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Politische Haushaltskontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in StadtAAm, CSU 69; Draft speech by Heinrich Aigner: ‘Kontrolle und Durch- setzbarkeit des parlamentarischen Mehrheitswillens in der Frage der Weiterentwicklung der europäischen Solidarität auf dem Gebiet der Regional- und Sozialpolitik’, in StadtAAm, CSU 11. (245) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 17.9.2012. (246) The Court’s titles in French and German (namely Cour des comptes européenne and Europäischen Rechnungshof respectively) were already being used in the EC documents that preceded its foundation. Meanwhile, the English-language version of these documents used ‘European Audit Office’ or ‘Community Audit Office’ in line with the UK ‘National Audit Office’. The English version of the 1975 Treaty then switched to the name ‘European Court of Auditors’. (247) All quotations from Dreischer, Stephan: Machtaufstieg, p. 151. ROADS TO EUROPE 194

(248) Forsyth, Murray: Parliament, pp. 22-25. (249) According to Roland Bieber, these are legislative, electoral, control and feedback functions (Bie- ber, Roland: Organe, p. 25). (250) Until the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Commu- nities, which entered into force on 1 July 1967, the EEC, EAEC and ECSC each had their own Commission (or, in the case of the ECSC, a High Authority), along with their own Council. See OJ 152, 13.7.1967. (251) Beyme, Klaus von: Demokratie, p. 57. (252) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 15. (253) Ibid., p. 15 et seq; Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament und Haushaltsverfassungsrecht. Eine kritische Betrachtung der parlamentarischen Haushaltsbefugnisse, Berlin 1997 (Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften, Öffentliches Recht 9) pp. 5-19. (254) The procedure for a financial year consists of three stages: financial programming and budget preparation, implementation of the budget, and discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget. Discharge is the final stage of the budgetary control procedure, of which it is the political component. See Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, pp. 301-309. (255) Bieber, Roland: Organe, pp. 74-79. (256) See Article 201 of the EEC Treaty and Article 173 of the EAEC Treaty. (257) This had been called for by West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. See, for example, the Third Special Committee of the German Bundestag, Report on the Treaties establishing the EEC and EAEC, BT-Drs 3660/II, 2nd legislative period, cited: Bieber, Roland: Organe, p. 78. (258) See Patel, Kiran Klaus: Europäisierung wider Willen: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG, 1955-1973, Munich 2009. (259) Bieber, Roland: Organe, pp. 79-81. (260) See the report of 14.6.1963, on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, on the powers and prerogatives of the European Parliament, rapporteur Hans Furler, in HAEU, PE0 422; report of 7.5.1964, on behalf of the Budget and Administration Committee, on strengthening the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, rapporteur Hans Furler, in HAEU, PE0 465. (261) Debates of the European Parliament, 12.5.1964, p. 37 et seq. (262) ‘The European Parliament is of the opinion that […] controls on expenditure need to be strengthened and that, to this end, the creation of a proper European audit office should be envisaged.’ (Report of 23.7.1964, on behalf of the Budget and Administration Committee, on budgetary and administrative issues arising from merging the Executives and, if applicable, the Communities, p. 13, HAEU, PE0 468). (263) In protest, the French government refused to participate in the Council of Ministers of the EEC and the Committee of Permanent Representatives from July 1965 to January 1966. The EEC was therefore unable to act, as it did not have quorum. The crisis revealed fundamental discord among Member States about how supranational the Communities should be. This was overcome with the Luxembourg Compromise of 29 January 1966. (264) Rittberger, Berthold: Building Europe’s Parliament. Democratic Representation beyond the Na- tion-State, New York/Oxford 2005, p. 116. (265) There was no explicit provision for internal control in the founding treaties of the three Commu- nities. In accordance with French administrative practice, however, each institution appointed an official as its financial controller. Since 1973, this position has been enshrined in the Financial Regulation, and it was subsequently provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993. See Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, pp. 10-12; Graf, Rainer: Die Finanzkontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1999 (Schriftenreihe Europäisches Recht, Politik und Wirtschaft 213) pp. 60-64. (266) Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, pp. 12-16. To date, the literature has lacked an extensive examination of the Audit Board and the ECSC auditor. The collections of the former Audit Board can be found in the Archives of the European Union in Florence. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 195

(267) Strasser, Daniel, p. 28. On the Treaties see also: Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: ‘The 1970 and 1975 Budget Treaties: Enhancing the Democratic Architecture of the Community’, in Laursen, Finn (ed.): Designing the European Union. From Paris to Lisbon, Houndmills et al. 2012, pp. 98-123. (268) In fact, this timetable was later changed. See Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament, pp. 20-28. (269) The Treaty of 22.4.1970 amending certain budgetary provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities. (270) For further information and an explanation of the difference between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures, see Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, pp. 28-33 and 183-191; Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament, pp. 24-28. (271) Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament, pp. 24-28. Previously, the European Parliament was required only to give an opinion; the Council decided whether to grant discharge on its own. Yet there were also instances of the Council omitting to seek the Parliament’s opinion and skipping straight to granting discharge. See the letter from Georges Spénale, Chair of the Committee on Budgets, to Mario Scelba, EP President, in the minutes of the meeting of 2.2.1971 of the Commit- tee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1967 BUDG-19710202. (272) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 33. (273) See the report of 1.10.1969, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the financial accounts and statements showing the implementation of the EC 1967 budget and on the related report from the Audit Board, rapporteur Victor Leemans, in HAEU, PE0 978; Debates of the European Parliament of 6.10.1969, pp. 9-22; Resolution on the financial accounts and statements showing the implementation of the EC 1967 budget and on the related report from the Audit Board, in OJ C 139 of 28.10.1969, pp. 6-8; Debates of the European Parliament of 26.11.1969, pp. 69-94; Minutes of the meeting of 10.11.1970 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1967 BUDG-19701110; Report of 16.11.1970, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the financial accounts and statements showing the Communities’ assets and liabilities in relation to the implementation of the 1968 budget and on the related report from the Audit Board, in HAEU, PE0 1107; Minutes of the meeting of 14.5.1971 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1967 BUDG-19710514. (274) Gräfe, Horst: ‘Auf dem Wege zu einem Rechnungshof für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in Schiffer, Eckart/Karehnke, Helmut (eds): Verfassung, Verwaltung, Finanzkontrolle. Festschrift für Hans Schäfer, Cologne, etc. 1975, pp. 349-371, specifically p. 350. (275) Gräfe, Horst: Wege, pp. 350-353; Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshöfe, pp. 12-15. (276) ‘Straßburg kritisiert die EG-Kommission’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung of 11.5.1973, p. 10; ‘Brüssels dunkle Kanäle’, in Münchner Merkur of 11.5.1973, p. 4. (277) ‘Nationale Rechnungshöfe für gemeinsames EG-Kontrollorgan’, VWD Europa of 19.6.1973, in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 1.2. (278) Letter from Georges Spénale, Chair of the Committee on Budgets, to Mario Scelba, EP President, in the minutes of the meeting of 2.2.1971 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1967 BUDG-19710202. (279) See the minutes of the meeting of 14.5.1971 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1967 BUDG-10, pp.8-10. (280) Report of 7.6.1971, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the European Parliament’s budgetary estimate of revenue and expenditure for the 1972 financial year, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE0 1233, p. 5. (281) Report of 9.6.1971, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the financial accounts and statements of the Communities’ assets and liabilities in relation to the implementation of the 1969 budget and on the related report from the Audit Board, rapporteur Horst Gerlach, in HAEU, PE0 1235; see OJ C 66 of 1.7.1971, p. 37. (282) Gräfe, Horst: Wege, pp. 350-353. A working document from the Audit Board examined the different conceptions of audit between the Commission and the Audit Board. See ‘Document de travail concernant des problèmes des modalités concrètes d’exercice et de la fonction de contrôle’, rapporteur Horst Gerlach, in CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1967 A0-0321/72 0030. ROADS TO EUROPE 196

