Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict As of Early 2014 Bell, Arvid
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www.ssoar.info A network in transition: actors, interests, and alliances in the Afghanistan conflict as of early 2014 Bell, Arvid Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Arbeitspapier / working paper Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK) Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Bell, A. (2014). A network in transition: actors, interests, and alliances in the Afghanistan conflict as of early 2014. (PRIF Working Papers, 20). Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. https://nbn- resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-455277 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). 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Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. No. 20 Working Papers Working A Network in Transition: Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict as of Early 2014 Arvid Bell with Botakoz Iliyas May 2014 the 1 A Network in Transition: Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict as of Early 2014 Arvid Bell with Botakoz Iliyas, Frankfurt am Main, May 2014 Abstract This paper maps out the negotiation environment of the Afghanistan conflict. So far, all attempts to end the violence between the Afghan government, insurgency, and US and NATO through negotiations have failed. Key obstacles to negotiations are the complexity of the conflict and the variety of state and non-state actors that are directly or indirectly involved. This paper explores the interests and relationships of these actors and highlights the most important alliances and connections. Finally, these connections are visualized in a network diagram. Table of Contents 1. Introduction: Purpose, Framework, and Caveats .............................................................................. 2 2. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) ................................................ 3 3. The Afghan Political Opposition ......................................................................................................... 4 4. The Afghan Warlords ........................................................................................................................... 6 5. The Afghan Insurgency ........................................................................................................................ 7 5.1 The Afghan Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) ......................................... 7 5.2 The Haqqani Network (HQN) ......................................................................................... 9 5.3 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party (HIG) ................................................................ 9 6. The Afghan Civil Society .................................................................................................................... 10 7. The United States of America (USA) ................................................................................................ 11 8. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) .......................................................................... 12 9. The United Nations (UN) .................................................................................................................. 12 10. Militant Islamism in Pakistan ............................................................................................................ 13 10.1 The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) .......................................................................................... 13 10.2 Al-Qaeda ........................................................................................................................... 14 10.3 Other Militant Islamist Groups ...................................................................................... 14 11. The Regional Powers ........................................................................................................................... 16 11.1 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan ................................................................................... 16 11.2 The Republic of India ...................................................................................................... 17 11.3 The Islamic Republic of Iran .......................................................................................... 18 11.4 The Republic of Turkey ................................................................................................... 19 11.5 The People’s Republic of China...................................................................................... 20 11.6 The Russian Federation ................................................................................................... 20 12. The Arab States of the Persian Gulf ................................................................................................... 21 12.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ........................................................................................ 21 12.2 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ................................................................................. 22 12.3 The State of Qatar ............................................................................................................ 23 13. The Central Asian States ..................................................................................................................... 23 13.1 The Republic of Tajikistan .............................................................................................. 24 13.2 The Republic of Uzbekistan ............................................................................................ 25 13.3 Turkmenistan ................................................................................................................... 25 13.4 The Republic of Kazakhstan ........................................................................................... 26 13.5 The Kyrgyz Republic ....................................................................................................... 27 14. Conclusion: The Afghanistan Network as of Early 2014................................................................. 27 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 30 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................... 34 PRIF Working Paper No. 20 2 1. Introduction: Purpose, Framework, and Caveats With the withdrawal of the remaining ISAF troops scheduled for the end of 2014, a peaceful and secure future for Afghanistan is anything but certain. An armed insurgency steps up its attacks against the national security forces, neighboring countries cooperate with their proxies on Afghan soil, and a weak civil society finds itself trapped between the Taliban, despised warlords, a fragmented political opposition, and an administration plagued with corruption. At the same time, attempts to negotiate a political solution between the main parties to the conflict have stalled. The strategic complexity of the Afghanistan conflict which involves a variety of state and non-state actors makes a negotiation process – not even to mention a negotiated settlement itself – very difficult. This paper seeks to outline these actors, their interests in the Afghanistan conflict, and their multiple connections and alliances. It serves as a comprehensive overview of the negotiation environment in the Afghanistan conflict.1 The paper assesses the parties through the lens of the Afghanistan conflict. It does not intend to give a full assessment of all actors’ interests or, in the case of the involved states, of entire security strategies. Only interests relevant for or connected to the Afghanistan conflict are touched upon. Given the variety of actors and issues at stake and because of the necessity to limit the scope of this analysis, the assessment remains largely on a rationalist level and does not systematically explore issues such as identities and perceptions and the constructions of those in every actor’s case. However, these