DOCSLIB.ORG

Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict As of Early 2014 Bell, Arvid

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict As of Early 2014 Bell, Arvid www.ssoar.info A network in transition: actors, interests, and alliances in the Afghanistan conflict as of early 2014 Bell, Arvid Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Arbeitspapier / working paper Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK) Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Bell, A. (2014). A network in transition: actors, interests, and alliances in the Afghanistan conflict as of early 2014. (PRIF Working Papers, 20). Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. https://nbn- resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-455277 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. No. 20 Working Papers Working A Network in Transition: Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict as of Early 2014 Arvid Bell with Botakoz Iliyas May 2014 the 1 A Network in Transition: Actors, Interests, and Alliances in the Afghanistan Conflict as of Early 2014 Arvid Bell with Botakoz Iliyas, Frankfurt am Main, May 2014 Abstract This paper maps out the negotiation environment of the Afghanistan conflict. So far, all attempts to end the violence between the Afghan government, insurgency, and US and NATO through negotiations have failed. Key obstacles to negotiations are the complexity of the conflict and the variety of state and non-state actors that are directly or indirectly involved. This paper explores the interests and relationships of these actors and highlights the most important alliances and connections. Finally, these connections are visualized in a network diagram. Table of Contents 1. Introduction: Purpose, Framework, and Caveats .............................................................................. 2 2. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) ................................................ 3 3. The Afghan Political Opposition ......................................................................................................... 4 4. The Afghan Warlords ........................................................................................................................... 6 5. The Afghan Insurgency ........................................................................................................................ 7 5.1 The Afghan Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) ......................................... 7 5.2 The Haqqani Network (HQN) ......................................................................................... 9 5.3 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party (HIG) ................................................................ 9 6. The Afghan Civil Society .................................................................................................................... 10 7. The United States of America (USA) ................................................................................................ 11 8. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) .......................................................................... 12 9. The United Nations (UN) .................................................................................................................. 12 10. Militant Islamism in Pakistan ............................................................................................................ 13 10.1 The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) .......................................................................................... 13 10.2 Al-Qaeda ........................................................................................................................... 14 10.3 Other Militant Islamist Groups ...................................................................................... 14 11. The Regional Powers ........................................................................................................................... 16 11.1 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan ................................................................................... 16 11.2 The Republic of India ...................................................................................................... 17 11.3 The Islamic Republic of Iran .......................................................................................... 18 11.4 The Republic of Turkey ................................................................................................... 19 11.5 The People’s Republic of China...................................................................................... 20 11.6 The Russian Federation ................................................................................................... 20 12. The Arab States of the Persian Gulf ................................................................................................... 21 12.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ........................................................................................ 21 12.2 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ................................................................................. 22 12.3 The State of Qatar ............................................................................................................ 23 13. The Central Asian States ..................................................................................................................... 23 13.1 The Republic of Tajikistan .............................................................................................. 24 13.2 The Republic of Uzbekistan ............................................................................................ 25 13.3 Turkmenistan ................................................................................................................... 25 13.4 The Republic of Kazakhstan ........................................................................................... 26 13.5 The Kyrgyz Republic ....................................................................................................... 27 14. Conclusion: The Afghanistan Network as of Early 2014................................................................. 27 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 30 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................... 34 PRIF Working Paper No. 20 2 1. Introduction: Purpose, Framework, and Caveats With the withdrawal of the remaining ISAF troops scheduled for the end of 2014, a peaceful and secure future for Afghanistan is anything but certain. An armed insurgency steps up its attacks against the national security forces, neighboring countries cooperate with their proxies on Afghan soil, and a weak civil society finds itself trapped between the Taliban, despised warlords, a fragmented political opposition, and an administration plagued with corruption. At the same time, attempts to negotiate a political solution between the main parties to the conflict have stalled. The strategic complexity of the Afghanistan conflict which involves a variety of state and non-state actors makes a negotiation process – not even to mention a negotiated settlement itself – very difficult. This paper seeks to outline these actors, their interests in the Afghanistan conflict, and their multiple connections and alliances. It serves as a comprehensive overview of the negotiation environment in the Afghanistan conflict.1 The paper assesses the parties through the lens of the Afghanistan conflict. It does not intend to give a full assessment of all actors’ interests or, in the case of the involved states, of entire security strategies. Only interests relevant for or connected to the Afghanistan conflict are touched upon. Given the variety of actors and issues at stake and because of the necessity to limit the scope of this analysis, the assessment remains largely on a rationalist level and does not systematically explore issues such as identities and perceptions and the constructions of those in every actor’s case. However, these
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ethnicity and the Political Reconstruction of Afghanistan
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Schetter, Conrad Working Paper Ethnicity and the political reconstruction of Afghanistan ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 3 Provided in Cooperation with: Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung / Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn Suggested Citation: Schetter, Conrad (2005) : Ethnicity and the political reconstruction of Afghanistan, ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 3, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0202-2008091124 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88366 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen
    [Show full text]
  • Turkic Council Monthly News Bulletin March 2013
    Turkic Council Monthly News Bulletin March 2013 Prepared by Turkic Council Secretariat NEWS BULLETIN MARCH 2013 AZERBAIJAN Indonesian MPs sign appeal on recognition of Khojaly genocide March 2 (AzerTAc). Azerbaijan`s embassy to Indonesia, the world`s biggest NGO Nahdlatul Ulama and the University of Indonesia co organized a ceremony on the 21st anniversary of the Khojaly genocide with participation of the Islamic Conference Youth Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation. The event was attended by Indonesian parliament speaker Marzuki Ali and MPs, religious figures, scientists, professors, Azerbaijani Diaspora representatives and ambassadors from OIC member countries. The aim of the event is to commemorate victims of the Khojaly massacre and facilitate implementation of the resolution of the OIC Parliamentary Union adopted in January 2012 in the Indonesian city of Palembang, calling for recognition of the Khojaly genocide. Speakers including speaker Ali noted that Armenia occupied the Azerbaijani land of Nagorno-Karabakh and committed genocide in Khojaly. The appeal on recognition of the Khojaly Genocide to be presented to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was first signed by Mr. Ali. The appeal was signed by Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Prof. Agil Sirac, over 30 MPs and others. It is expected to collect over 100 signatures. Average annual economic growth rates to make 5.1% in Azerbaijan March 4 (AzerTAc). “Average annual economic growth rate will make 5.1% in Azerbaijan in 2013-2017 including 8% in non-oil sector. In this period, the average annual inflation rate will make 4.4%,” Azerbaijani Minister of Economic Development Shahin Mustafayev said at the meeting with IMF mission head for Azerbaijan Raja Almarzoqi.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan May 2008
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT AFGHANISTAN 20 MAY 2008 UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE AFGHANISTAN 20 MAY 2008 Contents Latest News EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 1 MAY TO 20 MAY 2008 REPORTS ON AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 1 MAY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY........................................................................................1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.08 2. ECONOMY............................................................................................ 2.01 3. HISTORY.............................................................................................. 3.01 Overview to December 2001........................................................ 3.01 Post-Taliban.................................................................................. 3.02 Presidential election 9 October 2004 and the new Cabinet...... 3.08 Parliamentary and provincial elections 18 September 2005 .... 3.10 Afghanistan Compact 31 January 2006...................................... 3.14 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................... 4.01 5. CONSTITUTION..................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM .............................................................................. 6.01 Overview ....................................................................................... 6.01 The Executive Branch.................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Special Essay: China's New Defense White Paper
    Foreign Military Studies Office OE WATCH FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Special Essay: China’s New Defense White Paper The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces: Have We Really Learned Anything? Vol. 3 Issue #7 July 2013 IN THIS ISSUE Click on a link below RUSSIA 31 Dissension in Daraa CHINA 3 Contracted Logistics: A Russian 32 The Post-Qusayr Stage 47 ‘Peace Ark’ Ahoy: Perspective on Military Outsourcing 47 The PLA’s Growing Focus on Military 9 How Turkish Protests Influence Russian AFRICA Diplomacy Demonstrations— on 12 June and Beyond 35 Forget Earlier Rebuke: Western Alliances 48 A PLA Cyber “Rules of the Road” Proposal 11 Moscow and Tehran’s Complex with Chad’s President to Fight Terrorism in 49 China Develops Another Top Partnership Mali Supercomputer But Claim They Have a 14 Chechens Fighting with Syrian 37 South African “NObama” Campaign to Long Way To Go Opposition? Protest U.S. Military and Foreign Policy 50 China’s Investment in the U.S. Goes 16 Red Star Symbol Returns 38 Tensions Rise in Mozambique Along Civil Beyond U.S. Treasuries 17 Reducing Tank Inventory War Lines 19 Prospects for Military Recruitment KOREA 21 War’s Unchanging Nature SOUTHEAST ASIA 51 Chinese View of North Korean WMD 23 Ukraine-China Military Collaboration 39 Indo-Pacific Asia - Food Security and “GMO” CENTRAL ASIA TURKEY 53 The Development of Uzbekistan’s Special 25 Protests Directed at Erdoğan’s LATIN AMERICA Forces Authoritarian Style 42 Peasant Reservations? 54 The Naval Capabilities of Kazakhstan’s 27 Al Nusra
    [Show full text]
  • Province: Kabul Governor: Hajji Din Mohammad NDS Chief
    Program for Culture & Conflict Studies www.nps.edu/programs/ccs Province: Kabul Governor: Hajji Din Mohammad NDS Chief: Nazar Shah Population Estimate: 3,445,000 Urban: 615,900 Rural: 2,829,100 Area in Square Kilometers: 4,462 Capital: Kabul Names of Districts: Bagrami, Chahar Asiab, Dih Sabz, Guldara, Istalif, Kabul, Kalakan, Khaki Jabbar, Mir Bacha Kot, Musayi, Paghman, Qarabagh, Shakar Dara, Surobi Composition of Population: Ethnic Groups: Religious Groups: Ethnic Groups: Tajik, Hazara, Primarily Sunni; some Pashtun: Ghilzai, Pashtun, Kuchi, Shia Shinwari, Wardak Qizilbash Total # Mosques: 3,025 Occupation of Population Major: Business, government service, Minor: Animal husbandry agriculture, skilled professionals, day labor Crops/Farming/Livestock: Wheat, potato, vegetable, corn, Cow, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, fruit, poultry 1 Literacy Rate Total: 57% Number of Educational Colleges/Universities: 9 Universities; Kabul University, Teacher Training Institutions: 696 Colleges, Polytechnic Institutes, Institute of Health Science Number of Security January: 7 March: 3 May: 8 Incidents, Jan-Jun 2007: 24 February: 1 April: 1 June: 4 Poppy (Opium) Cultivation: 2006: 80 ha 2007: 500 ha Percent Change: 525% NGOs Active in Province: UNHCR, HAND, AMDA, WROR, ISRA, DACAR, NCA, SCA, UNICEF, NPO, CARE, MEDAir, INTERSOS, Provincial Aid Projects:2 Total PRT Projects: 107 Other Aid Projects: 1,332 Total Projects: 1,439 Planned Cost: $11,426,983 Planned Cost: $49,980,289 Planned Cost: $61,407,272 Total Spent: $9,729,006 Total Spent: $31,182,209 Total Spent: $39,911,215 Transportation: Primary Roads: Three main asphalt roads/highways connect the capital with the rest of the country; the Salang road links Kabul with the northern provinces; the Kabul-Kandahar Highway connects Kabul to the southern provinces.
    [Show full text]
  • The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry
    MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY October 2008 MIT CENTER FOR INTERNatioNAL STUDIES 08-15 of the Conventional Wisdom The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry Barnett R. Rubin with Sara Batmanglich New York University fghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term Acommon interests of the U.S. and Iran have been over- shadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confronta- tion has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found. During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to sup- Center for International Studies port efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul’s dependence on Massachusetts Institute of Technology the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in Building E38-200 292 Main Street 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the Cambridge, MA 02139 primary means of maintaining U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S
    Order Code RL30588 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Updated January 28, 2003 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Summary The United States and its allies are helping Afghanistan emerge from more than 22 years of warfare, although substantial risk to Afghan stability remains. Before the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban movement began on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan had been mired in conflict since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until its collapse in December 2001 at the hands of the U.S. and Afghan opposition military campaign. The defeat of the Taliban enabled the United States and its coalition partners to send forces throughout Afghanistan to search for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters and leaders that remain at large, including Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, about 2 million Afghan refugees have returned, and women are returning to schools and their jobs and participating in politics. As U.S.-led combat against remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban elements winds down, the United States is shifting its military focus toward stabilizing and extending the writ of the central government, including training a new Afghan national army, supporting an international security force (ISAF), and setting up regional enclaves to protect aid and reconstruction workers.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: the Culmination of the Bonn Process
    RESEARCH PAPER 05/72 Afghanistan: the 26 OCTOBER 2005 culmination of the Bonn process The Afghan parliamentary elections of 18 September 2005 marked the final step in the political process set out in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, which sought to establish a stable, democratic government for Afghanistan. This paper includes an overview of historical developments up to the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. It goes on to examine the main stages of the Bonn process, before looking at the evolving security environment, the narcotics issue and the progress made with disarmament and demobilisation. A map of Afghanistan is included as an appendix. More detail on the role of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan is provided in Library Standard Note SN/IA/2601, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Tim Youngs INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY Recent Library Research Papers include: List of 15 most recent RPs 05/57 Unemployment by Constituency, July 2005 17.08.05 05/58 Zimbabwe after the 2005 parliamentary election 18.08.05 05/59 Employment tribunals (Representation and Assistance in Discrimination 26.08.05 Proceedings) Bill [Bill 14 of 2005-06] 05/60 Unemployment by Constituency, August 2005 14.09.05 05/61 Employment & Training programmes for the unemployed Vol. 1: 30.09.05 Recent developments and the New Deal programmes 05/62 Employment & Training programmes for the unemployed Vol. 2: 30.09.05 Other programmes and pilots 05/63 Social Indicators [includes articles: MRSA Statistics: Frequently
    [Show full text]
  • Parwan in 2004, Likely in an Effort to Appease the Panjshiri Tajiks
    Program for Culture & Conflict Studies [email protected] U Province: Panjshir Governor: Hajji Bahlul Chief of Police: Waliullah Population Estimate:1 over 300,000 Urban: Rural: Area in Square Kilometers 3,610 Capital: Bazarak 2 Names of Districts: Panjshir, Hisa-I-Awali Panjshir, Hisa-I-Duwumi Panjshir Composition of Population: Ethnic Groups: Religious Groups: Tajik, Hazara, Primarily Sunni with some Shia Muslim Pashai, Nuristani, Total # Mosques: Ghilzai Pashtun 544 Occupation of Population Major: Agriculture, animal Minor: Business husbandry, day labor Crops/Farming/Livestock: Sheep, goats, cows 3 Literacy Rate Total: 27% Number of Educational Schools: Colleges/Universities: Institutions: 46 Primary: Secondary: Number of Security Incidents, Jan-Jun 2007: None reported by BBC Monitoring Poppy (Opium) Cultivation: 2006: 0 ha 2007: 0 ha Percent Change: 0% NGOs Active in Province: IMC, Emergency, RRA, HT, MDC, CARE, ACTED, ICRC, MSF, ACF, AMI, WFP, WSD, SCA, UNICEF, AVACINA Provincial Aid Projects:4 Total PRT Projects: 14 Other Aid Projects: 413 Total Projects: 413 Planned Cost: $1,168,014 Planned Cost: $9,989,398 Planned Cost: $11,157,412 Total Spent: $260,214 Total Spent: $1,371,913 Total Spent: $1,632,127 Transportation: Primary Roads: One major provincial road Charikar-Bazarak-Deh Parian; other secondary roads and tracks 5 Electricity: Estimated Population w/access: Health Facilities: Hospitals: 3 Clinics, etc.: 15 Primary Sources/Availability River water through channels, wells, of Drinking Water: springs Rivers: Panjshir River and tributaries Significant Topographic The province is dominated by the Panjshir Valley and Features: surrounding mountains; Panjshir Range to the north and the Kuhestan Range to the south.
    [Show full text]
  • Vishal Chandra
    Commentary The Afghan Elections and the Bonn Process: Assessing India’s Options Vishal Chandra The thrice postponed Afghan parliamentary and provincial council elections are finally over. But, is the Bonn-mandated political process over? With the US intent on cutting down its troop levels in Afghanistan this year, is the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan also over? It is being said that the Bonn process has concluded with the September 18, 2005 elections. If so, then it is pertinent to examine the end-result of the four-year political process and the recently concluded elections. The three landmark events of the process—adoption of a new Constitution by the Loya Jirga in January 2004, the presidential election in October 2004 and the recently concluded September 18 parliamentary elections—pale into insignificance when compared with the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan. The elections have neatly brought out, and to an extent brought back, a complex mix of actors and forces that have defined the socio-political character of Afghan war for over a quarter of a century. The very fact that 2004-05 has been the worst for Afghanistan in terms of levels of violence, drug production and the Taliban onslaught, makes the whole political process and the ‘war on terror’ questionable. It is in the context of the enormous challenges that lie ahead in post-election Afghanistan that India needs to assess its options. The 159 Million Dollar Elections Is post-election Afghanistan any different from the pre-election one? It was a foregone conclusion that the new Afghan Parliament would be a motley mix of Islamists, former mujahideen1, drug barons, former communists2, technocrats, academics, independents, women and the Taliban.
    [Show full text]
  • AFSC Conflict Assessment Afghanistan
    CONFLICT ASSESSMENT AFGHANISTAN FEBRUARY 2009 (Mausoleum of King Nadir Shah in Kabul / April 2006) Written by: Corinna Vigier Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................................... 12 PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. 13 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ........................................................................................ 15 I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 16 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 18 2. The formation of an Afghan State (1747 – 1963) ................................................................................. 19 3. The end of the monarchy and the Soviet invasion (1964 – 1979) ........................................................ 21 4. The soviet occupation and the communist regime (1979 – 1988)........................................................ 23 5. The civil war and the rise of the Taliban (1989 – 2001) ...................................................................... 25 6. The US-Led Invasion and the first years after the Fall of the Taliban (2001 – 2006) .........................
    [Show full text]
  • Parliamentary Elections: One Vote Every Four Is Not Valid
    Year VIII N° 3 - Autumn 2010 Afghan Theater Parliamentary elections: one vote every four is not valid Fausto Biloslavo On October 20, the Independent Electoral Commission has announced a preliminary list of possible winners of the parliamentary elections held on September 18. Final figures should be announced on October 30 or in November since the Commission still has to verify over 4 thousand complaints it has received regarding candidates and alleged irregularities. It’s not by chance that one quarter of the votes were cancelled. Over 50% of new MPs, if they are confirmed, would be new appointees. Almost all the former Assembly leaders have collected less votes than they did in the first parliamentary elections five years ago. The number of the invalid ballots shows how long and still difficult the road to democracy in Afghanistan is. Five million and 600 thousand voters went to the polls, but 1,3 million votes were declared invalid. 224 candidates, including some MPs who aimed to their re-election, were investigated for fraud. Frauds and irregularities were recorded in 2,543 of the 17,744 polling stations opened for voting on September 18. Despite the 300 attacks on election day "voter turnout in the current situation of the country and the election process can be considered a success," said Fazul Ahmad Manawa, head of the Independent Commission that counts the votes, with a good dose of optimism. Preliminary results, pending claims verification, indicate that there will be 177 new members in the Wolesi Jirga and only 77 MPs re-elected. Muhammad Mohaqiq, a Shiite leader, who, five years ago, got the highest number of preferences (52,686) was elected in Kabul with only 16,166 votes.
    [Show full text]