(283) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 33. (284) See for example the report of 9.3.1973, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on problems relating to the specific arrangements for the exercise of control by the Audit Board, rapporteur Horst Gerlach, in HAEU, PE0 1421; Debates of the European Parliament of 9.5.1973, pp. 150-161; Resolution on problems relating to the specific arrangements for the exercise of control by the Audit Board, in OJ C 37, 4.6.1973, pp. 42-44. (285) The Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the EU Member States still meet in a Contact Committee, established in 1960. See the Contact Committee’s website at http://www.contactcommittee.eu (accessed on 27.8.2015). The Contact Committee should not be confused with the Audit Board of the European Communities or the European Parliament’s Control Subcommittee, which would later become the Committee on Budgetary Control. (286) Minutes of the meeting of 24.3.1972 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1967 BUDG-19720324, p. 13. (287) Gräfe, Horst: Wege, p. 350. (288) Minutes of the meeting of 14-15.9.1972 of the Committee on Budgets on the hearing with the Heads of the Member States’ national audit offices, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1967 BUDG- 19720914, p. 47. (289) Report of 4.7.1972, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the follow-up to be given to the agreements of April 1970 on extending the Parliament’s budgetary powers, rapporteur Georges Spénale, in HAEU, PE0 1399. (290) See Spénale, Georges: Die Eigenmittel. der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und die Haushalts- befugnisse des Europäischen Parlaments. Dokumentensammlung, Luxembourg 1972; Report of 4.7.1972, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the follow-up to be given to the agreements of April 1970 on extending the Parliament’s budgetary powers, rapporteur Georges Spénale, in HAEU, PE0 1399. (291) Minutes of the meeting of 1.12.1972 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1967 BUDG-19721201, pp. 2-6. (292) See ‘Mehr Integration durch Kontrolle’, in Handelsblatt, 8.11.1973, p. 9; ‘Für stärkeres EG-Parla- ment’, Die Welt, 5.10.1973, in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 1.2; ‘Le Parlement Européene souhaite création d’une Cour des comptes et d’une banque centrale européenes’, L’Agence économique et financière, 2.3.1973, in HAEU, CPPE 94; ‘EWG-Ausgabenkontrolle soll verbessert werden’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18.9.1972, p. 15, along with other newspaper articles in the HAEU collection, CPPE 94. (293) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office. See extract in the annexes. (294) ‘Mehr Integration durch Kontrolle’, in Handelsblatt, 8.11.1973, p. 9. (295) Ibid. (296) Minutes of the meeting of 18.6.1973 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 BUDG19730618, p. 7. (297) See Vardabasso, Valentina: Cendrillon, p. 298 et seq.; Bergel, Philipp: Rechnungshöfe als vierte Staatsgewalt? Verfassungsvergleich der Rechnungshöfe Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Österreichs, Spaniens, des Vereinigten Königreichs und des Europäischen Rechnungshofes im Gefüge der Gewaltenteilung, Göttingen 2010, p. 209; Thäsler, Christoph: Finanzkontrolle im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Die Zusammenarbeit der europäischen Rechnungskontrollbehörden und die Perspektiven für einen externen Finanzkontrollverbund, Göttingen 2012 (Schriften zum Europäi- schen und Internationalen Recht 20), pp. 170-174. (298) Because no written sources survive to show how contact was arranged with the representatives of national audit institutions, it is not clear how Heinrich Aigner did this. He probably used his position as an MEP in the Committee on Budgets to establish links with the Contact Committee. There is nothing to suggest that Aigner had any historical links to this network. The President of Germany’s national audit institution, the Bundesrechnungshof, from 1971 to 1978 was Hans Schäfer. (299) See Commission of the European Communities: ‘Strengthening of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament’, in HAEC, COM(73) 1000. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 197

(300) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office, p. 26. See extract in the annexes. (301) Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, p. 17. (302) See Report of the Working Party examining the problem of the enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament, 25.3.1972, in Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/1972, pp. 7-87, online: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/vedel_report_25_march_1972-en-a4f5b134-99b9-41b3- 9715-41769dfea12a.html (accessed on 17.9.2015). (303) See Article 5 of the draft treaty in HAEC, COM(73) 1000. This proposal would have meant a complete reversal of the situation prior to 1970, whereby the Parliament made a recommendation while the Council had the sole right of discharge. (304) Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, pp. 16-18. (305) This was not the case with the other areas covered by the Parliament’s budgetary powers. Georges Spénale, the Chair of the Committee on Budgets, even considered a new motion of no confidence against the Commission for failing to adequately meet the Parliament’s demands in relation to increasing its budgetary powers. See extract from the minutes of the meeting of 24.10.1973 of the Committee on Budgets (short version), in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19731024, pp. 2-6. (306) See OJ C 62, 31.7.1973, pp. 29-31; OJ C 87, 17.10.1973, pp. 8-11. Report of 3.10.1973, on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the Communication from the Commission of the European Com- munities to the Council (doc. 124/73) on strengthening the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, rapporteur Georges Spénale, in HAEU, PE0 1578. (307) See Commission of the European Communities: ‘Strengthening of the Budgetary Powers of the European Parliament’, in HAEC, COM(73) 1000 final. (308) See Final Communiqué of the Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Mem- ber States of the European Community in Copenhagen on 14 and 15 December 1973, in HAEU, CM2 73-127, p. 10. (309) Gräfe, Horst: Wege, p. 358. Aigner’s blueprint for an audit office cannot be presented here, but is reproduced verbatim in the annexes. (310) Ehlermann, Claus: Rechnungshof, pp. 18-22; Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, p. 90 et seq. (311) As far as I can tell from the sources, regional audit authorities, like those in the German Länder, did not take part. (312) Vardabasso, Valentina: Cendrillon, p. 298 et seq. (313) Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, p. 20. (314) Minutes of the Control Subcommittee’s meeting of 4.12.1973 on the implementation of the budget of the Communities, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1967 BUDG-19731204. (315) Ibid. (316) Aigner, Heinrich: Case, pp. 26-28. See extract in the annexes. (317) For each point in detail, see Gräfe, Horst: Wege, pp. 359-368. (318) ‘Whereas, for example, in Switzerland and Denmark, financial control falls to the Ministry of Finance, in Belgium, Norway, Austria and the USA financial control bodies are part of the legisla- ture. In France, Italy and Spain, they form part of the judiciary. The German and UK audit offices come the closest to being able to claim full independence.’ (Graf, Rainer: Finanzkontrolle, p. 75, FN 140). See also Bergel, Philipp: Rechnungshöfe. (319) Vardabasso, Valentina: Cendrillon, p. 300. (320) Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, p. 20 et seq. (321) Not until the Maastricht Treaty did the European Court of Auditors become a European Union body with the same institutional status as the other main bodies (Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, p. 94 et seq.). (322) Working document of 4.3.1977 on the preparations for the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, drafted by Heinrich Aigner, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PR B0-0329/77 0030, p. 7. ROADS TO EUROPE 198

(323) See the minutes of the meeting of 8.1.1974 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19740108, pp. 2-4; minutes of the meeting of 4.3.1974 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19740304, p. 3. (324) See the minutes of the meeting of 18.2.1974 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19740218, p. 3 et seq.; minutes of the meeting of 4.3.1974 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19740304, p. 3. (325) See the draft working document of 7.2.1974, in CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0-0167/75 0095; draft report of 18.6.1975 on the Council’s proposed draft treaty, rapporteur Heinrich Aign- er, in CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0-0167/75 0040. (326) Council’s joint guidelines on strengthening the European Parliament’s budgetary powers, in CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0-0166/75 0210. (327) The European Parliament delegation sent to meet the Council on 14 October 1974 consisted of Cornelis Berkhouwer, EP President, Georges Spénale, Chair of the Committee on Budgets, Hein- rich Aigner and three other MEPs. (See CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0-0166/75 0120). (328) Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter: Rechnungshof, p. 21. (329) ‘The requirement for Parliament to be able to participate fully in the procedure for appointing members of the Court of Auditors should be retained. However, the term ‘the assent of Parlia- ment’ used by the Commission in its amended proposal could, since it has been expressly objected to [by] the Council, be replaced by the term ‘in agreement with the Assembly’ which is already used in the Treaties.’ (Citation in Committee on Budgets: second working document of 4.6.1975 examining the draft Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Community Treaties, Section on Court of Auditors, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0-0167/75 0060). See also the report of 9.7.1975, drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Budgets, on the draft Treaty amending certain financial provisions, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE0 2014. See Aigner’s address to the European Parliament on 11.7.1975, reproduced in the annexes. (330) See OJ C 179 of 6.8.1975, pp. 61-72. (331) See the Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities, in OJ L 359 of 31.12.1977, pp. 1-19. See extract in the annexes. (332) See Glaesner, Hans-Joachim: ‘Das Konzertierungsverfahren zwischen Rat und Europäischem Parlament’, in Integration 4 (1981), pp. 22-27; Dreischer, Stephan: Machtaufstieg, p. 158 et seq. (333) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 33. The last States to ratify the Treaty were Italy and Ireland. See minutes of the meeting of 15.2.1977 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG. 1973 BUDG 19770215, p. 5. (334) See minutes of the meeting of 21.6.1976 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19760621, p. 2. (335) See letter from Hilmar Hartig to Heinrich Aigner of 14 April 1976, in ACSP, NL Aigner 17; letter from Hilmar Hartig to Heinrich Aigner of 15 July 1977, in ACSP, NL Aigner 20/3. (336) See correspondence concerning the transition to the Court of Auditors, in HAEU, C.CO Courrier Entrée 1975-1977. (337) See working document of 4.3.1977 on preparatory work to be undertaken in relation to the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, drafted by Heinrich Aigner, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PR B0-0329/77 0030, p. 10 et seq. (338) See Communication from the Commission to the Council: Establishment of the Court of Audi- tors, in HAEC, COM(76) 635 final; also in CARDOC, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19770118 0020. (339) ‘Mr President, it is not for the Commission alone, and certainly not for the Council alone, to make the bed for the European Court of Auditors. That must also be the Parliament’s job.’ Heinrich Aigner in Debates of the European Parliament, 10.2.1977, p. 228. (340) Minutes of the meeting of 15/16.2.1977 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG. 1973 BUDG-19770215, p. 5 et seq. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 199

