Keystone XL: a Tar Sands Pipeline to Increase Oil Prices
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Enbridge Responses to ADOE IR No. 1 Page 1 of 4 Transcanada
Enbridge Responses to ADOE IR No. 1 Page 1 of 4 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline GP Ltd. (“Keystone”) Keystone XL Pipeline Application OH-1-2009 Responses to The Alberta Department of Energy Information Request No. 1 to Enbridge Pipelines Inc. (“Enbridge”) 1.1 Reference: Written Evidence of Enbridge Pipelines Inc., dated July 30, 2009 including the attached Muse Stancil Report and CAPP June 2009 report Preamble: We understand Enbridge’s evidence indicates that generally: (1) an additional one million b/d of take-away capacity from Western Canada on the Keystone Pipeline and the Enbridge system will be built by 2010; (2) while a certain level of excess pipeline capacity is advantageous, the advantage reverses when the cost of capacity outweighs the netback benefits; (3) the Keystone XL Pipeline project would create an unnecessary and unprecedented level of excess pipeline capacity between Western Canada and U.S. markets; (4) if Keystone XL is placed into service in late 2012, it will offload volumes from the Enbridge system; (5) this off loading will increase Enbridge system shippers’ costs, shipping between Edmonton and Chicago, by Cdn$315 million (Cdn$0.75 per barrel); (6) impact could be greater if volume shipped on either base Keystone or Keystone XL were more than contracted volumes; (7) Enbridge asked Muse Stancil to estimate aggregate net benefit to Canada of the Keystone XL Pipeline and Muse Stancil estimates it would only be US$102 million in 2013, as compared to Purvin & Gertz Inc. estimate of $3.4 billion benefit to Canadian heavy crude producers alone; (8) Enbridge is advancing the “Gretna Option” as a modification the Keystone XL Pipeline; (9) the Gretna Option would reduce the capital cost of the Keystone XL Pipeline by approximately US$2 billion and would reduce tolls on Enbridge system by about Cdn$0.35 per barrel; Enbridge Responses to ADOE IR No. -
Keystone Pipeline System Keystone Pipeline System
Keystone Pipeline System Keystone Pipeline System Keystone Pipeline System An innovative and cost-competitive solution to a growing North American demand for energy, the Keystone Pipeline System will link a reliable and stable source of Canadian crude oil with U.S. demand. Upon completion, the Keystone Pipeline System will be comprised of the 2,151- mile (3,461-kilometre) Keystone Pipeline and the proposed 1,661-mile (2,673-kilometre) Keystone Gulf Coast Expansion Project (Keystone XL). TransCanada affiliates will build and operate the Keystone Pipeline System in four phases. Keystone Pipeline (Phase I) Originating at Hardisty, Alta., Keystone Phase I transports crude oil to U.S. Midwest markets at Wood River and Patoka, Ill. Keystone Phase I began commercial operation in June 2010. The Canadian portion of Keystone Phase I involved the conversion of approximately 537 miles (864 kilometres) of existing TransCanada pipeline in Saskatchewan and Manitoba from natural gas to crude oil transmission service. Along with the construction of 16 pump stations Edmonton and approximately 232 miles (373 kilometres) of new pipeline in Canada, new facilities were also required Hardisty Alberta at the Keystone Hardisty Terminal, including: three Saskatchewan operational storage tanks, an initiating pump station, Calgary Regina Manitoba and interconnections with existing pipeline systems in the Winnipeg Ontario Hardisty area. The U.S. portion of the Keystone Pipeline included the North Dakota Helena construction of 1,084 miles (1,744 kilometres) of new, 30- Bismarck Minnesota inch diameter pipeline and 23 pump stations throughout Montana North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Missouri, and Illinois. Pierre Wisconsin Michigan South Dakota Wyoming Keystone Cushing Extension (Phase II) Iowa Chicago Measuring approximately 298 miles (480 kilometres) in Nebraska length,Ohio Keystone Phase II is an extension of Keystone Phase Lincoln Illinois Indiana I from Steele City, Neb., to Cushing, Okla. -
The Cost of Pipeline Constraints in Canada by Elmira Aliakbari and Ashley Stedman
FRASER RESEARCH BULLETIN FROM THE CENTRE FOR NATURAL RESOURCE STUDIES May 2018 The Cost of Pipeline Constraints in Canada by Elmira Aliakbari and Ashley Stedman MAIN CONCLUSIONS Despite the steady growth in crude oil From 2013 to 2017, after accounting for available for export, new pipeline proj- quality differences and transportation ects in Canada continue to face delays costs, the depressed price for Canadian related to environmental and regula- heavy crude oil has resulted in CA$20.7 tory impediments as well as political billion in foregone revenues for the Ca- opposition. nadian energy industry. This significant loss is equivalent to almost 1 percent of Canada’s lack of adequate pipeline ca- Canada’s national GDP. pacity has imposed a number of costly constraints on the nation’s energy sec- In 2018, the average price differen- tor including an overdependence on tial (based on the first quarter) was the US market and reliance on more US$26.30 per barrel. If the price differ- costly modes of energy transportation. ential remains at the current level, we These and other factors have resulted estimate that Canada’s pipeline con- in depressed prices for Canadian heavy straints will reduce revenues for Cana- crude (Western Canada Select) relative dian energy firms by roughly CA$15.8 to US crude (West Texas Intermediate) billion in 2018, which is approximately and other international benchmarks. 0.7 percent of Canada’s national GDP. Between 2009 and 2012, the average Insufficient pipeline capacity has re- price differential between Western sulted in substantial lost revenue for Canada Select (WCS) and West Texas the energy industry and thus imposed Intermediate (WTI) was about 13 per- significant costs on the economy as a cent of the WTI price. -
