Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul
Created on 4 July 2005 at 14.33 hours page 137 SHAME, PLEASURE, AND THE DIVIDED SOUL JESSICA MOSS Thumos—spirit, the middle part of the soul in Plato’s Republic— has a bad reputation. In one of the most sustained attacks on its integrity, Terry Penner writes: Plato’s true view [in the Republic] is . that there are only two parts of the soul, a rational part and an irrational part, and he allows himself thumos (spirit) for irrelevant political or moral reasons only . Plato had no logical or psychological arguments for going beyond two parts of the soul.1 Many scholars share Penner’s suspicions. Spirit is at best poorly unified and ill-defined, and at worst an ad hoc addition to Plato’s underlying view of the soul as the battleground between reason and non-rational desire, an afterthought which he introduces in book 4 to preserve his dubious analogy between city and soul, and then soon forgets, reverting in book 10 to his original view.2 Some have defended spirit by arguing that in describing it Plato ã Jessica Moss 2005 For all their help and good advice I thank John Cooper, Helen Cullyer, Cian Dorr, Alexander Nehamas, David Sedley, and Allan Silverman. 1 T.Penner, ‘Thought and Desire in Plato’, in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, ii. Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion (New York, 1971), 96–118 at 96 and 113. 2 Allegedly at Rep. 602 c ·., where he distinguishes between the rational part of the soul, the part that calculates and measures, and an irrational part that falls prey to illusions.
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