(341) Working document of 4.3.1977 on preparatory work to be undertaken in relation to the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, drafted by Heinrich Aigner, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PR B0-0329/77 0030. See also ‘Aufzeichnung über die Problematik des Europäischen Rechnungsho- fes’, 14 September 1977, in 15 ACSP, NL 10, reproduced in the annexes. (342) See Communication from the Commission to the Council: Establishment of the Court of Audi- tors, in HAEC, COM(76) 635 final; p. 2. (343) Letter of 16.2.1977 from G. Freddi, Chairman of the Audit Board, to the President of the Council, in HAEU, C.CO Courrier Sortie 29-7-1975 à 31-5-1977. (344) Working document of 4.3.1977 on preparatory work to be undertaken in relation to the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, drafted by Heinrich Aigner, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PR B0-0329/77 0030, p. 5; minutes of the meeting of 14.3.1977 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 SCCB-19770314, p. 5. (345) Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, p. 104. (346) Working document of 4.3.1977 on preparatory work to be undertaken in relation to the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, drafted by Heinrich Aigner, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PR B0-0329/77 0030, p. 5 et seq. (347) See minutes of the meeting of 14.3.1977 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19770314, p. 5 et seq. (348) Claus Schöndube: ‘Sagen, was wir fühlen’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 1.2. (349) Ibid. (350) ‘The President of the Netherlands Court of Auditors, Mr Peschar, expressed his displeasure at the turn which the foregoing discussion had taken and [said] that the present meeting [should] avoid giving rise to the impression that decisions were being taken on the structure and functioning of the European Court of Auditors. / Secondly, the President of the Luxembourg Court of Auditors, Mr Goerens, stated that the Second Financial Treaty was ‘self-executing’; additional interpretation in the context of the present meeting did not, therefore, seem to be required.’ (Quoted from the minutes of the meeting of 3.5.1977 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19770503, p. 4). (351) Minutes of the meeting of 15.2.1977 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG. 1973 BUDG-19770215, p. 5. (352) Letter of 9.9.1977 from G. Friedel of the Directorate-General for Committees and Interparliamen- tary Delegations to Heinrich Aigner, in StadtAAm, CSU 38; minutes of the meeting of 15.9.1977 of the EP Bureau, in CARDOC, PE0 OD PV/BUBE-19770915 0010, p. 21. (353) See letter of 5.10.1977 from Lord Bruce of Donington to Emilio Colombo, President of the EP, protesting about the exclusion of the Committee on Budgets from the appointment procedure for members of the European Court of Auditors, in CARDOC, PE1 P1 224/RIAU RIAU-19770428 0080 DOC1. (354) See report of 15.9.1981, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control, on consultation of the European Parliament for the appointment of four members of the Court of Auditors of the Euro- pean Communities, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 A1-0469/81; report of 11.1.1983, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control, on consultation of the European Parliament for the appointment of a member of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 A1-1125/82; report of 5.10.1983, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control, giving the opinion of the European Parliament on the appointment of six members of the Court of Auditors of the Euro- pean Communities, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE1 AP RP/CONT.1979 A1-0790/83; report of 14.1.1986, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control, giving the opinion of the European Parliament on the appointment of two members of the Court of Auditors of the Euro- pean Communities, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 A2-0200/85; report of 15.4.1986, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control, giving the opinion of the European Parliament on the appointment of a member of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 A2-0030/86; report of 28.9.1987, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control, on the appointment of six members of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 A2-0147/87. ROADS TO EUROPE 200

(355) See Aigner, Heinrich: Case. (356) See chapter 7. (357) Heinrich Aigner quoted in the minutes of the meeting of 14/15.9.1972 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1967 BUDG-19720914, p. 34. (358) See Gräfe, Horst: Wege, p. 353. (359) Some of the members of the Audit Board did indeed later work at the European Court of Au- ditors, but they were not initially recruited to senior positions. (Interview with Jean Darras on 21.10.2013). (360) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Neue Kompetenzen für das Europäische Parlament — Errichtung des Euro- päischen Rechnungshofes hat grundsätzliche Bedeutung’, in Deutschland-Union-Dienst 9 of 12.1.1978, pp. 6-8, specifically p. 7, reproduced in the annexes. (361) Ibid. (362) Fontaine, Pascal: Herzenssache, p. 104. (363) ‘Der Europäische Rechnungshof’, in Die Europäische Sicht. Der Sonderkommentar. Analysen zum Zeitgeschehen 45/1977, (ed.) Hahn-Butry, Bonn, in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 1.2; Michael Möhnle: ‘Ein ‚europäischer Wirbelwind’ . Dr Heinrich Aigner: 25 Jahre im Europäischen Parlament’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 13. (364) http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/History.aspx (accessed on 14.9.2015). (365) Aigner, Heinrich: Case. (366) See letter of 12.8.1974 from the Council of the European Communities on the strengthening of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, in CARDOC, PE0 AP RP/BUDG.1973 A0- 0166/75 0170, p. 5. (367) Article 16 of the Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities, in OJ L 359, 31.12.1977, pp. 1-19, specifically p. 12. (368) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Die neue Institution’, in StadtAAm, CSU 38; Heinrich Aigner: ‘Neue Kom- petenzen für das Europäische Parlament — Errichtung des Europäischen Rechnungshofes hat grundsätzliche Bedeutung’, in Deutschland-Union-Dienst 9, 12 January 1978, pp. 6-8, reproduced in the annexes. (369) Freytag, Michael: Rechungshof, p. 114 et seq. (370) Heinrich Aigner: Finanzkontrolle, p. 191. (371) Letter of 20.9.1977 from Emilio Colombo, President of the EP, to the members of the European Court of Auditors, in CARDOC, PE1 P1 224/RIAU RIAU-19770920 0010 DOC1. (372) Minutes of the meeting of 3.10.1977 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 BUDG-19771003, p. 2 et seq. (373) Debates of the European Parliament, 12.10.1977, p. 150. (374) Ibid. (375) Motion for a resolution on the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, in HAEU, PE0 5029; published in OJ C 266, 7.11.1977, p. 28 et seq. (376) Minutes of the meeting of 27/28.10.1977 of the European Court of Auditors, in HAEU, CCE 277, p. 1. (377) Letter of 31.10.1977 from Norman Price, Member of the Court of Auditors, to Emilio Colombo, President of the EP, in HAEU, CCE 2989. (378) See minutes of the meeting of 26-28.10.1977 of the European Court of Auditors, in HAEU, CCE 270; questions arising from the discussion 26-28.10.1977, in HAEU, CCE 271. (379) Letter of 20.9.1977 from Emilio Colombo, President of the EP, to Michael Murphy, President of the European Court of Auditors, in HAEU, CCE 1976. (380) This was a source of much conflict between the Court of Auditors and the Commission in the early years. See Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, p. 202 et seq. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 201

(381) Letter of 7.12.1977 from Michael Murphy, President of the European Court of Auditors, to Emilio Colombo, President of the EP, in CARDOC, PE1 P1 224/RIAU RIAU-19770325 0055 DOC1. (382) Minutes of the meeting of 14/15.12.1977 of the European Court of Auditors, in HAEU, CCE 319, p. 3. (383) System to stabilise the export earnings of developing countries. (384) Letter from Heinrich Aigner to Michael Murphy, President of the European Court of Auditors, 19.1.1978, in HAEU, CCE 337. (385) Draft letter from Michael Murphy, President of the European Court of Auditors, to Heinrich Aigner, 10.2.1978, in HAEU, CCE 357. (386) Draft minutes of the meeting of 8.2.1978 of the European Court of Auditors, in HAEU, CCE 351, p. 2. The Court of Auditors was also keen to maintain the upper hand in this process. Therefore, it asked Heinrich Aigner, in an informal meeting, to refrain from any open discussion of the Parlia- ment’s relations with the Court of Auditors on the committee before the Court of Auditors had submitted its memorandum. Aigner agreed to this request. See the relevant documents in HAEU, CCE 371; CCE 3000; PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 SCCB-19780227. (387) Commentary on the memorandum on relations with the European Parliament: HAEU, CCE 361, p. 1. (388) Draft memorandum on relations between the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, with commentary, in HAEU, CCE 361. (389) Draft minutes of the meeting of the Court of Auditors of 6.8.1978, in HAEU, CCE 400, p. 2. (390) Draft memorandum on relations between the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, with commentary, in HAEU, CCE 361, p. 6. (391) Minutes of the meeting of 9.6.1978 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19780609, p. 6 et seq. (392) Minutes of the meeting of 8.5.1978 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 BUDG-19780508, p. 2. (393) See minutes of the meeting of 24/25.1.1979 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 BUDG-19790124, p. 8 et seq; Opinion of the Court of Auditors, 29.1.1979, in HAEU, CCE 632; Communication from the President to the members of the Court of Auditors, 2.2.1979, in HAEU, CCE 3089. (394) See the short chapter in Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, pp. 227-252; Skiadas, Dimitrios: Court, pp. 31-34. (395) See chapter 7. (396) Text of speech by Aigner: ‘Das Europäische Parlament und seine Aussichten’ for the Hanns-Sei- del-Stiftung conference on 29/30.1.1977 in Kreuth, in ACSP, NL Aigner 2/1; Heinrich Aigner: ‘Europaparlament — Haus ohne Macht?’, Deutsche Tagespost [undated], in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 57. (397) Forsyth, Murray: Parlament, pp. 45-48; Bieber, Roland: Organe, pp. 125-133. (398) For more information on the introduction of direct elections, see the articles in Mittag, Jürgen (ed.): 30 Jahre Direktwahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (1979-2009). Europawahlen und EP in der Analyse, Baden-Baden 2011 (Denkart Europa 12); Piodi, Franco: Der Weg zu den Direktwah- len des Europäischen Parlaments, Luxembourg 2009 (CARDOC archives, special edition). (399) Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the Bundestag on 26 May 1977, cited in Blind, Jochen: Das Heimspiel der „Europa-Parteien’? Die Europawahlkämpfe der Union von 1979 bis 2009, Wiesbaden 2012, p. 49. (400) Ibid., pp. 49-54. (401) Draft programme ‘Vorbereitung Wahlkongress am 9. September 1978 Olympiahalle’, in StadtA- Am, CSU 83. (402) Interview with Michael Möhnle on 16.1.2013. (403) Posselt, Martin/Voss, Dirk: Paneuropa Jugend. 10 Jahre Kampf um Europa, Munich 1982, p. 96 et seq. (404) Ibid.; ‘Olympische Kämpfe für Europa’, Rieser Nachrichten of 14.5.1979, in StadtAAm, CSU 83. ROADS TO EUROPE 202

