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Countering Iran in the Gray Zone What the United States Should Learn from Israel’S Operations in Syria

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Countering Iran in the Gray Zone What the United States Should Learn from Israel’S Operations in Syria APRIL 2020 Countering Iran in the Gray Zone What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas A. Heras, Kaleigh Thomas, and Jennie Matuschak About the Authors Acknowledgments Ilan Goldenberg is a Senior Fellow and The authors would like to thank Sarit Zehavi and Tal Beeri Director of the Middle East Security at the Alma Institute for their input into this report and their Program at the Center for a New feedback, as well as for spending a day with the authors American Security (CNAS). He previously visiting Israel’s northern border. They would also like to served at the State Department as a chief thank Israeli government and defense officials who engaged of staff for the small team supporting with them on this project and they are grateful to Norman then–Secretary of State John Kerry’s Roule, Lt Col Stewart Parker, and Loren DeJonge Schulman initiative to conduct permanent-status for reviewing drafts and offering helpful comments; and to negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Formerly Melody Cook and Maura McCarthy, who assisted with the a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign production of this report. Relations Committee, he focused on the Middle East. Prior to that, he served as a special advisor on the Middle East About the Middle East Security and then as the Iran team chief in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Program The Middle East Security Program conducts cutting-edge Nicholas A. Heras is the Middle East research on the most pressing issues in this turbulent Portfolio Manager at the Institute for region. The program focuses on the source of instability in the Study of War. Heras works with the the region, maintaining key U.S. strategic partnerships, and research team covering Syria, Iraq, and generating solutions that help policymakers respond to both the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham fast-moving events and long-term trends. The Middle East (ISIS). Previously he was a fellow in the Security Program draws on a team with deep government Middle East Security Program at CNAS. and nongovernment experience in regional studies, U.S. A former National Security Education foreign policy, and international security. It analyzes trends Program David L. Boren Fellow, he has conducted extensive and generates practical and implementable policy solutions in-field research in all regions of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, that defend and advance U.S. interests. with significant experience in Turkey’s border regions with Syria and Iraq. Before CNAS, Heras was a research associate at the National Defense University, where he worked on a project that comprehensively analyzed the impact on the Middle East of the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts. Kaleigh Thomas is a Research Associate in the Middle East Security Program at CNAS. She was a program coordinator for both the Middle East Security and Energy, Economics, and Security programs at CNAS. Thomas holds an M.A. from American University in International Peace and Conflict Resolution, and a B.S. in Business Administration from the University of South Carolina, double-majoring in International Business and Marketing. JENNIE MATUSCHAK is a Joseph S. Nye Jr. Research Intern in the Middle East Security Program at CNAS. Previously she interned for the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center. She holds a B.A. in History from Bucknell University, with a concentration in Arab Studies and a minor in Arabic. America Competes 2020 America Competes 2020 is a Center-wide initiative featuring cutting-edge CNAS research, publications, events, and multimedia aimed at strengthening the United States’ strategic advantages at home and abroad. COUNTERING IRAN IN THE GRAY ZONE 01 Executive Summary 02 Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone 06 The Israeli Campaign between the Wars 10 Lessons for the United States from the Mabam Campaign 18 Applying Lessons Learned to the U.S. Strikes against Kata’ib Hezbollah and Qassim Soleimani 20 Conclusion MIDDLE EAST SECURITY | APRIL 2020 Countering Iran in the Gray Zone: What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria Executive Summary ince the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and especially ¡ Purposefully and carefully limit adversary and civilian since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has casualties. S become highly proficient in using its surrogates ¡ Take a gradualist forward planning approach that and proxies across the Middle East as a tool to achieve permits iteration step-by-step, instead of the more tra- its interests while avoiding direct conflict with the ditional military planning that starts with identifying United States. Successive U.S. presidents have sought end-states and working backwards from there. options for pushing back against this Iranian strategy but have struggled to find approaches that could deter ¡ Pursue complementary diplomacy with other actors in Iran’s actions or degrade its capabilities. In most cases the theater to create space for military action. U.S. administrations have been hesitant to respond at all, ¡ Be realistic about what a limited tactical campaign can for fear of starting a larger conflict. The recent killing of achieve—and curtail it when it is no longer generating Qassim Soleimani represents the opposite problem, in outcomes. which the United States and Iran came unnecessarily close to a much larger war. It is highly questionable whether the United States can In contrast, Israel’s “campaign between the wars” replicate the Israeli approach, given U.S. institutional (the Hebrew acronym is mabam) against Iran and constraints. It is not clear whether there are many Iranian-backed groups in Syria has been one of the military theaters in which it would be in America’s most successful military efforts to push back against interest, as a superpower, to devote the kind of intel- Iran in the “gray zone.” Since the start of the Syrian ligence resources and detailed analysis necessary to civil war in 2011, and especially since early 2017, Israel conduct such operations. Equally unclear are the fol- has conducted more than 200 airstrikes inside Syria against more than 1,000 targets linked to Iran and it’s Mabam represents one of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC- QF), and against IRGC-QF backed groups such as the few examples of a successful Lebanese Hezbollah. This campaign has slowed Iran’s campaign to counter Iranian military buildup in Syria while avoiding a broader surrogates and proxies. U.S. regional conflagration that would have been damaging policymakers and military to Israel’s interests.1 This study examines Israel’s mabam campaign and planners should examine it asks what lessons the United States can draw and how carefully. they may be applied to future U.S. actions in gray zone conflicts, both against Iran and more broadly. The lessons lowing considerations: is the U.S. government too big include: and not nimble enough to support such operations; do the diverse views held on Iran strategy within the U.S. ¡ Instead of broad-based strategic objectives, focus on government make such a strategy more challenging to clearly defined and limited operational objectives that implement; can the U.S. government, without the use can be achieved through limited military force. of a military censor (which Israel deploys), do enough ¡ Only pursue this type of campaign in theaters where to control the public messaging associated with such a it is possible to maintain intelligence superiority that campaign. Even so, mabam represents one of the few enables in-depth analysis of the reactions of various examples of a successful campaign to counter Iranian actors, and to maintain the military superiority that surrogates and proxies. Therefore, U.S. policymakers will reduce the likelihood of effective retaliation. and military planners should examine it carefully. ¡ Be willing to take calculated risks, including recog- nizing the large space between taking no kinetic action and ending up in a full-scale war. ¡ Develop a subtle messaging campaign that can be deniable but still sends a clear deterrent signal to the target. 1 @CNASDC Iran-U.S. Conflict in the Gray Zone the conflict, there is significant ambiguity regarding the extent to which the clash will escalate into direct armed Before diving into the lessons the United States can learn conflict—even though each actor seeks to avoid crossing from Israel’s campaign against Iran in the Syrian gray this ambiguous threshold leading to open war.7 The zone, it is first essential to understand the definition of outcome of this situation is a type of “hybrid warfare,” a gray zone conflicts; how Iran has operated in the gray popular phrase in the U.S. defense and national security zone historically; and the challenges the United States policymaking establishment. Kinetic and non-kinetic has faced countering Iranian gray zone activities. activities are deployed, and the measure of victory is oftentimes more geo-political than military.8 Gray zone Defining Gray Zone Conflicts activities tend to extend beyond those associated with What is known as the “gray zone” is a state between war routine statecraft, and below those associated with direct and peace. Actors (state and non-state) who conduct gray military conflict.9 The toolkit includes information oper- zone activities seek to compel their opponents without ations and disinformation, political coercion, economic requiring extensive or sustained military activity.2 In coercion, cyber operations, space operations, proxy a gray zone conflict, the objective is not to defeat an support, and provocation by state-controlled forces. enemy and control the territory once possessed, but to Challengers in the gray zone often act across these cate- advance one’s own security interests at the expense of gories in a multidimensional fashion.10 the rival.
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