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Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress

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OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS APRIL 1, 2019‒JUNE 30, 2019 ABOUT THIS REPORT In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on designated overseas contingency operations. The DoD Inspector General (IG) has been designated as the Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The DoS IG is the Associate IG for OIR. The USAID IG participates in oversight for the operation. The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OIR. The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions related to these oversight contingency operations to: • Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over the contingency operation. • Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations. • Report quarterly and biannually to Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies. METHODOLOGY To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from their agencies and open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. DoD, DoS, and USAID officials also provide written responses to quarterly requests for information from Lead IG agencies. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, or evaluations mentioned or referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited all the data and information provided by the agencies. For details of the methodology for this report, see Appendix B. CLASSIFIED APPENDIX This report also includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Lead IG provides the classified appendix separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees. FOREWORD We are pleased to submit this Lead Inspector General quarterly report on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to the Inspector General Act. The United States launched OIR in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and to set the conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability. The strategy to defeat ISIS includes military operations, as well as support for local security forces, diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization programs. In response to the ISIS threat, the United States and Coalition partners began training, advising, and assisting Iraqi and Syrian partner forces. In December 2017, the Iraqi government declared ISIS defeated in Iraq after the terrorist organization lost its final stronghold in the city of Mosul. In March 2019, ISIS lost its final territorial hold in Syria’s Middle Euphrates River Valley, bringing an end to the group’s physical “caliphate” in both Iraq and Syria. Despite the loss of physical territory, thousands of ISIS fighters remain in Iraq and Syria and are carrying out attacks and working to rebuild their capabilities. This report’s Quarter in Review section includes an overview of the major developments and strength and capabilities of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The country-specific sections explore the status of the conflict, actions conducted against ISIS, the role of third parties, capacity building of partner forces, diplomacy and political developments, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance. The support to mission section describes funding and staffing of OIR. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of the Inspector General and our partner oversight agencies during the period from April 1, 2019, through June 30, 2019. Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on this contingency operation. Glenn A. Fine Steve A. Linick Ann Calvaresi Barr Principal Deputy Inspector General Inspector General Inspector General Performing the Duties U.S. Department of State U.S. Agency for International of the Inspector General Development U.S. Department of Defense On the Cover (Top row): Spanish soldiers fire a machine gun during a training exercise in Iraq (U.S. Army photo); A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon refuels (U.S. Air Force photo); A Syrian mother and her children walk down the streets of their neighborhood (U.S. Army photo). (Bottom): Iraqi soldiers move through a smokescreen that provides cover during an assault exercise (U.S. Army photo). MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL I am pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on the status of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). This is the 18th report on OIR summarizing the quarter’s events and describing Lead IG and partner agency oversight work relating to OIR. It also includes a classified appendix that is made available to relevant congressional and government agencies. ISIS remains a threat in Iraq and Syria. This quarter, ISIS continued its transition from a territory– holding force to an insurgency in Syria, and it intensified its insurgency in Iraq. According to the Combined Joint Task Force-OIR (CJTF-OIR), ISIS carried out assassinations, suicide attacks, abductions, and arson of crops in both Iraq and Syria. During the quarter, CJTF-OIR completed the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria. According to CJTF-OIR, the reduction of U.S. forces has decreased the support available for Syrian partner forces at a time when their forces need more training and equipping to respond to the ISIS resurgence. CJTF-OIR also said that the drawdown could cause U.S.-backed forces in Syria to look for “alternate partnerships and resources” to replace the reduced U.S. support, and that in its assessment such an outcome could be “detrimental to the United States’ mission in Iraq Glenn A. Fine and Syria.” CJTF-OIR also reported that ISIS has established “resurgent cells” in areas controlled by Syrian partner forces. While Syrian forces carried out clearance operations in northeastern Syria to eliminate these cells, CJTF-OIR reported that U.S.-backed Syrian forces also have limited capacity to hold liberated areas. U.S. Central Command reported that ISIS is also active in al Hol, a sprawling internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in northeastern Syria where thousands of ISIS family members now reside, and ISIS is likely working to enlist new members from the camp’s large population of IDPs. The Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that ongoing lawlessness and violence in Syria are preventing IDPs from returning home and hindering the work of humanitarian organizations who are trying to provide assistance. In Iraq, CJTF-OIR reported that despite improving capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), ISIS is rebuilding in remote territory, which is hard for Iraqi forces to secure. Furthermore, CJTF-OIR reported that Iraq lacks hold forces capable of maintaining security in areas cleared of ISIS. USAID-funded organizations also reported that hundreds of thousands of IDPs do not want to return home in Iraq due to concerns about security and the lack of services and economic opportunity. In the wake of reports of increased threats from Iran, in May the DoS ordered the departure of non-emergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy and the Diplomatic Support Center in Baghdad and from the U.S. Consulate in Erbil. The DoS reported to the DoS OIG that the departure of staff “eroded” the ability of the Embassy and the Consulate General to carry out stabilization activities in Iraq. This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners issued 10 oversight reports related to OIR, examining various topics such as combatting trafficking in persons, countering violent extremism programs and projects, and contract management and accountability in overseas contingency operations. Lead IG investigations resulted in one contractor debarment. As of June 30, 2019, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners had 24 ongoing and 11 planned oversight projects, and 124 open investigations related to OIR. My colleagues and I remain committed to providing quarterly reports on activities related to OIR. We thank the dedicated employees of each Lead IG agency who conduct this important work, both in the United States and abroad. Glenn A. Fine Principal Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense An Iraqi Federal Policeman clears rooms during a training exercise at the Besmaya Range Complex, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo) CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................2 THE QUARTER IN REVIEW .............................14 Major Developments ............................................ 14 Events in Syria .....................................................
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