(405) Ibid. (406) See the press review of 12.5.1979 on the Paneuropean congress, in StadtAAm, CSU 83. (407) Bruno Friedrich, Member of the Bundestag for the SPD, quoted in ‘Bayerisches Bekenntnis’, in Die Zeit of 6.4.1979. (408) See Baier, Stephan: Otto von Habsburg, pp. 400-412. (409) ‘Große Zeiten brechen am rechten Rand Europas aus’, in Frankfurter Rundschau of 14.5.1979, p. 3; ‘Bayerisches Bekenntnis’, in Die Zeit of 6.4.1979. (410) ‘Kontroverse Rothemund-Ratzinger’, in Deutsche Tagespost of 8.5.1979, p. 8. (411) See the press review of 12.5.1979 on the Paneuropean congress, in StadtAAm, CSU 83. (412) Interview with Michael Möhnle on 16.1.2013. (413) Baier, Stephan: Otto von Habsburg, pp. 400-412. (414) After the CSU decided in 1976 to terminate its parliamentary association with the CDU at the national level, the CDU considered fielding candidates in Bavaria for the Bundestag elections, while the CSU, for its part, would run for election throughout West Germany. In the end, it did not come to this in either the 1979 European elections or the 1980 Bundestag elections, and Strauß beat Helmut Kohl to the candidacy for Chancellor. See ibid., pp. 52-54; Richter, Saskia ‘Kanzlerkandidatur von Franz Josef Strauß, 1980’, in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, http://www. historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_46134 (accessed on 15.9.2015). (415) Aigner wrote to Strauß: ‘The European elections could hold the key to initiating our emergence as the fourth party in 1980.’ (Heinrich Aigner to Franz Josef Strauß on 7.1.1979, in ACSP, LG-8.WP 117). (416) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 17.9.2012; interview with Bernd Posselt on 15.10.2013; Hans Klein to Heinrich Aigner on 18.3.1980, in ACSP, NL Klein 537. (417) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 15.10.2013. (418) See chapter 6. (419) Blind, Jochen: Heimspiel, p. 72 et seq. (420) The European People’s Party — the association of Christian Democratic parties of the European Community, to which the CDU and CSU also belonged, was founded in Luxembourg on 8 July 1976. In the European Parliament, the EPP forms the Group of the European People’s Party (Chris- tian-Democratic Group). See Jansen, Thomas: Die Entstehung einer Europäischen Volkspartei. Vorgeschichte, Gründung und Entwicklung der EVP, Bonn, 1996; Fontaine, Pascal: Herzenssache. (421) The Socialist Group won 112 seats, the EPP 107. See Blind, Jochen: Heimspiel, p. 76. (422) Original: ‘Volksfrontkoalition’ (Aigner, Heinrich: Schicksalsfrage, p. 15). (423) Voter turnout in Baden-Württemberg was 59.2 %. It was highest in the Saarland at 83.2 % and Rhineland-Palatinate at 77.9 %. However, local elections took place in these two Länder on the same day. Blind, Jochen: Heimspiel, p. 73. (424) Ibid.; see Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.: Europawahl in Deutschland. Eine Analyse der 1. Direkt- wahl zum Europaparlament am 10. Juni 1979, Mannheim 1979, p. 16. (425) Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the Bundestag on 26.5.1977, cited in Blind, Jochen: Das Heimspiel der ‘Europa-Parteien’? Die Europawahlkämpfe der Union von 1979 bis 2009, Wiesbaden 2012, p. 49. (426) Blind, Jochen: Heimspiel, pp. 73-77; See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.: Europawahl, pp. 17-26. (427) Correspondence between Edelbert Breu, Chair of the CSU local group in Edelsfeld, and Heinrich Aigner, April 1977, in StadtAAm, NL Aigner 375. (428) Election advertisement by Heinrich Aigner, in Der Oberpfälzer, Issue 3, September 1976, in ACSP, BV Oberpfalz Fl. 1979: 1; see also Heinrich Aigner: ‘Die Oberpfalz — eine Rand oder Zentralregi- on Europas?’, in StadtAAm, CSU 51. (429) Interview with Heinz Donhauser on 21.8.2013. (430) Letter of 4.12.1979 from Edmund Stoiber, Secretary-General of the CSU, to Heinrich Aigner, in ACSP, NL Aigner 18. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 203

(431) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Christlich-demokratische Politik für die europäische Einheit’, in ACSP, LG-8. WP 117. (432) Ibid.; ‘Die EG muß weiterentwickelt werden. Die Deutsche Tagespost sprach in Straßburg mit Dr Heinrich Aigner, MdB und MdEP’, in Deutsche Tagespost of 30.10.1979, p. 5. Aigner had a similar model in mind for MEPs as was in place at the time for members of the Bundestag from West Berlin, who had the right to speak but not to vote (Sternberger, Dolf et al (eds): Die Wahl der Parlamente und anderer Staatsorgane. Band 1.1.: Europa, Berlin 1969, p. 287). His proposal was rejected. On cooperation between the Bundestag group and MEPs, see Westerhoff, Horst-Dieter: ‘Die parlamentarische Zusammenarbeit von Bundestagsfraktion und Europaabgeordneten. Das Beispiel CDU/CSU’, in Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 3 (1985), pp. 372-382. (433) ‘MdB Aigner wurde abgewählt’, in Donaukurier, 8/9.3.1980, p. 5. (434) Ibid.; ‘ “Schlamassel” bei Neumarkts Christlich Sozialen’, in Mittelbayerische Zeitung, 8/9.3.1980, p. 9. (435) Blind, Jochen: Heimspiel, p. 73 et seq. (436) ‘Bayerisches Bekenntnis’, in Die Zeit of 6.4.1979. (437) Letter of 4.12.1979 from CSU Secretary-General Edmund Stoiber to Heinrich Aigner, in ACSP, NL Aigner 18. (438) Comment made by Dr Scholle on 9.11.1981 regarding the invitation of Bavarian MEPs, in BayHS- tA, StK 16576. (439) ‘You can be assured of my readiness to lend my support, and — should you so wish — to assist by any means possible, in connection with any initiatives designed to consolidate the European unification project.’ (Letter of 4.1.1980 from Franz Josef Strauß, Bavarian PM, to the CSU MEPs, in BayHStA, StK 16576). (440) Comment made by Dr Scholle on 7.3.1980 regarding the invitation of Bavarian MEPs, in BayHS- tA, StK 16576. (441) Letter of 4.12.1979 from CSU Secretary-General Edmund Stoiber to Heinrich Aigner, in ACSP, NL Aigner 18; letter of 22.1.1980 from Edmund Stoiber to Heinrich Aigner, in ACSP, NL Strauß PV 121. (442) ‘I can only imagine that some of my dear party colleagues have finally achieved their aim of poisoning you against us Europeans, myself included.’ (Letter of 13.6.1980 from Heinrich Aigner to Franz Josef Strauß, in StadtAAm, NL Aigner 607); letter of 7.7.1980 from Franz Josef Strauß to Heinrich Aigner, in ACSP, NL Strauß PV 121. (443) ‘I am writing this letter to say that I do not think much of this affair and am most certainly not available for this role. I am convinced that the whole concept on which this idea is based is un- tenable.’ (Letter of 20.12.1983 from Franz Josef Strauß to Heinrich Aigner, in ACSP, NL Strauß PV 15757). (444) ‘Brüssel — nein danke’, in Die Zeit, 5.12.1980; ‘Aigner als EG-Kommissar nach Brüssel?’, in Paneu- ropa Intern 15, 30.10.1980, p. 2. (445) Interview with Ulrich Aigner on 9.11.2013. Due to an agreement with the FDP, the ‘union’ parties were entitled to name the West German Commissioner. (See ‘Brüssel — nein danke’, in Die Zeit of 5.12.1980). It is also possible that the CSU was unable to get the CDU to agree to any of its candidates. (446) Colette Flesch had been the Chair of the first Control Subcommittee in May 1973, while Horst Gerlach had chaired the second in June 1974. See Debates of the European Parliament, 15.6.1976, pp. 86-88, and the collections of the Historical Archives of the European Union concerning the European Parliament’s committees: HAEU, PE0 PV Commissions 1965-79. (447) Working paper on the proposal to establish a Community audit committee, 15.1.1976, drafted by Lord Bruce of Donington, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19760128 0020. (448) Summary report of 23.1.1976 on a discussion of problems relating to financial control in the Community, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19760120, p. 6. (449) Minutes of the meeting of 12.5.1976 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 BUDG-19760512, p. 5. ROADS TO EUROPE 204

(450) See resolution on the role and function of parliamentary control of Community resources and expenditure, in OJ C 159, 12.7.1976, p. 16 et seq. (451) See resolution on the number and composition of parliamentary committees, in OJ C 203, 13.8.1979, p. 35 et seq. (452) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Politische Haushaltskontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in StadtAAm, CSU 69, p. 5 et seq. (453) Interview with Jean Darras on 21.10.2013. (454) Clark, Stephen/Priestley, Julian: Europe’s Parliament. People, Places, Politics, London 2012, p. 279. (455) See, for example, Heinrich Aigner: ‘Bundesrepublik Deutschland — der Zahlmeister Europas?’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 10. (456) ‘ “Deutsche Mafia” im EG-Parlament probt den Aufstand’, Bonner General-Anzeiger, 29.12.1978, in ACSP, NL Aigner 8. (457) Letter of 2.10.1981 from Bodil Kathrine Boserup, Committee on Budgetary Control, to Simone Veil, President of the EP, in CARDOC, PE1 P1 272/COMP CONT.1979-040 0010 DOC1. (458) On the Bavarian Supreme Audit Office, see Hofmann, Ulrike Claudia: ‘Bayerischer Oberster Rechnungshof (ORH)’, in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, at http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_45919 (accessed on 17.9.2015). (459) Letter of 19.10.1981 from Heinrich Aigner to Karl Mann, President of the Bavarian Supreme Audit Office, in BayHStA, StK 16577. (460) The meeting also saw receptions held for the Committee on Budgetary Control by the Bavarian state government, e.g. Karl Hillermeier, Bavaria’s Deputy Prime Minister, and Max Streibl, the state’s Minister for Finance. Only Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauß was unable to make time for a reception. See letter of 13.11.1981 from Director-General Huber to Heinrich Aigner, in BayHS- tA, StK 16577; letter of 27.10.1981 from Franz Josef Strauß to Heinrich Aigner, in BayHStA, StK 16577. (461) See chapter 7. (462) Committee on Budgetary Control, notice to members of 22.3.1984, in CARDOC, PE1 AP PV/ CONT.1979 CONT-19840416 0030. (463) Interview with Jean Darras on 21.10.2013. (464) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Politische Haushaltskontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in StadtAAm, CSU 69, p. 6. (465) Clark, Stephen: Parliament, p. 279. (466) See the reflections drafted by André Middelhoek, Member of the European Court of Auditors, following the Council’s discussion of the annual report, 10.4.1984, in HAEU, CCE 1572; interview with Jean Darras, 21.10.2013. (467) Michael Möhnle: ‘Ein “europäischer Wirbelwind”. Dr Heinrich Aigner: 25 Jahre im Europäischen Parlament’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 13. (468) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 310; Herman, Valentine: Parliament, p. 51 et seq. (469) Minutes of the meeting of 12.7.1976 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19760712, p. 2 et seq.; Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 310. (470) Minutes of the meeting of 18.10.1976 of the Control Subcommittee, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19761018, p. 7. (471) ‘If this Parliament no longer asserts its rights, if it proves incapable of even defending the rights written into the Treaty, then this Parliament will become the laughing-stock of the Commission — and that at a time when we are trying to mobilise millions of electors to vote for it.’ (Heinrich Aigner, quoted in Debates of the European Parliament of 14.12.1976, p. 136). (472) Debates of the European Parliament of 16.12.1976, p. 298; Herman, Valentine: Parliament, p. 51 et seq. (473) Debates of the European Parliament of 10.2.1977, p. 228; minutes of the meeting of 15/16.2.1977 of the Committee on Budgets, in HAEU, PE0 AP PV/BUDG.1973 BUDG-19770215, p. 7; documents relating to the Malt report of January/February 1977, in HAEU, EN 211. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 205

(474) Herman, Valentine: Parliament, p. 51. (475) See, for example, the minutes of the meeting of 28.2.1986 of the Committee on Budgetary Con- trol, in CARDOC, PE1 AP PV/CONT.1979 CONT-19850228 0010, p. 7. (476) Article 206b of the EEC Treaty reads: ‘The Assembly, acting on a recommendation from the Council which shall act by a qualified majority, shall give a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget. To this end, the Council and the Assembly in turn shall examine the accounts and the financial statement referred to in Article 205 and the annual report by the Court of Auditors together with the replies of the institutions under audit to the observations of the Court of Auditors.’ (Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Trea- ties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities, in OJ L 359 of 31.12.1977, p. 12). See extract in the annexes. (477) Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, pp. 230-232. (478) The resolution of 13.12.1978 still had only four pages; by that of 16.4.1985, there were already 19. Baziadoly, Sophie: ‘Le refus de la décharge par le Parlement Européen’, in Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 354 (1992), p. 66. (479) See, for example, Debates of the European Parliament of 5.5.1981, pp. 89-91; Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 302 et seq.; Baziadoly, Sophie: ‘Le refus de la décharge par le Parlement Européen’, in Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 354 (1992), pp. 58-73, specifically p. 58. (480) Quoted in Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament, p. 166. (481) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 302 et seq. (482) Ibid., pp. 304-306; see the resolution pursuant to Article 85 of the Financial Regulation informing the Commission of the reasons for the deferral of discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget for the 1980 financial year, in OJ C 125 of 17.5.1982, pp. 28-33; Resolution pursuant to Article 85 of the Financial Regulation informing the Commission of the reasons for the deferral of discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the 1982 financial year, in OJ C 127 of 14.5.1984, pp. 36-39. (483) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 427 et seq.; minutes of the meeting of 19/20.3.1984 of the Commit- tee on Budgetary Control, in CARDOC, PE1 AP PV/CONT.1979 CONT-19840319 0010, p. 7 et seq.; minutes of the meeting of 28.3.1984 of the Committee on Budgetary Control, in CARDOC, PE1 AP PV/CONT.1979 CONT-19840328 0010, p. 10. (484) Debates of the European Parliament of 14.11.1984, pp. 114-139; Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, pp. 427-432. (485) See the decision to refuse to grant discharge to the Commission of the EC in respect of the implementation of the EC budget for the 1982 financial year, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of Annex IV to the Rules of Procedure, in OJ C 337 of 17.12.1984, p. 23 et seq.; report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control on a motion for a resolution incorporating a decision to refuse to grant discharge to the Commission of the EC in respect of the implementation of the EC budget for the 1982 financial year, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of Annex IV to the Rules of Procedure, in HAEU, PE2 AP RP/CONT.1984 A2-0888/84. (486) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, pp. 424-427. After discharge had been refused, in the end even Aigner conceded in November 1984 that the 1982 budget still had to be closed for pure accounting purposes. See Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 431 et seq. The debate about postponing or refusing discharge thus had more of a symbolic function, rather than exploring the technicalities of the discharge procedure. (487) The EP’s Rules of Procedure were amended accordingly in 1981 and 1984. See Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, pp. 424-427. (488) Konrad Schön, EPP, quoted in Debates of the European Parliament of 14.11.1984, p. 121. (489) Christopher Tugendhat, Vice-President of the Commission, quoted in Debates of the European Parliament of 14.11.1984, p. 117. (490) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 427 et seq. (491) Heinrich Aigner, quoted in Debates of the European Parliament of 14.11.1984, p. 116. ROADS TO EUROPE 206

(492) Ibid. (493) Ibid. (494) In respect of 1978 and 1979, disregarding the financial controller’s refusal to grant an endorsement, the Commission had made payments from the EAGGF Guarantee Section which did not fall to this fund. See Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 310 et seq.; Baziadoly, Sophie: Refus, p. 67. (495) Debates of the European Parliament of 14.11.1984, p. 116 et seq. (496) On the financial crisis, see Rossi, Matthias: Europäisches Parlament, pp. 30-39. (497) Clemens, Gabriele: Geschichte, pp. 221-223. This debate is famous for the phrase ‘I want my money back’, which is attributed to UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. (498) Baziadoly, Sophie: Refus, p. 72. (499) Cited in Ibid. (500) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, p. 424. (501) Marty-Gauquié, Henry: Le côntrole externe des finances publiques européennes, Brussels 1988, p. 219. (502) Strasser, Daniel: Finanzen, pp. 424-427. (503) Ibid., p. 311 et seq. (504) Marty-Gauquié, Henry: Côntrole, p. 206. (505) Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, p. 248. (506) Neuhann, Florian: Im Schatten der Integration. OLAF und die Bekämpfung von Korruption in der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden 2005 (Münchner Beiträge zur Europäischen Einigung 12), pp. 22-27. (507) Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, p. 227 et seq. (508) Committee on Budgetary Control, Notice to Members No 46/83, in CARDOC, PE1 AP PV/ CONT.1979 CONT-19831201 0020, p. 3. (509) Ibid. (510) Court of Auditors’ meeting of 22.11.1984, in HAEU, CCE 1690, p. 4. (511) Note to the President and the Members of the Court of 25.1.1985, in HAEU, CCE 1709; comments on document DEC 10/85, in HAEU, EN 4126. (512) Note to the President and the Members of the Court of 13.4.1984, in HAEU, CCE 1572, p. 1. (513) Neuhann, Florian: Schatten, pp. 32-37. (514) Ibid., p. 39. (515) Report of 1.12.1970 on behalf of the Committee on Budgets on the proposal of the Commission of the European Community to the Council (doc. 151/70) for a Regulation concerning irregularities, the recovery of unduly paid amounts in connection with common agricultural policy funding, and the setting-up of an information system, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE0 1111. (516) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office, pp. 21-26. See extract in the annexes. (517) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office, p. 28; ‘Mehr Integration durch Kontrolle’, in Handelsblatt of 8.11.1973, p. 9. (518) Neuhann, Florian: Schatten, p. 36. (519) ‘Die kriminellen Geschäfte mit der EG-Agrarkasse’, VWD, 7.8.1986, in ACSP, NL Aigner 35. (520) ‘Harte britische Haltung gegenüber der EG’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.1987, in ACSP, NL Aigner 34. (521) See for example: article on the ZDF documentary ‘Betrug im Kühlhaus’ aired at 7.30 p.m. on 19.5.1987, in Hören und Sehen, 16-22.5.1987, in ACSP, NL Aigner 13; ‘Mehr Integration durch Kontrolle’, in Handelsblatt, 8.11.1973, p. 9. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 207

(522) Minutes of the meeting of 22/23/24.4.1986 of the Committee on Budgetary Control, public hearing: Ways of improving funding schemes and budgetary control procedures for Community own resources and the EAGGF Guarantee Section, in ACSP NL Aigner 35; Letter of 17.10.1985 from Heinrich Aigner to Marcel Mart, President of the European Court of Auditors, in HAEU, CCE 1826. (523) EPP/CD Group press release: ‘Europäische Kontrolle setzt sich durch’, 15.10.1987, in ACSP, NL Aigner 32. (524) See Inghelram, Jan F.H.: Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, Groningen 2011, pp. 10-13; White, Simone: Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communi- ties: The Fight against Fraud and Corruption, The Hague 1998. (525) Neuhann, Florian: Schatten, p. 23 et seq. (526) See Neuhann, Florian: Schatten, pp. 22-27; Inghelram, Jan: Aspects; Hummer, Waldemar/Obwe- xer, Walter: ‘Der, geschlossene Rücktritt der Europäischen Kommission. Von der Nichtentlastung für die Haushaltsführung zur Neuernennung der Kommission’, in Integration 2 (1999), pp. 77-94. (527) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Politische Haushaltskontrolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in StadtAAm, CSU 69, p. 1. (528) Ibid., p. 6. (529) Clark, Stephen: Parliament, p. 275. (530) See the reflections drafted by André Middelhoek, Member of the European Court of Auditors, following the Council’s discussion of the annual report, 10.4.1984, in HAEU, CCE 1572. (531) Graf, Rainer: Finanzkontrolle, p. 118. (532) ‘Die kriminellen Geschäfte mit der EG-Agrarkasse’, VWD, 7.8.1986, in ACSP, NL Aigner 35. See Graf, Rainer: Finanzkontrolle, p. 165. (533) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 17.9.2012; interview with Heinz Aigner on 10.1.2013; interview with Ulrich Aigner on 9.11.2013. (534) Both quotations in Clark, Stephen: Parliament, p. 278. (535) Interview with Bernd Posselt on 17.9.2012. (536) Claus Schöndube: ‘Sagen, was wir fühlen’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 7, 1.2. (537) Ibid. (538) See documents and newspaper reports in StadtAAm, NL Aigner 581. (539) ‘Bayerisches Bekenntnis’, in Die Zeit, 6.4.1979. (540) ‘Große Zeiten brechen am rechten Rand Europas aus’, in Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.5.1979, p. 3. (541) This becomes clear, for example, from interviews with Heinrich Aigner on the establishment of the European Court of Auditors, where he generally only talks about the European Parliament’s achievements but hardly mentions himself. See interview with Heinrich Aigner, in StadtAAm, NL Aigner 4; Heinrich Aigner: ‘Neue Kompetenzen für das Europäische Parlament — Errichtung des Europäischen Rechnungshofes hat grundsätzliche Bedeutung’, inDeutschland-Union-Dienst 9 of 12.1.1978, pp. 6-8, reproduced in the annexes. (542) Written notification of 15.10.2012 from the Honours Secretariat of the Office of the Federal President. (543) ‘Pour tout vous dire. Haute distinction pour le Dr Heinrich Aigner’, Le republicain lorrain of 19.12.1986, in ACSP, NL Aigner 13. (544) Michael Möhnle: ‘Ein “europäischer Wirbelwind”. Dr Heinrich Aigner: 25 Jahre im Europäischen Parlament’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 13, p. 1; written notification of 15.10.2012 from the Honours Secretariat of the Office of the Federal President. (545) See Conze, Vanessa: Europa; Schildt, Axel: Abendland; Trunk, Achim: Europa. (546) Trunk, Achim: Europa, pp. 320-325. (547) Ibid., pp. 171-195, p. 316. ROADS TO EUROPE 208

(548) See Hübler, Martin: Bayern; Hübler, Martin: Europapolitik; Schöfbeck, Martina: Bastion; Schramek, Christian: Regionalpartei. (549) See chapter 7. (550) See chapter 6. (551) See, for example, Heinrich Aigner: ‘Bundesrepublik Deutschland — der Zahlmeister Europas?’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 10. (552) ‘Bayerisches Bekenntnis’, in Die Zeit of 6.4.1979. (553) Posselt, Martin: Paneuropa, p. 224. Declining interest in the European elections was also reflected in the turnout, which in West Germany was only 56.8 % in 1984. In 1979, it had been 65.7 %. (Blind, Jochen: Heimspiel, p. 317). (554) Haller, Max: ‘Die europäische Integration als Elitenprojekt’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 23-24 (2009), pp. 18-23. (555) Ibid., p. 18 (556) Net contributors are Member States that contribute more than they receive in funding. (557) See chapter 5. (558) Henßler, Patrick: ‘Reservatrechte’, in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_44589 (accessed on 17.9.2015). CSU politician Fritz Schäffer, who was undoubtedly known to Heinrich Aigner from the CSU, was a particular advocate of sound fiscal policy during the post-war period. However, there is no evidence in the sources of contact between the two, nor of Aigner having been influenced by Schäffer. (559) Bieber, Roland: Organe, pp. 140-147. (560) Although Aigner was criticised for this, his justification was that the motion in question was for the establishment of an information office of the European Communities in Munich, and that he needed every vote possible in order to achieve the majority required to push it through. Correspondence between Richard Jaeger and Heinrich Aigner between 27.11.1980 and 25.7.1981, in ACSP, NL Jaeger C 146. (561) Aigner, Heinrich: Schicksalsfrage; Heinrich Aigner: ‘Europapolitik ist Friedenspolitik — Thesen zu Europa’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 12, reproduced in the annexes. (562) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Ein Europäischer Rechnungshof — Was soll er erreichen?’, in StadtAAm, CSU 38. (563) See Freytag, Michael: Rechnungshof, pp. 92-99. (564) Vardabasso, Valentina: Cendrillon, p. 285. (565) Clark, Stephen: Parliament, p. 279. (566) Ibid. (567) Theato, Diemut/Graf, Rainer: Das Europäische Parlament und der Haushalt der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Baden-Baden 1994, p. 172. (568) Judge, David: Ripples, p. 28. (569) Ibid. (570) ‘Klares Bekenntnis zu Europa’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27.1.2014. The German constitutional court’s decision of 26.2.2014 declaring the 3 % threshold in the European elections to be uncon- stitutional likewise shows that the European Parliament is still not perceived as a fully-fledged Parliament. See ‘Verfassungsgericht kippt Drei-Prozent-Hürde bei Europawahl’, in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26.2.2014. (571) ‘Ein, leuchtendes Vorbild’. Dr Heinrich Aigner’, in Amberger Volksblatt, 2.4.1988, p. 1; interview with Bernd Posselt, 17.9.1988; interview with Ulrich Aigner, 9.11.2013. (572) Gelberg, Karl-Ulrich: Die Protokolle des Bayerischen Ministerrats 1945-1954, Munich 1995-2005. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 209

(573) Aigner, Heinrich: The Case for a European Audit Office, Luxembourg 1973, pp. 15-29. An English translation of Aigner’s Case for a European Audit Office already exists, dating back to 1973. However, it differs markedly from the original German text in some places. For the purpose of the present book, this original translation has been revised in order to make it more faithful to the German text, update the terminology used and improve the overall quality of the text. (574) ‘UA’ stands for ‘unit of account’. This was the European Communities’ accounting unit prior to the introduction of a single currency, i.e. the euro. (575) These countries acceded on 1 January 1973. (576) Article 206 of the EEC Treaty laid down the general provisions regarding the Audit Board of the Communities. (577) ‘First among equals’, the first among multiple persons of the same standing. (578) Extract from Heinrich Aigner’s address to the European Parliament on 11 July 1975 on agenda item 7: ‘Draft treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties − Joint debate on two reports drawn up by Mr Lange and Mr Aigner on behalf of the Committee on Budgets (Doc. 166/75 and Doc. 167/75)’, in Debates of the European Parliament of 11.7.1975, p. 267 et seq. (english version)/p. 281 et seq. (german version). (579) Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Budgets on the draft treaty amending certain financial provisions of 9.7.1975, rapporteur Heinrich Aigner, in HAEU, PE0 2014. (580) This agenda item was chaired by Vice-President Jacques Santer. (581) This is a reference to the draft treaty of the Council of February 1975: Draft Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities, in European Parliament session document No 501/74, session 1974-1975. (582) The name ‘European Parliament’ only became official with the Single European Act of 1.7.1987; prior to this, the Treaties referred to the Parliament as the ‘Assembly’, although the Assembly itself had been referring to itself as the ‘European Parliament’ since 1957. (583) Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Commu- nities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities, in OJ L 359, 31.12.1977, pp. 1-19, specifically pp. 10-12 and pp. 16 et seq. (584) The articles reproduced below are similar to the articles in Chapter I amending the ECSC Treaty and in Chapter III amending the EAEC Treaty, which I have therefore not included separately. (585) See ‘Aufzeichnung über die Problematik des Europäischen Rechnungshofes’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 10; letter to the Bureau of the European Parliament on 14.9.1977, in CARDOC, PE0 AP PV/ BUDG.1973 SCCB-19770926 0017. (586) Hand-written interpolations by Heinrich Aigner, such as this one, are in italics. (587) Crossed out: ‘our efforts to date’ (588) Treaty of 22.7.1975 amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities. (589) Present seat of the Audit Board of the European Communities. (590) Seat of the European Court of Auditors in Luxembourg. (591) Seat of the European Commission in Brussels. (592) The word ‘Brussels’ was circled by hand. (593) The word ‘Luxembourg’ was circled by hand. (594) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Neue Kompetenzen für das Europäische Parlament — Errichtung des Europäi- schen Rechnungshofes hat grundsätzliche Bedeutung’, in Deutschland-Union-Dienst 9, 12.1.1978, pp. 6-8. (595) Treaty of 22.4.1970 amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities. ROADS TO EUROPE 210

(596) Treaty of 22.7.1975 amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities. (597) See Article 206a of the Treaty of 22.7.1975. (598) A reference to the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Control, which Heinrich Aigner chaired at that time. (599) A reference to the Audit Board of the European Community and the auditor of the ECSC, which were superseded by the European Court of Auditors. (600) The auditors of the individual bodies of the European Communities, which took on responsibility for ex ante checks of revenue and expenditure and were independent of the external audit function. (601) Heinrich Aigner: ‘Europapolitik ist Friedenspolitik — Thesen zu Europa’, in ACSP, NL Aigner 12. (602) German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, all of whom championed European unification. HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 211

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACDP Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (Archive for Christian Democrat Politics) ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States ACSP Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik (Archive for Christian- Social Politics) ADAC Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club (German automobile club) BayHStA Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Central Bavarian Archives) BHE Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (Expellees’ and Disenfranchised People’s Bloc) BT Bundestag (Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany) BT-Drs Bundestag-Drucksache (Bundestag printed document) BVP Bayerische Volkspartei (Bavarian People’s Party) BWK Bundeswahlkreis (Federal constituency) CARDOC Centre archivistique et documentaire (European Parliament’s Archive and Documentation Centre) CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) CSU Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) DSU Deutsche Soziale Union (German Social Union) EAEC European Atomic Energy Community EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund EC European Communities ECA European Court of Auditors ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community EP European Parliament EPP European People’s Party FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) ROADS TO EUROPE 212

FN Footnote HAEC Historical Archives of the European Commission HAEU Historical Archives of the European Union HY Hitler Youth JU Junge Union (youth organisation of the CDU and CSU) KV Kartellverband katholischer deutscher Studentenvereine (umbrella organisation of German Catholic student fraternities) KV Amberg Kreisverband Amberg MEP Member of the European Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NL Nachlass (estate) OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation OJ Official Journal of the European Communities OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office PEU Paneuropean Union PM Prime Minister SAI Supreme Audit Institution StadtAAm Stadtarchiv Amberg SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party) StA Am Staatsarchiv Amberg StA M Staatsarchiv München Stabex Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation (System to stabilise the export earnings of developing countries) StK Staatskanzlei (regional chancellery) UCLAF Anti-Fraud Coordination Unit VWD Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste (a German economic news agency) WP Wahlperiode (legislative period) HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 213

INDEX

The index lists persons, places and things from the text and from the annexes. If a term appears only in the footnotes, the corresponding page numbers are marked with an asterisk (*).

Abendland (Christian west) 24, 49, 50, 51, Bavarian European Academy (Europäische 108, 110 Akademie Bayern) 53, 192* ‒ Abendland movement 24, 49, 188* Bavarian European Institut (Bayerisches ‒ Abendländische Akademie 52, 192* Europa-Institut) 52, 53, 192* ACP-EEC Convention (Lomé Convention) Bavarian Landesjugendring 36 192* Bavarian Landtag 20, 21, 29, 33, 34, 38, 39, Adenauer, Konrad 17, 42, 45, 46, 154, 183*, 96, 159, 186* 210* Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) 35, 38, 185*, Aigner 186* ‒ Elisabeth 25, 33 Bavarian Supreme Audit Office 96, 204* ‒ Georg 30, 34 Belgium 45, 197* ‒ Katharina 30 Berchtesgaden 39, 40, 186* Algeria 45 Birkl, Rudolf 35 Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club Boserup, Bodil 99, 112 (ADAC) 51 Brandt, Willy 46 Alsace 106 Brauchle, Georg 36 Amberg 19, 26, 27, 29-32, 34, 40, 41, 44, 46, Bruce, Donald William Trevor, Lord Bruce 91, 106, 110, 162, 163, 182*, 183*, 185*, of Donington 82 186*, 189* Brunner Angioi, Aldo 65 ‒ Guido 93 Anti-Fraud Coordination Unit (UCLAF) ‒ Josef 187* 104 Brussels 18, 66, 67, 69, 76, 96, 146-148 Audit Board of the European Communities 62, 64-66, 69, 72, 75, 76, 79, 80, 83, 84, Budgetary control (financial control) 19-24, 113, 118-124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 134, 141, 26, 54, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71-73, 78, 142, 144, 145, 148, 152, 194*, 196*, 200*, 81, 93-104, 109, 111, 113, 114, 117-124, 209*, 210* 127, 129, 130, 133, 146, 147, 181*, 194*, 197* Budgetary policy 19, 92, 94, 95, 106-109, 111, 112 Bangemann, Martin 95 Budgetary power 19, 22, 58-64, 66, 68, 69, Bavaria 19-21, 25, 27, 30, 33-36, 42, 48, 52, 74, 75, 87, 91, 95, 98, 100, 101, 111, 114, 57, 88-90, 96, 108, 112, 181*-186*, 190*- 151, 197* 193*, 202*, 204* Bundesrechnungshof 72, 96, 197* Bavaria Party (Bayernpartei) 36, 39, 42, Butterhof, Franz Xaver 35 186* ROADS TO EUROPE 214

Carstens, Carl 92 ‒ Power of discharge 98, 101 Case for a European Audit Office 22, 68, 69, Displaced persons and refugees 33 71, 72, 78-80, 103, 113, 116, 117, 209* Donhauser, Anton 40 Catholic Church 52, 54, 88, 192* Drachsler, Hans 36 Catholic Council of the Diocese of Dresden 31 Regensburg 52 Cherbourg 31 Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 34, 42, Ebrach 30 86, 89, 90, 93, 108, 167, 189*, 190*, 192*, 202*, 203* Ehard, Hans 36, 186*, 187* Christian Social Union (CSU) 19, 20, 25, Engelhard, Alois 38, 187* 27, 30, 33-36, 38-42, 47, 48, 52, 53, 56, 57, Erhard, Ludwig 45 86-93, 96, 107-109, 112, 184*-193*, 202*, Erlangen 32, 34, 182*, 184* 203*, 208* Erny, Horst 38 ‒ CDU/CSU electoral group 42, 189*, 192* Europa-Union Deutschland 48-50, 190*- ‒ CSU Board 35, 92 192* ‒ CSU grouping in the Bundestag 42, 189* European Agricultural Guidance and Cold War 42, 47, 54 Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 61, 118, 127, Common Agricultural Policy 56, 61, 63, 64, 206* 78, 100, 111, 126 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 104 Communism 50, 54, 57, 112, 154, 191* European Atomic Energy Community ‒ Eurocommunism 50, 191* (EAEC or Euratom) 17, 45, 60-62, 119, 120, 141, 178*, 189*, 194* Contact Committee of supreme audit institutions 68, 70-72, 75, 76, 80, 113, ‒ EAEC Treaty 119, 120, 194*, 209* 196* European Audit Office 19, 21, 26, 59, 62, 64, Copenhagen 69, 70, 74, 197* 66-73, 78-80, 86, 103, 109, 112-114, 116- 119, 124, 126, 127, 131-134, 193*, 194* Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard Nikolaus von 24, 33, 48, 49, 52, 178*, 184* European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 17, 45, 60-62, 120*, 141, 152, Council of Europe 17, 56, 189* 178*, 189*, 194* Council of the Communities (Council of ‒ ECSC Auditor 61, 65, 72, 152, 194*, 210* Ministers) 58, 60-77, 79-83, 86, 95, 100, 103, 104, 118, 120-123, 126, 128, 131, 132, ‒ ECSC Treaty 119, 120, 209* 135-142, 144, 145, 147, 151, 152, 194*, ‒ High Authority 60, 61, 194* 195*, 197*, 198*, 205* European Commission 23, 58, 60-66, 68-76, 79, 80, 83, 95-104, 114, 119*, 120-134, 137, 140-144, 152, 153, 189*, 194*, 195*, De Gasperi, Alcide 154, 210* 197*, 198*, 204*-206*, 209* De Gaulle, Charles 56, 63, 190* European Communities (EC) 17, 18, 20-24, 50, 54, 56-58, 60-64, 66, 68, 73, 85, 87, 90, Delors, Jacques 101 93, 96, 99, 100-103, 105-109, 111, 113- Denmark 68, 117, 197* 115, 117, 130, 138, 141, 178*, 182*, 193*, Development policy 29, 54, 92, 181*, 192* 208*-210* Discharge 22, 23, 61-63, 69, 78, 79, 81, 95, European Court of Auditors (ECA) 18-23, 98-102, 104, 112, 114, 121, 136, 140, 152, 25-28, 59-61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 71, 73-80, 82, 194*, 195*, 197*, 205* 84, 85, 87, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 102, 103, 107, 109, 110, 113, 116, 135-153, 178*, 193*, ‒ Discharge procedure 63, 64, 78, 79, 95, 197*-201*, 205*, 209*, 210* 98, 99, 101, 102, 205* HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 215

European Court of Justice 76, 122, 123, 126, Feury, Otto Freiherr von 184* 128, 131, 178*, 189* Financial controller 62, 97, 121-125, 129, European Defence Community (EDC) 45 130, 194* European Development Fund 117, 124, 130 Flesch, Colette 203* European Documentation and Information France 31, 45, 62, 191*, 198* Centre (Europäisches Dokumentations- Free Democratic Party (FDP) 42, 190*, 203* und Informationszentrum) 52 Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Karl- European Economic Community (EEC) 17, Theodor 42 24, 25, 45, 60-62, 120*, 137, 138, 140, 141, 178*, 189*, 194* Furtner, Josef 33 ‒ EEC Treaty 69, 119, 120, 123*, 131, 194*, 205*, 209* European integration 17, 18, 23-25, 28, 45, Gaudy, Paul 65 46, 48, 51, 56, 57, 60, 91, 92, 95, 103, 104, Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 86 107, 110, 113, 115, 119, 143, 182*, 191*, Gerlach, Horst 95, 203* 192* German Bundestag 19-21, 28, 29, 34, 38, European Monetary Fund 117 40-46, 86, 87, 89-93, 95, 104, 106, 110, European Parliament (Common Assembly/ 186*, 188*, 189*, 192*, 202*, 203* EP) 18-23, 25-28, 39, 40, 42-46, 48, 51-66, ‒ Audit Subcommittee 42 69, 70, 73, 74, 76-79, 81, 82, 87-91, 93, ‒ Budget Committee 42, 43, 188* 95, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109-115, 117-120, 131, 135, 136, 143, 145, 148, − Development Aid Committee 43 150-153, 189*, 194*-196*, 202*, 207*, ‒ International Trade Committee 43 208*, 210* German-Brazilian Society 54, 192* ‒ Committee on Budgetary Control 19, Goppel, Alfons 41, 46, 49, 52, 87, 90, 92, 22, 26, 78, 94-96, 98-104, 109, 114, 182*, 183* 196*, 204* Great Britain 48, 117 ‒ Committee on Budgets 44, 64-66, 67, 68, 71-73, 75, 77, 79, 82-85, 94, 95, 112, 118, 119, 135, 196*-198* ‒ Committee on Development and Habsburg, Otto von 49, 51, 52, 87-90, 181*, Cooperation 44, 54 191*, 192* ‒ Control Subcommittee 60, 73, 75, 80, 82, Hanselmann, Johannes 88 84, 85, 94-97, 113, 196*, 203* Hartig, Hilmar 75 European People’s Party (EPP) 79, 90, 182, Held, Heinrich 30 202* Heubl, Franz 35 European policy 20, 21, 25, 30, 46, 154 Hillermeier, Karl 53, 190*, 192*, 204* Expellees’ and Disenfranchised People’s Höhenberger, Fritz 185*, 186* Bloc (BHE) 42 Hundhammer, Alois 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 48, 49, 185*-187*

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 30, 32, 42, 44-46, 48, 49, 52, 73, 86, 90, 104, 105, 107-109, 112, 194*, Indochina 45 202*, 208* Ireland 68, 117, 198* Federalism 25, 30, 56, 57, 182, 185 Italy 31, 45, 73, 191*, 197*, 198* Fellner, Hermann 91 ROADS TO EUROPE 216

Jaeger, Richard 27, 34, 35, 38, 41, 46, 49, Narjes, Karl-Heinz 93 183*, 184*, 186*-188*, 208* National Socialism (Nazi Party) 27, 30, 31, Jenkins, Roy 97 47, 88, 108 Johansen, Arne K. 65 ‒ Hitler Youth 30, 183* Junge Union (JU) 20, 27, 34-36, 38, 39, 41, NATO 42 184*-186*, 188* Netherlands 45, 194*, 199* Niederheining 39 Nittenau 36 Kohl, Helmut 41, 89, 202* North Rhine-Westphalia 112 Königstein 35 North-South divide 54 Norway 68, 197* Nuremberg 35, 88, 110, 184* Lange, Erwin 95, 112 Laufen 39, 40, 186* League of Nations 24 Obere Siedlungsbehörde in Munich 33, Leicht, Albert 65 34, 36 Lelong, Pierre 65 Old Bavaria (Altbayern) 36 Ludwigshafen 188* Organisation for European Economic Luxembourg 18, 22, 26, 40, 45, 52, 62-64, Cooperation (OEEC) 17 66, 67, 74, 76, 107, 117, 146-149, 194*, 199*, 202*, 209* Paneuropean Union 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 33, 41, 48-52, 87-89, 108, 110, 111, 178*, Malt Affair 22, 78, 97, 100, 104, 107 182*, 184*, 190*-192* Marian Society Munich 52 ‒ Paneuropa intern 51 Marshall Plan 17 ‒ Paneuropean Union Europe Day 51, 52, Mart, Marcel 74, 65 87, 88, 110 Maximov, Vladimir 87 ‒ Paneuropean youth movement 89 Middelhoek, André 25, 65, 102, 204*, 207* Pirkl, Fritz 35, 38, 184*, 186* Milk Marketing Board Affair 100, 101, 105, Pompidou, Georges 56, 63 114 Posselt, Bernd 27, 184* Monetary Union 117 Price, Norman 65 Monnet, Jean 17 Probst, Maria 46 Monte Cassino 31 Müller, Josef (Ochsensepp) 35, 36, 38, 185* Munich 27, 29, 31-35, 51, 52, 87, 88, 96, Raß, Hans 27, 40 183*, 186*, 187*, 208* Ratzinger, Joseph (Benedikt XVI.) 51, 52, ‒ Frauenkirche 52, 88 88, 191* ‒ Olympic Hall 51, 87, 110 Regensburg 35, 52, 88, 191* Murphy, Michael 65 Rothemund, Helmut 88 Russia 31, 48 HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 217

Sackmann, Franz 35, 36, 38, 41, 187* Treaty of Amsterdam 113 Santer, Jacques 101, 104, 209* Treaty of Maastricht 18, 113, 178*, 194*, Schäfer, Hans 196* 197* Schäffer, Fritz 35, 36, 38, 41, 185*, 208* Treaty of Nice 113 Schedl, Otto 35, 38, 183*, 186*, 187* Tutzing 38 Schleswig-Holstein 89 Schlögl, Alois 33, 184* United Kingdom (UK) 68, 73, 79, 88, 100, Schmidhuber, Peter 36 103, 104, 106, 112, 193*, 197*, 206* Schmidt, Helmut 92 United States of America (USA) 48, 49, Schuman, Robert 17, 40, 147, 154, 210* 190*, 197* Schwabach 38 United States of Europe 48, 57, 190* Seidel, Hanns 42, 188* Upper Palatinate (Oberpfalz) 19, 30, 36, 44, Single European Act 189,* 209* 51, 90, 92, 143, 185* Social Democratic Party (SPD) 42, 87, 88, 107, 190*, 202* Socialism 50, 54, 191* Vedel Report 69, 197* Soviet Union 54, 191* Veil, Simone 100 Spénale, Georges 68, 197*, 198* Steber, Franz 34, 35 Stoiber, Edmund 89, 93 Wehrmacht 31 Strasbourg 18, 45, 51, 53, 106, 107 Weimar Republic 30, 112 Strauß, Franz Josef 38, 41, 46, 49, 57, 87-89, Winkler, Martin 40, 41 91-93, 107, 109, 186*, 187*, 192*, 202*, 204* Streibl, Max 183*, 204* Zimmermann, Friedrich 38 Stützle, Hans 38 Sulzbach-Rosenberg 40, 184* Swabia (Schwaben) 36

Thanbichler, Johann 39, 186*, 187* Thatcher, Margret 87, 103, 206* Thiele, Wolfram 35 Thierfelder, Franz 34 Treaties of Rome 17, 45, 46, 56, 60, 61, 86 Treaty amending certain budgetary provisions (Treaty of Luxembourg/ Treaty of 22 April 1970) 22, 62-64, 151 Treaty amending certain financial provisions (Treaty of Brussels/Treaty of 22 July 1975) 18, 66, 69, 74, 94, 113, 135, 137, 144, 145, 152, 198*, 200*

ROADS TO EUROPE TO ROADS HEINRICH AIGNER AND THE GENESIS OF OF GENESIS THE AND AIGNER HEINRICH AUDITORS OF COURT EUROPEAN THE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH CHRISTINE LAURA

ROADS TO EUROPE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH ROADS TO EUROPE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH

ROADS TO EUROPE LAURA CHRISTINE ULRICH

QJ-02-15-731-EN-C doi:10.2865/759383 ISBN 978-92-9241-998-1 ISBN 978-92-9241-998-1