Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 17 NO. 16 03 SEPTEMBER 2014

Contents'' ' Analytical'Articles' ! RESURGENCE'OF'THE'NAGORNO9KARABAKH'CONFLICT'–'A'RUSSIAN'MOVE'ON' THE'UKRAINE'CHESSBOARD' ' ' ' ' ' ' '''''3!' Avinoam!Idan! ! CENTRAL'ASIAN'MILITANTS'TARGET'XINJIANG,'SOUTH'ASIA'AND'SYRIA'BEFORE' THE'HOMEFRONT'' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ''''6' Jacob!Zenn! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!! ! CHINA'AND'AFGHANISTAN'–'TIME'OF'DECISION'' ' ' '''' ' '''10' Richard!Weitz!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!' ! CAUCASUS'EMIRATE'SUFFERS'HIGHER'CASUALTIES'UNDER'NEW'LEADERSHIP'14' Huseyn Aliyev ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Field'Reports' ' MIXED'RECEPTION'OF'SOCHI'TALKS'IN''!! ! ! ! !!!18' Mina!Muradova! ! !!! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! ! ABKHAZIA’S'NEW'LEADER'INSISTS'ON'DEEPER'TIES'WITH'MOSCOW' ' ' '''21' Eka!Janashia! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!'

! BORDER'DISPUTE'AT'THE'CENTER'OF'TAJIK9KYRGYZ'MEETING'!! ! ! !!23' Oleg!Salimov!!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! ! !! TURKMENISTAN’S'GOVERNMENT'CALLS'FOR'CONSTITUTIONAL'REFORM'''''''''''25' Tavus!Rejepova!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! ' ' !!! ! ! ! !! ! !' THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 3!

RESURGENCE OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT – A RUSSIAN MOVE ON THE UKRAINE CHESSBOARD Avinoam Idan

The return of open fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict recently brought about a meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan and in Sochi, under the auspices of President Putin, on August 10, 2014. The growing tension in the conflict and the Sochi meeting take place against the background of the crisis in Ukraine. The Karabakh conflict serves as Russian leverage in influencing and promoting Russia’s geostrategic aims in the Caucasus and beyond, and Russia’s new initiative in the conflict meant to improve Russia’s stance in its confrontation with the U.S. and EU and its hegemony over the gateway to Eurasia.

BACKGROUND: The NK conflict military option in order to regain developed from an internal conflict to a control of areas lost during the war. war between two independent states in The rise in energy revenues, especially 1991, with the break-up of the Soviet since the construction of the - Union and the establishment of Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2005, had Azerbaijan and Armenia as allowed Azerbaijan to institute a independent states. The cease-fire defense budget greater than Armenia’s achieved in 1994 with Russia as entire annual budget. mediator froze this conflict. Armenia, supported in the war by Russia, took control of the disputed territory as well as additional neighboring areas, in total about 17 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has been at the helm of international mediation efforts for years, in the framework of the Minsk Group, whose (Source: Wikimedia Commons) co-chairs are France, the U.S. and However, Azerbaijan is also Russia, to no avail. landlocked, borders Russia and is in Armenia, landlocked and suffering need of Russian good- will in order to from a weak economy and a precarious sustain the regional stability needed for security situation, is entirely dependent its energy export infrastructure. Both on Russia, which has military bases Armenia, dependent upon Russian deployed on Armenian soil. Azerbaijan, support in the conflict, and Azerbaijan, a country rich in oil and gas, is whose military and policy options in endeavoring to establish its own the conflict are not obtainable as long as ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 4!

Armenia enjoys Russian support, Georgian War in 2008, given that consider Russia a key state in any Russia established its position vis-à-vis future settlement. , Azerbaijan’s neighbor in the Both states are aware that U.S. and EU Caucasus. efforts to broker this conflict will come The future of the conflict and the to nothing unless Moscow agrees. possible return of territory Azerbaijan Under these circumstances, the conflict lost during the war is of particular serves as effective Russian leverage in importance to Baku. Russia, which order to further its geostrategic Armenia is entirely dependent upon, objectives. The location of the has decisive influence over these Nagorno-Karabakh region in the territories. In light of Russia’s desire to Caucasus, and the location of the improve its position in the current Caucasus as a vital bottleneck, Ukrainian crisis, it now perceives the underlines the conflict’s geopolitical time to be right to use the Armenian- significance in Eurasia. As a result, the Azerbaijani conflict as leverage for latest development in the conflict influence over Azerbaijan. In parallel cannot be separated from the present with Russia’s actions in Ukraine, its crisis in Ukraine. latest complementary activities aim to The Ukrainian crisis exceeds its local tighten control over Azerbaijan. The context and is an expression of the renewal of tension in the conflict hence struggle between the West and Russia does not stem only from the bilateral over hegemony in the Eurasian sub- relations between the two countries continent. Therefore, one should directly involved in the conflict, but consider the renewal of hostilities in should be seen as a combined Russian Karabakh and the meeting between the move, as part of the Ukrainian crisis. heads of states of Azerbaijan and The Ukrainian crisis erupted following Armenia and the Russian president as a the EU’s initiative to promote the development connected to the Eastern Partnership, intended to intensification of the conflict in include Ukraine in the EU’s Ukraine. framework. The source of Russia’s IMPLICATIONS: Ukraine and reaction, therefore, is the perception of Azerbaijan are two pivotal states in the its most vital geostrategic interests Black Sea–Caspian region, strategically coming under threat. In due course, located at the gateway to Eurasia. U.S. Russia devised countermeasures by geostrategic thinking defined them as accelerating the establishment of the geopolitical states of critical importance Eurasian Union. The inclusion of at the end of the 1990s. Moreover, additional countries in the Eurasian Russia sees Azerbaijan as a target of Union from among the CIS countries is high priority, whose subordination to intended to consolidate the CIS Russia would help seal Central Asia off members in a political and economic from the West. This attitude has been framework that would block EU and further validated since the Russian- NATO expansion eastward. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 5!