Follow-Up Letter
March 2, 2018 President Margarette May Macaulay Commissioner Antonia Urrejola Commissioner Francisco José Eguiguren Praeli Commissioner Esmeralda Arosemena de Troitiño Commissioner Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva Commissioner Joel Hernández García Commissioner Flávia Piovesan Executive Secretary Paulo Abrão Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1889 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Re: Update on Effect of U.S. Executive Order “Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure Projects” Dear Commissioners Eguiguren Praeli, Macaulay, Urrejola, Arosemena de Troitiño, Vargas Silva, and Piovesan, and Executive Secretary Abrão, We, the undersigned Indigenous and civil society organizations, write to update the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on President Trump’s Executive Order “Expediting Environmental Review and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure Projects,” (Infrastructure EO) with a focus on developments since the March 21, 2017 hearing1 on this matter. The actions taken in the last year in direct and indirect furtherance of the Infrastructure EO – including granting permission for construction without conducting appropriate assessments and silencing opposition to that permission – severely impact the rights of Indigenous peoples in the United States to their land and culture, as well as to free, prior, and informed consent. We ask the Commission to maintain its involvement in monitoring and responding to this situation, including by taking the specific actions listed at the conclusion of -
Media Coverage of Oil Sands Pipelines: a Chronological Record of Headlines from 2010 to 2014
Media Coverage of Oil Sands Pipelines: A Chronological Record of Headlines from 2010 to 2014 Oil Sands Research and Information Network School of Energy and the Environment University of Alberta December 2014 Oil Sands Research and Information Network The Oil Sands Research and Information Network (OSRIN) is a university-based, independent organization that compiles, interprets and analyses available knowledge about managing the environmental impacts to landscapes and water affected by oil sands mining and gets that knowledge into the hands of those who can use it to drive breakthrough improvements in regulations and practices. OSRIN is a project of the University of Alberta’s School of Energy and the Environment (SEE). OSRIN was launched with a start-up grant of $4.5 million from Alberta Environment and a $250,000 grant from the Canada School of Energy and Environment Ltd. OSRIN provides: Governments with the independent, objective, and credible information and analysis required to put appropriate regulatory and policy frameworks in place Media, opinion leaders and the general public with the facts about oil sands development, its environmental and social impacts, and landscape/water reclamation activities – so that public dialogue and policy is informed by solid evidence Industry with ready access to an integrated view of research that will help them make and execute environmental management plans – a view that crosses disciplines and organizational boundaries OSRIN recognizes that much research has been done in these areas by a variety of players over 40 years of oil sands development. OSRIN synthesizes this collective knowledge and presents it in a form that allows others to use it to solve pressing problems. -
Canadian Pipeline Transportation System Energy Market Assessment
National Energy Office national Board de l’énergie CANADIAN PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT National Energy Office national Board de l’énergie National Energy Office national Board de l’énergieAPRIL 2014 National Energy Office national Board de l’énergie National Energy Office national Board de l’énergie CANADIAN PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENERGY MARKET ASSESSMENT National Energy Office national Board de l’énergie National Energy Office national Board de l’énergieAPRIL 2014 National Energy Office national Board de l’énergie Permission to Reproduce Materials may be reproduced for personal, educational and/or non-profit activities, in part or in whole and by any means, without charge or further permission from the National Energy Board, provided that due diligence is exercised in ensuring the accuracy of the information reproduced; that the National Energy Board is identified as the source institution; and that the reproduction is not represented as an official version of the information reproduced, nor as having been made in affiliation with, or with the endorsement of the National Energy Board. For permission to reproduce the information in this publication for commercial redistribution, please e-mail: [email protected] Autorisation de reproduction Le contenu de cette publication peut être reproduit à des fins personnelles, éducatives et/ou sans but lucratif, en tout ou en partie et par quelque moyen que ce soit, sans frais et sans autre permission de l’Office national de l’énergie, pourvu qu’une diligence raisonnable soit exercée afin d’assurer l’exactitude de l’information reproduite, que l’Office national de l’énergie soit mentionné comme organisme source et que la reproduction ne soit présentée ni comme une version officielle ni comme une copie ayant été faite en collaboration avec l’Office national de l’énergie ou avec son consentement. -
