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From Deep State to Islamic State: the Arab Counter-Revolution and Its Jihadi Legacy

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From Deep State to Islamic State: the Arab Counter-Revolution and Its Jihadi Legacy From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and Its Jihadi Legacy By Jean-Pierre Filiu New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 311 pages, £15.99, ISBN: 9781849045469. Reviewed by Osman Türk, Turkish National Police Academy Major changes have taken place in the MENA region. In this re- in the Middle East and North Af- gard, Jean-Pierre Filiu, who has rica (MENA) since the eruption extensive first-hand experience of of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010. Con- the region as a diplomat, offers an cepts such as the new world order, informed comparative analysis to democracy, freedoms and human identify, for instance, the structure rights have widely circulated in the of military and intelligence agen- Arab world, particularly after the cies, which can be deemed guard- invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the pro- ians of the state in Egypt, Syria, Tu- gression of what turned out to be a civil war nisia, Yemen and Algeria. in Syria triggered an array of academic stud- ies on the past, present and future shape of The author begins by analyzing the deep state, the region. Within that volatile context, the which as a term originates from near Turkish emergence of jihadi groups that constantly political history and is usually composed of renew themselves and spread over a wide high-level elements within intelligence ser- territory with the claim to defend religion vices, the military, internal security, the judi- makes it all the more necessary to compre- ciary, and the mafia. Structures of deep state hensively study the structure of the region. in the region provide the real reason for the spread of jihadi groups like al-Qaida and The title of Filiu’s book, From Deep State to ISIS. For instance, according to Filiu, the po- Islamic State: the Arab Counter-Revolution litical and social structure of Egypt before the and its Jihadi Legacy may lead its readers to Arab Spring prepared the appropriate envi- assume that this is an exclusive discussion of ronment for Hosni Mubarak to take over the jihad organizations. Instead, the book exam- country after Enver Sadat was assassinated. ines the deep-seated structures and processes When the popular revolts offered a key -de that prepare the ground for the emergence of mocratization prospect in 2011, the Egyptian these groups. Filiu starts with the fundamen- deep state helped strangle it in another coup tal argument that global jihadist groups such d’état by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (pp. 54-55). as al-Qaida and ISIS [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] did not fall from the blue sky. Syria and Egypt merged to form a new state Each built itself upon major critical events, under the name of the United Arab Republic in a group of frustrated or ruined people and 1958. The Syrian Ba’ath executives strongly a sound ideology. A historical perspective desired to establish this state, but the result is therefore the sine qua non for understand- was not what they expected. Under the strong ing the social and political structure of states control of Nasser, the Syrian Ba’ath Party rap- 2017 Summer 263 BOOK REVIEWS idly weakened and the situation of officers de- have received significant support from teriorated. On top of this, a group of Ba’ath the Arab deep state. It is now a well-known people, including Hafez Assad, took over with fact that once the revolutionary fire was lit the coup. His son, Bashar al-Assad, who was in Syria, the Syrian deep state did two things the new dictator after Hafez Assad’s death in in particular to hijack the revolution: it first 2000, maintained the same empire of fear that released extremist prisoners from Syria’s in- his father had established. However, the au- famous prisons to hijack the revolution and thoritarian regime in Syria did not dodge the force the West to eventually come to a point popular waves in the region after 2010. where it had to choose either ‘radicals’ or ‘Assad.’ It therefore actively colluded with ISIS Filiu claims that the most important reason and al-Qaida, using regional actors to reach its for the failure of the momentous attempt target of maintaining its hold on power. The at revolution is the Arab deep state. Accord- regime also collaborated with the PYD and its ing to his analysis, the Arab deep state uses a armed wing the YPG, both being the PKK’s number of arguments, tools, and mechanisms Syrian franchises, in order to prevent Kurds to consolidate the presence and legitimize the from joining the revolution, therefore cutting continuity of the current regime, among them a crucial support base for the revolution.1 the worn-out argument of defending Arabs against the Zionists and the Crusaders. These Despite his impressive knowledge and expe- tools were successful in legitimizing the in- rience, Filiu underestimates the influence of cumbents’ clamp on Arab society in the same Salafi ideology on the region. This movement way that Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser first emerged after the Ottomans started los- or Houari Boumedienne of Algeria had done ing their dominion in the first half of the 18th in the past. This attitude actually caused ji- century. The ideology sprang up in Saudi Ara- hadi organizations to become widespread in bia, supported by the British empire, and was the region. According to Dr. Filiu, the de- based on the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, who was mocratization movement that took place with a significant supporter of traditional Islamic the Arab spring has not succeeded in target jurisprudence. The movement took its final countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria. shape from Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This indicates that the sectarian nature of cur- Filiu makes a useful analogy between how rent conflicts in the region plays a supportive the above-mentioned, strategically-used ar- role for jihadist terrorist organizations which is gument of defending Arabs against Zionists far too great to be underestimated. That is, not and Crusaders, and that of the Mamluks, only the exploitation of jihadi groups by deep who had claimed they fought against the states but also misinterpretation of religious Mongolian hordes in order to defend their scripts deepen sectarian rifts in the region and nation. Hence, Filiu calls modern Arab se- are used to extend sectarian ideologies, the curity establishments ‘modern Arab Mam- most obvious example of which is Wahhabism. luks’ (pp. 47-48). Filiu also downgrades the influence and poli- tics of Iran in the region. The destruction of On the other hand, counter-revolutionaries the Baghdad administration after the invasion played an important role in the escalation of of Iraq and its replacement with a sectarian radicalization, especially after the Arab Shiite structure with Nouri al-Maliki as Prime spring. In this context, Salafi-Jihadi groups Minister from 2006 and 2014 resulted in the 264 Insight Turkey oppression of Sunnis, which created a well of tude of Erdoğan in Turkey. Filiu constantly resentment and frustration in the country, puts forward the Islamic identity of Erdoğan, thus paving the way for ISIS to emerge. arguing that Erdoğan’s dictatorial attitude re- veals his dark side (p. 11). In this context, it Another slight weakness in the book is that al- must be understood that some of the author’s though it is very rich in details and anecdotes, allegations are based on newspaper headlines. the sheer number of names, groups, and dates makes the book difficult to follow. Filiu’s ac- Filiu has presented this work to us by com- count also suffers from a technically false de- bining deep experience and extensive re- piction of the historic borders of al-Sham (Bi- search on the region. From Deep State to Is- lad al Sham has been described as the coun- lamic State should be studied by scholars and try of al-Sham, Sham also being the name researchers who want to do in-depth work, of Damascus in Arabic and in Turkish) (p. especially on the Middle East and North 25). However, al-Sham is the region border- African. ing the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, usually known as the Levant or the region of Syria, i.e. modern Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Jor- Endnote dan, Cyprus and the Turkish Hatay province. 1. Phil Sands, Justin Vela and Suha Maayeh, “Assad Regime Abetted Extremists to Subvert Peaceful Uprising, Says For- mer Intelligence Official,” The National, (January 21, 2014), Also, Filiu fails to make a right connection retrieved from https://www.thenational.ae/world/assad- between the dictatorial administration of regime-abetted-extremists-to-subvert-peaceful-uprising- the Arab countries and the political atti- says-former-intelligence-official-1.319620. 2017 Summer 265.
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