The more entangled the Ukrainian region of geopolitical importance. The crisis becomes, the more likely it is that reappearance of tensions in Karabakh at Russia will make use of its options to this time is closely connected to the exert leverage over countries in the crisis in the Ukraine. Russia is taking region in order to block what Russia advantage of the conflict in order to sees as a U.S. geopolitical threat in a solidify its hold on Azerbaijan and to region that it considers its own improve its stance in the confrontation backyard. The current flare-up in with primarily the U.S. over Ukraine. Karabakh can be understood in this This confrontation, in effect, is over light. Using the conflict as leverage geopolitical superiority in the Black against Azerbaijan is a preventive Sea-Caspian region, which is the key to measure on Russia’s part to prevent a the gates of Eurasia. similar development of U.S. and EU AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Avinoam tactics in the Ukraine. Idan is a political geographer and a Russia chose to take extreme steps in Senior Fellow with the Central Asia- order to block, as it saw it, the West Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies from taking control over one of the Program, based in Washington DC. most vital pivotal states in the Russian Prior to his academic career, he served sphere. Using Karabakh as leverage is in the Israeli Embassy in Moscow meant to ensure that Azerbaijan will during the break-up of the Soviet not join the EU framework, but also to Union. convince it in the long term to consider joining the Eurasian Union. As long as the confrontation between the U.S. and Russia in Ukraine continues, we can expect the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to intensify. CONCLUSIONS: The future of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is not only in the hands of the two sides directly involved. From the very beginning, the outcome of the conflict has largely been dependent on outside players, predominantly on Russia and the U.S. The interests of these two powers are influenced by the competition between them, which transcends regional dimensions. The crisis in Ukraine is defined by competition between Russia and the West over preserving or changing the geostrategic balance of power in a ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 6!

CENTRAL ASIAN MILITANTS TARGET XINJIANG, SOUTH ASIA AND SYRIA BEFORE THE HOMEFRONT Jacob Zenn

Despite concerns about the threat of Central Asian militant groups to their home countries after the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, these militant groups are currently focused on “winning” primarily in Afghanistan, secondarily on China’s Xinjiang Province and South Asia, and only then on their home fronts. Central Asians in Syria and Iraq, however, are receiving inspiration from the Islamic State’s self-declared Caliphate and military successes and are vowing that they will create a similar Caliphate in Central Asia. In the near-term, China, Pakistan and possibly India are within range of Central Asian militant groups, but the security crises in Central Asia that are most likely to emerge come from the region’s own internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

BACKGROUND: The largest carried out a suicide operation on the Central Asian militant group operating governor’s office in Panjshir, Pakistan and Afghanistan is the Islamic Afghanistan in May 2013, the IMU said, Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). “we hope from Allah that future According to a Pakistani Taliban conquests are very near in statement, the IMU played a key role Mawarounnahr [the ancient name for in the attack on the Karachi airport in modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan that killed 36 people in June Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan].” In 2014. The IMU and Pakistani Taliban contrast to this statement, however, the also coordinated the December 2012 rhetoric from the IMU’s spiritual attack at Peshawar airport and the leader, Abu Zar al-Burmi, gives no hint Bannu Prison Break in April 2012. that these “conquests” in Central Asia The IMU is active in northern are the priority for the IMU. Afghanistan, especially in In most of his video-taped sermons assassinations, but the IMU only since 2013, al-Burmi avoided discussing occasionally expresses its plans to Central Asia and instead threatened attack Central Asia from those that China is the “next number one northern Afghan provinces. For enemy” after the U.S. withdraws from example, in one instance, after six IMU Afghanistan. He also promises revenge members, including two from on his native Burma for its treatment of Uzbekistan and one from Kyrgyzstan, the country’s Muslim Rohingya people, ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 7! which al-Burmi says is part of a Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or any other Chinese plot to evict the Rohingya country” and come to Syria. In later from lucrative oil-producing regions. videos, they declared an intention to Al-Burmi also often appears in videos “restore the Caliphate” system in of al-Qaeda’s as-Sahab media and with Central Asia. Some Central Asians Uighur militants in videos of the who were in Syria have also returned Turkistan Islamic Party. In one video, home to Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang, but al-Burmi said that the IMU plans to according to government sources they conquer lands in an operation called were arrested before they could carry “Ghazwat-ul-Hind,” which translates out attacks, including one intended for to the “military expedition of the the Shanghai Cooperation Summit in Indian subcontinent.” Bishkek in 2014. IMPLICATIONS: The messaging and trajectory of Central Asian militant groups is confused, with the majority of militants not focused on their home region. One of the major reasons for this is that Central Asia remains impervious to militancy, with the region’s governments preserving (Source: Flickr) political stability and cracking down on Salafist groups that are sympathetic to Like al-Burmi, al-Qaeda is showing the militants, such as Tablighi Jamaat interest in South Asia. As-Sahab has in and Hizb al-Tahrir. Moreover, other 2014 posted Urdu-language messages regions of the world are more favorable that are tailored to South Asian environments for the militants to audiences under the brand of “As- spread their propaganda and operations Sahab Organization, Subcontinent.” In for the time being, especially Xinjiang January 2014, al-Qaeda leader Ayman and India, while Syria and Iraq al-Zawahiri also highlighted the continue to attract Central Asian victimization and “weakening of the recruits because of the Islamic State’s Muslim ummah in the subcontinent” military successes and influential and called on South Asian Muslims to propaganda campaign online. “confront the alliance” of India and the West. If the Taliban comes to power in parts of Afghanistan, it will also need some The only Central Asians who appear to modicum of legitimacy and economic be focused on overthrowing Central cooperation from neighboring Central Asian governments are those currently Asian countries, which makes it likely in Syria and Iraq. In 2013, for example, that the Taliban will encourage the the Kazakh Abu-Mu’adh al-Muhajir IMU and Central Asian militants to issued a video to “Muslims everywhere, void operations that would disrupt not only in Kazakhstan, who are living potential relationships with Central under tyranny, to emigrate from ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 8!