Amended Complaint
Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 71 Filed on 06/01/21 in TXSD Page 1 of 59 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS GALVESTON DIVISION STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ALASKA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF FLORIDA; STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF KANSAS; COMMONWEATH OF KENTUCKY; STATE OF INDIANA; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF Civ. Action No. 3:21-cv-00065 MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI; STATE OF NEBRASKA; STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA; STATE OF OHIO; STATE OF OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA; STATE OF UTAH; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; and STATE OF WYOMING, Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official capacity as President of the United States; ANTONY J. BLINKEN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of State; MERRICK B. GARLAND, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 71 Filed on 06/01/21 in TXSD Page 2 of 59 ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; DEB HAALAND, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; JENNIFER GRANHOLM, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy; MICHAEL S. REGAN, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; THOMAS J. VILSACK, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Agriculture; PETE BUTTIGIEG, in his official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; SCOTT A. SPELLMON, in his official capacity as Commanding General of the U.S. -
Protests Against Trump's Immigration Executive Order May Have Helped
Protests against Trump’s immigration executive order may have helped shift public opinion against it. blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2017/02/12/protests-against-trumps-immigration-executive-order-may-have-helped-shift-public-opinion-against-it/ 2/12/2017 Donald Trump’s executive order preventing the entry of refugees and those from seven Muslim- majority countries has sparked protests across the country and the world. But have those protests had an effect on public opinion? Loren Collingwood, Nazita Lajevardi, and Kassra Oskooii present preliminary findings from a survey conducted before and after President Trump’s executive order. They find that after the ban, 25 percent more Democrats and an additional 15 percent of Republicans became opposed to it. In addition, one in five of all respondents stated that the protests had an impact on their views towards immigration policy. On Friday, January 27th, President Donald Trump signed executive order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” The order made changes to immigration policies and procedures and banned for 90 days the entry into the United States of individuals from seven predominantly Muslim countries. The ban set off a fury of protests across US cities and airports. Thousands of Americans from coast to coast chanted slogans such as “No hate, no fear, refugees are welcome here.” While the ban raises several important Constitutional questions that are making their way through the nation’s courts, two public opinion questions have emerged: 1) Did the ban, and ensuing controversy shift public opinion, and if so amongst whom? 2) Did the demonstrations specifically shift public opinion against the ban? Anticipating the executive order, we fielded a two-wave panel survey of 423 respondents between January 24-27th but before the president announced the executive order. -
15 Billion for Cancellation of Keystone XL Pipeline Project Aviana Cooper University of Baltimore, [email protected]
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law Volume 4 Issue 2 Article 6 Volume IV, No. 2 2015-2016 2016 Emerging Issues: Transcanada v. Obama Administration – 15 Billion for Cancellation of Keystone XL Pipeline Project Aviana Cooper University of Baltimore, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Cooper, Aviana (2016) "Emerging Issues: Transcanada v. Obama Administration – 15 Billion for Cancellation of Keystone XL Pipeline Project," University of Baltimore Journal of International Law: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil/vol4/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Transcanada v. Obama Administration – 15 Billion for Cancellation of Keystone XL Pipeline Project By Aviana Cooper* TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP and TC Oil Pipeline Op- erations Inc., subsidiaries of TransCanada Corporation (“TransCana- da”), lost their seven-year bid with the United States (U.S.) Govern- ment for a permit to complete the $5.4 billion oil pipeline connecting Canada and the U.S.1 On November 6, 2015, President Obama -
