G-COE GLOPE II Working Paper Series Political Competition, Rent-Seeking and Corruption: The Emergence of "Clean" Government in Chile Gabriella R. Montinola UC Davis, Department of Political Science
[email protected] Working Paper No.12 If you have any comment or question on the working paper series, please contact each author. When making a copy or reproduction of the content, please contact us in advance to request permission. The source should explicitly be credited. GLOPEⅡ Web Site: http://globalcoe-glope2.jp/ Political Competition, Rent-Seeking and Corruption: The Emergence of "Clean" Government in Chile Gabriella R. Montinola UC Davis, Department of Political Science
[email protected] Why does corruption persist despite the presence of democratic institutions such as competitive elections? What conditions facilitate the emergence of accountable government? This article presents a model based on the principal-agent framework that shows that level of corruption is a function, not only of the presence or absence of challengers, but also of the structure of competition to influence public policy. The model shows that when the electorate's demands are structured along more than a single dominant dimension, challengers cannot credibly commit to act differently from corrupt incumbents, and incumbents have substantial incentives and opportunities to engage in corrupt behavior. Alternatively, when the electorate's preferences are confined largely to a single dimension, challengers' promises can be credible. The credibility of challengers' commitments keeps incumbents from significantly deviating from their campaign promises and provides constituents with the means to punish corrupt incumbents. Evidence from the experience of Chile during 1891-1952 proves consistent with expectations derived from the model.