Asian governments. In addition, Asia, it could allow for militants in attacking Central Asia involves Afghanistan and Pakistan to exploit the difficulties for militants because the unrest and enter Central Asia and security forces in those countries speak connect with violent extremists active the local languages, whereas in in the region. In the absence of any Xinjiang the majority Han Chinese sudden change in the situation in security forces do not speak Uighur, Central Asia, however, the militants and in both India and Xinjiang it is will likely continue to issue propaganda easier for Muslim militants to operate about Xinjiang and India as well as among their Muslims brethren. Syria and Iraq and carry out operations Another reason why China and India outside of their Central Asian face greater threats than Central Asian homelands until the situation in the countries is that militant propaganda region becomes more favorable. resonates more with Muslims when CONCLUSIONS: Central Asian targeting Xinjiang and India. Although militants, particularly in the IMU, Central Asian governments are secular, continue to carry out major attacks they are still Muslim, while in China with the Taliban in Afghanistan and and India the militants call for the Pakistan – not in Central Asia. The overthrow of the “Buddhist” or rhetoric of Central Asian militants “Hindu” rulers, in addition to the fact suggests they will focus on Xinjiang, that both countries are secular. Before China and South Asia in the years 2001, China also had leverage over most immediately following the U.S. Taliban factions through its “all- withdrawal from Afghanistan. The weather friendship” with Pakistan, but Central Asian militants in Syria and now that the Pakistani Taliban is a Iraq, who focus on their homelands in sworn enemy of the Pakistani their statements, may present a long- government, it is unclear whether term threat to Central Asia if they China can exercise leverage via return home. However, for the next Pakistan to contain them. several years they will mostly be As a result, in it is unlikely in the occupied with the war in Syria and Iraq short-term that Central Asian militants as part of the newly announced Islamic will pose a direct threat to their State and other factions. The key threat homelands while China and India may that Central Asian militants in Syria face more pressure from attacks. and Iraq pose to stability in Central However, the pre-existing problems in Asia is therefore the ideology of Central Asia, including resource, ethnic “creating the Caliphate” that they are and border conflicts, the lack of clear attempting to export and promote back leadership succession plans, and the home. growing drugs and arms trafficking AUTHOR’S BIO: Jacob Zenn is an networks between Afghanistan and analyst of Eurasian and African Affairs Central Asia are a vulnerability. If any for the Jamestown Foundation and crises emerge internally within Central non-resident research fellow of the ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 9!

Center of Shanghai Cooperation Studies (COSCOS) in Shanghai. He testified before the U.S. Congress on Islamist Militant Threats to Central Asia in February 2013.

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 10!

CHINA AND AFGHANISTAN – TIME OF DECISION Richard Weitz

President Barack Obama’s recent characterization of China as a global free rider certainly applies in Afghanistan. Although China has declined to join the NATO- led International Security Force in Afghanistan or even allow its members to use Chinese territory to supply their forces in Afghanistan, Chinese firms have been benefiting from the massive economic and security contributions of other countries to Afghanistan. But that time is ending and China and the West need to strike a new and more balanced bargain there. Chinese alarm about Afghanistan is rising as U.S. concerns and commitments are declining.

BACKGROUND: China has industry. The country is thought to important though not critical economic have unexplored or underdeveloped and security interests related to reserves of oil, natural gas, iron, gold, Afghanistan. China’s current interests copper, and other raw materials that in Afghanistan focus on security issues, China imports in abundance. Although particularly how developments in Chinese firms have yet to develop Afghanistan could promote instability many of these projects due to security, in the neighboring countries of Central logistical, legal, and other challenges, as Asia, Pakistan, and China itself, well as the availability of cheaper and especially its western province of more reliable alternative sources for Xinjiang. There are also lingering these goods, an improved security concerns regarding what the U.S. might environment in Afghanistan or a do in the region. Although the Western decrease in the reliability of alternative military presence in Eurasia is supplies could induce China to build on declining, Sino-American security ties its strong position. are worsening, leaving some Chinese analysts concerned about whether the Pentagon might try to keep some enduring U.S. military presence in China’s strategic rear. In the longer-term, China’s economic interests in Afghanistan could grow (Source: Office of the President, Afghanistan) more important than its security concerns. Through several major deals, By acquiring these goods from Chinese companies have rapidly Afghanistan and other western become the leading foreign investors in countries along the proposed new Afghanistan’s natural resource Economic Silk Road Belt, China could ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 11! further diversify its source of imports and natural-resourced dependent away from more distant world regions, economies. whose products are transported to IMPLICATIONS: The growth of China along lengthy ocean shipping the Islamic State and its direct threats routes vulnerable to pirates, foreign to China’s economic presence in the navies, and other interruptions. Middle East and the loyalty of China’s Chinese policy makers consider these Muslim minority have reinforced land-based import routes especially Beijing’s fears. Furthermore, Afghan- valuable since they do not come from related insecurity would discourage the the volatile Middle East or arrive via economic investment needed to develop vulnerable maritime routes. Importing and disrupt oil and natural gas flows materials from Afghanistan and from and through Central Asian neighboring regions further permits countries into China. PRC analysts can Beijing to pursue a more geographically hope that building their new Silk Road balanced process of internal economic belt through two routes that development since it facilitates circumvent Afghanistan, proceeding commercial activities in China’s from Xinjiang northwestward through western provinces. Trade with Central Asia and southwestward from Afghanistan also promotes the Xinjiang through Pakistan to Iran and economic growth of Pakistan and the the Persian Gulf will solve the problem. Central Asian republics, two other But they recognize that, if uncontained, regions that have received considerable severe instability in Afghanistan could Chinese direct investment in recent impede progress along both routes. years, and which Chinese strategists arguably see as more important than PRC policy makers naturally wish to Afghanistan. maintain their low profile in Afghanistan and limit their economic The continued growth in regional and security assistance to the Afghan terrorism and instability emanating and Pakistani governments, from Afghanistan threaten China’s encouraging them to rely on Western regional security and economic aid instead, but such an option will interests. The reestablishment of probably not be available given the terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan declining Western role in this region. could make it easier for foreign They are now considering various terrorists to operate in Xinjiang or options for promoting a favorable elsewhere on Chinese territory. Since economic and security environment in the advent of the Arab Afghanistan even with reduced Spring, PRC officials and academics Western economic and military have worried that the political disorders assistance. in the Muslim Middle East could spread to Central Asia and Afghanistan China’s preferred solution is that the since the regimes in these regions share international community would important similarities in terms of collectively support Afghanistan’s political systems, religious affiliation, security and economic reconstruction. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 12!

This scenario would establish a more much improved cooperation regarding favorable environment for PRC Afghanistan are small. investment in Afghanistan (an option At best, Western governments might Beijing is eager to exploit), reduce some be able to induce Chinese agencies to sources of regional terrorism and provide more training of Afghans in narcotics trafficking, and facilitate use various technical skills helpful for the of Afghanistan’s territory as part of the country’s economic recovery. The PRC Afghan-Pakistan-Central Asian “Silk also has the capability, even if it does Road” connecting China’s trade and not want to send its own military investment with the rest of Eurasia and policy to Afghanistan, to train more Europe beyond. Chinese policy makers Afghan police forces, an area where the would prefer that the Taliban have as EU has encountered difficulty. China little influence as possible in might also want to join Russia and Afghanistan, but if the Taliban again other countries in helping train and becomes an influential actor in that equip Afghan counter-narcotics country, then Beijing will likely rely on personnel given the PRC concern about their Pakistani contacts to influence the Afghan-origin narcotics entering their Taliban to respect PRC investment in country. Afghanistan and not support Uighur or other anti-Beijing terrorism. The PRC China’s policy toward Afghanistan might rely on the SCO to bolster cannot be considered in isolation. It regional security and containment must be placed in context by looking at against the further spread of militant the domestic, regional, and global Islam in Central Asia, but would prefer context. For example, the two countries to share that burden with NATO as might cooperate better in multilateral well as Russia. institutions, especially on economic issues, rather than bilaterally on The opportunities for cooperation security issues. In addition, China and between China and the U.S. are the U.S. could find it easier to limited. China will not substitute for collaborate on Pakistan or overlapping the decreasing Western economic and Afghan-Pak issues rather than on military support for Afghanistan in any Afghanistan alone. Their security comprehensive way. Thus far, Chinese stakes are potentially higher in policy makers consider their stakes in Pakistan, better aligned, and both Afghanistan modest and perceive the countries share the frustration of dangers of adopting a much higher lacking success in influencing profile in that country as exceeding the Pakistan’s broad policies. possible benefits. CONCLUSIONS: It is imperative Given China’s limited stakes in to avoid mirror imaging. Chinese and Afghanistan and the many obstacles to U.S. views and interests regarding Sino-American and China-NATO Afghanistan differ in important security cooperation, opportunities for respects, even though threat assessments are aligning more closely. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 13!

Chinese analysts have traditionally held less alarmist threat assessments than the U.S. and other countries that have sent their combat forces to the country and considered Afghanistan the main battlefield for the war on terror or the future of NATO. But Chinese alarm about Afghanistan is rising, due to the growth of terrorism in and near China and the NATO military drawdown, as U.S. concerns and commitments are declining. Nonetheless, several factors will make Sino-American cooperation especially difficult in the next few years. In particular, Chinese policy makers see the U.S. as weak and withdrawing from Afghanistan. This makes them think that Washington is trying to trap them into pulling U.S. chestnuts out of the fire and, conversely, that they do not need to pay much heed to U.S. views due to its declining capacity and interest in the region. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 14!

CAUCASUS EMIRATE SUFFERS HIGHER CASUALTIES UNDER NEW LEADERSHIP Huseyn Aliyev

The recent change of leadership in the North Caucasus’ Islamist insurgency – the Caucasus Emirate – after Doku Umarov’s death appears to have weakened the insurgents’ ability to launch an effective spring/summer offensive on the ground. Recent reports on the number of conflict-related deaths in the region suggest that since the end of Umarov’s leadership, the Caucasus Emirate is more fragmented and militarily weaker than ever. Amidst the failures of the insurgents to successfully target government forces and the controversial claims by the new leader of the Caucasus Emirate to refrain from suicide bombings and attacks on civilians, local jama’ats (insurgent groups) began re-grouping and posing a challenge to the Emirate’s central leadership.

BACKGROUND: The end of the Second Chechen War and the spread of harsh winter months across the North a low-level Islamist insurgency – under Caucasus traditionally signals the start the command of the Caucasus Emirate of a spring/summer offensive, marked from 2007 – across the North Caucasus, by an increase in the number of the region saw the highest levels of insurgent attacks on government recorded insurgency-related violence in installations and personnel across the the late spring and summer months region. (from May to September). The melting of snow in the mountain passes and the appearance of foliage provide cover for insurgents in the mountains. But warmer weather also produce other advantages of, such as better logistics. For years, these conditions have allowed for a doubling of insurgent attacks across Dagestan, (Source: YouTube) Ingushetia, Chechnya and the rest of Peaks in the number of incidents and the region, as well as occasionally in casualties as a result of the armed other parts of the Russian Federation. insurgency usually occur from the However, the spring and summer of beginning of spring and continue until 2014 show a complete reversal of this late summer. Ever since the end of trend. large-scale military operations in the ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 15!

The death of the Caucasus Emirate’s of law enforcement agencies and 12 (25 founder and a self-proclaimed leader in 2013) civilians. This data shows that Umarov in late 2013 resulted in the not only has the Caucasus Emirate selection on March 18 of the Emirate’s suffered significantly higher losses new amir (head): the Dagestani these spring-summer months than militant leader Ali-Askhab Kebekov during the same period last year, but (aka Abu Muhammad). the militants were also able to cause In a bid to legitimize his authority fairly limited casualties to the among the militants and to improve the counterinsurgent forces. image of the organization among the The increase in numbers of militant local population, Kebekov denounced casualties follows a reduction in civilian violence against civilians and casualties – promised by the leader of recommended militants to focus their the Caucasus Emirate – as compared to efforts entirely on targeting previous periods. However, the record- government and federal law low numbers of conflict-related enforcement and military personnel. causalities in the North Caucasus The video message was circulated on region demonstrate the militants’ Jihadist websites and posted on failure to launch the traditional YouTube in June. He also officially spring/summer offensive against their forbade the use of female suicide favorite targets – members of local law bombers and the employment of enforcement agencies, local police and females in military operations. This federal troops. In fact, this data on was Kebekov’s only public appearance conflict-related casualties during the since he assumed leadership of the spring-summer of 2014 is not Emirate. significantly different from the data on IMPLICATIONS: The beginning of conflict-related victims during the spring season in the North Caucasus, winter months (February to March), which roughly coincided with the when the level of fighting is usually announcement of Kebekov as the new low. In 2014, only 84 people were killed leader of the Caucasus Emirate, and 49 sustained injuries. however, did not result in the It is noteworthy that the highest traditional spring/summer offensive. number of deaths among the militants According to the reports compiled by (39 people) and civilians (11 people) the independent news agency Caucasus occurred in Dagestan – Kebekov’s Knot, 146 (96 dead and 50 injured) native republic – where only five law people became victims to the armed enforcement personnel were killed conflict in the North Caucasus from during the spring and summer months April 1 to the end of July 2014, of 2014. In that republic, despite the compared to 296 (118 dead and 178 militants’ desperate attempts, the injured) casualties in 2013. Among 96 majority of insurgent attacks on deaths, 71 (59 in 2013) were members of government personnel and facilities militant groups, 13 (34 in 2013) members resulted in fiasco. For instance, a bold ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 16! militant attack on the Center for support granted by Chechen jama’ats to Combating Extremism on August 1, the Caucasus Emirate’s central involving militants firing rocket- command under the Dagestani native propelled grenades at the building, Kebekov appears to be unshaken, the resulted in no casualties among the meeting demonstrates the tendency Center’s employees. among Chechen commanders to seek While the militant activities remained stronger leadership among ethnic fairly low in Ingushetia, causing few Chechens, as provided by Amir casualties among both militants and Tarkhan. counterinsurgents, Kabardino- CONCLUSIONS: For the first time Balkaria’s militants lost 18 of their since its creation, the Caucasus Emirate members this spring and summer while appears to be in decline militarily. The managing to kill only one member of militants’ failure to launch a the security forces. The activity of spring/summer offensive as in previous Chechen militants was similarly low, years reflects not only the weakening of causing only 14 casualties to law the organization’s central command but enforcement agencies as compared to also signals the decline of local militant the spring/summer of 2013, when 27 jama’ats. Moreover, the local level members of the security forces were networking and regrouping, as seen killed or injured. during the meeting of Chechen militant The failure of the spring/summer commanders this July, are the first offensive coincided with a meeting of signs of de-centralization of the the Chechen militant commanders in Emirate’s leadership. The appearance of July, which was the first of its kind local centers of power, which may pose since 2011. The formal pretext for the a challenge to the integrity of the meeting was to pledge their allegiance Emirate. The data on conflict-related to the Caucasus Emirate’s new leader, casualties presented in this article which many of those present at the suggests that even in Dagestan, the meeting had already done. long-time hotbed of the North Nevertheless, it appears that Amir Caucasus insurgency and the power Tarkhan, one of the most influential of base of its current leader, militants have the few high-ranking Chechen militant for the first time in many years begun commanders still alive, used the to lose ground. Provided that the meeting to strengthen his position militants, particularly in Dagestan, fail within the Chechen militant ranks. to reverse the tide before the start of winter season (early October), a further The very occurrence of the meeting, weakening and ensuing de- attended by the majority of existing centralization of the Caucasus Emirate Chechen commanders on Chechen are likely to follow. territory, is unique owing to the high level of counterinsurgency activity in AUTHORS’ BIO: Huseyn Aliyev that republic, posing extreme security has recently completed his Ph.D. in risks to the participants. While the Politics at the University of Otago, ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 17!

New Zealand. His recent articles appeared in the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Demokratizatsiya and Ethnopolitics Papers.

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 18!

MIXED RECEPTION OF SOCHI TALKS IN AZERBAIJAN Mina Muradova

The Sochi talks on settlement of the headed toward the frontline have Nagorno-Karabakh conflict initiated by spread in social networks. President Valdimir Putin has not met Controversial information about the hopes of many for a serious and deadly clashes gave rise to breakthrough in peace negotiations. aggressive rhetoric from both sides, The meeting reached only its even in the virtual world. On Facebook, immediate aim – a decrease in deadly a number of Azerbaijani users called on skirmishes on the line of contact the authorities to show “all our military between Armenian and Azerbaijani power to Armenian side.” One Baku troops, which resulted in the deaths of resident posted: “Now it is time to at least 20 soldiers in early August. demonstrate all our military power. Many in Baku believe that the clashes Our military aircraft have to destroy all were provoked by Moscow to justify its territories along the line of contact, influential position in the region. where the ceasefire was constantly According to Yerevan, the fighting was violated in order to demonstrate a result of repeated small-scale Armenians how serious we are….” Azerbaijani attacks to which Armenia Before President Ilham Aliyev left for responded. Baku for its part said that Sochi, around 60 tweets threatening Azerbaijani troops forcibly prevented Armenia were posted via his official provocations by “Armenian sabotage account. “We will restore our groups.” sovereignty. The of Azerbaijan will The recent clashes were the gravest fly in all the occupied territories, since the 1994 ceasefire agreement was including Shusha and Khankandi [in signed between the two sides with Nagorno-Karabakh],” he wrote. “Just mediation of the Kremlin. as we have beaten the Armenians on the political and economic fronts, we “The nature of the clashes is totally are able to defeat them on the unprecedented,” said Lawrence Sheets, battlefield”. a Caucasus analyst told Bloomberg. “What has changed is that over the past Although Azerbaijan seems to the side weeks, we have seen the first instances that is most interested in changing the of the use of high-caliber weapons, not status-quo in the conflict, many in just small arms as had previously often Baku believe that Armenia, a strategic been the case. The verbal threats have ally of Russia in the South Caucasus, also hit an unprecedented peak.” provoked clashes at the behest of the Kremlin. The theory is that Moscow Over past weeks, images of military wanted to use the situation in order to vehicles and equipment most likely change of Vladimir Putin’s image from ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 19! an intriguer and aggressor to a will stir international mediators into peacemaker in the region. action,” he said. “Azerbaijan wants Vafa Guluzade, a former state advisor peace, the neither war nor peace on foreign policy, said that Putin situation can’t last forever.” wanted to show that “Russia still plays Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei a decisive role in the South Caucasus,” Lavrov told reporters that the talks and therefore, Putin called for a summit with Aliyev and Sargsyan, were on August 10 with his Azerbaijani and “useful,” with both presidents Armenian counterparts in order to reaffirming their commitment to show the world his “peaceful, seeking a solution exclusively on the mediating face.” basis of a peaceful approach. “There are Guluzade also noted in an interview to only few uncoordinated aspects of the Interfax that the Kremlin tried to force conflict settlement, the overwhelming Azerbaijan to join the Moscow-led majority of agreements are already Customs Union, an economic entity clear.” According to Lavrov, several specific points will be finalized: “As that Azerbaijani officials have declined to join. “The meeting with Putin’s they say, the devil is in the details, and mediation was organized just for show, the most complex issues are not solved demonstrating that Russia is a key actor yet.” in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh After Sochi, the rhetoric coming from problem … Russia tried to compel Baku and Yerevan became even louder. Azerbaijan, up to the last moment, to Sargsyan stated that his country had join the Customs Union. But missiles with a 300-km-radius, which Azerbaijan today is a confident and could turn Azerbaijani towns into military strong country, so it gave no “Aghdam” referring to the ruined result,” Guluzade added. Azerbaijani city under Armenian While the presidents were watching a control. Aliyev stated on August 30 that sambo tournament in Sochi following “…The position of Azerbaijan in Sochi the trilateral meeting, Armenian and sounded even stronger, thanks to the Azerbaijani troops continued breaching courage of the heroic Azerbaijani the ceasefire agreement and taking soldiers and officers and the enemy was hostages. dealt a devastating blow that they still can’t get over … Of course, Azerbaijan After the summit, President Aliyev and the Azerbaijani army is strong, and said “We discussed the settlement of heroic Azerbaijani soldiers are a the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in constant source of fear for them.” Karabakh which has been going on for too long and needs to be resolved.” The According to Lawrence Sheets, “With president stressed that the main all the current violent upheavals in the mission of the international mediators world, from Ukraine to Iraq and was to settle the conflict, not to freeze beyond, unfortunately some are not it or strengthen the confidence-building taking the current major escalation process. “I believe that the latest events between Azerbaijan and Armenia ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 20! seriously enough … This is a war, and we are now only a step away from any of the sides deciding to resort to the use of highly destructive and sophisticated missile systems they have acquired, capable of causing massive casualties and destruction.” The U.S. called on Yerevan and Baku to take steps in order to reduce tensions and respect the ceasefire. U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Heffern delivered a video message stressing that threats and militant rhetoric will not help resolve any conflict. Heffern repeated that there can be no military solution to the Karabakh conflict and called on the parties to start talks, since revenge and further escalation will make it difficult to achieve peace. “The best way to honor the memory of those killed is to stop clashes right now,” - he noted.

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 21!

ABKHAZIA’S NEW LEADER INSISTS ON DEEPER TIES WITH MOSCOW Eka Janashia

On August 27, Abkhazia’s newly Khajimba-led ultra-nationalists blamed elected president Raul Khajimba met Ankvab for deliberately distributing with Russian President Vladimir Putin “Abkhaz passports” to ethnic to discuss the possibility of signing a Georgians in efforts to secure their comprehensive cooperation treaty support. Khajimba insisted that between Moscow and Sokhumi. districts predominantly populated by The meeting took place three days after ethnic Georgians were a menace to the snap presidential elections on “Abkhaz statehood.” Such rhetoric August 24, when Khajimba eventually proved effective both in ousting became Abkhazia’s de facto leader after Ankvab and in preventing a sizeable three failed attempts since 2004. His part of the region’s population from predecessor Alexander Ankvab stepped casting ballots. down on July 1 in response to street Whereas the EU, NATO, and the U.S. protests by Khajimba-led opposition Department of State condemned groups in late May, 2014. breakaway Abkhazia’s presidential Khajimba was able to oust Ankvab and elections, Putin was quick to narrowly avoided a runoff by gaining congratulate Khajimba on the election 50.57 percent of the votes. The former victory and restated his readiness to head of the state security service Aslan buttress “friendly” relations with Bzhania was second with 35.91 percent, Abkhazia. followed by former defense minister Khajimba has been the Kremlin’s Merab Kishmaria and former interior favorite candidate for almost a decade. minister Leonid Dzapshba with 6.4 and In the mid-1980s he graduated from 3.4 percent respectively. Minsk’s KGB academy and served at Before the elections, Abkhazia’s Tkvarcheli’s KBG unit in Abkhazia parliament declared the “Abkhaz until 1992. Moscow actively promoted passports” held by most ethnic Khajimba during the 2004 presidential Georgians residing in the region illegal, elections, where he was nevertheless preventing 16,411 residents of Gali, 5,504 defeated by Sergey Bagapsh. To eschew of Tkvarcheli and 872 of Ochamchire an anticipated political crisis, Khajimba districts from participating in the took the post of vice president with elections (see the 06/18/2014 issue of direct support from the Kremlin. In the the CACI Analyst). 2009 elections, Bagapsh repeated his success while Khajimba scored only 15.4 Reportedly, one of key reasons for percent of the votes. Finally, Ankvab Ankvab’s departure was controversy gained a landslide victory over over the “passportization” issue. Khajimba in the 2011 polls. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 22!

Khajimba eventually became the number of voters who would Abkhazia’s new leader after the oppose Abkhazia’s accession to Russia. political standoff in May, and almost These local changes mirror the regional immediately declared the need for convulsions triggered by Russia’s signing a comprehensive cooperation annexation of Crimea and its military treaty between Moscow and Sokhumi escalation in eastern Ukraine. In this in order to elevate bilateral cooperation broader spotlight, regime change in to a substantially new level and ensure Abkhazia might imply a tactical move “clearer” security guarantees for on Moscow’s part to prepare the ground “Abkhazia’s independence.” for a complete absorption of the region According to Khajimba, one aspect of or at least to gain additional levers the treaty could be the establishment of there. In Moscow’s perspective, joint command over Abkhaz forces and bringing Khajimba to power in Russian military bases in Abkhazia. Abkhazia will imply fewer risks of “The new document should take into unexpected clashes and weaker consideration those difficulties which objections to the region’s direct Abkhazia and Russia now face on the integration with Russia. Unlike in international arena, which exist in South Ossetia, independence is a relationship with Georgia, Europe and critical issue for large parts of the the United States,” he said. Abkhaz population, which pushes the This statement reflects several political Kremlin to proceed more cautiously. shifts taking place locally as well as The Kremlin’s success, however, hinges regionally. Locally in Abkhazia, the on its ability to maintain at least its results of the recent elections should be status of a regional power in Eurasian perceived as a long-expected victory of geopolitics. a Kremlin favorite who, unlike previous leaders, will be more amenable to the Kremlin’s interests. In early May 2014, the Ankvab-led government strongly condemned the proposition for a formal association with Russia aired by the head of the International Association of the Abkhaz-Abazin People, Professor Taras Shamba. Abkhazia’s foreign ministry claimed that such a move would rid Abkhazia of the “signs of an independent state.” What happened next was the overthrow of Ankvab’s government and the political deactivation of ethnic Georgians, which considerably limits ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 23!

BORDER DISPUTE AT THE CENTER OF TAJIK-KYRGYZ MEETING Oleg Salimov

The governments of Tajikistan and bilateral cooperation. As reported by Kyrgyzstan reported significant the Kyrgyz government, the border progress in consultations on border dispute delegations of Tajikistan and demarcation and delimitation during Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement on their recent meeting in Bishkek. They the simultaneous construction of a road also announced that an agreement was and two bridges, which will connect the reached on economic, social, and other Tajik enclave Vorukh on Kyrgyz forms of cooperation intended to territory with Tajikistan. The stimulate neighborly and mutually agreement includes provisions on beneficial relationships. At the same relocating border patrol stations and time, people living in the border regions establishing favorable conditions for of both countries continue to engage in timely construction. The delegations violent clashes and shootouts. A endorsed a proposal from the joint peaceful resolution of the conflict over investigative committee for impartial long-disputed territory will test the examination of all border-related political maturity of these Central incidents taking place since January Asian republics. The outcome of this 2014 in the disputed territory. The sides conflict can predetermine the future exchanged maps with layouts of the development and stability of the region. border and agreed to intensify the The last week of August was marked process of delimitation and by multiple meetings between various demarcation. committees, delegations, and officials The session of the Tajik – Kyrgyz from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in intergovernmental committee proved to Bishkek. The topics of discussion be the most productive among these revolved around border issues, meetings. The committee devoted a economic cooperation, and socio- significant amount of time to cultural exchange and assistance. The discussing issues relating to electric border dispute delegations met on energy. Thus, agreements were reached August 26, the Tajik – Kyrgyz on mutual assistance in emergency intergovernmental committee had its situations in the countries’ electric session on August 27-28, and systems, possible transit of Tajik Kyrgyzstan’s Prime Minister Joomart electricity to Kazakhstan through Otorbayev met Tajikistan’s Deputy Kyrgyzstan in 2015, and continued Prime Minister Azim Ibrohim on efforts to realize the “CASA – 1000” August 28. project. This project foresees the The sides discussed the border problem expansion of electric energy trade in and numerous proposals for increasing Central Asia and South Asia with ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 24!

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan exporting enclave Sarvak. Besides recent tensions up to 1000 megawatt of electric energy in the Vorukh, Kyrgyzstan experiences to Pakistan and Afghanistan for up to 15 frequent conflicts in the Uzbek Sokh years. However, as of June 2013, the enclave. The most recent took place in project’s main investor, the Asian spring 2013 when a Kyrgyz border Development Bank, withdrew from the patrol was taken hostage by Sokh project that must be completed in 2017, residents. citing political instability in While Tajik and Kyrgyz officials were Afghanistan. While Russia, the World meeting in Bishkek, the situation on Bank, and the Islamic Development the border remained highly volatile. On Bank expressed their interest, the August 25, right before the Tajik prospects of the project remain unclear. delegation arrived in Kyrgyzstan, five The other resolutions of the committee Tajiks were wounded when included water allocation, facilitation of confronting Kyrgyz authorities on the transit impediments, educational border of Tajikistan’s Sughd province, exchange, and cooperation in increasing the casualties in the healthcare, culture, and art. territorial dispute. Still, Tajikistan and Finally, the meeting between Kyrgyzstan are ought to find a Otorbayev and Ibrohim was mainly compromise and overcome the existing dedicated to the problem of disagreements on borderlines. The demarcation and delimitation of the observed, during the last official border between the two countries. meetings, employment of such factors Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan organized as mutual economic dependency, an intergovernmental committee on membership in the same regional resolving border disputes in 2001. Out organizations such as SCO and CSTO, of 971 kilometers of the border, around and common cultural and historic 500 are disputed. The lack of heritage indicate the willingness of compromise is compounded by the both players to prioritize long-term differences in interpretation of Soviet benefits of peaceful coexistence over era maps and Soviet officials’ questionable short-term territorial motivations during Central Asia gains. territorial delimitation in 1924. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have simultaneous border disputes with Uzbekistan. All three have enclaves populated by ethnic minorities in the Fergana Valley where their borders connect and interlock. Two Tajik enclaves, Vorukh and Chorku, and two Uzbek enclaves, Sokh and Shakhimardan, are located in Kyrgyzstan, whereas Uzbekistan has the Kyrgyz enclave Barak and the Tajik ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 25!

TURKMENISTAN’S GOVERNMENT CALLS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM Tavus Rejepova

During the first session of the constitutional reform has gained wide Commission on Improvement of the support among the population. Constitution of Turkmenistan on Nurberdiyeva pledged that the August 6, President Berdimuhamedov Members of Parliament will hold stated a need to amend and introduce meetings and seminars to solicit public new articles to the country’s opinion on the constitutional reform. constitution. “With the development of market Speaking during the session, the economic relations and private Democratic Party of Turkmenistan’s entrepreneurship, there is a growing chairman Kasymguly Babayev noted necessity to improve issues of that a constitutional reform is a ownership and property relations to “historical necessity” and assured that bring them up to modern methods and the members of his party will run a full standards,” Nurberdiyeva said. scale public awareness campaign on the President Berdimuhamedov noted that issue. the Constitution, adopted in 1992, has The last time Turkmenistan’s successfully passed the test of time and constitution was amended under the that the deep socio-economic current administration was in transformations or changes the September of 2008, when Turkmen nation is undergoing over the Turkmenistan’s 2,500 member course of the latest years need to be legislative body, the Khalk Maslahaty written down and regulated by law. (people’s council), was abolished and its “The new articles in the Constitution powers were transferred to the will not only reflect today’s political, president and the Mejlis (parliament). economic and social issues, but also In addition, amendments were made to address the directions of the near and reflect the country’s commitment to distant future,” said the president. He market economic principles, various called for a need to bring the types of property ownership and Constitution up to contemporary world principles of democratic development. standards and noted that the upcoming constitutional reforms are aimed at In May 2014, President step-by-step development of socio- Berdimuhamedov signed a decree “On political relations and drawing clear establishment of the Constitutional lines among the legislative, judicial and Commission and its composition for executive branches of the government. improvement of the Constitution.” The Mejlis Speaker Akja Nurberdiyeva said The Mejlis will be the main state body the creation of this commission on responsible for organizational issues ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!03!September!2014! 26! and necessary documents in connection Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its with the upcoming constitutional International Relations Institute, and reform. The President suggested that the Turkmen National Institute for the Parliament creates two inter-sector Democracy and Human Rights under committees. The first committee, to be the President of Turkmenistan, were established by the Mejlis’ decree will tasked to study whether the upcoming receive, study and categorize the public constitutional amendments meet the recommendations to the Constitutional UN Human Rights Conventions to Reform Committee on improving the which Turkmenistan is a signatory, and constitution. While the draft reforms also suggested that these agencies raise are being prepared, the second the public awareness of the committee or Mejlis Working Group constitutional reform abroad. will consist of scientists, Deputy Chairmen in the oil and gas representatives of ministries, public sector, trade and economy were told to organizations, and experts and will do a create special working groups that will political, legal evaluation on the draft study the public input related to their project. The president mentioned that respective portfolios. Deputy Chairman the deep meaning and purposes of the Annamuhammet Gochyev covering constitutional reform should be economy and finance will provide explained to the public. financial support for conducting the Though the government has not constitutional reform and also prepare a released any timeline for the suggested proposal for the President’s constitutional reform, some sources consideration on any possible additions claim it will be completed sometime to the constitutional amendments close to the session of Yashulylar deriving from the economy, banking Maslahaty (Council of Elders) and finance sectors. scheduled for October 20, 2014. Once The president also recommended the reforms are prepared, the draft seeking the expert views of the local constitution will be published in all offices of international organizations state newspapers and internet websites on the new constitution draft. Satlyk for public discussion and input. Maysa Satlykov, the Deputy Chairman of the Yazmuhamedova, Deputy Cabinet of Ministers who covers the Chairwoman of the Cabinet of transportation and communications Ministers of Turkmenistan covering sectors in the government, was tasked culture, TV, and the press was tasked to make Internet communication to raise the public awareness through widely accessible in receiving public mass media in ways easily opinion on the draft constitution and understandable to the public. Deputy Chairman Sapardurdy Toylyev President Berdimuhamedov also gave was tasked with seeking the input of specific directives to various ministries the scholarly community. in support of the upcoming constitutional reform. Turkmenistan’s