Keystone XL Pipeline: Overview and Recent Developments
Keystone XL Pipeline: Overview and Recent Developments Updated April 1, 2015 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R43787 Keystone XL Pipeline: Overview and Recent Developments Summary TransCanada’s proposed Keystone XL Pipeline would transport oil sands crude from Canada and shale oil produced in North Dakota and Montana to a market hub in Nebraska for further delivery to Gulf Coast refineries. The pipeline would consist of 875 miles of 36-inch pipe with the capacity to transport 830,000 barrels per day. Because it would cross the Canadian-U.S. border, Keystone XL requires a Presidential Permit from the State Department based on a determination that the pipeline would “serve the national interest.” To make its national interest determination (NID), the department considers potential effects on energy security; environmental and cultural resources; the economy; foreign policy, and other factors. Effects on environmental and cultural resources are determined by preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The NID process also provides for public comment and requires the State Department to consult with specific federal agencies. TransCanada originally applied for a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline in 2008. Since then various issues have affected the completion of both the NEPA and NID processes for the project. In particular, during the NID process for the 2008 application, concerns over environmental impacts in the Sand Hills of Nebraska led the state to enact new requirements that would change the pipeline route. Facing a 60-day decision deadline imposed by Congress, the State Department denied the 2008 permit application on the grounds that it lacked information about the new Nebraska route. -
Enbridge 2011 Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2 Enbridge 2011 Corporate Social Responsibility Report
ENBRIDGE 2011 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2 ENBRIDGE 2011 CORPORATE SOCIAL ResPONSIBILITY RePORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 ... About Enbridge 34 ... Environmental Performance 35 Goals and Performance 2 ... About the Enbridge 2011 Corporate 35 Environmental Scorecard Social Responsibility Report 36 Environmental Performance Indicators 3 ... Forward-Looking Information 36 EN1 – Materials used by weight or volume. 36 EN2 – Percentage of materials used that are recycled 4 ... Awards and Recognition input materials. 5 ... Strategy and Profile 36 EN3 – Direct energy consumption by primary energy source. 5 Organizational Profile 36 EN4 – Indirect energy consumption by primary source. 6 Report Parameters 39 EN5 – Energy saved due to conservation and 11 ... Governance, Commitments and Engagement efficiency improvements. 11 Governance (Enbridge Inc.) 39 EN6 – Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable 13 Commitments to External Initiatives energy-based products and services, and reductions in 15 Stakeholder Engagement energy requirements as a result of these initiatives. 18 ... Overall Management Approach 41 EN7 – Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and to Corporate Social Responsibility reductions achieved. 19 ... Economic Performance 43 EN8 – Total water withdrawal by source. 20 Goals and Performance 43 EN9 – Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water. 20 Economic Scorecard 43 EN10 – Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused. 26 Economic Performance Indicators 44 EN11 – Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, 26 EC1 – Direct economic value generated and distributed, or adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value including revenues, operating costs, employee compensation, outside protected areas. donations and other community investments, retained earnings, and payments to capital providers and governments. -
Is Public Policy Undermined by Investor State Dispute Mechanisms? Michelle C
University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 5-9-2018 Trading Goods for Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined by Investor State Dispute Mechanisms? Michelle C. Perez Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons Recommended Citation Michelle C. Perez, Trading Goods for Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined by Investor State Dispute Mechanisms?, 49 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 132 (2018) Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol49/iss2/7 This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-American Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Trading Goods for Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined by Investor State Dispute Mechanisms? Michelle C. Perez I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................133 II. HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE FREE-TRADE REVOLUTION ........134 A. GATT and Globalization ...................................................135 B. Origins and Purpose of Investor State Settlement ............136 C. A growing chorus of ISDS claims and concerns ..............137 III. INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT